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The  Senator  Gravel  Edition 


critical  assays 
Edited  by  Noam  Chomsky 

and  Howard  Zinn 
and  an  Index  to 
Volumes  One -Four 

VOLUME  FIVE 


Gravel  Edition  /  Pentagon  Papers  /  Volume  V 


The  Senator  Gravel  ELdition 

The  Pentagon  Papers 


Critical  Essays  Edited  by 

Noam  Chomsky  and  Howard  Zinn 

and  an  Index  to 
Volumes  One-Four 

Volume  V 


Beacon  Press  Boston 


The  essays  in  this  volume  are  copyright  ©  1972  by 
the  authors,  individually;  indices  and  glossary  are 
copyright  ©  1972  by  Beacon  Press. 
Library  of  Congress  catalog  card  number:  75-178049 
International  Standard  Book  Number:  0-8070-0522-3  (hardcover) 

0-8070-0523-1  (paperback) 
Beacon  Press  books  are  published  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Unitarian  Universalist  Association 

Published  simultaneously  in  Canada  by  Saunders  of  Toronto,  Ltd. 
All  rights  reserved 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


Contents  of  the  Gravel  Edition,  Volumes  I-IV 


VOLUME  I 

Introduction  by  U.S.  Senator  Mike  Gravel 
Letter  of  Transmittal  by  Leslie  H.  Gelb 

1.  Background  to  the  Conflict,  1940-1950 

2.  U.S.  Involvement  in  the  Franco-Viet  Minh  War,  1950-1954 

3.  The  Geneva  Conference,  May-July,  1954 

4.  U.S.  and  France  in  Indochina,  1950-1956 

5.  Origins  of  the  Insurgency  in  South  Vietnam,  1954-1960 

VOLUME  II 

1.  The  Kennedy  Commitments  and  Programs,  1961 

2.  The  Strategic  Hamlet  Program,  1961-1963 

3.  Phased  Withdrawal  of  U.S.  Forces,  1962-1964 

4.  The  Overthrow  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  May-November  1963 

5.  US-GVN  Relations,  1964-1967 

6.  The  Advisory  Build-up,  1961-1967 

7.  Re-emphasis  on  Pacification:  1965-1967 

VOLUME  III 

1.  U.S.  Programs  in  South  Vietnam,  November  1963-April  1965 

2.  Military  Pressures  Against  North  Vietnam,  February  1964-January  1965 

3.  The  Air  War  in  North  Vietnam:  Rolling  Thunder  Begins,  February-June,  1965 

4.  American  Troops  Enter  the  Ground  War,  March-July,  1965 

VOLUME  IV 

1.  The  Air  War  in  North  Vietnam,  1965-1968 

2.  U.S.  Ground  Strategy  and  Force  Deployments,  1965-1968 

[At  the  end  of  each  volume  is  a  collection  of  documents,  a  section  entitled 
"Justification  of  the  War — Public  Statements,"  and  a  Glossary] 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2013 


http://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersde04beac 


Contents  of  Volume  V 


Editors'  Preface  ix 

Notes  on  the  Contributors  xi 

1.  The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  by  Gabriel  Kolko  1 

2.  Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy:  The  National 
Security  Council  and  Vietnam  by  Richard  B.  Du  Boff  16 

3.  A  Vietnamese  Viewpoint  by  Truong  Buu  Lam  32 

4.  The  Media  and  the  Message  by  James  Aronson  41 

5.  The  Receiving  End  by  Wilfred  Burchett  60 

6.  Ideology  and  Society:  The  Pentagon  Papers  and 

North  Vietnam  by  Gerard  Chaliand  82 

7.  "Tell  Your  Friends  that  We're  People"  by  Don  Luce  91 

8.  The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia:  Japan  in  and  out 

of  the  Pentagon  Papers  by  John  W.  Dower  101 

9.  The  Last  Line  of  Defense  by  Nina  S.  Adams  143 

10.  "Supporting"  the  French  in  Indochina?  by  Philippe 
Devillers  159 

1 1 .  The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History 

by  Noam  Chomsky  179 

12.  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  "Counterinsurgency":  1961- 

1964  by  David  G.  Marr  202 

13.  Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon 

Papers  by  Peter  Dale  Scott  21 1 


viii      Contents  of  Volume  V  .  ' 

14.  The  Pentagon  Papers  and  the  United  States 
Involvement  in  Laos  by  Walt  Haney  248 

15.  Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  The  Pathology  of 

Power  by  Fredric  Branfman  294 

A  Note  on  the  Three  Editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  314 
The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  320 

ik  ik  ik 

Appendix 

[The  indices  and  glossary  cover 
The  Senator  Gravel  Edition,  Volumes  I-IV.] 


Name  Index 
Subject  Index 
Glossary 


3 
21 
67 


ix 


Editors'  Preface 


The  documentary  history  of  American  policy  in  Vietnam  compiled  by  research- 
ers for  the  Department  of  Defense,  known  now  as  the  Pentagon  Papers,  became 
public  property  in  1971  against  the  wishes  of  the  United  States  government.  This 
seems  only  proper  when  we  consider  that  for  seven  years  this  government  has 
been  carrying  on  a  war  of  annihilation  in  Indochina  against  the  wishes  of  the 
people  there,  and  now  against  the  wishes  of  the  American  people,  too.  Those  who 
made  the  Pentagon  Papers  public  have  laid  out  for  general  scrutiny  the  story  of 
American  war  policy  and  have  exposed  the  coldness  of  mind,  the  meanness  of 
spirit,  behind  that  policy. 

As  a  sign  that  this  country,  born  with  thrilling  phrases  about  freedom,  has  not 
been  truly  free,  there  was  peril  for  those  who  informed  the  American  people  of 
the  decisions  that  sent  their  sons  to  war.  The  New  York  Times  was  brought  into 
court  by  the  government,  and  while  a  Supreme  Court  decision  saved  it  from  an 
injunction  to  prevent  publication,  the  possibility  of  later  prosecution  was  left 
open.  Such  prosecution  has  indeed  begun  of  Daniel  Ellsberg  and  Anthony  Russo. 
It  was  they  who  defied  the  doctrine  of  secrecy,  showing  that  true  patriotism  which 
asks  dedication  not  to  one's  government,  but  to  one's  country  and  countrymen. 

Beacon  Press,  not  nearly  so  wealthy  or  huge  an  enterprise  as  the  New  York 
Times,  had  the  audacity  to  print  the  bulk  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  those  which 
Senator  Mike  Gravel  had  in  his  possession  and  which  he  began  to  read  into  the 
record  one  dramatic  night  in  Washington  in  the  summer  of  1971.  Four  massive 
volumes  were  required  for  this:  a  mountain  of  information  for  scholars  and  citi- 
zens. The  volumes  contain  a  thousand  pages  of  documents,  three  thousand  pages 
of  narrative,  and  two  hundred  pages  of  public  statements  by  government  officials 
trying  to  explain  American  involvement  in  Vietnam. 

Those  of  us  who  began  to  explore  these  pages  soon  realized  that  something 
more  was  needed.  An  index,  of  course,  as  a  guide  through  the  mass  of  material; 
and  it  has  been  provided  here  in  this  volume.  But  even  more  important,  we  could 
not  leave  the  readers  of  the  four  volumes  with  the  commentary  of  the  Pentagon 
analysts  as  the  last  word.  These  analysts  were  all  people  who  were  working  for 
the  military  bureaucracy — hardly  independent  researchers.  Furthermore,  they 
were  operating  under  the  constraints  of  a  government  harassed  by  the  antiwar 
movement,  watching  the  growing  peace  sentiments  of  the  American  population, 
and  sensitive  to  any  possible  hint  of  criticism.  And  these  researchers  were  writ- 
ing their  report  for  one  of  the  engineers  of  the  war — Secretary  of  Defense 
Robert  McNamara. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  that  with  all  the  weight 
of  thousands  of  pages,  there  are  serious  omissions  in  the  story,  and  also  gross 
distortions.  "Lies  and  lacunae"  is  how  the  two  of  us  and  Arnold  Tovell  of  Beacon 
Press  summarized  the  insufficiency  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  as  we  discussed  them 
one  evening.  This  volume  of  essays  is  the  result  of  that  assessment. 

We  decided  to  ask  men  and  women  who  have  devoted  much  of  their  lives  to 
the  Indochina  war  during  these  past  years  to  read  through  the  four  volumes,  and 
to  comment  on  them.  All  the  people  we  asked  were  critics  of  the  war,  and  we 


X     Editors'  Preface 

feel  no  apologies  are  needed  for  this  deliberate  bias:  four  thousand  pages  from 
the  Department  of  Defense  are  enough  from  the  side  of  the  government.  As  the 
volumes  of  the  Gravel  edition  came  off  the  press,  we  flew  them  to  our  authors, 
in  New  Hampshire,  in  California,  in  Paris,  in  Washington,  D.C.,  and  many 
other  places — and  then  the  essays  began  coming  in. 

A  number  of  the  commentators  have  spent  years  in  Vietnam  or  Laos,  as  jour- 
nalists, as  scholars,  or  as  field  workers  in  the  countryside.  Others  have  written 
extensively  about  the  war  in  Vietnam  in  books  and  articles.  Most  of  the  writers 
are  Americans,  but  one  is  a  Vietnamese  and  several  are  French,  because  we 
wanted  to  include  the  viewpoint  of  these  people  who  have  felt  and  suffered  most 
from  the  policies  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  to  draw  upon  the  prior  French 
experience  with  the  anticolonial  revolution  in  Indochina.  And,  as  we  anticipated, 
some  of  those  invited  to  contribute  essays,  including  a  number  of  Southeast 
Asians,  devoted  their  time  in  this  spring  of  1972  to  acting  against  the  war,  not 
writing. 

We  hope  the  essays  will  illuminate  for  the  reader  what  is  obscure  in  the 
Pentagon  Papers,  will  suggest  what  is  missing  in  the  official  story,  will  bring  for- 
ward what  is  important  and  might  be  overlooked.  Most  of  all,  we  hope  they 
supply  what  the  government  documents  lack,  some  sense  of  the  human  conse- 
quences of  this  war,  so  that  now  Americans  will  devote  time  and  energy  to 
stopping  the  unforgivable  American  assault  on  the  land  and  people  of  South- 
east Asia. 

Noam  Chomsky 
Howard  Zinn 

May  5,  7972 


xi 


Notes  on  Contributors 


Nina  S.  Adams  and  her  family  have  been  living  in  Paris  doing  research  this  year 
and  expect  to  move  to  Hong  Kong  in  the  near  future.  She  edited,  with  Alfred 
McCoy,  Laos:  War  and  Revolution,  which  was  published  in  1970. 

James  Aronson  was  a  founder  and  for  many  years  editor  of  the  radical  news- 
weekly  National  Guardian,  which  he  left  in  1967  for  a  career  in  writing  and 
teaching.  He  is  the  author  of  The  Press  and  the  Cold  War  and  Deadline  for  the 
Media. 

Fredric  Branfman  is  the  director  of  Project  Air  War  in  Washington,  D.C.  He  was 
in  Laos  from  1967  to  1971  with  International  Voluntary  Services  and  as  a  free- 
lance journalist.  Mr.  Branfman  studied  at  the  University  of  Chicago  and  at 
Harvard. 

Wilfred  Burchett,  born  in  Australia,  has  traveled  throughout  the  world  as  a  jour- 
nalist for  the  Daily  Express,  the  London  Times,  Le  Soir,  L'Humanite,  the  London 
Daily  Worker,  the  Christian  Science  Monitor,  the  Toronto  Star,  and  other  news- 
papers. He  was  in  Indochina  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle  of  Dien  Bien  Phu  and 
has  been  a  close  observer  of  the  war  in  Indochina  for  many  years. 

Gerard  Chaliand  is  a  French  writer  specializing  in  national  liberation  movements 
in  the  third  world.  His  book  Peasants  of  North  Vietnam  was  written  as  the  re- 
sult of  research  in  that  country. 

Noam  Chomsky  is  Ward  Professor  of  Linguistics  at  the  Massachusetts  Institute 
of  Technology  and  the  author  of  American  Power  and  the  New  Mandarins,  At 
War  with  Asia,  and  Problems  of  Freedom  and  Knowledge. 

Philippe  Devillers  is  the  director  of  South  East  Asia  Studies  of  Centre  d'£tude 
des  Relations  Internationales  in  Paris.  He  was  attached  to  General  Leclerc's 
headquarters  in  Saigon  during  1945-1946  and  was  for  some  time  a  senior  cor- 
respondent for  Le  Monde.  He  is  the  author  of  What  Mao  Really  Said  and  co- 
author of  End  of  a  War:  Indochina  Nineteen  Fifty-Four. 

John  W.  Dower  is  an  assistant  professor  of  Japanese  history  at  the  University 
of  Wisconsin  at  Madison.  A  member  of  the  Committee  of  Concerned  Asian 
Scholars,  he  has  lived  in  Japan  and  is  the  author  of  The  Elements  of  Japanese 
Design.  He  is  currently  working  on  a  book  about  postwar  U.S. -Chin a- Japan 
relations. 

Richard  B.  Du  BolT  is  an  associate  professor  of  economics  at  Bryn  Mawr  Col- 
lege, where  he  is  a  specialist  in  economic  history  and  development.  He  co- 
authored  with  Edward  S.  Herman  America's  Vietnam  Policy:  The  Strategy  of 
Deception. 


xii      Notes  on  Contributors 


Walt  Haney  is  a  graduate  student  at  the  Center  for  Studies  in  Education  and 
Development  at  Harvard.  He  spent  two  years  in  Laos  with  International  Volun- 
tary Services  and  one  year  with  the  Ministry  of  Education  of  the  Royal  Lao 
government.  Mr.  Haney  prepared  the  Survey  of  Civilian  Casualties  Among 
Refugees  from  the  Plain  of  Jars  for  the  U.S.  Senate  subcommittee  on  refugees 
and  escapees. 

Gabriel  Koiko  is  currently  professor  of  history  at  York  University  in  Toronto. 
Among  his  books  are  The  Roots  of  American  Foreign  Policy,  The  Politics  of 
War,  and  with  Joyce  Kolko,  The  Limits  of  Power. 

Truong  Buu  Lam  is  now  a  visiting  professor  of  history  at  the  University  of 
Hawaii.  The  author  of  Patterns  of  Vietnamese  Response  to  Foreign  Interven- 
tions: 1858-1900,  he  was  for  several  years  the  director  of  the  Institute  of  His- 
torical Research  in  Saigon  and  concurrently  taught  at  the  University  of  Saigon. 

Don  Luce  is  now  director  of  the  Indochina  Mobile  Education  Project.  He  was 
in  Vietnam  from  1958  to  1971  as  an  agriculturist,  as  director  of  International 
Voluntary  Services,  and  as  a  research  associate  and  journalist  for  the  World 
Council  of  Churches.  He  is  the  author  of  Vietnam:  The  Unheard  Voices  and  has 
translated  and  edited  a  volume  of  Vietnamese  poetry.  We  Promise  One  Another: 
Poems  from  an  Asian  War. 

David  G.  Marr  served  as  an  intelligence  officer  in  the  U.S.  Marine  Corps  from 
1959  to  1964.  Now  an  assistant  professor  of  Vietnamese  studies  at  Cornell  Uni- 
versity and  director  of  the  Indochina  Resource  Center  in  Washington,  D.C.,  he  is 
the  author  of  Vietnamese  Anticolonialism. 

Peter  Dale  Scott,  a  former  Canadian  diplomat,  has  taught  political  science.  Now 
an  associate  professor  of  English  at  the  University  of  California  at  Berkeley,  he 
is  a  co-author  of  The  Politics  of  Escalation  in  Vietnam  and  author  of  The  War 
Conspiracy. 

Howard  Zinn  is  a  historian  and  professor  of  political  science  at  Boston  Univer- 
sity. Among  his  books  are  Vietnam:  The  Logic  of  Withdrawal  and  The  Politics 
of  History. 


Gravel  Edition  /  Pentagon  Papers  /  Volume  V 


1 


1.  The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam 
by  Gabriel  Kolko 


specialization  often  becomes  the  historian's  means  for  escaping  a  reality  too 
complex  for  his  comprehension.  To  perceive  everything  about  a  narrow  segment 
of  history  is  thereby  transformed  into  a  tacit  admission  that  the  larger,  more 
profound  and  significant  dimensions  of  a  period  are  beyond  one's  understanding. 
This  is  especially  the  case  for  the  government's  historians  or  its  hired  academics 
who,  in  addition  to  the  limits  of  time  and  difficulty  of  the  topic,  must  avoid  alien- 
ating superiors  whose  biases  candor  and  truth  are  likely  to  rankle. 

Conversely,  there  is  no  doubt  that  sheer  quantity  can  help  overcome  self- 
censorship  and  myopia  inflicted  by  superiors  on  mediocrity.  Even  if  the  Pentagon 
Papers'  authors  did  not  write  good  history,  much  less  reflect  on  it  with  the  kind 
of  intelligence  that  even  conservative  historians  occasionally  show,  the  vast  bulk 
of  the  undertaking — with  its  endless  narrative  and  documents — brings  us  vir- 
tually to  the  threshold  of  the  essential  history  of  the  Vietnam  war  as  seen  from 
the  official  American  perspective.  For  we  can  reassess  the  documents,  cast  the 
narrative  into  a  sharply  new  mold,  and  isolate  the  critical  bases  of  the  U.S.  role 
in  Indochina  from  the  mass  of  verbiage  encrusting  the  fundamentals  of  the  ex- 
perience. 

The  greatest  failing  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  that  they  largely  divorce  the 
twenty-five-year  history  of  the  United  States  and  Indochina  from  the  global  con- 
text in  which  Washington's  decisionmakers  always  made  policy  and  perceived 
the  world.  They  ignore  earlier  and  contemporaneous  crises  and  interventions  that 
are  better  measures  of  the  sources  of  policy  and  give  us  a  keener  index  by  which 
to  assess  the  causes  of  policy  and  conduct  often  alluded  to,  however  imperfectly, 
in  the  Pentagon  Papers.  And  by  failing  to  write  concisely,  with  a  view  Xo  stressing 
the  main  themes  which  their  own  evidence  clearly  sustains,  the  authors  of  the 
Pentagon  Papers  have  buried  the  major  currents  of  U.S.  policy  in  Indochina 
under  a  mass  of  verbiage. In  this  essay  I  shall  seek  to  extract  and  analyze  some 
of  these  central  threads — the  concept  of  the  domino  theory  and  its  real  meaning 
and  significance,  the  notion  of  "credibility"  in  the  larger  context  of  Washington's 
global  priorities,  and  the  issue  of  "Vietnamization"  and  the  implications  of  this 
futile  doctrine  to  the  character  and  conduct  of  the  terrible  war  itself. 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Gabriel  Kolko. 

*  The  text  for  numbered  notes  is  at  the  end  of  each  essay.  The  Pentagon  Papers — The 
Senator  Gravel  Edition,  4  vols.  (Boston:  Beacon  Press,  1971)  is  cited  in  parentheses 
within  the  essays.  Other  editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  are  cited  as  USG  ed.  (U.S. 
government  edition)  and  NYT/Bantam  (New  York  Times  paperback)  and  NYT/ 
Quadrangle  (New  York  Times  hardcover). 


2      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 


I.    FOUNDATIONS  OF  THE  INDOCHINA  WAR 

Obscured  in  a  mass  of  operational  details  which  never  focus  on  the  purpose  or 
even  the  nature  of  policy  in  any  real  depth,  the  Pentagon  Papers  necessarily  im- 
part a  kind  of  muddled  and  accidental  character  to  U.S.  policy  in  Indochina  with- 
out revealing  the  firm  assumptions  which  almost  invariably  cause  decisionmakers 
to  select  certain  options.  Such  impressions  ignore  the  fact  that  a  nation  gets  into 
the  sort  of  complicated,  often  insoluble  difficulties  to  which  its  basic  national 
policy  and  definitions  of  interests  necessarily  make  it  prone,  and  that  its  "errors" 
and  muddling  appear  only  when  its  goals  exceed  its  means  for  attaining  them. 
In  this  sense  Indochina  proved  to  be  only  the  culminating  yet  unavoidable  mis- 
calculation in  a  global  effort  that  began  well  before  the  Indochina  crisis  and 
then  ran  concurrent  to  it. 

Years  before  Washington  used  the  domino  theory  to  justify  intervention  in 
Southeast  Asia,  it  exploited  it  in  other  regions  in  a  manner  that  revealed  the  exact 
substance  of  this  doctrine.  Perhaps  the  first  important  application  of  the  analogy 
was  in  the  Middle  East  in  the  first  two  years  after  World  War  II.  The  stakes 
were  entirely  explicit:  oil  and  "the  raw-material  balance  of  the  world,"  in  Presi- 
dent Truman's  words. ^  The  question  was  to  avoid  a  vacuum  of  power  which  the 
Soviet  Union  and/or  radical  nationalism  might  fill.  The  extension  of  specifically 
U.S.  power  and,  preeminently,  economic  interests  in  a  region  therefore  became 
integral  to  the  domino  theory.  "If  Greece  should  dissolve  into  civil  war,"  Secre- 
tary of  State  George  C.  Marshall  argued  privately  in  February  1947,  Turkey 
might  then  fall  and  "Soviet  domination  might  thus  extend  over  the  entire  Middle 
East  and  Asia."  ^  And  this  perspective  served  not  merely  as  the  strategic  justifi- 
cation for  military  aid,  with  the  threat  of  intervention,  but  the  acquisition  of  ever 
greater  U.S.  oil  concessions  at  one  and  the  same  time. 

Even  before  the  first  Indochina  crisis,  therefore,  Washington  had  hammered 
out  in  the  real  world  the  functional  meaning  of  the  domino  theory,  and  a  kind  of 
political-military  imperial  overhead  charge  became  integral  to  its  later  realization 
of  clearly  articulated  economic  goals.  Translated  into  concrete  terms,  the  domino 
theory  was  a  counterrevolutionary  doctrine  which  defined  modern  history  as  a 
movement  of  Third  World  and  dependent  nations — those  with  economic  and 
strategic  value  to  the  United  States  or  its  capitalist  associates — away  from  colo- 
nialism or  capitalism  and  toward  national  revolution  and  forms  of  socialism. 
Insofar  as  the  domino  theory  was  never  a  timetable,  but  an  assessment  of  the 
direction  in  history  of  large  portions  of  the  world  from  the  control  of  the  Right 
to  the  control  of  the  Left,  it  was  accurate.  No  less  important  was  the  first  Ameri- 
can decision,  taken  during  the  Truman  Doctrine  crisis  of  early  1947,  that  inter- 
vention in  one  country  largely  to  save  those  around  it  was  the  inevitable  pre- 
liminary political  and  military  overhead  charges  of  imperialism.  Well  before  1950, 
much  less  the  profound  involvement  in  Indochina  after  1960,  the  U.S.  had  ap- 
plied this  principle  to  many  other  regions  of  the  world.  Indochina  became  the 
culmination  of  this  effort  to  expand  America's  power  by  saving  vast  areas  of  the 
world  for  its  own  forms  of  political  and  economic  domination. 

In  the  first  instance,  at  least,  America's  leaders  defined  the  problem  of  Indo- 
china in  its  global  context.  Only  later  was  it  to  become  the  transcendent  test  of 
the  very  efficacy  of  the  essential  means  and  goals  of  U.S.  imperialism  everywhere. 
For  the  major  event  influencing  the  U.S.  response  to  the  Vietnamese  revolution 
was  the  final  demise  of  the  Kuomintang  in  China  in  1949  and  the  policy  discus- 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  3 


sions  that  ensued  from  that  monumental  fact.  The  United  States  had  always  been 
hostile  toward  the  Vietminh,  but  in  mid- 1949  the  U.S.  government  made  the 
irrevocable  decision  to  oppose  the  further  extension  of  "Communism"  elsewhere 
in  Asia  and  Southeast  Asia.  Although  the  means  by  which  it  would  do  so  were 
unclear,  the  principle  itself  was  not  in  any  manner  vague,  and  this  prejudged  the 
policy  options.  Specifically,  the  United  States  anticipated  a  major  crisis  in  Indo- 
china and  began  to  prepare  for  it,  and  had  the  unanticipated  outbreak  of  war  in 
Korea  not  preempted  its  main  focus  it  is  likely  it  would  have  intervened  far  more 
aggressively  there  much  earlier.  For  recognition  of  the  French  puppet  regimes, 
and  important  military  and  economic  aid  to  them,  began  before  the  Korean 
conflict. 

Other  considerations,  besides  resistance  to  "Communism"  in  Asia,  also  entered 
into  the  decision  to  sustain  the  French  in  Indochina.  All  were  important,  but  the 
precise  weight  one  would  assign  to  each  varies  over  time.  There  was  also  the 
desire  to  help  the  French  end  the  war  in  order  to  return  their  troops  to  Europe 
so  that  France  would  cease  to  block  West  German  rearmament.  So  long  as  France 
was  tied  up  in  colonial  ventures,  it  would  lack  confidence  in  its  mastery  over  a 
resurgent  Germany.  Then  there  was  the  desire  to  direct  Japan  toward  Southeast 
Asia's  markets  and  raw  materials  rather  than  seeing  it  emerge  as  an  economic 
rival  elsewhere,  or  perhaps  dependent  on  Left  regimes  that  could  thereby  control 
Japan's  future  social  system.  Such  an  outlook  was  of  an  integrated  East  Asia  capi- 
talism, with  Japan  as  its  keystone,  docilely  cooperating  with  the  American  metrop- 
olis. Next  was  the  entire  raw  materials  question.  And  lastly  was  the  search  for  a 
military  doctrine  relevant  to  local  revolutionary  conflicts  rather  than  global 
atomic  war  with  industrial  states — the  beginning  of  the  long  and  futile  American 
search  for  a  means  by  which  to  relate  its  illusory  technological  superiority  to  the 
dominant  social  trends  of  the  post-World  War  II  era.* 

The  vital  relationship  of  the  future  of  the  Indochina  war  to  European  affairs 
emerges  only  dimly  from  the  Pentagon  Papers,  with  its  erroneous  assumption 
that  the  United  States  somewhat  unwillingly  supported  France  in  Indochina  for 
fear  of  losing  its  support  for  the  European  Defense  Community.  But  no  such 
French  pressure  was  necessary,  for  in  actuality  the  United  States — for  its  own 
reasons — sustained  the  French  cause  as  its  own  as  well  as  in  the  hope  of  bringing 
that  nation  victoriously  back  to  the  European  arena  which  the  Americans  thought 
more  vital  in  the  global  context  (Gravel  ed.,  1:79-80,  405-407).^  Given  Amer- 
ica's passionate  anti-Communism,  it  was  inevitable  that  it  associate  spiritually  as 
well  as  materially — to  the  tune  of  $3.5  billion  by  1954 — with  France's  undertak- 
ing. References  to  anti-Communism,  even  outside  the  context  of  the  strategic- 
economic  assumptions  of  the  domino  theory  analyzed  below,  were  frequent 
enough  in  the  official  American  discussion  prior  to  1954 — to  the  extent  of  ac- 
tively considering  direct  U.S.  military  intervention  against  the  Vietminh  and 
China  (Gravel  ed.,  1:55,  79,  82-83,  363,  375-376).6 

No  less  important,  and  barely  alluded  to  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  was  the  tor- 
tured strategy  debate  that  the  Eisenhower  administration  initiated  immediately 
upon  entering  office.  Basically,  it  acknowledged  the  need  for  a  superior  military 
doctrine  than  the  haphazard  eclecticism  the  Truman  regime  had  dumped  upon  it, 
and  so  began  a  convoluted  search  for  a  means  by  which  they  could  bring  together 
American  military  technology  and  economic  power,  immense  by  world  standards 
but  also  finite  insofar  as  the  U.S.  budget  was  concerned,  for  a  new,  more  success- 
ful synthesis.  The  gnawing  insecurity  which  the  Korean  conflict  left  among  Amer- 
ica's political  and  military  leaders,  who  had  failed  to  impose  swiftly  and  cheaply 
their  will  in  that  conflict,  was  the  first  tacit  acknowledgment  of  the  profound  lim- 


4      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  PapeKs/Vol.  V 

its  of  American  power  in  a  decentralized  world  filled  with  agrarian  revolutions 
and  upheavals.  The  "New  Look"  debate  of  1953-1954  sought  to  maximize  mili- 
tary results  at  less  cost,  and  because  it  lacked  concrete  precision  for  specific  situ- 
ations, and  eventually  proved  utterly  worthless,  the  effort  left  a  psychological  ten- 
sion in  which  Washington  thought  that  perhaps  by  acting  in  Indochina  to  avert 
French  defeat  the  United  States  could  synthesize  success  from  experience  blended 
with  doctrine.  The  failure  of  conventional  war  in  Asia — both  in  Korea  and  Indo- 
china— colored  all  American  responses  to  the  coming  demise  of  France  in  Indo- 
china until  the  Geneva  Conference  of  May  1954.  At  that  time  Washington  was 
reduced  to  the  fruitless,  eventually  incredibly  dangerous  role  of  creating  obstacles 
to  a  final  diplomatic  resolution  of  the  war  in  the  hope  of  buying  time  by  which  to 
retain  its  puppets  in  at  least  a  portion  of  Vietnam.  The  strategic  value  of  the  East 
Asian  states,  the  willingness  and  capacity  of  the  United  States  to  act  against  local 
revolutions  with  optimum,  even  nuclear  force  to  sustain  the  credibility  of  its 
numerous  pacts  and  alliances,  both  privately  and  publicly  appear  in  the  U.S. 
documents  at  this  time  (Gravel  ed.,  1:418,  494)."^  More  to  the  point  and  illumi- 
nating, both  in  terms  of  sheer  bulk  and  intrinsic  importance,  is  the  articulation 
of  the  domino  theory  in  the  Southeast  Asia  context. 

It  is  impossible  to  divorce  the  economic  and  strategic  components  of  the  so- 
called  domino  theory,  because  they  are  far  more  often  than  not  mentioned  in  the 
same  private  and  public  discussions  of  official  U.S.  policy.  To  confront  the  sig- 
nificance of  this  synthesis  of  concerns  is  to  comprehend  the  truly  imperialist  na- 
ture of  American  policy  in  Southeast  Asia,  its  precedents  and  purposes,  and  quite 
naturally  the  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  failed  to  assess  the  constant  refer- 
ences to  raw  materials  found  in  their  documents.  But  policy-makers  cannot  afford 
the  obscurantism  of  their  court  historians,  and  candor  on  the  objectives  of  the 
American  undertaking  in  Asia  was  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception. 

Indeed,  documents  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  reiterate  that  as  early  as  1941  the 
"supreme  importance"  of  the  control  of  "rubber,  tin  and  other  commodities"  of 
the  region  was  a  major  contributing  element  in  the  war  with  Japan  (Gravel  ed., 
1:8).  "The  fall  of  Indochina  would  undoubtedly  lead  to  the  fall  of  the  other  main- 
land states  of  Southeast  Asia,"  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  argued  in  April  1950, 
and  with  it  Russia  would  control  "Asia's  war  potential  .  .  .  affecting  the  balance 
of  power"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:187).  Not  only  "major  sources  of  certain  strategic  ma- 
terials" would  be  lost,  but  also  communications  routes  (Gravel  ed.,  1:364).  The 
State  Department  argued  a  similar  line  at  this  time,  writing  off  Thailand  and 
Burma  should  Indochina  fall.  Well  before  the  Korea  conflict  this  became  the  of- 
ficial doctrine  of  the  United  States,  and  the  war  there  further  intensified  this  com- 
mitment (Gravel  ed.,  1:194,  362-364,  373). 

The  loss  of  Indochina,  Washington  had  decided  by  its  vast  arms  shipments  to 
the  French  as  well  as  by  formal  doctrine  articulated  in  June  1952,  "would  have 
critical  psychological,  political  and  economic  consequences.  .  .  .  The  loss  of  any 
single  country  would  probably  lead  to  relatively  swift  submission  to  or  an  align- 
ment with  communism  by  the  remaining  countries  of  this  group.  Furthermore, 
an  alignment  with  communism  of  the  rest  of  Southeast  Asia  and  India,  and  in  the 
longer  term,  of  the  Middle  East  (with  the  probable  exceptions  of  at  least  Pakistan 
and  Turkey)  would  in  all  probability  progressively  follow.  Such  widespread  align- 
ment would  endanger  the  stability  and  security  of  Europe."  It  would  "render  the 
U.S.  position  in  the  Pacific  offshore  island  chain  precarious  and  would  seriously 
jeopardize  fundamental  U.S.  security  interests  in  the  Far  East."  The  "principal 
world  source  of  natural  rubber  and  tin,  and  a  producer  of  petroleum  and  other 
strategically  important  commodities,"  would  be  lost  in  Malaya  and  Indonesia. 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  5 


The  rice  exports  of  Burma  and  Thailand  would  be  taken  from  Malaya,  Ceylon, 
Japan,  and  India.  Eventually,  there  would  be  "such  economic  and  political  pres- 
sures in  Japan  as  to  make  it  extremely  difficult  to  prevent  Japan's  eventual  ac- 
commodation to  communism"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:83-84).  This  was  the  perfect  in- 
tegration of  all  the  elements  of  the  domino  theory,  involving  raw  materials,  mili- 
tary bases,  and  the  commitment  of  the  United  States  to  protect  its  many  spheres 
of  influence.  In  principle,  even  while  helping  the  French  to  fight  for  the  larger 
cause  which  America  saw  as  its  own,  Washington  leaders  prepared  for  direct  U.S. 
intervention  when  it  became  necessary  to  prop  up  the  leading  domino — Indo- 
china (Gravel  ed.,  1:375-390). 

Privately  and  publicly,  there  was  no  deception  regarding  the  stakes  and  goals 
for  American  power.  "Why  is  the  United  States  spending  hundreds  of  millions 
of  dollars  supporting  the  forces  of  the  French  Union  in  the  fight  against  com- 
munism," Vice-President  Richard  Nixon  explained  publicly  in  December  1953. 
"If  Indochina  falls,  Thailand  is  put  in  an  almost  impossible  position.  The  same  is 
true  of  Malaya  with  its  rubber  and  tin.  The  same  is  true  of  Indonesia.  If  this 
whole  part  of  Southeast  Asia  goes  under  Communist  domination  or  Communist 
influence,  Japan,  who  trades  and  must  trade  with  this  area  in  order  to  exist,  must 
inevitably  be  oriented  towards  the  Communist  regime."  ^  Both  naturally  and 
logically,  references  to  tin,  rubber,  rice,  copra,  iron  ore,  tungsten,  and  oil  are 
integral  to  American  policy  considerations  from  the  inception  of  the  war  (Gravel 
ed.,  1:407,  421,  436,  450,  473,  594,  597).^  As  long  as  he  was  President,  Eisen- 
hower never  forgot  his  country's  dependence  on  raw  materials  imports  and  the 
need  to  control  their  sources.  When  he  first  made  public  the  "falling  domino" 
analogy  in  April  1954,  he  also  discussed  the  dangers  of  losing  the  region's  tin, 
tungsten,  and  rubber,  and  the  risk  of  Japan  being  forced  into  dependence  on  Com- 
munist nations  for  its  industrial  life — with  all  that  implied  (Gravel  ed.,  1:603, 
623). 10  Only  one  point  need  be  mentioned  here  regarding  the  understanding  of 
the  domino  theory.  Always  implicit  in  the  doctrine  was  that  it  was  the  economic 
riches  of  the  neighbors  of  the  first  domino,  whether  Greece  or  Indochina,  that 
were  essential,  and  when  the  U.S.  first  intervened  into  those  hapless  and  relatively 
poor  nations  it  was  with  the  surrounding  region  foremost  in  its  calculations.  It 
was  this  willingness  to  accept  the  immense  preliminary  overhead  charges  of  re- 
gional domination  that  should  be  as  clear  in  our  minds  as  it  was  in  those  of  the 
men  who  made  the  decisions  to  intervene. 

But  to  find  a  practical  way  of  relating  such  considerations  to  reality  was  not 
easy  for  the  American  leaders,  and  Dulles'  vague  threats,  beginning  at  the  end  of 
1953  and  continuing  until  the  termination  of  the  Geneva  conference,  to  employ 
nuclear  weapons  or  U.S.  forces  scarcely  altered  the  inexorable  facts  that  the 
Vietminh's  military  triumphs  imposed.  From  this  point  onward  the  modalities  for 
attaining  U.S.  goals  in  Southeast  Asia  were  bankrupt,  rear-guard  efforts  designed 
only  to  strengthen  decaying  regimes  and  the  next  domino.  But  the  policy  itself 
was  only  reaffirmed  after  the  French  defeat.  It  was  tactically  temporarily  suc- 
cessful, but  strategically  disastrous,  and  the  slow  unfolding  of  that  fact  con- 
stitutes the  main  experience  in  American  history  since  1954  (Gravel  ed.,  1:86, 
98,  106-107,  177).  Indochina  becomes  the  conjunction  point,  from  this  time  on- 
ward, for  assorted  doctrines  and  crises  that  had  accumulated  during  the  preceding 
decade  without  satisfactory  resolution  for  the  controllers  of  American  power. 
Military  power,  economic  integration,  leadership  of  the  world  struggle  against  the 
tides  of  revolutionary  change — all  these  crises  and  frustrations  were  to  fix  upon 
the  Indochina  experience  in  some  central  manner. 


6      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 


11.    THE  CRISIS  OF  AMERICAN  POWER 

This  futile  American  search  for  a  military  doctrine  capable  of  mastering  the 
imperatives  of  U.S.  national  interests  in  the  world,  applying  successfully  the  vast 
military  technology  it  had  hoarded  since  1945,  and  meeting  the  exigencies  of  local 
war  all  came  to  a  head  when  President  Kennedy  entered  office.  Because  this 
combination  of  circumstances  was  part  of  the  generalized  crisis  in  U.S.  power  in 
the  world  that  had  been  gradually  building  up  since  the  Korean  war,  Washington's 
policy  toward  Indochina  was  largely  colored,  especially  until  1963,  by  the  global 
context.  This  was  surely  the  case  while  Kennedy  was  President. 

Kennedy  had  been  briefed  by  President  Eisenhower  on  the  domino  theory  and 
Southeast  Asia  immediately  before  the  transfer  of  power,  and  the  doctrine  was 
accepted  as  a  truism  in  planning  U.S.  policy  throughout  this  critical  formative 
period.  But  no  less  important,  at  this  time,  was  the  Kennedy  administration  link- 
age of  events  in  Cuba  or  Berlin,  and  general  relations  with  the  USSR,  to  those 
in  Indochina.  The  phrase  "a  symbolic  test  of  strength  between  the  major  powers 
of  the  West  and  the  Communist  bloc"  was  already  being  employed  during  March 
1961,  and  while  this  proposition  does  not  necessarily  capture  all  dimensions  of 
the  causes  of  U.S.  action,  it  does  provide  an  important  psychological  insight  into 
how,  and  why,  many  actions  were  taken  (Gravel  ed.,  11:33,  48-49,  57,  635-637). 
"Credibility,"  in  any  event,  was  part  of  the  earlier  frustrating  U.S.  doctrinal  de- 
bate over  "massive  retaliation"  and  the  like.  The  day  after  the  Bay  of  Pigs  in- 
vasion capsized,  April  20,  1961,  the  new  Administration  created  a  special  task 
force  on  Southeast  Asia  that  was  to  help  generate  a  whole  new  phase  of  the  Indo- 
china crisis.  Even  publicly,  at  this  time,  Kennedy  was  explicit  in  linking  the 
events  in  Vietnam  to  his  concern  for  the  defeat  in  Cuba,  and  developments  in 
Europe  were  no  less  influential.  Put  succinctly,  given  the  U.S.  failures  everywhere 
else,  the  United  States  was  prepared  to  make  Laos  and  Vietnam  the  test  of  Amer- 
ican resolution,  to  find  new  means  of  warfare  as  yet  unknown,  "to  grasp  the  new 
concepts,  the  new  tools,"  to  quote  Kennedy,  that  might  snatch  victory  from  im- 
pending defeat  for  American  imperialism  elsewhere  in  the  world  (Gravel  ed.,  II: 
34,  2,  21,  33,  57,  72-73,  801).  He  quickly  sent  a  "military  hardware"  team,  aware 
"of  the  various  techniques  and  gadgets  now  available,"  to  Saigon  (Gravel  ed.,  II: 
34).  The  crucifixion  of  Indochina  that  began  then  to  unfold  was  directed  both  to- 
ward Southeast  Asia  and  the  other  dominos,  but  also  toward  all  the  rest  of  revo- 
lutionary mankind.  It  was  as  if  the  Americans  had  decided  to  make  Indochina 
pay  for  an  unkind  history's  debts  for  postwar  American  imperiahsm's  defeats,  de- 
feats that  were  to  evoke  the  vengeance  of  the  desperate. 

This  concern  for  the  "psychological  impact"  of  a  strong  stand  in  South  Vietnam 
on  the  events  in  Berlin  and  Cuba  surely  prevailed  during  the  early  part  of  1962, 
when  an  immense  expansion  of  the  "limited  war"  budget  and  capability  of  the 
U.S.  military  also  needed  the  now  traditional  international  crisis  and  tensions  es- 
sential to  the  quick  passage  of  funding  bills  in  Congress.  Along  more  conven- 
tional lines  of  thought,  American  planners  also  calculated  the  allegedly  grievous 
domino  effects  as  far  as  Japan,  India,  and  Australia,  as  that  stalwart  doctrine  im- 
bedded itself  yet  more  deeply.  Complementing  these  thoughts,  but  less  often  cited 
for  the  period  after  1960  by  the  Pentagon  Papers'  authors,  were  the  "rice,  rubber, 
teak,  corn,  tin,  spices,  oil,  and  many  others"  of  the  nations  in  the  Southeast  Asia 
line  of  dominos  (Gravel  ed.,  11:817,  174-175,  663-665).  While  men  of  power 
naturally  assumed  this  critical  definition  of  the  substantive  meaning  of  retaining 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  7 


power  in  the  region,  the  decline  of  such  references  after  1960  is  more  a  reflection 
on  the  perceptions  and  qualities  of  the  authors  of  the  history,  or  the  demands 
placed  on  them,  than  it  is  of  the  true  reasons.  Roughly  three-quarters  of  their 
study  is  devoted  to  the  period  1961-1967,  during  which  time  probably  most  of 
the  internal  operational  documents  on  which  they  focus  were  written,  but  also 
because,  as  the  director  of  the  undertaking  admits,  many  earlier  documents  were 
not  kept  or  found.  Since  nowhere  in  the  work  do  the  authors  attempt  to  weigh  the 
relative  importance  of  causal  factors,  this  abdication  to  quantity  of  memos  and 
reports  leads  to  myopic  history.  The  economic  element,  so  critical  in  the  longer 
period  of  1945-1959  from  their  own  account,  is  minimized  by  default  thereafter. 
The  strategic  importance  of  Southeast  Asia,  and  the  need  to  resist  the  presumed 
expansionist  intentions  of  China  against  all  Asia,  is  now  their  preferred  explana- 
tion (Gravel  ed.,  I:xvi;  11:821-822). 

This  partiality  in  treating  the  causes  of  the  war,  whether  by  default  to  docu- 
ments weighted  by  quantity  or  ideological  preference,  extends  to  such  few  defini- 
tions of  the  nature  of  the  war  that  they  allude  to  in  the  work.  None  of  this  is 
surprising,  of  course,  because  "professional"  official  military  historians  have 
been  uniformly  second-rate  since  the  writing  of  such  history  began,  but  also  be- 
cause the  three  dozen  or  so  authors  who  came  from  other  government  agencies 
were,  again  to  quote  the  project  director,  "not  always  versed  in  the  art  of  re- 
search" (Gravel  ed.,  I:xv).  Assigning  discrete  parts  to  so  many  different  hands, 
it  is  not  surprising  the  history  lacks  thematic  consistency  or  unity,  much  less  re- 
flection and  serious  evaluations.  And,  given  their  professional  and  personal  con- 
nections and  choices,  they  are  uniformly  incapable  of  transcending  the  conven- 
tional wisdom  common  in  Washington.  One  of  their  deficiencies,  their  incapacity 
to  comprehend  the  relationship  of  the  war  to  the  Vietnamese  masses  themselves, 
and  the  very  nature  of  the  undertaking,  makes  it  quite  impossible  for  them  to 
perceive  the  larger  events  after  1963.  We  must  attempt  to  do  so  before  analyzing 
the  logic  of  the  recent  war. 

Had  the  conflict  in  Vietnam  since  1945  been  essentially  that  of  a  civil  war,  in 
which  Vietnamese  fought  Vietnamese,  the  French  and  then  the  American  under- 
taking would  have  been  militarily  feasible.  Indeed,  it  might  even  have  been 
temporarily  successful.  That  it  was  a  military  disaster  for  the  vastly  superior  ma- 
terial forces  of  the  French  and  now  the  United  States,  and  that  their  external 
military  role  and  aid  has  always  been  the  source  of  warfare,  is  proof  of  the  inter- 
ventionary  and  fragile  nature  of  the  entire  Western  effort.  Basically,  this  inter- 
ventionary,  colonial  quality  of  the  war  has  always  inevitably  produced  defeat  for 
the  intruders.  The  United  States  interceded  in  Indochina  to  protect  its  own  na- 
tional interests,  a  proposition  that  holds  everywhere  else  as  well.  Had  there  been 
a  social  and  cultural  basis  for  the  successive  regimes  of  its  puppets,  then  the  "Viet- 
namization"  of  the  war  would  possibly  have  attained  some  measure  of  temporary 
success  sometimes  since  1945.  Axiomatically,  the  fact  that  an  appreciable  num- 
ber of  Vietnamese  could  never  be  found  to  effectively  use  their  vastly  superior 
weapons  against  the  Vietminh  and  then  the  National  Liberation  Front  is  evidence 
that  the  war  was  never  a  civil  conflict.  And  no  less  axiomatic  was  the  necessity 
of  ever  greater  foreign  commitments — "escalations"  as  they  are  now  called — to 
sustain  political  fictions  and  loyal  elites  in  power.  For  military  escalation  was  al- 
ways the  inevitable,  logical  ancillary  of  keeping  phantom  governments  alive  on 
behalf  of  a  foreign  nation's  interests,  and  this  fact  was  always  understood  in  Wash- 
ington. 

The  United  States  first  began  its  attempt  to  "Vietnamize"  the  war  in  1950, 
when  its  initial  economic  and  military  aid  went  to  local  puppet  forces  whose 


8      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

leaders  have  now  long  since  retired.  Roughly  350,000  such  troops  were  being 
funded  by  1953,  when  the  long  string  of  disasters  for  the  French  reached  a  critical 
point.  By  early  1961,  the  approximately  170,000-man  army  Diem  had  used  to  re- 
press opposition  with  declining  success  was  enlarged  to  200,000  (Gravel  ed.,  I: 
396,  400,  490-491;  11:24,  37,  50).  Relying  on  these  men,  well  armed  and  formally 
with  superior  training,  to  control  the  insurgency  and  manage  the  country  was  the 
public  and  private  objective  of  Washington's  policy  from  1961  onward.  The  de- 
sire to  prove  American  "credibility"  to  the  world  and  stop  the  dominoes  at  one 
and  the  same  time  was  initially  linked  to  buttressing  Diem's  forces,  not  employing 
America's.  During  the  last  half  of  1962  the  United  States  further  embellished  its 
commitment  by  seeking  to  train  and  equip  458,000  regular  and  paramilitary  Sai- 
gon forces  by  mid- 1965,  with  the  NLF  resistance  scheduled  to  be  under  control 
by  the  end  of  that  year.  The  Americans  increased  their  military  personnel  in 
South  Vietnam  from  2,646  at  the  beginning  of  1962,  mainly  in  air  transport  and 
support  units,  to  12,200  during  1964-1965,  and  even  planned  their  extensive 
withdrawal,  to  start  during  late  1965  (Gravel  ed.,  11:175-179,  186). 

If  the  data  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  may  be  accepted  on  face  value,  it  is  clear 
that  the  main  U.S.  decisionmakers  truly  expected  that  lavish  expenditures  of 
funds  and  a  now  relatively  small  U.S.  military  contingent  would  suffice  to  "Viet- 
namize"  the  war.  But,  as  the  authors  of  the  study  embarrassingly  reflected  as  an 
aside,  "Only  the  Viet  Cong  had  any  real  support  and  influence  on  a  broad  base 
in  the  countryside"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:204).  Added  to  this  defining  fact  was  the 
political  chaos  and  resistance  in  the  urban  areas  and  the  deepening  instability  of 
the  Diem  clique.  As  President  Kennedy  admitted  publicly  on  September  2,  1963, 
"I  don't  think  that  unless  a  greater  elTort  is  made  by  the  [Diem]  Government  to 
win  popular  support  that  the  war  can  be  won  out  there"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:241). 
Privately,  a  National  Security  Council  report  the  following  month  made  pre- 
cisely the  same  point  and  urged  the  withdrawal  of  American  "advisors"  as  sched- 
uled (Gravel  ed..  Ill:  19).  Given  American  awareness  of  the  objective  facts  at  the 
time,  its  disenchantment  with  Diem,  and  the  apparently  genuine  desire  of  the  key 
policymakers  to  withdraw  manpower  shortly,  the  subsequent  long  string  of  ever 
more  violent  escalations  can  only  be  understood  as  a  function  of  the  protection 
of  American  national  interest  as  it  was  then  defined  in  terms  of  economics,  the 
domino,  and  credibility.  This  perception  of  the  unpleasant  truth  regarding  "Viet- 
namization"  proved  less  important  than  what  had  to  be  done  in  spite  of  it.  For 
the  United  States  was  not  in  Vietnam  to  protect  a  whole  series  of  regimes  it  scorn- 
fully regarded  as  venial,  but  its  own  stakes  in  Southeast  Asia  and,  as  it  defined  it 
more  broadly,  the  world.  Not  because  of  the  palace  generals  would  it  abandon 
South  Vietnam.  And,  if  for  whatever  reason  the  troops  of  these  corrupt  leaders 
would  not  fight  on  behalf  of  American  interests,  then  a  proportionate  escalation 
of  American  manpower  and  fire  would  be  required.  Washington's  error  was  to 
miscalculate  the  economic  and  human  cost  to  itself  in  sustaining  its  immutable 
objectives  in  Vietnam  and  Southeast  Asia.  The  subsequent  history  of  the  war  is 
quite  predictable  in  light  of  these  fixed  poles  in  its  W eltanschaung. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  document  the  long  sequence  of  frustrations  and  failures 
that  ensued  after  1963.  The  main  themes  in  them  are  the  inextricably  linked 
failure  of  "Vietnamization"  and  the  subsequent  escalations  at  the  cost  of  staving 
off  defeats,  the  effort  to  establish  credibility  in  the  region  and  world  while  bal- 
ancing against  it  other  priorities  in  the  maintenance  of  the  fragile  American  em- 
pire, and  the  confrontation,  once  again,  with  the  limits  of  American  technology 
in  directing  the  destiny  of  modern  history. 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  9 


Suffice  it  to  say,  the  critical  year  of  1964  was  merely  the  history  of  the  failure 
of  Vietnamization  juxtaposed  against  the  desire  to  sustain  credibility — and  there- 
fore escalation.  Stated  in  its  simplest  form  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  "In  1964  the 
U.S.  tried  to  make  GVN  [Saigon]  strong,  effective,  and  stable,  and  it  failed" 
(Gravel  ed.,  11:277).  Vietnamization  was  a  military  and  a  political  failure,  and 
talk  in  Saigon  of  a  popular  front,  neutralist  government  was  rife  by  the  late  sum- 
mer. Moreover,  in  1964,  just  as  Eisenhower  had  observed  with  bewilderment  in 
1961,  "Not  only  do  the  Viet  Cong  units  have  the  recuperative  powers  of  the 
Phoenix,  but  they  have  had  an  amazing  ability  to  maintain  morale"  (Gravel  ed., 
111:668;  see  also  11:336,  637;  111:652,  666-667).  Understanding  this,  however, 
did  not  cause  the  Americans  to  see  that  such  strength  was  a  decisive  element  in 
the  larger  war.  Escalating,  they  thought,  would  substitute  American  firepower 
for  Saigon's  defeatism,  and  overcome  the  ardor  and  genius  of  the  NLF. 

In  part,  as  well,  the  United  States  believed  that  in  escalating,  among  other 
things,  it  could  also  thereby  win  time  for  the  Vietnamization  process  eventually  to 
succeed.  It  would  show  "the  U.S.  continues  to  mean  business"  and  "tend  to  lift 
GVN  morale"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:561).  Pitting  steel  against  dedication  suits  crack- 
pot realists  well,  and  the  notion  that  it  would  win  Saigon  time  for  its  training  tasks 
appears  not  to  have  been  questioned.  Not  only  would  it  reveal  "a  willingness  to 
raise  the  military  ante  and  eschew  negotiations  begun  from  a  position  of  weak- 
ness," but  by  obtaining  "a  breakthrough  in  the  mutual  commitment  of  the  U.S. 
in  Vietnam  to  a  confident  sense  of  victory"  it  would  galvanize  the  tottering,  op- 
portunistic Khanh  regime  to  do  better  for  the  United  States  (Gravel  ed.,  111:78; 
see  also  11:344;  111:546,  559). 

Moreover,  as  McNamara  told  Johnson  in  January  1964,  though  he  much  pre- 
ferred Saigon  troops  fighting  the  war,  "we  cannot  disengage  U.S.  prestige  to  any 
significant  degree.  .  .  .  The  consequences  of  a  Communist-dominated  South 
Vietnam  are  extremely  serious  both  for  the  rest  of  Southeast  Asia  and  for  the 
U.S.  position  in  the  rest  of  Asia  and  indeed  in  other  key  areas  of  the  world  .  .  ." 
(Gravel  ed.,  11:193).  "If  we  leave  Vietnam  with  our  tail  between  our  legs,"  Gen. 
Maxwell  Taylor  argued  the  following  September,  "the  consequences  of  this  de- 
feat in  the  rest  of  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America  would  be  disastrous"  (Gravel 
ed.,  11:336).  Here  was  a  synthesis  of  the  credibility  and  domino  theories  that  was 
to  profoundly  influence  subsequent  American  policy  as  well. 

Such  a  combination  of  doctrines  had  occurred  during  the  first  Eisenhower  ad- 
ministration, but  it  appears  likely  that  the  sensitivity  to  "credibility"  was  to  deepen 
as  U.S.  manpower  grew,  if  only  because  of  the  failure  until  then  of  the  soldiers 
and  military  implements  on  which  Washington  was  staking  so  much  elsewhere 
as  well.  For  if  America  were  to  be  frustrated  in  Vietnam,  its  capacity  to  control 
events  in  other  parts  of  the  Third  World  would  be  profoundly  challenged.  In 
actual  policy  debates,  however,  the  domino  and  credibility  doctrines  tended  to  be 
more  and  more  merged:  "the  South  Vietnam  conflict  is  regarded  as  a  test  case  of 
U.S.  capacity  to  help  a  nation  to  meet  a  Communist  'war  of  liberation'  "  (Gravel 
ed.,  111:500;  see  also  111:496-497).  The  only  real  issue,  from  the  viewpoint  of 
domino  theory,  became  not  the  analogy  itself  but  how  far  the  falling  dominoes 
might  extend.  Indeed,  precisely  because  the  United  States  had  put  its  force  on 
the  testing  line  of  battle,  the  dominoes  might  fall  all  the  more  quickly  and  em- 
phatically, it  was  now  conjectured.  A  somewhat  milder,  less  concerned  version 
continued  to  be  issued  publicly.  But  not  only  nearby  states  were  thrown  into  a 
doctrine  of  falling  links,  but  the  unraveling  of  the  Pacific  and  Asia  pacts  as  well, 
and  even  the  future  of  Greece  and  Turkey  in  NATO  (Gravel  ed.,  111:219-220, 
500,  598-599,  622-628,  657-659,  712,  714,  732). 


10      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

This  test  case  proposition,  involving  credibility,  was  honed  to  a  fine  doctrine 
throughout  1964.  Not  merely  the  dominoes,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  argued 
during  January,  but  the  "durability,  resolution,  and  trustworthiness"  of  the  United 
States  would  affect  "our  image  in  Africa  and  in  Latin  America,"  a  clear  lesson  to 
revolutionary  movements  there  (Gravel  ed.,  111:497).  As  the  crisis  of  Vietnam 
reached  a  peak  during  the  fall,  requiring  grave  new  decisions,  "will  and  capabil- 
ity to  escalate  the  action  if  required"  was  trotted  out  again  (Gravel  ed.,  111:208). 
"U.S.  prestige  is  heavily  committed,  .  .  .  our  standing  as  the  principal  helper 
against  Communist  expansion"  had  to  be  impaired  as  little  as  possible,  "to  pro- 
tect U.S.  reputation  as  a  counter-subversion  guarantor"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:216,  598; 
see  also  111:622,  659),  and  the  like  they  argued  repeatedly,  with  no  objections  at 
all  from  other  decisionmakers.  Moreover,  Washington  fully  believed  that,  in  some 
imperceptible  but  quite  ideological  manner,  China  was  the  root  cause  of  the  Indo- 
china conflict — a  notion  that  could  not  explain  the  morale  and  success  of  the 
NLF  with  the  large  masses  of  Vietnamese  people.  By  the  end  of  1964,  as  well,  the 
increasingly  active  role  of  the  USSR  in  supporting  the  DRV  made  it  seem,  in- 
deed, as  if  the  major  enemies  the  U.S.  had  chosen  for  itself  were  now  putting  it 
to  the  test.  Given  this  concern  for  the  new  balance  of  forces  in  the  war,  the  im- 
plications of  defeat  for  the  region  and  counterrevolution  everywhere,  and  "our 
reputation,"  the  utter  military  ineptitude  of  the  vast  Saigon  army  left  the  Ameri- 
can leaders  two  options — acceptance  of  reality,  with  all  its  concomitant  implica- 
tions for  the  future  of  U.S.  interventionism  and  economic  power  elsewhere,  or 
escalation.  In  light  of  the  imperatives  of  postwar  American  imperialism,  and  the 
men  at  its  helm,  the  choice  was  foreordained  (Gravel  ed.,  111:683;  see  also  III: 
115,  266-267,  592,  695). 

III.    THE  LIMITS  OF  ESCALATION 

The  history  of  the  war  after  1965  is  the  history  of  escalation,  a  period  so  well 
known  that  the  Pentagon  Papers  tell  us  scarcely  more  than  new  operational  de- 
tails about  it.  Given  the  visible  facts,  and  the  human  and  military  effects  of  the 
war  then  being  widely  publicized,  there  can  be  precious  little  mystery  to  fathom. 
The  experience  showed  an  endemic  American  incapacity  to  reason  outside  a  pro- 
foundly destructive  fixed  frame  of  reference,  one  that  reflected  conventional  wis- 
dom, and  an  almost  self-destructive  conformity  to  it  even  when  its  operational 
bankruptcy  was  repeatedly  revealed  in  practice.  The  only  surprise  in  the  Pentagon 
Papers  is  how  little  internal  opposition  to  this  course  existed  among  those  in  a 
position  to  shape  policy,  and  that  appeared  well  after  it  was  baldly  apparent  that 
America's  goals  greatly  exceeded  its  means  and  other  global  obligations.  This 
near  unanimity  was  a  result  of  the  total  consensus  on  the  nature  of  national  in- 
terests among  men  who  attain  power,  a  consensus  that  again  proved  that  the  ob- 
jectives of  U.S.  postwar  interventionism,  rather  than  being  a  muddle  or  accident, 
brought  the  nation  to  its  final  impasse  and  defeat.  By  their  own  criteria  and  needs, 
American  leaders  did  what  their  system  demanded,  and  had  often  successfully 
achieved  elsewhere.  Their  miscalculation  was  to  grossly  overestimate  U.S.  power 
in  relationship  to  that  of  the  Vietnamese. 

More,  than  ever  before,  the  "credibility"  argument  tended  to  shape  American 
leadership's  responses  to  developments  in  Vietnam  after  1965.  ".  .  .  To  avoid 
humiliation"  and  "preserve  our  reputation,"  or  words  like  it,  "appears  in  count- 
less memoranda,"  writes  a  Pentagon  Papers  author  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 22,  47). 
Domino  analogies  also  are  routinely  employed,  although  by  1967  at  least  some 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  11 


U.S.  leaders,  such  as  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk,  sought  to  escape  criticism  of 
the  assumptions  behind  it  by  describing  the  equivalent  phenomenon  in  presum- 
ably more  neutral,  operational  terms.  Given  these  continued  durable  premises, 
and  the  pervasive  incapacity  of  Saigon's  army,  it  was  certain  that  escalation  on 
the  United  States'  part  would  follow.  In  1966,  however,  its  leaders  now  occasion- 
ally appeared  to  weigh  the  United  States'  commitment  in  Vietnam  against  its 
physical  obligations  and  needs  elsewhere  and  the  discontent  of  its  European  allies. 
By  1967,  indeed,  this  concern  for  priorities  was  supplemented  by  the  graver,  im- 
mediate problem  of  the  economic  costs  of  the  war  to  domestic  inflation  and  the 
United  States'  balance-of-payments  problem  overseas.  As  the  authors  of  the  Pen- 
tagon Papers  fail  to  note  later,  this  consciousness  of  global  priorities  and  the  eco- 
nomic limits  of  escalation  in  March  1968  was  to  begin  to  impose  at  least  some 
critical  brake  on  the  escalatory  process  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 88-89,  442,  490,  510, 
614,618,  636,  662,  681).i^ 

The  Pentagon  Papers  deluge  us  with  endless  details  on  the  process  of  escala- 
tion: there  were  large  escalations,  small  ones,  long  and  short,  wider  ones  to  Laos, 
more  northerly  or  less,  and  escalations  that  were  considered  and  rejected.  The 
dominant  fact  in  this  welter  of  details,  much  of  it  superfluous,  is  that  the  United 
States  raced  up  the  ladder  of  munitions  tonnages  and  manpower  at  a  rate  that 
was  to  prove  faster  than  even  the  immense  American  economy  could  digest,  but 
utterly  inadequate  to  deliver  the  coveted  military  victory.  Indeed,  that  triumph 
would  have  been  denied  even  had  the  United  States  implemented  all  the  schemes 
it  contemplated  with  their  vast  risks  of  war  with  China.  From  about  650,000 
tons  of  ground  and  air  munitions  in  1965,  the  United  States  dropped  2,883,000 
tons  in  1968,  and  its  manpower  increased  to  543,000  men  in  South  Vietnam  by 
the  end  of  1968,  plus  230,000  war-related  personnel  in  the  surrounding  region. 
That  simple  fact  sets  the  crucial  context  for  the  internal  policy  debate  that  was  to 
occur  during  this  period. 

The  American  debates  were  always  encumbered  by  gnawing  contingencies. 
One  problem  was  that  during  1966  the  U.S.  leaders  became  aware  of  the  im- 
portance of  inflation  caused  by  the  rapid  troop  arrivals  in  aggravating  the  al- 
ready moribund  Saigon  economy.  Excessive  escalation,  in  the  context  of  this 
problem  alone,  could  inflict  severe  damage  on  the  American  undertaking.  Then, 
at  the  end  of  1966,  McNamara  visited  Saigon  and  concluded  that  significant  es- 
calation, accompanied  by  progress  in  the  "pacification"  program,  might  convince 
the  public  within  18  months — which  is  to  say  before  the  Presidential  election — 
that  U.S.  victory  was  attainable  in  due  course  thereafter.  Until  the  end  of  1967, 
with  one  unimportant  exception,  the  issue  of  escalation  in  Washington  was  not 
its  efficacy  but  the  numbers  that  it  had  to  commit.  By  May,  indeed,  the  Joint 
Chiefs  were  considering  ground  attacks  into  Cambodia,  Laos,  and  North  Vietnam, 
plus  the  possible  use  of  nuclear  weapons  against  sites  in  southern  China  (Gravel 
ed.,  IV:171,  180,  239,  353,  369,  378,  442,  457,  461,  490-492). 

Despite  this  vast  upsurge  of  activity,  the  military  results  were  infinitely  less 
than  the  American  leaders  had  hoped  for,  and  their  military  reserves  in  the  world 
were  too  small  for  the  undertaking  that  even  some  Pentagon  analysts  thought 
might  drag  on  indefinitely  at  any  level  short  of  nuclear  war.  In  fact,  almost  im- 
mediately the  American  fascination  with  their  own  material  power  led  to  the  rev- 
elation of  the  limits  of  technology  in  revolutionary  warfare  in  a  manner  that  is 
certain  to  have  profound  repercussions  in  future  and  futile  American  efforts  to 
discover  a  military  doctrine  appropriate  to  its  immense  technical  means  and  even 
larger  political  and  economic  goals  during  the  remainder  of  this  century.  Es- 
sentially, every  weapons  system  the  Americans  applied  failed  to  attain  the  pur- 


12      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

poses  for  which  it  was  intended.  In  terms  of  U.S.  expenses  in  bombing  North 
Vietnam  during  the  first  year,  its  losses  to  the  DRV  air  defense  alone  were  four 
times  the  estimated  material  damage  inflicted — but  far  higher  yet  in  terms  of 
total  U.S.  costs.  More  important,  with  extremely  accurate  statistical  measurement 
the  United  States  knew  that  it  had  failed  to  deprive  the  DRV  of  anything  it 
needed  to  resist  eff"ectively.  Its  oil  storage  and  transport  systems  remained  more 
than  ample  for  any  demand  imposed  on  them.  Its  capacity  to  move  men  and 
equipment  south  increased,  and  the  essence  of  these  frustrating  facts  were  made 
public  at  the  time.  Success  via  air  power,  America's  leaders  learned  quickly,  was 
not  attainable.  But  on  the  ground  itself,  the  Americans  concluded  by  mid-1967, 
the  NLF  controlled  the  terms  and  timing  of  combat  in  almost  four-fifths  of 
the  engagements  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:45,  55-59,  67,  69,  107,  109-112,  457,  461- 
462,  490).  The  United  States,  clearly,  could  not  achieve  victory  in  such  a  war. 

Rather  than  accept  the  political  conclusions  of  these  defining  military  facts 
by  withdrawing  from  Vietnam,  the  United  States  turned  to  other  uses  for  its 
technology  in  the  hope  of  grasping  victory  from  the  maw  of  imminent  defeat.  In- 
ternal discussions  printed  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  show  that,  given  the  militarily 
inconclusive  nature  of  the  air  war,  war  crimes  against  civilian  populations  be- 
came an  intended  consequence  of  the  war.  In  what  it  calls  a  "very  influential  re- 
port," in  March  1966  the  CIA  assessed  the  feeble  results  of  bombing  and  outlined 
the  need  to  turn  to  "the  will  of  the  regime  as  a  target  system"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:71 ). 
It  proposed  "a  punitive  bombing  campaign,"  in  the  words  of  the  Pentagon  Pa- 
pers (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 74).  The  Americans  would  bomb  without  illusions  as  to  the 
direct  military  results,  but  in  the  hope  of  breaking  a  nation's  will  to  resist.  In  any 
nation  that  could  only  mean  the  people:  the  "attrition  of  men,  supplies,  equip- 
ment and  [oil],"  to  quote  a  document  of  the  following  September  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 
110).  Four-fifths  of  the  North  Vietnamese  casualties  of  the  bombing,  the  CIA 
reported  in  January  1967,  were  civilians.  One  expression  of  this,  to  quote  Robert 
Komer  in  April  1967  as  he  set  out  for  Saigon  with  power  to  implement  his  pro- 
gram, was  to  "Step  up  refugee  programs  deliberately  aimed  at  depriving  the  VC 
of  a  recruiting  base"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 441;  see  also  IV:  136).  Or,  to  quote  John 
McNaughton  the  earlier  year,  while  urging  studies  of  the  feasibility  of  attacking 
the  dams  and  locks  in  the  DRV,  "by  shallow-flooding  the  rice,  it  leads  after  time 
to  widespread  starvation  (more  than  a  million?)  unless  food  is  provided — which 
we  could  offer  to  do  'at  the  conference  table'  "  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 43). 

It  was  as  a  result  of  the  failure  of  orthodox  bombing  techniques  that  a  group 
of  crackpot  realist  academics,  for  the  most  part  self-styled  "liberals,"  were  able  to 
concoct  and  sell  the  doctrine  of  electronic  warfare.  Roger  Fisher  of  the  Harvard 
Law  School  first  proposed  it  to  McNaughton  in  January  1966,  suggesting  chemi- 
cal warfare,  mines,  and  the  like  stretched  in  a  belt  across  the  DMZ  and  part  of 
Laos.  Over  the  coming  spring  and  summer,  academics  such  as  Carl  Kaysen, 
Jerome  Wiesner,  and  Jerrold  Zacharias  were  able  to  propose  a  whole  family  of 
antipersonnel  concepts  and  weapons,  geared  to  sensoring  and  monitoring  tech- 
niques, to  attack  manpower.  But  while  such  diabolical  contrivances  could  be  ap- 
plied against  personnel  under  other  circumstances,  the  electronic  belt  was  never 
to  be  constructed,  and  electronic  warfare  itself  proved  to  be  at  least  the  same  dis- 
mal failure  as  conventional  bombing  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  1 12-126) .^2 

The  incapacity  of  the  United  States  depending  on  its  own  manpower  and  re- 
sources in  Indochina  was  the  dominant  experience  of  the  escalations  of  1965- 
1967.  Full  of  confidence,  but  forced  by  repeated  frustrations  to  concoct  yet  more 
costly  and  dangerous  escalations  throughout  this  period,  as  the  Pentagon  Papers 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  13 


conclude:  "The  TET  offensive  showed  that  this  progress  in  many  ways  had  been 
illusory.  The  possibility  of  military  victory  had  seemingly  become  remote  and 
the  cost  had  become  too  high  in  political  and  economic  terms"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 
604).  Insofar  as  U.S.  manpower  was  concerned,  after  the  stunning  Vietnamese 
offensive  in  February  1968  the  Americans  committed  but  25,000  more  men.  But 
it  spent  far  more  on  firepower,  and  the  fiscal  year  beginning  July  1968  was  to 
prove  the  most  costly  of  the  war.  More  important,  assorted  escalation  schemes  de- 
signed during  this  early  1968  period  became  the  basis  of  the  subsequent  Johnson- 
Nixon  strategy  as  the  war  was  energetically  pushed  into  Cambodia  and  Laos.  But 
of  this,  and  the  full  reasons  for  the  March  1968  stabilization  of  large  manpower 
increments,  the  Pentagon  Papers  say  nothing  or  far  less  than  has  been  published 
elsewhere. 

It  was  in  this  context  that  the  United  States  was  to  return  to  the  chimera  of  rely- 
ing on  the  Vietnamese  commanded  by  Saigon  fighting  their  own  countrymen  who 
had  successfully  defeated  the  infinitely  more  powerful  Americans.  While  this  no- 
tion is  now  called  the  Nixon  Doctrine,  it  was  in  fact  the  oldest,  least  successful 
approach  to  the  war  since  1949. 

After  1965  the  United  States  certainly  had  not  abandoned  the  principle  of  de- 
pending on  Saigon's  forces  in  some  critical  manner,  at  some  vague  future  time. 
As  U.S.  men  poured  into  Vietnam  in  1965,  the  belief  was  that  Saigon's  morale 
would  be  bolstered  and  that  the  Americans  would  give  it  time  to  reform  and  en- 
large its  military  arm.  If  that  illusion  appears  to  have  been  seriously  held  at  first, 
as  time  went  on  and  American  forces  grew  it  was  thought  that  the  certain,  im- 
minent destruction  of  the  NLF  main  force  units  might  give  Saigon  more  leisure 
to  prepare  to  mop  up  thereafter.  The  immediate  military  problem  therefore  be- 
came one  for  the  United  States,  and  although  it  was  not  difficult  to  add  about 
100,000  men  to  Saigon's  units  in  the  eighteen  months  after  July  1965  (bringing 
it  to  623,000  men),  getting  them  to  fight  was  quite  another  task  (Gravel  ed.,  II: 
284,  511,  596;  111:432,  462). 

Illusions  about  building  Saigon's  military  capacity  or  morale  with  greater  U.S. 
presence  were  soon  smashed,  and  a  quite  realistic  assessment  of  reality  predomi- 
nated. In  fact,  new  escalations  were  justified  in  internal  debates  precisely  because 
Washington  was  aware  of  how  decadent  and  fragile  the  Saigon  political,  economic, 
and  military  structure  was  at  any  given  time.  In  July  1965  the  Americans  con- 
sidered it  on  the  verge  of  disaster.  At  best,  key  Americans  thought  the  following 
year,  an  enfeebled  Saigon  would  drag  on  unable  to  prosecute  the  war,  particularly 
the  "vital  nonmilitary  aspects  of  it"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 87;  see  also  IV:21).  The 
contempt  with  which  Washington  held  the  Saigon  regime  at  this  time  was  total. 
"It  is  obviously  true  that  the  Vietnamese  are  not  today  ready  for  self-govern- 
ment," Henry  Cabot  Lodge  commented  at  the  middle  of  the  year,  "but  if  we  are 
going  to  adopt  the  policy  of  turning  every  country  that  is  unfit  for  self-govern- 
ment over  to  the  communists,  there  won't  be  much  of  the  world  left"  (Gravel 
ed.,  IV:99;  see  also  IV:89).  Security  in  the  Saigon  offices  was  so  poor  that  it  was 
given  only  one-hour  notifications  in  advance  of  major  escalations.  But  Saigon's 
economic  and  political  weaknesses  correctly  worried  the  Americans  the  most.  It 
knew  the  peasants  regarded  the  Saigon  officials  as  "tools  of  the  local  rich  .  .  . 
excessively  corrupt  from  top  to  bottom"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 374;  see  also  IV:  103). 
And  they  retained  an  obsessive  fear  of  inflation  that  could  shatter  the  entire  econ- 
omy, increase  military  desertions,  and  ultimately  become  the  decisive  factor  of 
the  war  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 341-343,  369,  377-378).  U.S.  troop  escalations  were 
often  calculated  in  terms  of  their  economic  impact  on  the  local  economy,  a  fact 
that  inhibited  yet  further  increases. 


14      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Nothing  that  occurred  in  the  period  before  the  Tet  offensive  altered  this  Amer- 
ican vision.  Saigon's  army  fought  conventional  warfare  in  a  guerrilla  context,  it 
was  poorly  led,  had  poor  morale,  victimized  the  peasantry,  and  had  low  opera- 
tional capabilities.  This  fact  was  recognized  in  many  forms,  and  numerous  schemes 
plotted  for  counteracting  it.  But  they  came  to  naught,  because  even  as  the  United 
States  intervened  presumably  to  remove  the  main  military  burden  from  Saigon's 
backs,  its  presence  convinced  Saigon's  generals  that  "Uncle  Sam  will  do  their  job 
for  them"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:503;  see  also  IV:396-399,  402-403,  439-440,  463). 
It  was  this  unregenerate  group  of  self-serving  officers  to  whom  the  United  States 
was  to  turn  when  its  vast  gamble  was  finally  smashed  during  the  Tet  offensive.  In 
the  tortured  weeks  after  that  calamity  for  the  Americans,  the  extent  of  Saigon's 
shocking  weakness  was  candidly  assessed,  and  the  Pentagon  officials  used  that 
fact  as  justification  for  demanding  yet  another  200,000  men  for  Indochina  and 
even  heavier  reliance  on  American  manpower  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 267,  562). 

But  further  increases  in  U.S.  manpower  were  effectively  to  end  at  this  point, 
as  Washington  ignored  the  twenty-year  history  of  the  war  on  behalf  of  the  hope 
that  somehow,  at  some  time,  Vietnamese  could  be  made  to  fight  Vietnamese  on 
behalf  of  a  foreign  imperialism.  The  trap  was  thereby  fixed,  taken  up  by  the 
Nixon  administration  as  its  doctrine  in  Indochina  and  remained  to  suck  the  U.S. 
into  further  necessary  escalations  of  firepower,  expeditions  into  neighboring 
states,  and  a  protracted  involvement  and  expense  in  money  and  men  to  buy  the 
time  essential  for  "Vietnamization."  In  this  sense,  the  Nixon  administration  be- 
came the  inheritor  and  proponent  of  all  the  main  themes  and  failures  of  the  pre- 
ceding two  decades,  accepting  them  as  the  inevitable  basis  of  his  own  eventual 
demise.  The  story  is  as  familiar  as  the  outcome  is  certain.  Only  the  timing  is  un- 
known, along  with  the  number  and  magnitude  of  the  American  efforts  that  will  be 
required  so  long  as  Washington,  seeking  to  prevent  the  economically  significant 
dominoes  from  falling,  hopes  to  save  a  shred  of  credibility  as  to  the  efficacy  of 
America's  will,  or  continues  its  efforts  to  impose  a  U.S.-dominated  military,  po- 
litical, and  economic  structure  on  South  Vietnam.  The  alternative  is  to  acknowl- 
edge the  reality  that  the  magnificent  Vietnamese  people  has  defeated  the  most 
powerful  nation  in  modern  times. 

Though  mediocre  as  history  and  partial  as  documentation,  the  Pentagon  Pa- 
pers provide  a  singularly  overwhelming  indictment  of  how  devious,  incorrigible, 
and  beyond  the  pale  of  human  values  America's  rulers  were  throughout  this  epic 
event  in  U.S.  history.  If  they  occasionally  moderated  the  scale  of  violence  it  was 
purely  as  a  result  of  a  pragmatic  realization  that  it  failed  to  produce  results  de- 
sired, and  they  as  freely  vastly  increased  it  when  convinced  they  might  also  at- 
tain their  ends. 

But  far  more  important  is  the  main  lesson  that  the  entire  Vietnam  history  has 
made  painfully  obvious  to  all  who  have  either  studied  or  experienced  it.  The 
United  States  did  not  at  any  time  regard  Vietnam  itself  as  the  main  issue  as  much 
as  it  did  the  future  of  Southeast  Asia  and,  beyond  it,  the  relationship  of  Vietnam 
to  revolution  in  modern  times.  Vietnam,  almost  by  chance,  became  the  main  in- 
tersection of  the  frustrations  and  limits  of  U.S.  power  in  the  postwar  period,  the 
focus  of  the  futile  American  effort  to  once  and  for  all  translate  its  seemingly  over- 
whelming technological  and  economic  might  into  a  successful  inhibition  of  local 
revolutionary  forces,  thereby  aborting  the  larger  pattern  of  world  revolution  and 
advancing  America's  own  economic  and  strategic  interests  at  one  and  the  same 
time.  This  conclusion  is  inescapable  from  a  study  of  the  whole  of  postwar  U.S. 
foreign  policy  and  the  "domino"  and  "credibility"  theories  as  applied  to  Vietnam. 


The  American  Goals  in  Vietnam  15 


In  this  manner,  the  Vietnamese  fought  for  their  national  salvation  and  self- 
determination,  but  also  for  that  of  the  entire  world  as  well.  For  just  as  Vietnam 
personified  to  the  United  States  the  consummate  danger  of  the  Left  everywhere 
in  the  Third  World  in  postwar  history,  the  Vietnamese  resistance  embodies  its 
triumph.  For  this  reason,  the  Vietnamese  have  carried  the  burden  in  blood  and  ad- 
vanced the  cause  of  a  larger  international  movement — diverse  and  pluralist  as 
that  movement  may  be.  In  their  national  struggle  they  have  therefore  also  been 
the  most  profoundly  internationalist,  giving  both  time  and  freedom  to  Latin 
American  forces  that  have  infinitely  less  to  fear  from  a  mired  United  States.  And 
by  defining  the  limits  of  the  American  ruling  class's  power  in  a  manner  that  may 
inhibit  that  elite's  willingness  to  sacrifice  the  blood  of  its  docile  youth  in  future 
imperialist  follies,  they  have  done  for  the  American  people  what  they  themselves 
could  not  accomplish.  The  monumental  struggle  which  the  Vietnamese  undertook 
and  won  has  thereby  become  one  of  the  most  profoundly  important  events  to  the 
future  of  progress  in  the  remainder  of  this  century. 


Notes 

1.  For  an  example  of  how  informative  official  military  history,  even  written  from  a 
very  conservative  viewpoint,  can  be  both  as  narrative  and  in  subsuming  the  main  cur- 
rents, see  Lionel  Max  Chassin,  The  Communist  Conquest  of  China:  A  History  of  the 
Civil  War,  1945-1949  (Cambridge,  1965). 

2.  Joyce  and  Gabriel  Kolko,  The  Limits  of  Power:  The  World  and  United  States 
Foreign  Policy,  1945-1954  (New  York,  1972),  p.  72. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  340. 

4.  Ibid.,  pp.  554-562;  Gabriel  Kolko,  The  Roots  of  American  Foreign  Policy  (Bos- 
ton, 1969),  chap.  IV,  for  a  history  of  the  main  events  of  the  war;  The  Senator  Gravel 
Edition,  The  Pentagon  Papers:  The  Defense  Department  History  of  United  States  De- 
cisionmaking on  Vietnam  [4  vols.]  (Boston,  1971 ),  1:31,  37,  62-63,  362-363,  450. 

5.  Kolko,  Limits  of  Power,  683-684. 

6.  Kolko,  Limits  of  Power,  686-687. 

7.  Kolko,  Limits  of  Power,  698-700. 

8.  Kolko,  Limits  of  Power,  685. 

9.  Ibid.,  686-687,  795. 

10.  Kolko,  Limits  of  Power,  686. 

11.  More  useful  data  appears  in  Townsend  Hoopes,  The  Limits  of  Intervention  (New 
York,  1969);  Eliot  Janeway,  The  Economics  of  Crisis  (New  York,  1968),  pp.  228,  280- 
281;  Richard  N.  Gardner,  Sterling-Dollar  Diplomacy  (New  York,  1969),  pp.  xxii,  Ixvii; 
Gabriel  Kolko,  The  London  Bulletin,  August  1969. 

12.  Lenny  Siegel,  "Vietnam's  Electronic  Battlefield,"  Pacific  Research  and  World  Em- 
pire Telegram,  September-October  1971,  pp.  1-8. 

13.  Lloyd  Norman,  'The  '206,000  Plan'— The  Inside  Story,"  Army,  April  1971,  pp. 
30-35;  Hoopes,  Limits  of  Intervention,  passim;  Kolko,  London  Bulletin,  passim;  and 
contemporary  accounts  in  the  New  York  Times. 


16 


2.     Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy:  The 
National  Security  Council  and  Vietnam 

by  Richard  B.  Du  Boff 


We  know  that  the  struggle  between  the  Communist  system  and  our- 
selves will  go  on.  We  know  it  will  go  on  in  economics,  in  productivity, 
in  ideology,  in  Latin  America  and  Africa,  in  the  Middle  East  and  Asia. 
— President  John  F.  Kennedy,  Remarks  at  Billings,  Montana,  Septem- 
ber 25,  1963  (Gravel  edition:  11:829). 

Publication  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  offers  us  a  once-in-a-lifetime  glimpse  into 
the  inner  councils  of  the  decisionmaking  apparatus  which  carries  out  the  broad 
policies  of  America's  ruling  class.  This,  as  I  see  it,  is  why  President  Nixon  and  his 
Attorney  General,  John  Mitchell,  fought  so  strenuously  to  block  their  publication 
in  June  1971.  After  all,  it  would  have  been  a  relatively  simple  matter  for  Nixon, 
one  of  the  great  opportunists  of  American  history,  to  have  made  considerable 
short-term  political  capital  from  the  revelations  in  the  Papers:  most  of  the  stun- 
ning instances  of  deceit,  subterfuge,  and  cynical  manipulation  of  the  American 
public  pertain  to  the  Democratic  administrations  of  1961-1969,  the  Kennedy- 
Johnson  years.  Nixon's  fight  to  prevent  publication  of  this  record  must  be  inter- 
preted as  an  act  of  class  solidarity,  an  effort  to  protect  the  secrecy  and  close-cir- 
cuited concentration  of  decisionmaking  power  in  the  upper  reaches  of  the  U.S. 
foreign  policy  establishment. 

I.    DECISIONMAKING  AT  THE  TOP:  THE  IDEOLOGICAL  ROOTS 

Over  the  years  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  has  exhibited  a  remark- 
able degree  of  consistency.  Since  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century  this 
nation's  external  relations  have  been  characterized  by  a  compulsive  expansion- 
ism, principally  though  not  exclusively  commercial  and  financial;  a  marked 
propensity  for  military  intervention  abroad;^  a  distinct  preference  for  allies  of  a 
conservative  and  counterrevolutionary  stripe;  and  a  well-known  aggressiveness  of 
purpose  often  expressed  via  the  unilateral  act,  the  fait  accompli.  Unless  it  is  ar- 
gued that  the  external  behavior  of  the  American  power  elite  is  essentially  planless 
and  just  happens  to  fit  this  mold,  artificially  imposed  upon  it,  such  long-term 
unity  of  foreign  policymaking  reflects  underlying  economic  interests.  In  other 
words,  U.S.  foreign  policy  serves  the  goals  of  an  economic  ruling  class  more  than 
any  other  single  component  of  American  society. 

Increasingly,  this  economic  elite  has  become  anchored  in  giant  corporations 
and  financial  institutions.  Corporate  business  is  not  merely  another  "interest 
group"  in  a  complex  social  structure,  but  (as  Gabriel  Kolko  describes  it)  "the 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Richard  B.  Du  Boff. 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  17 

keystone  of  power  which  defines  the  essential  preconditions  and  functions  of  the 
larger  American  social  order.  ...  At  every  level  of  the  administration  of  the 
American  state,  domestically  and  internationally,  business  serves  as  the  fount  of 
critical  assumptions  or  goals  and  strategically  placed  personnel."  ^ 

These  "critical  assumptions"  form  the  ideology  that  promotes  the  interests  of 
the  corporate  business  class — which  in  turn  has  supplied  most  of  the  personnel 
to  man  the  major  foreign  policy  posts  in  Washington.'^  This  ideology,  moreover, 
constitutes  the  vital  link  between  economic  interests  and  political  actions.  The 
reason  is  that  the  key  inputs  into  foreign  policy  ideology  are  derived  from  the 
general  outlook  of  the  American  business  community,  which  regards  the  external 
world  in  terms  of  actual  and  potential  threats  to  free-wheeling,  open-ended  profit 
maximization.  Active  policy  goals,  then,  tend  to  sanction  "stability"  and  "re- 
sponsible" behavior  on  the  part  of  foreign  governments — just  as  the  overriding 
requirement  for  corporations  is  a  stable  and  highly  favorable  environment  for 
their  investment,  production,  and  trade  activities.  While  not  "each  and  every  act 
of  political  and  military  policy"  can  be  tied  to  economic  motivations,^  the  gen- 
eral thrust  of  American  foreign  policy  over  the  past  seven  or  eight  decades  comes 
from  the  "growth"-propelled  search  for  control  over  major  resource  areas  and 
the  effort  to  keep  an  open  door  everywhere  else  for  potential  future  expansion. 
The  enlargement  of  capital  values  and  market  outlets  is  the  first  condition  of 
capitalist  production  itself.  The  development  of  a  worldwide  market  to  assure 
the  continuity  of  the  expansion  process  is  also  part  of  the  first  condition  of  capi- 
talist production — by  no  means  can  it  be  called  extrinsic  to  the  survival  of  the 
system. 

The  transmission  belt  that  converts  the  structure  of  economic  privilege  into 
complementary  political  and  military  decisions  is  ideology.  An  expansionist  mar- 
ket economy  generates  the  ideological  assumptions  which  provide  the  framework 
for  political  actions.^  Furthermore,  as  noted,  the  individuals  at  the  center  of  the 
foreign  policy  establishment  have  been  drawn,  in  disproportionate  numbers,  from 
the  ranks  of  the  economic  elite.  Over  the  long  run  they — and  their  ideology — 
have  shaped  the  governmental  institutions  and  policy  criteria  through  which  de- 
cisions are  made.  (The  National  Security  Council  and  its  reports,  as  we  shall  see, 
were  the  chief  instruments  in  establishing  U.S.  policy  toward  Indochina  through 
1954  and  beyond.)  Thus,  even  if  the  State  and  Defense  departments,  and  the 
White  House,  were  to  come  under  the  control  of  individuals  only  marginally  con- 
nected with  the  corporate  business  community — as  may  be  the  case  with  some 
of  the  arrivistes  at  the  helm  of  the  Nixon  administration — ideological  implanta- 
tion virtually  guarantees  that  the  overall  formulation  and  execution  of  foreign 
policy  will  remain  unchanged,  short  of  a  radical  restructuring  of  the  distribution 
of  economic  and  political  power  in  the  outside  society.  As  a  high  State  Depart- 
ment official  put  it  in  1969: 

The  options  the  President  exercises  over  foreign  policy  are  bound  to  be 
limited.  There  is  little  possibility  that  the  President  can  alter  basic  policy 
premises.  Our  conception  of  fundamental  interests  is  non-controversial;  the 
question  is  what  you  do  to  promote  these  interests." 

The  critical  elements  of  business  ideology  bear  a  direct  relationship  to  Amer- 
ican foreign  policy.  One  element  is  that  in  international  affairs,  as  in  business, 
there  are  "rules  of  the  game"  that  are  violated  only  under  pain  of  swift  retribu- 
tion. These  rules  represent  political  mechanisms  which  warrant  continuation  of 
the  capitalist  property  system.  The  arrogant,  moralizing  mentality  of  a  John 


18      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Foster  Dulles,  for  instance,  can  be  traced  to  training  in  and  practice  of  inter- 
national law,  traditionally  the  vehicle  for  imposing  a  network  of  Western  privi- 
leges on  lesser  breeds.  More  generally,  the  legalistic  approach  to  international 
relations  represents  a  self-interested  extension  of  capitalist  rules  of  the  game  to 
the  world  arena.  There  are  some  things  one  can  do,  others  one  cannot,  and  most 
of  the  taboos  are,  of  course,  things  you  would  be  tempted  to  do,  not  I.  Property 
rights  and  the  incomes  produced  by  them  (profits,  dividends,  rent,  interest)  can- 
not be  interfered  with;  commercial  and  financial  contracts,  debts,  mortgages,  secu- 
rity provisions  are  "enforceable"  in  courts  of  law.  "Free"  markets  for  resources, 
labor  power,  and  consumer  goods  embody  certain  norms  of  participant  behavior, 
and  these  may  not  be  tampered  with.  Nor,  for  that  matter,  is  it  permissible  to 
abrogate  or  renege  on  treaty  obligations,  agreements,  commitments,  or  "under- 
standings" in  international  affairs,  especially  when  they  have  been  drawn  up 
within  the  political  and  psychological  field  of  gravity  generated  by  the  rules  of 
the  game. 

A  second  element  of  foreign  policy  ideology  is  the  absolute  need  for  dynamic 
growth  and  expansion.  The  almost  instinctive  goal  of  an  "activist"  foreign  policy 
(the  way  the  State  Department  describes  its  own)  is  the  building  up  of  a  struc- 
ture of  rewards  and  compulsions  ("carrots  and  sticks")  to  assure  key  profit  makers 
at  home  unimpeded  access  to  external  markets  and  resource  areas  and  to  furnish 
some  insurance  that  future  expansion  into  these  areas  will  not  be  closed  off  by 
the  rise  of  hostile  or  Communist  governments.  The  expansion-minded,  it  follows, 
habitually  project  their  own  motivations  to  their  adversaries.  Even  when  Ameri- 
can policymakers  judged  the  Soviet  Union  and  China  to  be  assuming  an  essen- 
tially defensive  posture  in  international  affairs,  they  accused  them  of,  and  at 
times  subjectively  believed  them  to  be,  practicing  "aggressive  expansionism" 
throughout  the  world. The  growth  imperative,  like  others  in  American  society, 
has  been  projected  outward,  externalized.  For  the  past  twenty-five  years  the 
United  States  has  been  mobilizing  against  Russians  and  Chinese,  Cubans  and 
Vietnamese.  Communism  appears  to  be  a  constituent  which  the  U.S.  corporate 
economy  needs  in  order  to  keep  functioning. 

The  third  significant  input  into  foreign  policy  ideology,  one  which  seems  to 
have  a  particular  hold  on  the  intellectuals  selected  out  from  academic,  military, 
and  political  careers  to  serve  in  the  policymaking  apparatus,  is  the  "bad  example" 
syndrome.  Means  must  be  devised  to  discourage  the  spread  of  revolutions  or 
serious  social  and  economic  reforms  that  might  set  bad  examples  for  other  na- 
tions. This  input  explains  why  the  central  characters  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 
place  so  much  credence  in  the  "domino  theory"  first  stated  in  public  by  President 
Eisenhower  in  his  press  conference  of  April  7,  1954  (Gravel  ed.,  1:597),  but 
inherent  in  Washington's  thinking  about  Indochina  since  mid- 1947,  when  Secre- 
tary of  State  George  C.  Marshall  cabled  his  Ambassador  to  France  that  sympathy 
for  the  Vietnamese  in  their  struggle  against  French  colonialism  should  be  kept 
within  bounds: 

Signs  [of]  development  [of]  anti-Western  Asiatic  consciousness  [are]  already 
multiplying.  .  .  .  Unanimity  [of]  support  for  Vietnamese  among  other  Asi- 
atic countries  [is]  very  striking,  even  leading  to  moves  Burma,  India,  and 
Malaya  send  volunteer  forces  their  assistance.  Vietnam  cause  proving  rally- 
ing-cry  for  all  anti-Western  forces  and  playing  in  hands  Communists  all 
areas.  We  fear  continuation  conflict  may  jeopardize  position  all  Western 
democratic  powers  in  Southern  Asia  and  lead  to  very  eventualities  of  which 
we  most  apprehensive.® 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  19 

It  is  true  that  the  simplistic,  almost  physical  version  of  "falling  dominoes"  put 
forward  in  1954  by  Eisenhower,  a  version  which  postulated  a  Communist  "take- 
over" in  one  country  leading  automatically  to  the  loss  of  one  country  after 
another  in  geographical  order  from  the  original  one,  was  ridiculed  practically 
from  the  start  and  became  a  favorite  target  for  American  liberals  in  the  late 
1950s  and  1960s.  But,  as  was  frequently  the  case  with  Eisenhower,  awkward 
rhetoric  and  faulty  grammar  obscured  a  deeper  reality  understood  by  the  U.S. 
power  structure.  Although  a  Communist  or  leftist  triumph  might  not  bring  about 
immediate  collapse  in  adjacent  countries,  it  would  signify  a  dangerous  historical 
and  psychological  precedent.  The  "losses"  of  Russia  in  1917,  China  in  1949,  and 
Cuba  in  1959  supplied  proof  that  peoples  formerly  colonized  or  dominated  by 
Western  capitalism  could  indeed  create  new  socioeconomic  institutions  to  deal 
with  structural  problems  of  backwardness,  poverty,  and  stagnation,  provided  they 
could  take  up  the  revolutionary  option  and  wield  effective  control  over  their  own 
resources.  The  "domino  theory"  has  a  grimly  convincing  ring  to  it  when  it  sym- 
bolizes this  ominous  drift  of  history.  Under  these  circumstances  President  Ken- 
nedy emphatically  affirmed  his  own  faith  in  the  domino  theory  two  months  before 
his  death:  "...  I  believe  it.  I  believe  ...  if  South  Vietnam  went,  it  would  not 
only  give  them  an  improved  geographic  position  for  a  guerrilla  assault  on  Malaya 
but  would  also  give  the  impression  that  the  wave  of  the  future  in  Southeast  Asia 
was  China  and  the  Communists.  So  I  believe  it"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:828).  In  June 
1964  when  Lyndon  Johnson  asked  the  basic  question  "Would  the  rest  of  South- 
east Asia  necessarily  fall  if  Laos  and  South  Vietnam  came  under  North  Viet- 
namese control?"  neither  he  nor  his  close  advisers  paid  any  heed  to  the  response 
from  the  CIA  Board  of  National  Estimates:  "With  the  possible  exception  of  Cam- 
bodia, it  is  likely  that  no  nation  in  the  area  would  quickly  succumb  to  commu- 
nism as  a  result  of  the  fall  of  Laos  and  South  Vietnam."  Apparently  they  too 
rejected  the  simplistic  version  of  "falling  dominoes"  in  favor  of  the  Board's  esti- 
mate that  the  loss  of  South  Vietnam  and  Laos  "would  be  profoundly  damaging 
to  the  U.S.  position  in  the  Far  East"  because  of  its  impact  on  America's  prestige 
(Gravel  ed.,  111:127,  178).  The  CIA  Board  cautioned  that,  if  South  Vietnam 
"went,"  the  Peking  leadership  would  be  able  to  justify  its  revolutionary  policies 
with  demonstrated  success  in  Indochina. 

Time  and  again  this  prospect  of  a  "successful"  revolutionary  option  is  con- 
sidered to  be  the  greatest  menace  to  our  own  "prestige,"  "reputation,"  and 
"credibility,"  words  which  recur  throughout  the  Papers.  Thus,  Assistant  Secretary 
of  Defense  John  T.  McNaughton  was  insisting  in  the  fall  of  1964  that  were  we 
to  fail  in  Vietnam,  that  failure  must  be  made  "clear  to  the  world"  as  having 
been  "due  to  special  local  factors  .  .  .  that  do  not  apply  to  other  nations"  and 
that  "cannot  be  generalized  beyond  South  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:657,  583; 
McNaughton's  emphasis.  See  also  his  "good  doctor"  prescription  for  maintaining 
America's  global  reputation  [Gravel  ed.,  111:559,  582,  604]  and  William  P. 
Bundy's  advice  that  "stronger  action"  by  the  United  States  would  enhance  our 
image  to  Asians  even  if  South  Vietnam  fell  [Gravel  ed.,  111:684-686]). 

II.    THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  AND  VIETNAM 

In  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War  the  United  States  faced  a  new 
array  of  politico-military  problems  brought  on  by  the  cold  war,  reduced  defense 
budgets,  and  a  more  complex  military  establishment  in  which  air  power  was  be- 
ginning to  play  an  increasingly  attractive  and  politically  independent  role.  The 


20      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

response  of  the  civilian  ruling  class  came  in  the  form  of  the  National  Security 
Act  of  (July)  1947,  which  created  a  single,  unified  military  establishment,  au- 
thorized a  Secretary  of  Defense  to  oversee  it,  and  established  the  National  Secu- 
rity Council  (NSC)  as  an  advisory  body  to  the  President  to  help  in  "voluntary 
coordination"  of  policy.  "The  Secretary  of  Defense  was  not  to  be  the  chief  ar- 
chitect of  defense  policy" — this  was  now  placed  more  firmly  than  ever  under  the 
control  of  civilians  outside  the  Pentagon.-* 

For  this  reason,  the  NSC  was  set  up,  and  for  this  reason  too  its  precise  func- 
tion was  left  obscure.  Statutory  membership  comprises  the  President  and  Vice- 
President,  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense,  and  the  Director  of  the  Office  of 
Civil  and  Defense  Mobilization.  The  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and 
the  Director  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  are  statutory  advisers  to  the 
Council  (not  members).  Beyond  that,  the  President  may  select  his  own  NSC 
counselors  from  among  other  government  officials,  or  he  may  appoint  private 
citizens  as  informal  advisers  or  consultants. The  effect  of  this  act  was  to 
strengthen  the  bond  between  the  formal  policymaking  apparatus  culminating  in 
the  Presidency  and  the  corporate-business-banking  sector  of  the  external  society. 

Accordingly,  the  1947  act  opened  up  a  pipeline  between  the  summit  of  state 
power  and  the  civilian  ruling  elites,  both  in  and  out  of  government.  While  it 
created  flexible  machinery  allowing  different  Presidents  to  use  NSC  in  different 
ways,  it  has  underscored  the  role  of  the  civilian  economic  elite  in  drafting  mili- 
tary and  political  strategy,  and  it  demonstrates  the  importance  of  upper-class 
"outsiders"  in  molding  foreign  policy. Foundation  experts  (often  from  the 
Council  on  Foreign  Relations)  and  councils  of  "wise  men"  have  frequently  been 
shuttled  in  and  out  of  the  informal,  committee-type  NSC  structure,  particularly 
for  major  decisions  or  special  crisis  management. 

Thanks  in  good  part  to  NSC,  both  the  Truman  and  Eisenhower  administrations 
were  "able  to  follow  military  policies  which  when  inaugurated  had  little  support 
from  the  people,"  because  "the  appropriate  agencies  of  the  government,  not  public 
opinion,  had  the  final  word,"  according  to  Professor  Samuel  Huntington.  In  1953, 
Huntington  reports  further,  the  NSC  brought  in  "yet  another  group  of  six  con- 
sultants .  .  .  and  James  Black,  president  of  Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Company, 
one  of  the  'Seven  Wise  Men'  [who  had  worked  on  an  earlier  NSC  project]"  to 
resolve  the  continental  defense  problems  posed  by  the  Soviets'  acquisition  of  the 
hydrogen  bomb.^^  March  1968,  in  the  wake  of  the  National  Liberation  Front's 
Tet  Offensive  in  South  Vietnam,  it  was  an  informal  "Senior  Advisory  Group  on 
Vietnam"  that  prevailed  upon  Lyndon  Johnson  to  put  a  ceiling  on  the  resources 
allocated  to  the  Vietnam  war,  lest  price  inflation  and  the  balance  of  payments 
deficit  lurch  completely  out  of  control. These  advisers,  some  of  them  well- 
known  "hawks"  and  most  having  close  ties  to  Wall  Street  and  other  corporate 
institutions,  forcefully  pointed  out  the  dangers  to  the  American  economy  and  its 
overseas  interests  from  continued  increases  in  Vietnam  spending.  The  President 
reluctantly  stopped  escalating  the  conflict  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:266-276). 

This  kind  of  NSC  influence  and  control  is  evident  in  America's  involvement 
in  Indochina,  above  all  through  1954  when  hard,  hawkish  decisions  were  made 
that  set  the  stage  for  later  military  buildups  and  eventual  escalation.  During  this 
period,  furthermore,  the  executive  secretaries  of  the  NSC  were  Sidney  Souers,  a 
successful  businessman  from  St.  Louis,  and  James  S.  Lay,  Jr.,  a  former  utility 
company  oflficial;  Eisenhower's  special  assistant  for  NSC  affairs  was  Boston 
bankeV  Robert  Cutler;  and  among  NSC  advisers  were  corporation  lawyers,  bank- 
ers, industrialists. The  Pentagon  Papers  contain  every  critical  NSC  document 
relating  to  the  Vietnam  war — as  the  continuous  references  to  them  in  other  doc- 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  21 

uments  (cables,  telegrams,  reports  from  other  agencies)  make  clear.  And  these 
NSC  materials  are  surely  the  reason  why  the  Pentagon  Papers  historians  claim 
that  their  "collection  [of  appended  documents]  represents  the  internal  commit- 
ment of  the  U.S.  as  expressed  in  classified  documents  circulated  at  the  highest 
levels  in  the  Government." 

Through  the  Truman  and  Eisenhower  administrations  the  major  NSC  docu- 
ments constitute  what  I  would  call  "paradigm  statements."  They  evolve  out  of 
prior  periods  of  policy  disarray,  doubt,  conflict,  infighting,  or  plain  indecision. 
Slowly  but  surely — and  sometimes,  under  pressing  crisis,  swiftly — this  divided 
counsel  gives  way  to  consensus,  expressed  by  an  NSC  position  paper.  Henceforth 
this  "paradigm  statement"  serves  as  clearly  established  policy.  It  is  referred  to 
and  quoted  constantly  thereafter.  As  a  set  of  guidelines  it  can  be  modified  and 
amended.  Eventually,  it  may  even  be  replaced  when  it  has  outlived  its  usefulness 
or  when  the  decisionmaking  structure  decides,  perhaps,  that  one  segment  of  it 
should  now  be  more  strongly  emphasized  at  the  expense  of  another. 

In  discussing  these  NSC  paradigm  statements,  I  shall  cite  only  those  through 
the  end  of  1954  when,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  U.S.  policy  for  Indochina 
was  cast  for  the  next  two  decades:  South  Vietnam  was  held  to  be  vital  for  Amer- 
ican security,  its  future  was  not  to  be  subject  to  negotiation  of  any  sort,  and  it 
had  to  be  defended  by  military  action — including  U.S.  intervention — if  need  be. 

The  key  NSC  paradigm  statements  on  Indochina  through  1954: 

1.    NSC  48/1,  23  December  1949  (Gravel  ed.,  I:82)i6 

This  was  the  first  policy  statement  on  Indochina,  capping  three  years  of  grow- 
ing doubts  over  French  diplomatic  and  military  policy  and  fears  about  Ho  Chi 
Minh's  "clear  record  as  agent  [of]  international  communism,"  as  Acting  Secretary 
of  State  Dean  Acheson  warned  the  U.S.  Consul  in  Saigon  in  December  1946 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:20).  Two  months  later  Secretary  of  State  George  C.  Marshall 
expressed  "increasing  concern  over  situation  as  it  is  developing  in  Indochina"; 
the  United  States  could  "not  lose  sight  [of]  fact  that  Ho  Chi  Minh  has  direct 
Communist  connections  .  .  .  philosophy  and  political  organizations  emanating 
from  and  controlled  by  Kremlin."  NSC  48/1  also  embodied  the  "domino  the- 
ory," first  voiced  by  Marshall  in  May  1947  (as  noted  earlier)  and  repeated  in 
1949  by  Under  Secretary  of  State  James  Webb:  "If  COMMIES  gain  control  IC 
[Indochina],  THAI  and  rest  SEA  will  be  imperiled."  In  March  1949  George 
M.  Abbott,  U.S.  Consul  General  in  Saigon,  told  Washington  that  a  French  with- 
drawal from  Vietnam  would  leave  "a  Communist-controlled  government  in  a 
strategic  area  of  Southeast  Asia,"  and  Secretary  of  State  Acheson  was  soon  in- 
forming his  Consul  General  in  Hanoi  that  "In  light  Ho's  known  background,  no 
other  assumption  possible  but  that  he  outright  Commie.  .  .  ." 

NSC  48/1  established  a  deep  American  concern  over  developing  events  in 
Southeast  Asia,  particularly  in  view  of  the  disintegration  of  the  Nationalist  armies 
in  China:  "the  extension  of  communist  authority  in  China  represents  a  grievous 
political  defeat  for  us  ...  If  Southeast  Asia  is  also  swept  by  communism,  we 
shall  have  suffered  a  major  political  rout  the  repercussions  of  which  will  be  felt 
throughout  the  rest  of  the  world,  especially  in  the  Middle  East  and  in  a  then 
critically  exposed  Australia"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:82). 

But  in  synthesizing  earlier  concerns  over  Indochina  and  world  communism, 
NSC  48/1  took  a  discrete  step  upward,  into  a  comprehensive  review  of  the 
political  economy  of  the  Far  East.  Topmost  among  its  considerations  was  the 
precarious  position  of  Japan,  which  obviously  had  to  be  retained  in  the  free 


22      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

world,  to  anchor  the  Pacific  flank  of  the  international  capitalist  system.  "A  middle 
of  the  road  regime  in  Japan  .  .  .  would  in  the  long-run  prove  more  reliable  as 
an  ally  of  the  United  States  than  would  an  extreme  right-wing  totalitarian  gov- 
ernment." This  would  be  the  best  way  for  pro-American  elements  "to  exercise 
their  influence  over  government  policy  and  to  mold  public  opinion."  20  Japan 
was  seen  as  the  hub  of  an  integrated  Asian  economy — a  free  market  economy 
whose  various  parts  would  be  linked  together  through  complementary  trading 
patterns,  investment  and  capital  goods  flows,  and  technical  and  financial  aid 
programs  : 

Asia  is  a  source  of  numerous  raw  materials,  principally  tin  and  natural 
rubber,  which  are  of  strategic  importance  to  the  United  States,  although  the 
United  States  could,  as  in  World  War  II,  rely  on  other  sources  if  neces- 
sary. .  .  . 

The  United  States  has  an  interest  in  the  attainment  by  the  free  peoples  of 
Asia  of  that  degree  of  economic  recovery  and  development  needed  as  a  foun- 
dation for  social  and  political  stability.  This  interest  stems  from  the  principle 
that  a  viable  economy  is  essential  to  the  survival  of  independent  states.  In 
the  two  major  non-Communist  countries  of  this  area,  India  and  Japan,  U.S. 
aid  ...  is  averting  a  deterioration  in  economic  conditions  that  would  other- 
wise threaten  political  stability.  While  scrupulously  avoiding  assumption  of 
responsibility  for  raising  Asiatic  living  standards,  it  is  to  the  U.S.  interest  to 
promote  the  ability  of  these  countries  to  maintain  .  .  .  the  economic  con- 
ditions prerequisite  to  political  stability.  Japan  can  only  maintain  its  present 
living  standard  on  a  self-supporting  basis  if  it  is  able  to  secure  a  greater  pro- 
portion of  its  needed  food  and  raw  material  (principally  cotton)  imports 
from  the  Asiatic  area,  in  which  its  natural  markets  lie,  rather  than  from  the 
U.S.,  in  which  its  export  market  is  small.  In  view  of  the  desirability  of  avoid- 
ing preponderant  dependence  on  Chinese  sources,  and  the  limited  availability 
of  supplies  from  prewar  sources  in  Korea  and  Formosa,  this  will  require  a 
considerable  increase  in  Southern  Asiatic  food  and  raw  material  exports. 
.  .  .  One  major  prerequisite  to  such  an  increase  is  the  restoration  of  political 
stability  in  the  food  exporting  countries  of  Burma  and  Indo  China.  .  .  . 
Another  major  prerequisite  is  expanded  agricultural  development  in  the 
stable  Southern  Asiatic  countries  in  which  such  development  would  be  eco- 
nomic: India,  Pakistan — which  exports  wheat  and  cotton,  Thailand — which 
exports  rice,  and  Ceylon — whose  sizable  rice  imports  reduce  the  availability 
of  Asiatic  foodstuffs  to  India  and  Japan.  Japanese  and  Indian  food  require- 
ments, and  Japanese  cotton  requirements,  could  be  met  if  certain  projected 
irrigation,  reclamation,  and  transportation  projects  were  executed.  .  .  . 

These  projects  will  probably  require  .  .  .  some  external  technical  aid, 
some  limited  external  financial  aid.  .  .  .  External  technical  aid  should  be 
made  available  under  the  Point  IV  program.  The  external  financial  aid  re- 
quired is  of  such  a  limited  character  that  it  can  probably  be  adequately  pro- 
vided by  the  International  Bank  and  the  Export-Import  Bank.  .  .  . 

Through  increased  sales  of  rice,  wheat,  and  cotton,  Thailand  and  Pakistan 
could  most  economically  secure  the  imports  of  capital  and  consumer  goods 
to  develop  and  diversify  their  economies.  .  .  . 

Our  interest  in  a  viable  economy  in  the  non-Communist  countries  of  Asia 
would  be  advanced  by  increased  trade  among  such  countries.  Japanese  and 
Indian  industrial  revival  and  development  can  contribute  to  enlarged  intra- 
regional  trade  relations  which  suffered  a  set-back  because  of  the  economic 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  23 

vacuum  resulting  from  the  defeat  of  Japan  .  .  .  and  the  interference  and 
restrictions  arising  from  extensive  governmental  controls.  Given  a  favorable 
and  secure  atmosphere — plus  adequate  freedom  to  individual  traders,  readily 
available  working  capital,  suitable  commercial  agreements  establishing  con- 
ditions favorable  to  commerce  and  navigation  and  general  assistance  in  the 
promotion  of  trade — it  is  expected  that  a  substantial  increase  in  intra-Asia 
trade  can  occur. 21 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  aim  was  not  general  economic  and  social  betterment 
for  Asian  masses — scrupulous  avoidance  of  that  responsibility  was  recommended, 
along  with  suitably  low  aid  levels.  NSC  48/1  looked  upon  Indochina  as  essential 
to  a  political  economy  of  "stability"  that  would  simply  allow  Japan  in  the  Pacific 
(and  India  in  South  Asia)  to  remain  "non-Communist." 

2.  NSC  64,  27  February  1950  (Gravel  ed.,  1:83,  186-187,  361-362) 

Like  NSC  48/1,  this  document  preceded  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Korea.  Already 
it  was  deemed  necessary  "to  protect  U.S.  security  interests  in  Indochina  .  .  . 
and  to  prevent  the  expansion  of  Communist  aggression  in  that  area."  The 
domino  theory  was  reiterated. 

3.  NSC  68,  April  1950 

Still  top  secret,  this  important  document  is  not  found  in  the  Pentagon  Papers. 
Most  scholars  consider  it  a  cold  war  turning  point,  "a  document  which  recom- 
mended a  substantial  increase  in  expenditures  on  national  security  in  a  variety  of 
ways  at  a  time  when  further  reductions  in  defense  expenditures  were  under  seri- 
ous consideration."  22  it  should  be  included  in  any  survey  of  Indochina,  because 
it  brings  out  the  broad,  strategic  considerations  behind  American  foreign  policy 
at  this  point  in  time,  as  well  as  the  kinds  of  responses  U.S.  leaders  were  con- 
templating in  "trouble  spots"  all  over  the  world.  It  grew  out  of  a  comprehensive 
assessment  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  carried  out  by  a  joint  State-Defense  Department 
study  group  headed  by  Paul  Nitze  (who  would  later  play  an  important  role  in  the 
Kennedy  administration),  a  partner  in  the  investment  banking  house  of  Dillon, 
Read,  which  was  also  the  home  base  of  James  Forrestal,  Ferdinand  Eberstadt, 
and  C.  Douglas  Dillon,  all  key  figures  in  postwar  foreign  policy-making.  Calling 
for  wholesale  U.S.  rearmament  before  the  Korean  War,  NSC  68  was  formulated 
amidst  rising  anguish  over  Vietnam,  China  (the  Communists  had  triumphed  the 
previous  October),  and  Russia's  first  atomic  bomb  (detonated  in  August  1949, 
three  years  ahead  of  American  intelligence  estimates).  It  meant  "virtual  abandon- 
ment by  the  United  States  of  trying  to  distinguish  between  national  and  global 
security,"  so  that  "much  of  what  was  done  in  the  Korean  buildup  would  have  been 
done,  anyway  .  .  .  the  Korean  war  remained  only  a  part  of  the  larger  picture  of 
the  national  strategy.  For  most  people  who  knew  anything  about  it,  NSC-68 
represented  that  larger  picture."  23 

At  this  juncture  too,  in  May  1950,  the  United  States  began  its  fateful  program 
of  direct  economic  and  military  aid  to  French  forces  in  Indochina  (Gravel  ed., 
1:41-42,370). 

4.  NSC  48/5,  May  17,  1951  24 

Desirable  now  was  "development  of  power  relationships  in  Asia  which  will 
make  it  impossible  for  any  nation  or  alliance  to  threaten  the  security  of  the 


24      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

United  States  from  that  area.""  Continded  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  necessity 
for  Japan  "contributing  to  the  security  and  stabiUty  of  the  Far  East." 

5.  NSC  124/1,  February  13,  1952  (Gravel  ed.,  1:375-381) 

"Indochina  is  of  far  greater  strategic  importance  than  Korea  .  .  .  [and]  criti- 
cal to  U.S.  security  interests."  "The  fall  of  Southeast  Asia  would  underline  the 
apparent  economic  advantages  to  Japan  of  association  with  the  communist- 
dominated  Asian  sphere."  Furthermore: 

Exclusion  of  Japan  from  trade  with  Southeast  Asia  would  seriously  affect 
the  Japanese  economy,  and  increase  Japan's  dependence  on  United  States 
aid.  In  the  long  run  the  loss  of  Southeast  Asia,  especially  Malaya  and  Indo- 
nesia, could  result  in  such  economic  and  political  pressures  in  Japan  as  to 
make  it  extremely  difficult  to  prevent  Japan's  eventual  accommodation  to 
the  Soviet  Bloc. 

Southeast  Asia  ...  is  the  principal  world  source  of  natural  rubber  and 
tin.  Access  to  these  materials  by  the  Western  Powers  and  their  denial  to  the 
Soviet  bloc  is  important  at  all  times  .  .  .  [rice  surpluses  and  petroleum  are 
also  cited  in  this  respect]. 

Communist  domination  of  mainland  Southeast  Asia  would  place  un- 
friendly forces  astride  the  most  direct  and  best-developed  sea  and  air  routes 
between  the  Western  Pacific  and  India  and  the  Near  East. 

6.  NSC  124/2,  June  25,  1952  (Gravel  ed.,  I:  384-390) 

This  document  repeated  the  heavy  geopolitical-economy  articulation  of  NSC 
124/1  and  added  a  statement  of  what  the  Pentagon  Papers  historians  call  "the 
'domino  principle'  in  its  purest  form"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:83-84).  These  historians 
ignore,  however,  another  highly  significant  step  toward  direct  American  involve- 
ment in  Indochina:  a  provision  that  if  French  energies  in  pursuing  the  war  begin 
to  flag,  the  United  States  should,  first,  "oppose  a  French  withdrawal,"  and  then 
"consider  taking  unilateral  action." 

7.  Progress  Report  on  NSC  124/2,  August  5,  1953 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:405-410) 

France's  lack  of  success  in  Indochina  was  traced  largely  to  failure  "to  frustrate 
nationalist  appeal  of  the  Viet  Minh"  and  "to  plan  and  execute  aggressive  military 
operations."  "In  general,"  the  official  historians  write  of  this  period,  "the  U.S. 
sought  to  convince  the  French  that  military  victory  was  the  only  guarantee  of 
diplomatic  success"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:96).  French  Prime  Minister  Joseph  Laniel, 
undoubtedly  under  intense  pressure  from  Washington,  was  promising  the  Ameri- 
cans that  he  could  "keep  his  government's  support  without  going  further  in  [the] 
direction  of  negotiations.  .  .  ." 

8.  NSC  5405,  January  16,  1954  (Gravel  ed.,  1:434-443). 

As  French  armed  forces  were  being  harder  pressed  by  the  Viet  Minh,  little 
doubt  remained  about  the  importance  of  Indochina:  "Communist  domination,  by 
whatever  means,  of  all  Southeast  Asia  would  seriously  endanger  in  the  short  term. 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  25 

and  critically  endanger  in  the  longer  term,  United  States  security  interests."  Thus, 
the  United  States  should  assist  France  in  fashioning  an  aggressive  military  pro- 
gram "to  ehminate  organized  Viet  Minh  forces  by  mid- 1955."  Again,  stress  was 
placed  on  "the  interrelation  of  the  countries  of  the  area,"  and  the  "serious  eco- 
nomic consequences"  stemming  from  the  losses  of  natural  rubber,  tin,  petroleum, 
and  other  strategically  important  resources,  including  "the  rice  exports  of  Burma, 
Indochina  and  Thailand  .  .  .  ,  of  considerable  significance  to  Japan  and  India." 
Echoing  NSC  124/1,  this  paper  went  on  to  warn  that 

The  loss  of  Southeast  Asia  would  have  serious  economic  consequences  for 
many  nations  of  the  free  world.  .  .  .  [This]  could  result  in  such  economic 
and  political  pressures  in  Japan  as  to  make  it  extremely  difficult  to  prevent 
Japan's  eventual  accommodation  to  communism. 

Events  now  unfolded  at  a  quicker  pace,  as  the  specter  of  French  military 
defeat  loomed  at  Dienbienphu  (it  materialized  on  May  7,  1954).  On  March  17, 
1954,  an  NSC  Memorandum  asserted  that  "The  French  desire  for  peace  in  Indo- 
china almost  at  any  cost  represents  our  greatest  vulnerability  in  the  Geneva  talks," 
scheduled  to  begin  on  April  26  (Gravel  ed.,  1:452).  On  April  5,  as  debate  was 
heating  up  in  Washington  over  whether  U.S.  forces  should  be  openly  committed 
to  combat  to  aid  the  weakening  French,  an  NSC  Action  Paper  foresaw  a  "pos- 
sibility that  a  trend  in  the  direction  of  the  loss  of  Indochina  to  Communist  con- 
trol may  become  irreversible  over  the  next  year  in  the  absence  of  greater  U.S. 
participation"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:463).  In  addition,  a  Special  (Presidential)  Commit- 
tee for  review  of  NSC  5405  decided  that,  as  a  statement  of  policy,  NSC  5405 
"remains  valid,"  and  that,  in  keeping  with  the  strategic  considerations  it  outlined, 
"defeat  of  the  Viet  Minh  in  Indo-China  is  essential  if  the  spread  of  Communist 
influence  in  Southeast  Asia  is  to  be  halted."  Its  final  recommendation:  "It  be  U.S. 
policy  to  accept  nothing  short  of  a  military  victory  in  Indo-China"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:472-474;  emphasis  added). 

In  public  too,  it  is  interesting  to  note,  the  Eisenhower  admmistration  was  re- 
peating the  policy  rationales  of  its  NSC  deliberations.  In  an  address  before  the 
Overseas  Press  Club  in  New  York  on  March  29,  1954,  Secretary  of  State  Dulles 
described  the  importance  of  Indochina.  Among  other  factors,  Dulles  claimed, 
"Southeast  Asia  is  the  so-called  'rice  bowl'  which  helps  to  feed  the  densely  pop- 
ulated region  that  extends  from  India  to  Japan.  It  is  rich  in  many  raw  materials, 
such  as  tin,  oil,  rubber,  and  iron  ore.  It  offers  industrial  Japan  potentially  impor- 
tant markets  and  sources  of  raw  materials."  Dulles  continued: 

The  area  has  great  strategic  value.  Southeast  Asia  is  astride  the  most  direct 
and  best-developed  sea  and  air  routes  between  the  Pacific  and  South  Asia. 
It  has  major  naval  and  air  bases  (Gravel  ed.,  1:594-595). 

These  sentences  came  almost  verbatim  from  NSC  124/1.  They  were  again  trotted 
out  on  April  1 1  by  Under  Secretary  of  State  Walter  Bedell  Smith  in  a  television 
interview  (Gravel  ed.,  1:598). 

9.    NSC  5421,  June  1,  1954^^ 

This  publication  was  a  collection  of  agency  reports  "prepared  on  the  assump- 
tion that  U.S.  armed  forces  intervene  in  the  conflict  in  Indochina.  .  .  ." 


26      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 


10.  NSC  5429/2,  August  20,  1954^'^ 

The  French  defeat  at  Dienbienphu  and  the  "unfavorable"  nature  of  the  Geneva 
Accords  of  July  21,  1954,  have  led  to  "loss  of  prestige  in  Asia  suffered  by  the 
U.S.  as  a  backer  of  the  French  and  the  Bao  Dai  Government."  As  a  result  "U.S. 
prestige  will  inescapably  be  associated  with  subsequent  developments  in  South- 
east Asia."  It  should  be  America's  goal,  then,  "to  maintain  and  support  friendly 
non-Communist  governments  in  Cambodia  and  Laos,  to  maintain  a  friendly  non- 
Communist  South  Vietnam,  and  to  prevent  a  Communist  victory  through  all- 
Vietnam  elections." 

11.  NSC  5429/5,  December  22,  1954 

Washington's  resolve  was  hardening  (Gravel  ed.,  1:214-221).  Military  action 
was  now  being  discussed  as  a  concrete  possibility,  "subject  to  prior  submission 
to  and  approval  by  the  Congress  unless  the  emergency  is  deemed  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  be  so  great  that  immediate  action  is  necessary.  .  .  ."  This  clause  was 
soon  to  be  invoked  as  the  basis  of  "U.S.  policy  in  the  event  of  a  renewal  of  hos- 
tilities by  the  Communists"  after  the  miscarriage  of  the  all-Vietnam  elections 
called  for  in  the  Geneva  Accords. 

Finally,  as  the  official  historians  also  appear  to  believe  (Gravel  ed.,  1:121), 
the  old  American  idea  of  "rollback"  resurfaced: 

While  there  is  now  no  reason  to  anticipate  an  early  collapse  of  the  [Chinese 
Communist]  regime  nor  any  means  of  seeing  when  one  might  occur,  inher- 
ently such  regimes  have  elements  of  rigidity  and  instability  which  sometimes 
produce  crises.  We  should  be  ready  to  exploit  any  opportunities  which  might 
occur  as  a  result  of  inherent  internal  weaknesses.  .  .  .  Reduction  of  Chi- 
nese Communist  power  and  prestige,  or  securing  by  reorientation  a  Govern- 
ment on  the  mainland  of  China  whose  objectives  do  not  conflict  with  the 
vital  interests  of  the  United  States  [should  now  be  U.S.  policy]. 

The  policymaking  role  of  NSC  was  somewhat  de-emphasized  during  the  Ken- 
nedy-Johnson years.  NSC  became  more  an  appendage  of  the  White  House  for- 
eign policy  staff,  and  McGeorge  Bundy  was  its  manager.  Still,  "National  Security 
Action  Memoranda"  were  the  chosen  means  for  denoting  major  policy  steps  and 
setting  them  up  as  precedents  "to  guide  national  policy"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:9).  As 
far  as  Indochina  decisions  were  concerned,  the  slight  change  in  policymaking 
form  implied  no  change  in  content.  What  is  striking  about  the  NSAM  documents 
for  the  Kennedy  administration  is  that  the  "commitment"  to  South  Vietnam  was 
no  longer  questioned. The  NSAMs  show  total  programmatic  continuity  and 
deal  almost  exclusively  with  force  levels,  tactics,  the  efficiency  and  durability  of 
the  Diem  Government,  and  issues  raised  by  "wars  of  national  liberation"  and 
counterinsurgency.  (See,  for  example,  NSAM  52  and  NSAM  124:  Gravel  ed., 
11:642-643  and  660-661.)  NSC  papers  of  the  1950s  were  also  alluded  to,  though 
not  always  explicitly.  In  a  speech  before  the  Economic  Club  of  Detroit  in  April 
1963,  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  State  U.  Alexis  Johnson  used  the  same  lan- 
guage from  NSC  124/1 — then  eleven  years  old — as  Dulles  and  Smith  had  in 
1954  (Gravel  ed.,  11:817).  Two  years  later  before  the  same  forum  Deputy  Un- 
der Secretary  Leonard  Unger  followed  suit  (Gravel  ed.,  111:731). 

As  the  situation  in  South  Vietnam  underwent  progressive  deterioration  in  the 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  27 

early  1960s  the  U.S.  military  intervention  envisioned  in  1954  appeared  increas- 
ingly necessary.  The  first  major  move  in  that  direction  came  in  April  and  May  of 
1961,  with  John  F.  Kennedy's  decision  to  dispatch  400  U.S.  special  forces  sol- 
diers and  100  other  military  advisers  to  the  Diem  government  and  to  begin  a 
campaign  of  covert  military  operations  against  North  Vietnam  (Gravel  ed., 
11:38-55,  637-643).  In  November  1961  the  Kennedy  administration  took  an- 
other step  forward,  sharply  expanding  the  U.S.  military  mission  and  putting 
American  troops  in  combat-support  roles  (Gravel  ed.,  11:102-120).  At  the  time 
of  Kennedy's  assassination,  16,000  U.S.  troops  were  stationed  in  South  Vietnam, 
as  opposed  to  685  when  he  took  office.  In  December  1963  Defense  Secretary 
McNamara  sounded  the  alarm  over  impending  Communist  victory  in  South  Viet- 
nam or  neutralization  of  that  country  (Gravel  ed.,  111:494-496).  NSAM  273, 
November  26,  1963,  and  NSAM  288,  March  17,  1964,  reaffirmed  "the  central 
object  of  the  United  States  in  South  Vietnam  ...  to  win  the  contest  against 
the  externally  directed  and  supported  Communist  conspiracy"  (Gravel  ed..  Ill: 
7-9,  50-58,  496-500).  Three  days  after  NSAM  288,  President  Johnson  in- 
structed his  Ambassador  to  Saigon,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  "that  your  mission  is 
precisely  for  the  purpose  of  knocking  down  the  idea  of  neutralization  wherever 
it  rears  its  ugly  head  .  .  .  nothing  is  more  important  than  to  stop  neutralist  talk 
wherever  we  can  by  whatever  means  we  can"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:511). 

All  along  the  road  to  escalation,  to  be  sure,  John  Kennedy  and  Lyndon  John- 
son expressed  doubts.  But  never  could  they  or  their  advisers  bring  themselves  to 
break  with  the  momentum  and  sheer  force  of  six  to  ten  years  of  solid  policy  com- 
mitments. What  chief  executive  could  have  done  that?  Only  one  with  an  alto- 
gether different  outlook  upon  the  flow  of  world  history  and  America's  role  in 
that  historical  process.  Neither  JFK  nor  LBJ  was  that  man.  Nor  is  it  likely  that 
any  such  man  could  have  gained  either  the  Democratic  or  Republican  Presiden- 
tial nomination,  let  alone  the  Presidency,  under  the  prevailing  political  structure 
in  the  United  States  and  the  larger  economic  interests  and  business  ideology  it 
represents. 

III.  CONCLUSION 

From  the  NSC  documents  of  1949-1954,  and  beyond,  emerge  four  themes  in 
the  making  of  U.S.  policy  toward  Indochina. 

1.  Southeast  Asia  was  viewed  as  an  essential  part  of  a  Pacific  rimlands  po- 
litical economy  composed  of  several  interdependent  units  and  revolving  about 
Japan  as  a  nucleus.^^ 

2.  Were  any  part  of  this  political  economy  to  "fall"  or  to  opt  out  of  the  free 
(enterprise)  world,  the  repercussions  would  be  felt  throughout  the  area,  partic- 
ularly in  Japan,  which  had  to  have  access  to  a  wide  hinterland  for  economic 
growth  and  expansion.^^ 

3.  "Loss"  of  any  of  Indochina  would  have  further  grave  domino  effects,  of  a 
psychological  and  political  nature,  on  America's  power  as  a  guarantor  of  "order" 
and  "stability." 

4.  No  negotiations  whatever  were  to  be  considered  with  Communists  over  the 
future  of  Southeast  Asia. 

A  number  of  corollaries  followed  from  such  policy  axioms.  For  instance,  loss 
of  territory  to  the  Communists  in  itself  constituted  a  U.S.  defeat  even  if  accom- 
panied by  diplomatic  success  (Gravel  ed.,  1:176-178).  Thus,  "rollback"  of  Com- 
munist power,  acknowledged  to  be  an  exceedingly  dangerous  idea,  was  nonethe- 


28      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

less  a  policy  option  to  be  held  in  reserve  should  the  opportunity  arise.  In  his 
April  7,  1954,  press  conference  President  Eisenhower  claimed  that  a  Viet  Minh 
victory  in  Southeast  Asia  "takes  away,  in  its  economic  aspects,  that  region  that 
Japan  must  have  as  a  trading  area  or  .  .  ,  have  only  one  place  in  the  world  to 
go — that  is,  toward  the  Communist  areas  in  order  to  live"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:597). 
In  a  New  York  Times  interview  thirteen  years  later  (December  24,  1967)  the 
former  President,  probably  recalling  1953-1954  NSC  discussions  and  policy 
papers,  adduced  the  same  dangers  to  Japan  and  added:  "Probably  the  less  said 
about  that  right  now  the  better,  but  the  plain  fact  is  that  no  prosperous  free 
society  based  on  the  private  enterprise  system  can  expect  to  exist  indefinitely 
alongside  a  sprawling  police  state  like  Communist  China  and  its  satellites."  This 
hinted  that  ultimately  we  might  have  to  extirpate  communism  in  Asia  in  order 
to  make  Japan  and  other  "free"  countries  secure. 

America's  cold  war  policymakers  have  shared  an  amazingly  expansive  concept 
of  U.S.  "national  security."  Can  it  be  accidental  that  this  concept  is  a  mirror 
image  of  the  feverish  growth  dynamic  of  corporate  business?  Or  is  it,  as  Pro- 
fessor Robert  Tucker  argues  in  dismissing  the  primacy  of  economic  factors  be- 
hind American  foreign  policy,  that  economic  statements  like  the  ones  I  quote 
above  are  made  by  U.S.  leaders  "largely  to  elicit  support  for  a  policy  that  is 
pursued  primarily  for  quite  different  reasons"? 

Tucker  is  not  altogether  incorrect.  Immediate  policy  decisions  often  have  little 
to  do  with  demonstrable  economic  benefits.  It  would  be  pure  idealism  to  reduce 
North  American  or  Western  European  politics  to  the  rational  interests  of  "capi- 
talism" in  the  abstract.  The  process  by  which  economic  forces  are  ultimately 
determinant  is  a  complex  one  in  which  in  specific  situations  the  decisive  factors 
may  well  be  political,  psychological,  or  social.  But  several  points  must  be  kept  in 
mind  with  respect  to  American  foreign  policy,  and  its  Indochina  disaster. 

In  the  first  place,  the  economic  declarations  contained  in  the  Pentagon  Papers 
were  not  intended  as  rhetoric  for  public  consumption.  The  NSC  documents  in 
particular  were  internal  working  papers  "for  eyes  only" — official  eyes.  It  should 
be  clearly  stated,  secondly,  what  noneconomic  purposes — what  "quite  different 
reasons" — underlie  U.S.  foreign  policy.  Here,  Tucker  is  consistent.  He  grants 
that  "America's  universalism  has  been  throughout  indistinguishable  from  Amer- 
ica's expansionism.  In  the  period  that  has  followed  the  initial  years  of  the  cold 
war,  it  is  the  expansionist  interest  that  has  become  increasingly  dominant." 
The  reason  for  this  expansionism,  Tucker  alleges,  is  an  "exaggerated"  sense  of 
security,  due  to  "the  fear  arising  simply  from  the  loss  of  preponderance  itself." 
U.S.  policymakers,  possessing  "inordinate  power,"  will  be  "ready  to  use  it  if  only 
in  order  to  rule  over  others,"  just  as  powerful  men  have  done  throughout  his- 
tory.3^ 

But  can  Tucker  show — can  anyone? — that  such  American  foreign  policy  de- 
cisions have  ever  been  made  on  grounds  recognizably  injurious  to  the  dominant 
economic  power  centers?  The  "quite  different  reasons"  usually  turn  out  to  be 
providentially  consistent  with  the  palpable  economic  interests  of  the  corporate 
upper  class  who — it  must  be  repeated — have  occupied  the  key  foreign  policy 
posts  in  Washington  in  the  present  century. 

The  fact  is  that  America's  policymakers  exercise  both  functions  at  once:  they 
represent  the  economic  elite  and  the  national  interest  as  traditionally  understood 
in  Machtpolitik  terms.  Bound  up  in  a  seamless  web  relationship,  these  two  func- 
tions cannot  be  segregated  by  any  neat  boundary.  To  do  so  would  be  dialectically 
meaningless.  The  economic  blazes  paths  for  the  political  and  the  military  (as  in 
Latin  America),  and  state  power  is  utilized  in  ways  that  rarely  clash  with  pos- 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  29 


sibilities  for  external  economic  expansion  (as  in  Asia).  While  Marxists  talk 
about  "unity  of  theory  and  practice,"  capitalists  achieve  it,  and  on  an  inter- 
national plane.  The  interests  of  the  giant  U.S.  corporations  and  banks,  as  their 
executives  never  cease  to  proclaim  in  their  own  annual  reports  and  elsewhere,  are 
international.  Why  should  they  not  fear  "international  communism"?  Capitalism 
itself  was  the  very  first  global  system.  Long  before  communism  existed,  Great 
Britain,  the  pioneer  industrial  nation,  was  trading,  investing,  banking  abroad  and 
leading  the  way  toward  creation  of  a  true  international  market  economy  after 
1850.  From  this  moment  any  basic  threat  to  these  institutional  arrangements  had 
to  be  "international,"  almost  by  definition. 

America's  foreign  policymakers  do  have  legitimate  fears.  And  they  project 
them  within  the  channels  of  statecraft  and  diplomacy  which  have  been  an  in- 
herent element  of  the  foreign  aff'airs  bureaucracies  of  all  great  powers  since  Louis 
XIV's  France.  Thus,  they  enthusiastically  respond  to  challenges  of  strategic 
necessity  and  national  interest.  Doing  so  reinforces  the  self-esteem  that  elites 
need  to  rationalize  their  own  exalted  positions  in  the  social  hierarchy.  They  are 
important  men  because  they  are  dealing  with  transcendentally  important  matters. 
In  their  own  minds  they  must  satisfy  themselves  that  they  are  promoting  "na- 
tional security,"  "international  stability,"  '^^  "world  justice,"  all  issues  loftily  above 
mundane  considerations  like  (as  Joseph  Schumpeter  used  to  ask)  "who  stands  to 
gain?"  The  official  mentality  is  shaped  by  the  policymakers'  sober  consciousness 
of  themselves  as  a  deserving  political  elite,  men  endowed  with  all  the  advantages 
of  (what  passes  for)  a  cultivated  upbringing.  "Trained  for  public  service  and 
somewhat  'cosmopolitan'  in  outlook,  it  regards  itself  as  uniquely  qualified  for 
leadership,  especially  in  foreign  affairs."  It  believes  itself  to  be  a  vanguard, 
willing  to  accept  the  "terrible  responsibilities"  and  risks  of  world  power,  from 
which  many  of  its  less  intrepid  countrymen  shrink.  What  we  see  operating  here 
is  the  psychological  counterpart  of  socioeconomic  privilege. 

It  is  no  surprise  that  some  of  these  powerful  men — the  Nixons,  Rusks,  McNa- 
maras — become  true  believers  in  the  "Communist  conspiracy."  This  too,  how- 
ever, serves  the  rhetoric  of  self-justification  required  to  organize  society  and  cul- 
ture along  corporate,  neocapitalist  lines.  For  if  much  of  America's  ruling  class 
is  really  convinced  that  communism  and  socialism  are  deadly,  subversive,  aggres- 
sive, externally  directed  menaces,  we  must  remember  not  only  that  these  beliefs 
are  an  integral  part  of  a  process  of  internal  justification,  not  only  that  in  broad 
historical  terms  the  proposition  harbors  a  grain  of  truth,  but  that  selective  belief 
is  a  result  of  class  breeding  and  class  philosophy.  U.S.  leaders  have  been  con- 
ditioned to  oppose  the  Left  all  around  the  world  because  revolutionary  aspira- 
tions and  movements  objectively  threaten  the  framework  of  their  own  social  sys- 
tem, the  framework  within  which  they  formulate  policy  and  influence  the  fate 
of  millions  of  people  inside  their  own  country  and  out.  That  this  power  is  exer- 
cised irresponsibly  and  immorally  is  something  that  the  Left  has  long  believed. 
The  Pentagon  Papers  now  provide  proof. 


Notes 

1.  See  the  lists  of  instances  of  the  use  of  U.S.  armed  forces  abroad,  inserted  in  the 
Congressional  Record  by  Sen.  Barry  Goldwater,  117  (April  26,  1971),  S5636-47  and 
Sen.  Everett  Dirksen,  115  (June  23,  1969),  S16839-44. 

2.  Gabriel  Kolko,  The  Roots  of  American  Foreign  Policy  (Boston:  Beacon  Press, 
1969),  9,  26. 


30      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

3.  Kolko,  Roots,  ch.  1;  G.  William  Domhoff,  Who  Rules  America?  (Englewood 
Cliffs,  N.J.:  Prentice-Hall,  1967),  chs.  2  and  3,  and  "Who  Made  American  Foreign 
policy,  1945-1963?"  in  David  Horowitz,  ed.,  Corporations  and  the  Cold  War  (New 
York:  Monthly  Review,  1969),  reprinted  in  Domhoff's  The  Higher  Circles:  The  Gov- 
erning Class  in  America  (New  York:  Random  House,  1970),  ch.  5. 

4.  Harry  Magdoff,  The  Age  of  Imperialism  (New  York:  Monthly  Review,  1969), 

13. 

5.  See  Arthur  MacEwan,  "Capitalist  Expansion,  Ideology,  and  Intervention,"  in 
Richard  C.  Edwards  et  al.,  The  Capitalist  System:  A  Radical  Analysis  of  American  So- 
ciety (Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.:  Prentice-Hall,  1972). 

6.  "Students  Assail  Defense  System,"  New  York  Times,  October  12,  1969. 

7.  See  Walter  LaFeber,  America,  Russia,  and  the  Cold  War,  1945-1966  (New  York: 
Wiley,  1967),  chs.  1-4;  and  William  A.  Williams,  "The  Cold  War  Revisionists,"  The 
Nation,  205  (November  13,  1967).  In  the  post- World  War  II  period,  according  to  Pro- 
fessor Samuel  P.  Huntington,  "the  dominant  feature  of  international  politics  .  .  .  was 
the  expansion  of  the  power  of  the  United  States.  A  critical  feature  of  this  expansion 
was  the  extension  of  American  power  into  the  vacuums  that  were  left  after  the  decline 
of  the  European  influence  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  even  Latin  America.  .  .  .  Americans  de- 
voted much  attention  to  the  expansion  of  Communism  (which,  in  fact,  expanded  very 
little  after  1949),  and  in  the  process  they  tended  to  ignore  the  expansion  of  the  United 
States  influence  and  presence  throughout  much  of  the  world."  "Political  Development 
and  the  Decline  of  the  American  System  of  World  Order,"  Daedalus,  96  (Summer 
1967),  927. 

8.  Telegram  to  U.S.  Embassy  in  Paris,  May  13,  1947,  in  United  States-Vietnam  Re- 
lations 1945-1967.  Study  Prepared  by  the  Department  of  Defense  (Washington:  Printed 
for  the  use  of  the  House  Committee  on  Armed  Services,  1971),  Book  8,  100-102.  This 
is  the  U.S.  Government  edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  and  will  hereafter  be  cited  as 
USG  ed. 

9.  Paul  Y.  Hammond,  Organizing  for  Defense:  The  American  Military  Establish- 
ment in  the  Twentieth  Century  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1961),  228,  231; 
Samuel  P.  Huntington,  The  Common  Defense:  Strategic  Programs  in  National  Politics 
(New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1961),  114-115,  378-81;  Kolko,  Roots,  37-47. 

10.  See  Hammond,  Organizing  for  Defense,  353-357,  227-232. 

11.  See  Domhoff,  "Who  Made  American  Foreign  Policy?"  41-46,  reprinted  in  The 
Higher  Circles,  128-135. 

12.  Huntington,  The  Common  Defense,  241,  333-334. 

13.  See  Townsend  Hoopes  (Under  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force  at  the  time).  The 
Limits  of  Intervention  (New  York:  McKay,  1969),  ch.  10,  published  in  an  earlier  ver- 
sion in  The  Atlantic,  224  (October  1969).  Hoopes's  account  is  in  close  agreement  with 
that  of  the  New  York  Times  special  report  of  March  7,  1969. 

14.  See  the  references  in  note  11,  as  well  as  Hoopes,  Limits  of  Intervention,  2-5. 

15.  Foreword  to  Books  8  and  9  of  USG  ed. 

16.  The  complete  document  can  be  found  in  USG  ed..  Book  8,  225-272,  which  in- 
cludes NSC  48/2,  appended  on  30  December  1949. 

17.  USG  ed..  Book  8,  98-99;  Telegram  to  U.S.  Embassy  in  Paris,  February  3,  1947. 

18.  Ibid.,  219-222;  Cable  to  U.S.  Embassy  in  Rangoon,  20  June  1949. 

19.  Ibid.,  155-157,  196;  Memo  on  Indochina,  March  31,  1949,  and  cable  to  U.S. 
Consul  in  Hanoi,  May  20,  1949. 

20.  Ibid.,  241. 

21.  Ibid.,  256-261. 

22.  Hammond,  Organizing  for  Defense,  347. 

23.  Cabell  Phillips,  The  Truman  Presidency:  The  History  of  a  Triumphant  Succession 
(New  York:  Macmillan,  1966),  305-308.  On  NSC  68,  see  also  Huntington,  The  Com- 
mon Defense,  47-53  and  220-221. 

24.  USG  ed..  Book  8,  425-445.  The  quotation  is  from  428,  with  emphasis  added. 

25.  USG  ed..  Book  9,  202;  Cable  from  Paris  to  Secretary  of  State,  November  30, 
1953. 

26.  Ibid.,  510-529. 


Business  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  31 

27.  USG  ed.,  Book  10,  731-741. 

28.  Ibid.,  835-852. 

29.  Cited,  for  instance,  on  June  13,  1955  {ibid.,  984).  On  Dulles's  scheme  for 
"legally"  preventing  elections,  see  his  April  6,  1955,  cable  to  Saigon,  ibid.,  892-893.  On 
the  failure  to  hold  the  elections  called  for  in  the  Geneva  Accords,  see  I,  182-183,  208- 
209,  239-241. 

30.  USG  ed.,  Book  10,  837,  839.  See  also  the  CIA  Special  Estimate  of  December  15, 
1953,1,  432  (8c). 

31.  Except  by  Ambassador  to  India  John  Kenneth  Galbraith,  who  got  nowhere.  See 
II,  121-125,  147,  669-672. 

32.  For  recent  surveys,  see  Peter  Wiley,  "Vietnam  and  the  Pacific  Rim  Strategy," 
Leviathan,  1  (June  1969)  and  Carl  Oglesby  and  R.  Shaull,  Containment  and  Change 
(New  York:  Macmillan,  1967),  ch.  5,  esp.  121-130.  Professor  Robert  W.  Tucker  finds 
this  interpretation  of  U.S.  policy  in  the  Far  East  "difficult  to  take  seriously."  American 
leaders  have  expressed  such  views,  Tucker  admits,  but  "at  best  .  .  .  citation  of  these 
views  proves  no  more  than  conviction,  and  a  mistaken  conviction  at  that."  The  Radical 
Left  and  American  Foreign  Policy  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1971),  116-117. 
One  might  think  that  "conviction,"  even  if  mistaken,  provides  a  rather  reliable  guide  to 
the  formulation  and  execution  of  policy. 

33.  Revival  of  Japan,  naturally,  has  posed  another  kind  of  dilemma  for  the  United 
States:  that  of  a  tough  competitor  in  the  markets  of  the  world.  On  the  contradictions  of 
U.S.  policy  toward  Japan,  see  Walter  LaFeber,  "Our  Illusory  Affair  with  Japan,"  The 
Nation,  206  (March  11,  1968)  and  Tom  Engelhardt  and  Jim  Peck,  "Japan:  Rising  Sun 
in  the  Pacific,"  Ramparts,  10  (January  1972). 

34.  Tucker,  The  Radical  Left,  61.  This  book,  despite  its  weaknesses,  is  the  most 
astute  and  fair-minded  critique  of  the  radical  view  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  Most  radicals 
will  benefit  from  reading  it. 

35.  Ibid.,  108. 

36.  Ibid.,  69,  105,  151. 

37.  Tucker  nowhere  takes  into  account  the  evidence  on  this  point  in  Kolko  and  Dom- 
hoff  (see  notes  3  and  11). 

38.  But  see  the  NSC  documents  for  the  kind  of  "stability"  the  United  States  prefers 
— not  Ho  Chi  Minh's  brand. 

39.  Christopher  Lasch,  "The  Making  of  the  War  Class,"  Columbia  Forum,  1,  New 
Series  (Winter  1971),  3. 


32 


3.  A  Vietnamese  Viewpoint 
by  Truong  Buu  Lam 


When  the  President  of  the  United  States  declares  that  American  troops  will  re- 
main in  the  southern  part  of  Vietnam  as  long  as  needed  to  preserve  the  Viet- 
namese people's  right  to  self-determination,  what  he  means,  quite  simply,  is  that 
the  American  military  shall  not  leave  Vietnam  until  a  pro-American  government 
in  Saigon  manages  to  survive  on  its  own  and  so  maintain  that  part  of  Vietnam 
within  the  American  sphere  of  influence.  It  is  the  self-reliance  of  a  pro-U.S. 
government  then  that  is  at  issue,  not  the  self-determination  of  the  Vietnamese 
people,  and  certainly  not  the  relationship  of  the  Vietnamese  people  toward  that 
government.  From  the  beginning  until  now,  that  has  been  the  primary  concern 
of  U.S.  policy-makers.  The  Pentagon  Papers  demonstrate  this  clearly, 
and  the  Nixon  administration  recently  reiterated  the  position  in  unmistakable 
terms.  In  his  news  conference  of  January  1,  1972,  Mr.  Nixon  imparted  the  im- 
pression that  the  release,  by  the  Democratic  Republic  of  North  Vietnam,  of  U.S. 
prisoners  of  war  remained  the  sole  obstacle  to  a  total  withdrawal  of  American 
forces  from  Vietnam.  The  very  next  day,  however,  an  administration  spokesman 
hurriedly  modified  the  presidential  statement:  ".  .  .  as  in  the  past,  he  said,  the 
survivability  of  the  Saigon  government  of  President  Nguyen  van  Thieu  remains 
a  second  condition  for  a  total  U.S.  pull-out"  (The  Honolulu  Star-Bulletin,  Jan- 
uary 3,  1972).  Again,  in  his  speech  of  January  25,  although  Mr.  Nixon  did 
commit  his  administration  to  withdraw  U.S.  troops  from  Vietnam  within  six 
months  were  his  latest  plan  accepted,  that  plan  contained  conditions  that 
amounted  to  a  demand  that  the  NLF  lay  down  their  arms  and  surrender  to  the 
Saigon  authorities. 

My  task  in  this  paper  is  to  stress  the  deception  which  most  have  now  come 
to  see  as  a  deception:  that  the  interests  of  the  Vietnamese  people  counted  for 
something  in  Washington  policymaking.  With  the  publication  of  the  Pentagon 
Papers,  Americans  can  no  longer  grope  for  respectability  with  the  adage  that 
"We  went  in  with  good  intentions." 

When,  at  the  American  Historical  Association  meeting  in  1971,  two  of  the 
authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  Leslie  Gelb  and  Daniel  Ellsberg,  were  questioned 
on  the  lack  of  material  relating  to  social  conditions  in  Vietnam  in  the  Papers, 
they  replied:  ".  .  .  if  the  study  failed  to  deal  with  the  underlying  social  and 
human  conditions  in  Vietnam,  it  was  because  these  conditions  were  not  being 
considered  by  American  policy-makers"  (The  New  York  Times,  Thursday,  De- 
cember 30,  1971). 

Of  course  one  did  not  need  the  Pentagon  Papers  to  learn  that,  from  Truman's 
administration  on,  altruistic  concern  for  the  welfare  of  the  Vietnamese  people 
meant  nothing  more  than  a  very  sick  public  relations  joke  to  Washington.  Bombs, 
defoliants,  prisoners  in  tiger  cages,  political  assassinations — these  represent  the 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Truong  Buu  Lam. 


A  Vietnamese  Viewpoint  33 

net  contribution  of  the  United  States  to  the  welfare  of  Vietnam.  Of  interest  in 
the  Pentagon  Papers,  rather,  is  the  unfolding  of  a  policy  which,  while  constantly 
holding  certain  American  interests  in  focus,  sought  to  secure  those  interests  with 
increasingly  desperate  means,  under  increasingly  untenable  conditions. 

In  reviewing  all  the  decisions  made  which  propelled  the  United  States  into 
Vietnam,  President  Roosevelt's  stand  apart,  in  that  his  attitude  toward  Indochina 
seems  to  have  included  a  measure  of  concern  for  the  area's  well-being.  Having 
been  drawn  into  a  war  in  the  Pacific  with  Japan,  Roosevelt  developed  an  interest 
in  the  affairs  of  Southeast  Asia.  Possibly  irate  during  the  war  over  Vichy's  poli- 
cy of  surrendering  to  the  Japanese  and  so  effecting  a  cooperative  relationship 
between  local  colonial  administrators  and  the  Japanese  army,  Roosevelt  decided, 
in  1944,  that  Indochina  should  not  be  returned  to  France,  but  that  it  should  be, 
instead,  administered  by  an  international  trusteeship. 

.  .  .  France  has  had  the  country — 30  million  inhabitants  for  nearly  one 
hundred  years,  and  the  people  are  worse  off  than  they  were  at  the  begin- 
ning. .  .  .  France  has  milked  it  for  a  hundred  years.  The  people  of  Indo- 
China  are  entitled  to  something  better  than  that  (Gravel  edition,  1:10). 

The  trusteeship  concept  was  approved  by  Russia  and  China,  but  it  met  strong 
opposition  from  France  and,  understandably,  Britain,  which  feared  that  its  own 
possessions  would  be  lost  to  the  concept.  Another  factor  still  was  to  hinder  the 
establishment  of  a  trusteeship.  In  early  1945,  the  status  of  the  Pacific  islands 
captured  by  the  Allies  from  the  Japanese  came  under  the  consideration  of  various 
departments  of  the  U.S.  government.  The  Department  of  War  and  the  Navy 
"advocated  their  retention  under  U.S.  control  as  military  bases"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:14).  Avid  for  one  set  of  territories,  Roosevelt  found  it  difficult  to  deny  France 
another.  In  a  statement  issued  by  the  State  Department  on  April  3,  1945,  the 
United  States  left  the  question  of  the  international  trusteeship  of  colonial  ter- 
ritories on  a  fully  voluntary  basis,  that  is,  up  to  the  colonialists.  Roosevelt,  how- 
ever, did  not  quite  abandon  his  plan  for  Indochina.  Earlier,  in  March,  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  had  in  fact  drafted  a  statement  in  which  the  United  States  would 
explicitly  pledge  to  "do  all  it  can  to  be  of  assistance"  to  the  French  government 
in  the  latter's  moves  in  reconquering  Indochina  from  the  Japanese.  Roosevelt 
refused  to  issue  that  statement. 

After  Roosevelt's  death  on  April  12,  1945,  his  lingering  influence  could  be 
seen  in  the  initial  U.S.  refusal  to  help  the  French  reestablish  their  control  over 
Indochina.  Which  is  not  to  say  that  the  United  States  favored  the  Vietnamese, 
either,  who,  by  mid-August,  had  gained  control  over  the  entire  territory  of  Viet- 
nam and,  by  September  2,  1945,  established  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam. 
In  the  American  neutral  stance,  one  could  already  see  the  balance  tilt  in  France's 
favor,  as  indicated  in  the  following  document,  possibly  a  telegram  sent  by  the 
State  Department  to  the  American  representative  in  Paris,  or  Saigon: 

US  has  no  thought  of  opposing  the  reestablishment  of  French  control  in 
Indochina  and  no  official  statement  by  US  GOVT  has  questioned  even  by 
implication  French  sovereignty  over  Indochina.  However,  it  is  not  the  policy 
of  this  GOVT  to  assist  the  French  to  reestablish  their  control  over  Indo- 
china by  force  and  the  willingness  of  the  US  to  see  French  control  reestab- 
lished assumes  that  French  claim  to  have  the  support  of  the  population  of 
Indochina  is  borne  out  by  future  events  (Gravel  ed.,  1:16-17). 


34      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Between  1945  and  1950,  at  which  time  the  U.S.  government  definitively  com- 
mitted itself  to  the  French  side  in  the  Franco-Vietnamese  conflict,  U.S.  policy 
toward  Vietnam  developed  in  three  distinct  stages,  in  none  of  which  were  the 
interests  of  the  Vietnamese  people  to  count  for  anything. 

First,  the  United  States  categorically  refused  to  recognize  Ho  Chi  Minh  and 
his  organization,  the  Viet  Minh,  as  the  true,  legal  representatives  of  the  new 
Vietnamese  state.  In  late  1945  and  early  1946,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  his  Secretary  of  State  received  at  least  eight  communications  from  Ho  Chi 
Minh  asking  for  U.S.  recognition  of  Vietnam's  independence,  and  even  for  the 
establishment  of  an  international  trusteeship  over  Vietnam.  The  United  States 
chose  to  leave  all  those  messages  unanswered  (Gravel  ed.,  1:50).  It  paid  no 
attention  to  Ho  Chi  Minh  because,  as  the  then  Secretary  of  State  put  it  in  his 
telegram  to  the  American  representative  in  Hanoi,  Ho  had  a  "clear  record  as 
agent  of  international  communism."  What  the  American  diplomat  in  Vietnam 
should  try  to  avoid,  he  went  on  to  say,  is  the  "establishment  of  a  Communist- 
dominated,  Moscow-oriented  state  [in]  Indochina"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:20). 

Having  decided  to  reject  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam,  the  United 
States  sought  to  forward  French  interests  more  and  more.  The  Franco-Vietnamese 
war  broke  out  at  a  time  when  the  United  States  was  involved  in  helping  Europe 
rebuild  its  economy  out  of  the  ruins  of  World  War  II.  The  Vietnamese  war  also 
coincided  with  British  and  French  moves  to  check  Soviet  influence  in  Europe. 
Under  the  circumstances,  the  United  States  found  it  impractical  to  disassociate 
itself  from  the  French  recapture  of  Indochina.  The  French,  for  their  part,  dis- 
covered early  in  the  conflict  the  usefulness  of  waging  colonial  wars  under  the 
guise  of  anticommunism.  The  merging  of  American  interests  with  those  of  West- 
ern Europe  is  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  following  instructions  the  State  De- 
partment sent  to  its  diplomats  in  Paris  and  Vietnam: 

Key  our  position  is  our  awareness  that  in  respect  developments  affecting 
position  Western  democratic  powers  in  southern  Asia,  we  essentially  in 
same  boat  as  French,  also  as  British  and  Dutch.  We  cannot  conceive  set- 
backs to  long-range  interests  France  which  would  not  also  be  our  own 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:31). 

The  commentator  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  states  rightly  that,  in  those  years, 
the  United  States  "cared  less  about  Vietnam  than  about  France"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:51),  and  that  "compared  with  European  recovery,  and  escape  from  communist 
domination,  the  United  States  considered  the  fate  of  Vietnamese  nationalism  rela- 
tively insignificant"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:29). 

The  third  stage  in  the  evolution  of  U.S.  policy  paved  the  way  for  the  ensuing 
civil  war.  Being  hostile  to  the  government  of  President  Ho  Chi  Minh,  the  United 
States  put  pressure  on  France  to  create  an  alternative  Vietnamese  government. 
The  State  Department  itself  instructed  its  representatives  in  Vietnam  to  gather  all 
information  available  pertaining  to  the  "strength  of  non-Communist  elements  in 
Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:21).  The  search  for  a  non-Communist  Vietnamese  re- 
gime was  clearly  stated  to  the  French  in  February  of  1947.  While  the  United 
States  "fully  recognized  France's  sovereign  position  in  that  area  [Indochina]," 
it  advised  France  to  abandon  "its  outmoded  colonial  outlook  and  methods." 
France  was  to  emulate  the  outstanding  examples  of  Britain  and  the  Netherlands 
in  their  respective  colonies,  and  yield  a  measure  of  autonomy  to  the  Vietnamese. 
Still,  the  United  States  "does  not  lose  sight  the  fact  that  Ho  Chi  Minh  has  direct 
Communist  connections  and  it  should  be  obvious  that  we  are  not  interested  in 


A  Vietnamese  Viewpoint  35 


seeing  colonial  empire  administrations  supplanted  by  philosophy  and  political 
organizations  emanating  from  and  controlled  by  Kremlin"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:31). 
By  the  end  of  1947,  the  French  did,  indeed,  establish  contact  with  Bao  Dai,  the 
former  emperor  of  Vietnam,  with  the  intention  of  using  him  to  form  a  mildly 
independent,  but  above  all  anticommunist,  government.  The  United  States,  for 
its  part,  devoted  all  its  resources  to  bring  about  the  Bao  Dai  solution.  In  1948, 
the  State  Department  instructed  its  ambassador  in  Paris  to  urge  the  French  gov- 
ernment to  leave  nothing  undone  "which  will  strengthen  truly  nationalist  groups 
in  Indochina  and  induce  present  supporters  of  the  Viet  Minh  to  come  to  the 
side  of  that  group"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:32).  The  United  States  justly  estimated  that 
it  would  be  impossible  for  any  Vietnamese  leader  to  form  a  government,  or  rally 
popular  support,  without  displaying  a  modicum  of  independence.  The  French, 
however,  were  not  quite  willing  to  yield  even  a  fraction  of  their  prewar  privileges. 
Finally,  U.S.  pressure  assumed  its  familiar  financial  form.  The  American  am- 
bassador in  Paris  informed  the  French  Foreign  Minister  that  the  United  States 
was  willing  "to  consider  assisting  French  Government  with  respect  to  matter  of 
financial  aid  for  Indochina  through  ECA  but  could  not  give  consideration  to 
altering  its  present  policy  in  this  regard  unless  real  progress  made  in  reaching 
non-Communist  solution  in  Indochina  based  on  cooperation  of  true  nationalists 
of  that  country"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:33). 

Immediately  on  February  2,  1950,  when  the  French  government  announced 
the  ratification  by  the  French  National  Assembly  of  the  independence  of  Vietnam, 
the  United  States  extended  diplomatic  recognition  to  the  State  of  Vietnam, 
headed  by  Bao  Dai.  On  February  16,  1950,  France  requested  military  and  eco- 
nomic assistance  in  prosecuting  the  war  in  Indochina,  and  rapidly  obtained  it. 
In  May  1950,  the  United  States  publicly  announced  the  beginning  of  military 
and  economic  aid  to  the  government  of  Bao  Dai.  An  aid  mission  was  estab- 
lished in  Vietnam  a  few  days  later. 

From  1950  on,  U.S.  policy  toward  Vietnam  was  not  unlike  what  Washington 
now  calls  "Vietnamization,"  except  that  then,  both  the  French  and  the  Viet- 
namese were  being  used.  On  the  one  hand,  the  United  States  gave  France  enough 
money  and  military  equipment  to  stave  off  its  military  defeat;  on  the  other,  it 
siphoned  enough  aid  to  the  Bao  Dai  government  to  enable  it  to  raise  an  army  of 
Vietnamese  men,  equipped  with  modern  Western  weapons,  trained  by  French  of- 
ficers, to  fight  other  Vietnamese  men. 

Less  than  a  year  after  the  Communist  victory  in  China,  and  at  about  the  time 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  war,  the  United  States  became  totally  committed  to 
France's  aims  in  Vietnam.  The  events  in  China  and  Korea  did  not,  as  often  sup- 
posed, incite  the  United  States  to  blindly  adopt  an  anticommunist  stance  vis-d-vis 
Vietnam.  That  course  of  action,  as  we  are  now  able  to  trace  it,  had  been  set  back 
in  late  1946.  The  anti-Ho  Chi  Minh,  pro-French,  and  then  pro-Bao  Dai  policies 
stemmed  from  one  and  the  same  preoccupation  of  the  State  Department's:  to 
stop  "Moscow-oriented  regimes"  in  Asia  and  in  Western  Europe  from  becoming 
a  strong  defense  shield  for  the  Soviet  Union.  That  the  United  States,  along  with 
much  of  Western  Europe,  should  have  feared  the  Communist  threat  to  their  hith- 
erto comfortable  world  of  empires  and  colonies  is  understandable.  What  the 
United  States  failed  to  grasp,  however,  was  that  socialism,  wedded  to  the  desire  for 
independence,  had  become  a  formidable  local  force  in  many  of  the  old  colonies, 
and  that  no  alleged  links  to  the  Kremlin  would  explain  it  away.  At  every  stage  in 
the  evolution  of  U.S.  policy  toward  Vietnam,  the  United  States  was  warned  of 
this  analytical  confusion  by  its  own  agents,  or  by  people  familiar  with  the  prob- 
lem. The  State  Department  made  its  decisions  in  full  knowledge  of  the  data.  For 


36      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

example,  the  State  Department  knew  of  Ho  Chi  Minh's  commitment  to  the  Com- 
munist ideology.  It  also  knew  perfectly  well  that  Russia  had  had  very  little  to  do 
in  Vietnam.  According  to  a  report  from  the  Office  of  Intelligence  Research  of 
the  Department  of  State  itself,  "evidence  of  Kremlin-directed  conspiracy  was 
found  in  virtually  all  countries  [of  Southeast  Asia]  except  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:34).  The  United  States  chose  to  side  with  France  against  Vietnam  when  its  Di- 
rector in  the  Office  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs  in  the  State  Department  wrote  the  fol- 
lowing memorandum: 

Although  the  French  in  Indochina  have  made  far-reaching  paper-concessions 
to  the  Vietnamese  desire  for  autonomy,  French  actions  on  the  scene  have 
been  directed  toward  whittling  down  the  powers  and  the  territorial  extent 
of  the  Vietnam  "free  state."  This  process  the  Vietnamese  have  continued  to 
resist.  At  the  same  time,  the  French  themselves  admit  that  they  lack  the 
military  strength  to  reconquer  the  country.  In  brief,  with  inadequate  forces, 
with  public  opinion  sharply  at  odds,  with  a  government  rendered  largely  in- 
effective through  internal  division,  the  French  have  tried  to  accomplish  in 
Indochina  what  a  strong  and  united  Britain  has  found  it  unwise  to  attempt  in 
Burma.  Given  the  present  elements  in  the  situation,  guerrilla  warfare  may 
continue  indefinitely  (Gravel  ed.,  1:29). 

Washington  actively  supported  the  Bao  Dai  solution,  although  it  was  surely 
familiar  with  the  following  remark  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  French  Army  on 
his  return  from  an  observation  tour  in  1949: 

If  Ho  Chi  Minh  has  been  able  to  hold  off  French  intervention  for  so  long,  it 
is  because  the  Viet  Minh  leader  has  surrounded  himself  with  a  group  of  men 
of  incontestable  worth.  .  .  .  [Bao  Dai,  by  contrast,  had]  a  government 
composed  of  twenty  representatives  of  phantom  parties,  the  best  organized 
of  which  would  have  difficulty  in  rallying  twenty-five  adherents  .  .  . 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:59). 

The  conflict  in  Vietnam  which  began  as  a  struggle  for  independence  against  a 
colonial  power  waged  by  a  coalition  of  several  political  groups,  the  Viet  Minh,  in 
which  the  Communists  played  a  leading  role,  now  had  added  to  it  a  new  and 
disastrous  dimension  in  1950:  that  of  a  civil  war.  That  the  United  States  created 
the  conditions  for  a  civil  war  is  obvious.  The  French  were  primarily  interested  in 
defeating  the  Viet  Minh  forces  and  repossessing  their  former  colony.  At  the  in- 
stigation of  the  United  States,  they  adopted  a  secondary  political  ploy:  the  setting 
up  of  an  anticommunist  "national"  government  in  Saigon,  whence  have  derived 
all  the  "Saigon"  governments  since.  Without  the  support  of  France  and  the  United 
States,  the  Bao  Dai  government  would  never  have  come  into  being,  and  the  anti- 
colonial  war  would  have  been  waged  and  won,  whereas  today,  the  war  of  inde- 
pendence and  a  civil  war  rage  on,  side  by  side. 

After  1950,  and  particularly  after  the  onset  of  the  Eisenhower  administration 
in  1952,  Vietnam  assumed  the  importance  of  a  test-case  for  the  United  States. 
The  events  in  Vietnam  were  perceived  to  be  intimately,  and  inextricably,  linked 
to  events  in  other  Southeast  Asian  countries.  The  outbreak  of  the  Korean  war 
and  the  signing  of  the  peace  treaty  with  Japan  in  1951,  stimulated  the  United 
States  to  secure  all  countries  from  Burma  to  Japan  for  the  "free  world."  In  con- 
crete terms,  keeping  Southeast  Asia  "free"  meant  the  following:  demonstrating  to 


A  Vietnamese  Viewpoint  37 

capitalist  and  other  noncommunist  countries  the  resolve  of  the  United  States 
to  withstand  Communist  expansion;  assuring  a  Southeast  Asian  market  for 
the  Japanese  economy  which  would  otherwise  lean  too  heavily  on  American  aid; 
removing  the  need  for  a  Japanese  accommodation  with  the  Soviet  bloc;  securing 
access  to  the  world's  richest  sources  of  natural  rubber  and  tin,  and  perhaps  sec- 
ond-richest source  of  petroleum;  securing  access  to  direct  and  well-developed  air 
and  sea  routes  between  the  western  Pacific  and  India  and  the  Near  East;  gaining 
control  of  military  bases  and  other  facilities  on  mainland  Southeast  Asia  which 
would  lessen  the  need  for  less  desirable  insular  installations.  All  these  considera- 
tions are  set  forth  in  a  National  Security  Council  staff  study  dated  February  13, 
1952  (Gravel  ed.,  1:375-376).  Given  the  importance  of  Southeast  Asia  and  given 
the  fact  that  Indochina  has  long  been  considered  "a  key  area  of  Southeast  Asia 
.  .  .  under  immediate  threat"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:373),  the  United  States  decided 
that,  in  the  case  that  the  Vietnamese  [the  Saigon  government]  should  be  weary  of 
the  war,  and  the  French  should  accept  to  negotiate  an  end  to  it,  the  United  States 
should  still  "continue  to  oppose  any  negotiated  settlement  with  the  Viet  Minh," 
because  "any  settlement  based  on  a  withdrawal  of  French  forces  would  be  tanta- 
mount to  handing  over  Indochina  to  communism"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:379). 

A  year  later,  actual  entry  into  the  war  by  the  United  States  was  anticipated: 
"If  the  French  actually  decided  to  withdraw,  the  United  States  would  have  to 
consider  most  seriously  whether  to  take  over  in  this  area."  So  advocated  a  re- 
port by  the  State  Department,  in  August  of  1953,  at  a  time  when  the  United 
States  raised  its  aid  to  the  Paris  and  Saigon  forces  from  $1,700,000  in  that  year 
to  $2,160,000  in  1954,  or  from  33  percent  to  61  percent  of  the  total  war  cost 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:407-408). 

In  1954,  while  the  Viet  Minh  besieged  the  French  at  Dien  Bien  Phu,  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council  debated  the  advisability  of  salvaging  the  French  military 
fiasco  by  dispatching  into  Vietnam  U.S.  naval,  air  and  ground  forces  (Gravel  ed., 
1:465-472).  The  use  of  nuclear  weapons  was  suggested  quite  matter-of-factly: 
"the  estimated  forces  initially  to  be  supplied  by  the  U.S.  ...  are  based  on  the 
assumption  of  availability  [of  nuclear  weapons].  If  such  weapons  are  not  avail- 
able, the  force  requirements  may  have  to  be  modified"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:466-467). 
While  the  consequences  of  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  were  carefully  studied, 
that  is,  the  repercussions  of  their  use  on  U.S.  allies,  on  nonaligned  couptries,  and 
on  the  Soviet  bloc,  not  a  word  is  to  be  found  concerning  what  they  would  do  to 
the  Vietnamese  people  or  country. 

Even  after  Prime  Minister  Eden  had  shown  him  a  map  of  Indochina  which, 
according  to  Dulles,  indicated  that  "virtually  all  of  Vietnam,  Laos  and  Cambodia 
is  under  or  subject  to  imminent  control  by  the  Viet  Minh,"  the  Secretary  of  State 
concluded  that  "it  would  be  a  tragedy  not  to  take  action  which  would  prevent 
Indochina  from  being  written  off." 

From  all  the  documents  available  on  the  U.S.  role  in  the  Geneva  talks  from 
May  8  to  July  21,  1954,  it  appears  that  the  United  States  attended  the  negotia- 
tions with  the  clear  intention  of  persuading  the  French  to  continue  the  fighting 
and  to  seek  a  military  victory.  French  proposals  for  a  Vietnamese  coalition  gov- 
ernment were  strongly  discouraged,  for  such  a  government  "would  open  the  way 
for  the  ultimate  seizure  of  control  by  the  Communists  under  conditions  which 
might  preclude  timely  and  effective  external  assistance  in  the  prevention  of  such 
seizure,"  the  "timely  and  effective  external  assistance"  to  come  from  the  United 
States,  clearly.  Neither  was  any  territory  to  be  ceded  to  the  Viet  Minh,  because 
that  "would  constitute  a  retrogressive  step  in  the  Containment  Policy  and  would 
invite  similar  Communist  tactics  against  other  countries  of  Southeast  Asia."  Set- 


38      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

dements  based  on  self-determination  through  free  elections  were  not  to  be  given 
a  thought  for  that  "would  be  attended  by  almost  certain  loss  of  the  Associated 
States  [Vietnam,  Cambodia  and  Laos]  to  Communist  control"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:449). 

But  the  map  that  Eden  showed  to  Dulles  spoke  louder  to  a  weakened  France 
than  all  of  Dulles'  exhortations,  so  that  the  American  Secretary  of  State  soon  had 
to  renounce  too  much  of  his  desiderata. 

On  June  14,  1954,  Dulles  cabled  his  ambassador  in  Paris  informing  him  that 
plans  for  a  U.S.  intervention  in  Indochina  were  now  virtually  abandoned.  "This," 
wrote  Dulles,  "is  the  inevitable  result  of  the  steady  deterioration  in  Indochina 
which  makes  the  problem  of  intervention  and  pacification  more  and  more  diffi- 
cult" (Gravel  ed.,  1:524).  Soon  after  this,  the  question  of  the  partition  of  Viet- 
nam was  broached.  Dulles'  immediate  reaction  to  this  was:  "There  can  ...  be 
no  repeat  no  question  of  U.S.  participation  in  any  attempt  to  QUOTE  sell  UN- 
QUOTE a  partition  to  non-Communist  Vietnamese"  (17  June  1954,  Gravel  ed., 
1:531).  The  following  day,  Dulles  sent  another  cable  to  Geneva  saying  that  the 
United  States  was  willing  to  "reexamine  possible  de  facto  partition  Vietnam" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:532).  The  reason  for  this  about-face  was  that  the  proposed  de- 
marcation line  seemed  advantageous  to  the  French,  and  that,  in  any  event,  the 
French  military  situation  in  the  Tonkin  delta  had  rapidly  deteriorated  and  become 
desperate. 

The  Geneva  Accords  were  signed  on  July  21,  1954.  The  war  between  the 
French  and  the  Viet  Minh  officially  ended.  Vietnam  was  temporarily  divided  into 
two  regions.  At  that  very  moment,  the  United  States  prepared  to  pick  up  the 
pieces  the  French  were  leaving.  Already,  by  June  1,  1954,  Colonel  Lansdale  had 
arrived  in  Saigon  to  direct  the  Saigon  Military  Mission,  the  aims  of  which  were  to 
"undertake  paramilitary  operations  against  the  enemy  and  to  wage  political-psy- 
chological warfare.  Later,  after  Geneva,  the  mission  was  modified  to  prepare  the 
means  for  undertaking  paramilitary  operations  in  Communist  areas  rather  than 
to  wage  unconventional  warfare  (Gravel  ed.,  1:574). 

The  interests  of  the  Vietnamese  people  dictated  that  the  country  be  united  un- 
der a  single  government  of  independence.  But  it  was  against  the  interests  of  the 
United  States,  as  Washington  conceived  of  them,  to  have  that  government  be  Ho 
Chi  Minh's.  The  United  States,  therefore,  undertook  to  lend  total  support  to  the 
regime  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  who  became  Prime  Minister  of  the  Bao  Dai  govern- 
ment in  1954  and  who  eventually  replaced  Bao  Dai  as  Chief  of  State  in  1955,  in 
hopes  of  seeing  it  develop  into  a  viable  alternative  to  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Vietnam.  It  would  be  wrong  to  think  that  the  United  States  opposed  the  concept 
of  reunification.  It  had  taken,  at  the  Geneva  Conference,  the  pledge  to  "continue 
to  seek  to  achieve  unity"  for  the  divided  countries,  but  how  the  National  Security 
Council  conceived  of  reunification  is  another  matter.  In  1956,  after  the  deadline 
for  the  reunification  elections  had  passed,  the  National  Security  Council  directed 
all  U.S.  agencies  in  Vietnam  to: 

Assist  Free  Vietnam  to  develop  a  strong,  stable,  and  constitutional  govern- 
ment to  enable  Free  Vietnam  to  assert  an  increasingly  attractive  contrast  to 
conditions  in  the  present  Communist  zone  .  .  .  [and]  work  toward  the 
weakening  of  the  Communists  in  North  and  South  Vietnam  in  order  to  bring 
about  the  eventual  peaceful  reunification  of  a  free  and  independent  Vietnam 
under  anti-Communist  leadership  (Gravel  ed.,  1:267). 

In  the  meantime,  then,  southern  Vietnam  had  to  be  made  workable,  appealing, 
and  U.S.  money  poured  into  Saigon  to  do  precisely  that.  How  much  of  the  largess 


A  Vietnamese  Viewpoint  39 

benefited  the  Vietnamese  living  in  southern  Vietnam?  The  purpose  of  the  aid  was 
not  to  lift  the  standard  of  life  of  the  Vietnamese: 

Security  was  the  focus  of  U.S.  aid;  more  than  75%  of  the  economic  aid  the 
U.S.  provided  in  the  same  period  went  into  the  GVN  [Government  of  Viet- 
nam-Saigon] military  budget;  thus  at  least  $8  out  of  every  $10  of  aid  went 
directly  toward  security.  In  addition,  other  amounts  of  nominally  economic 
aid  (e.g.,  that  for  public  administration)  went  toward  security  forces,  and 
aid  for  agriculture  and  transportation  principally  funded  projects  with  stra- 
tegic purposes  and  with  an  explicit  military  rationale.  For  example,  a  20- 
mile  stretch  of  highway  from  Saigon  to  Bien  Hoa,  built  at  Gen.  Williams'  in- 
stance for  specifically  military  purposes,  received  more  U.S.  economic  aid 
than  all  funds  provided  for  labor,  community  development,  social  welfare, 
health,  and  education  in  the  years  1954-1961  (Gravel  ed.,  1:268). 

Being  a  nation  of  peasants,  the  Vietnamese  desperately  needed  an  agrarian  re- 
form to  abolish  the  inequalities  spawned  under  colonialism:  after  six  years  of 
study,  research,  and  various  programs,  the  situation,  as  of  1960,  remained  as  fol- 
lows: "45%  of  the  land  remained  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  2%  of  landown- 
ers, and  15%  of  the  landlords  owned  75%  of  all  the  land"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:254). 

Not  only  did  the  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  regime  make  no  attempt  to  eradicate  social 
injustices,  it  prevented  its  citizens  from  attempting  to  redress  these  wrongs  in  the 
political  arena.  The  government  tolerated  no  opposition  of  any  kind  and  political 
life  was  at  a  virtual  standstill.  Prisons  overflowed  with  political  prisoners.  "In 
brief,  Diem's  policies  virtually  assured  that  political  challenges  to  him  would  have 
to  be  extra-legal"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:257). 

Some  U.S.  policymakers  were  naturally  uneasy  at  the  blatantly  dictatorial  ways 
of  their  proteges  in  Saigon,  but  even  with  the  advent  of  a  new  U.S.  administra- 
tion in  1961,  they  hesitated  to  revise  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  gov- 
ernment, simply  because  "South  Vietnam  (unlike  any  of  the  other  countries  in 
Southeast  Asia),  was  the  creation  of  the  United  States"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:22). 

Most  of  the  Vietnamese  who  cared  to  know,  had  known  that  since  1954.  And 
those  who  cared  to  fight,  or  saw  no  alternative  but  to  fight,  quietly  picked  up  their 
arms  again  and  resumed  the  old  anti-colonialist  struggle  which  had  merely  sub- 
sided. 

Studies  of  peasant  attitudes  conducted  in  recent  years  have  demonstrated 
that  for  many,  the  struggle  which  began  in  1945  against  colonialism  continued 
uninterrupted  throughout  Diem's  regime:  in  1954  the  foes  of  nationalists 
were  transformed  from  France  and  Bao  Dai,  to  Diem  and  the  U.S.  ...  but 
the  issues  at  stake  never  changed  (Gravel  ed.,  1:295). 

Subsequent  to  1960,  all  U.S.  interventions  in  the  Vietnamese  situation  devel- 
oped logically  out  of  the  premise  that  South  Vietnam  was  to  be  kept  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  "free  world,"  regardless  of  how  that  affected  the  Vietnamese 
people. 

After  1960,  events  in  South  Vietnam  were  but  the  reenactment  of  events  fifteen 
years  earlier.  There  was  a  change  of  actors,  but  not  of  plots.  The  Viet  Minh  were 
replaced  by  the  National  Liberation  Front  of  South  Vietnam,  the  French  by  the 
Americans,  and  the  Bao  Dai  government  by  subsequent  Saigon  governments.  In 
the  eyes  of  the  Americans,  just  as  the  Viet  Minh  had  to  be  controlled  by  Moscow, 
although  no  evidence  for  it  could  be  found,  so  now  the  National  Liberation  Front 


40      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

of  South  Vietnam  had  to  have  been  directed  by  North  Vietnam,  although  ample 
proof  could  be  found  for  localized,  southern  grievances  and  organized  opposition. 
The  real  difference,  though,  is  that  whereas  France  was  not  able  to  bomb  Moscow, 
the  United  States  has  been  absolutely  free  to  all  but  devastate  North  Vietnam. 
What  saved  North  Vietnam  from  total  destruction,  and  the  North  Vietnamese 
people  from  annihilation,  is  the  risk  the  United  States  of  America  always  faces  of 
bringing  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  into  an  enlarged  war.  American  planes  did 
not  bomb  the  oil  depots  and  power  plants  around  Hanoi  and  Haiphong  not  for  the 
sake  of  the  Vietnamese  people,  but  because  that  would  "trigger  Chinese  interven- 
tion on  the  ground.  .  .  .  This  is  what  we  wish  to  avoid"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 31). 
But  if  other  less  risky  ways  could  be  found  to  arrive  at  the  same  results,  they 
were  to  be  considered: 

Strikes  at  population  targets  (per  se)  are  likely  not  only  to  create  a  counter- 
productive wave  of  revulsion  abroad  and  at  home,  but  greatly  to  increase 
the  risk  of  enlarging  the  war  with  China  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Destruction 
of  locks  and  dams,  however — if  handled  right — might  .  .  .  offer  promise. 
It  should  be  studied.  Such  destruction  does  not  kill  or  drown  people.  By 
shallow-flooding  the  rice,  it  leads  after  time  to  widespread  starvation  (more 
than  a  million?)  unless  food  is  provided — which  we  could  offer  to  do  "at  the 
conference  table"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 43). 

Southern  Vietnam,  however,  was  truly  a  free-fire  zone,  with  China  safely  at  a 
distance.  And  that  is  why  the  United  States  has  been  destroying  its  people  out- 
right, in  order  to  "save"  them. 


41 


4.  The  Media  and  the  Message 
by  James  Aronson 


The  people  of  this  nation,  in  whose  name  and  by  whose  ultimate  con- 
sent all  high  government  officials  serve,  have  both  the  need  and  the 
right  to  be  thoroughly  informed  on  decisions. 

Thomas  Jefferson  did  not  say  that.  Robert  S.  McNamara  did,  in  the  preface 
to  a  collection  of  his  speeches  delivered  during  his  tenure  as  Secretary  of  Defense 
under  President  Kennedy  and  President  Johnson,  and  published  in  1968  after 
he  had  left  the  Johnson  administration  to  become  director  of  the  World  Bank. 

In  1971,  Arthur  Krock,  the  former  Washington  Correspondent  of  the  New 
York  Times,  titled  his  most  recent  book  The  Consent  of  the  Governed,  and  Other 
Deceits.  It  is  possible  that  Krock  had  read  McNamara's  collected  speeches — an 
assignment  of  unusually  cruel  punishment — but  he  hardly  needed  to  do  so  in  ar- 
riving at  his  title:  at  age  eighty-five,  he  had  known  twelve  American  presidents 
and  countless  cabinet  officials. 

A  less  cynical  man  who  has  known  fewer  presidents  but  more  people  (as  dis- 
tinguished from  government  officials)  phrased  it  less  elegantly  but  more  pun- 
gently  just  before  publication  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  by  the  New  York  Times 
had  been  aborted  by  federal  court  order.  He  was  Jimmy  Breslin,  reporter  and  stu- 
dent of  politics-in-the-raw,  in  the  unaccustomed  role  of  Class  Day  orator  at 
Harvard  College  on  June  16,  1971. 

"I  was  just  thinking  on  the  way  up  here,"  said  Breslin,  "that  the  Berrigans  are 
in  jail  and  the  Bundys  are  in  the  street."  Since  the  brothers  Bundy,  McGeorge 
and  William  P.,  were  so  closely  identified  with  Harvard  and  the  Kennedy-John- 
son administrations,  that  comment  in  Harvard  Yard  had  a  piercing  point.  Breslin 
continued: 

This  week  we  all  found  out  that  [soldiers  have]  died  to  keep  alive  the  lies 
of  some  people  who  thought  they  were  important.  This  is  a  very  great  in- 
stitution here.  But  with  these  sustained  reprisals  hanging  in  the  air,  I  just 
think  that  you  might  think  you  have  something  to  overcome,  coming  out  of 
here  too. 

There  are  many  Americans  with  something  to  overcome — and  to  learn — in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  not  only  in  the  universities  and  the  federal 
government,  but  also  in  the  communications  establishment  with  which  this  chapter 
is  concerned.  Few  events  in  recent  years  have  been  so  revealing  of  the  inner  rela- 
tions between  the  government  and  the  communications  industry.  Nothing  has 
borne  so  directly  on  the  public's  right  to  know,  a  concept  which  for  more  than 
twenty-five  Cold  War  years  has  been  far  more  violated  than  honored.  Few  de- 
Copyright  ©  1972  by  James  Aronson. 


42      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

velopments  have  cast  a  colder  light  on  the  credibility  of  the  highest  elected  and 
appointed  officials  and,  in  reflection  and  by  omission,  on  the  communications  in- 
dustry itself. 

For  the  owners  and  operators  of  the  newspapers,  the  managers  of  the  radio- 
television  networks,  and  the  men  and  women  who  work  in  the  news  industry,  the 
summer  of  1971  was  a  crisis  point.  Since  November  1969,  Vice  President  Agnew 
had  been  blanketing  the  lecture  circuit  with  his  alliterative  assaults  on  press  and 
television  news  commentators;  the  Justice  Department  had  been  seeking  through 
grand  jury  subpoenas  to  intimidate  reporters  by  forcing  disclosure  of  their  news 
sources;  the  White  House  news  coordinator,  Herbert  Klein,  had  been  attempting 
to  circumvent  a  not  entirely  compliant  Washington  press  corps  to  deal  directly 
with  flattered  news  executives  throughout  the  country;  the  President  himself 
through  a  series  of  selective  briefings  had  been  anointing  his  favorite  newspapers 
and  columnists,  and  marking  others  for  outer  darkness,  or  at  least  for  a  purga- 
torial interim. 

This  was  the  atmosphere  in  which  the  Pentagon  Papers  were  published,  first  by 
the  New  York  Times  on  June  13,  1971,  then  in  relay  by  the  Washington  Post, 
the  Boston  Globe,  the  St.  Louis  Post-Dispatch,  and  several  other  newspapers.  The 
times  and  events  would  seem  to  have  called  for  the  most  searching  kind  of  self- 
examination,  not  only  of  the  factors  behind  the  publication  of  the  Pentagon  Pa- 
pers, but  of  the  whole  question  of  government-media  relations,  and  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  communications  industry  to  the  public.  The  immediate  core  issue 
derived  from  the  Nixon  administration's  concerted  attack  on  the  media;  in  a 
larger  context,  it  was  related  to  the  origins  of  the  Cold  War  at  the  close  of  World 
War  II  and  the  role  of  the  communications  industry  in  relation  to  Cold  War  pol- 
icymaking in  Washington.  In  this  context,  an  examination  of  the  communications 
media  during — and  before — the  time  span  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  in  order. 

A  key  question  in  the  examination  is  this:  How  much  of  the  information  con- 
tained in  the  Pentagon  documents  was  available  to  the  media  and,  if  much  of  it 
was,  why  was  it  not  made  public? 

The  opportunity  rarely  arises  from  a  left  viewpoint  to  quote  with  approval  a 
comment  by  Joseph  Alsop.  However,  on  June  23,  1971,  Alsop  wrote: 

The  orgy  of  public  hypocrisy,  touched  off  by  the  .  .  .  Pentagon  docu- 
ments, is  something  that  has  to  be  seen  to  be  believed.  ...  In  reality,  any 
senator  who  did  his  homework  and  any  reasonably  realistic  and  hardwork- 
ing reporter  could  easily  discover  what  was  actually  going  on,  in  the  period 
covered  by  the  Times  quotations. 

However  accurate  this  appraisal,  there  remains  the  question  of  what  the  hard- 
working reporters  (presumably  including  Alsop)  did  with  their  discoveries,  if 
and  when  they  made  them.  Nonetheless,  there  was  confirmation  of  Alsop's  view 
from  another  correspondent  who  has  generally  expressed  approval  of  the  United 
States  intervention  in  Southeast  Asia.  On  June  17,  1971,  Keyes  Beech,  a  veteran 
of  the  Indochina  theater,  wrote  in  the  Chicago  Daily  News: 

The  New  York  Times  report  .  .  .  held  few  surprises  for  the  correspond- 
ents who  have  covered  this  war  from  the  start.  In  general,  the  Pentagon  ac- 
count confirms  what  some  of  us  knew,  half-knew,  or  suspected  without  be- 
ing able  to  document.  Some  of  us  had  and  wrote  the  story  piecemeal.  While 


The  Media  and  the  Message  43 

we  could  see  what  was  happening  here,  we  could  not  know  what  was  hap- 
pening in  Washington. 

What  was  happening  in  Washington,  as  far  as  the  news  corps  was  concerned, 
was  recorded  in  the  Columbia  Journalism  Review  (Winter  1970-1971)  by  Jules 
Witcover,  an  astute  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Los  Angeles  Times.  Months 
before  the  Pentagon  documents  were  made  public,  Witcover  wrote  in  his  article 
titled  "Where  Washington  Reporting  Failed" : 

While  the  press  corps  in  those  years  diligently  reported  what  the  govern- 
ment said  about  Vietnam,  and  questioned  the  inconsistencies  as  they  arose, 
too  few  sought  out  opposing  viewpoints  and  expertise  until  too  late,  when 
events  and  the  prominence  of  the  Vietnam  dissent  could  no  longer  be  ig- 
nored. In  coverage  of  the  war,  the  press  corps'  job  narrowed  down  to  three 
basic  tasks — reporting  what  the  government  said,  finding  out  whether  it  was 
true,  and  assessing  whether  the  policy  enunciated  worked.  The  group  did  a 
highly  professional  job  on  the  first  task.  But  it  fell  down  on  the  second  and 
third,  and  there  is  strong  evidence  the  reason  is  too  many  reporters  sought 
the  answers  in  all  three  categories  from  the  same  basic  source — the  govern- 
ment. 

There  was  a  fourth  task  not  cited  by  Witcover  which  may  be  the  most  perti- 
nent of  all.  Beyond  the  question  of  whether  the  policy  worked,  the  basic  question, 
unasked,  was  whether  it  was  wise,  whether  it  was  in  the  public  interest?  The  rea- 
son for  the  correspondents'  confining  approach,  Witcover  ruefully  conceded  later, 
and  Keyes  Beech  confirmed  in  his  book  Not  Without  the  Americans  (Doubleday, 
1971),  was  that  the  news  corps,  both  in  Indochina  and  in  Washington,  was  still 
enthralled  by  the  Cold  War  and  its  central  philosophy — the  theory  of  the  interna- 
national  Communist  conspiracy. 

The  pervasiveness  of  this  philosophy,  even  in  the  earliest  stages  of  the  Indo- 
china question,  within  the  media,  was  delineated  by  Susan  Welch  of  the  political 
science  faculty  of  the  University  of  Nebraska  in  a  thorough  survey  of  four  major 
American  newspapers  from  1950  to  1956.^  The  newspapers  were  the  New  York 
Times,  Washington  Post,  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  and  Chicago  Tribune.  Some 
of  Miss  Welch's  conclusions: 

It  was  in  the  1950s,  not  the  1960s,  that  this  distant  and  undeclared  war 
became  established  in  the  minds  of  both  the  public  and  public  officials  as  a 
showdown  between  the  forces  of  Communism  and  anti-Communism,  vital  to 
the  "free  world";  that  Ho  Chi  Minh  was  identified  as  a  tool  of  a  larger  Com- 
munist movement,  and  that  victory  in  Indochina  was  seen  as  vital  to  the  pres- 
ervation of  all  Asia  and  beyond.  What  the  press  did  to  help  establish  these 
views  is  important.  .  .  .  The  press  echoed  the  administration  in  its  definition 
of  the  Indochinese  situation.  In  only  one  instance  was  the  basic  assumption 
underlying  United  States  policy  questioned.  The  terms  of  the  debate  hard- 
ened at  a  very  early  stage  in  policymaking,  and  remained  constant  through- 
out. The  assumptions  of  the  administration  were  reiterated  and  emphasized 
in  news  stories  and  editorials  alike. 

Much  of  the  information  gathered  by  the  press  ,  .  .  was  administration 
sponsored,  directly  or  indirectly.  .  .  .  Support  for  the  position  of  the  ad- 
ministration (both  before  and  after  the  Republican  takeover)  as  expressed 


44      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

in  editorials  was  high  for  all  but  the  Chicago  Tribune.  .  .  .  [It]  was  re- 
flected by  the  rhetoric  with  which  the  Indochina  war  [between  the  Vietminh 
and  the  French]  was  discussed.  News  stories  also  reinforced  the  preconcep- 
tions of  the  administration  largely  because  most  of  the  stories  dealt  with 
quotes  and  comments  of  those  involved  in  the  decision  making. 

The  conservative  Chicago  Tribune  alone  questioned  the  basic  assumptions  of 
administration  policy,  largely  because  of  the  Tribune's  isolationist  position.  Fight- 
ing Communists  at  home  was  a  worthy  pursuit,  it  felt,  but  sending  American 
men  and  money  abroad,  particularly  to  bail  out  the  colonial  French,  was  patently 
absurd.  But  the  liberal  press — the  Times,  the  Post,  and  the  Chronicle — reacted 
with  "pre-established  programs  of  action — helping  to  defend  a  free — or  almost 
free — people  against  Communist  aggression."  From  55  to  85  percent  of  the  "hard 
news"  items  about  Indochina  were  of  this  variety.  When  the  news  source  was  in- 
dependent of  the  administration,  and  indicated  that  neither  French  nor  American 
policy  was  working,  the  indications  were  discounted  in  the  news  rooms  and  the 
editorial  sanctums.  The  timidity  of  the  press  as  to  the  "ideological  implications" 
involved  in  Indochina  was  presented  dispassionately  and  clearly  by  Miss  Welch: 

There  might  have  been  a  certain  degree  of  risk  in  proclaiming  too  loudly 
Ho  Chi  Minh's  nationalistic  appeal  without  immediate  disclaimers  of  his 
status  as  a  puppet  of  Moscow,  or  Peking.  The  period  1950-1956  involved  an 
internal  climate  not  designed  to  encourage  those  who  did  not  see  Com- 
munism in  this  prescribed  pattern.  The  whole  early  Cold  War  era  also  tended 
to  mold  feelings  about  Communism  into  black  and  white  patterns,  with  little 
place  in  the  accepted  pattern  for  unusual  combinations  of  nationalism  and 
Communism.  The  Korean  struggle  only  reinforced  already  held  preconcep- 
tions about  the  aggressive  and  Moscow-Peking  directed  nature  of  Com- 
munism. 

The  excesses  of  the  McCarthy  period  subsided  in  the  decade  that  followed, 
but  the  institutionalized  Cold  War  philosophy  maintained  the  molded  feelings  to 
keep  public  opposition  to  governmental  policy  at  a  minimum.  The  media  went 
along.  In  his  Columbia  Journalism  Review  article  cited  earlier,  Jules  Witcover 
raised  a  significant  point  anticipating  the  furor  over  the  Pentagon  documents 
and  the  reasons  for  it.  He  said:  "One  can  speculate  how  the  course  of  the  war 
might  have  been  affected  had  more  members  of  the  Washington  news  community 
relied  less  on  their  government  and  more  on  its  responsible  critics  in  appraising 
the  veracity  and  effectiveness  of  government  policy." 

In  June  1971,  public  reaction  to  the  publication  of  the  documents  was  based 
not  so  much  on  an  understanding  of  the  issues  involved  in  the  American  presence 
in  Indochina,  as  on  a  realization  that  the  public  had  been  lied  to  for  years.  The 
reaction  could  not  be  based  on  an  understanding  of  the  issues  because  the  issues 
had  rarely  been  presented  in  a  manner  that  would  enable  the  public  to  form 
opinions  or  reach  judgments  about  the  events  that  shaped  the  issues.  Therefore, 
in  the  news  stories  and  editorials  about  the  documents,  far  more  stress  was  placed 
on  the  circumstances  involved  in  obtaining  and  publishing  the  documents,  and 
on  freedom  of  the  press,  than  on  the  contents  of  the  documents.  The  core  issue 
thus  was  never  fully  discussed. 

There  was  a  defensive  echo  of  Witcover's  comment  in  a  retrospective  editorial 
in  the  New  York  Times,  appropriately  on  July  4,  1971.  It  said: 


The  Media  and  the  Message  45 

Even  if  these  secret  decisions,  now  being  revealed  in  the  Pentagon  Pa- 
pers, had  been  generally  understood  by  the  public  at  the  time,  we  are  not 
at  all  sure  that  in  the  climate  of  those  days,  the  results  would  have  been  any 
different.  Given  the  fear  of  Communist  penetration  and  aggression  though- 
out  the  '50s  and  most  of  the  '60s,  it  is  quite  likely  that  the  American  public 
would  have  supported  the  basic  rationale  of  escalation  even  if  the  respective 
administrations  had  been  as  forthcoming  as  democratic  procedures  de- 
manded. 

The  Times  may  be  sound  in  this  conclusion,  but  the  uneasy  question  implied  is 
neither  asked  nor  answered  directly.  Did  not  the  vast  majority  of  the  United 
States  media — including  the  New  York  Times — advance  the  myth  of  the  inter- 
national Communist  conspiracy  and  help  engender  the  atmosphere  of  fear?  They 
did  not  dispute  Joe  McCarthy's  ends — only  his  methods.  They  worried  far  more 
about  damage  to  American  prestige  abroad — that  is,  the  credibility  of  American 
policy — than  damage  to  Americans  and  American  principles  of  freedom  at  home. 
They  did  not  report  on  the  open  and  systematic  violations  by  the  United  States 
of  the  Geneva  agreements  of  1954  (though  they  did  publish  the  government's 
denials),  or  the  reasons  for  the  rise  of  the  National  Liberation  Front  of  South 
Vietnam.  Nor  did  they  demand  withdrawal  of  American  support  for  a  brutal  and 
corrupt  administration  in  Saigon — until  the  situation  became  so  untenable  that 
even  the  administration  was  forced  to  take  action.  The  case  history  of  the  media 
and  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  whose  life  and  death  figure  so  prominently  in  the  Pentagon 
documents,  is  instructive. 

For  the  American  public,  the  myth  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  seems  to  have  been 
fashioned  in  equal  measure  by  Cardinal  Spellman,  Michigan  State  University 
(acting  on  behalf  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency),  and  a  group  of  publicists 
led  by  Joseph  H.  Buttinger,  an  Austrian  anti-Communist  who  had  won  the  favor 
of  Colonel  Edward  M.  Lansdale,  the  CIA  chief  in  Vietnam  in  the  1950s.  Thus, 
when  Diem  came  to  the  United  States  in  1957,  as  the  President  of  the  Republic 
of  South  Vietnam,  the  communications  media  were  prepared  to  do  somersaults 
for  him  on  the  welcoming  red  carpet — and  did. 

The  ISIew  York  Times  declared  that  "by  establishing  democratic  forms.  Presi- 
dent Diem  had  carved  a  deep  niche  in  official  esteem  in  Washington."  A  New 
York  City  banquet  was  presided  over  by  Henry  Luce  of  Time,  and  Life  ap- 
plauded his  "great  accomplishment"  in  abrogating  the  1956  elections,  ordered 
under  the  Geneva  agreements,  to  decide  the  future  of  Vietnam.  The  Reporter 
magazine  and  the  New  Leader  (which  had  provided  two  of  its  editors  for  the 
executive  committee  of  the  American  Friends  of  Vietnam,  along  with  Max  Lerner 
and  Arthur  Schlesinger,  Jr.)  were  effusive  in  their  praise.  In  1960,  he  was  still 
"doughty  little  Diem"  to  Time,  and  Newsweek'^  Ernest  K.  Lindley  described 
him  as  "one  of  Asia's  ablest  leaders." 

Thus  it  went  through  the  period  of  blatant  repression  by  Diem  of  all  political 
opposition  and  the  consequent  rise  of  the  National  Liberation  Front  of  South 
Vietnam.  These  developments  went  almost  entirely  unreported  in  the  American 
press,  except  for  a  few  left-wing  weeklies.  Wilfred  Burchett,  as  a  correspondent 
of  the  National  Guardian  and  a  contributor  to  newspapers  abroad,  set  up  a  home 
base  in  Cambodia  and  traveled  extensively  throughout  Southeast  Asia.  He  was  a 
frequent  visitor  to  North  Vietnam  (long  before  any  other  Western  correspondents 
were  there)  and  was  permitted  into  areas  of  South  Vietnam  controlled  by  the 


46      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Liberation  Front.  His  cabled  and  airmailed  dispatches  appeared  regularly  in  the 
National  Guardian,  whose  editors  regularly  had  extra  proofs  run  off  and  hand- 
delivered  to  the  daily  newspapers  in  New  York  and  the  wire  services.  They  were 
ignored. 

Occasionally  a  Burchett  report  which  had  been  published  in  the  Asahi  Shimbun 
of  Tokyo  (circulation  5  million)  was  relayed  back  to  the  United  States,  where 
it  appeared  in  abbreviated  fashion  in  a  few  newspapers.  Later,  when  the  war  was 
admittedly  going  badly  for  the  United  States  forces,  and  when  it  became  apparent 
that  Burchett  had  access  to  authoritative  information  in  both  North  and  South 
Vietnam,  the  Associated  Press  requested  articles  from  him  which  appeared  with 
an  italic  precede  describing  him  as  a  "Communist  journalist,"  and  warning  that 
his  dispatches  should  be  read  with  that  in  mind.  Burchett  protested  to  the  Asso- 
ciated Press  and  the  description  was  modified  to  "a  journalist  close  to  Communist 
leaders."  In  the  United  States  press,  the  description  did  not  disappear  until  the 
late  1960s.  Yet  while  Burchett  escaped  from  his  precede,  the  American  public 
was  still  a  prisoner  of  the  prejudices  of  newspaper  editors  and  publishers. 

By  1962  it  was  clear  to  the  New  York  Times,  at  least,  that  something  was 
going  terribly  wrong  in  Vietnam,  and  it  sent  one  of  its  ablest  reporters.  Homer 
Bigart,  to  Vietnam  (it  was  he  who  coined  the  slogan  "Sink  or  Swim  With  Ngo 
Dinh  Diem").  Bigart  became  involved  in  what  became  known  as  the  "second 
war"  in  Vietnam — the  war  of  the  correspondents  against  the  combined  United 
States-Vietnamese  authority  in  Saigon.  In  fact,  it  was  not  a  war  at  all,  but  a 
serious  conflict  between  some  correspondents^  and  almost  all  official  functionaries 
as  to  how  to  carry  out  American  policy  most  efficiently — in  brief,  how  to  win  the 
war  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  there  were  first-rate 
examples  of  honest  and  courageous  reporting  both  in  the  field  and  in  Saigon. 
But  what  was  so  painfully  apparent  was  the  contradiction  between  the  reporting 
of  the  best  of  the  correspondents  and  the  conclusions  they  drew  from  their  own 
reportage,  both  about  United  States  policy  and  the  aspirations  of  the  Vietnamese 
people. 

By  insisting  on  presenting  to  the  American  public  the  facts  about  the  Diem 
government,  the  "Young  Turks"  in  Vietnam  (as  they  were  called)  hastened  a 
review  of  Washington's  tactics,  but  not  its  policy.  That  policy  for  Indochina  has 
remained  unaltered  from  President  Kennedy's  decision  in  1961  to  corrimit  forces 
in  depth  to  Vietnam  until  this  day.  The  group  of  remarkably  able  and  dedicated 
newspapermen  assigned  to  Saigon  in  the  years  1962-1963  strove  mightily  to  make 
the  American  public  aware  that  the  "Miracle  of  Dierh"  was  a  costly  myth,  and 
that  a  change  was  needed.  Their  goal,  however,  was  not  an  end  to  United  States 
intervention,  but  reform  of  that  intervention  to  attain  an  American  victory. 

This  was  reflected  in  the  writings  of  Halberstam,  Browne,  and  Sheehan  after 
their  tours  of  duty  in  Vietnam.  In  1967,  Browne  had  moved  from  acceptance  of 
the  "credible"  American  presence  in  Vietnam  (expressed  in  1966)  to  an  an- 
guished conclusion  that  "Asia  and  America  seem  doomed  to  play  out  the  tragic 
drama  to  the  end."  ^  In  1965,  David  Halberstam  said  the  United  States  could  not 
agree  to  a  neutral  Vietnam  which  would  create  a  "vacuum"  for  Communist  "sub- 
version." Withdrawal  would  encourage  the  "enemies"  of  the  West  to  attempt 
"insurgencies  like  the  ones  in  Vietnam"  throughout  the  world. ^  In  1966,  Sheehan 
conceded  that  "the  military  junta  in  Vietnam  would  not  last  a  week  without 
American  bayonets  to  protect  it."  But,  he  said,  there  was  no  alternative  to  the 
American  strategy  to  "continue  to  prosecute  the  war,"  and  to  develop  a  "killing 
machine"  to  be  turned  on  the  enemy  "in  the  hope  that  over  the  years  enough 


The  Media  and  the  Message  41 

killing  will  be  done  to  force  the  enemy's  collapse  through  exhaustion  and  de- 
spair." ^ 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Sheehan  and  Browne  (both  now  on  the  staff  of  the 
New  York  Times,  as  is  Charles  Mohr)  have  come  a  far  way  from  their  despairing 
and  limited  views  of  the  middle  1960s.  So  has  Halberstam,  and  it  was  ironic  in 
its  way  that  Sheehan  became  so  intimately  involved  in  the  publication  of  the 
Pentagon  documents,  and  that  he  and  Halberstam  were  called  to  appear  before 
a  federal  grand  jury  in  Boston  in  the  fishing  expedition  following  the  disclosure 
by  Dr.  Daniel  Ellsberg  that  he  had  given  the  documents  to  the  New  York  Times. 
Perhaps  purposeful  would  be  a  better  description  than  ironic,  for  the  vindictive 
arm  of  government  is  long,  and  the  malice  of  government  officials  seeking  to 
cover  their  tracks  (as  so  many  of  the  civilian  strategists  of  Vietnam  policy  have 
been  seeking  to  do)  is  pervasive.  Sheehan  and  Halberstam,  after  all,  committed 
the  cardinal  sin:  they  refused  as  reporters  to  "get  on  the  team,"  and  that,  at  any 
stage  of  governmental  operations,  is  an  unforgivable  act. 

Perhaps  a  clue  to  the  limitations  of  even  the  best  of  the  reporters  in  Vietnam 
in  the  1960s — in  addition  to  their  lack  of  historical  perspective  and  knowledge 
of  the  area  they  were  covering — may  be  found  in  an  examination  of  journalism's 
unwritten  and  adjustable  rules  of  objectivity.  According  to  these  rules,  the  only 
reliable  sources  of  information  about  Indochina  were  untainted  "free  world" 
centers,  and  most  central  of  all  was  the  government  of  the  United  States.  Sources 
of  information  outside  the  government  were  suspect,  and  radical  sources  almost 
entirely  rejected.  The  most  distinguished  Asian  scholars  had  not  quite  recovered 
their  acceptability  lost  during  the  McCarthy  years*^  and,  besides,  they  almost 
universally  disapproved  of  the  American  intervention.  Why  go  to  them  for  back- 
ground when  abstracts  of  State  Department  white  papers  abounded? 

Correspondents  of  left-wing  American  journals  and  respected  European  cor- 
respondents like  Jean  Lacouture  and  the  commentators  of  Le  Monde  were  rarely 
quoted.  The  radicals,  of  course,  wanted  the  Vietnamese  to  "win,"  and  the  French, 
once  they  were  out,  wanted  the  Americans  to  "lose,"  because  France  too  had  lost. 

When  Harrison  Salisbury  of  the  New  York  Times,  in  a  startling  series  of  dis- 
patches from  North  Vietnam  at  the  turn  of  1967,  discredited  Washington's  de- 
nials of  bombings  near  Hanoi,  and  confirmed  the  Burchett  reports  that  had  been 
appearing  regularly  in  the  National  Guardian,  he  was  charged  by  Chalmers 
Roberts  of  the  Washington  Post  with  using  a  subversive  typewriter  in  the  service 
of  Ho  Chi  Minh.  The  campaign  of  venom  against  him  by  his  own  colleagues  was 
almost  unprecedented  (the  Times  itself,  in  its  devotion  to  balance  and  ob- 
jectivity in  the  news,  featured  on  page  one  an  article  by  Hanson  Baldwin,  its 
military  affairs  analyst,  taking  sharp  issue  with  the  findings  of  Salisbury  on  the 
scene  in  North  Vietnam).  Salisbury  was  deprived  of  a  Pulitzer  Prize  for  his 
series  when  the  Pulitzer  board  blatantly  overruled  the  committee  of  editors  who 
had  selected  Salisbury  for  the  award. 

There  was  an  echo  of  all  this  at  the  Paris  talks  on  Vietnam  in  June  1971. 
Madame  Nguyen  Thi  Binh,  the  representative  of  the  Provisional  Revolutionary 
Government  of  South  Vietnam  (which  the  New  York  Times  still  calls  the  Viet- 
cong),  said  that  the  Pentagon  documents  "confirm  a  truth  that  we  have  often 
expressed  at  this  table,  to  wit,  that  the  American  administration  .  .  .  conceived 
plans  for  unleashing  war  and  spreading  it  stage  by  stage." 

The  North  Vietnamese  delegate  at  the  same  session  produced  a  white  paper — 
published  on  July  10,  1965,  in  English  among  other  languages,  and  broadcast  to 


48      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

the  world  over  Radio  Hanoi — entitled  ""Twenty  Years  of  American  Aggression 
and  Intervention  in  Vietnam."  It  was  a  document  of  remarkable  accuracy,  as 
the  Pentagon  Papers  demonstrate.  Included  was  a  description  of  the  infamous 
Plan  No.  6,  drawn  up  by  Walt  W.  Rostow,  then  chairman  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment's Planning  Council,  calling  for  increasing  commitments  of  United  States 
ground  forces  and  air  power. 

In  December  1965,  Nguyen  Huu  Tho,  chairman  of  the  National  Liberation 
Front,  said  in  a  statement  (confirmed  by  the  Pentagon  documents)  that  the 
United  States  was  operating  under  a  "McNamara  Plan"  aimed  at  "pacifying  the 
south  within  the  two  years  of  1964-1965,  and  representing  a  new  and  greater 
effort  to  improve  the  critical  situation  of  the  puppet  government  and  forces,  and 
to  concentrate  their  forces  on  pacifying  the  main  areas  under  the  Front's  control." 
Such  statements,  said  Erwin  KnoU,"^  "received  scant  attention  in  the  American 
media.  They  were  merely  'Communist  propaganda,'  and  our  government,  which 
knew  better,  hardly  bothered  to  issue  rebuttals." 

The  July  1965  white  paper  was  available  to  the  American  press  immediately 
after  it  was  published.  It  was  the  subject  at  the  time  of  both  a  leading  news 
article  and  an  editorial  in  the  National  Guardian.  No  American  newspaper  of 
general  circulation  used  it.  But  Vietnamese  were  not  the  only  pariahs  for  the 
American  media.  Even  certified  non-Communist  Americans  foolhardy  enough  to 
be  skeptical  of  or  oppose  administration  policy  or  pronouncements  were  ignored 
or  discredited.  Consider  the  story  of  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  incident  in  August  1964. 

I.  F.  Stone  in  his  weekly  newsletter,^  almost  alone  among  the  Washington  press 
corps,  presented  evidence  immediately  after  the  event  indicating  that  the  alleged 
attack  by  North  Vietnamese  gunboats  against  the  United  States  fleet  was  a  fraud. 
His  reports  were  ignored  by  his  colleagues  who,  years  later,  would  review  his 
books  (based  largely  on  his  earlier  published  material)  and  honor  him  as  the 
conscience  of  the  Washington  press  corps.  But  the  post-mortem  flattery  smacked 
of  confession-booth  relief  and  even  caste  condescension.  This  tenacious  little  bull- 
dog, as  they  like  to  call  him,  was  eminently  qualified  to  be  the  mascot  of  the 
White  House  Correspondents  Association,  but  never  a  member.  Not  that  Stone 
had  ever  wanted  in. 

On  August  5,  1964,  Secretary  McNamara  held  a  news  conference — maps, 
pointers,  and  field-grade  flunkies  at  his  elbow — to  explain  in  his  computerized 
fashion  what  had  happened  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin.  There  was  not  one  probing 
question  from  the  reporters,  although  it  might  have  seemed  inconceivable  to  at 
least  some  of  them  that  two  little  North  Vietnamese  gunboats  would  seek  out  and 
attack  the  mighty  American  fleet,  knowing  full  well  what  the  reprisal  would  be. 

The  New  York  Times,  after  Tonkin,  saw  in  the  alleged  attack  "an  ominous 
perspective  .  .  .  the  beginning  of  a  mad  adventure  by  the  North  Vietnamese 
Communists."  The  mad  adventures,  however,  were  on  the  other  side — a  fact 
which  became  clear  in  the  American  escalation  of  the  war  immediately  thereafter. 
And  the  calculated  fraud  was  exposed  further  in  statements  by  members  of  the 
crews  of  the  United  States  vessels  involved  in  the  incident,  long  before  the  Pen- 
tagon Papers  were  published. 

Dissenting  legislators  (there  were  few  enough  of  them  then)  fared  little  better 
than  Stone.  On  August  10,  1964,  Senator  Ernest  Gruening  of  Alaska  who,  with 
Senator  Wayne  Morse  of  Oregon,  five  days  earlier  had  cast  the  only  dissenting 
votes  against  the  Tonkin  Gulf  resolution,  delivered  the  first  speech  on  the  Senate 
floor  advocating  withdrawal  of  American  troops  from  Vietnam.  The  speech  was 
a  reasoned  and  factual  presentation  of  the  circumstances  of  American  involve- 
ment. The  next  morning  Gruening  sought  out  newspaper  accounts  of  his  speech. 


The  Media  and  the  Message  49 

There  was  not  a  line  about  it  in  either  the  New  York  Times  or  the  Washington 
Post.  Had  he  been  able  to  repeat  the  exercise  with  most  if  not  all  other  news- 
papers in  the  country  that  day,  the  search  would  have  been  equally  futile. 

A  significant  indicator  of  the  communication  media's  attitude  during  the  1950s 
and  1960s  was  provided  in  the  New  York  Times  editorial  of  July  4,  1971.  "We 
do  not  think,"  it  said,  "that  the  respective  officials  involved  made  recommenda- 
tions or  took  decisions  that  they  did  not  conscientiously  believe  to  be  in  the 
public  interest.  As  an  early  opponent  of  the  escalation  of  American  military  force 
in  Vietnam,  this  newspaper  has  never  attacked  the  motives  of  those  leaders.  .  .  ." 

The  key  words  here  are  escalation  and  motives.  The  Times  did  not  oppose 
intervention  in  Indochina,  as  we  have  seen.  On  the  contrary,  it  endorsed  it  with 
exhortation  to  victory  ("Thomas  Jefferson  would  have  no  quarrel"  with  /Ngo 
Dinh  Diem's  definition  of  democracy,  it  said  as  far  back  as  1957).  The  Times 
did  begin  to  oppose  escalation  when  it  became  apparent  that  there  could  be  no 
military  victory  in  Indochina.  Similarly,  it  never  questioned  the  motives  of  the 
succeeding  administrations  because  it  subscribed  wholeheartedly  to  the  policies 
being  motivated. 

Speculation  is  a  doubtful  practice  at  best.  But  we  should  include  the  period 
before  1960,  for  which  a  reasonable  speculation  might  be:  If  the  communica- 
tions media  had  presented  the  history  of  Indochina  and  the  aspirations  of  its 
peoples;  if  they  had  opened  their  facilities  to  the  opponents  of  developing  Cold 
War  policy  to  encourage  a  public  debate  based  on  realities  and  not  on  myth — 
if  they  had  done  these  things,  would  the  government,  confronted  with  an  in- 
formed public,  have  dared  to  embark  on  a  venture  which  has  cost  millions  of 
Indochinese  lives,  thousands  of  American  lives,  incredible  destruction  of  the  life- 
giving  land  of  Indochina,  and  incalculable  damage  to  the  spiritual  fabric  of  Amer- 
ican life? 

This  leads  to  a  central  question  about  the  publication  of  the  documents  bear- 
ing directly  upon  the  responsibility  of  the  communications  industry  and  the  pub- 
lic's right  to  know.  The  revelations  dealt  with  events  that  had  occurred  before 
1968.  In  response  to  the  government's  charge  that  publication  was  damaging  to 
the  security  interests  of  the  country,  the  Times  responded  editorially  on  June  16, 
the  day  after  publication  had  been  suspended: 

It  is  in  the  interest  of  the  people  of  this  country  to  be  informed.  ...  A 
fundamental  responsibility  of  the  press  in  this  democracy  is  to  publish  in- 
formation that  helps  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  understand  the  proc- 
esses of  their  own  government,  especially  when  these  processes  have  been 
clouded  over  in  a  veil  of  public  dissimulation  and  even  deception.  .  .  .  Once 
this  material  fell  into  our  hands,  it  was  not  only  in  the  interest  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  to  publish  it  but,  even  more  emphatically,  it  would  have  been 
an  abnegation  of  responsibility  not  to  have  published  it. 

Obviously  the  Times  would  not  have  made  this  decision  if  there  had  been 
any  reason  to  believe  that  publication  would  have  endangered  the  life  of  a 
single  American  soldier  or  in  any  way  threatened  the  security  of  our  country 
or  the  peace  of  the  world.  The  documents  in  question  belong  to  history.  .  .  . 
Their  publication  could  not  conceivably  damage  American  security  interests, 
much  less  the  lives  of  Americans  or  Indochinese. 

Five  days  later,  when  the  Washington  Post  began  publication,  the  Times  em- 
phasized again  that  the  documents  "in  no  way  affect  current  plans,  operations. 


50      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

or  policy;  and  there  seems  no  longer  any  justification  for  these  papers  ...  to 
bear  the  kind  of  classification  that  keeps  them  from  general  public  access."  The 
next  day,  June  22,  the  Boston  Globe  began  its  publication  of  parts  of  the  docu- 
ments not  yet  published.  Its  editorial  likewise  assured  its  readers  that  "the  na- 
tion's security"  was  not  involved  in  publication. 

The  implication  here  was  that  neither  the  Times  nor  the  Globe  nor,  perhaps, 
any  other  newspaper  would  publish  classified  material  relating  to  current  or  future 
events,  no  matter  how  salutary  to  the  national  interest  public  knowledge  of  that 
material  might  be.  The  conclusion  was  that  the  Times,  in  any  case,  had  not  al- 
tered its  policy  in  regard  to  such  information  since  the  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco  in  1961. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  in  April  1961,  Times  correspondent  Tad  Szulc  came 
into  possession  of  information  in  Florida  that  a  United  States  financed  and  sup- 
ported invasion  of  Cuba  was  imminent.  The  Times,  at  the  request  of  the  White 
House  and  largely  on  the  advice  of  James  Reston,  then  Washington  bureau  chief, 
withheld  publication  of  key  facts  of  the  story  on  the  ground  that  it  was  in  the 
national  interest  to  do  so. 

Again,  in  October  1962,  the  New  York  Times  and  the  Washington  Post  had 
firm  knowledge  during  the  so-called  missile  crisis  of  President  Kennedy's  plans 
for  a  military  blockade  of  Cuba  and  for  intercepting  any  foreign-flag  ship  at- 
tempting to  reach  the  island  republic.  The  newspapers  withheld  publication  at 
the  request  of  President  Kennedy.  The  crisis  was  resolved  by  a  Soviet  agreement 
to  remove  missiles  emplaced  on  Cuban  territory  in  return  for  an  American  pledge 
that  there  would  be  no  repetition  of  the  1961  invasion  attempt. 

In  the  1961  incident,  United  States  involvement  in  the  aborted  invasion  of  a 
sovereign  state  was  in  clear  violation  of  international  law.  In  the  1962  incident, 
the  Soviet  Union  was  clearly  within  its  rights  in  placing  missiles  in  Cuba,  at  the 
invitation  of  the  Cuban  government  and  under  Cuban  control,  however  dis- 
tasteful it  may  have  been  to  the  government  of  the  United  States.  The  bristling 
reaction  to  the  missiles  (to  this  day  there  has  been  no  precise  description  of  their 
potential)  was  outrageous  in  view  of  the  fact  that  hundreds  of  American  missiles 
had  been  placed  close  to  the  borders  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Beyond  this,  Drew  Pearson  reported  on  October  26,  1962,  that  the  missile 
crisis  had  been  engendered  in  Washington  by  the  Kennedy  administration  to  shore 
up  its  political  prospects  in  the  November  1962  elections  against  Republican 
charges  that  it  was  being  soft  on  communism  "ninety  miles  from  our  shores." 
And  Max  Frankel  in  the  New  York  Times  of  October  23,  1962,  indicated  that 
one  compelling  reason  for  the  need  for  secrecy  about  Washington's  plans  was 
fear  that  the  Soviet  Union  might  take  the  matter  to  the  United  Nations  and  un- 
dercut the  effect  of  Kennedy's  ultimatum — an  ultimatum  which  could  have  led 
to  war  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  As  late  as  1966  the  Times 
was  still  justifying  its  suppression  of  the  missile  crisis  story.^ 

There  is  a  connection  between  the  Cuban  events  and  those  of  June  1971.  The 
Boston  Globe  sent  Crocker  Snow,  assistant  managing  editor,  to  New  York  dur- 
ing the  first  week  of  the  publication  of  the  documents  to  find  out  how  and  why 
the  Times's  decision  to  publish  was  reached,  and  how  the  staff  felt  about  it. 
Snow  determined  that  there  was  a  "curious  relationship"  between  the  June  1971 
decision  and  the  one  taken  years  earlier  at  the  time  of  the  Bay  of  Pigs.  He  re- 
called Kennedy's  hindsight  comment  to  Times  executive  editor  Turner  Catledge: 
"If  you  had  printed  more  about  the  [Bay  of  Pigs]  operation,  you  would  have 
saved  us  from  a  colossal  mistake." 

Had  this  "embarrassing  memory"  played  a  part  in  the  decision  to  publish  the 
Pentagon  documents?  Snow  asked.  Very  little,  said  the  editors.  One  told  Snow: 


The  Media  and  the  Message  51 

"This  is  a  very,  very  different  thing.  These  are  basically  historical  documents,  and 
the  Cuban  stories  were  about  pending  missions.  I  can  say  honestly  that  if  this 
secret  material  now  had  been  about  ongoing  missions,  then  we  wouldn't  have 
used  it."  This  confirms  the  editorial  comment  in  the  Times  quoted  earlier. 

The  mind  conjures  the  image  of  an  ashen  editorial  writer,  sitting  at  a  charred 
typewriter,  painfully  recording  that,  in  retrospect,  the  decision  to  drop  an  atomic 
bomb  on  Peking,  in  retaliation  for  the  defeat  of  the  American  Ping-Pong  team 
by  the  Chinese  at  the  Sands  Hotel  in  Las  Vegas,  was  poorly  conceived.  The 
Times,  the  editorial  would  say,  had  information  that  a  contingency  plan  for 
the  preemptive  retaliatory  protective  reaction  strike  was  in  existence,  but  with- 
held the  information  because  it  concerned  ongoing  policy,  and  disclosure  might 
endanger  the  life  of  even  one  American  airman. 

While  this  fantasy  may  seem  absurd  to  some,  the  reality  was  less  absurd  to 
thousands  of  Indochinese  whose  charred  remains  continued  to  pile  up  in  a  non- 
contingent  pattern  as  a  result  of  ongoing  United  States  policy  whose  underlying 
principles  were  still  accepted  by  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  communications 
media.  Who  then  will  blow  the  whistle  on  this  policy  in  the  genuine  national 
interest? 

The  Pentagon  Papers  demonstrated  that  government  not  only  refuses  to  give 
out  information  but  also  lies  and  distorts  the  facts.  Is  it  not,  therefore,  the  re- 
sponsibility of  newspapers  and  television  networks  to  make  the  record  public 
when  they  are  persuaded  that  a  planned  government  action  could  bring  the  na- 
tion up  to  or  over  the  brink  of  an  illegal,  immoral,  and  disastrous  war?  This  is 
not  to  argue  that  the  media  in  a  wartime  situation  should  have  published  in 
advance,  say,  the  date  of  the  invasion  of  Normandy  in  World  War  II.  There  are 
of  course  situations  when  security  must  be  maintained.  The  publication  by  the 
Chicago  Tribune  in  World  War  II  of  the  information  that  the  United  States  had 
broken  the  Japanese  naval  code  was  reprehensible. 

But  Cuba  is  another  matter.  We  were  not  at  war  with  Cuba.  We  simply  wanted 
to  smash  its  revolution,  and  the  media  was  in  general  accord  with  this  policy. 
And  Indochina  is  another  matter.  War  has  never  been  declared  there,  and  a 
majority  of  Americans  has  finally  concluded  that  the  United  States  must  extricate 
itself.  If  the  government  persists  in  thwarting  the  public  will,  do  not  the  media 
have  a  responsibility  to  intervene  in  behalf  of  the  public?  If  they  do  not,  who 
will? 

"Who  elected  the  New  York  Times  to  get  into  the  game?  some  people  ask," 
James  Reston  wrote  on  June  20,  1971,  "and  the  answer  is  nobody  but  the  men 
who  wrote  the  First  Amendment  to  the  Constitution."  A  fair  answer,  and  one 
Reston  might  have  given  to  himself  when  he  advised  his  publisher  not  to  publish 
the  facts  about  the  Bay  of  Pigs  invasion  (Reston  still  refers  to  the  CIA's  Cubans 
as  "freedom  fighters")  and  the  missile  crisis.  But  the  answer  implies  something 
more  than  responsibility  in  hindsight. 

"The  political  game  as  it  is  now  played  in  Washington  is  like  a  football  game 
without  boundaries,  rules,  or  officials,"  Reston  declared  in  the  same  article.  "All 
the  men  in  the  press  box  can  do  is  report  the  shambles."  Poorly  stated.  The  men 
who  drew  up  and  fought  for  the  First  Amendment  privileges  and  protections 
for  the  press  did  so  precisely  because  they  sought  to  prevent  the  shambles  from 
occurring.  In  Reston's  metaphor,  they  wanted  the  press  to  guard  the  stadium 
gates  like  watchdogs  to  prevent  the  crooked  managers,  the  fixed  players,  and 
the  blood-money  gamblers  from  taking  over. 

The  Times  was  a  toothless  watchdog  when  Coach  Eisenhower's  Washington 
All-Stars  were  playing  Russian  Roulette  in  their  U-2  spy  planes  over  the  Soviet 


52      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Union  in  1960,  and  before.  Several  Times  editors  later  conceded  that  the  Times 
knew  all  about  this  dangerous  game,  but  published  nothing  about  it.  Premier 
Khrushchev  made  his  famous  U-2  accusation  just  before  a  scheduled  summit  con- 
ference with  President  Eisenhower  in  Paris  in  May  1960 — a  conference  called 
to  advance  the  "spirit  of  Camp  David"  supposedly  established  during  Khru- 
shchev's visit  to  the  United  States  the  year  before. 

The  sainted  Eisenhower,  the  nearest  miss  to  General  Washington  the  nation 
has  ever  had,  lied  about  the  U-2s,  and  the  Times  soberly  published  his  lies — even 
though  it  knew  the  facts.  The  press  in  general  decreed  that  Khrushchev  did  not 
want  to  talk  peace  anyway.  Then  Khrushchev  produced  the  photographs  of  the 
U-2  wreckage  and  mug  shots  of  pilot  Gary  Powers.  The  Paris  conference  broke 
up  before  it  had  begun,  an  Eisenhower  trip  to  the  Soviet  Union  was  canceled. 
The  game  was  called  on  account  of  international  darkness,  and  the  nation  slid 
back  into  Reston's  Cold  War  shambles.  That  is  the  most  dangerous  game  of  all, 
and  the  Times  was  an  accomplice  before  and  after  the  fact  because  it  did  not 
genuinely  subscribe  to  the  public's  right  to  know. 

In  January  1972  an  incident  occurred  which  seemingly  put  to  test  the  question 
whether  the  most  prestigious  newspapers  of  the  country  would  alter  their  policy 
of  not  publishing  government  documents  about  ongoing  or  future  policy.  The 
episode  acquired  the  name  "the  Anderson  Papers,"  after  Jack  Anderson,  the 
Washington-based  muckraker  whose  column  appears  in  700  newspapers.  In  his 
column  of  January  3  Anderson  wrote  that  he  had  come  into  possession  of  secret 
summaries  of  White  House  meetings  of  December  3,  4,  and  6  disclosing  a  firmer 
anti-India  attitude  by  the  United  States  government  than  had  been  made  public 
during  and  following  the  India-Pakistan  dispute  over  East  Pakistan.  The  creation 
of  the  state  of  Bangladesh  had  followed  the  Indian  invasion  of  East  Pakistan. 

Much  of  the  information  in  the  Anderson  columns  pictured  White  House 
adviser  Henry  M.  Kissinger  as  the  President's  chief  spokesman  in  the  matter. 
Kissinger  insisted  that  Anderson  had  "wrenched"  the  information  "out  of  con- 
text." Anderson,  to  prove  his  contention,  thereupon  released  the  full  text  of 
memoranda  of  the  White  House  meetings,  and  they  were  published  on  January 
5  by  the  Washington  Post  and  the  New  York  Post.  The  New  York  Times  asked 
Anderson  for  the  documents  and  published  them  in  full  on  January  6.  The 
Washington  Post  described  Anderson's  actions  as  "an  undoubted  contribution  to 
the  public's  right  to  know." 

While  the  documents  undoubtedly  did  shed  light  on  the  insular  arrogance  with 
which  policy  decisions  are  reached,  they  added  litde  to  the  public's  knowledge  of 
United  States  attitudes  toward  India  and  Pakistan — attitudes  whose  bias  against 
India  was  clearly  evident  in  United  States  actions  and  comments  at  the  United 
Nations,  and  in  statements  by  the  White  House  and  the  State  Department.  Fur- 
ther, in  any  comparison  with  the  Pentagon  Papers,  it  should  be  noted  that  the 
documents  were  turned  over  to  Anderson  from  within  the  government — and 
there  is  considerable  reason  to  believe  that  the  leak  was  motivated  not  so  much 
by  concern  for  the  public's  right  to  know,  as  by  jealousy  and  dissension  among 
warring  factions  within  the  administration.  It  was  common  knowledge  in  Wash- 
ington that  both  the  State  Department  and  the  Defense  Department  had  long 
resented  Kissinger's  "running  the  government  from  the  White  House  basement," 
and  the  Anderson  coup  had  all  the  earmarks  of  a  palace  intrigue  to  "get" 
Kissinger. 

While  Anderson  may  be  credited  with  nobler  motives  in  making  the  informa- 
tion public,  an  examination  of  the  administration's  public  statements  on  India 


The  Media  and  the  Message  53 

and  the  secret  documents  revealed  differences  only  in  degree  and  intensity.  Com- 
parisons with  the  Pentagon  documents  fall  noticeably  short.  Neither  in  content 
nor  in  significance  do  the  two  sets  of  documents  compare.  Furthermore,  by  the 
time  the  documents  were  published,  Bangladesh  was  a  fait  accompli.  In  the  last 
analysis,  the  Anderson  papers  did  not  test  the  willingness  of  the  press  to  publish 
major  documents  about  current  or  future  policy. 

The  leadership  of  the  Times  nationally  was  demonstrated  by  the  chain  reaction 
following  its  publication  of  the  first  of  the  Pentagon  Papers.  In  rapid  order,  the 
documents  began  to  appear  in  the  Washington  Post,  Boston  Globe,  Chicago  Sun- 
Times,  the  Knight  newspapers,  Los  Angeles  Times,  St.  Louis  Post-Dispatch, 
Newsday  of  Long  Island,  and  the  Christian  Science  Monitor.  Granted  by  then 
it  was  too  sensational  a  story  to  suppress,  there  was  much  more  involved.  It 
was  evident  that  those  newspapers  generally  regarded  as  the  most  responsible 
understood  they  had  a  common  and  compelling  necessity  to  support  one  another 
in  the  face  of  an  unprecedented  government  attempt  at  "prior  restraint" — that  is, 
action  taken  to  prevent  the  publication  of  a  news  story  or  transcripts  of  docu- 
ments. 

This  was  the  problem  that  confronted  the  editors  (and  the  legal  department, 
which  sometimes  overrules  or  supplants  the  editors)  at  the  Times  in  the  three 
months  during  which  they  had  possession  of  the  documents  and  weighed  their 
decision  to  publish  or  not  to  publish.  The  atmosphere  at  the  Times  and  in  the 
surrounding  mid-Manhattan  area  could  have  been  appropriate  for  an  elaborate 
spy  melodrama.  Men  and  women  were  spirited  out  of  the  Times  building  in 
West  43rd  Street  to  set  up  secret  headquarters  at  the  Hotel  Hilton,  their  privacy 
protected  by  Times  company  guards  (eventually  the  Times  had  nine  rooms  on 
two  floors  of  the  hotel).  Special  secret  composing  rooms  were  established  with 
only  trusted  typesetters  admitted.  Questions  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  missing 
Washington  bureau  men  were  met  with  "Don't  ask." 

In  Washington  there  were  similar  scenes  at  the  Post,  of  briefer  duration  but 
perhaps  of  even  greater  intensity.  There  an  all-night  battle  between  the  "business 
side"  and  the  "editorial  side"  at  the  home  of  executive  editor  Benjamin  Bradlee 
ended  with  a  victory  by  the  editorial  side  to  publish. 

First  reactions  in  the  newspaper  world  were  marked  by  indolence  and  in- 
eptitude and,  in  many  areas,  caution.  The  Times  News  Service,  with  300  clients, 
alerted  its  subscribers  on  the  afternoon  of  June  12  (Saturday)  that  it  would 
move  a  major  story  at  6  p.m.  The  Louisville  Courier-Journal  gave  prominent 
place  to  the  story,  but  the  Chicago  Tribune  ignored  it.  UPI  did  not  send  a  story 
out  until  Sunday  afternoon,  and  AP  waited  until  Monday  afternoon  (both  serv- 
ices are  permitted  to  pick  up  stories  from  member  newspapers  immediately). 
Neither  Time  nor  Newsweek  remade  their  pages  on  Saturday  night,  although 
there  was  time. 

The  television  networks  handled  the  story  even  more  casually.  ABC  put  the 
Times  story  aside  to  read  at  a  future  time.  At  CBS,  during  the  "Face  the  Nation" 
program  on  Sunday  with  Secretary  of  Defense  Melvin  Laird  (who  had  been 
briefed  by  Attorney  General  Mitchell  as  to  his  possible  replies),  neither  the  CBS 
correspondent  nor  the  New  York  Times  man  on  the  program  asked  a  single  ques- 
tion concerning  the  documents.  Only  NBC  realized  the  significance  of  the  story 
and  devoted  almost  half  of  the  time  of  its  Sunday  evening  news  to  it. 

In  general,  however,  the  performance  of  the  television  networks  was  limited 
in  the  weeks  that  followed.  While  they  covered  the  legal  battles  and  the  Ellsberg 
involvement  fully,  they  paid  scant  attention  to  the  content  of  the  documents,  and 


54      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

it  was  not  until  the  end  of  December  1971  that  any  network  devoted  any  ap- 
preciable time  to  the  papers  themselves.  That  was  the  two-hour  program  "Viet- 
nam Hindsight,"  produced  by  NBC  and  devoted  mainly  to  the  origins  of  Amer- 
ican involvement  and  the  events  leading  to  the  assassination  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem 
on  November  2,  1963. 

But  a  high  degree  of  excitement  was  engendered  in  the  last  two  weeks  of  June, 
particularly  about  the  question  of  freedom  of  the  press  and  the  interpretation  of 
the  First  Amendment.  And  the  excitement  was  warranted.  Never  before  in  the 
history  of  the  country  had  the  issue  of  "prior  restraint"  been  raised  in  terms  of 
legal  action  and  pursued  through  the  courts  by  the  government — not  even  during 
the  two-year  period  in  which  the  Alien  and  Sedition  acts  were  in  force  from  1798 
to  1800.  Even  these  acts  invoked  postpublication  penalties,  and  they  expired 
before  the  Supreme  Court  was  able  to  rule  on  the  constitutional  issues. 

A  proper  question  to  be  asked  at  this  juncture  is  this:  If  the  Congress  is  for- 
bidden by  the  First  Amendment  from  enacting  legislation  in  the  area  of  freedom 
of  the  press,  by  what  right  did  the  Executive  branch  intervene  to  ask  the 
Judiciary  to  act,  and  by  what  right  did  the  courts  accede  to  the  Executive's  re- 
quests? There  was  a  sharp  exchange  on  this  point  during  the  Supreme  Court 
hearing  on  June  26,  1971,  between  Justice  Douglas,  an  unyielding  advocate  of 
absolute  interpretation  of  First  Amendment  freedoms,  and,  surprisingly,  the  at- 
torney representing  the  Times,  Alexander  M.  Bickel  of  Yale  Law  School. 

Bickel  argued  that  the  courts  might  have  the  power  to  restrain  the  press  if 
Congress  passed  a  law  specifically  authorizing  it  to  do  so.  Justice  Douglas  looked 
up  sharply  from  his  note-taking  and  said:  "The  First  Amendment  says  that  Con- 
gress shall  make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  the  press.  Are  you  saying  that 
Congress  can  make  some  laws  abridging  freedom  of  the  press?  [That]  is  a  very 
strange  argument  for  the  Times  to  make  that  all  this  can  be  done  if  Congress 
passes  a  law."  Bickel  wisely  made  no  response. 

It  was  indeed  a  strange  argument  on  behalf  of  a  newspaper  petitioning  to  lift 
the  judicial  restraining  order  against  continuing  publication  of  the  Pentagon  doc- 
uments. It  was  even  more  strange  in  view  of  the  position  taken  by  four  justices 
against  accepting  certiorari  (review)  on  the  ground  that,  because  of  the  First 
Amendment's  clear  language,  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction  in  the  case. 

A  head-on  test  of  this  principle  might  have  occurred  if  the  Times  had  ignored 
the  initial  injunction  in  the  Federal  District  Court  in  New  York  and  continued 
publication  of  the  documents.  But  the  Times,  as  a  newspaper  which  abides  by 
the  "rule  of  law,"  was  not  willing  to  make  the  challenge;  nor,  it  seems,  was  any 
other  newspaper.  However  one  might  have  hoped  for  such  a  challenge,  it  was 
not  logical  to  expect  it  from  newspapers  which  have  consistently  rebuked  demon- 
strators for  "going  outside  the  law." 

There  was  another  alternative  for  the  Times:  It  could  have  published  the  entire 
set  of  documents  in  one  issue  and  thus  rendered  moot  the  issue  of  prior  restraint 
— at  least  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  case.  But  newspapers,  however  much  they  may 
protest  that  they  are  a  public  service,  are  profit-making  enterprises.  The  Times's 
circulation  had  been  declining  at  a  fairly  steady  rate  through  1971.  Here  was  a 
chance  to  recoup  some  losses  through  a  series  of  articles  spread  over  a  period  of 
time  with  tremendous  impact.  It  would  hardly  be  speculative  to  suggest  that  hard 
heads  in  the  countinghouse  prevailed  over  softer  ones  in  the  editorial  department. 

What  was  the  long-range  meaning  of  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  to  permit 
the  Times  to  continue  publication?  Perhaps  the  soundest  answer  came  from  one 
of  the  nation's  leading  authorities  on  constitutional  law,  Thomas  I.  Emerson  of 
Yale  Law  School. He  wrote: 


The  Media  and  the  Message  55 

The  result  was  certainly  favorable  to  a  free  press.  Put  the  other  way,  a 
contrary  result  would  have  been  a  disaster.  It  would  have  made  the  press 
subject  to  a  very  considerable  extent  of  advance  restriction.  It  would  have 
changed  the  whole  relationship  between  the  press  and  government.  The  out- 
come was  a  sound  outcome.  On  the  other  hand,  the  legal  theory  that  the 
court  adopted  is,  I  think,  cause  for  concern. 

Only  three  justices  came  out  strongly  against  a  system  of  prior  restraint — 
Black,  Douglas  and  Brennan,  and  Brennan  would  make  some  narrow  ex- 
ceptions. Black  and  Douglas  apparently  permitted  none.  Justice  Marshall 
probably  would  go  along  with  them,  but  actually  he  based  his  opinion  on  a 
different  ground — that  Congress  had  denied  the  power  to  the  President,  and 
the  Court  therefore  did  not  get  into  the  question.  But  if  you  assume  there 
were  four  who  would  vigorously  apply  the  doctrine  of  no  previous  re- 
straint, nevertheless  there  were  five  whose  opinions  seriously  undermine 
the  doctrine  against  prior  restraint.  Certainly  the  three  dissenters  would 
have  made  exceptions,  but  also  Justices  White  and  Stewart  announced  that 
any  anticipated  publication  which  raised  an  immediate  danger  to  national 
security  would  be  grounds  for  an  injunction,  and  the  dissenting  justices 
would  have  gone  at  least  that  far. 

There  were  two  major  problems,  as  Emerson  saw  the  decision:  (1)  The  spe- 
cified exception — that  advance  restraint  of  a  newspaper  was  proper  if  the  gov- 
ernment proved  a  grave  and  immediate  breach  of  national  security — is  a  wide- 
open  exception  which  would  probably  allow  the  government  to  obtain  an  injunc- 
tion in  most  cases  where  the  question  of  national  security  was  raised;  (2)  if  the 
courts  ultimately  interpret  the  concept  of  "grave  and  immediate  breach  of  na- 
tional security"  rather  narrowly,  the  very  application  of  the  rule  would  constitute 
a  system  of  prior  restraint  because  it  would  hold  up  publication  while  the  courts 
investigated  whether  there  was  indeed  a  breach  of  security. 

Emerson  found  the  media  to  be  in  a  vulnerable  position.  The  rapid  changes  in 
the  Supreme  Court,  tilting  the  balance  distinctly  toward  the  restrictive  Nixon- 
Mitchell  view  of  civil  liberties,  made  the  position  of  the  media  even  more  vul- 
nerable. On  this  point,  Emerson  had  some  advice  for  the  media  in  seeking  allies 
to  protect  its  freedom: 

I  would  say  that  one  of  the  main  things  that  the  media  can  do  is  to 
educate  the  public  to  the  significance  of  the  whole  system  of  free  expres- 
sion. .  .  .  The  New  York  Times  case  has  opened  up  the  possibility  of 
making  people  aware  of  what  the  role  of  the  press  is:  that  its  role  isn't 
simply  to  take  handouts  given  by  the  government;  it's  for  the  people. 

The  major  problem  with  the  system  of  freedom  of  the  press  today  is  the 
inability  of  many  points  of  view  to  find  an  outlet.  That  is  a  very  serious 
problem.  I  think  that  it  is  important  for  the  media  to  be  aware  of  that,  to 
anticipate  it,  to  try  to  take  account  of  it.  In  other  words,  just  as  I  think 
the  government  ought  to  subsidize  an  opposition  to  itself,  in  a  sense  monopo- 
listic elements  in  the  communications  industry  should  subsidize  some  op- 
position to  themselves.  I  think  it  would  be  a  much  healthier  and  ultimately 
more  successful  system. 

It  was  unlikely  that  either  the  government  or  the  communications  industry 
would  give  serious  heed  to  Emerson's  Jeffersonian  counsel.  In  the  more  than  two 
years  during  which  the  Nixon  administration  had  sought  to  pressure  the  com- 


56      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

munications  industry  to  cast  off  even  its  tepid  adversary  role  vis-d-vis  govern- 
ment, the  industry  to  a  large  extent  played  the  artful  dodger,  yielding  a  bit  here, 
making  a  tentative  thrust  there,  but  generally  avoiding  a  direct  confrontation  with 
the  government.  The  publication  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  altered  the  situation, 
but  subsequent  events  have  not  demonstrated  that  the  communications  industry 
has  absorbed  the  obvious  lesson  of  the  Pentagon  Papers — that  the  only  proper 
role  of  the  media  is  not  as  partner  to  government,  but  as  spokesman  and  forum 
for  an  enlightened  and  informed  public  opinion  which  it  should  help  to  create. 

In  the  first  days  after  the  documents  were  published,  there  was  a  heartening 
closing  of  ranks  to  resist  the  abrogation  of  the  First  Amendment — for  that  is 
what  it  had  come  down  to.  The  directors  of  NBC  and  CBS,  themselves  under 
governmental  siege,  voiced  their  support  of  the  newspapers.  ABC,  concentrating 
on  a  "happy  news"  approach  in  accord  with  the  Agnew  syndrome,  was  silent. 

The  American  Society  of  Newspaper  Editors  joined  the  fight,  as  did  the  As- 
sociated Press  Managing  Editors  Association,  the  Newspaper  Guild,  and  Editor 
&  Publisher,  the  generally  stodgy  journal  of  the  newspaper  industry.  The  Boston 
Globe  recalled  the  dark  days  of  the  witch-hunting,  black-listing  1950s  with  a 
warning  that  it  could  happen  again.  Its  political  editor  Robert  Healy  wrote: 
"After  all,  the  issue  is  not  simply  the  right  [of  newspapers]  to  publish  these  doc- 
uments, but  the  right  of  the  people  to  read  them." 

The  classic  arrogant  response  to  this  position  was  given  by  General  Maxwell 
Taylor,  who  served  in  the  deceit  elite  of  both  the  Kennedy  and  Johnson  adminis- 
trations, and  therefore  was  a  person  of  prominence  in  the  Pentagon  documents. 
On  the  question  of  "the  people's  right  to  know,"  he  said: 

I  don't  believe  in  this  as  a  general  principle.  You  have  to  talk  about 
cases.  What  is  a  citizen  going  to  do  after  reading  these  documents  that  he 
wouldn't  have  done  otherwise?  A  citizen  should  know  the  things  he  needs 
to  know  to  be  a  good  citizen  and  discharge  his  functions,  but  not  to  get  into 
secrets  that  damage  his  government  and  indirectly  damage  himself. 

The  disclosures,  he  said,  were  laying  the  foundations  for  "bad  history."  That 
meant,  in  plain  English,  that  it  would  make  the  central  figures  in  the  drama — 
Taylor  among  them — look  bad.  And  that,  at  all  costs,  particularly  at  the  cost  of 
truth,  had  to  be  avoided.  Opposed  to  the  Taylor  view,  Tom  Wicker  wrote  in  the 
New  York  Times  on  June  16,  1971:  "No  statute  exists  that  says  that  government 
officials  must  be  protected  from  the  exposure  of  their  follies  or  misdeeds.  Indeed, 
the  great  lesson  of  the  Pentagon  record  is  that  the  ability  to  operate  in  secrecy 
breeds  contempt  for  that  very  public  in  whose  name  and  interest  officials  claim 
to  act." 

That  is  a  great  lesson  indeed,  but  it  applies  to  the  newspapers  which  refused  to 
publish  information  in  their  possession  during  the  years  of  the  Pentagon  Papers, 
as  well  as  the  government  officials  who  sought  to  keep  secret  their  policymaking 
actions.  For  the  communications  media  it  ought  to  have  meant  a  continuing  ef- 
fort to  tear  the  shroud  of  secrecy  and  misinformation  from  every  area  of  gov- 
ernmental policymaking,  and  particularly  about  the  seemingly  endless  war  in 
Indochina.  But  after  a  period  of  vigorous  self-congratulation,  the  media  lost  in- 
terest altogether  in  the  contents  of  the  Pentagon  documents,  especially  as  to  the 
light  they  might  cast  on  current  policy  and  actions,  and  resorted  to  their  cus- 
tomary way  of  doing  things. 

Body  counts  and  kill  ratios  still  dominated  the  news  stories  from  Indochina, 


The  Media  and  the  Message  57 

and  "Hanoi"  was  credited  with  all  "enemy"  military  actions  in  Cambodia,  Laos, 
and  South  Vietnam.  Missing  from  the  media — and  from  the  American  conscious- 
ness— was  any  recognition  of  the  role  of  the  National  Liberation  Front  of  South 
Vietnam,  the  Cambodian  National  Liberation  Front,  and  the  Pathet  Lao,  the 
liberation  movement  of  Laos,  each  of  which  is  in  control  of  the  major  portion 
of  its  respective  country,  and  each  of  which  in  fact  is  opposing  the  forces  of  the 
United  States  and  their  mercenary  troops — not  "Hanoi." 

When  the  bombings  of  North  Vietnam  were  resumed  in  force  late  in  1971, 
and  administration  spokesmen,  in  language  which  could  have  been  taken  verbatim 
from  the  Pentagon  documents,  sought  to  justify  the  bombings,  the  media  reported 
the  explanations  without  contest  in  the  traditionally  objective  fashion.  An  enter- 
prising newspaper  could  have  laid  the  official  statements  side  by  side  with  similar 
statements  from  the  Pentagon  documents,  and  the  point  would  have  been  sharply 
underscored.  But  such  enterprise  was  not  countenanced,  if  it  ever  was  proposed. 

Even  more  striking  was  the  treatment  in  the  media,  and  particularly  the  New 
York  Times,  of  the  man  whose  initiative,  enterprise,  and  single-minded  purpose 
enabled  the  publication  of  the  Pentagon  documents.  On  August  5,  1971,  Daniel 
EUsberg  was  ordered  by  a  United  States  District  judge  in  Boston  to  be  removed 
to  California  to  face  charges  of  illegal  possession  of  secret  government  documents. 
The  Times,  one  felt,  would  regard  itself  as  personally  involved — with  due  regard 
for  the  need  to  protect  its  own  legal  position — and  deem  this  news  worthy  of 
page  one  display.  It  decided,  however,  to  place  the  story  (ten  inches  of  type)  on 
page  six  of  its  August  6  issue. 

An  Appeals  Court  held  up  the  extradition  order  on  August  6,  and  the  Times 
on  August  7  moved  the  story  up  to  page  four  (thirteen  inches).  Ellsberg  was  not 
in  court  in  Portland,  Maine,  where  the  action  took  place,  but  held  a  news  con- 
ference in  Boston,  and  made  some  statements  which  could  provide  a  motive  for 
his  relegation  to  the  Times'^  inside  pages.  He  said  he  was  disappointed  that  the 
newspapers  were  not  printing  more  of  the  Pentagon  documents.  "The  New  York 
Times  and  the  Washington  Post  have  most  of  the  papers,"  he  said,  "but  the  public 
doesn't  have  them.  I  have  to  say  this  means  many  newspapers  in  this  country 
which  have  access  to  large  sections  of  the  Pentagon  study  are  now  in  the  business 
of  withholding  it  from  the  public,  just  as  the  Defense  Department  was  for  so  long 
in  that  business." 

That  was  a  strong  enough  statement  to  elicit  comment  from  the  Times  or  the 
Washington  Post,  but  none  was  forthcoming.  In  fact,  Ellsberg  dropped  out  of  the 
Times  for  the  rest  of  the  week,  and  its  News  of  the  Week  in  Review,  on  Sunday, 
August  8,  did  not  consider  his  situation  of  sufficient  interest  for  an  item  in  the 
review,  let  alone  for  editorial  comment. 

Coverage  of  the  Ellsberg  case  did  improve  in  the  Times  after  the  second  in- 
dictments by  a  grand  jury  in  Los  Angeles  in  December  1971,  but  an  examination 
of  the  Times's  editorials  from  June  through  December  1971  yielded  only  one 
comment  about  the  Ellsberg  case.  That  was  an  editorial  critical  of  the  govern- 
ment's use  of  wiretapping  in  pursuing  persons  in  the  academic  community  who 
may  have  sympathized  with  or  assisted  Ellsberg's  efforts  to  make  the  Pentagon 
documents  public. 

The  Boston  Globe  was  prematurely  accurate  in  describing  the  climate  sur- 
rounding the  Pentagon  Papers'  publication  as  similar  to  that  of  the  1950s,  "when 
intellectuals,  Hollywood  writers,  professors  and  labor  leaders  were  being  sum- 
moned before  a  congressional  committee  and  then  being  judged  in  contempt  be- 
cause they  refused  to  answer  questions  about  their  alleged  Communist  beliefs." 


58      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Substitute  the  words  "grand  jury"  for  ""congressional  committee,"  and  "Ellsberg 
connections"  for  "Communist  beliefs,"  and  one  has  a  fair  picture  of  the  atmos- 
phere on  East  Coast  and  West  Coast  at  the  turn  of  1972. 

Even  the  most  vigorous  efforts — if  they  were  indeed  to  be  made — by  the  media 
to  ensure  a  fair  trial  for  Ellsberg  and  the  others  who  were  indicted,  or  may  still 
be,  could  not  absolve  the  media  of  their  responsibility  in  the  situation.  That 
could  be  achieved  only  by  an  acknowledgment  that  the  wrong  persons  were  being 
placed  on  trial,  and  that  the  government's  efforts  were  a  diversion  to  delude  the 
public  once  again  as  to  the  real  nature  of  the  American  crisis. 

In  the  New  York  Times  of  June  13,  1971 — the  day  the  first  of  the  documents 
appeared — James  Reston  described  as  persons  of  "unquestioned  personal  moral 
character"  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara,  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk,  Walt 
W.  Rostow,  and  the  Bundy  brothers.  It  is  a  strange  characterization  for  men  en- 
gaged for  years  in  the  process  of  deliberately  deceiving  the  American  public  in 
order  to  continue  killing  both  Indochinese  and  Americans  to  prove  the  correct- 
ness of  their  policy. 

As  of  January  1972,  all  of  these  moral  men  were  still  active  in  public  life. 
McNamara — with  a  second  five-year  term — was  presiding  over  the  billions  in  the 
World  Bank;  Rusk  was  teaching  history  to  unsuspecting  young  people  at  a  South- 
ern university;  McGeorge  Bundy  was  distributing  Ford  Foundation  largess  as 
chairman  of  the  board;  brother  William  had  been  confirmed  (by  David  Rocke- 
feller) as  editor  of  Foreign  Affairs,  a  journal  which  seeks  to  present  American 
foreign  policy  in  its  most  benevolent  light;  Rostow  was  heavily  engaged  at  the 
University  of  Texas  (sometimes  known  as  the  University  of  Lyndon  B.  Johnson) 
in  Austin,  presenting  to  history  as  a  benign  democrat  one  of  the  grossest  men 
ever  to  achieve  the  Presidency. 

All  the  high-minded  editorials  about  the  inviolability  of  the  First  Amendment 
and  the  "vitality  of  the  American  form  of  government"  {New  York  Times  edi- 
torial, July  4,  1971)  notwithstanding,  the  communications  industry  will  have  ab- 
dicated its  responsibility  completely  unless  it  seeks  an  answer  to  the  compelling 
question:  How  could  these  things  be?  If  the  industry  does  not  stand  united  in  an 
adversary  role  to  government — the  only  proper  stance  for  a  free  press  in  a  democ- 
racy— there  will  be  ever  greater  incursions  on  its  freedoms,  and  the  freedoms  of 
others.  Ultimately,  the  public  may  be  left  without  a  major  defense  of  its  interests 
against  predatory  government. 

And  a  Berrigan  will  still  be  in  jail. 


Notes 

1.  In  a  paper  prepared  for  delivery  at  the  66th  annual  meeting  of  the  American 
Political  Science  Association  in  Los  Angeles  in  September  1970;  and  in  an  article  in 
The  Nation,  October  11,  1971,  part  of  an  essay  to  be  included  in  Communications  in 
International  Politics,  edited  by  Richard  I.  Merritt  (University  of  Illinois  Press). 

2.  At  the  height  of  the  controversy  about  Diem,  only  the  Associated  Press,  the  United 
Press  International,  and  the  New  York  Times  had  full-time  correspondents  in  South 
Vietnam.  When  a  major  story  broke,  a  stream  of  correspondents  poured  in  from  Hong 
Kong,  Tokyo,  and  Bangkok.  Neil  Sheehan  was  then  correspondent  for  UPI,  Malcolm 
Browne  for  AP,  and  Charles  Mohr  was  Southeast  Asia  bureau  chief  for  Time.  With 
David  Halberstam,  who  succeeded  Homer  Bigart  for  the  New  York  Times,  they  com- 
prised the  group  of  journalistic  rebels  whose  dispatches  were  contradicted  by  junketeer- 
ing  correspondents  such  as  Joseph  Alsop  and  Marguerite  Higgins  of  the  New  York 


The  Media  and  the  Message  59 

Herald  Tribune,  sent  out  to  Vietnam  for  that  purpose.  By  July  1966,  there  were  360 
accredited  correspondents  in  South  Vietnam,  about  a  third  of  them  actual  reporters,  the 
rest  technicians,  interpreters,  and  CIA  agents. 

3.  In  a  perceptive  review  of  Roger  Hilsman's  To  Move  a  Nation  (Doubleday,  1967), 
in  The  Nation,  June  5,  1967. 

4.  In  The  Making  of  a  Quagmire  (Random  House,  1965). 

5.  In  an  article  entitled  "Not  a  Dove,  But  No  Longer  a  Hawk,"  in  the  New  York 
Times  Magazine,  October  9,  1966. 

6.  Between  1945  and  1950,  specialists  connected  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations, 
a  prime  McCarthy  target,  reviewed  twenty-two  of  thirty  books  about  China  for  the 
New  York  Times,  and  thirty  of  thirty-five  books  for  the  New  York  Herald  Tribune. 
From  1952  to  1955,  the  years  of  McCarthyite  prevalence,  not  one  of  these  authorities 
was  engaged  to  review  a  single  book  by  either  the  Times  or  the  Herald  Tribune.  These 
figures  are  from  Roger  Hilsman's  To  Move  a  Nation. 

7.  In  the  Progressive,  August  1971.  Knoll  is  Washington  editor  of  the  Progressive,  and 
coauthor  with  William  McGaffin  of  Anything  But  the  Truth  (G.  P.  Putnam's,  1968), 
about  the  credibility  gap  in  Washington. 

8.  Stone  ceased  publication  of  his  newsletter  with  the  issue  of  December  14,  1971,  to 
become  a  contributing  editor  of  the  New  York  Review  of  Books.  The  Weekly  is  avail- 
able on  microfilm  from  University  Microfilms,  a  subsidiary  of  Xerox. 

9.  In  a  speech  by  Clifton  Daniel,  Times  managing  editor,  on  June  1,  1966,  to  the 
World  Press  Institute  at  Macalester  College  in  St.  Paul,  Minnesota,  and  printed  the 
next  day  in  full  in  the  Times. 

10.  In  the  Columbia  Journalism  Review  (September/October  1971),  an  issue  de- 
voted almost  entirely  to  the  media  and  the  Pentagon  documents. 


60 


5.  The  Receiving  End  ' 
by  Wilfred  Burchett 


"It  is  repugnant  for  honest  people  to  think  that  the  government  of  a  country 
with  the  standing  of  the  United  States  had,  for  many  years,  premeditated,  pre- 
pared, and  planned,  down  to  the  most  minute  details,  systematic  aggression;  a 
criminal  war  of  genocide  and  biocide  against  a  small  people,  a  small  country  situ- 
ated 10,000  kilometers  and  more  from  America's  frontiers;  to  think  that  this  gov- 
ernment for  many  years  on  end  has  deliberately  and  knowingly  lied  to  cover  up 
the  crime,  to  hide  its  plans  and  deceive  American  public  opinion,  the  American 
Congress,  and  America's  allies  as  well  as  its  friends  and  supporters  throughout  the 
world. 

"When  American  presidents  declare  that  all  they  want  is  peace;  that  they  will 
never  commit  aggression;  that  they  will  never  resort  to  force;  that  all  they  want 
is  to  defend  democracy  and  freedom  in  Vietnam;  any  amount  of  people  through- 
out the  world  had  difficulty  in  believing  that  this  was  nothing  but  sheer  lies  and, 
even  worse,  cynical  cover-ups  for  the  most  detailed  preparations  and  plans  for 
war.  Decent  people  thought  there  must  be  at  least  a  modicum  of  truth  and  sin- 
cerity in  the  word  of  leaders  of  one  of  the  most  important  governments  in  the 
world.  They  thought  there  must  be  much  propaganda  in  the  accusations  of  the 
'other  side'  against  the  White  House  and  the  Pentagon. 

"Today,  it  is  high  time  to  inspect  the  evidence.  The  truth  has  been  flushed  out 
into  broad  daylight.  The  official  documents,  notes,  minutes  of  working  sessions, 
directives,  circulars — in  all  7,000  pages,  2,500,000  words,  reveal  in  black  and 
white  the  extent  of  the  plot  and  the  lies.  .  . 

"For  over  20  years,  Yankee  imperialism  fixed  its  prey,  spread  its  nets,  set  its 
traps,  orchestrated  its  propaganda,  launched  the  necessary  provocations  to  end  up 
by  hurling  over  11  million  tons  of  bombs  at  Vietnam  and  casting  $200  billion 
into  the  Indochina  abyss.  .  .  .  Truman,  Eisenhower,  Kennedy,  Johnson,  finally 
Nixon — Democrats  and  Republicans,  one  can  hardly  imagine  more  dissimilar 
personalities — have  succeeded  each  other,  but  Washington's  Vietnam  and  Indo- 
china policy  has  not  deviated  an  iota. 

"Events  have  unfolded  as  in  a  scenario  prepared  by  a  one-track-mind  pro- 
ducer. The  most  murderous  weapons  have  been  tried  out;  the  most  barbarous 
forms  of  warfare  employed;  the  most  bloodthirsty  minions  utilized  and,  when 
necessary,  physically  liquidated  when  they  outlived  their  usefulness. 

"For  the  Vietnamese  people  who  saw  the  first  US  warships  arrive  in  Saigon 
waters  in  March  1950  and  from  then  on  saw  US  military  missions  at  work, 
followed  by  swarms  of  Yankee  'advisers'  of  all  types,  followed  in  turn  by  hordes 
of  GIs,  the  Pentagon  Papers  merely  confirm  the  opinion  about  Yankee  imperial- 
ism that  they  have  consistently  held  for  20-odd  years.  For  the  Vietnamese,  La- 
Copyright  ©  1972  by  Wilfred  Burchett. 


The  Receiving  End  61 

otian,  and  Cambodian  peoples,  as  for  all  those  who  have  had  to  face  up  to  Yankee 
imperialism  in  recent  years,  these  documents  hardly  constitute  real  secrets.  For 
we  have  had  to  judge  the  men  in  Washington  by  their  deeds,  not  by  their  speeches; 
and  the  sequence  and  logic  of  these  acts  amply  proved  the  true  nature  of  Yankee 
imperialism. 

"When  dealing  with  matters  such  as  the  death  of  Diem,  the  refusal  to  hold  the 
1956  elections,  the  'Tonkin  Gulf  incident,'  or  the  eventual  use  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons, these  documents  certainly  do  not  reveal  everything.  There  is  still  plenty  to 
be  said!  But  the  essential  is  there.  The  policy  of  intervention,  the  aggression 
waged  by  Washington  with  great  obduracy  and  duplicity  against  Vietnam  and  the 
peoples  of  Indochina.  .  . 

This  must  be  taken  only  as  a  preliminary  reaction  from  Hanoi — in  late  Sep- 
tember 1971 — based  on  what  the  North  Vietnamese  had  seen  and  heard  of  the 
Pentagon  Papers  till  that  date.  It  was  before  the  Senator  Gravel  edition  or  the 
Government  edition  had  been  published  and  doubtless  much  more  will  be  heard 
from  Hanoi  when  those  much  more  complete  texts  have  been  studied. 

It  is  quite  true  that  there  is  still  "plenty  to  be  said";  many  things  have  been 
omitted  which  provide  vital  clues  to  understanding  the  real  import  of  the  Papers. 
The  documents  "hardly  constitute  real  secrets"  for  those  of  us  present  at  the  re- 
ceiving end  of  these  policies  and  who  have  dug  hard  for  confirmatory  data  from 
the  initiating  end.  McNamara's  researchers  seem  to  have  missed  quite  a  lot  of 
confirmatory  data  available  even  in  the  memoirs  of  qualified  Establishment  higher- 
ups.  For  instance,  although  the  Papers  deal  in  detail  with  contingency  plans  for 
joint  or  unilateral  U.S.  military  intervention  from  the  period  of  the  Dien  Bien 
Phu  battle  right  up  to  the  11th  hour  of  the  1954  Geneva  Cease-fire  Agreements, 
they  do  not  deal  with  very  firm  plans,  drawn  up  immediately  after  Geneva  for  a 
unilateral  United  States  invasion  of  North  Vietnam  and  the  occupation  of  the 
Red  River  Delta  up  to,  and  including  Hanoi,  for  a  start.  As  a  "declaration  of  in- 
tention" and  an  explanation  of  what  followed,  this  is  crucial.  A  major  participant 
in  this  planning.  Brigadier  General  James  M.  Gavin,  in  a  book  that  attracted 
comparatively  little  attention,  reveals  the  whole  plot.  Gavin,  at  the  time  of  which 
he  writes,  was  Deputy  in  Charge  of  Plans  to  General  Matthew  B.  Ridgway,  Army 
Chief  of  Staff."^ 

After  the  French  "unwisely  folded"  by  signing  the  1954  Geneva  Agreements, 
Gavin  reveals,  the  Pentagon  view,  supported  by  John  Foster  Dulles  and  the  CIA, 
was  that  "it  was  obviously  up  to  us  to  assume  the  full  burden  of  combat  against 
Communism  in  that  area.  .  .  ."  It  was  in  this  spirit,  he  continues,  that  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  "began  with  the  highest  priority  to  study  a  proposal  to  send  combat 
troops  into  the  Red  River  delta  of  North  Vietnam.  .  .  ." 

It  is  later  made  quite  clear  that  this  planning  started  immediately  after  the 
Geneva  Agreements,  which  in  the  Pentagon  view,  represented  an  unpleasant  in- 
terruption in  the  business  of  "stopping  Communism"  for  which  the  United  States 
had  been  footing  the  bills  till  then  but  would  now  have  to  take  over  the  actual 
fighting. 

"As  Chief  of  Plans  of  the  Army  Staff,"  continues  Gavin,  "I  was  responsible  for 
recommending  what  attitude  the  Army  should  take  towards  this  proposal  to  put 
American  ground  troops  into  North  Vietnam.  .  .  ."  In  his  consultations,  Gavin 
and  his  colleagues,  including  "the  best  Asian  experts,"  concluded  that  in  invading 
North  Vietnam  they  would  also  be  taking  on  China.  The  Navy  made  this  quite 
clear  by  pointing  out  that  they  could  not  guarantee  safety  for  the  invasion  force 
unless  they  first  occupied  the  Chinese  island  of  Hainan.  After  a  visit  to  the  area. 


62      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Gavin  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  invasion  would  require  "eight  combat  di- 
visions supported  by  35  engineering  battalions  and  all  the  artillery  and  logistics 
support  such  mammoth  undertakings  require.  .  . 

The  fact  that  the  United  States  had  pledged  not  to  use  force  or  "threat  of  force" 
to  upset  the  Geneva  Agreements  seems  not  to  have  entered  into  the  considerations 
of  the  planners.  As  for  the  danger  of  war  with  China: 

Admiral  Radford  [then  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  W.B.]  was 
emphatically  in  favor  of  landing  a  force  in  the  Haiphong-Hanoi  area,  even 
if  it  meant  risking  war  with  Red  China.  In  this  he  was  fully  supported  by 
the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Air  Force  and  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
[continued  Gavin].  In  my  opinion  such  an  operation  meant  a  great  risk  of 
war.  .  .  .  The  Navy  was  unwilling  to  risk  their  ships  in  the  Haiphong  area 
without  first  invading  and  capturing  the  island.  Admiral  Radford  and  the 
Chiefs  of  the  Navy  and  Air  Force  felt  that,  faced  with  overwhelming  power, 
the  Red  Chinese  would  not  react  to  this  violation  of  their  sovereignty.  Gen- 
eral Ridgway  and  I  had  grave  doubts  about  the  validity  of  this  reason- 
ing.  .  .  ." 

Ridgway,  with  his  Korean  experience  (a)  in  getting  involved  with  Chinese  troops 
in  a  ground  war  and  (b)  the  ineffectiveness  of  air  power  in  such  wars,  was  against 
the  plan.  He  went  over  the  head  of  Radford  directly  to  President  Eisenhower  and 
as  a  result  the  proposal  was  killed.  By  everything  that  Gavin  writes,  this  was  not 
just  a  bit  of  "contingency  planning"  but  a  real  plan  of  war  which  had  "highest 
priority"  and  could  not  have  been  initiated  without  Eisenhower's  support.  Gavin 
makes  it  clear  that  he  and  Ridgway  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  getting  the  plan 
canceled.  He  refers  to  "weeks  and  months"  during  which  "we  were  to  argue 
forcefully  and  frequently  against  such  a  war.  .  .  ." 

How  such  a  war  would  have  been  justified,  Gavin  does  not  reveal.  But  the  later 
fakery  with  the  "Tonkin  Gulf"  incident  proved  that  pretexts  are  no  problem  once 
the  decision  has  been  made!  The  war,  for  the  moment,  was  called  off.  But  Gavin 
points  out  there  was  a  "compromise."  There  would  be  a  "Vietnamization"  of  the 
plans.  "We  would  not  attack  North  Vietnam,"  Gavin  continues,  "but  we  would 
support  a  South  Vietnamese  government  that  we  hoped  would  provide  a  stable, 
independent  government  that  was  representative  of  the  people.  .  .  ."  Here  Gavin 
was  writing  with  his  tongue  in  his  cheek.  The  "compromise"  as  he  knew  full  well 
was  that  the  United  States  would  place  a  military  machine  in  the  hands  of  Ngo 
Dinh  Diem  that  would  do  what  Eisenhower  had  thwarted  Dulles,  the  CIA,  and 
Pentagon  from  doing  in  1954.  Why  this  vital  link  in  the  chain  of  intentions  is 
omitted  from  the  Pentagon  Papers,  when  there  is  so  much  frankness  on  other 
matters,  is  difficult  to  understand.  It  makes  so  many  other  things  comprehensible. 
What  followed  in  the  South  was  preparation  for  the  "March  to  the  North."  The 
United  States  took  over  the  training  and  build-up  of  Diem's  forces;  graduates  at 
the  training  schools  pledged  to  "march  to  the  North"  and  were  issued  shoulder 
flashes  bearing  this  motto.  Gavin  reveals  that  following  the  abandonment  of  the 
earlier  war  plan  he  was  sent  to  Saigon  "early  in  1955  ...  to  discuss  political 
and  economic  plans  plus  military  aid  and  assistance.  .  .  ." 

As  far  as  I  know — and  I  was  in  the  North  from  October  1954  until  May  1957 
— Ho  Chi  Minh  was  not  aware  of  the  Dulles-Radford  plan,  but  he  was  aware  of 
secret  aggression  against  the  North,  immediately  after  the  Geneva  Accords  went 
into  effect.  The  North  Vietnamese  were  aware  of  the  American  hand  behind  false 
rumors — such  as  those,  spread  by  a  Lansdale  team,  of  Chinese  troops  raping 


The  Receiving  End  63 

North  Vietnamese  girls — and  the  propaganda  campaign  to  scare  Catholics  into 
fleeing  to  the  South  to  escape  the  A-bombs  which  would  be  used  against  the 
"pagans"  who  remained  in  the  North.  Many  of  Lansdale's  agents  deserted — as 
he  admits — the  moment  they  set  foot  in  the  North,  so  the  Vietnamese  were  well 
aware  of  his  activities — if  not  of  his  personality,  and  those  of  his  psywar,  es- 
pionage, and  sabotage  teams  as  detailed  in  Document  95  [Gravel  edition,  1:573- 
583]. 

By  accident  I  personally  stumbled  on  evidence  of  their  activities  at  the  Hongay- 
Campha  coal-mining  area.  It  was  toward  the  end  of  the  300-day  period  during 
which  the  French  were  allowed  to  retain  an  enclave  around  Haiphong  port 
through  which  their  forces  were  gradually  to  be  evacuated  to  the  South.  (Three 
hundred  days  from  the  signing  of  the  Geneva  Agreements  was  the  period  provided 
for  completing  the  regrouping  of  both  sides'  armed  forces  north  and  south  of  the 
17th  parallel  respectively,  and  also  for  civilians  who  wished  to  change  their  place 
of  residence.)  At  the  coal  mines,  I  was  told  of  a  strange  incident  just  before  the 
French  pulled  out  to  Haiphong,  in  which  a  sharp-eyed  youngster  had  noticed  a 
mysterious  visitor  who  fumbled  around  the  stacks  of  coal  briquettes  at  the  Campha 
storing  area.  At  first  he  thought  it  was  just  someone  helping  himself  to  fuel.  Then 
he  noticed  that  the  visitor — who  always  turned  up  in  the  evenings— was  putting 
briquettes  into  the  stacks.  When  an  advanced  guard  of  Vietminh  troops  arrived 
he  reported  this.  A  watch  was  kept  and  the  visitor  grabbed.  His  "briquettes"  were 
the  same  size  and  shape  but  less  shiny  than  the  others.  They  were  found  to  be 
made  of  powerful  explosives.  Fed  into  locomotive  engines  or  powerhouse  and 
factory  furnaces,  they  would  have  caused  tremendous  damage  with  no  way  of 
tracing  the  source. 

The  Campha  culprit  admitted  that  he  was  one  of  a  number  of  French  under- 
cover agents  in  the  North  who  had  been  recruited  by  the  CIA  immediately  after 
the  Geneva  Agreements,  whisked  off  to  a  U.S.  base  on  a  Pacific  island  for  a 
crash-course  in  espionage-sabotage  techniques  and  infiltrated  back  into  the  North 
through  the  Haiphong  enclave.  While  I  was  at  Campha,  teams  were  still  patiently 
combing  through  the  mountains  of  briquettes  to  collect  the  explosive  dummies. 
My  Vietnamese  friends  asked  me  not  to  write  about  it  at  the  time  because  they 
did  not  want  Lansdale  to  know  how  much  they  already  knew  of  his  activities. 

In  his  report,  Lansdale  recounts  with  some  pride  how  one  of  his  teams  "had 
spent  the  last  days  of  Hanoi  in  contaminating  the  oil  supply  of  the  bus  company 
for  a  gradual  wreckage  of  engines  in  the  buses,  in  taking  the  first  actions  of  a  de- 
layed sabotage  of  the  railroad  (which  required  teamwork  with  a  CIA  special 
technical  team  in  Japan  who  performed  their  part  brilliantly)  and  in  writing  de- 
tailed notes  of  potential  targets  for  future  paramilitary  operations.  .  .  ."  Lans- 
dale complains  that  U.S.  adherence  to  the  Geneva  Agreements  prevented  his 
teams  "from  carrying  out  the  active  sabotage  it  desired  to  do  against  the  power 
plant,  water  facilities,  harbor  and  bridge.  .  .  ."  (Those  jobs  were  done  later  by 
the  U.S.  Air  Force!!!)  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  sabotage  of  the  bus  company 
was  specifically  aimed  at  the  French  concept  of  economic  coexistence  with  the 
DRV,  the  bus  company  being  owned  and  staffed  by  French  personnel.  The  "first 
actions"  for  delayed  sabotage  of  the  railroad  were  undoubtedly  the  planting  of 
the  explosive  "briquettes"! 

"By  31  January  [1955]"  reported  Lansdale,  all  operational  equipment  of  the 
Binh  paramilitary  group  had  been  trans-shipped  to  Haiphong  from  Saigon.  .  .  . 
We  had  smuggled  into  Vietnam  about  eight  and  a  half  tons  of  supplies  for  the 
paramilitary  group.  They  included  fourteen  agent  radios,  300  carbines,  90,000 
rounds  of  carbine  ammunition,  50  pistols,  10,000  rounds  of  pistol  ammunition 


64      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

and  300  pounds  of  explosives.  Two  and  a  half  tons  were  delivered  to  the  Hao^ 
agents  in  Tonkin,  while  the  remainder  was  cached  along  the  Red  River  by  SMM 
(Saigon  Military  Mission  which  Lansdale  headed.  W.B.)  with  the  help  of  the 
Navy.  .  .  ." 

A  reason  repeatedly  given  years  later  by  Washington  for  not  engaging  in  ne- 
gotiations to  end  America's  war  in  Vietnam  was  that  they  could  not  place  any 
reliance  in  "agreements  reached  with  Communists."  Walter  Bedell-Smith  at  the 
closing  session  of  the  1954  Geneva  Conference  solemnly  stated  that:  "The  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  of  America  declares  that  with  regard  to  the  afore- 
said Agreements  and  paragraphs  that:  1 )  it  will  refrain  from  the  threat  or  the  use 
of  force  to  disturb  them,  in  accordance  with  Article  2  (Section  4)  of  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations.  .  .  .  2)  It  would  view  any  renewal  of  the  aggression  in 
violation  of  the  aforesaid  Agreements  with  grave  concern  and  as  seriously  threat- 
ening international  peace  and  security." 

"Haiphong  was  taken  over  by  the  Vietminh  on  16  May,"  continues  the  Lans- 
dale report.  "Our  Binh  and  northern  Hao  teams  were  in  place,  completely 
equipped.  It  had  taken  a  tremendous  amount  of  hard  work  to  beat  the  Geneva 
deadline,  to  locate,  exfiltrate,  train,  infiltrate,  equip  the  men  of  these  two  teams 
and  have  them  in  place  ready  for  actions  required  against  the  enemy.  .  .  ."  In 
other  words  in  place  ready  for  "the  use  of  force  to  disturb"  the  Geneva  Agree- 
ments. 

For  a  comparison  of  attitudes,  one  only  has  to  study  Ho  Chi  Minh's  "Appeal 
to  the  Vietnamese  People"  on  June  22,  1954,  the  day  after  the  Geneva  Cease-fire 
Accords  were  signed.  It  can  be  imagined  that  fulfilling  that  part  of  the  agreement 
calling  for  the  evacuation  of  old  Vietminh  resistance  bases  in  the  South — some  of 
which  the  French  had  never  been  able  to  penetrate  from  the  start  of  the  resistance 
struggle — called  for  a  special  effort  of  discipline  and  self-sacrifice  which  only  the 
authority  of  Ho  Chi  Minh  could  make  acceptable.  Families  would  be  separated 
for  the  two  years  until  reunification;  the  local  people  would  lose  the  protection 
the  Vietminh  had  for  so  long  provided.  After  explaining  that  the  Geneva  Agree- 
ments represented  a  "brilliant  victory"  for  the  resistance  struggle,  Ho  Chi  Minh 
set  the  new  task  as:  "to  struggle  to  consolidate  peace;  to  realize  national  unity, 
independence  and  democracy.  To  restore  peace,  the  two  parties  must  first  of  all 
observe  the  cease-fire.  For  that,  it  is  important  that  the  armed  forces  of  both 
parties  regroup  in  two  different  regions,  which  means  that  the  limits  of  both  re- 
grouping zones  must  be  well  marked.  Such  delimitation  is  a  temporary  measure,  a 
transition  indispensable  to  the  good  implementation  of  the  military  agreement 
and  to  the  restoration  of  peace  with  a  view  to  the  nationwide  elections  for  the 
reunification  of  the  country.  .  .  ."  He  explained  that  some  areas  occupied  till 
then  by  the  French  would  now  be  in  the  liberated  zone  north  of  the  17th 
parallel  and  some  areas  liberated  in  the  South  would  fall  under  temporary  French 
occupation. 

"I  am  asking  all  our  compatriots,  combatants  and  cadres,  to  strictly  adhere  to 
the  political  line  drawn  up  by  the  Party  and  Government  and  to  correctly  apply 
the  measures  taken  in  our  struggle  to  consolidate  peace,  realize  unity,  independ- 
ence and  democracy. 

"All  of  you,  truthful  patriots,  no  matter  to  what  social  class  you  belong,  no 
matter  what  God  you  believe  in,  no  matter  what  side  you  were  with,  I  invite  you 
all  to  cooperate  frankly  in  the  struggle  for  the  sake  of  the  people  and  of  the  Na- 
tion, for  peace,  for  the  unity,  independence  and  democracy  of  our  beloved  Viet- 
nam. .  .  ." 

These  were  sacred  instructions  for  every  Vietminh  cadre.  Some  140,000  of 


The  Receiving  End  65 

them — military  and  civilian — were  then  withdrawn  to  the  North,  in  accordance 
with  the  regrouping  procedures  agreed  to  at  Geneva  to  separate  the  combatant 
forces. 

Whereas  Ho  Chi  Minh  accepted  the  Geneva  Agreement  as  a  solemn  interna- 
tional treaty  to  be  respected  no  matter  what  the  sacrifices  involved,  Eisenhower 
treated  it  as  a  hindrance,  to  be  circumvented  by  any  means  whatsoever,  to  Ameri- 
can global  plans  to  "stop  communism."  Thus  the  North  Vietnamese  are  right  in 
seeing  one  single  scenario  from  March  16,  1950 — when  the  U.S.  aircraft-carrier 
Boxer  and  the  destroyers  Sticknel  and  Anderson,  under  7th  Fleet  Commander, 
Rear  Admiral  Arleigh  Burke,  anchored  in  Saigon  Harbor  in  support  of  the  French, 
through  the  Lansdale  "cloak  and  dagger"  operations — right  up  to  the  1 1  million 
tons  of  bombs  on  Vietnam  and  U.S.  aggression  extended  to  Laos  and  Cambodia. 
Developing  variations  of  a  single  theme  of  U.S.  neo-colonialist  aggression! 

Another  curious  omission  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  the  extent  of  Pentagon 
responsibility,  at  the  start  at  least,  of  the  ill-fated  action  at  Dien  Bien  Phu.  Some 
space  is  given  to  various  plans  like  "Operation  Vulture,"  aimed  at  saving  the 
French  from  final  defeat,  but  nothing  is  said  of  the  initial  US  encouragement 
to  the  French  to  jump  headlong  into  the  trap.  For  the  Vietnamese  people,  how- 
ever, Dien  Bien  Phu  was  almost  as  much  an  American  as  a  French  defeat.  It 
was  the  wrecks  of  American  planes,  American  tanks,  American  artillery  pieces 
that  later  littered  the  battlefield.  The  "Navarre  Plan,"  of  which  Dien  Bien  Phu 
was  a  key  element,  had  been  approved  in  Washington  and  extra  funds  earmarked 
accordingly.  On  November  23,  1953,  General  Thomas  Trapnell,  chief  of  the 
US  Military  Aid  and  Advisory  Group  (MAAG)  set  up  in  Saigon  as  far  back  as 
October  1950,  inspected  the  Dien  Bien  Phu  positions  together  with  Generals 
Henri  Navarre,  C-in-C  of  the  French  Expeditionary  Corps,  and  Rene  Cogny, 
commanding  French  troops  in  the  Tonkin  area,  where  Dien  Bien  Phu  was  sit- 
uated. Trapnell  made  two  more  inspection  trips  (on  December  19,  1953,  with  a 
group  of  US  miliary  officers,  and  on  January  14,  1954)  to  check  up  on  the  dis- 
position of  some  $10  million  worth  of  US  equipment.  On  February  2,  General 
"Iron  Mike"  O'Daniel,  C-in-C  of  US  forces  in  the  Pacific,  paid  a  visit  and  decided 
to  appoint  three  American  officers  to  remain  on  the  spot  and  help  with  the  final 
preparations  for  the  battle.  (Dien  Bien  Phu  was  intended  to  be  the  vital  war- 
winning  operation  by  which  the  elite  troops  of  the  Expeditionary  Corps,  having 
been  parachuted  into  Dien  Bien  Phu  valley,  deep  inside  Vietminh-controUed  ter- 
ritory, were  to  outflank  and  overrun  the  main  Vietminh  base  area  in  northern 
Tonkin.)  Had  Dien  Bien  Phu  succeeded,  much  would  no  doubt  have  been  heard 
of  the  key  role  of  the  United  States  in  the  victory.  As  it  was,  it  was  written  off 
as  a  French  military  blunder! 

A  week  before  the  Geneva  Conference — by  which  time  it  was  clear  that  Dien 
Bien  Phu  was  doomed,  as  Ho  Chi  Minh  at  his  jungle  headquarters  assured  me  it 
was  right  at  the  start  of  the  battle — the  Pentagon  Papers  report  the  National  Se- 
curity Council  as  urging  President  Eisenhower  to  warn  the  French  that  "US  aid 
to  France  would  automatically  cease  upon  Paris'  conclusion  of  an  unsatisfactory 
settlement"  and  that  the  United  States  should  approach  the  puppet  governments 
of  the  three  states  of  Indochina  "with  a  view  to  continuing  the  anti-Vietminh 
struggle  in  some  other  form,  including  unilateral  American  involvement  'if  nec- 
essary.' The  NSC  clearly  viewed  the  Indochina  situation  with  extreme  anxiety, 
and  its  action  program  amounted  to  unprecedented  proposals  to  threaten  France 
with  the  serious  repercussions  of  a  sell-out  in  Southeast  Asia  .  .  ."  (Gravel  edi- 
tion, 1:117). 

This  was  the  spirit  in  which  the  USA  approached  the  Geneva  Conference  and 


66      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

the  implementation  of  the  Cease-fire  Agreements.  British  Foreign  Secretary  An- 
thony Eden  is  quoted  as  reveaHng  that  at  one  point,  Walter  Bedell  Smith,  who 
headed  the  US  delegation,  showed  him  a  "telegram  from  President  Eisenhower 
advising  him  to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  bring  the  conference  to  an  end  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  on  the  grounds  that  the  Communists  were  only  spinning 
things  out  to  suit  their  own  military  purposes"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:138). 

Much  of  the  58  pages  of  the  chapter  on  the  Geneva  Conference  deals  with 
the  efforts  of  Dulles  to  wreck  it;  to  avoid  a  cease-fire  at  all  costs  in  favor  of 
international  military  intervention  on  the  Korean  model.  With  the  equivalent  of 
the  entire  yearly  output  of  officers  from  the  St.  Cyr  Academy — France's  West 
Point — being  lost  each  year  in  Indochina,  the  French  began  to  wonder  whether 
it  was  worth  it.  From  the  government  down  to  the  troops  dying  in  ricefield  mud, 
it  gradually  began  to  dawn  that  France  itself  was  fighting  and  dying  for  the 
United  States.  The  United  States  by  the  time  of  Geneva  was  footing  80  percent 
of  the  bill  but  also,  as  former  premier  Paul  Reynaud  cried  out  in  the  French 
National  Assembly:  "You  Americans  draw  from  Indochina  89  percent  of  the 
natural  rubber  and  52  percent  of  the  tin  you  need  for  your  consumption.  There- 
fore on  the  material  side  of  things  it  is  for  your  interests  rather  than  ours  that 
we  are  fighting  for  Indochina." 

Even  Henri  Navarre,  the  last  would-be  "war-winner"  general,  wrote  later  that 
"the  Americans  helped  us  materially  but  on  the  other  hand  they  fought  us  morally. 
While  they  made  use  of  the  French  'fist' — essential  to  their  anti-Communist  game 
— they  worked  to  undermine  and  even  destroy  our  interests."  ^  Navarre  was  lucky 
that  the  war  ended  before  he  suffered  the  final  humiliation  of  having  the  "French- 
ification"  label  stuck  to  his  war  efforts.  But  that  he  had  virtually  become  an 
American  mercenary,  he  had  started  to  realize. 

Despite  the  efforts  of  Dulles,  agreement  was  reached  at  Geneva.  While  most 
of  the  world  heaved  a  great  sigh  of  relief  that  one  more  shooting  war  had  been 
stopped,  Lansdale  went  full  steam  ahead  with  his  secret  war  against  the  North; 
Dulles,  the  CIA  and  the  Pentagon  planned  the  full-scale  invasion,  and  while  the 
US  propaganda  services  shouted  at  "Communist  bad  faith,"  Dulles  went  ahead 
to  set  up  the  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organisation  (SEATO)  to  offset  the  Geneva 
Agreements  and  violate  them  by  placing  South  Vietnam,  Laos  and  Cambodia 
under  SEATO  "protection." 

Meanwhile  the  United  States  started  to  take  over  from  the  French  in  South 
Vietnam.  A  serious  omission  in  the  chapter  on  the  "Origins  of  the  Insurgency 
in  South  Vietnam"  is  the  failure  to  mention  the  US  police  role  and  responsibility 
in  putting  the  finger  on  those  who  had  been  active  in  the  anti-French  resistance 
struggle.  This  was  done  within  the  framework  of  a  "Denounce  Communists"  cam- 
paign almost  immediately  after  the  cease-fire,  with  police  teams  from  Michigan 
State  University  helping  behind  the  scenes,  with  everything  from  up-to-date  fin- 
gerprinting and  electronic  filing  methods  to  torture  gadgets  used  in  interrogation. 
Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  set  up  in  Saigon  as  premier  at  US  insistence  just  before  the 
Cease-fire  Agreements  were  concluded,  took  the  view  that  the  resistance  struggle 
had  been  "illegal";  thus  all  who  helped  were  "criminals  by  association."  Paragraph 
14c  of  the  Geneva  Agreements,  banning  any  form  of  reprisals  against  those  who 
had  helped  one  side  or  the  other  during  the  war,  was  ignored  in  the  South  from 
the  start. 

Although  these  operations  were  not  directly  under  the  Pentagon,  reactions  to 
them  certainly  contributed  to  the  "origins  of  the  insurgency."  A  booklet  issued 
by  the  Information  Department  of  the  DRV  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  1962 
described  the  situation  as  early  as  1955  as  follows:  "USOM  [US  Operations 


The  Receiving  End  67 


Mission]  spread  its  network  of  'advisers'  to  all  branches  of  economy  and  finance. 
'Advisers'  were  to  be  found  in  the  ministries  of  Economy,  Finance,  Agriculture, 
etc.  They  were  also  to  be  found  in  many  central  offices.  They  participated  in  the 
elaboration  of  general  programs  and  plans  to  implement  them.  They  controlled 
the  carrying-out  of  those  plans  and,  in  particular  the  use  of  the  aid  funds  and  the 
allotment  of  foreign  currency.  Through  USOM,  the  United  States  controlled  all 
economic  activities  of  the  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  administration. 

"Other  branches  of  Diem's  administrative  machinery  fell  under  the  control  of 
the  Mission  of  the  'Michigan  State  University'  (MSU),  a  body  which  reminds 
one  of  the  US  espionage  organization  labeled  'Free  Europe's  University.'  The 
MSU  Mission  had  its  'advisers'  in  the  branches  of  Education,  Labor,  etc.,  but  its 
main  activities  consisted  in  organizing  the  security  and  police  services,  and  train- 
ing their  personnel.  General  Lansdale,  famous  for  his  implication  in  many  coups 
d'etat  and  cases  of  espionage,  was  for  a  long  time  an  'adviser'  to  this  mission,  in 
charge  of  security  and  police.  .  .  ."  By  the  end  of  1954  the  police  were  busy 
arresting  and  physically  liquidating  anyone  in  the  South  named  as  having  taken 
part  in  the  resistance  struggle. 

One  of  the  first  cases  of  mass  reprisals  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  Interna- 
tional Control  Commission  (India  as  Chairman,  Poland  and  Canada)  was  at  Binh 
Thanh  village  on  the  Mekong  River.  The  ICC  had  been  informed  that,  early  in 
December  1954,  74  villagers  had  been  arrested  on  the  pretext  that  they  had  sup- 
ported the  resistance.  Of  these  24  were  said  to  have  been  executed,  after  which 
their  bodies  had  been  burned  and  the  ashes  thrown  into  the  Mekong.  The  ICC 
team  arrived  at  Binh  Thanh  on  December  8,  and  were  lodged  in  a  motorboat 
anchored  in  the  river.  The  village  was  occupied  by  Diemist  troops  with  machine- 
gun  posts  at  every  crossroads.  Contact  with  the  population  was  difficult  but  by 
the  end  of  the  day,  seven  witnesses  had  come  forward  confirming  there  had  been 
mass  arrests  and  executions  and  threats  of  death  against  any  who  testified  before 
the  ICC.  Next  morning  the  bodies  of  two  of  the  seven  were  found,  including  an 
old  woman  who  had  been  beheaded  and  disemboweled.  The  other  five  were  under 
arrest.  While  the  team  members  were  discussing  their  next  move,  three  sampans 
appeared  out  of  the  mists,  the  occupants  asking  if  security  could  be  guaranteed 
for  themselves  and  others  who  wanted  to  testify.  A  French  liaison  officer  gave  the 
necessary  assurances.  An  hour  later  a  flotilla  of  95  sampans  appeared  with  almost 
500  persons  aboard.  They  had  been  in  hiding  since  the  massacre,  which  they 
confirmed  ^  with  minute  details  as  to  the  story  of  the  arrests,  massacre  and  dis- 
posal of  bodies.  This  was  one  of  scores  of  such  cases  of  mass  reprisals  confirmed 
by  the  ICC. 

I  reported  at  the  time^  that  "Up  to  the  end  of  July  1955  .  .  .  according  to 
incomplete  figures  forwarded  by  General  Nguyen  Vo  Giap  to  the  International 
Control  Commission,  there  had  been  over  3,000  cases  of  reprisals  against  former 
resistance  supporters  in  South  Vietnam,  resulting  in  over  6,000  killed,  wounded 
and  missing  and  more  than  25,000  arrested.  .  .  ."  Added  to  these  figures  were 
an  estimated  7,000  killed  and  twice  as  many  wounded  when  Diem's  troops  at- 
tacked the  pro-French  armed  sects,  the  Binh  Xuyen  in  Saigon  and  its  outskirts 
and  the  Hoa  Hao  in  the  Mekong  delta  to  the  west. 

On  June  6,  1955,  the  government  of  the  DRV  had  declared  its  readiness  "to 
open  the  Consultative  Conference  with  the  competent  representative  authorities 
of  the  South,  from  July  20,  1955,  onward,  to  discuss  the  preparation  of  free 
general  elections  to  be  held  over  the  entire  territory  of  Vietnam  during  the 
month  of  July  1956.  .  .  ."  (As  provided  for  in  the  Geneva  Agreements.) 

The  Pentagon  Papers  report  that:  "By  the  time  the  deadlines  for  election  con- 


68      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

sultations  fell  due  in  July  1955,  South  Vietnam  was  sovereign  de  facto  as  well  as 
de  jure,  waxing  strong  with  US  aid,  and  France  was  no  longer  in  a  position  to 
exert  strong  influence  on  Diem's  political  actions.  As  early  as  January  1955,  Pres- 
ident Diem  was  stating  publicly  that  he  was  unlikely  to  proceed  with  the  Geneva 
elections  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  1:245) . 

As  the  French  were  more  and  more  openly  abdicating  their  responsibilities  and 
had  not  reacted  to  the  June  6  Declaration,  Hanoi  addressed  a  further  note  to  the 
"Ngo  Dinh  Diem  Administration"  on  July  19 — a  very  mild  note  pointing  out  that 
as  both  sides'  armed  forces  had  completed  regroupment  this  had  created  "the 
necessary  basis  for  the  achievement  in  the  near  future  of  a  political  settle- 
ment. .  .  ."  Until  this  time  it  should  be  noted — something  ignored  by  the  Pen- 
tagon Papers — that  the  United  States,  the  French  and  Diem  had  enjoyed  only 
advantages  from  the  Geneva  Agreements.  Namely,  the  French  had  been  able  to 
withdraw  their  forces  intact  from  untenable  positions — after  the  Dien  Bien  Phu 
debacle — north  of  the  17th  parallel;  in  return  the  Vietminh  forces  had  abandoned 
key  base  areas  in  the  South;  some  800,000  Catholics  had  been  moved  from  the 
North  to  the  South  to  bolster  Diem's  fanatically  pro-Catholic  regime.  Now  was 
to  come  the  "pro"  part  of  the  quid  pro  quo  for  the  Vietminh — elections  to  unify 
the  country.  "The  Government  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam,"  con- 
tinued the  July  19  note,  "suggests  that  you  nominate  your  representatives  to  hold, 
together  with  its  own  representatives,  the  Consultative  Conference  as  from  July 
20,  1955,  onwards,  as  provided  for  in  the  Geneva  Agreements,  at  a  place  agree- 
able to  both  sides  on  Vietnamese  territory,  in  order  to  discuss  the  problem  of 
national  reunification  through  free  nationwide  elections." 

The  reply  came  next  morning  when  military  trucks  laden  with  uniformed 
youths  arrived  opposite  the  Majestic  and  Gallieni  hotels,  the  residential  head- 
quarters of  the  International  Control  Commission.  Armed  with  axes,  pick-handles 
and  machetes,  they  sacked  the  offices  and  private  rooms  of  ICC  members  as  part 
of  the  celebration  of  Diem's  officially  designated  "day  of  shame"  (the  first  anni- 
versary of  the  Geneva  Agreements). 

Dulles  is  quoted  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  as  having  commented  on  Diem's  re- 
jection of  the  Consultations:  "Neither  the  United  States  Government  nor  the 
Government  of  Viet-Nam  is,  of  course,  a  party  to  the  Geneva  armistice  agree- 
ments. We  did  not  sign  them,  and  the  Government  of  Viet-Nam  did  not  sign 
them  and,  indeed,  protested  against  them  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  1:245).  To  which 
the  comment  of  the  editors  of  the  Papers  is:  "Thus,  backed  by  the  US,  Diem 
obdurately  refused  to  open  talks  with  the  Hanoi  government.  He  continued  to 
maintain  that  the  Government  of  South  Vietnam  had  not  signed  the  Geneva 
Agreements  and  thus  was  not  bound  by  them."  In  this  way  the  Vietminh  were 
cheated  of  the  full  fruits  of  victory  in  their  infinitely  difficult  and  heroic  struggle 
for  independence  and  the  foundation  was  laid  for  the  terrible  war  that  followed. 
Diem,  put  into  power  by  the  United  States  and  objectively  speaking  only  there 
because  the  Vietminh  had  beaten  the  French,  stepped  up  his  attempts  to  exter- 
minate the  former  resistance  activists  and  their  supporters:  The  ferocity  of  the 
repression  was  in  direct  proportion  to  the  military  strength  the  United  States  put 
at  his  disposal. 

Ho  Chi  Minh  had  appealed  for  political  struggle  to  demand  the  1956  elections, 
so  the  political  repression  was  also  directed  against  any  who  agitated  for  the 
elections  or  anything  else  connected  with  implementation  of  the  Geneva  Agree- 
ments. To  support  the  latter  became  a  "crime."  Committees  set  up  in  defense 
of  peace  and  the  Geneva  Agreements  were  dissolved,  leading  members — including 
the  head  of  the  Saigon-Cholon  committee,  the  lawyer  Nguyen  Huu  Tho — were 


The  Receiving  End  69 

arrested.  (Nguyen  Huu  Tho  was  later  rescued  from  prison  by  NFL  guerrillas  and 
became  President  of  the  National  Liberation  Front.)  Those  who  took  advantage 
of  the  sections  of  the  Geneva  Agreements  guaranteeing  full  political  freedoms 
and  who  tried  to  use  these  freedoms  in  defense  of  the  Agreements  were  marked 
down,  if  not  for  immediate  arrest,  for  arrest  and  extermination  later. 

"The  DRV  repeatedly  tried  to  engage  the  Geneva  machinery,  forwarding  mes- 
sages to  the  Government  of  South  Vietnam  in  July  1955,  May  and  June  1956, 
March  1958,  July  1959  and  July  1960,  proposing  consultations  to  negotiate  'free 
general  elections  by  secret  ballot,'  and  to  liberalize  North-South  relations  in  gen- 
eral," comments  the  Pentagon  Papers  on  this  aspect  of  US-Saigon  policy.  "Each 
time  the  GVN  replied  with  disdain,  or  with  silence.  The  17th  parallel,  with  its 
demilitarized  zone  on  either  side,  became  de  facto  an  international  boundary, 
and — since  Ngo  Dinh  Diem's  rigid  refusal  to  traffic  with  the  North  excluded  all 
economic  exchanges  and  even  an  interstate  postal  agreement — one  of  the  most 
restricted  boundaries  in  the  world.  The  DRV  appealed  to  the  UK  and  the  USSR 
as  co-chairmen  of  the  Geneva  Conference  to  no  avail.  In  January  1956,  on  DRV 
urging.  Communist  China  requested  another  Geneva  Conference  to  deal  with 
the  situation.  But  the  Geneva  Co-Chairmen,  the  USSR  and  the  UK,  responded 
only  by  extending  the  functions  of  the  International  Control  Commission  beyond 
its  1956  expiration  date.  ...  If  the  political  mechanism  for  reunifying  Vietnam 
in  1956  proved  impractical,  the  blame  lies  at  least  in  part  with  the  Geneva  con- 
ferees themselves,  who  postulated  an  ideal  political  settlement  incompatible  with 
the  physical  and  psychological  dismemberment  of  Vietnam  they  themselves  un- 
dertook in  July  1954"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:247).  This  comment  is  typical  of  many 
such  fatuous  conclusions  by  the  compilers.  They  might  at  least  have  added:  "The 
major  part  of  the  blame  however  lies  with  the  United  States  which  set  out  to 
wreck  the  Geneva  Agreements  from  the  start,  especially  any  provisions  which 
would  have  extended  'communist  control'  south  of  the  demarcation  line."  Diem 
was  a  US  creation,  fed,  financed  and  armed  by  the  United  States,  with  Americans 
controlling  every  key  aspect  of  policymaking  and  implementation. 

Repression  and  massacre  became  the  order  of  the  day.  Overcrowded  jails 
could  not  house  the  victims.  Presidential  Order  No.  6,  of  January  11,  1956,  pro- 
vided in  Article  1  that  "Awaiting  the  restoration  of  peace  and  order,  individuals 
considered  dangerous  to  national  defense  and  common  security  may,  on  execu- 
tive order  taken  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  as  proposed  by  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  be  confined  to  a  concentration  camp,  or  forced  to  reside,  or  deported 
far  from  their  dwelling  place  or  far  from  fixed  locations,  or  subjected  to  admin- 
istrative control  .  .  ."  with  appropriate  penalties  stipulated  for  those  who 
evaded  the  concentration  camps  and  controls. 

Conditions  in  the  jails  were  later  described  by  deputy  Tran  Ngoc  Ban  to  the 
South  Vietnamese  National  Assembly  on  January  3,  1958,  as  follows: 

Let  us  take  one  cell  among  so  many  others  at  the  Gia  Dinh  prison. 
Forty-five  feet  long  by  a  little  less  than  eleven  feet  wide.  In  this  area  are 
generally  packed  150  detainees.  Simple  arithmetic  shows  us  that  there  is 
room  for  three  persons  per  square  meter.  It  is  in  this  place  that  detainees 
sleep,  eat,  wash  themselves  and  ease  their  bowels.  A  bucket  with  a  lid  is 
put  in  a  corner  of  the  room  for  that  purpose.  It  suffices  that  each  of  the 
prisoners  uses  it  once  a  day  for  five  minutes  and  the  bucket  would  remain 
open  for  twelve  hours.  .  .  . 

As  for  possibilities  of  sitting  or  lying  down  .  .  .  squatting  they  have  just 
enough  room;  sitting  cross-legged  they  are  very  cramped.  At  night  they  can 


70      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

just  sleep  lying  with  their  knees  under  their  chin.  So  a  quarter  of  the  de- 
tainees have  to  stand  up  to  allow  the  others  to  stretch  out  for  a  moment. 
It  is  a  fraternal  gesture  but  also  a  necessity.  Because  of  the  sweltering 
heat  .  .  .  many  detainees  are  unable  to  bear  wearing  a  garment  and  remain 
half-naked.  They  must  live  day  and  night  in  this  room  and  only  go  out 
into  the  courtyard  once  a  day  for  a  meal,  which  is  taken  outside  even  in 
rainy  weather.  Medicines  hardly  exist.  .  .  ^ 

For  having  the  courage  to  reveal  this,  Tran  Ngoc  Ban,  M.P.,  was  arrested  and 
sent  to  join  the  inmates  whose  fate  he  had  described.  He  was  talking  of  those 
fortunate  enough  to  have  escaped  the  extermination  squads  that  were  hard  at 
work  physically  liquidating  what  were  in  fact  political  opponents  of  the  Diem 
regime. 

During  the  first  year  of  its  activities,  the  International  Control  Commission 
investigated  40  violations  of  Article  14C  in  the  South,  some  of  them  involving 
the  massacre  of  hundreds  of  people.  The  balance  of  that  first  year  of  "peace" 
in  the  South  was  16  violations  confirmed,  13  investigations  completed  but  find- 
ings not  published,  8  cases  under  investigation  and  3  cases  in  which  evidence 
was  insufficient  to  prove  violations.  There  were  no  violations  of  14C  in  the  North. 
Not  included  in  the  list  was  a  case  on  July  7,  1955,  in  which  a  battalion  of 
Diem's  security  forces  surrounded  the  tiny  hamlets  of  Tan  Lap  and  Tan  Hiep 
in  Quang  Ngai  province — a  guerrilla  area  in  the  resistance  struggle.  Every  man, 
woman  and  child  at  Tan  Lap  was  killed  and  all  the  males  at  Tan  Hiep  on  the 
evening  of  July  7.  Five  days  later  the  security  troops  returned  to  Tan  Hiep, 
arrested  15  women,  raped  them,  then  took  them  to  a  neighboring  hamlet  of 
An  Che  and  killed  them.  The  following  day  they  killed  the  remaining  three  adults 
and  15  children  at  Tan  Hiep.  Not  a  living  soul  was  left  in  these  two  hamlets — 
30  men,  30  women  and  32  children  had  been  massacred.  Detailed  reports  were 
made  to  the  ICC,  but  investigation  of  the  case  was  blocked  by  the  Diemist  au- 
thorities. 

By  early  1956,  Diem  had  almost  completely  paralyzed  the  work  of  the  ICC, 
as  the  following  report  shows:  "Mobile  Team  117  conducted  an  investigation 
asked  for  by  the  People's  Army  of  Vietnam,  Note  No.  141-CT/I/B,  dated 
March  2,  1956,  on  the  massacre  by  the  South  Vietnamese  authorities  of  21  per- 
sons buried  alive  at  the  marketplace  at  Cho  Duoc  and  reprisals  against  14  other 
persons  of  the  villages  of  An  Tra  and  Tan  Luu  (Quang  Nam  province)  but  the 
interested  party  refused  to  allow  the  Commission  to  have  a  mobile  Team  in- 
vestigate this  case."  ^ 

"Security  was  the  focus  of  US  aid,"  reports  the  Pentagon  Papers  dealing  with 
this  early  period.  "More  than  75  percent  of  the  economic  aid  the  US  provided 
in  the  same  period  went  into  the  GVN  military  budget;  thus  at  least  $8  out  of 
every  $10  of  aid  provided  Vietnam  went  directly  toward  security.  In  addition, 
other  amounts  of  nominally  economic  aid  (e.g.,  that  for  public  administration) 
went  toward  security  forces,  and  aid  for  agriculture  and  transportation  princi- 
pally funded  projects  with  strategic  purposes  and  with  an  explicit  military  ra- 
tionale. For  example,  a  20-mile  stretch  of  highway  from  Saigon  to  Bien  Hoa, 
built  at  Gen.  Williams'  instance  for  specifically  military  purposes,  received  more 
US  economic  aid  than  all  funds  provided  for  labor,  community  development, 
social  welfare,  health,  and  education  in  the  years  1954-1961"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:268). 
Would  US  taxpayers  be  proud  of  this  use  of  their  taxes? 

If  one  compares  the  reality  of  the  unilateral  war  against  the  people  of  South 
Vietnam  waged  against  an  unarmed  population  for  its  political  opposition  to  a 


The  Receiving  End  71 

fascist  regime  with  the  description  given  by  that  semiotficial  apologist  for  US 
Vietnam  policies,  Douglas  Pike,  then  one  has  some  measure  of  the  deceit  of 
public  opinion.  Pike  is  trying  to  make  the  point  that  the  NLF  was  entirely  a 
creation  of  Hanoi.  "Of  necessity  it  must  have  been  created  in  Hanoi  and  im- 
ported," the  Pentagon  Papers  credit  Pike  with  writing.  "A  revolutionary  organi- 
zation must  build;  it  begins  with  persons  suffering  genuine  grievances,  who  are 
slowly  organized  and  whose  militancy  gradually  increases  until  a  critical  mass 
is  reached  and  the  revolution  explodes.  Exactly  the  reverse  was  the  case  with 
the  NLF.  It  sprang  full-blown  into  existence  and  then  was  fleshed  out.  The 
grievances  were  developed  or  manufactured  almost  as  a  necessary  afterthought" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:346). 

Reality  was  that  from  1959  onwards,  especially  after  the  passing  of  Law  10/59, 
providing  for  death  or  life  imprisonment  for  a  wide  range  of  offenses  against  the 
government,  there  were  spontaneous,  sporadic  and  unorganized  acts  of  resistance 
by  those  who  "preferred  to  die  on  our  feet  rather  than  on  our  knees"  as  one  of 
them  expressed  it  to  me.  Later  these  acts  became  more  generalized  and  to  co- 
ordinate and  give  correct  leadership  the  NLF  was  formed  in  December  1960.  By 
the  time  the  NLF's  first  congress  was  held  (February  16  to  March  3,  1962),  and 
according  to  incomplete  figures  compiled  by  NLF  committees  at  provincial  and 
district  levels:  105,000  former  resistance  supporters  had  been  killed,  350,000  at 
that  moment  were  being  held  in  874  prisons  and  concentration  camps,  including 
over  6,000  children,  many  of  them  born  in  prison.  These  are  what  Pike  describes 
as  "grievances  manufactured  as  an  afterthought." 

If  I  have  dealt  at  length  and  in  detail  with  some  aspects  of  the  early  years 
after  the  Geneva  Agreements,  this  is  because  there  are  vast  gaps  in  the  Pentagon 
Papers'  account  of  the  period  which  have  to  be  sketched  in  to  understand  the 
monstrous  injustice  done  the  Vietnamese  people,  even  before  the  US  invasion 
with  combat  troops  in  1965  and  the  start  of  the  bombings  of  the  North.  They 
were  cheated  of  the  fruits  of  their  struggle  against  the  French,  essentially  be- 
cause of  US  intervention.  It  is  against  this  background  and  the  merciless,  bar- 
barous years  "of  the  long  knives,"  that  the  people  of  the  South  took  to  arms  to 
defend  man's  most  ancient  rights  to  defend  his  life  and  home.  Some  knowledge 
of  what  went  on  in  this  period  is  helpful,  incidentally,  in  understanding  why  the 
DRV-PRG  negotiators  in  Paris  are  tough,  and  determined  that  this  time  they 
really  get  what  they  fought  for — total  independence  on  terms  which  can  never 
again  be  violated. 

The  North  Vietnamese  date  the  next  phase  of  US  intervention — preparing  for 
and  waging  "special  war" — from  the  arrival  of  the  Staley  Mission  in  mid-June 
1961.  President  of  the  Stanford  Research  Institute,  economist  by  profession, 
Eugene  Staley  was  soon  dabbling  in  affairs  which  had  little  to  do  with  his  aca- 
demic qualifications.  His  approach  may  be  judged  from  the  following  passage 
quoted  in  the  Pentagon  Papers:  "Vietnam  is  today  under  attack  in  a  bitter,  total 
struggle  which  involves  its  survival  as  a  free  nation.  Its  enemy,  the  Viet  Cong, 
is  ruthless,  resourceful  and  elusive.  This  enemy  is  supplied,  reinforced,  and  cen- 
trally directed  by  the  international  communist  apparatus  operating  through  Hanoi. 
To  defeat  it  requires  the  mobiHzation  of  the  entire  economic,  military,  psycho- 
logical, and  social  resources  of  the  country  and  vigorous  support  from  the  United 
States  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  11:63).  (It  is  worth  noting  that  four  months  later  the 
NIE — National  Intelligence  Estimate — gave  the  total  number  of  guerrillas  as 
17,000,  of  whom  "80-90  percent  had  been  locally  recruited  and  .  .  .  little  evi- 
dence that  the  VC  relied  on  external  supplies.  .  .  ."  The  Diem  army  at  the  time 
was  170,000  with  another  80,000  paramilitary  units.  For  the  military  muscle  of 


72      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

the  "international  communist  apparatus"  17,000  guerrillas,  many  of  them  armed 
only  with  clubs,  hoes  and  bicycle  chains,  etc.,  at  the  time,  seems  modest  to  say  the 
least.  John  Kenneth  Galbraith,  visiting  the  South  a  month  after  the  NIE  report, 
believed  the  number  of  guerrillas  was  closer  to  10,000.)  Staley  recommended 
building  the  regular  Diem  army  up  to  200,000,  to  be  increased  later  to  270,000. 
The  Pentagon  Papers  dismiss  the  Staley  report  as  "not  much  more  than  a  piece  of 
paper"  and  say  the  President  agreed  with  its  three  basic  tenets:  (a)  Security 
requirements  must,  for  the  present,  be  given  first  priority;  (b)  military  opera- 
tions will  not  achieve  lasting  results  unless  economic  and  social  programs  are 
continued  and  accelerated;  (c)  it  is  our  joint  interest  to  accelerate  measures  to 
achieve  a  self-sustaining  economy  and  a  free  and  peaceful  society  in  Viet-Nam." 

Hanoi's  information  about  the  Staley  Mission  was  much  more  complete  and 
reflects  another  of  those  important  omissions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers.  On  Feb- 
ruary 28,  1962,  the  Foreign  Ministry  of  the  DRV  published  the  following  details: 

Three  phases  are  contemplated  in  the  Staley  Plan: 

First  Phase:  "Pacification"  of  South  Vietnam  within  18  months  and  "es- 
tablishment of  bases"  in  North  Vietnam. 

Second  Phase:  Economic  rehabilitation  and  reinforcement  of  the  South 
Vietnam  economy,  increase  of  sabotage  in  North  Vietnam. 

Third  Phase:  Development  of  the  South  Vietnam  economy,  and  offensive 
against  North  Vietnam. 

For  the  first  phase,  considered  an  extremely  important  one,  Staley  has  laid 
down  a  series  of  measures,  including: 

Increase  of  the  strength  of  the  South  Vietnam  regular  army  from  150,000 
to  170,000  men  by  the  end  of  1961. 

Increase  of  the  strength  of  the  civil  guard  from  68,000  to  100,000  men  and 
turning  it  into  regular  forces. 

Increase  of  the  strength  of  the  police  from  45,000  to  90,000  men. 

Reinforcing  the  "self-defense"  corps  in  the  villages  to  the  extent  required. 

Regroupment  of  villages  and  concentration  of  the  people  into  "prosperity 
zones"  and  "strategic  hamlets"  which  are  actually  camouflaged  concentra- 
tion camps;  establishment  of  a  no-man's  land  starting  from  the  provisional 
military  demarcation  line  and  running  along  the  frontier  between  South 
Vietnam  on  the  one  hand,  and  Laos  and  Cambodia  on  the  other,  setting  up 
of  100  new  "prosperity  zones"  in  the  delta  of  the  Mekong,  which  are  to  be 
imbricated  with  a  network  of  "strategic  hamlets"  fenced  in  by  bamboo 
hedges,  barbed  wire  and  control  posts,  for  the  purpose  of  concentrating 
nearly  1,000,000  peasants. 

Increase  of  the  aid  to  the  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  Administration  to  carry  out  the 
above-mentioned  plan.^^ 

Far  from  being  "not  much  more  than  a  piece  of  paper"  this  was  the  blueprint 
for  a  vast  military  campaign,  very  soon  to  be  run  by  the  United  States  itself,  to 
try  and  herd  the  whole  of  South  Vietnam's  peasantry  into  16,000  concentration 
camps  disguised  as  "strategic  hamlets."  I  published  details  of  the  Staley  Plan — 
and  the  stepped-up  dollar  allocations  to  finance  it — at  the  time  in  newspaper 
articles,  also  in  a  book,  with  the  comment  that  "no  peasants  in  the  world  had 


The  Receiving  End  73 


so  many  dollars  per  capita  lavished  on  their  extermination."  Also  that  "General 
Maxwell  Taylor  was  sent  from  October  10  to  25  (1961)  to  work  out  supple- 
mentary details  of  the  Staley  Plan  in  view  of  a  decision  taken  a  few  days  earlier 
by  the  National  Security  Council  on  direct  US  intervention.  .  .  ."  Staley's 
monstrous  "strategic  hamlet"  program  which  brought  the  whole  of  the  peasantry 
out  in  armed  revolt,  is  dismissed  as  "economic  and  social  programs"  in  the  Pen- 
tagon Papers  and  the  consequences  as  "grievances  .  .  .  manufactured  almost  as 
a  necessary  afterthought"  by  Pike. 

One  of  Maxwell  Taylor's  contributions  which,  if  Hanoi  knew  about  at  the 
time,  did  not  reveal,  was  to  start  direct  US  military  intervention  camouflaged  as 
a  "humanitarian"  Task  Force  of  6,000  to  8,000  men  for  "flood  relief."  In  an 
"eyes  only  for  the  President"  cable  from  the  Philippines  (presumably  on  October 
25)  Taylor  reports  that  "the  interim  Communist  goal — en  route  to  total  take- 
over— appears  to  be  a  neutral  Southeast  Asia,  detached  from  US  protection. 
This  strategy  is  well  on  the  way  to  success  in  Vietnam.  .  .  ."  To  counter  this 
"dangerous  and  immoral"  possibility  (to  quote  from  John  Foster  Dulles'  charac- 
terization of  neutrality),  Taylor  recommended  as  his  first  point  that  "upon  re- 
quest from  the  Government  of  Vietnam  to  come  to  its  aid  in  resisting  the  in- 
creasing aggressions  of  the  Viet-Cong  and  in  repairing  the  ravages  of  the  Delta 
flood  which,  in  combination,  threaten  the  lives  of  its  citizens  and  the  security  of 
the  country,  the  US  Government  offer  to  join  the  GV  in  a  massive  joint  effort 
as  part  of  a  total  mobilization  of  GVN  resources  to  cope  with  both  the  Viet- 
Cong  (VC)  and  the  ravages  of  the  flood.  ...  In  support  of  the  foregoing  broad 
commitment  .  .  .  the  US  Government  will  engage  in  a  joint  survey  of  the  con- 
ditions in  the  provinces  to  assess  the  social,  political,  intelligence  and  military 
factors  bearing  on  the  prosecution  of  the  counterinsurgency  .  .  ."  etc.,  etc. 
Taylor  outlines  a  most  comprehensive  plan  for  stepped-up  intelligence  and  actual 
military  operations  over  the  whole  of  South  Vietnam,  always  under  the  guise  of 
"flood  relief."  In  a  second  "eyes  only  for  the  President"  cable  apparently  sent 
the  same  day,  Taylor  emphasizes  the  necessity  for  speed — otherwise  "the  pos- 
sibility of  emphasizing  the  humanitarian  mission  will  wane.  .  .  ."  With  the 
Taylor  mission  was  William  Jorden  of  the  State  Department,!^  who  summed  up 
his  impression  of  the  underlying  reasons  for  the  situation:  "Intrigue,  nepotism 
and  even  corruption  might  be  accepted,  for  a  time,  if  combined  with  efficiency 
and  visible  progress.  When  they  accompany  administrative  paralysis  and  steady 
deterioration,  they  become  intolerable.  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  11:95.) 

President  Kennedy  did  not  accept  the  "Flood  Task  Force"  idea  but  did  opt 
to  send  in  US  military  personnel  by  the  end  of  1961.  Decisive  probably  in  the 
decision,  if  not  the  manner  of  intervention,  was  a  memo  by  Defense  Secretary 
McNamara  of  November  8,  supporting  Taylor's  recommendations.  There  is  a 
fascinating  estimation  of  McNamara's  that  "Hanoi  and  Peiping  may  intervene 
openly  .  .  ."  but  even  so  "the  maximum  US  forces  required  on  the  ground  in 
Southeast  Asia  will  not  exceed  six  divisions  or  about  205,000  men  .  .  ."  (Gravel 
ed.,  11:108).  (In  his  jungle  headquarters  some  years  later,  discussing  the  possi- 
bility of  the  commitment  of  US  ground  forces,  the  NLF  president  Nguyen  Huu 
Tho  told  me  that  he  estimated  that  if  the  United  States  decided  to  intervene, 
they  would  probably  put  in  around  500,000  troops.  This  was  at  the  Lunar  New 
Year  1964,  but  the  NLF  president  did  not  have  the  benefit  of  McNamara's  com- 
puters!) However  it  proves  that  the  Pentagon  and  White  House  were  well  aware 
in  early  November  1961  that  they  had  embarked  on  the  step-by-step  course  of 
full-scale  warfare  in  South  Vietnam. 

In  order  to  justify  the  despatch  of  the  first  troops,  Jorden  was  given  the  task 


74      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

of  rushing  out  a  "white  paper"  to  prove  that  the  whole  problem  in  the  South 
was  "aggression  and  subversion"  from  the  North.  There  is  a  Rusk-McNamara 
recommendation  to  the  President,  dated  November  11,  point  five  of  which  pro- 
poses that  as  the  US  military  personnel  to  be  sent  would  be  a  violation  of  the 
Geneva  Agreements,  the  government  "publish  the  'Jorden  report'  as  a  US  'white 
paper,'  transmitting  it  as  simultaneously  as  possible  to  the  governments  of  all 
countries  with  which  we  have  diplomatic  relations,  including  the  Communist 
states  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  11:115).  This  was  done.  When  it  came  out — as  a 
"Blue  Book" — Robert  Kennedy,  then  Attorney  General,  is  reported  to  have 
called  Jorden  in  and  said,  "Bill — there  is  not  a  single  fact  in  that  report  that 
would  stand  up  in  a  court  of  law." 

Confirmation  that  Hanoi's  information  on  the  Staley  Plan  was  correct  was 
soon  to  come  in  operational  terms  and  as  regards  the  Third  Phase  of  an  offen- 
sive against  the  North,  there  is  a  passage  in  Maxwell  Taylor's  full  report  of 
November  3,  in  which — waxing  more  and  more  enthusiastic  as  he  moves  from 
"flood  control"  to  broader  prospects — he  writes:  "It  is  clear  to  me  that  the  time 
may  come  in  our  relations  to  Southeast  Asia  when  we  must  declare  our  intention 
to  attack  the  source  of  guerrilla  aggression  in  North  Vietnam  and  impose  on  the 
Hanoi  Government  a  price  for  participating  in  the  current  war  which  is  com- 
mensurate with  the  damage  being  inflicted  on  its  neighbors  to  the  South  .  .  ." 
(Gravel  ed.,  11:98). 

It  is  generally  considered  that  US  intervention  started  on  December  11,  1961, 
when  two  helicopter  companies  of  36  Shawnee  helicopters  and  370  officers  and 
men  of  the  US  army  together  with  7  T-28  trainer-combat  planes  were  landed 
in  Saigon.  But  Hanoi  reported  that  a  squadron  of  "B-26"  bombers  "and  several 
hundred  US  officers,  NCOs  and  troops  arrived  at  the  Bien  Hoa  air  base  on 
November  10,  1961. 

While  the  State  Department  was  trying  to  peddle  the  myth  of  North  Vietnam's 
"aggression  and  subversion"  against  the  South  to  cover  up  the  start  of  its  own 
war  of  aggression  against  the  whole  Vietnamese  people,  there  was  very  real 
"aggression  and  subversion"  being  carried  out  by  CIA-directed  operations  against 
the  North.  "On  July  24,  1961,  General  Arthur  D.  Trudeau,  Chief  of  Research 
and  Development  of  the  US  armed  forces,  a  specialist  in  'activities  of  subversion 
and  sabotage'  in  the  socialist  countries,  author  of  a  plan  for  sabotage  and  sub- 
version in  Eastern  Europe  and  North  Vietnam,'  came  in  person  to  South  Viet- 
nam," 1^  reports  a  document  published  by  the  Press  and  Information  Depart- 
ment of  the  DRV's  foreign  ministry,  in  1964.  "Since  then,"  continues  this  docu- 
ment, "under  the  guidance  of  the  CIA,  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States 
and  its  agents,  starting  from  South  Vietnam  and  sometimes  from  US  bases  in 
the  Pacific,  have  made  frequent  intrusions  into  the  air  space  and  territorial  wa- 
ters of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam. Spy  commandos,  direcdy  organ- 
ized, trained  and  equipped  by  US  specialists,  have  been  repeatedly  smuggled  in 
groups  into  North  Vietnam  by  land,  by  sea  and  by  air  for  the  purposes  of 
espionage,  provocation  and  sabotage. 

"They  are  usually  South  Vietnam  Army  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
born  in  North  Vietnam,  or  youths  who  had  been  forcibly  evacuated  from  North 
to  South  Vietnam  by  the  French  Union  Forces.  They  are  well  acquainted  with 
various  regions  in  North  Vietnam,  where  some  of  them  also  have  relatives.  They 
had  been  enlisted  by  the  US  intelligence  agencies  and  their  men  into  'Special 
Force'  units  under  Colonel  Lam  Son,  who  had  replaced  Colonel  Le  Quang 
Tung.i^  They  underwent  training  in  the  centers  of  Nha  Trang,  Tourane  (Da- 


The  Receiving  End  75 

nang)  or  Saigon,  and  in  some  cases  in  Taiwan,  Guam  or  Okinawa.  They  were 
initiated  into  the  secret  of  the  job  by  US  mihtary  and  inteUigence  experts. 

"They  were  subsequently  sent  to  North  Vietnam  with  instructions  to  engage, 
depending  on  the  cases,  in  various  activities:  collection  of  intelligence  data — 
military,  political,  economic  and  otherwise,  psychological  warfare:  distribution 
of  leaflets,  dissemination  of  false  and  tendentious  news,  kidnapping  or  assassina- 
tion of  officials,  army  men  and  civilians  with  a  view  to  extorting  intelligence 
data  or  creating  an  atmosphere  of  insecurity,  sabotage  of  defense  installations, 
warehouses,  factories  and  workshops,  mines,  bridges,  roads,  railways  and  setting 
up  of  local  spy-rings  or  hotbeds  of  armed  activities  particularly  in  remote  hilly 
areas,  with  the  specific  aim  of  eventually  starting  'guerrilla'  operations  in  North 
Vietnam. 

'To  achieve  the  above  objectives,  the  United  States  and  the  South  Vietnam 
Administration  have  undertaken  large-scale  smuggling  of  spy-commandos  into 
North  Vietnam,  heedless  of  their  agents'  fate,  the  successful  outcome  of  only 
one  operation  out  of  a  hundred  being  already,  in  their  eyes,  a  success. 

"But,  in  the  face  of  the  vigilance  and  the  patriotism  being  displayed  by  the 
people  of  North  Vietnam,  they  will  reap  only  bitter  setbacks.  The  US  news 
agency  UPI  itself  was  compelled  to  admit  openly  on  February  22,  1964,  that 
'about  85  to  90  percent  (of  course  these  figures  are  below  the  actual  ones — Ed.) 
of  the  South  Vietnamese  guerrilla  specialists  airdropped  or  otherwise  smuggled 
into  North  Vietnam  were  either  killed  or  captured.'  .  .  .^^ 

"In  spite  of  many  serious  defeats  in  South  Vietnam  and  the  shameful  failure 
of  their  provocation  and  sabotage  vis-a-vis  the  DRV,  the  United  States  and  the 
South  Vietnam  administration  are  still  contemplating  'major  sabotage  raids 
which  would  have  a  quick  and  serious  effect'  .  .  ." 

The  booklet  then  lists  62  cases  of  air  violations,  usually  associated  with  the 
dropping  of  commandos  or  attempts  to  establish  air-ground  liaison  with  those 
already  dropped  and  22  naval  operations  for  the  same  purpose. 

Such  groups  were  almost  always  rounded  up  within  hours  of  being  dropped 
or  landed.  The  Foreign  Ministry  documents  cite  many  specific  cases.  For  ex- 
ample: 

At  about  1  A.M.  on  April  13,  1963,  an  aircraft  coming  from  South  Viet- 
nam intruded  into  the  airspace  of  North  Vietnam  and  dropped  a  group  of 
spy-commandos  on  a  hilly  area  northwest  of  Kien  Thanh  commune  at  the 
limits  of  Ha  Bac  and  Lang  Son  provinces.  Immediately  after  the  landing 
and  before  they  had  time  to  come  into  contact  with  one  another  and  to  hide 
their  equipment  underground,  the  spy-commandos  were  rounded  up  by  the 
local  security  forces,  militia  and  people.  In  their  stampede,  they  left  behind 
three  cases  of  weapons,  signal  equipment,  instruments  for  sabotage,  food  ra- 
tions and  medicines,  six  spare  parachutes,  six  plastic  hats  and  parachutists' 
cotton-padded  attire.  Continuing  their  pursuit,  the  local  people  and  armed 
forces  successively  arrested  five  spy-commandos  and  shot  dead  a  sixth  one 
who  had  tried  to  oppose  resistance,  and  who  .  .  .  was  subsequently  identi- 
fied as  Luong  Van  Pho,  sabotage  agent.  .  .  . 

They  have  been  sent  to  North  Vietnam  with  the  following  task: 

— to  sabotage  defense  installations,  economic  establishments,  warehouses, 

bridges  and  means  of  transport  and  communication; 
— to  collect  intelligence  information; 


76      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

— to  kidnap  and  assassinate  officials,  armymen  and  simple  civilians; 
— to  establish  spy-rings,  to  corrupt  and  sow  dissension  among  the  various 
nationalities  in  the  area. 

The  ringleader  was  sentenced  to  death  in  a  public  trial  on  July  10,  1963,  in 
Lang  Son,  the  others  to  from  10  years  to  life  imprisonment.  Typical  of  the  state- 
ments was  that  of  Than  Van  Kinh,  head  of  the  group  and  sentenced  to  life  im- 
prisonment. Apart  from  the  technical  details  of  the  mission,  he  testified  that  he 
and  the  others  "had  been  trained  by  US  advisers  in  intelligence  work,  the  use 
of  mines  and  explosives  for  sabotage  purposes,  parachute-jumping,  the  kidnap- 
ping of  officials,  etc.  Before  leaving  for  North  Vietnam,  we  were  briefed  by  two 
US  advisers  and  Captain  Anh,  who  assigned  to  us  the  following  task:  to  sabotage 
the  railways  and  National  Road  No.  1,  railway  stations,  bridges  and  sluices, 
water  tanks  and  locomotives,  etc.  .  .  ." 

Four  months  before  the  Taylor  mission  and  Jorden's  fable,  an  American  plane 
had  dropped  a  group  of  spy  commandos  in  Quang  Binh  province — just  north  of 
the  17th  parallel — and  a  month  later — just  after  midnight  on  July  2,  1961,  a 
C47  was  shot  down  in  Kim  Son  district,  Ninh  Binh  province  and  all  members 
of  a  group  of  10  commandos  were  captured.  (One  had  bailed  out  and  landed 
on  the  roof  of  the  home  of  the  secretary  of  the  local  branch  of  the  Communist 
[Lao  Dong]  party!) 

These  activities  are  not  revealed  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  although  they  con- 
stitute "acts  of  war"  under  internationally  accepted  definitions  of  the  term. 

In  a  chronology  of  events  (Gravel  ed.,  IIL  1 17),  there  is  reference  to  a  NSAM 
52  (National  Security  Action  Memorandum)  of  May  11,  1963,  authorizing 
"CIA-sponsored  covert  operations  against  NVN,"  and  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff,  on  September  3,  1963,  having  "approved  this  program  for  non-attributable 
'hit-and-run'  operations  against  NVN,  supported  by  US  military  advisory  material 
and  training  assistance."  Again  on  November  23  of  the  same  year  there  is  a 
NSAM  273,  authorizing  "planning  for  specific  covert  operations,  graduated  in 
intensity,  against  the  DRV." 

There  is  also  a  rather  wistful  admission  of  failure,  in  a  conversation  between 
Secretary  McNamara,  Maxwell  Taylor  and  General  Nguyen  Khanh,  then  in  power 
in  Saigon,  in  May  1964.  Khanh  was  pushing  for  "attacks  on  the  North."  Taylor 
"asked  how  best  to  attack  the  North.  It  had  been  noted  that  small-scale  operations 
had  had  no  success  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  111:72) . 

I  find  no  reference  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  to  anyone  posing  the  question  as  to 
why  it  was  the  ill-armed  "Vietcong"  guerrillas  were  able  to  flourish  in  the  South, 
protected  by  the  local  population,  while  the  life  or  liberty  of  superbly  equipped 
agents  dropped  into  the  North  could  usually  be  counted  in  hours! 

Finally  the  Pentagon  Papers  version  of  the  Tonkin  Gulf  "incident"  (which 
provided  President  Johnson  with  his  blank  check  to  bomb  the  North  and  invade 
the  South)  has  to  be  compared  with  the  North  Vietnamese  version.  In  the  section 
"Military  Pressures  Against  North  Vietnam,  February  1964-January  1965" 
(Gravel  ed..  Ill:  106-109)  there  is  reference  to  "pressure  planning"  and  to 
plans  for  mounting  "overt  coercive  pressures  against  the  North."  US  ambassador 
in  Saigon,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  and  Johnson's  national  security  adviser  Walt 
Rostow  are  quoted  as  urging  "increased  military  measures"  and  it  is  revealed 
that  "during  the  third  quarter  of  1964,  a  consensus  developed  within  the  Johnson 
Administration  that  some  form  of  continual  overt  pressures  mounting  in  severity 
against  North  Vietnam  would  soon  be  required.  .  .  . 


The  Receiving  End  11 

"Although  it  did  not  take  the  form  of  decision,  it  was  agreed  that  the  US 
should  at  an  unspecified  date  in  the  future  begin  an  incremental  series  of  grad- 
ually mounting  strikes  against  North  Vietnam.  The  only  real  questions  were 
precisely  what  actions  should  be  taken  and  when?  .  .  . 

"The  key  events  in  this  period  were  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents  of  August  2nd 
and  4th  and  the  US  reprisal  on  North  Vietnam  PT  boats  and  bases  on  August 
5th.  The  explanation  for  the  DRV  attack  on  US  ships  remains  puzzling.  .  .  . 
The  US  reprisal  represented  the  carrying  out  of  recommendations  made  to  the 
President  by  his  principal  advisers  earlier  that  summer  and  subsequently  placed 
on  the  shelf.  .  .  ."  The  report  then  goes  on  to  describe  how  President  Johnson 
used  the  incidents  to  have  his  blank-check  resolution  passed  almost  unanimously 
on  August  7,  1964. 

Although  this  report  is  rather  coy  as  to  the  actual  background  to  the  Tonkin 
Bay  "incident,"  it  is  less  so  as  to  the  Pentagon  frame  of  mind  afterwards.  It 
would  have  been  more  realistic  had  McNamara's  researchers  related  this  frame 
of  mind  to  the  "incident"  itself.  The  "limited  and  fitting  response"  to  use  Presi- 
dent Johnson's  description  of  the  bombing  of  North  Vietnam's  northern  coastal 
areas  on  August  5,  1964,  brought  the  "pressures-against-the-North  thinking 
to  a  head  in  the  strategy  meetings  of  the  principals  on  September  7th,"  accord- 
ing to  the  Pentagon  Papers'  version.  "One  program  proposal  came  from  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  It  was  a  repeat  of  the  94-target  list  program  which  the 
JCS  had  recommended  on  August  26th.  The  JCS  called  for  deliberate  attempts 
to  provoke  the  DRV  into  taking  acts  which  could  then  be  answered  by  a  sys- 
tematic US  air  campaign  (My  italics.  W.B.).  The  JCS  argued  that  such  actions 
were  now  'essential  to  preventing  complete  collapse  of  the  US  position  in  the 
RVN  and  SEA,'  because  'continuation  of  present  or  foreseeable  programs  lim- 
ited to  the  RVN  will  not  produce  the  desired  result.'  The  Chiefs  were  supported 
by  ISA^^  in  their  provocation  approach"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:110). 

The  DRV  version  of  the  "Gulf  of  Tonkin  incident"  makes  it  quite  clear  that 
the  "provocation  approach"  was  the  cause  and  not  a  result,  of  the  incident. 

A  rough  timetable  of  the  background  to  the  "Tonkin  Gulf  incident"  is  as 
follows: 

2  Mar  1964  The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  outline  their  proposal  for  punitive 
action  to  halt  Northern  support  for  the  VC  insurgency.  Bombing  is  spe- 
cifically called  for.  [It  is  worth  noting  that  the  proposal  to  bomb  the  North 
was  linked  to  the  failure  of  the  Saigon  regime  to  implement  US  policies  in 
the  South  and  the  resistance  of  the  peasants  to  the  "Strategic  Hamlet" 
program.  It  had  the  logic  of  the  sort  of  blind  reprisals  against  hostages  that 
the  Nazis  used  in  occupied  Europe  every  time  one  of  their  gauleiters  or 
lesser  stars  was  assassinated.  There  was  a  parallel  in  late  December  1971, 
when  President  Nixon  ordered  a  series  of  massive  air  attacks  against  the 
DRV  because  of  successes  of  the  resistance  forces  in  Laos  and  Cambodia!] 

14  Mar  1964  The  JCS  .  .  .  reiterate  their  views  of  2  March  that  a  pro- 
gram of  actions  against  the  North  is  required  to  effectively  strike  at  the 
sources  of  the  insurgency. 

17  Mar  The  JCS  are  authorized  to  begin  planning  studies  for  striking  at  the 
sources  of  insurgency  in  the  DRV. 

4  Apr  In  a  letter  to  [Ambassador]  Lodge,  Bundyi^  asks  him  to  comment  on 
a  scenario  for  mobilizing  domestic  US  political  support  for  action  against 
the  DRV. 


78      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

17-20  Apr  Secretary  of  State  Rusk  and  party  visit  Saigon.  ...  At  the 
April  19  meeting  with  the  Country  Team,  much  of  the  discussion  is  devoted 
to  the  problem  of  pressures  against  the  North. 

15  Jun  W.  P.  Bundy  memo  to  SecState  and  SecDef.  .  .  .  One  of  the  im- 
portant themes  is  that  an  act  of  irreversible  US  commitment  might  provide 
the  necessary  psychological  support  to  get  real  reform  and  effectiveness 
from  the  GVN.  (Again  the  theme  that  the  North  is  considered  hostage  for 
reprisals  in  order  to  get  a  more  stable  government  in  the  South.  W.B.) 

19  Jul  In  a  public  speech,  Khanh  [General  Nguyen  Khanh,  the  US  "strong 
man"  at  the  top  in  Saigon  at  that  time.  W.B.]  refers  to  the  "March  to  the 
North."  In  a  separate  statement  to  the  press,  General  [Nguyen  Cao]  Ky  also 
refers  to  the  "march  North"  [In  more  detailed  references  to  these  and  sub- 
sequent such  statements  it  transpires  that  the  "March  to  the  North"  means 
US  "reprisal  bombings."  W.B.]. 

2  Aug  The  destroyer  USS  Maddox  is  attacked  in  the  Tonkin  Gulf  by  DRV 
patrol  craft  while  on  a  DE  SOTO  patrol  off  the  DRV  coast.  Several  patrol 
boats  sunk.2o 

4  Aug  In  a  repetition  of  the  2  August  incident,  the  Maddox  and  the 
C.  Turner  Joy  are  attacked.  After  strenuous  efforts  to  confirm  the  attacks, 
the  President  authorizes  reprisal  air  strikes  against  the  North. 

5  Aug  US  aircraft  attack  several  DRV  patrol  boat  bases,  destroying  ships 
and  facilities. 

7  Aug  At  the  time  of  the  attacks,  the  President  briefed  leaders  of  Congress 
and  had  a  resolution  of  support  for  US  policy  introduced.  It  is  passed  with 
near-unanimity  by  both  Houses. 

11  Aug  The  President  signs  the  Tonkin  Gulf  Resolution  and  pledges  full 
support  for  the  GVN. 

18  Sep  The  first  resumed  DE  SOTO  patrol  comes  under  apparent  attack. 
To  avoid  future  incidents,  the  President  suspends  the  patrols.  [With  the 
blank  check  already  in  his  pocket,  Johnson  no  longer  needed  the  provoca- 
tions of  the  DE  SOTO  patrols.  W.B.] 

The  DRV  claims  that  a  series  of  provocations  started  on  July  30  at  11:40  p.m. 
when  US  and  South  Vietnamese  warships  shelled  the  North  Vietnamese  islands 
of  Hon  Ngu  and  Hon  Me,  four  and  twelve  kilometers  respectively  off  the  coast 
of  Thanh  Hoa  province.  From  July  31  to  August  2,  the  destroyer  Maddox 
"operated  very  near  the  Vietnamese  coast  in  Quang  Binh,  Ha  Tinh,  Nghe  An  and 
Thanh  Hoa  provinces."  21 

"On  August  1,  at  11:45  a.m.,  four  T-28s  coming  from  the  direction  of  Laos 
bombed  and  strafed  the  Nam  Can  frontier  post — 7  kilometers  from  the  Vietnam- 
Laos  border — which  was  visibly  flying  the  flag  of  the  DRV  and  also  Noong  De 
village,  about  20  kms  from  the  same  border.  Both  places  are  situated  far  inside 
Vietnamese  territory  and  belong  to  Ky  Son  district,  Nghe  An  province.  .  .  ." 
The  raid  against  Nam  Can  was  repeated  the  following  day  with  7  T-28s  and 
AD-6s,  also  coming  from  the  direction  of  Laos,  according  to  the  foreign  ministry 
report,  which  continues: 

"On  August  2,  at  3  p.m.  [local  time],  while  in  Vietnamese  waters  between 
Hon  Me  and  Lach  Truong  [Thanh  Hoa]  the  Maddox,  encountering  patrol  boats 


The  Receiving  End  79 

of  the  DRV,  opened  fire  at  them.  Confronted  with  such  brazen  provocation,  the 
Vietnamese  boats  had  to  take  defensive  action  to  safeguard  national  sovereignty 
and  territorial  v^aters,  protect  the  fishermen,  and  finally  drove  the  intruder  out 
of  Vietnamese  waters. 

"On  August  3,  at  11  p.m.  [local  time],  under  the  cover  of  the  Ticonderoga 
task  group  stationed  in  the  offing,  four  warships — two  small  and  two  big — in- 
truded into  Vietnamese  waters,  and  opened  fire  with  40  mm  guns  and  12.7  mm 
machine  guns  at  Ron  and  Deo  Ngang  areas  [Quang  Binh  province  on  the  North 
Vietnamese  mainland.  W.B.]. 

"On  August  5,  1964,  from  12:30  to  5  p.m.  (local  time),  Skyhawk,  Crusader 
and  Phantom  jets  and  Skyraider  aircraft  taking  off  from  the  carriers  Constella- 
tion and  Ticonderoga  anchored  in  the  Gulf  of  Bac  Bo  (Tonkin  Gulf)  came  in 
many  waves  to  bomb  and  rocket  a  number  of  places  along  the  North  Vietnamese 
coast,  the  vicinity  of  Hong  Gai  town,  Lach  Truong,  the  vicinity  of  Ben  Thuy — 
Vinh,  the  mouth  of  the  Gianh  River.  .  .  ."  The  events  between  July  30  and 
August  2  were  also  described  in  a  statement  issued  by  a  spokesman  for  the 
High  Command  of  the  Vietnam  People's  Army,  on  August  4. 

The  DRV  Memorandum  denied  as  a  "farce"  the  charge  that  it  attacked  US 
destroyers  on  the  night  of  August  4,  describing  the  charge  as  "an  out-and-out 
fabrication,"  and  makes  the  following  points: 

President  Johnson  said  that  following  the  August  2,  1964,  "attack"  in  the 
Gulf  of  Bac  Bo,  he  ordered  the  destroyer  Turner  Joy — then  in  the  Philip- 
pines— to  join  the  Maddox.  In  fact  at  7:30  p.m.  on  August  2,  the  Turner 
Joy  was  already  in  the  Gulf  of  Bac  Bo,  east  of  Deo  Ngang.  In  other  words, 
it  must  have  received  the  relevant  instructions  prior  to  "the  first  attack"  on 
the  Maddox, 

President  Johnson  also  said  that  following  the  "second  attack,"  in  the  night 
of  August  4,  1964,  he  ordered  the  aircraft  carrier  Constellation  to  sail  to 
the  Gulf  of  Bac  Bo  as  reinforcement  to  the  US  Navy  there.  Actually  the 
Constellation  left  Hong  Kong  in  the  morning  of  August  4,  1964.  This  was 
confirmed  by  its  commander,  Captain  Frederic  A.  Bardshar,  at  his  August 
10,  1964  press  conference. 22  in  the  evening  of  August  4,  1964,  i.e.,  prior 
to  the  "second  attack,"  the  carrier  was  already  in  the  Gulf  of  Bac  Bo. 

Judging  by  President  Johnson's  assertions,  it  would  appear  that  the  de- 
stroyer Maddox  was  the  only  US  warship  in  the  Gulf  of  Bac  Bo  in  the 
evening  of  August  2,  As  a  matter  of  fact,  four  destroyers  were  operating 
at  that  time  along  the  North  Vietnamese  coast,  namely  the  Maddox,  the 
Turner  Joy,  the  Samuel  Moore  and  the  Berkeley. 

In  the  evening  of  August  4  and  prior  to  the  "second  attack,"  11  US  war- 
ships belonging  to  the  7th  Fleet  were  already  on  the  spot.  Ticonderoga 
task  group  with  the  aircraft-carrier  Ticonderoga,  destroyers  Samuel  Moore, 
Edison,  Harry  Hubbard  and  Berkeley,  Constellation  task  group  with  the 
aircraft-carrier  Constellation,  destroyers  Preston  and  Fechteler,  and  the 
USS  Gridley;  and  finally  the  two  destroyers  Maddox  and  Turner  Joy. 

According  to  President  Johnson's  August  4,  1964,  statement,  the  air  strike 
against  North  Vietnam  was  decided  following  the  "second  attack"  on  US 
warships  in  the  Gulf  of  Bac  Bo. 

"But,  according  to  the  Reuter  correspondent  who  attended  the  August  10, 
1964,  press  conference  aboard  a  ship  of  the  7th  Fleet,  the  pilot  of  an  A-4 


80      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

jet  based  on  the  carrier  Constellation — whose  name  was  not  given — said 
that  the  pilots  were  informed  of  the  attack  against  North  Vietnam  back 
in  the  morning  of  August  4,  that  is  in  the  evening  of  August  3  (Washing- 
ton time).  .  .  . 

The  August  5,  1964,  air  raid  was  not  an  isolated  action:  on  the  contrary, 
it  came  in  the  wake  of  a  series  of  other  US  war  acts  against  the  DRV.  .  .  ." 

The  Memorandum  then  quotes  a  DRV  government  declaration  of  August 
6,  1964,  that:  "The  air  strafing  and  bombing  of  August  5,  1964,  are  obvi- 
ously a  premeditated  act  of  war  within  the  US  Government's  plan  for  in- 
tensified provocation  and  sabotage  against  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Vietnam  ...  an  extremely  serious  act  of  war  .  .  .  which  constitutes  a 
blatant  violation  of  international  law  and  the  1954  Geneva  Agreements  on 
Indo-China,  and  adds  to  the  danger  of  extended  war  in  Indo-China  and 
South-East  Asia." 

All  that  has  happened  since,  including  the  revelations  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 
— inadequate  as  they  are  in  many  instances — confirm  how  completely  accurate 
was  this  immediate  evaluation  of  the  "Tonkin  incident"  by  the  government  of 
the  DRV. 

From  the  August  5  air  attacks  to  operations  "Flaming  Dart" — a  so-called 
"reprisal  raid"  on  Febuary  8,  1965,  for  a  guerrilla  attack  on  a  US  helicopter 
base  as  Pleiku,  and  "Rolling  Thunder" — the  code  name  for  the  systematic 
bombing  of  North  Vietnam,  starting  March  2,  1965,  was  but  a  short  step  once 
Congress  had  given  Johnson  power  to  do  what  he  liked  in  Southeast  Asia.  That 
by  this  time  he  was  looking  for  pretexts  to  put  into  effect  decisions  taken  months 
earlier,  is  documented  in  a  Chronology  (Gravel  ed.,  III:275ff.)  which  reveals 
that  it  was  decided  on  January  28,  to  resume  the  provocative  DE  SOTO  patrols 
"on  or  about  3  February"  and  that  on  January  29,  the  "Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
urged  again  that  a  strong  reprisal  action  be  taken  immediately  after  the  next 
DRV/VC  provocation.  In  particular,  they  propose  targets  and  readiness  to  strike 
should  the  forthcoming  resumption  of  the  DE  SOTO  patrols  be  challenged." 

The  DE  SOTO  patrols  were,  in  fact,  called  off  temporarily  because  Soviet 
premier  Kosygin  was  due  to  arrive  within  a  few  days  in  Hanoi.  A  routine 
guerrilla  attack  on  a  US  base,  however,  was  used  as  the  pretext  to  set  "Flaming 
Dart"  into  operation,  and  five  days  later  Johnson  approved  "Rolling  Thunder." 
Within  six  days  of  the  start  of  "Rolling  Thunder"  the  first  marines  started  dis- 
embarking at  Danang  and  the  United  States  was  fully  committed  to  a  war  of 
destruction  against  the  DRV  and  a  war  of  aggression  against  the  Vietnamese 
people  as  a  whole. 


Notes 

1.  Although  my  task  was  to  compare  certain  elements  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  with 
Vietnamese  "communist  historical  sources  dealing  with  the  same  period,"  I  have  drawn 
on  my  own  on-the-spot  experiences  for  certain  aspects  which  were  not  covered  at  the 
time,  for  reasons  of  security,  by  North  Vietnamese  official  documents.  This  applies  es- 
pecially for  such  matters  as  the  Lansdale  sabotage  efforts  in  the  period  immediately 
after  the  Geneva  Agreements.  W.B. 

2.  The  above  and  following  passages  represent  the  first  reaction  from  Hanoi  to  the 
publication  of  the  Pentagon  Papers.  They  are  from  the  Introduction  to  "Les  Vrais  et  les 


The  Receiving  End  81 

Faux  Secrets  du  Pentagone"  (True  and  False  Pentagon  Secrets)  published  in  booklet 
form  by  Le  Court  ier  d  Vietnam,  Hanoi,  1971. 

3.  Crisis  Now  by  James  M.  Gavin,  in  collaboration  with  Arthur  T.  Hadley  Vintage 
Books,  May  1968,  pp.  46-49. 

4.  "Binh"  and  "Hao"  are  the  code  names  given  by  Lansdale  in  his  report  for  the  es- 
pionage-sabotage groups  sent  into  the  North. 

5.  L'Agonie  de  I'Indochine  by  General  Henri  Navarre,  Librairie  Plon,  Paris,  1956. 

6.  "North  of  the  17th  Parallel,"  Hanoi,  Septtmber  1955. 

7.  "Official  Gazette"  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam,  No.  5,  January  28,  1956. 

8.  Quoted  by  the  author  in  This  Furtive  War,  p.  48.  International  Publishers,  New 
York,  1963. 

9.  ICC  Note  No.  IC/FB/3/2/18,  Jan.  7,  1958. 

10.  Memorandum  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Vietnam,  February  1962. 

11.  The  Furtive  War,  p.  67,  International  Publishers,  New  York,  1963. 

12.  William  Jorden,  formerly  of  AP  and  the  New  York  Times,  turned  up  as  Harri- 
man's  spokesman  at  the  Paris  Peace  talks  in  May,  1968. 

13.  The  Wall  Street  Journal,  on  May  24,  1961,  reported  that  General  Trudeau  had 
worked  out  a  plan  for  "sabotage  and  subversion  of  Eastern  Europe  and  North  Vietnam," 
which  is  the  source  quoted  by  the  DRV  document. 

14.  A  list  of  such  incidents  during  1961-1962,  was  published  by  the  DRV  in  July 
1963,  but  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the  author  at  the  time  of  writing. 

15.  Former  head  of  South  Vietnam's  "Special  Forces."  He  was  executed  at  the  time 
of  the  coup  against  Diem. 

16.  Quoted  from  the  same  UPI  despatch  of  Febmary  22,  1964. 

17.  ISA:  Office  of  International  Security  Affairs,  Defense  Department. 

18.  William  P.  Bundy,  then  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Asian  Affairs. 

19.  The  timetable  references  are  taken  verbatim  from  Gravel  ed.,  111:8-13.  The 
"Country  Team"  is  apparently  the  top  US  military,  diplomatic,  CIA,  etc.,  personnel  in 
Saigon. 

20.  DE  SOTO  was  a  code  name  for  destroyer  patrols  off  the  coast  of  North  Vietnam, 
which  usually  took  place  within  the  latter's  territorial  waters,  claimed  as  12  nautical 
miles. 

21.  This  and  other  quotes  are  from  a  "Memorandum  regarding  the  US  war  acts 
against  the  DRV  in  the  first  days  of  August  1964,"  published  by  the  DRV's  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  September  1964. 

22.  The  Memorandum  cites  Renter  for  this  information. 


82 


6.  Ideology  and  Society:  The  Pentagon  Papers 
and  North  Vietnam 

by  Gerard  Chaliand 


Concerning  the  air  war  over  North  Vietnam,  the  Pentagon  Papers  acknowledge 
that: 

In  the  North,  the  regime  battened  down  and  prepared  to  ride  out  the 
storm.  With  Soviet  and  Chinese  help,  it  greatly  strengthened  its  air  defenses, 
multiplying  the  number  of  AAA  guns  and  radars,  expanding  the  number  of 
jet  fighter  airfields  and  the  jet  fighter  force,  and  introducing  an  extensive 
SAM  system.  Economic  development  plans  were  laid  aside.  Imports  were 
increased  to  offset  production  losses.  Bomber  facilities  were  in  most  cases 
simply  abandoned.  The  large  and  vulnerable  barracks  and  storage  depots 
were  replaced  by  dispersed  and  concealed  ones.  Several  hundred  thousand 
workers  were  mobilized  to  keep  the  transportation  system  operating.  Miles 
of  by-pass  roads  were  built  around  choke-points  to  make  the  system  re- 
dundant. Knocked-out  bridges  were  replaced  by  fords,  ferries,  or  alternate 
structures,  and  methods  were  adopted  to  protect  them  from  attack.  Traffic 
shifted  to  night  time,  poor  weather,  and  camouflage.  Shuttling  and  trans- 
shipment practices  were  instituted.  Construction  material,  equipment,  and 
workers  were  prepositioned  along  key  routes  in  order  to  effect  quick  re- 
pairs. Imports  of  railroad  cars  and  trucks  were  increased  to  offset  equipment 
losses. 

In  short,  NVN  leaders  mounted  a  major  effort  to  withstand  the  bombing 
pressure.  They  had  to  change  their  plans  and  go  on  a  war  footing.  They 
had  to  take  drastic  measures  to  shelter  the  population  and  cope  with  the 
bomb  damage.  They  had  to  force  the  people  to  work  harder  and  find  new 
ways  to  keep  the  economy  operating.  They  had  to  greatly  increase  imports 
and  their  dependence  on  the  USSR  and  China.  There  were  undoubtedly 
many  difficulties  and  hardships  involved.  Yet,  NVN  had  survived.  Its  econ- 
omy had  continued  to  function.  The  regime  had  not  collapsed,  and  it  had 
not  given  in.  And  it  still  sent  men  and  supplies  to  SVN  (Gravel  edition, 
IV:58). 

How  and  why  has  North  Vietnam  been  able  to  resist  the  American  bombard- 
ment? Before  replying  to  this  question,  I  would  like  to  summarize  the  diverse, 
and  over  the  years  often-changing,  motives  which  led  to  the  decision  to  under- 
take an  air  war  against  North  Vietnam.  After  having  pretended  that  the  escala- 
tion was  simply  a  reaction  to  the  Maddox  incident  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin,  then 

Translated  from  the  French  by  Stephen  C.  Headley 
Copyright  ©  1972  by  Gerard  Chaliand 


Ideology  and  Society  83 

later  pretending  that  it  was  a  reprisal  to  the  attack  against  the  American  base  at 
Pleiku,  the  Johnson  administration  finally  affirmed  that  the  escalation  was  aimed 
at  stopping  the  flow  of  DRV  material  and  troops  to  the  South.  In  the  context  of 
the  domino  theory,  to  bomb  the  North  was  an  effort  to  show  not  only  the  South 
Vietnamese  favorable  to  the  Saigon  government,  but  also  China  and  the  other 
Southeast  Asian  states  the  determination  of  the  United  States  to  bar  the  road  to 
communism. 

Many  other  reasons  have  been  found  to  minimize  circumstantially  the  failure 
of  the  escalation,  but  even  when  this  failure  is  recognized,  what  is  lacking — and 
this  is  what  strikes  me  about  the  Pentagon  Papers — is  a  concrete  analysis  of  the 
causes  of  the  failure.  One  has  the  impression  from  beginning  to  end  that  their 
analysis  remains  on  the  edge  of  the  subject. 

An  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  bombardment  of  North  Vietnam 
can  only  rest  on  the  understanding  of  these  two  fundamentals: 

1 )  The  historical  and  social  conditions  which  shaped  the  Vietnamese  people. 

2)  The  ideology  which  motivates  and  supports  the  will  and  the  actions  of 
the  leaders  of  North  Vietnam,  and  through  the  mediation  of  the  party, 
the  masses  of  North  Vietnam. 

In  reading  the  Pentagon  Papers,  as  well  as  the  writings  of  other  government 
officials,  one  ascertained  an  ignorance  of  one  or  the  other,  if  not  both,  of  these 
two  fundamentals. 1  One  must  remember  that  before  dropping  the  bombs  the 
American  air  force  (during  the  Kennedy  administration  in  1961)  dropped  tracts 
to  maintain  the  morale  of  the  North  Vietnamese  peasants,  reassuring  them  that 
the  United  States  had  not  forgotten  them  and  that  they  would  be  liberated  from 
their  Communist  leaders. 

I.    THE  HISTORICAL  AND  SOCIAL  CONDITIONS  WHICH  SHAPED 
THE  VIETNAMESE  PEOPLE 

From  the  beginning  of  Vietnamese  history,  several  centuries  before  our  era, 
the  fundamental  social  structure  of  Vietnam  has  been  the  village  commune.  It 
has  endured  down  to  our  times  without  having  been  assimilated  by  the  long 
Chinese  occupation  which  gave  many  of  its  institutions  to  Vietnam.  The  state 
exacted  tribute  and  drafted  the  youth  for  the  army,  but  the  village  community, 
through  the  mediation  of  its  council  of  notables,  fixed  the  amount  of  the  tax  for 
each  family  and  designated  the  recruits. 

The  mandarin,  representative  of  the  state,  did  not  penetrate  the  village  pro- 
tected by  its  high  bamboo  hedge,  described  here  by  Gourou: 

At  the  same  time  as  it  provides  protection  against  dangers,  the  hedge  is 
a  kind  of  sacred  boundary  to  the  village  community,  the  sign  of  its  individ- 
uality and  independence.  If  in  a  period  of  uprisings,  the  village  has  par- 
ticipated in  the  agitation  or  given  shelter  to  the  rebels,  the  first  punishment 
inflicted  on  it  is  to  force  the  village  to  cut  down  its  bamboo  hedge.  This 
is  a  grave  wound  for  its  self-respect,  a  sign  of  scandal.  The  village  feels  as 
embarrassed  as  a  human  would  who  has  been  stripped  and  abandoned  in 
the  middle  of  a  fully  dressed  crowd.^ 

The  cohesion  of  this  rural  society  stemming  from  the  Vietnamese  commune 
resisted  ten  centuries  of  Chinese  occupation  even  as  it  absorbed  Chinese  culture. 


84      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

The  central  authorities  were  never  in  direct  contact  with  local  individuals,  but 
only  with  the  commune,  which  thus  exercised  its  autonomy.  In  its  attitude  to- 
ward the  ruling  state,  as  in  its  attitude  toward  the  natural  milieu  it  sought  to 
control,  the  inhabitants  of  the  commune  maintained  solidarity.  The  success  or 
the  opprobrium  of  one  member  of  the  commune  reflected  on  the  totality  of  the 
village. 

The  specific  factors  which  constitute  the  national  character  of  the  Vietnamese 
are  determined  by  the  village  community,  its  relative  autonomy  and  its  particular 
solidarity.  The  unceasing  hydraulic  work,  necessarily  collective  and  of  vital 
importance  for  the  rice  fields  of  the  Red  River  delta,  cradle  of  the  Vietnamese 
nation,  reinforced  this  cohesion  and  this  solidarity,  and  developed  the  tenacity 
and  the  capacity  for  painstaking  labor  which  characterize  the  Vietnamese  peasant. 

Finally,  besides  the  village  and  the  hydraulic  questions,  a  third  factor  permits 
a  better  understanding  of  the  Vietnamese  personality:  its  military  tradition,  both 
of  conquest  and  resistance.  From  the  eleventh  to  the  eighteenth  century,  stim- 
ulated by  the  shortage  of  farmland,  a  slow  but  uninterrupted  movement  advanced 
little  by  little  the  network  of  Vietnamese  villages  all  the  way  down  to  the  Ca 
Mau  peninsula,  destroying  on  its  way  the  Cham  and  Khmer  empires.  In  the 
interim,  the  Vietnamese  people  forged  for  itself  a  long  tradition  of  resistance 
against  various  Chinese  dynasties,  including  the  Mongols.  This  military  tradition 
necessarily  rested  on  a  highly  developed  national  consciousness. 

These  historical  and  social  factors  have  only  been  succinctly  recalled;  a  deeper 
understanding  of  them^  permits  one  to  measure  to  what  point  the  decentraliza- 
tion, the  dispersion,  the  provincial  and  village  autonomy  that  the  bombings  have 
created,  coincides  with  the  historical  structure  of  the  rural  base  of  Vietnamese 
society.  In  a  situation  where  many  countries  would  have  been  disabled,  Vietnam 
organized  itself  effectively. 

None  of  these  factors  by  themselves  are  sufficient  to  explain  why  one  doesn't 
find  the  same  behavior  in  Hanoi  that  one  finds  in  Saigon.  In  the  contemporary 
world  none  of  these  factors  would  be  sufficient  to  permit  a  small,  still  essentially 
agricultural  nation  to  successfully  resist  the  pressure  of  a  powerful  industrial 
country.  For  example,  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  one  reads: 

The  threat  implicit  in  minimum  but  increasing  amounts  of  force  ("slow 
squeeze")  would,  it  was  hoped  by  some,  ultimately  bring  Hanoi  to  the  table 
on  terms  favorable  to  the  U.S.  Underlying  this  optimistic  view  was  a  sig- 
nificant underestimate  of  the  level  of  the  DRV  commitment  to  victory  in 
the  South,  and  an  overestimate  of  the  effectiveness  of  U.S.  pressures  in 
weakening  that  resolve  (Gravel  ed.,  Ill:  1 12). 

One  doesn't  see  where  the  mistakes  in  estimations  have  been  made.  The  rare 
explanations  are  incapable  of  embracing  the  logic  of  the  adversary.  They  denote 
"occidentocentrism,"  narrow-mindedness,  an  incapacity  to  come  to  grips  with 
the  factors  and  profound  motivations  of  the  adversary.  Consider  the  following 
passage : 

The  idea  that  destroying,  or  threatening  to  destroy,  NVN's  industry  would 
pressure  Hanoi  into  calling  its  quits  seems,  in  retrospect,  a  colossal  misjudg- 
ment.  The  idea  was  based,  however,  on  a  plausible  assumption  about  the 
rationality  of  NVN's  leaders,  which  the  U.S.  intelligence  community  as  a 
whole  seemed  to  share.  This  was  that  the  value  of  what  little  industrial  plant 
NVN  possessed  was  disproportionately  great.  That  plant  was  purchased  by 


Ideology  and  Society  85 


an  extremely  poor  nation  at  the  price  of  considerable  sacrifice  over  many 
years.  Even  though  it  did  not  amount  to  much,  it  no  doubt  symbolized  the 
regime's  hopes  and  desires  for  national  status,  power,  and  wealth,  and  was 
probably  a  source  of  considerable  pride.  It  did  not  seem  unreasonable  to 
believe  that  NVN  leaders  would  not  wish  to  risk  the  destruction  of  such 
assets,  especially  when  that  risk  seemed  (to  us)  easily  avoidable  by  cutting 
down  the  insurgency  and  deferring  the  takeover  of  SVN  until  another  day 
and  perhaps  in  another  manner — which  Ho  Chi  Minh  had  apparendy  de- 
cided to  do  once  before,  in  1954.*  After  all,  an  ample  supply  of  oriental 
patience  is  precisely  what  an  old  oriental  revolutionary  like  Ho  Chi  Minh 
was  supposed  to  have^  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:57;  italics  are  author's). 

Compared  to  the  above,  even  the  Jason  Report,  which  was  highly  critical  and 
recognized  the  failure  of  the  bombardments,  was  able  to  single  out  only  one 
aspect,  certainly  important,  but  by  itself  insufficient  to  explain  the  resistance  of 
North  Vietnam:  nationalism.  Compare  this  passage: 

The  bombing  campaign  against  NVN  has  not  discemibly  weakened  the 
determination  of  the  North  Vietnamese  leaders  to  continue  to  direct  and 
support  the  insurgency  in  the  South.  Shortages  of  food  and  clothing,  travel 
restrictions,  separations  of  families,  lack  of  adequate  medical  and  educa- 
tional facilities,  and  heavy  work  loads  have  tended  to  affect  adversely  civilian 
morale.  However,  there  are  few  if  any  reliable  reports  on  a  breakdown  of 
the  commitment  of  the  people  to  support  the  war.  Unlike  the  situation  in 
the  South,  there  are  no  reports  of  marked  increases  of  absenteeism,  draft 
dodging,  black  market  operations  or  prostitution.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
possible  war  weariness  among  the  people  has  shaken  the  leadership's  belief 
that  they  can  continue  to  endure  the  bombing  and  outlast  the  U.S.  and 
SVN  in  a  protracted  war  of  attrition.  .  .  . 

The  expectation  that  bombing  would  erode  the  determination  of  Hanoi 
and  its  people  clearly  overestimated  the  persuasion  and  disruptive  effects  of 
the  bombing  and,  correspondingly,  underestimated  the  tenacity  and  recupera- 
tive capabilities  of  the  North  Vietnamese.  That  the  bombing  has  not  achieved 
anticipated  goals  reflects  a  general  failure  to  appreciate  the  fact,  well-docu- 
mented in  the  historical  and  social  scientific  literature,  that  a  direct,  frontal 
attack  on  a  society  tends  to  strengthen  the  social  fabric  of  the  nation,  to 
increase  popular  support  of  the  existing  government,  to  improve  the  de- 
termination of  both  the  leadership  and  the  populace  to  fight  back,  to  induce 
a  variety  of  protective  measures  that  reduces  the  society's  vulnerability  to 
future  attack  and  to  develop  an  increased  capacity  for  quick  repairs  and 
restoration  of  essential  functions.  The  great  variety  of  physical  and  social 
countermeasures  that  North  Vietnam  has  taken  in  response  to  the  bombing 
is  now  well  documented,  but  the  potential  effectiveness  of  these  counter- 
measures  has  not  been  adequately  considered  in  previous  planning  or  assess- 
ment studies  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 224). 

II.    THE  IDEOLOGY 

It  is  not  simple  to  explain  the  role  of  ideology,  especially  if  one  begins  with 
the  prejudice  that  your  yourself,  and  consequently  the  society  to  which  you  be- 
long, think  rationally,  whereas  the  adversary  alone  is  "ideologized."  This  pro- 


86      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

cedure  is  more  common  in  the  United  States  than  in  other  Western  countries, 
especially  since  the  Cold  War  began.  American  society,  despite  the  changes  which 
occurred  in  it  during  the  1960s,  is,  without  clearly  realizing  it,  a  profoundly 
ideologized  society  in  several  ways,  among  them  anticommunism.  After  the  war 
and  in  the  1950s,  there  has  not  been,  for  example,  a  political  thinker  of  the 
power  and  clairvoyance  of  Raymond  Aron,^  capable  of  combating  the  Com- 
munists using  Marxism  itself,  knowing  how  to  choose  between  what  Maxime 
Rodinson  judiciously  calls  "Marxist  sociology"  and  "Marxist  ideology."  Thus 
in  general,  the  American  government's  approach  to  the  political  realities  of  North 
Vietnam  is  vitiated  by  ideological  a  priori  assumptions  which  obscure  the  assess- 
ments made  of  the  enemy.  This  is  essentially  what  is  reflected  in  the  Pentagon 
Papers. 

"Anti-Communist  ideology,"  conscious  or  unconscious,  fed  by  ignorance  of 
the  enemy's  ideology  (i.e.,  the  tool  which  motivates  his  behavior  and  his  actions) 
explains,  I  feel,  how  the  U.S.  experts  and  decisionmakers  failed  to  understand 
the  capacities  of  the  enemy.  To  fail  to  understand  the  logic  of  the  enemy  does 
not  prove  his  irrationality,  but  rather  the  limits  of  one's  own  system  of  thought. 

A  serious  study  of  revolutionary  phenomena  must  not  underestimate  the  role 
of  ideology.  In  Vietnam  not  only  did  the  ideology  disseminated  by  the  cadres  of 
the  Viet  Minh  permit  them  to  forge  the  means  to  victoriously  end  colonialism  at 
Dien  Bien  Phu,  thus  bringing  a  solution  to  the  crisis  of  Vietnamese  society  as 
a  whole;  but  also,  in  the  North,  it  permitted  them  to  reinforce  that  national  inde- 
pendence and  to  lay  the  basis  for  the  construction  of  a  modern  industry. 

On  the  one  hand,  there  is  national  independence,  and  it  should  be  remembered 
that  Vietnam  is  one.  There  are  few  nations  in  Asia  or  elsewhere  as  homogeneous. 
Moreover,  this  independence  is  also  maintained  vis  a  vis  the  USSR  and  China. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  the  effort  to  modernize  the  country  through  eco- 
nomic construction.  This  transformation  aims  at  modifying  the  condition  of  the 
whole  population  and  not  at  favoring  exclusively  one  social  class  as  is  the  case 
in  most  Third  World  countries.  To  hasten  this  transformation,  the  ideology  dis- 
seminated among  the  masses  by  the  cadres  relying  on  the  notions  of  national 
dignity  and  social  justice,  tends  to  change  the  traditional  relationships  between 
time  and  work  by  rationalizing  them,  i.e.,  by  stressing  efficiency.  By  a  constant 
pressure,^  which  should  not  be  characterized  as  violent  coercion,  for  North  Viet- 
nam is  not  the  USSR  of  Stalin's  era,  the  cadres  push  the  peasants  to  modify 
their  traditional  behavior.  This  effort,  which  is  not  directed  simply  at  the  propen- 
sity toward  small  family  property,  is  necessary  in  order  to  make  up  for  the 
historical  delay  which  currently  characterizes  the  so-called  developing  countries. 
This  mobilizing  ideology  can  obviously  only  get  results,  in  any  given  phase,  if 
the  reality  experienced  by  the  masses  shows  no  noticeable  discrepancy  with  the 
reflections  of  it  to  be  found  in  the  reformers'  slogans.  The  failure  of  numerous 
socialist  experiments  is  explained  by  just  such  discrepancies.  It  is  because  the 
ideology  is  shared,  to  different  degrees,  by  the  masses,  that  it  becomes  possible 
to  accomplish  that  which  the  traditional  society  of  the  past,  stagnant,  disrupted 
and  submissive,  did  not  seem  capable  of  in  its  own  eyes,  as  well  as  in  the  eyes  of 
Western  observers. 

In  North  Vietnam,  the  ideology  communicated  by  the  party  is  deeply  rooted 
in  nationalism  on  the  one  hand  and  in  Marxism-Leninism  on  the  other.  This 
means  that  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  political  and  economic  independence,  class 
struggle,  management  in  the  hands  of  the  controlling  bureaucracy,  the  necessity 
for  construction  and  modernization,  and  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  wealth. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  important  to  note  that  since  the  twenties,  and  especially 


Ideology  and  Society  87 

since  the  thirties,  the  Vietnamese  Communist  party,  which  was  to  become  the 
Viet  Minh,  was  the  only  party  to  take  responsibility,  not  only  for  the  aspirations 
for  social  justice,  but  also  and  above  all,  for  the  national  independence  move- 
ment. When  the  French  eliminated  in  1930  the  "Viet  Nam  Quoc  Dan  Dang" 
(modeled  after  the  Chinese  Kuomintang)  following  their  having  organized  a 
military  uprising,  the  only  other  surviving  Vietnamese  party  capable  of  directing 
the  national  movement  was  the  Communists.  It  was  these  leaders  and  the  middle- 
level  cadres  of  the  party  who  crystallized  the  idea  of  a  revolution  against  the 
humiliation  caused  by  the  colonial  oppression,  and  who  patiently  forced  the 
means  to  end  it. 

The  Geneva  Accords  were,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Vietnamese  leaders,  only  a 
temporary  compromise  imposed  as  much  by  Soviet  pressure  as  by  circumstance. 
The  legitimate  objective  of  eventual  reunification  of  Vietnam  was  never  aban- 
doned. Thus  to  underestimate,  as  the  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  generally 
have,  the  nationalism  of  the  leaders  of  North  Vietnam  shows  as  much  ignorance 
of  their  history  as  it  does  of  their  motivations. 

Thus,  if  the  social  distance  between  the  party  cadres  was  not  very  accentuated, 
and  it  never  has  been  in  Vietnam,  and  if  the  accomplishments  which  the  masses 
can  measure  in  their  daily  lives  can  be  added  to  the  regime's  dynamism,  then 
the  morality  which  the  party  spreads,  composed  of  discipline,  civic  spirit,  austerity 
— in  sum  the  puritanism  of  primitive  accumulation — tends  to  give  the  society  a 
cohesion  and  a  capacity  for  resistance  which  the  experts  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 
incorrectly  attribute  to  nationalism  alone.  Certainly  the  bombardments  reinforced 
the  popularity  of  the  Hanoi  regime,  but  there  can  be  strong  national  feeling  with- 
out its  providing  the  material  and  moral  means  to  face  the  enemy. 

Even  with  an  exacerbated  nationalism,  the  Saigon  regime,  if  it  had  undergone 
the  same  bombardments  as  the  North  (even  supposing  that  the  NLF  no  longer 
existed),  could  not  have  held  out.  Without  mentioning  the  problems  of  infra- 
structure, the  Saigon  regime  lacks  the  social  cohesion  and  the  accomplishments 
which  make  it  worthwhile  for  the  people  to  sacrifice  themselves  in  its  defense. 
This  is  all  the  more  true  as  the  traditional  social  structure  of  Vietnam  has  nothing 
whatsoever  to  do  with  the  ideology  of  free  enterprise. 

On  the  one  hand  North  Vietnam  was  able  to  resist  the  bombing  because  the 
regime  had  demonstrated  in  1964-1965  that  it  could  materially  improve  the 
daily  life  of  the  North  Vietnamese  peasants.  On  the  other  hand,  the  regime  even 
before  it  proceeded  with  the  dispersion  (decentralization)  necessary  to  parry  the 
bombing,  had  managed  to  create  at  the  village,  district,  and  provincial  level  an 
infrastructure  unequaled  in  Asia  (with  the  exception  of  China,  North  Korea,  and 
naturally  Japan).  This  resistance  cannot  be  explained  without  an  appreciation 
of  the  transformations  which  the  regime  was  able  to  institute,  especially  in  the 
countryside.  Certainly  important  errors  were  committed  during  the  agricultural 
reform  of  1954-1956.  Inspired  in  a  mechanical  way  by  the  Chinese  model,  the 
Vietnamese  agricultural  reform  was  tainted  by  "leftism."  In  all  the  villages  a 
certain  percentage  of  the  landlords  were  sought  out;  well-to-do  and  even  middle 
peasants  were  equally  dispossessed  of  their  lands.  Even  patriotic  landowners  were 
treated  as  collaborators  of  the  colonial  administration.  It  is  true  that  these  errors 
were  facilitated  by  the  structure  of  Vietnamese  landholdings  where  there  were 
very  few  large  landowners  and  no  public  land  register.  Land  was  scarce  (three 
times  less  land  per  inhabitant  than  in  India).  Those  who  employed  hired  hands 
were  considered  landlords,  even  if  they  only  owned  seven  and  a  half  acres.  Gen- 
erally divided  into  plots,  these  paddy  fields  were  distributed  by  the  landowners 
among  the  members  of  their  families.  The  first  land  reform,  due  to  its  Stalinist 


88      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

techniques,  provoked  in  1956  an  upHsing  in  the  province  of  Nghe  An  which 
was  repressed  by  the  army.  But  unlike  the  Soviet  Union  under  Stalin,  collectiviza- 
tion and  agricultural  questions  were  not  solved  from  beginning  to  end  against  the 
wishes  of  the  peasant.  In  1957,  at  least  those  errors  which  could  be  repaired  were 
publicly  rectified  by  the  personal  intervention  of  Ho  Chi  Minh,  and  those 
responsible  all  the  way  up  to  the  top,  including  the  general  secretary  of  the  party, 
Truong  Chinh,  were  given  other  jobs.  Meanwhile,  the  cultivated  areas  had  been 
augmented  by  a  fourth  in  comparison  to  1 939,  the  total  production  by  68  percent, 
and  the  individual  consumption  by  13  percent. 

So  after  these  difficulties,  it  was  only  very  prudently,  solely  with  volunteers, 
that  the  cooperatives  were  instituted  in  1959.  These  were  only  generalized  three 
years  later  when  the  state  and  the  party  could  prove  to  the  peasants  that  it 
was  more  profitable  to  belong  to  a  cooperative  than  to  remain  an  individual 
farmer.  Increasing  the  number  of  hydraulic  works  permitted  the  cooperatives 
from  one,  to  two,  or  even  three  harvests  a  year.  Improving  agricultural  tools  and 
techniques,  limiting  the  free  market  where  small  landholders  placed  a  part  of 
their  production,  and  increasing  the  amount  of  agricultural  produce  by  about 
4  percent  were  some  of  the  proofs  given  the  farmers. 

The  regime  did  not  try  to  destroy  the  village  structure,  its  cohesion  or  its 
solidarity.  The  commune  served  as  the  immediate  point  of  departure  for  the 
cooperative.  The  notables  were  eliminated  as  a  class,  the  landlords  were  dis- 
possessed, but  the  members  of  the  Party  who  directed  the  cooperatives  all  came 
from  the  village,  and  were  not  sent  in  from  Hanoi  or  elsewhere.  The  economic 
improvements  which  the  large  majority  of  Vietnamese  peasants  experienced  on 
the  eve  of  the  bombing,  are  indisputable:  the  per  hectare  (2.4  acres)  output  had 
reached  four  tons;  and  with  the  wells,  the  septic  tanks,  the  threshing  floors,  etc., 
daily  life  itself  had  changed.  The  peasants  were  very  far  away  from  the  years 
1945-1946,  when  2  million  farmers  died  of  starvation. 

From  1954-1964,  an  educational  and  sanitary  infrastructure  was  created 
which  was  widely  dispersed  throughout  the  countryside.  In  fact  North  Vietnam 
did  not  hold  out  because  it  was  an  agricultural  country  without  great  needs,  as 
some  experts  have  pretended.  It  held  out  because  it  had  a  modern,  if  modest, 
infrastructure  at  the  level  of  the  village  and  the  district.  Each  village  had  a 
sanitary  station,  each  district  had  several  hospitals  equipped  with  qualified  per- 
sonnel, each  province  had  its  hospital  with  specialized  personnel  and  equipment. 
The  bombing  only  further  strengthened  this  infrastructure  in  order  to  respond  to 
the  problems  which  the  air  war  posed:  aid  no  matter  where,  no  matter  when. 
Corresponding  to  the  medical  infrastructure  was  the  network  of  schools  which 
had  been  extended  to  all  the  villages  before  the  bombing  began.  All  children 
from  seven  to  ten  years  old  followed  the  first  course-cycle.  The  second  and  third 
cycles  were  dispensed  at  the  district  and  province  level.  The  air  war  does  not 
seem  to  have  noticeably  slowed  down  educational  activities  in  North  Vietnam. 
In  fact  it  was  their  medical  and  educational  infrastructures  that  enabled  the 
regime  to  create  the  conditions  for  resistance  among  the  North  Vietnamese 
peasantry. 

Relying  on  these  accomplishments,  the  North  Vietnamese  regime,  facing  the 
bombing,  was  thus  able  to  implement  and  carry  out  the  following  three  actions: 

— facing  aerial  aggression,  it  capitalized  on  Vietnamese  nationalism 
— it  mobilized  the  masses  around  the  accomplishments  from  which  they  had 
benefited,  and  which  were  the  immediate  foundation  of  the  regime  and 
its  ideology.  By  so  doing,  the  regime  underlined  the  fact  that  any  sub- 


Ideology  and  Society  89 

mission  to  American  pressures  could  only  lead  to  a  deterioration  of  these 
accomplishments,  including  the  level  of  daily  life 
— in  order  to  further  strengthen  this  mobilization,  the  regime  democratized 
to  a  certain  extent  the  political  structures;  this  encouraged  the  emergence 
of  new  cadres  at  all  levels  and  thus  reinforced  the  Party. 

This  third  point  is  worth  expanding,  for  it  shows  the  vitality  of  the  regime  and 
its  ability  to  adapt.  Because  of  the  bombing,  North  Vietnam,  through  the  media- 
tion of  the  Party,  encouraged  the  youth,  boys  and  girls,  to  occupy  a  more  im- 
portant place  in  Vietnamese  society,  namely  by  taking  responsibilities  in  the 
militia  and  the  cooperatives,  as  well  as  in  the  Party  itself.  Because  of  the  decen- 
tralization instigated  by  the  bombardments,  beginning  in  April  1967,  local  plan- 
ning was  elaborated  with  much  more  real  participation  on  the  part  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  cooperatives.  They  could  control  the  distribution  of  manufactured 
objects  coming  from  the  towns,  check  the  accountants'  books,  elect  their  repre- 
sentatives to  the  Popular  Council  (where  the  proportion  of  Party  members  was 
not  to  exceed  40  percent).  In  1967  a  campaign  was  launched  to  eliminate  the 
excessively  bureaucratic  cadres,  the  dishonest  and  the  lazy,  in  order  to  promote 
a  more  democratic  management.  Currently  every  official  is  required  to  appear 
once  a  month  to  hear  possible  criticisms  by  the  members  of  the  cooperative. 
Since  the  institution  of  these  democratic  improvements  in  income  distribution, 
the  one-hectare  plots  previously  reserved  for  the  Administrative  Committees 
have  been  abolished. 

In  this  brief  sketch,  I  hope  I  have  been  able  to  demonstrate  to  what  extent  a 
certain  number  of  prejudices  account  for  the  misunderstandings  of  numerous 
American  experts:  systematic  anticommunism;  the  conviction  that  they  alone  pos- 
sess "rational"  thought  applicable  to  any  situation;  the  consequent  impossibility  of 
understanding  the  adversary's  motivations;  the  temptation  to  explain  different, 
even  if  coherent,  behavior  by  racial  or  religious  reasons;  the  underestimation 
of  the  enemy  due  to  an  underestimation  of  his  ideology. 

As  far  as  North  Vietnam  is  concerned,  such  are,  I  believe,  the  roots  of  the 
failure  of  America's  politics. 


Notes 

1.  Townsend  Hoopes  (Undersecretary  of  the  Air  Force)  in  his  book  The  Limits  of 
Intervention  (David  McKay  and  Co.,  New  York,  1969):  "We  believe  the  enemy  can 
be  forced  to  be  'reasonable,'  i.e.,  to  compromise  or  even  capitulate,  because  we  assume 
he  wants  to  avoid  pain,  death  and  material  destruction.  We  assume  that  if  these  are 
inflicted  on  him  with  increasing  severity,  then  at  some  point  in  the  process  he  will  want 
to  stop  the  suffering.  Ours  is  a  plausible  strategy — for  those  who  are  rich,  who  love  life 
and  fear  pain.  But  happiness,  wealth  and  power  are  expectations  that  constitute  a  di- 
mension far  beyond  the  experience,  and  probably  beyond  the  emotional  comprehension 
of  the  Asian  poor.  For  them  there  may  be  little  difference  between  the  condition  of 
death  and  the  condition  of  unrelieved  suffering  in  life.  Indeed  the  Buddhist  belief  in 
reincarnation  tends  to  create  a  positive  impetus  toward  honorable  death,  because  the 
faithful  discharge  of  moral  and  civic  duties  in  this  life  are  the  understood  passports  to  a 
higher  station,  greater  comfort,  and  less  suffering  when  one  next  returns  to  earth.  And 
it  is  through  such  a  series  of  trials  on  earth  that  the  soul  makes  its  slow  and  painful 
advance  toward  eventual  unity  with  God.  The  strategy  of  the  weak  is  therefore  the 
natural  choice  of  ideologues  in  Asia,  for  it  converts  Asia's  capacity  for  endurance  in 


90      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

suffering  into  an  instrument  for  exploiting  a  basic  vulnerability  of  the  Christian  West.  It 
does  it,  in  effect,  by  inviting  the  West,  which  possesses  unanswerable  military  power,  to 
carry  its  strategic  logic  to  the  final  conclusion,  which  is  genocide  .  .  ."  pp.  128-129. 

2.  Pierre  Gourou,  Les  paysans  du  Delta  Tonkinois  (Paris,  1936;  second  edition, 
Paris-The  Hague,  1965). 

3.  It  is  surprising  that  a  country  embroiled  directly  or  indirectly  in  a  war  since  the 
end  of  the  1950s  has  not  found  it  useful  to  translate  the  basic  literature  in  French  on 
Vietnam.  For  example:  Pierre  Gourou's  fundamental  book  on  the  peasants  of  the  Ton- 
kin delta  cited  above  (pirated  and  badly  translated  in  the  Human  Relations  Area  Files); 
Paul  Mus's  Vietnam,  sociologie  d'une  guerre  appeared  abridged  in  English  only  in  1970; 
basic  works  like  Charles  Robequain's  L'Evolution  economique  de  I'lndochine  frangaise 
(Paris,  1939;  English  edition,  London,  Oxford  Univ.  Press,  1944)  and  his  province 
study,  Le  Thanh  Hoa,  remain  unknown  and/or  untranslated,  not  to  mention  the  more 
recent  economic  studies  such  as:  Doan  Trong  Truyen  and  Pham  Thanh  Vinh,  L' Edifi- 
cation d'une  economie  nationale  independente  au  Vietnam  (Editions  en  Langues  Etrans- 
geres,  Hanoi,  1967);  Le  Chau,  Le  Vietnam  socialiste  (Maspero,  Paris,  1966);  Vo  Nhan 
Tri,  Croissance  economique  de  la  Republique  Democratique  du  Vietnam,  1945-1965 
(Editions  en  Langues  Etrangeres,  Hanoi,  1967);  Leon  Lavallee,  Fran^oise  Direr  and 
Edith  Bouche,  L' Economie  du  Nord  Vietnam,  1960-1970  (Cahiers  du  C.E.R.M.  #94 
and  #94  bis,  Paris,  1971). 

4.  Correct;  under  pressure  from  the  USSR.  But  the  conditions  in  what  had  been  the 
"Socialist  camp"  have  since  changed. 

5.  Another  quality  attributed  to  Ho  Chi  Minh  is  to  have  known  how  to  choose  and 
exploit  the  "favorable  moment." 

6.  Raymond  Aron,  Peace  &  War  (Praeger,  New  York,  1967). 

7.  Maxime  Rodinson,  "Sociologie  marxiste  et  ideologic  marxiste,"  Diogene  (#64, 
Oct.-Dec.  1968),  pp.  70-104. 

8.  This  does  not  infer  a  kind  of  police  coercion,  but  rather  a  social  pressure  grounded 
in  the  traditions  of  the  rural  communities  where  the  individual  holds  a  very  secondary 
place  compared  with  the  collective  interests. 


91 


7.  "Tell  Your  Friends  that  We're  People" 
by  Don  Luce 


The  human  consequences  of  American  policy  toward  Vietnam  have  not  been 
considered  by  U.S.  policymakers.  The  private  memos,  official  statements  and 
policy  speeches  leave  out  the  Vietnamese  refugees,  children,  farmers  and  slum 
dwellers  .  .  .  and  the  American  GI.  They  are  all  missing  in  the  Pentagon 
Papers. 

I  remember  trying  to  discuss  the  breakdown  of  the  family  structure  with  Am- 
bassador Bunker  in  1967.  "Do  they  [the  refugees]  need  more  Bulgar  wheat  and 
cooking  oil?"  he  kept  asking  me.  He  could  not  understand,  or  he  did  not  want 
to  understand,  that  the  Vietnamese  did  not  want,  or  need,  American  relief.  They 
wanted  to  see  the  end  to  the  defoliation  and  bombing  so  that  they  could  return 
to  their  farms. 

In  May  1971,  I  was  ordered  to  leave  Vietnam  for  "special  reasons."  I  had 
taken  two  American  Congressmen  to  the  Tiger  Cages  of  Con  Son.  Before  leaving, 
I  asked  the  Vietnamese  with  whom  I  worked  to  tell  me  what  they  would  like  me 
to  say  to  my  American  friends. 

"Tell  your  friends  that  we're  people,"  they  said.  "We're  not  slants,  slopes,  gooks 
or  dinks.  We're  people!" 

The  Vietnamese  feel  that  they  have  been  presented  by  U.S.  government  of- 
ficials and  the  news  media  for  so  long  as  statistics  and  kill  ratios  that  Americans 
have  forgotten  that  they  are  people  with  many  of  the  same  aspirations,  dreams 
and  fears  that  we  have.  To  many  Americans,  the  Vietnamese  have  become  the 
nonpeople. 

How  has  this  happened?  In  reading  the  Pentagon  Papers  I  was  struck  by  the 
fact  that  none  of  the  writers  of  the  different  documents  could  speak,  read,  or 
write  Vietnamese.  We  have  never  had  an  ambassador  in  Vietnam  who  could  say 
"hello"  in  Vietnamese.  Our  decisionmakers  have  all  had  to  depend  on  interpreters 
or  the  elite  class  of  Vietnamese  who  speak  English  for  their  understanding  of 
that  country.  The  result  has  been  that  our  officials  have  learned  how  the  farm 
people  and  workers  feel  from  the  educated  English-speaking  community — some- 
thing like  learning  about  the  farmers  in  Iowa  and  Nebraska  from  Harvard  pro- 
fessors or  about  New  York  City  dock  workers  from  Smith  College  co-eds. 

The  Vietnamese  language  is  hard  to  learn.  It  is  tonal  and,  unlike  most  European 
languages,  has  no  similarity  to  English.  (When  Secretary  of  Defense  Robert 
McNamara  once  tried  to  shout  in  Vietnamese  "Long  Live  Vietnam"  to  a  group 
of  Saigonese,  he  got  the  tones  mixed  up.  Raising  his  arms  high  in  a  victory  ges- 
ture, he  shouted:  "The  Southern  Duck  Wants  to  Lie  Down.") 

We  have  lost  more  than  50,000  American  lives  and  $150  billion  of  our  na- 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Don  Luce 


92      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

tional  wealth  there.  Yet  a  few  months  of  language  study  has  never  been  required 
from  our  decisionmakers. 

Often  the  Vietnamese  see  things  differently  than  U.S.  officials.  For  example: 
— An  NLF  soldier  enters  a  village,  shoots  at  a  U.S.  spotter  plane,  and  then 
runs  away.  The  pilot  of  the  plane  sends  a  message  to  headquarters  and  the 
village  is  bombed  or  bombarded.  I  have  discussed  this  with  U.S.  army  officers. 
They  know  the  NLF  soldiers  usually  leave  the  village  immediately  after  shooting 
at  the  plane,  but,  one  explained,  the  village  is  bombed  so  that  "someday  the 
villagers  will  learn  if  they  allow  Viet  Cong  in  their  village  they're  going  to  get 
bombed." 

The  villagers  look  at  it  differently.  They  were  bombed  by  airplanes,  they  say, 
and  only  the  Americans  have  airplanes.  Therefore,  as  long  as  the  Americans  are 
there,  they'll  be  bombed.  The  solution,  as  it  appears  to  them,  is  to  join  the  NLF. 

— In  the  Ba  Long  An  Peninsula  of  Quang  Ngai  province  and  other  areas  where 
the  machine-gunning  of  farm  people  by  U.S.  planes  has  been  most  prevalent,  the 
farmers  have  learned  to  stand  still  and  point  their  heads  at  the  airplanes  so  they 
will  make  a  smaller  target  as  the  planes  look  down  on  them. 

"We  used  to  lie  down,"  they  explain.  "But  now  we  stand  there  and  point  our 
heads  at  the  planes.  Fewer  people  are  killed  that  way." 

American  pilots  explain  that  they  could  still  hit  the  farmers,  but  the  fact  that 
they  just  stand  there  indicates  that  they  have  nothing  to  hide — they're  not  Viet 
Cong. 

Ironically,  the  farmers  have  learned  this  "trick"  from  the  NLF  cadre. 

Often  the  villagers  are  warned  before  the  bombardment.  U.S.  government 
officials  carefully  explain  to  visitors  how  much  care  is  taken  to  prevent  innocent 
civilian  casualties. 

One  method  described  as  "surprisingly  successful"  by  the  U.S.  Air  Force  is 
the  "I  told  you  so"  approach.  Super  Skymaster  planes  drop  leaflets  or  use  air- 
recorded  tapes  from  powerful  loudspeakers  over  suspected  NLF  areas  telling 
everyone  to  Chieu  Hoi,  or  come  to  the  side  of  the  Saigon  government.  A  1971 
press  release  (#4016)  by  the  Directorate  of  Information,  Headquarters  Seventh 
Air  Force  described  the  purpose  of  the  psyops  (psychological  operations)  leaflets 
this  way: 

The  message  also  contains  a  warning.  A  warning  of  attacks  by  planes  and 
artillery.  As  the  psyops  aircraft  moves  away  U.S.  Air  Force,  Republic  of 
Vietnam  Air  Force,  or  Royal  Australian  Air  Force  fighter  bombers  blanket 
the  area  with  a  barrage  of  firepower.  Before  the  smoke  clears  the  psyops 
pilot  returns  with  another  tape  message,  promising  more  of  the  same  to  the 
survivors  who  do  not  rally.  "This  is  why  we  call  it  the  'I  told  you  so'  ap- 
proach," Lieutenant  Loss  said. 

In  Quang  Ngai  province  of  Central  Vietnam,  the  Americal  Division  has  used 
tape  recordings  from  an  airplane  to  warn  the  villagers.  A  plane  flies  over  the  vil- 
lage a  ten-  or  twenty-second  tape  tells  the  villagers  to  leave  immediately.  Tape 
number  T7-21A-70,  used  in  1971,  announces: 

Attention  citizens:  You  must  leave  this  area  immediately.  There  will  be 
artillery  and  air  strikes  tomorrow  morning.  Evacuate  to  the  east  to  avoid  an 
accident.  There  will  be  artillery  and  airstrikes  tomorrow  morning.  Evacuate 
to  the  east. 


"Tell  Your  Friends  that  We're  People"  93 

If  there  are  NLF  in  the  village,  they  pick  up  their  guns  and  leave.  Or,  as 
some  of  the  refugees  say,  the  NLF  soldiers  stay  and  help  the  people  to  pack — 
perhaps  discussing  the  cruelty  of  the  Americans  in  making  them  move! 

The  villagers  gather  together  their  buffalo,  pigs,  chickens,  rice  and  children. 
Then  the  grandparents  refuse  to  leave. 

"We've  lived  here  for  seventy  years,"  the  old  people  say.  "Our  parents  lived 
here  and  are  buried  here.  We  will  not  leave  the  graves  of  the  ancestors." 

And  the  only  way  that  the  family  can  get  the  grandparents  to  leave  is  to  tell 
them  that  if  they  don't  the  grandchildren  will  be  killed. 

The  family  leaves  the  coconut  trees,  the  rice  fields  and  the  graves  of  the  an- 
cestors— all  those  things  that  have  held  the  family  together  and  been  meaningful. 
The  rice-planting  songs  and  the  evening  stories  told  by  Grandfather  about  days 
gone  by  are  replaced  by  the  thud  of  bombs.  The  people  are  crowded  into  the 
city  slums  and  around  the  air  bases.  Their  houses,  if  they  have  any,  are  built  of 
cardboard,  U.S.  government  cement  and  tin,  or  artillery-shell  packing  boxes.  The 
bewildered,  apathetic  people  sit  in  front  of  these  dwellings  staring  at  the  ground. 
The  six-cent-a-day  refugee  payments  are  held  up  by  bureaucracy,  or  never  come 
at  all. 

But  the  Vietnamese  are  a  resilient  people.  They  survive. 

The  men  who  once  plowed  the  acre  or  two  of  riceland  join  one  army  or  the 
other. 

The  women  try  to  sing  the  old  rice-planting  songs  as  they  wash  the  khaki  uni- 
forms of  foreign  soldiers.  In  the  evenings  they  no  longer  shell  beans  or  preserve 
the  food  for  the  dry  season  as  their  children  crowd  around  the  grandparents,  who 
tell  stories  of  when  they  were  boys  and  girls.  Now  they  worry  about  their  hus- 
bands and  when,  or  if,  their  children  will  return  from  shining  shoes. 

The  seventeen-  and  eighteen-year-old  girls  who  once  helped  their  mothers  plant 
rice  and  preserve  food  receive  visits  in  the  refugee  camps  by  madames  who  offer 
them  lots  of  money  to  work  in  the  bars  and  brothels.  The  family  needs  money, 
so  they  go  and,  if  they  are  lucky,  they  become  temporary  wives  for  soldiers.  They 
are  paid  well — often  in  Salem  cigarettes,  Tide  soap,  and  perhaps  even  a  T.V.  set. 
When  their  soldier  goes  back  to  the  United  States,  they  are  passed  on  to  his 
buddy  or  they  go  back  to  the  bar  to  find  another  husband.  They  have  children. 
They  want  children  because  they  cannot  imagine  their  soldier  leaving  them  if 
they  have  a  child.  Children,  they  feel,  are  the  most  precious  possession  that  a 
man  can  have. 

Between  100,000  and  200,000  Amer-Asian  children  have  been  born  in  Viet- 
nam. The  French,  during  their  war,  provided  health  care  for  the  mothers  and 
educational  benefits  for  the  children.  Today,  the  French/Vietnamese  are  among 
the  best  educated  in  the  country.  They  are  teachers,  lawyers  and  other  profes- 
sional people.  The  U.S.  government  has  ignored  the  existence  of  the  Amer-Asian 
children — they  might  add  fuel  to  the  peace  movement  in  the  United  States.  Viet- 
namese women  who  have  caught  VD  from  U.S.  soldiers  must  find  their  own 
source  of  penicillin  (often  outdated  and  watered-down  penicillin  from  quack 
doctors).  No  provisions  have  been  made  for  the  education  of  the  Amer-Asian 
children  in  Vietnam.  "They  should  be  treated  like  any  other  children,"  is  the 
position  of  U.S.  officials.  This  ignores  the  extra  problems  that  they  and  their 
mothers  face. 

The  refugee  children  who  once  tended  the  buffalo  and  caught  fish  and  shrimp 
in  the  canals  and  rice  fields  now  shine  shoes,  watch  and  wash  cars,  sell  peanuts, 
pimp,  steal,  and  push  drugs.  Once,  in  the  late  afternoon  when  Dad  and  the 


94      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

buffalo  were  tired,  they  learned  to  plow.  Now  their  education  is  learning  to 
exist  in  the  jungle  of  the  city  slums.  Each  day  in  the  late  afternoon,  they  can  be 
seen  beginning  their  rounds  of  the  bars  and  brothels,  pushing  their  wares  and 
changing  money. 

Six-year-old  boys  make  more  money  than  their  parents  and  the  smallest  boys 
make  the  most  money  because  they  are  the  cutest  and  the  soldiers  pay  them 
more.  The  children  run  away  from  home  and  sleep  on  the  streets.  Often  they 
are  picked  up  by  a  corrupt  policeman.  If  they  can  pay  the  100-piaster  bribe 
(25  cents),  they  are  released.  If  they  can't,  they  are  sent  to  jail  for  vagrancy. 
Each  day  in  the  Vietnamese  newspapers,  you  can  see  ads  with  a  picture  of  a 
little  boy  or  girl: 

Lost  child:  Our  child,  Tran  Van  Be,  age  seven,  ran  away  from  home  last 
year.  Please  help  us  to  find  him. 

Between  5  and  6  million  Vietnamese  people  have  been  moved  from  their 
farm  homes  into  the  city  slums  and  refugee  camps.  Most  of  these  people  have 
been  forced  off  their  land  by  Allied  firepower.  In  1958,  less  than  a  million  people 
lived  in  Saigon;  ten  years  later,  its  population  had  tripled  to  3  million.  Saigon 
became  the  world's  most  densely  populated  city  with  twice  the  population  density 
of  Tokyo,  its  nearest  rival.  With  the  crowding  came  disease.  The  U.S.  troops 
brought  their  goods  in  tin  cans,  the  rat  population  increased,  and  now  there  is 
the  danger  of  bubonic  plague.  Tuberculosis  and  dysentery  are  rampant. 

There  are  more  Vietnamese  doctors  in  France  than  in  Vietnam.  The  few  doc- 
tors that  are  in  Vietnam  are  usually  in  the  army  or  treating  the  very  rich.  Amer- 
ican, British,  German,  Philippine,  and  other  medical  programs  have  given  vac- 
cines and  dedicated  service.  Without  them,  epidemics  would  have  caused  even 
more  havoc.  These  medical  people  have  worked  very  hard — there  are  not  only 
the  sick,  but,  especially,  the  war-wounded  (most  of  them  victims  of  the  U.S. 
bombardments).  Patients  are  crowded  two  or  three  to  a  bed.  Sometimes  medicines 
have  been  cut  off.  Dr.  Eric  Wulff,  a  German  doctor  working  at  the  Hue  hospital, 
explained  in  late  1966  that  all  the  penicillin  and  sulfa  drugs  had  been  cut  off 
to  that  hospital  as  a  punishment  to  the  Buddhists  for  their  part  in  the  anti-Saigon 
government  Struggle  Movement. 

Our  officials  have  occasionally  voiced  concern  about  the  "other  war."  In  mid- 
1965,  General  Maxwell  Taylor,  the  American  ambassador,  expressed  the  fear 
that  the  NLF  might  "swamp  the  agencies  of  the  Vietnamese  government  en- 
gaged in  the  care  and  handling  of  refugees."  While  this  has  never  happened — 
the  villagers  are  the  families  and  neighbors  of  the  NLF — Allied  firepower  has 
driven  them  in.  In  Binh  Dinh  province,  thousands  of  refugees  were  generated  by 
a  Search  And  Destroy  (SAD)  mission  in  1966.  A  team  from  the  Ministry  of 
Social  Welfare  in  Saigon  went  to  Binh  Dinh  and  reported  back: 

The  number  of  refugees  increases  day  by  day.  Social  Welfare  Service  can't 
control  because  of  the  lack  of  personnel.  This  number  will  be  increased  and 
also  belongs  to  the  operations  settled  by  us  and  the  Allied  armies  in  order 
to  seize  the  land.  For  example,  in  Bong  Son  the  Operation  Than  Phong  II 
created  about  5,000  people  who  took  refuge  in  the  city.  These  people  have 
not  received  anything  as  of  a  week  ago.  The  refugee  settlements  of  the 
district  can't  contain  all  of  them,  for  that  they  have  to  stay  under  the  porch 
roofs  of  the  school.  Many  families  go  to  beg,  because  they  miss  all  things. ^ 


'  Tell  Your  Friends  that  We're  People"  95 

In  1966,  Robert  Komer  expressed  his  ambivalence  in  one  of  his  famous 
"Komergrams"  from  Washington  to  Deputy  Ambassador  Porter  in  Saigon: 

We  here  deeply  concerned  by  growing  number  of  refugees.  Latest  reports 
indicate  that  as  of  31  August,  a  total  of  1,361,288  had  been  processed  .  .  . 
Of  course,  in  some  ways,  increased  flow  of  refugees  is  a  plus.  It  helps  de- 
prive VC  of  recruiting  potential  and  rice  growers,  and  is  partly  indicative  of 
growing  peasant  desire  seek  security  on  our  side. 

Question  arises,  however,  of  whether  we  and  GVN  adequately  set  up  to 
deal  with  increased  refugee  flow  of  this  magnitude  (Gravel  edition,  11:569). 

But  Robert  Komer  believed  in  numbers  and  in  mass  brute  force.  Later,  he 
wrote: 

Wastefully,  expensively,  but  nonetheless  indisputably,  we  are  winning  the 
war  in  the  South.  Few  of  our  programs — civil  or  military — are  very  efficient, 
but  we  are  grinding  the  enemy  down  by  sheer  weight  and  mass  .  .  .  (Gravel 
ed.,  11:575). 

The  United  States  has  made  more  "Viet  Cong"  than  it  has  killed.  When  a 
farmer's  tomatoes  or  papaya  are  defoliated,  that  farmer  becomes  more  sym- 
pathetic to  the  NLF.  When  families  are  forced  to  leave  their  homes  and  the 
burial  grounds  of  their  ancestors,  they  hate  the  people  who  move  them.  The 
lack  of  understanding  of  the  Vietnamese  and  the  disregard  for  Vietnamese  life 
expressed  throughout  the  Pentagon  Papers  has  been  militarily  self-defeating. 

For  example,  the  United  States  forced  the  farm  people  into  the  refugee  camps 
in  order  to  deprive  the  NLF  of  food,  intelligence  and  personnel.  But  by  placing 
so  many  people  sympathetic  to  the  NLF  right  in  the  middle  of  city  slums,  the 
NLF  had  a  base  of  operations  during  the  1968  Tet  offensive.  Guns  and  ammuni- 
tion were  brought  into  Saigon  prior  to  the  Tet  offensive  in  mock  funerals.  The 
"coffins"  were  buried  in  the  cemeteries,  where  the  refugees  had  been  forced  to 
build  their  shacks  because  of  lack  of  any  other  space.  The  NLF  soldiers  moved 
in  with  friends,  relatives  and  sympathizers  just  prior  to  Tet.  And  while  the  chil- 
dren lit  firecrackers,  the  men  test-fired  their  rifles.  When  the  offensive  began, 
there  were  plenty  of  refugees  to  show  them  the  police  stations  and  act  as  guides 
through  the  alleyways  that  form  the  jungles  of  Saigon. 

The  NLF  made  a  misjudgment  too.  In  their  offensive,  they  did  not  expect  that 
the  Allies  would  bomb  the  Allied  cities.  "We  just  did  not  expect  that  the  United 
States  would  bomb  Saigon,  Hue  and  the  other  cities,"  I  was  told  by  one  NLF 
official.  The  U.S.  major  who  said  about  Ben  Tre,  "It  became  necessary  to  destroy 
the  town  to  save  it,"  was  describing  in  a  very  real  sense  what  has  happened  to 
all.  of  Vietnam.  To  the  military,  there  was  no  other  alternative. 

When  the  refugees  came  into  the  cities,  they  were  paid  well  to  wash  the  khaki 
uniforms,  serve  the  meals,  sleep  with  the  soldiers,  make  souvenirs,  build  the  air- 
ports and  roads,  and  shine  the  big,  black  shoes.  The  mamasans,  papasans,  hootch- 
maids,  and  all  the  others  smoldered  in  anger — but  they  were  paid  well.  Some  be- 
came agents  for  the  NLF  and  some  left  for  the  jungle  to  join  NFL  units.  But 
mostly,  they  just  existed.  As  Vietnamization  came  along,  existing  became  harder. 

Take  Mr.  Vinh,  for  example.  In  1966,  his  wife  and  two  children  moved  to 
Tam  Ky,  near  Chu  Lai  Air  Base,  after  one  of  his  children  was  wounded  by 
napalm.  Two  years  later,  he  and  the  other  three  children  followed  when  it  be- 
came impossible  to  farm  their  land  because  of  the  military  action.  In  the  hills, 


96      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Mr.  Vinh  had  ten  acres  of  land,  two  buffalo,  several  pigs,  some  chickens,  a  fruit 
orchard,  and  plenty  of  rice  paddy  land.  Now  he  makes  bamboo  mugs  to  sell 
as  souvenirs  to  the  soldiers  at  Chu  Lai.  But  now  there  are  fewer  soldiers  and  Mr. 
Vinh  cannot  sell  all  of  the  bamboo  mugs  that  he  makes.  Security  is  no  better  in 
the  hills  of  Quang  Tin  province  and  he  cannot  return  to  his  farm. 

There  is  not  a  single  decisionmaker  in  Vietnam  who  can  talk  directly  with 
Mr.  Vinh  and  the  millions  of  poor  people  like  him.  So  the  information  is  second- 
hand. The  Pentagon  and  State  Department  officials  have  been  concerned  with 
the  relationships  among  the  Vietnamese  generals  and  politicians  and  how  to 
bring  a  coup  against  Ngo  Dinh  Diem.  But  seldom,  if  ever,  have  they  been  con- 
cerned about  the  people.  Nowhere  is  this  brought  out  as  clearly  as  in  the  Pentagon 
Papers. 

There  is  a  street  in  Saigon  called  Cong  Ly,  which  means  Justice  in  English.  It 
so  happens  that  Cong  Ly  is  a  one-way  street.  So  the  Vietnamese  have  a  saying: 
"Justice  in  Vietnam  is  a  one-way  street." 

About  five  years  ago,  Vu  Thi  Dung  was  brought  to  the  United  States  to  study 
about  democracy  in  an  American  high  school.  She  was  an  excellent  student  and 
graduated  from  high  school  here  and  went  back  to  Vietnam  and  went  to  the 
university.  When  the  one-man  presidential  elections  were  held  in  October  1971, 
Miss  Dung  protested  these.  One-man  elections,  she  said,  are  what  dictators  have 
— not  democracy.  She  was  arrested,  interrogated,  and  finally  signed  a  "confes- 
sion" saying  that  she  had  participated  in  and  encouraged  other  students  to  par- 
ticipate in  demonstrations  against  the  elections. 

There  is  something  ironic  about  sending  a  young  girl  to  this  country  to  study 
democracy,  then  sending  her  back  to  Vietnam  and  paying  the  police  who  arrested 
and  interrogated  her  for  protesting  the  one-man  elections. 

There  are  100,000  political  prisoners  in  the  Vietnamese  jails.  These  include 
Truong  Dinh  Dzu,  the  runner-up  in  the  1967  presidential  elections,  Tran  Ngoc 
Chau,  the  National  Assemblyman  who  received  the  largest  majority  of  votes  in 
the  1967  Assembly  race,  and  at  least  four  newspaper  editors.  But  mostly  they 
are  peasant  farm  people  caught  in  the  middle  or  politically  resisting  the  Saigon 
government — though  not  joining  the  NLF  with  weapons. 

As  the  urban  unrest  grew,  the  United  States  responded  with  more  and  more 
aid  to  the  police.  In  1963,  the  Vietnamese  police  force  was  16,000.  By  1971,  it 
had  reached  113,000.  The  United  States  has  built  the  Interrogation  Centers, 
provided  the  tear  gas,  and  supplied  increasing  quantities  of  sophisticated  equip- 
ment to  the  police.  In  April  1970,  eleven  students  were  released  from  Chi  Hoa 
prison.  They  had  slivers  under  their  fingernails,  small  burns  caused  by  their 
interrogators  extinguishing  cigarettes  in  sensitive  parts  of  the  body,  and  black- 
and-blue  welts  all  over  their  bodies.  A  group  of  American  volunteers  who  had 
seen  the  students  were  concerned  about  the  use  of  American  money  and  equip- 
ment in  the  torture  of  the  students.  They  went  to  Ambassador  Bunker's  office  to 
set  up  an  appointment.  They  were  told  that  Ambassador  Bunker  could  not  see 
them  and  were  sent  to  Deputy  Ambassador  Berger's  office.  His  office  said  that  the 
deputy  ambassador  could  not  see  them  and  sent  them  on  to  Youth  Affairs,  which 
sent  them  to  the  U.S.  AID  Public  Safety  Director.  He  would  not  talk  to  the  group 
and  sent  them  on  to  the  American  who  advised  the  Vietnamese  prison  system.  He 
told  them  that  their  problem  was  at  too  high  a  level  for  him  and  that  they  should 
see  Ambassador  Bunker. 

The  Saigon  government  has  used  an  increasing  amount  of  repression  to  con- 
trol the  growing  urban  unrest.  Two  laws  which  the  Saigon  government  has  used 
most  frequently  are: 


"Tell  Your  Friends  that  We're  People"  97 

Article  2  of  Decree  Law  Number  93/SL/CT  of  1964,  which  states:  "Shall  be 
considered  as  pro-Communist  neutralist  a  person  who  commits  acts  of  propa- 
ganda for  and  incitement  of  Neutralism;  these  acts  are  assimilated  to  acts  of 
jeopardizing  public  security." 

Article  19  of  Decree  Law  Number  004/66  of  1966,  which  states:  "Those 
persons  considered  dangerous  to  the  national  defense  and  public  security  may  be 
[without  trial]  interned  in  a  prison  or  banished  from  designated  areas  for  a 
maximum  period  of  two  years,  which  is  renewable.  .  .  ." 

The  U.S.  government  has  encouraged  the  use  of  the  police  against  all  political 
opposition.  In  the  1970  Annual  Report  from  the  Director  of  the  United  States 
Agency  for  International  Development  in  Vietnam  to  Ambassador  Bunker,  the 
role  of  the  police  is  described : 

During  1970  the  police  continued  to  improve  their  capability  in  traditional 
police  functions.  Their  timely  and  positive  action  effectively  contained  civil 
disturbances  involving  war  veterans,  students  and  religious  groups,  thereby 
preventing  the  spread  of  violence. 

Assistance  to  the  police  and  prisons  has  steadily  increased.  In  February  1970, 
$20.9  million  was  spent  on  the  police  and  prisons;  thirty  million  dollars  was 
budgeted  for  February  1971.  (As  a  comparison,  aid  to  public  health  went  from 
$27.8  million  down  to  $25  million  and  aid  to  education  went  from  $6.1  million 
down  to  $4.5  milHon  in  the  same  period.  )2 

After  the  discovery  of  the  Tiger  Cages  at  Con  Son  prison  island  and  the 
subsequent  international  press  coverage,  the  Saigon  government  held  a  press 
conference  announcing  that  it  was  doing  away  with  the  Tiger  Cages.  Two  months 
later,  they  ordered  the  political  prisoners  on  the  island  to  build  new  ones  as  a 
"self-help  project."  The  prisoners  refused  to  build  their  own  Tiger  Cages  and 
were  put  back  into  shackles.  On  January  7,  1971,  the  Department  of  the  Navy 
gave  a  $400,000  contract  to  Raymond,  Morrison,  Knutson-Brown,  Root,  and 
Jones  to  build  an  "isolation  compound"  to  replace  the  Tiger  Cages.  The  new 
cells  are  six  feet  by  eight  feet,  or  two  square  feet  smaller  than  the  former  five  by 
ten  foot  Tiger  Cages.  There  were  120  Tiger  Cages  built  by  the  French;  now 
there  are  386  "isolation  cells"  built  by  the  United  States. 

The  Vietnamese  have  protested  the  building  of  "new  Tiger  Cages"  by  the  U.S. 
government.  On  February  25,  1971,  for  example.  Con  Ong  (The  Bee)  printed  a 
full-page  cartoon  of  President  Nixon  unloading  a  new  Tiger  Cage  for  the  Viet- 
namese. The  poor  people  are  shouting  up  to  President  Nixon  as  he  unloads  the 
boat,  "Oh,  this  is  needed  more  than  schools,  hospitals,  churches,  pagodas  or 
clothes  for  our  women!" 

There  is  nothing  the  Vietnamese  can  do  to  protest  U.S.  policy  in  Vietnam 
short  of  demonstrating  or  joining  the  NLF.  For  example,  when  Vice-President 
Agnew  went  to  Vietnam  in  the  autumn  of  1970,  a  group  of  twenty-one  Viet- 
namese women  tried  to  see  him: 

"We  are  the  Mothers  of  the  political  prisoners  detained  in  the  various  prisons 
of  South  Vietnam,"  they  wrote.  "None  of  our  children  is  convicted  of  crime  or 
robbery.  All  of  them  are  being  imprisoned  because  they  have  dared  spoken  of 
Peace  and  Independence,  a  most  profound  desire  of  all  the  Vietnamese  People 
after  years  and  years  of  war.  Our  children  were  arrested  and  barbarously  tortured. 
They  have  been  denied  food  and  drink,  even  medicine  when  they  are  sick." 

The  guards  at  the  U.S.  embassy  would  not  allow  the  leader  of  the  women,  Mrs. 
Ngo  Ba  Thanh,  to  enter  the  embassy  to  give  the  letter  to  Vice-President  Agnew. 


98      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Nor  would  they  take  the  letter  into  the  embassy  or  use  the  phone  which  they 
had  at  the  gate  to  inform  anyone  inside  the  embassy  that  the  women  had  a 
petition  to  give  to  the  Vice-President. 

"The  police  forces  which  arrest  and  repress  our  children  are  being  paid  by 
the  Americans,"  they  wrote.  "The  equipment  used  by  the  Police  to  repress, 
torture,  and  jail  our  children  is  part  of  the  U.S.  aid.  The  tear  gas,  the  rockets 
used  to  repress  them  are  'made  in  U.S.A.'  We  actually  witnessed  the  terrible 
repression  being  carried  out  right  in  front  of  the  U.S.  embassy  when  we  and 
our  foreign  friends  demonstrated  against  the  prison  system  on  July  11th,  1970. 
.  .  .  Our  children  witness  the  presence  of  American  advisors  at  the  prisons. 
They  know  that  more  aid  is  being  given  to  build  more  and  bigger  prisons." 

The  women  presented  sixteen  suggested  improvements.  These  included:  No 
citizen  shall  be  arrested  without  lawful  grounds.  All  prisoners  should  be  provided 
proper  food  and  drink  and  appropriate  care  when  they  are  sick.  The  prisoners 
should  be  allowed  to  write  to  their  families.  Parents  should  be  notified  when 
children  are  arrested.  Criminal  prisoners  should  not  be  used  to  guard  political 
prisoners.  Prisoners  whose  jail  terms  have  expired  should  be  released.  Tiger 
cages,  cattle  cages,  mysterious  caves,  separate  cells,  discipline  cells  and  rooms 
used  for  inhumane  tortures  should  be  abolished.  When  a  prisoner  dies,  his  body 
should  be  returned  to  his  family  for  proper  burial. 

"The  role  of  the  American  advisors  should  be  to  improve  the  prisoners'  con- 
ditions, not  merely  watch  the  tortures  done  to  our  children,  who  suffer  from 
hunger,  thirst,  disease  and  survive  in  agony  in  jail,"  the  women  argued. 

But  there  is  no  way  for  average  citizens  of  Vietnam  to  indicate  how  they 
would  like  to  see  U.S.  aid  given.  Nothing  is  said  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  about 
how  a  farm  woman  or  a  market  saleslady  might  indicate  how  she  would  like  to 
see  American  help  used.  If  the  Pentagon  Papers  were  translated  for  the  Viet- 
namese farm  people,  they  would  see  things  being  done  just  as  they  were  while 
the  French  were  there.  They  saw  no  help  coming  to  them  then  nor  was  there 
any  way  for  them  to  change  the  "system"  when  the  French  were  there  except 
for  armed  revolution.  Things  have  not  changed. 

One  other  group  of  people  that  the  decisionmakers  who  wrote  the  memos  in 
the  Pentagon  Papers  ignored  is  the  American  soldiers.  Most  American  soldiers 
go  to  Vietnam  thinking  that  they  are  going  to  help  the  Vietnamese.  When  they 
arrive,  they  find  that  the  Vietnamese  don't  want  them  there.  They  are  demon- 
strating against  U.S.  policy.  U.S.  jeeps  are  being  burned  and  signs  are  painted 
on  the  sidewalk  walls:  "GI  go  home."  The  American  soldier  goes  to  Vietnam 
to  fight  communism.  Yet  none  of  the  soldiers  knows  who  the  Communists  are. 
Everyone  wears  black  pajamas! 

He  is  frustrated,  and  often  terribly  bored.  He  is  looking  for  help,  some  kind 
of  escape.  His  officer  tells  him  to  be  a  man  and  go  on  to  battle.  He  finds  the 
chaplaincy  as  conservative  as  General  William  Westmoreland.  It's  Christ's  war, 
he's  told,  and  given  a  prayer  book: 

Guide  me,  direct  me  in  my  military  duty.  You  know  what  my  responsi- 
bility is:  if  I  must  use  force,  let  it  be  without  hatred  for  the  enemy  as  a 
person,  but  only  with  greater  love  of  what  I  believe  is  better,  good,  true 
and  necessary  to  defend  so  that  "Thy  will  be  done.  Thy  Kingdom  come." 
Jesus,  You  are  the  God  of  both  me  and  the  enemy — You  made  us  both. 
Because  of  You,  I  respect  the  dignity  of  all  men,  even  my  enemy.  If  I 
kill  or  injure  anyone  in  my  duty,  I  pray  You  will  have  mercy  on  their 


"Tell  Your  Friends  that  We're  People"  99 

souls  and  families.  Help  me,  dear  God,  to  fulfull  my  military  duty  in  line 
with  genuine  Christian  principles,  honor  and  true  justice.^ 

The  American  soldier  becomes  part  of  the  push-button  war.  If  he  is  a  pilot, 
he  drops  bombs  on  a  village  without  any  idea  of  whom  he  is  killing.  Through 
electronic  devices  called  "people  sniffers,"  or  seismic  sensors,  body  heat  can  be 
picked  up  in  remote  jungle  areas.  A  signal  is  sent  by  the  electronic  "people 
sniffers"  to  headquarters  and  the  area  is  bombed  by  airplanes  or  bombarded  by 
105  or  155  howitzer  guns.  The  "people  sniffers"  cannot  tell  the  difference  be- 
tween North  Vietnamese  soldiers,  Montagnard  women  going  to  market,  or 
farmers  getting  bamboo  to  fix  their  homes.  They  cannot  even  tell  the  difference 
between  people  and  animals.  One  soldier  told  me  about  following  fifty  or  so 
"bodies"  moving  southward  on  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  Trail.  The  area  was  bombed 
and  he  was  on  the  detail  sent  out  to  make  the  body  count.  They  got  twenty- 
seven — monkeys . 

The  American  soldier  is  looking  for  escape.  And  he  finds  more  "escape"  and 
solace  in  heroin  than  he  does  from  his  officers  or  chaplains.  In  May  1971,  heroin 
was  selling  for  two  dollars  a  vial.  It  could  be  bought  from  almost  any  cigarette 
saleslady  and  from  many  of  the  shoeshine  boys  (who  sometimes  got  hooked 
when  soldiers  would  get  them  to  sniff  it  so  that  they  could  watch  the  boy's 
reaction).  By  mid- 1971,  15  percent  of  the  U.S.  soldiers  were  using  hard  drugs. 
One  reason  for  the  high  number  of  nonhostile  casualties  has  been  the  ODs 
(overdoses).  The  purity  of  heroin  in  Vietnam  is  about  95  percent.  Men  who 
used  heroin  in  the  U.S.  before  going  to  Vietnam  got  it  in  the  U.S.  at  10  percent 
purity.  When  the  same  amount  of  powder  was  used  in  Vietnam,  it  killed  the 
soldier.  Another  problem  has  been  that  two  dollars'  worth  of  heroin  in  Viet- 
nam will  cost  $50  or  $100  in  the  United  States.  The  returning  addict  often 
resorts  to  stealing  or  pushing  drugs  to  others.  The  problem  of  addiction  has  al- 
most been  ignored  by  the  Veterans'  Hospitals  in  this  country. 

The  officials  who  made  the  decisions  that  got  us  deeper  and  deeper  into 
Vietnam  have  moved  on — McNamara  to  head  the  World  Bank,  McGeorge 
Bundy  to  head  the  Ford  Foundation,  William  Bundy  to  edit  Foreign  Affairs. 
Each  has  been  given  a  new  job  in  one  of  the  foundations  or  institutions  where 
our  foreign  and  domestic  policies  are  made.  Perhaps  it  should  not  surprise 
us  to  find  that  the  officials  who  treated  the  Vietnamese  so  callously  would 
treat  Americans  (or  Brazilians,  East  Pakistanis,  Greeks,  etc.)  any  differently. 

The  similarities  to  Vietnam  are  obvious.  In  Vietnam,  the  growing  police  force 
has  not  been  used  to  combat  the  growing  crime  rate,  but  to  control  and  repress 
political  opposition.  In  the  United  States,  where  the  police  and  crime  are  both 
increasing  rapidly,  the  police  and  court  systems  are  being  used  more  and  more 
often  as  political  forces.  An  increasing  amount  of  surveillance  is  being  used; 
mass  arrests  in  Washington  and  other  large  cities  have  become  frequent;  the 
Washington  Post,  New  York  Times  and  other  newspapers  were  censored  on  the 
question  of  the  Pentagon  Papers. 

In  Vietnam,  one  whole  organization.  International  Voluntary  Services,  was 
kicked  out  of  that  country  for  being  "too  political."  The  Vietnam  director, 
Hugh  Manke,  had  testified  before  the  Kennedy  Senate  Subcommittee  on  Refugees 
and  protested  the  forced  movement  of  the  Montagnards  from  their  mountain 
homes  into  the  city  slums.  One  of  the  IVS  team  members,  Alex  Shimkin,  had 
told  a  New  York  Times  reporter  about  the  forced  use  of  farm  labor  to  clear  a 
mine  field  in  Ba  Chuc  village  in  the  Mekong  delta  when  American  officials 


100      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

there  refused  to  act  even  after  some  of  the  farm  people  were  killed  and  several 
wounded.  In  Charleston,  West  Virginia,  a  group  of  volunteers  from  VISTA,  a 
domestic  group  which  is  similar  to  IVS,  were  fired  for  stirring  up  trouble  there. 
They  had  helped  the  mountain  people  around  Charleston  get  school  lunches 
for  their  children  and  to  protest  the  inequalities  between  elemencary  education 
for  mountain  children  and  Charleston  children. 

Another  example  can  be  found  in  the  different  standards  of  justice  for  the 
rich  and  for  the  poor.  In  Vietnam,  when  Pham  Chi  Thien  was  caught  smuggling 
a  million  dollars'  worth  of  heroin  into  Saigon,  he  just  continued  his  job  as 
congressman.  When  election  time  came,  he  was  allowed  to  run  for  office  again 
(he  lost!).  But  poor  people  caught  stealing  ten  pounds  of  rice,  or  students  caught 
in  peace  demonstrations,  can  spend  five  years  in  jail.  As  a  parallel,  when  Bobby 
Baker  was  caught  at  extortion  involving  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  at  the 
highest  levels  of  our  government,  he  was  sentenced  to  less  time  in  jail  than  George 
Jackson  spent  when  he  was  charged  with  stealing  seventy  dollars'  worth  of 
groceries. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  came  as  a  shock  to  this  country.  Most  people  feel 
powerless,  though.  We  have  seen  and  heard  our  highest  officials  lie  and  violate 
the  international  agreement  on  warfare  before.  Yet  most  feel  helpless  to  cope 
with  the  actions  of  high  officials. 

While  Lieutenant  Calley  was  being  tried,  Vice-President  Spiro  Agnew  ap- 
peared on  "Face  the  Nation"  (May  3,  1970)  to  explain  the  invasion  of  Cam- 
bodia: "The  purpose  of  the  strikes  into  the  sanctuaries  is  not  to  go  into  Cam- 
bodia," the  Vice-President  said,  "but  to  take  and  reduce  these  supply  depots, 
the  hospital  complexes.  .  .  ."  To  re-emphasize  his  point,  he  added  five  minutes 
later:  "But  they  cannot  move  these  facilities  such  as  hospitals.  .  .  ." 

Article  19  of  the  Geneva  Convention  for  the  Amelioration  of  the  Condition 
of  the  Wounded  and  Sick  in  Armed  Forces  in  the  Field  of  12  August  1959 
states:  "Fixed  establishments  and  mobile  medical  units  of  the  Medical  Service 
may  in  no  circumstances  be  attacked,  but  shall  at  all  times  be  respected  and 
protected  by  the  Parties  to  the  conflict." 

In  Vietnam  some  American  adventurers  managed  several  small  groups  of 
Vietnamese  dance  girls  who  went  out  to  the  remote  American  outposts  to  put 
on  their  show.  The  final  act  was  to  auction  off  the  leading  lady  to  one  of  the 
U.S.  military  officers. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  show  the  United  States  callously  pursuing  its  own 
selfish  motives  through  the  Second  Indochina  War  without  regard  for  the  people 
of  Vietnam,  Cambodia  and  Laos  or  concern  for  America.  Perhaps  the  greatest 
lesson  to  be  learned  is  that  a  person  cannot  destroy  another  person  without 
destroying  something  of  himself;  a  nation  cannot  destroy  another  nation  without 
destroying  something  of  itself. 


Notes 

1.  Viet  Nam:  The  Unheard  Voices,  by  Don  Luce  and  John  Sommer,  Cornell  Univer- 
sity Press,  Ithaca,  New  York,  1969,  pages  181-182. 

2.  Report  to  the  Ambassador  from  the  Director  of  the  United  States  Agency  for  In- 
ternational Development,  1970,  pages  42  and  43. 

3.  From  A  Soldier  Prays  in  Vietnam,  "Prayer  for  the  Enemy,"  page  13  (no  publisher 
is  listed  on  the  pamphlet).  It  is  passed  out  by  chaplains  and  at  the  USO. 


101 


8.     The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia: 
Japan  in  and  Out  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 

by  John  W .  Dower 

Pursuing  references  to  Japan  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  somewhat  like  entering 
an  echo  chamber.  Several  concepts  formulated  by  the  National  Security  Council 
(NSC)  around  1949  return  again  and  again  in  subsequent  NSC  documents 
through  the  1960s;  reverberate  in  the  opinions  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff;  carom 
off  into  the  public  statements  of  official  spolcesmen.i  Refinements  occur  over 
time,  but  are  less  striking  than  the  dogged  repetition  of  certain  catch  phrases 
concerning  Japan  and  its  projected  role  in  the  American  structuring  of  Asia. 
There  are  no  great  surprises  in  these  documents  insofar  as  an  understanding  of 
postwar  U.S.-Japanese  relations  is  concerned;  presumedly  these  relations  were 
addressed  more  directly  in  the  diplomatic  papers  used  for  the  original  Pentagon 
study  but  withheld  from  publication.  Certainly  the  full  story  of  Japan's  role  in 
postwar  Asia  will  require  access  to  "Japan  Papers"  in  both  Japanese  and  English 
at  least  as  voluminous  as  the  Pentagon  Papers,  and  most  probably  more  complex. 
Still,  with  the  Pentagon  Papers  plus  a  variety  of  other  materials  which  have 
recently  become  available,  it  is  now  possible  to  structure  the  general  course  of 
Japan's  postwar  development  in  a  more  meaningful  way.  The  essay  which  follows 
is  an  attempt  to  suggest  one  such  framework  of  analysis — and,  more  importantly, 
to  point  to  certain  questions  and  problems  which  seem  to  demand  particularly 
careful  attention  and  study  in  the  future — and  to  do  so  as  much  as  possible  by 
letting  the  sources  utilized  speak  for  themselves. 

Since  1945  the  course  taken  by  Japan  has  been  influenced  by  a  single  outside 
power,  the  United  States,  to  an  extent  rare  outside  the  history  of  colonial  coun- 
tries. That  influence  has  been  less  criminal  than  the  American  impact  upon 
Vietnam  and  Indochina;  it  has  been  less  brutally  tragic  than  the  U.S.  role  vis-a-vis 
Korea.  But  it  has  not  necessarily  been  less  pervasive  than  in  these  other  cases, 
and  thus  the  study  of  postwar  Japan  becomes  virtually  inseparable  from  the 
examination  of  U.S.-Japanese  relations.  That  is  not  the  only  focus  possible  or 
essential,  of  course — and  indeed  most  scholars  dealing  with  postwar  Japan  tend 
to  blur  this  issue — but  without  this  perspective,  developments  within  Japan,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  thrust  of  Japan's  role  in  Asia,  simply  cannot  be  comprehended. 
The  interlocks  are  complex  and  everywhere,  and  the  key  to  these  locks  lies  not 
so  much  in  Japan  itself  as  in  American  cold-war  policy  toward  Asia.  Economic, 
political  and  social  change  in  post- 1945  Japan  has  been  shaped  (and  misshapen) 
by  this.  Japan's  postwar  role  in  all  Asia  has  litde  meaning  apart  from  this.  And 
just  as  U.S.  policy  has  been  the  key  to  an  understanding  of  Japan  over  the  last 
several  decades,  so  in  turn  Japan  has  been  the  single  most  important  key  to 
American  policy  in  Asia  during  this  same  period.  Neither  the  Korean  War  nor 
the  isolation  and  containment  of  China  nor  the  Vietnam  and  Indochina  wars  can 
be  understood  apart  from  the  role  played  by  Japan  in  American  eyes.  In  U.S.  policy 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  John  W.  Dower 


102      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

toward  Asia,  in  the  word  of  those  who  made  it,  was  that  "keystone."  It  remains 
so  today,  for  the  keystone  is  now  also  the  third  most  powerful  nation  in  the 
world. 

In  the  pages  which  follow,  this  relationship  is  approached  from  several  direc- 
tions. Section  1  draws  mostly  upon  the  Pentagon  Papers  to  document  what  has 
long  been  obvious:  that  Japan,  more  than  Korea  and  more  than  Southeast  Asia, 
has  always  been  viewed  by  American  policymakers  as  the  superdomino  in  Asia 
(like  Germany  in  Europe),  and  much  of  America's  postwar  Asian  policy  has 
derived  from  adherence  to  this  simplistic  metaphor.  Section  2  relates  this  per- 
spective on  the  domino  theory  to  the  American  creation,  beginning  around  1949, 
of  a  U.S.-Japan-Southeast  Asia  nexus  aimed  at  the  creation  of  a  capitalist  bloc 
in  Asia  and  an  economic  and  military  noose  around  China.  It  traces  the  pur- 
portedly new  "regionalism"  of  the  Nixon  Doctrine  through  all  postwar  U.S. 
administrations  prior  to  Nixon.  Section  3  examines  the  U.S.-Japan  relationship 
as,  in  effect,  a  twentieth-century  version  of  the  unequal-treaty  systems  under 
which  Westerners  have  always  felt  most  comfortable  when  dealing  with  Asians. 
It  suggests  some  of  the  levers  manipulated  by  the  United  States  to  gain  Japanese 
acquiescence  to  the  Pax  Americana  in  Asia.  And  by  focusing  primarily  on  the 
occupation  period  and  its  immediate  aftermath,  this  section  attempts  to  briefly 
suggest  the  way  in  which  domestic  developments  within  Japan  have  been  shaped 
by  American  power. 

Section  4  addresses  the  role  of  war  and  militarization  in  postwar  Japanese 
development,  and  points  out  some  generally  neglected  anomalies  in  the  nature 
of  both  the  U.S.-Japan  military  relationship  and  the  thrust  of  Japanese  rearma- 
ment. Although  the  Japanese  economic  "miracle"  has  been  intimately  coupled 
with  war  since  the  nineteenth  century,  and  thus  offers  the  possibility  for  a  search- 
ing case  study  into  problems  of  capitalism  and  imperialism,  bourgeois  scholars 
have  tended  to  skirt  this  problem.  It  is,  in  fact,  somewhat  skirted  here  also,  but 
the  question  is  raised  for  the  postwar  Japanese  economy,  and  in  particular 
attention  is  drawn  to  the  correlation  between  U.S.  escalation  of  the  war  in  Viet- 
nam in  1964-1965  and  the  simultaneous  Japanese  move  toward  economic  he- 
gemony in  its  two  ex-colonies,  Taiwan  and  the  southern  part  of  Korea.  Section 
5  attempts  to  structure  some  of  the  paradoxes  of  the  postwar  relationship  by 
examining  American  attitudes  regarding  the  potential  of  Sino-Japanese  economic 
relations,  the  superficially  ironic  fear  of  an  American  "loss  of  face"  in  Japan, 
the  gap  between  the  Japanese  ruling  elites  and  the  Japanese  public,  and  the  po- 
tential of  the  Japanese  masses  for  revolutionary  action  (thus  prompting,  among 
other  things,  conscious  cultural  imperialism  on  the  part  of  the  United  States). 
On  the  surface,  the  totalistic  (either/or)  superdomino  framework,  which  the 
Pentagon  Papers  reveal  as  having  guided  American  policy  toward  Japan  up  to 
the  mid-1960s,  seems  irrational  and  even  paranoid.  One  explanation  for  this, 
it  is  finally  suggested  here,  can  be  located  in  the  conceptualizations  of  "totali- 
tarianism," "authoritarianism,"  or  "collectivism"  fashionable  among  liberals  dur- 
ing this  (and  earlier)  periods.  That  is,  American  policymakers  were  possessed 
by  a  fear  of  Japanese  "accommodation  to  communism"  because  they  saw  a 
fundamental  identity  between  the  politics  of  the  political  right  and  the  politics 
of  the  political  left.  Communism  and  fascism  blurred  under  the  rubric  of  au- 
thoritarianism, and  confronted  by  a  Japan  moving  increasingly  to  the  right  under 
U.S.  pressure,  the  question  inevitably  arose:  How  far  right  is  left? 

The  final  and  longest  section  deals  with  Japan  since  1968,  that  is,  since  the 
period  covered  by  the  Pentagon  Papers,  and  outlines  the  striking  contradictions 
which  have  emerged  with  seeming  suddenness  to  characterize  the  U.S.-Japan 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  103 

alliance.  The  discussion  focuses  on  Japan's  emergence  as  a  "superpower,"  on 
economic  tensions  between  the  two  countries,  and  on  the  decidedly  new  stage 
of  miHtary  escalation  which  Japan  has  embarked  upon  under  U.S.  pressure.  It 
asks,  in  brief:  Where  is  Japan  going?  The  economic  crisis  is  approached  through 
a  revealing  document  recently  released  by  the  Japanese  Foreign  Ministry.  Japa- 
nese militarism  is  addressed  through  Congressional  hearings  and  reports,  Chinese 
critiques,  and  analysis  of  the  1969  Nixon-Sato  joint  communique,  the  Okinawa 
reversion  trade-offs,  and  two  key  documents  issued  by  the  Japanese  Defense 
Agency  in  1970.  The  final  pages  of  the  essay  summarize  the  position  taken  by 
American  spokesmen  who  view  the  Nixon-Kissinger  rapprochement  toward 
China  as  a  potential  disaster  insofar  as  the  U.S.-Japan  relationship  is  concerned 
and  who,  in  the  conclusion  reached  here,  in  a  sense  seem  to  have  brought  the 
situation  full  circle:  to  the  superdomino,  and  the  apocalypse. 

1.    THE  SUPERDOMINO 

Because  of  their  particular  focus  on  Vietnam,  the  Pentagon  Papers  offer 
largely  a  tunnel  vision  of  Japan  as  the  ultimate  domino.  Thus,  in  what  the  Papers 
describe  as  the  "classic  statement  of  the  domino  theory,"  it  is  argued  that  should 
the  United  States  fail  in  its  objectives  in  Vietnam,  the  consequences  would  extend 
far  beyond  Southeast  Asia: 

Even  the  Philippines  would  become  shaky,  and  the  threat  to  India  on  the 
West,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  to  the  South,  and  Taiwan,  Korea,  and 
Japan  to  the  North  and  East  would  be  greatly  increased  (Gravel  edition, 
111:3,51). 

How  would  Japan  respond  to  this  "threat"?  The  Papers  are  clear  on  this.  In  the 
most  sanguine  appraisal,  Japan  would  be  "pressured  to  assume  at  best,  a  neu- 
tralist role"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:664).  More  probably,  Japan  would  move  into  the 
Communist  camp : 

Orientation  of  Japan  toward  the  West  is  the  keystone  of  United  States 
policy  in  the  Far  East.  In  the  judgment  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  loss 
of  Southeast  Asia  to  Communism  would,  through  economic  and  political 
pressures,  drive  Japan  into  an  accommodation  with  the  Communist  Bloc. 
The  communization  of  Japan  would  be  the  probable  ultimate  result. 

The  rice,  tin,  rubber,  and  oil  of  Southeast  Asia  and  the  industrial  capacity 
of  Japan  are  the  essential  elements  which  Red  China  needs  to  build  a 
monolithic  military  structure  far  more  formidable  than  that  of  Japan  prior 
to  World  War  II.  If  this  complex  of  military  power  is  permitted  to  develop 
to  its  full  potential,  it  would  ultimately  control  the  entire  Western  and 
Southwestern  Pacific  region  and  would  threaten  South  Asia  and  the  Middle 
East  (Gravel  ed.,  1:450). 

This  apocalyptic  appraisal  dominates  these  documents,  shared  in  common  by 
civilian  and  military  policymakers.  Japan's  estrangement  from  the  United  States 
would  cause  the  collapse  of  the  entire  U.S.  military  and  economic  strategy  in 
the  Pacific,  South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East — until  eventually  a  threat  to  the 
very  "security  and  stability  of  Europe,  could  be  expected  to  ensue"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:452;  cf.  1:375,  386,  463).  John  Foster  Dulles  often  evoked  this  image  of 


104      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Japan  as  the  global  superdomino  in  his  public  speeches  in  the  late  1940s  and 
1950s.  The  Pentagon  Papers  make  it  clear  that  the  famous  Dulles  rhetoric  actually 
was,  and  remained,  an  internal  touchstone  of  U.S.  policy  at  the  highest  levels. 

Japan  has  been  the  key  to  postwar  American  policy  in  Asia  since  approxi- 
mately 1948  because,  quite  simply,  it  is  strategically  located  and  possesses  im- 
mense war-making  potential.  George  Kennan  revealed  in  his  Memoirs  that,  as 
head  of  the  NSC  Planning  Staff,  he  stressed  this  point  upon  returning  from  a 
visit  to  occupied  Japan  in  February  and  March,  1948.^  In  one  of  the  most 
valuable  documents  pertaining  to  Japan  among  the  Pentagon  Papers — an  NSC 
draft  of  December  23,  1949,  based  on  NSC  48  and  reprinted  only  in  the  gov- 
ernment's own  edition — this  point  received  forceful  emphasis: 

If  Japan,  the  principal  component  of  a  Far  Eastern  war-making  complex, 
were  added  to  the  Stalinist  bloc,  the  Soviet  Asian  base  could  become  a 
source  of  strength  capable  of  shifting  the  balance  of  world  power  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

In  the  power  potential  of  Asia,  Japan  plays  the  most  important  part  by 
reason  of  its  industrious,  aggressive  population,  providing  a  larger  pool  of 
trained  manpower,  its  integrated  internal  communications  system  with  a 
demonstrated  potential  for  an  efficient  merchant  marine,  its  already  de- 
veloped industrial  base  and  its  strategic  position.  .  .  . 

The  industrial  plant  of  Japan  would  be  the  richest  strategic  prize  in  the 
Far  East  for  the  USSR.  .  .  . 

From  the  military  point  of  view,  the  United  States  must  maintain  a  mini- 
mum position  in  Asia  if  a  successful  defense  is  to  be  achieved  against  future 
Soviet  aggression.  This  minimum  position  is  considered  to  consist  of  at 
least  our  present  military  position  in  the  Asian  offshore  island  chain,  and 
in  the  event  of  war  its  denial  to  the  Communists.  The  chain  represents  our 
first  line  of  defense  and  in  addition,  our  first  line  of  offense  from  which  we 
may  seek  to  reduce  the  area  of  Communist  control,  using  whatever  means 
we  can  develop,  without,  however,  using  sizeable  United  States  armed 
forces.  The  first  line  of  strategic  defense  should  include  Japan,  the  Ryukyus, 
and  the  Philippines.  This  minimum  position  will  permit  control  of  the  main 
lines  of  communication  necessary  to  United  States  strategic  development  of 
the  important  sections  of  the  Asian  area.^ 

The  1949  NSC  position  bore  a  strong  Kennan  imprint,  distinguishing  between 
the  respectively  dismal  and  bright  power  potentials  of  China  and  Japan  on  the 
one  hand,  and  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  China  as  threats  to  the  United 
States  on  the  other  hand.  The  policy  at  this  time  was  overwhelmingly  anti-Soviet, 
and  in  fact  the  NSC  took  care  to  emphasize  that  "The  USSR  is  the  primary 
target  of  those  economic  policies  designed  to  contain  or  turn  back  Soviet- 
Communist  imperialism  and  not  China  or  any  of  the  Soviet  satellites  considered 
as  individual  countries."  ^  As  late  as  the  basic  "New  Look"  document  of  the 
Eisenhower  Administration  in  October  1953  (NSC  162/2),  the  possibility  that 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  might  assert  its  independence  from  the  USSR 
was  still  acknowledged,  but  by  this  time  the  observation  was  irrelevant  and 
Japan's  strategic  role — originally  conceived  vis-a-vis  the  Soviet  Union — was 
simply  retooled  to  counter  the  "Communist  Bloc"  or,  increasingly  from  the  time 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  105 

of  the  Korean  War,  simply  "Communist  China."  Under  the  Kennedy  Admin- 
istration, occasionally  commended  for  its  less  dogmatic  view  of  China,  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  was  in  fact  elevated  to  the  position  of  foremost  enemy,  and  Japan's 
role  was  seen  primarily  in  this  context.^ 

However  vaguely  or  precisely  the  enemy  has  been  defined — the  Soviet  Bloc 
or  the  Communist  Bloc,  the  USSR  or  China,  North  Korea  or  North  Vietnam — 
Japan's  strategic  importance  has  remained  essentially  the  same.  Both  militarily 
and  economically  it  was  developed  to  become  the  linchpin  of  U.S.  forward  con- 
tainment in  Southeast  as  well  as  Northeast  Asia.  Its  functions  have  been  many- 
faceted.  On  the  military  side  Japan,  including  Okinawa,  provides  extensive  bases 
and  services  to  the  U.S.  Air  Force  and  Seventh  Fleet,  plus  its  own  evolving  mili- 
tary capabilities.  Economically  it  has  been  directed  to  shore  up  America's  falter- 
ing Asian  allies  through  exports,  aid,  and  investments — while  in  turn  drawing 
sustenance  from  them  in  the  form  of  raw  materials  plus  trade  and  investment 
profits.  Japan's  role  vis-a-vis  China,  clear  since  1950,  has  been  to  contain  it 
militarily,  isolate  it  economically,  and  enable  other  less  developed  countries  on 
China's  periphery  to  do  likewise. 

2.    THE  U.S.-JAPAN-SOUTHEAST  ASIA  NEXUS 

The  Pentagon  Papers  reveal  not  only  the  "keystone"  role  of  Japan,  but  also 
the  fact  that  creation  of  triangular,  mutually  reinforcing  relations  between  the 
United  States,  Japan,  and  Southeast  Asia  has  been  integral  to  American  objec- 
tives in  Asia  since  the  late  1940s.  This  policy  actually  preceded  the  firm  U.S. 
commitment  to  rigid  isolation  of  China,  and  was  merely  intensified  by  the  adop- 
tion of  the  containment  strategy.  In  the  December  23,  1949,  NSC  document, 
this  was  stressed  from  the  Japanese  point  of  view: 

While  scrupulously  avoiding  assumption  of  responsibility  for  raising  Asiatic 
living  standards,  it  is  to  the  U.S.  interest  to  promote  the  ability  of  these  coun- 
tries to  maintain,  on  a  self-supporting  basis,  the  economic  conditions  pre- 
requisite to  political  stability.  Japan  can  only  maintain  its  present  living 
standard  on  a  self-supporting  basis  if  it  is  able  to  secure  a  greater  proportion 
of  its  needed  food  and  raw  material  (principally  cotton)  imports  from  the 
Asiatic  area,  in  which  its  natural  markets  lie,  rather  than  from  the  U.S.,  in 
which  its  export  market  is  small.  In  view  of  the  desirability  of  avoiding 
preponderant  dependence  on  Chinese  sources,  and  the  limited  availability 
of  supplies  from  prewar  sources  in  Korea  and  Formosa,  this  will  require  a 
considerable  increase  in  Southern  Asiatic  food  and  raw  material  exports.^ 

It  was  also  approached  from  the  complementary  perspective  of  Japan's  capacity 
to  contribute  to  economic  development  in  non-communist  Asia: 

Our  interest  in  a  viable  economy  in  the  non-Communist  countries  of  Asia 
would  be  advanced  by  increased  trade  among  such  countries.  Japanese  and 
Indian  industrial  revival  and  development  can  contribute  to  enlarged  intra- 
regional  trade  relations  which  suffered  a  set-back  because  of  the  economic 
vacuum  resulting  from  the  defeat  of  Japan,  the  devastation  caused  by  the 
war  in  other  areas  and  the  interference  and  restrictions  arising  from  ex- 
tensive governmental  controls."^ 


106      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

While  general  economic  relations  between  Japan  and  China  were  not  opposed 
by  the  NSC  at  this  time,  certain  restrictions  in  Japan's  trade  with  the  mainland 
were  encouraged,  as  was  the  development  of  alternative  (non-Chinese)  markets 
for  Japan: 

It  should  also  be  our  objective  to  prevent  Chinese  Communists  from  ob- 
taining supplies  of  goods  of  direct  military  utility  which  might  be  used  to 
threaten  directly  the  security  interests  of  the  western  powers  in  Asia.  It  is 
not,  however,  either  necessary  or  advisable  to  restrict  trade  with  China  in 
goods  which  are  destined  for  normal  civilian  uses  within  China  provided 
safeguards  are  established  to  accomplish  the  two  objectives  mentioned  above 
[denial  of  strategic  goods  to  the  USSR  and  China].  .  .  .  Japan's  economy 
cannot  possibly  be  restored  to  a  self-sustaining  basis  without  a  considerable 
volume  of  trade  with  China,  the  burden  of  Japan  on  the  United  States 
economy  cannot  be  removed  unless  Japan's  economy  is  restored  to  a  self- 
sustaining  basis  and  U.S.  interference  with  natural  Japanese  trade  relations 
with  China  would  produce  profound  Japanese  hostility.  .  .  .  While  SCAP 
should  be  requested  to  avoid  preponderant  dependence  on  Chinese  markets 
and  sources  of  supply  he  should  not  be  expected  to  apply  controls  upon 
Japan's  trade  with  China  more  restrictive  than  those  applied  by  Western 
European  countries  in  their  trade  with  China.  At  the  same  time,  SCAP 
should  encourage  development  of  alternative  Japanese  markets  elsewhere  in 
the  world,  including  Southern  and  Southeast  Asia,  on  an  economic  basis.^ 

Comparable  policies  concerning  Japan  and  Southeast  Asia  were  briefly  reem- 
phasized  by  the  NSC  in  a  document  prepared  four  months  prior  to  the  San 
Francisco  peace  conference  of  September  1951,  with  the  added  specific  goal  of 
encouraging  Japanese  military  production  for  use  "in  Japan  and  in  other  non- 
communist  countries  of  Asia"  ^  (see  Section  3  below). 

The  exact  point  at  which  the  United  States  abandoned  its  policy  of  permitting 
Japan  to  restore  relations  with  China  remains  unclear,  although  it  is  known  that 
both  Prime  Minister  Shigeru  Yoshida  and  Britain's  Foreign  Minister  Herbert 
Morrison  participated  in  the  San  Francisco  peace  conference  with  Dulles'  assur- 
ances that  after  independence  Japan  would  be  free  to  establish  relations  with 
China — as  in  fact  both  the  Japanese  and  British  desired.  Following  the  peace 
conference,  however,  Dulles  foreclosed  this  option.  In  December  1951  he  jour- 
neyed to  Japan  to  inform  Yoshida  that  the  price  of  Congressional  ratification  of 
the  peace  treaty  would  be  a  Japanese  pledge  of  nonrelations  with  the  People's 
Republic.  The  Japanese  had  little  choice  but  to  comply,  and  the  resultant  "Yoshida 
Letter"  of  December  1951  was  Japan's  ticket  to  second-class  independence  in 
America's  Asia.^o  Under  CHINCOM  (China  Committee),  the  U.S.-directed  in- 
ternational group  established  in  September  1952  to  formalize  an  embargo  on 
exports  to  China,  "independent"  Japan  was  maneuvered  into  acceptance  of  con- 
trols over  trade  with  China  which,  until  1957,  were  more  strict  and  far-reaching 
than  the  controls  adhered  to  by  any  other  country  with  the  exception  of  the 
United  States.  Writing  on  this  subject  in  1967,  Gunnar  Adler-Karlson  observed 
that  "The  reasons  for  this  are  at  present  unknown,  but  the  pressure  from  the 
American  side  on  a  nation  defeated  in  the  war  is  likely  to  have  been  the  main 
reason."  Even  after  the  Western  European  countries  in  effect  repudiated  the 
CHINCOM  restrictions  in  1957,  Japan's  trade  with  China  and  its  conformance 
with  the  continuing  U.S.  embargo  was  subject  to  regular  discussion  in  meetings 
of  the  U.S.-Japanese  Joint  Economic  Committee.^^ 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  107 

With  China  thus  substantially  closed  to  Japan  as  both  open  market  and  source 
of  raw  materials,  the  imperatives  of  developing  Southeast  Asia  (and  the  United 
States)  as  alternative  economic  partners  for  Japan  became  even  greater.  This 
was  accomplished  through  complex  economic  manipulations  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  in  particular,  but  also  Japan — lucrative  American  military  pur- 
chases in  Japan  (''special  procurements");  military-related  U.S.  aid  packages 
(the  Mutual  Defense  Assistance,  or  MDA,  agreements);  U.S. -arranged  preferen- 
tial treatment  for  Japan  through  the  World  Bank;  most-favored-nation  treatment 
under  the  General  Agreements  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT);  triangular  trade- 
offs in  the  export/import  lists  of  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  Southeast  Asia 
(pivoting  on  U.S.  Public  Law  480,  whereby  U.S.  agricultural  surpluses  were 
moved  into  Japan  to  stimulate  the  Japanese  economy  with  special  focus  on 
Japanese  exports  to  Southeast  Asia);  use  of  Japanese  reparations  to  Southeast 
Asia  as  the  cutting  edge  of  Japan's  economic  penetration  of  the  area;  and  so 
on.^-  Thus  long  before  the  1954  Geneva  Conference,  the  American  economic 
blueprint  for  Asia  tied  Japan  firmly  to  the  dollar,  to  Southeast  Asia,  and  to 
militarization  and  war.  That  the  Japanese  understood  this  perfectly  was  indicated 
in  a  private  note  to  the  United  States  of  February  1952,  two  months  before  the 
formal  restoration  of  Japanese  sovereignty: 

Japan  will  contribute  to  the  rearmament  plan  of  the  United  States,  supplying 
military  goods  and  strategic  materials  by  repairing  and  establishing  defense 
industries  with  the  technical  and  financial  assistance  from  the  United  States, 
and  thereby  assure  and  increase  a  stable  dollar  receipt.  .  .  .  Japan  will 
cooperate  more  actively  with  the  development  of  South  East  Asia  along 
the  lines  of  the  economic  assistance  programs  of  the  United  States. 

The  memo  further  stated  that  future  Japanese  economic  growth  would  be  geared 
to  U.S.  demands  in  Asia,  and  that  the  dollar  inflow  from  meeting  such  demands 
would  ensure  Japan's  emergence  as  one  of  America's  chief  markets. 

The  details  of  these  intricate  transactions  require  further  study,  but  the  ra- 
tionale behind  the  Japan-Southeast  Asia  interlock  is  amply  available  in  the 
Pentagon  Papers  and  indeed  has  long  been  part  of  the  public  record.  The  Eisen- 
hower Administration  in  particular  performed  quotable  service  in  this  respect, 
for  in  attempting  to  explain  the  American  position  at  the  time  of  the  1954  Geneva 
Accords,  U.S.  spokesmen  commonly  evoked  Japan.  In  one  of  his  more  resound- 
ing pronouncements,  for  example,  Dulles  declared  on  radio  at  the  very  moment 
the  Geneva  Conference  turned  to  Indochina  that  Ho  Chi  Minh  was  a  Communist 
"trained  in  Moscow"  who  would  "deprive  Japan  of  important  foreign  markets 
and  sources  of  food  and  raw  materials."  In  a  March  1954  speech  entitled  "The 
Threat  of  a  Red  Asia,"  he  developed  this  further,  touching  in  brief  compass 
virtually  all  of  the  major  points  subsequent  policymakers  would  refer  to  when 
citing  the  importance  of  Southeast  Asia  to  Japan  (food,  raw  materials,  markets, 
sea  and  air  lanes,  and  the  offshore  island  chain) : 

Southeast  Asia  is  the  so-called  "rice  bowl"  which  helps  to  feed  the  densely 
populated  region  that  extends  from  India  to  Japan.  It  is  rich  in  many  raw 
materials,  such  as  tin,  oil,  rubber,  and  iron  ore.  It  offers  industrial  Japan 
potentially  important  markets  and  sources  of  raw  materials. 

The  area  has  great  strategic  value.  Southeast  Asia  is  astride  the  most 
direct  and  best-developed  sea  and  air  routes  between  the  Pacific  and  South 
Asia.  It  has  major  naval  and  air  bases.  Communist  control  of  Southeast 


108      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Asia  would  carry  a  grave  threat  to  the  Philippines,  Australia,  and  New 
Zealand,  with  whom  we  have  treaties  of  mutual  assistance.  The  entire  West- 
ern Pacific  area,  including  the  so-called  "offshore  island  chain,"  would  be 
strategically  endangered  (Gravel  ed.,  1:594;  cf.  600). 

Eisenhower  reiterated  this  theme  in  a  news  conference  in  which  he  emphasized 
the  importance  of  Indochina  in  terms  of  "what  you  would  call  the  'falling  domino' 
principle."  Loss  of  the  area  to  communism,  he  explained,  "takes  away,  in  its 
economic  aspects,  that  region  Japan  must  have  as  a  trading  area  or  Japan,  in 
turn,  will  have  only  one  place  in  the  world  to  go — that  is,  toward  the  Com- 
munist areas  in  order  to  live"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:597).  Near  the  end  of  his  presi- 
dency, Eisenhower  stressed  the  complementary  nature  of  the  two  areas  in  simple 
terms  which  ignored  the  forced  dimension  of  the  relationship  and  well  typify 
liberal  American  comment  on  this  issue  to  the  present  day : 

As  a  different  kind  of  example  of  free  nation  interdependence,  there  is 
Japan,  where  very  different  problems  exist — but  problems  equally  vital  to 
the  security  of  the  free  world.  Japan  is  an  essential  counterweight  to  Com- 
munist strength  in  Asia.  Her  industrial  power  is  the  heart  of  any  collective 
effort  to  defend  the  Far  East  against  aggression. 

Her  more  than  90  million  people  occupy  a  country  where  the  arable  land 
is  no  more  than  that  of  California.  More  than  perhaps  any  other  industrial 
nation,  Japan  must  export  to  live.  Last  year  she  had  a  trade  deficit.  At  one 
time  she  had  a  thriving  trade  with  Asia,  particularly  with  her  nearest  neigh- 
bors. Much  of  it  is  gone.  Her  problems  grow  more  grave. 

For  Japan  there  must  be  more  free  world  outlets  for  her  products.  She 
does  not  want  to  be  compelled  to  become  dependent  as  a  last  resort  upon 
the  Communist  empire.  Should  she  ever  be  forced  to  that  extremity,  the 
blow  to  free  world  security  would  be  incalculable;  at  the  least  it  would  mean 
for  all  other  free  nations  greater  sacrifice,  greater  danger,  and  lessened 
economic  strength. 

What  happens  depends  largely  on  what  the  free  world  nations  can,  and 
will,  do. 

Upon  us — upon  you  here — in  this  audience — rests  a  heavy  responsibility. 
We  must  weigh  the  facts,  fit  them  into  place,  and  decide  on  our  course  of 
action. 

For  a  country  as  large,  as  industrious,  and  as  progressive  as  Japan  to 
exist  with  the  help  of  grant  aid  by  others,  presents  no  satisfactory  solution. 
Furthermore,  for  us,  the  cost  would  be,  over  the  long  term,  increasingly 
heavy.  Trade  is  the  key  to  a  durable  Japanese  economy. 

One  of  Japan's  greatest  opportunities  for  increased  trade  lies  in  a  free  and 
developing  Southeast  Asia.  So  we  see  that  the  two  problems  I  have  been 
discussing  are  two  parts  of  a  single  one — the  great  need  in  Japan  is  for  raw 
materials;  in  Southern  Asia  it  is  for  manufactured  goods.  The  two  regions 
complement  each  other  markedly.  So,  by  strengthening  Viet-Nam  and  help- 
ing insure  the  safety  of  the  South  Pacific  and  Southeast  Asia,  we  gradually 
develop  the  great  trade  potential  between  this  region,  rich  in  natural  re- 
sources, and  highly  industrialized  Japan  to  the  benefit  of  both.  In  this  way 
freedom  in  the  Western  Pacific  will  be  greatly  strengthened  and  the  interests 
of  the  whole  free  world  advanced.  But  such  a  basic  improvement  can  come 
about  only  gradually.  Japan  must  have  additional  trade  outlets  now.  These 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  109 

can  be  provided  if  each  of  the  industrialized  nations  in  the  West  does  its 
part  in  liberalizing  trade  relations  with  Japan  (Gravel  ed.,  1:626-627). 

The  Kennedy  and  Johnson  administrations  simply  followed  the  Eisenhower  script 
on  this  score.  In  late  September  1964,  on  the  eve  of  the  U.S.  escalation  in  Viet- 
nam, for  example,  William  Bundy  visited  Japan  and  offered  listeners  there  what 
might  be  called  the  Houdini  variation  of  the  domino  principle  (they  don't  fall, 
but  disappear) : 

We  believe  it  essential  to  the  interests  of  the  free  world  that  South  Vietnam 
not  be  permitted  to  fall  under  communist  control.  If  it  does,  then  the  rest 
of  Southeast  Asia  will  be  in  grave  danger  of  progressively  disappearing  be- 
hind the  Bamboo  Curtain  and  other  Asian  countries  like  India  and  even  in 
time  Australia  and  your  own  nation  in  turn  will  be  threatened  (Gravel  ed., 
111:723). 

While  the  primary  focus  in  the  Japan-Southeast  Asia  nexus  has  been  economic, 
the  military  side  of  the  relationship  also  requires  emphasis.  Most  obviously,  this 
has  involved  U.S.  reliance  on  bases  and  facilities  in  Japan  and  Okinawa  for 
aggression  in  Indochina.  As  noted  previously,  well  before  the  termination  of  the 
occupation  of  Japan,  it  was  planned  that  part  of  the  spin-off  from  Japanese  re- 
militarization be  provision  of  military  goods  to  less-developed  Asian  nations. 
More  important  than  this  during  the  initial  postwar  decades,  however,  has  been 
the  assumption  that  Japan's  economic  involvement  in  Southeast  Asia  will  both 
stabilize  the  pro-American,  anti-Communist  regimes  there  and  contribute  directly 
and  indirectly  to  their  own  capacity  for  developing  local  military-related  in- 
dustry. Although  Japanese  personnel  have  been  employed  by  the  United  States 
in  both  the  Korean  and  Vietnam  wars  (as  "civilian"  technicians,  boat  crews, 
etc.),  Japan  has  not  yet  dispatched  troops  abroad.  As  noted  in  Section  6  below, 
however,  this  constraint  is  now  being  eroded,  and  since  the  late  1960s  the  Japa- 
nese have  on  occasion  expressed  interest  in  future  "peace-keeping"  contributions 
in  the  area  through  dispatch  of  ground  forces  to  Indochina  and  naval  forces  to 
the  Straits  of  Malacca.  American  spokesmen  also  anticipate  that  Japan, will  pro- 
vide increasing  military  "supporting  assistance"  to  anti-Communist  regimes  in 
Southeast  Asia  "under  the  label  of  economic  aid,"  and  that  by  the  mid-1970s  the 
Japanese  government  will  have  surmounted  domestic  opposition  to  the  training 
of  foreign  military  personnel  on  Japanese  soil.^^ 

The  corollary  to  integration  of  Japan  and  Southeast  Asia,  as  noted,  has  been 
the  basic  American  position  that  neither  area  could  be  allowed  to  establish  any 
kind  of  significant  economic  relationship  with  China.  This  would  not  only 
strengthen  China  materially,  but  also  strengthen  China's  influence  over  the  two 
areas  at  the  expense  of  American  economic  hegemony  throughout  non-Com- 
munist Asia.  During  the  Eisenhower  Administration  the  goal  was  thus  to  prevent 
a  Japanese  "accommodation  with  the  Communist  bloc"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:472). 
Under  Kennedy  and  Johnson,  the  pet  phrase  was  if  anything  more  urgent,  spe- 
cific, and  paranoid:  a  constantly  reiterated  fear  of  the  "growing  feeling"  in  Japan 
"that  Communist  China  must  somehow  be  lived  with"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:219,  623, 
627,  658).  From  the  Truman  through  the  Johnson  administrations,  the  goal  of 
American  policy  in  Asia  was  to  freeze  bipolarity  until  an  integrated  capitalist 
network  had  been  created  which  could  be  capable  of  remaining  relatively  in- 
vulnerable to  the  pressures,  or  temptations,  of  the  Communist  nations.  In  a 


110      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

November  1964  memo,  one  of  William  Bundy's  advisers  summarized  U.S.  ob- 
jectives in  Vietnam  as  being  to  "delay  China's  swallowing  up  Southeast  Asia  until 
(a)  she  develops  better  table  manners  and  (b)  the  food  is  somewhat  more  in- 
digestible" (Gravel  ed.,  111:592).  With  this  image  at  hand,  it  may  perhaps  be 
concluded  that  Japan's  role  vis-a-vis  Southeast  Asia  had  been  to  help  make  that 
area  indigestible — or  possibly,  as  it  is  actually  working  out,  to  digest  it  itself. 

These  strategies  of  the  early  cold-war  period  are  only  now  coming  to  fruition 
insofar  as  Japan's  role  is  concerned.  And  indeed  it  is  a  striking  perspective  on 
the  "Nixon  Doctrine"  that,  despite  the  currently  fashionable  rhetoric  of  "re- 
gionalism" and  "multilateralism,"  the  policies  advanced  by  the  Nixon  Admin- 
istration are  in  fact  very  close  to  those  which  the  Pentagon  Papers  reveal  as 
having  been  the  objectives  of  all  prior  postwar  U.S.  administrations.  Whether 
under  Truman  or  Eisenhower,  Kennedy  or  Johnson,  the  United  States  has  con- 
sistently aimed  at  the  creation  of  Asian  regional  groupings  which  would  inter- 
lock in  turn  with  American  global  interests,  whether  economic  or  military.  As 
discussed  in  Section  6  below,  this  strategy  has  been  greatly  complicated  by 
developments  which  have  taken  place  under  President  Nixon,  notably  the  Sino- 
American  rapprochement  and  emerging  contradictions  within  the  U.S.-Japan 
alliance.  But  at  the  root,  current  American  policy  remains  consistent  with  the 
goals  first  established  in  the  late  1940s  and  1950s.  "Asian  regionalism"  remains 
capitalist,  anti-Communist,  and  anti-Chinese — whatever  its  new  guises.  Thus  in 
the  Symington  Committee  hearings  of  1970,  U.  Alexis  Johnson,  Undersecretary 
of  State  and  former  ambassador  to  Japan,  acknowledged  Chinese  apprehensions 
concerning  Japan's  economic  penetration  of  Southeast  Asia  and  then  in  effect 
confirmed  the  legitimacy  of  those  fears.  Discussing  Japanese  participation  in  the 
Asian  Development  Bank  and  the  Ministerial  Conference  on  Southeast  Asia 
Economic  Development,  Johnson  acknowledged  that  "The  whole  host  of  rela- 
tionships which  Japan  has  sought  in  the  economic  and  political  field  with  the 
countries  of  Southeast  Asia  obviously  represents  a  hindrance  or  a  block,  if  you 
will,  to  efforts  of  the  Chinese  to  extend  their  influence  in  the  area."  And  that, 
of  course,  has  always  been  precisely  the  goal. 

The  point  should  not  require  belaboring,  but  it  has  in  fact  been  generally 
obscured:  the  United  States  has  never  intended  to  carry  the  burden  of  anti- 
Communist  and  anti-Chinese  consolidation  in  Asia  alone.  It  has  always  seen  the 
end  goal  as  a  quasi-dependent  Asian  regionalism.  Under  Truman,  the  NSC 
stressed  that  "a  strong  trading  area  of  the  free  countries  of  Asia  would  add  to 
general  economic  development  and  strengthen  their  social  and  political  stability. 
Some  kind  of  regional  association,  facilitating  interchange  of  information,  among 
the  non-Communist  countries  of  Asia  might  become  an  important  means  of 
developing  a  favorable  atmosphere  for  such  trade  among  themselves  and  with 
other  parts  of  the  world."  ^"  By  1954,  under  Eisenhower,  the  U.S.  documents  are 
quite  blunt  about  the  ultimate  goal  of  an  Asian  regionalism  covertly  underwritten 
by,  militarized  by,  and  interlocked  with  the  capitalist  powers  of  the  West: 

It  should  be  U.S.  policy  to  develop  within  the  UN  charter  a  Far  Eastern 
regional  arrangement  subscribed  and  underwritten  by  the  major  European 
powers  with  interests  in  the  Pacific. 

a.  Full  accomplishment  of  such  an  arrangement  can  only  be  developed 
in  the  long  term  and  should  therefore  be  preceded  by  the  development, 
through  indigenous  sources,  of  regional  economic  and  cultural  agreements 
between  the  several  Southeast  Asian  countries  and  later  with  Japan.  Such 
agreements  might  take  a  form  similar  to  that  of  the  OEEC  in  Europe. 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  111 

Action:  State,  CIA,  FOA 

b.  Upon  the  basis  of  such  agreements,  the  U.S.  should  actively  but 
unobtrusively  seek  their  expansion  into  mutual  defense  agreements  and 
should  for  this  purpose  be  prepared  to  underwrite  such  agreements  with 
military  and  economic  aid  .  .  .  (Gravel  ed.,  1:475) . 

John  F.  Kennedy,  just  prior  to  assumption  of  the  Presidency,  expressed  the  anti- 
China  regionalism  concept  in  these  terms: 

The  real  question  is  what  should  be  done  about  the  harsh  facts  that  China 
is  a  powerful  and  aggressive  nation.  The  dangerous  situation  now  existing 
can  be  remedied  only  by  a  strong  and  successful  India,  a  strong  and  success- 
ful Japan,  and  some  kind  of  regional  group  over  Southeast  Asia  which  gives 
these  smaller  countries  the  feeling  that,  in  spite  of  their  distaste  for  a  military 
alliance,  they  will  not  be  left  to  be  picked  off  one  by  one  at  the  whim  of 
the  Peiping  regime  (Gravel  ed.,  11:799). 

Under  Lyndon  Johnson,  in  1967,  the  goal  appeared  to  be  almost  within  grasp: 

The  fact  is  that  the  trends  in  Asia  today  are  running  mostly  for,  not 
against,  our  interests  (witness  Indonesia  and  the  Chinese  confusion);  there 
is  no  reason  to  be  pessimistic  about  our  ability  over  the  next  decade  or  two 
to  fashion  alliances  and  combinations  (involving  especially  Japan  and  India) 
sufficient  to  keep  China  from  encroaching  too  far  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  174). 

All  postwar  administrations  have  recognized  the  sensitivity  of  Asian  nations 
to  Western  neo-colonial  domination.  All  have  sought  to  encourage  anti-Com- 
munist regional  groupings  in  Asia,  led  by  Japan  with  the  United  States  in  the 
wings.  And  at  the  heart  of  all  such  policies,  up  to  and  including  the  Nixon  Doc- 
trine, has  been  the  U.S.-Japan-Southeast  Asia  nexus.  In  their  constant  reiteration 
of  this  objective,  of  course,  U.S.  policymakers  have  conveniently  neglected  to  give 
due  weight  to  one  of  its  most  obvious  and  unpleasant  flaws:  the  fact  that  most 
Asian  nationalists  are  also  acutely  sensitive  to  the  very  real  threat  of  Japanese 
neo-colonialism. 

3.    INTERNAL/EXTERNAL  DIALECTICS 

The  integration  of  Japan  into  America's  Asia  undoubtedly  profited  the  Japa- 
nese state  in  a  number  of  ways,  but  the  long-range  costs  may  prove  to  be  far 
greater  than  the  immediate  dividends.  For  U.S.  pressure  on  Japan  has  inevitably 
shaped  not  only  Japan's  external  policy,  but  its  internal  development  as  well. 
This  has  been  particularly  obvious  in  the  rapid  recartelization  and  remilitariza- 
tion of  the  Japanese  economy,  but  the  social  and  political  consequences  within 
Japan  have  been  no  less  profound.  Whether  directly  or  indirectly,  for  example, 
political  polarization  within  contemporary  Japan  is  virtually  inseparable  from 
American  designs  for  postwar  Japan  and  postwar  Asia.  Economic  priorities  have 
been  largely  shaped  in  accordance  with  U.S.  requirements,  and  this  in  turn  has 
supported  a  ruling  class  with  predictably  conservative  goals  in  education,  civil 
liberties,  "quality-of-life"  problems,  and  the  like.  The  initial  thrust  in  this  direc- 
tion, as  suggested  in  the  preceding  sections,  was  imposed  while  Japan  was  still 
under  U.S.  occupation;  beginning  around  1947-1948,  it  took  the  form  of  a 


112      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

"reverse  course"  repudiating  many  of  the  early  reform  goals  of  the  occupation. 
What  must  be  stressed  here,  however,  is  that  the  termination  of  the  occupation 
in  April  1952  did  not  greatly  change  anything.  The  United  States  retained  im- 
posing de  facto  control  over  the  course  of  Japanese  development.  And  under 
the  conservative  Japanese  ruling  coalition  which  had  been  firmly  entrenched  by 
the  end  of  the  occupation,  the  reverse  course  has  continued,  step  by  step,  to  the 
present  day. 

In  blunt  terms,  the  United  States  has  had  to  buy  Japan's  allegiance  to  Amer- 
ican strategy  in  postwar  Asia.  There  is  room  for  considerable  debate  over  the 
tactics  of  this:  what  the  price  has  been,  how  it  has  been  paid,  and  how  it  has 
changed  over  time.  But  the  fact  of  Japan's  subordinate  and  quasi-mercenary 
status  vis-a-vis  the  United  States  for  the  greater  part  of  the  postwar  era  is  rarely 
denied  any  longer  even  by  the  spokesmen  of  the  two  countries.  In  the  Symington 
Committee  hearings,  for  example,  U.  Alexis  Johnson  engaged  in  this  exchange 
with  Senators  William  Fulbright  and  Stuart  Symington: 

SENATOR  FULBRIGHT:  ...  If  we  go  out  and  hire  foreign  govern- 
ments and  pay  them  to  agree  with  us,  I  think  we  are  perhaps  cutting  off  the 
source  of  good  advice.  We  ought  to  go  in  more  as  equals  and  say,  "What  do 
you  think  about  it?"  If  they  say,  "You  are  being  a  fool,"  we  ought  to  take  it 
seriously. 

MR.  JOHNSON:  All  I  can  say.  Senator,  is  that  insofar  as  Japan  is  con- 
cerned, I  do  not  feel  that  our  expenditures  in  Japan  are  any  significant  factor 
in  Japanese  attitudes. 

SENATOR  SYMINGTON:  Any  more. 

MR.  JOHNSON:  Any  more. 

SENATOR  SYMINGTON:  They  were  once. 

MR.  JOHNSON:  Oh,  yes.  I  agree.  I  do  not  think  they  are  any  more,^^ 

Roughly  a  year  later,  in  February  1971,  Aiichiro  Fujiyama — a  leading  Japanese 
businessman,  conservative  politician,  and  former  Foreign  Minister — implicitly  dis- 
agreed with  the  Johnson  view  only  to  the  extent  of  denying  that  Japan  had  yet 
escaped  this  subordination.  In  an  interview  with  a  correspondent  for  the  Far 
Eastern  Economic  Review,  Fujiyama  explained  Japan's  China  policy  as  follows: 

Q.  Why  do  you  think  the  government  takes  what  appears  to  be  a  minority 
view  not  only  in  the  international  community  but  in  Japan  as  well,  and  does 
it  think  this  policy  conforms  with  the  national  interest? 
A.  It  operates,  jointly  with  Taiwan  and  South  Korea,  within  the  framework 
of  U.S.  Asia  policy,  and  cannot  deviate  from  this  basic  line.  Some  people 
believe  that  to  keep  China  out  of  spheres  where  it  might  clash  with  Japan 
serves  their  own  brand  of  national  interest. 

"Our  foreign  ministry,"  Fujiyama  went  on  to  note,  "is  just  following  the  Wash- 
ington line."  Then,  in  a  rather  striking  comment  for  a  member  of  the  ruling 
Liberal-Democratic  party,  he  proceeded  to  acknowledge  that  the  "social  climate" 
which  had  developed  in  Japan  under  the  reverse  course  and  the  Washington  line 
had  indeed  increased  the  possibility  of  Japanese  militarism: 

Q.  In  your  talks  with  the  Chinese  leaders,  how  will  you  account  for  the 
charges  of  the  revival  of  Japanese  militarism  which  are  bound  to  come  up? 
A.  China  has  been  very  sensitive  to  foreign  domination  since  the  days  of 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  113 

Sun  Yat-sen.  It  has  reason — no  country  has  suffered  more  from  Japanese 
militarism  than  China.  MiUtarism  may  not  be  a  state  of  armament  alone. 
It  may  be  just  as  much  a  problem  of  mentality,  a  state  of  mind.  I  strongly 
feel  that  these  charges  of  militarism  are  largely  directed  against  the  social 
cUmate  of  Japan,  which  is  susceptible  to  totalitarianism.  Individualism  is 
still  in  a  very  young  stage  here;  I  think  it  is  for  us  Japanese  to  rethink  and 
reappraise  ourselves  rather  than  to  refute  or  deny  foreign  charges.  I  strongly 
fear  the  current  trend  in  which  the  younger  generation  is  increasingly  show- 
ing interest  in  war,  if  not  accepting  it.  It  is  our  responsibility  to  drive  home 
that  war  is  not  a  romantic  affair. 

The  pathetic  response  of  the  Japanese  government  to  the  Nixon  Administration's 
sudden  overtures  to  China  in  1971-1972  can  only  be  understood  in  this  context. 
Long  accustomed  to  being  bought  off,  they  were  not,  however,  prepared  to  be 
sold  out. 

The  origins  and  nature  of  the  reverse  course  in  occupied  Japan  remain  a  sub- 
ject of  considerable  interest.  One  basic  issue  still  requiring  fuller  documentation 
here  is  the  very  question  of  U.S.  motivations  in  initiating  this  turn  of  policy 
away  from  the  initial  occupation  goals  of  "demihtarization  and  democratization." 
With  the  notable  exception  of  mainstream  American  scholarship  on  the  subject, 
most  observers  have  attributed  this  to  cold-war  geopolitics — that  is,  the  reverse 
course  is  seen  primarily  as  part  of  America's  larger  strategic  decision  to  contain 
the  Soviet  Union  and,  increasingly,  impede  the  course  of  revolution  in  China 
and  throughout  Asia.  American  scholars,  on  the  other  hand,  have  tended  to 
adopt  a  more  internalized  view  and  justify  the  reverse  course  largely  in  terms 
of  the  need  to  remedy  (for  the  good  of  Japan)  the  economic  chaos  existing 
within  the  country  at  that  time;  at  the  same  time,  they  argue,  it  was  necessary  to 
get  Japan  on  its  feet  economically  in  order  to  "preserve  the  reforms"  and  ease 
the  tax  burden  which  the  occupation  was  imposing  on  the  American  people 
(some  half  billion  dollars  annually).  In  this  view,  strategic  cold-war  considera- 
tions were  secondary  to  more  practical  economic  concerns  within  Japan  itself, 
and  the  United  States  did  not  really  repudiate  its  generally  idealistic  original 
goals  for  Japan.  Recent  documentary  collections  such  as  the  Pentagon  Papers, 
the  John  Foster  Dulles  papers,  and  the  papers  of  Joseph  M.  Dodge,  who  en- 
gineered the  economic  reverse  course  in  occupied  Japan,  make  continued  ad- 
herence to  the  American  Altruism  Abroad  School  of  postwar  Japanese  history 
increasingly  a  matter  of  mystical  commitment.  But  at  the  very  same  time,  these 
materials  do  raise  provocative  questions  concerning  the  extent  to  which  funda- 
mentally economic  considerations  on  a  global  scale  may  have  taken  precedence 
in  both  time  and  importance  over  more  strictly  military  geopolitical  concerns. 
The  recent  revisionist  work  of  Joyce  and  Gabriel  Kolko,  for  example,  argues 
flatly  that  "Washington's  considerations  in  Japan  were  first  and  foremost  eco- 
nomic," meaning  preservation  of  a  global  capitalist  system,  and  developments  in 
China  only  "added  urgency"  to  the  decision  to  "insure  a  self-supporting  capitalist 
Japan."  20 

The  Pentagon  Papers  shed  only  belated  light  on  this  particular  issue,  for  the 
earliest  document  of  importance  which  deals  at  any  length  with  Japan  dates 
from  December  1949,  by  which  time  the  reverse  course  was  already  in  full  swing 
— having  been  initiated,  significantly,  long  before  the  "anti-Japanese"  Sino-Soviet 
Pact  of  February  1950  and  a  matter  of  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean 
War.  The  essence  of  this  initial  reverse  course  was  indeed  U.S.  support  for  the 
emergence  of  a  dependable,  capitalist  ruling  class  in  Japan,  and  beginning  in 


114      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

1948  Shigeru  Yoshida,  with  increasing  U.S.  support,  began  to  fashion  the  "tripod" 
of  big  business,  bureaucracy,  and  conservative  party  which  has  controlled  Japan 
to  the  present  day.  The  tentacles  of  this  development  were  many;  emanating 
from  the  fundamental  reversal  in  economic  policy,  they  reached  out  to  strangle 
early  reforms  in  the  political,  social,  and  military  spheres  as  well.  Zaibatsu  dis- 
solution was  abandoned  and  recartelization  encouraged;  reparations  were  tem- 
porarily curtailed  to  hasten  capital  formation;  restrictions  on  the  production  of 
hitherto  banned  war-related  materials  were  lifted;  purgees  and  war  criminals 
were  released;  the  working  class  was  crippled  through  antilabor  legislation  plus 
wage  freezes  and  "retrenchment"  policies;  "Red  purges"  (Japan's  McCarthyism) 
were  instituted  to  eliminate  the  leaders  of  effective  dissent  in  both  the  private  and 
public  sectors;  and  so  on. 

By  1948-1949,  the  reverse  course  had  also  moved  into  overtly  military  direc- 
tions. In  November  1948  the  NSC,  spurred  by  Kennan's  recommendations,  called 
for  the  creation  of  a  large  national  police  force  capable  of  suppressing  domestic 
unrest  in  Japan.  As  the  Communists  consolidated  their  victory  in  China  in  1949, 
it  became  known  that  severe  divisions  had  emerged  within  the  U.S.  government 
over  the  future  military  disposition  of  Japan,  with  the  Department  of  Defense 
opposed  to  relinquishing  any  U.S.  control  over  the  Japanese  islands  whatsoever. 
In  November  1949,  the  State  Department  gave  public  indication  of  an  apparent 
resolution  of  this  internal  debate  by  announcing  that  the  United  States  was 
willing  to  seek  a  peace  settlement  with  Japan  conditional  upon  the  indefinite  post- 
treaty  stationing  of  U.S.  military  forces  in  Japan.  In  fact,  however,  this  did  not 
assuage  the  Defense  Department  or  resolve  the  debate  in  Washington.  Dulles 
was  brought  into  the  State  Department  by  President  Truman  in  April  1950  to 
bring  "bipartisanship"  to  the  Japan  issue,  and  on  the  eve  of  the  Korean  War 
Dulles  was  in  Japan  attempting  to  sell  Yoshida  on  the  U.S.'s  latest  price  for 
sovereignty:  Japanese  remilitarization  and  rearmament — in  addition  to  the  post- 
independence  presence  of  American  troops. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  include,  in  the  government  edition  only,  two  NSC  docu- 
ments which  deal  at  some  length  with  policy  toward  occupied  Japan.  The  first, 
dated  December  23,  1949,  and  drawing  upon  position  papers  prepared  earlier 
that  year  (notably  NSC  48),  is  especially  provocative,  for  it  offers  not  only  a 
rare  glimpse  of  American  officials  musing  on  the  national  character  of  Japan, 
but  also  a  defense  of  the  road  Japan  was  subsequently  not  allowed  to  take:  the 
middle  road  in  a  multipolar,  not  bipolarized,  Asia.  It  is  important,  in  other  words, 
that  this  document  be  read  with  the  awareness  that  it  was  issued  by  the  NSC 
at  a  time  when  Japan  policy  was  the  subject  of  intense  controversy  in  Washing- 
ton, and  thus  represents  only  one  corner  of  the  debate  taking  place  at  that  time. 
In  all  likelihood  it  reflects  the  economically  oriented  position  endorsed  by  George 
Kennan  at  this  time  and  subsequently  militarized  by  the  U.S.  government — thus, 
in  Kennan's  view,  freezing  America's  options  in  Asia  and  very  possibly  con- 
tributing to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Korea.22  Since  the  document  is  relatively 
inaccessible,  the  main  sections  on  Japan  are  reproduced  here: 

8.  Japan  has  ceased  to  be  a  world  power,  but  retains  the  capability  of 
becoming  once  more  a  significant  Asiatic  power.  Whether  its  potential  is 
developed  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  used  will  strongly  influence  the  future 
patterns  of  politics  in  Asia.  As  a  result  of  the  occupation,  Japan's  political 
structure  has  been  basically  altered  and  notable  steps  have  been  taken  toward 
the  development  of  democratic  institutions  and  practices.  Despite  these  ad- 
vances, however,  traditional  social  patterns,  antithetical  to  democracy,  re- 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  115 

main  strong.  The  demonstrated  susceptibility  of  these  patterns  to  totalitarian 
exploitation  is  enhanced  by  economic  maladjustment  which  may  grow  more 
serious  as  a  result  of  population  increases  and  of  obstacles  to  the  expansion 
of  trade. 

9.  Although,  in  terms  of  the  Japanese  context,  an  extreme  right-wing 
movement  might  be  more  effective  in  exploiting  traditional  patterns  and 
current  dislocations  than  one  of  the  extreme  left,  a  number  of  factors  com- 
bine to  make  the  threat  of  Communism  a  serious  one.  These  factors  include 
the  close  proximity  to  a  weak  and  disarmed  Japan  of  Communist  areas  with 
the  attendant  opportunities  for  infiltration,  clandestine  support  of  Japanese 
Communist  efforts,  and  diplomatic  pressure  backed  by  a  powerful  threat; 
the  potential  of  Communist  China  as  a  source  of  raw  materials  vital  to 
Japan  and  a  market  for  its  goods;  and  the  existence  in  Japan  of  an  ably-led, 
aggressive,  if  still  relatively  weak.  Communist  movement  which  may  be 
able  to  utilize  Japanese  tendencies  toward  passive  acceptance  of  leadership 
to  further  its  drive  for  power  while  at  the  same  time  exploiting  economic 
hardship  to  undermine  the  acceptability  to  the  Japanese  of  other  social 
patterns  that  are  antithetical  to  Communist  doctrines. 

10.  Even  if  totalitarian  patterns  in  Japan  were  to  reassert  themselves  in 
the  form  of  extreme  right-wing  rather  than  Communist  domination,  the 
prospect  would  remain  that  Japan  would  find  more  compelling  the  political 
and  economic  factors  moving  it  toward  accommodation  to  the  Soviet  orbit 
internationally,  however  anti-Communist  its  internal  policies,  than  those 
that  move  it  toward  military  alliance  with  the  United  States.  Extreme  right- 
wing  domination  of  Japan,  moreover,  although  less  immediately  menacing 
to  the  United  States  than  Communist  control  would  represent  a  failure,  par- 
ticularly marked  in  the  eyes  of  other  non-Communist  Asiatic  countries,  of 
a  major  United  States  political  effort. 

11.  A  middle  of  the  road  regime  in  Japan  retaining  the  spirit  of  the 
reform  program,  even  if  not  necessarily  the  letter,  would  in  the  long-run 
prove  more  reliable  as  an  ally  of  the  United  States  than  would  an  extreme 
right-wing  totalitarian  government.  Under  such  a  regime  the  channels  would 
be  open  for  those  elements  in  Japan  that  have  gained  most  from  the  occupa- 
tion to  exercise  their  influence  over  government  policy  and  to  mold  public 
opinion.  Such  a  regime  would  undoubtedly  wish  to  maintain  normal  political 
and  economic  relations  with  the  Communist  bloc  and,  in  the  absence  of 
open  hostilities,  would  probably  resist  complete  identification  either  with 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  or  the  Soviet  Union.  The  existence  of 
such  a  regime,  however,  will  make  possible  the  most  effective  exercise  of 
United  States  political  and  economic  influence  in  the  direction  of  ensuring 
Japan's  friendship,  its  ability  to  withstand  external  and  internal  Communist 
pressure,  and  its  further  development  in  a  democratic  direction. 

12.  The  basic  United  States  non-military  objectives  in  Japan,  therefore, 
remain  the  promotion  of  democratic  forces  and  economic  stability  before 
and  after  the  peace  settlement.  To  further  this  objective  the  United  States 
must  seek  to  reduce  to  a  minimum  occupation  or  post-occupation  interfer- 
ence in  the  processes  of  Japanese  government  while  at  the  same  time  pro- 
viding protection  for  the  basic  achievements  of  the  occupation  and  the 
advice  and  assistance  that  will  enable  the  Japanese  themselves  to  perpetuate 
these  achievements;  provide  further  economic  assistance  to  Japan  and,  in 
concert  with  its  allies,  facilitate  the  development  of  mutually  beneficial  eco- 
nomic relations  between  Japan  and  all  other  countries  of  the  world;  make  it 


116      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

clear  to  Japan  that  the  United  States  will  support  it  against  external  ag- 
gression while  at  the  same  time  avoiding  the  appearance  that  its  policies  in 
Japan  are  dictated  solely  by  considerations  of  strategic  self-interest  and 
guarding  against  Japan's  exploitation  of  its  strategic  value  to  the  United 
States  for  ends  contrary  to  United  States  policy  interests;  and  promote  the 
acceptance  of  Japan  as  a  peaceful,  sovereign  member  of  the  community  of 
nations. 2^ 

The  Korean  War  became  the  pretext  for  repudiation  of  even  the  qualified 
flexibility  of  this  NSC  position;  and  by  the  time  of  the  San  Francisco  peace 
conference  of  September  1951  it  had  been  almost  completely  thrown  to  the 
winds.  The  remilitarization  and  remonopolization  of  the  Japanese  economy  had 
been  set  on  an  inexorable  course.  The  Japanese  military  was  under  reconstruction 
in  the  guise  of  a  National  Police  Reserve.  The  way  had  been  opened  for  the 
return  of  prewar  rightist  politicians,  businessmen,  and  military  officers  to  influ- 
ential positions  in  both  the  public  and  private  sectors.  The  Japanese  labor  move- 
ment was  in  disarray,  partly  through  subversion  by  American  labor  organizations. 
Political  dissent  in  Japan,  under  immense  pressure  from  both  U.S.  spokesmen 
and  the  Japanese  conservatives,  was  relegated  to  a  position  of  increasing  im- 
potence. The  peace  conference  itself,  widely  hailed  to  the  present  day  by  most 
Americans  as  possibly  Dulles'  most  notable  achievement,  was  indeed  a  rather 
unique  accomplishment:  a  "separate  peace"  for  Asia,  without  Asians.  The  Soviet 
Union  did  not  participate  because  of  the  militaristic  provisions  embodied  in  the 
concurrent  U.S. -Japan  Mutual  Security  Treaty — and  indeed  U.S.  policymakers 
had  recognized  from  before  the  Korean  War  that  such  arrangements  would  in- 
evitably exclude  the  possibility  of  Soviet  concurrence.  China  did  not  participate 
because  it  was  not  permitted  to  do  so;  under  the  ruse  of  letting  the  Japanese 
themselves  resolve  the  issue  of  relations  with  Peking  or  the  Kuomintang  regime 
at  a  later  date,  Dulles  gained  agreement  that  no  Chinese  representatives  would 
be  invited  to  the  conference — and  then,  with  this  fait  accompli  behind  him,  forced 
the  Japanese  into  relations  with  Taiwan.  India,  Indonesia,  and  Burma,  in  funda- 
mental disagreement  with  the  Dulles  style  of  statesmanship,  refused  to  participate. 
The  Philippines  signed  the  treaty  only  after  making  known  that  it  was  in  fact 
not  to  their  liking.  Indeed,  Asian  apprehension  concerning  the  unilateral  Ameri- 
can policy  toward  Japan  which  culminated  at  San  Francisco  was  assuaged  only 
by  Dulles'  simultaneous  negotiation  of  military  alliances  with  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  (ANZUS),  as  well  as  the  Philippines — pacts  demanded  of  the  United 
States  at  this  time  as  insurance  against  future  Japanese  aggression. 

The  second  document  in  the  government  edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  which 
deals  with  pre-independence  policy  for  postindependence  Japan  was  prepared  by 
the  NSC  in  May  1951,  four  months  before  the  peace  conference,  and  is  quite 
succinct  on  Japan's  projected  role: 

With  respect  to  Japan  the  United  States  should: 

a.  Proceed  urgently  to  conclude  a  peace  settlement  with  Japan  on  the 
basis  of  the  position  already  determined  by  the  President,  through  urgent 
efforts  to  obtain  agreement  to  this  position  by  as  many  nations  which  partic- 
ipated in  the  war  with  Japan  as  possible. 

b.  Proceed  urgently  with  the  negotiation  of  bilateral  security  arrange- 
ments with  Japan  on  the  basis  of  the  position  determined  by  the  President 
to  be  concluded  simultaneously  with  a  peace  treaty. 

c.  Assist  Japan  to  become  economically  self-supporting  and  to  produce 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  117 

goods  and  services  important  to  the  United  States  and  to  the  economic 
stability  of  the  non-communist  area  of  Asia. 

d.  Pending  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  settlement  continue  to: 

( 1 )  Take  such  steps  as  will  facilitate  transition  from  occupation  status 
to  restoration  of  sovereignty. 

(2)  Assist  Japan  in  organizing,  training,  and  equipping  the  National 
Police  Reserve  and  the  Maritime  Safety  Patrol  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
formation  of  an  effective  military  establishment. 

e.  Following  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  settlement: 

( 1 )  Assist  Japan  in  the  development  of  appropriate  military  forces. 

(2)  Assist  Japan  in  the  production  of  low-cost  military  materiel  in 
volume  for  use  in  Japan  and  in  other  non-communist  countries  of  Asia. 

(3)  Take  all  practicable  steps  to  achieve  Japanese  membership  in  the 
United  Nations  and  participation  in  a  regional  security  arrangement. 

(4)  Establish  appropriate  psychological  programs  designed  to  further 
orient  the  Japanese  toward  the  free  world  and  away  from  communism.^* 

As  Joseph  Dodge  observed  even  more  tersely  in  January  1952,  Japan's  post- 
treaty  obligations  to  the  United  States  would  be  as  follows: 

(1)  Production  of  goods  and  services  important  to  the  United  States  and 
the  economic  stabilization  of  non-Communist  Asia;  (2)  Production  of  low 
cost  military  material  in  volume  for  use  in  Japan  and  non-Communist  Asia; 
(3)  Development  of  its  own  appropriate  military  forces  as  a  defensive  shield 
and  to  permit  the  redeployment  of  United  States  forces. 

Following  the  restoration  of  independence,  Japan  in  fact  followed  the  Dodge 
outline,  a  path  significantly  distant  from  that  urged  earlier  by  Kennan.  "Middle 
of  the  road"  domestic  politics  in  Japan  was  so  quickly  abandoned  that  by  1957 
Nobusuke  Kishi,  former  economic  czar  of  Manchukuo  and  wartime  Vice  Muni- 
tions Minister  under  Tojo,  had  emerged  as  Prime  Minister  with  Mitsubishi  back- 
ing and  gladly  renewed  old  interests  as  Munitions  Minister  for  the  Eisenhower 
Administration.  "Middle  of  the  road"  external  policies  were  so  far  beyond 
Japan's  capability  or  concern  by  1957  that,  as  head  of  his  party's  foreign  policy 
committee,  Kishi  blithely  appointed  Kaya  Okinobu,  reputed  architect  of  the 
Greater  East  Asia  Co-Prosperity  sphere  concept.^^  War,  expansion  into  Southeast 
Asia,  and  the  United  States — which  together  had  brought  Japan  to  shambles  by 
1945 — became,  within  a  matter  of  years,  the  determinants  of  Japanese  recon- 
struction. 


4.    REAL,  IMAGINARY,  AND  MIRACULOUS  WARS 

SENATOR  CHURCH:  "Mr.  Secretary,  is  it  the  policy  of  the  administra- 
tion to  urge  Japan  to  modernize  its  armed  forces  or  to  expand  its  military 
budget?" 

SECRETARY  [of  State]  ROGERS:  "Yes." 
SENATOR  CHURCH:  "That  is  a  snappy  answer." 
SECRETARY  ROGERS:  "Well,  it  is  a  snappy  question." 

— from  the  Senate  hearings  on  the 
Okinawa  Reversion  Treaty,  October  1971  ^'^ 


1 1 8      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Although  the  Secretary  of  State  did  not  mention  it,  the  military  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan  also  involves  some  fairly  snappy  anomalies. 
Some  examples : 

By  1970  it  was  acknowledged  that  "Japan  has  the  capacity  of  defending, 
now  defending,  Japan  proper  against  a  major  conventional  attack."  Yet 
in  1970  the  Japanese  government,  with  strong  U.S.  support,  announced  its 
Fourth  Defense  Plan  calling  for  a  defense  budget  for  the  1972-1976  period 
which  is  more  than  fifty  percent  larger  than  prior  expenditures  under  the 
First,  Second,  and  Third  Defense  Plans  combined.  It  is  anticipated,  more- 
over, that  the  Fifth  Defense  Plan  will  show  a  comparable  increase  over  the 
Fourth.  i 


While  the  primary  mission  of  Japan's  "Self  Defense  Forces"  is  ostensibly 
defense  of  Japan  against  conventional  external  attack,  there  is  in  fact  no 
meaningful  evidence  that  any  other  Asian  country  in  recent  history  has  ever 
planned  a  direct  military  attack  on  Japan.  On  the  contrary,  historically  the 
threat  has  been  from  Japan  against  continental  Asia  (through  Korea),  and 
not  the  other  way  around.  The  public  statements  of  Washington's  spokes- 
men have,  of  course,  been  full  of  Communist  conspiracies,  timetables,  plans 
of  world  conquest.  The  Korean  War,  it  was  argued,  was  aimed  at  Japan, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  some  American  policymakers,  particularly  on  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  actually  believed  this  to  be  the  case.  Theoretically  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  postwar  period  has  been  capable  of  invading  Japan, 
although  this  would  require  (1)  extraordinarily  complex  mobilization  of 
amphibious  forces;  and  (2)  that  the  Kremlin's  leaders  be  insane.  George 
Kennan,  hardly  one  to  think  charitably  of  Soviet  intentions,  found  no  evi- 
dence to  indicate  that  the  Russians  had  "any  intention  to  launch  an  outright 
military  attack"  against  Japan  at  the  time  of  the  Korean  War,  and  there  has 
been  no  hard  evidence  to  the  contrary  since. China,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
never  posed  even  the  theoretical  possibility  of  a  conventional  attack  on 
Japan.  As  U.  Alexis  Johnson  noted  as  late  as  1970,  "lacking  air  and  over 
water  transport,  for  their  forces,  the  Chinese  Communists  do  not  now  pose 
a  direct  conventional  threat  against  Japan."  This  evaluation  is  widely 
accepted  by  virtually  all  American  experts  on  Chinese  military  development, 
and  it  is  furthermore  now  acknowledged  that  China  has  no  military  pro- 
grams underway  to  create  a  capability  of  offensive  action  against  Japan.  On 
the  contrary,  the  Chinese  military  is  almost  exclusively  oriented  toward  de- 
fense. Most  postwar  Japanese  leaders,  even  in  the  conservative  ranks,  have 
always  held  this  view — even  in  the  early  years  of  the  cold  war  when  it  ran 
counter  to  the  official  U.S.  line.^^ 


The  United  States  maintains  some  30,000  military  personnel  on  125  facilities 
covering  75,000  acres  in  Japan  proper;  as  of  September  1969  the  Defense 
Department  classified  40  of  these  bases  as  "major."  In  Okinawa  after  rever- 
sion the  United  States  will  maintain  approximately  50,000  American  service- 
men on  eighty-eight  military  installations  covering  another  75,000  acres 
(26  percent  of  all  the  land  on  Okinawa).  Yet  none  of  these  U.S.  forces  are 
directly  concerned  with  the  defense  of  Japan,  and  indeed — as  noted  by 
former  White  House  and  Pentagon  adviser  Morton  Halperin — "none  of  the 
forces  in  our  general  purpose  force  structure  are  justified  by  the  require- 
ments of  the  defense  of  Japan." 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  119 

The  USSR  could  pose  a  nuclear  threat  to  Japan,  and  China  is  presumedly 
now  developing  a  modest  capability  of  the  same  sort.  Should  a  serious  nu- 
clear strike  against  Japan  actually  take  place,  there  would  be  little  left  for 
Japan  to  do  (and  little  left  of  Japan's  industrial  heart),  and  the  burden  of 
response  would  fall  upon  U.S.  nuclear  retaliation.  Extension  of  the  U.S. 
nuclear  shield  to  cover  Japan  thus  presumedly  deters  such  attack.  However, 
U.S.  bases  in  Japan  are  theoretically  irrelevant  to  this  deterrence  since  under 
the  U.S. -Japan  agreement  nuclear  weapons  are  excluded  from  Japan.  And 
the  United  States  has  given  flat  assurances  that  there  will  be  no  nuclear 
weapons  on  Okinawa  after  reversion. -^'^  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  the 
American  nuclear  guarantee  to  Japan  means  U.S.  taxpayers  are  actually 
paying  for  Japan's  defense.  On  the  contrary,  as  Halperin  notes,  "The  U.S. 
nuclear  umbrella,  which  does  protect  Japan,  would  not  be  any  smaller  or 
any  different  if  Japanese  security  were  not  one  of  its  functions." 

Then  what  is  the  significance  of  American  bases  in  Japan,  and  of  Japan's 
steadily  accelerating  rearmament?  First,  in  U.  Alexis  Johnson's  words,  "Our 
position  in  our  facilities,  bases  in  Japan  as  well  as  in  Okinawa,  are  not  so  much 
related  directly  to  the  defense  of  Japan  and  Okinawa  as  they  are  to  our  ability  to 
support  our  commitments  elsewhere."  More  specifically: 

The  bases  and  facilities  provided  by  Japan  under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
are  especially  important  to  our  ability  to  maintain  our  commitments  to  the 
Republic  of  Korea  and  the  Republic  of  China.  Although  we  maintain  no 
ground  combat  forces  in  Japan,  our  rear  area  logistics  depots,  the  com- 
munications sites,  the  large  and  well  equipped  naval  facilities  and  airfields, 
hospitals,  and  so  on,  have  also  been  important  factors  in  our  ability  to 
support  and  maintain  our  forces  in  Southeast  Asia.^^ 

Simply  put,  the  bases  in  Japan  exist  to  support  America's  clients  in  "that  whole 
part  of  the  world":  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  the  Philippines,  South  Vietnam,  Laos, 
Cambodia,  and  Thailand.  Even  those  military  advisers  who  now  see  technological 
advances  as  permitting  a  substantial  reduction  in  the  U.S.  forward  position  in 
Asia  emphasize  that  access  to  the  key  air  and  naval  bases  in  Japan  must  remain 
a  bedrock  of  U.S.  strategy.^^  The  superdomino  argument  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 
can  easily  be  applied  to  explain  how  the  use  of  Japan  for  commitments  elsewhere 
is  in  the  end  a  commitment  to  Japan:  if  the  lesser  clients  fall,  so  eventually  will 
the  greater,  and  in  the  end  the  bases  in  Japan,  in  this  view,  do  keep  Japan  safe 
for  America. 

A  second  level  of  concern  is  why  Japan,  steadily  remilitarizing  since  1950  and 
already  capable  of  its  own  conventional  defense,  is  about  to  embark  upon  an 
entirely  new  level  of  military  expansion.  Here  the  official  spokesmen  of  both  the 
United  States  and  Japan  are  naturally  wary.  They  deny  that  Japan  is  attempting 
to  develop  the  capability  of  military  activity  outside  its  borders.  But  at  the  same 
time  the  definition  of  those  borders  ("defense  perimeter")  is  being  dramatically 
revised.  As  described  more  fully  in  Section  6,  this  is  precisely  the  implication  of 
the  1969  Nixon-Sato  communique.  While  hedging  on  the  issue  of  Japanese  troops 
abroad,  the  Nixon  Administration  has  been  frank  and  even  boastful  in  explaining 
the  price  it  exacted  from  Prime  Minister  Sato  in  return  for  the  reversion  of 
Okinawa:  Sato's  official  statement  ("quite  a  new  stage  of  thinking  in  Japan," 
according  to  Johnson-^^)  that  henceforth  Japan  will  regard  its  own  security  as 
inseparable  from  that  of  Korea  and  Taiwan.  To  students  of  Japanese  history, 


120      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

this  "new  stage  of  thinking"  has  quite  old  and  tangled  roots,  and  immediately 
evokes  Aritomo  Yamagata's  formulation  of  the  "lines  of  sovereignty,  lines  of 
defense"  concept  in  the  1890s,  following  which  Japan  lopped  off  Korea  (the 
Japanese  used  German  military  advisers  in  those  days).  For  students  of  con- 
temporary Japan,  the  1969  communique  calls  to  mind  the  "Three  Arrows" 
scandal  of  1965,  in  which  secret  Japanese  military  plans  linking  Japan  and  Korea 
were  leaked  to  the  public. Without  access  to  broad  U.S.  and  Japanese  docu- 
mentation comparable  to  the  Pentagon  Papers,  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  type 
of  integrated  contingency  plans  now  exist  for  Northeast  Asia.  But  it  is  absolutely 
unequivocable  that  a  major  change  in  public  consciousness  on  this  issue  is  now 
being  effected:  the  "important  thing  that  has  taken  place,"  Johnson  told  the 
Symington  committee,  is  "that  Japan  is  interested  and  involved  in  the  defense  of 
other  areas."  And  in  Halperin's  words,  "a  further  rearmament  by  the  Japanese, 
if  it  were  to  make  any  sense,  would  have  to  be  in  the  defense  of  other  countries 
in  Asia." 

The  issues  of  bases  in  Japan  and  Japanese  rearmament  pose  serious  questions 
of  military  planning;  these  are  fairly  obvious.  At  another,  more  neglected  level, 
however,  these  point  to  a  simple  and  important  fact:  from  the  beginning  of  its 
modern  experience,  wars — real  or  imagined,  its  own  or  someone  else's — have 
been  the  spur  to  economic  growth  and  industrial  take-off  in  Japan.  Armaments 
were  Japan's  initial  entree  into  the  development  of  heavy  industry  in  the  nine- 
teenth century.  The  Sino-Japanese  and  Russo-Japanese  wars  of  1894-1895  and 
1904-1905  moved  it  into  the  stage  of  finance  capital  and  continental  economic 
expansion.  World  War  I,  the  war  of  the  others,  provided  the  boom  that  propelled 
the  industrial  sector  ahead  of  the  agrarian,  and  shaped  the  giant  combines. 
Mobilization  for  "total  war"  production  in  the  1930s  pulled  Japan  out  of  the 
global  depression.  The  outbreak  of  the  Korean  War  in  1950  turned  a  potentially 
disastrous  depression  deriving  from  the  Dodge  retrenchment  policies  into  spec- 
tacular take-off,  after  orthodox  economic  policies  had  failed.  The  ravishment  of 
another  Asian  country,  Vietnam,  heated  a  cooling  Japanese  economy  from  1965. 
Even  the  ostensible  exception — the  eight-years'  war  of  1937-1945,  which  ended 
with  Japan  seemingly  in  ruins — in  fact  only  proves  the  rule:  for  it  appears  now 
that  much  of  Japan's  postwar  economic  growth  is  directly  attributable  to  gov- 
ernmental investment  in  equipment  and  technical  education  during  the  1930s  and 
1940s.  "The  Japanese  economy,"  in  Ronald  Dore's  words,  "has  thrived  on  war 
and  the  prospect  of  war."  This  has  been  as  true  in  the  postwar  era  as  it  was 
before  1945,  and  those  who  presently  offer  the  "Japanese  miracle"  as  a  model  to 
others  offer  a  very  deceptive  product.  Without  a  hundred  years  of  actual  or  en- 
visioned war  to  fatten  on,  the  Japanese  economy  would  still  be  lean. 

Detailed  examination  of  the  role  of  war-related  stimulation  in  postwar  Japanese 
economic  growth  is  extremely  difficult,  for  the  statistics  involved  are  illusive,  a 
large  part  of  the  relationship  is  indirect,  and  few  scholars  have  attempted  to  come 
to  grips  with  the  problem.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  possible  to  point  to  some  fairly 
firm  figures:  between  1950-1960,  the  United  States  pumped  a  total  of  $6.12 
billion  in  military  "special  procurements"  purchases  into  Japan,  thus  comprising 
the  single  most  important  impetus  to  postwar  recovery.^i  From  1946  to  1968  the 
United  States  provided  some  $1.07  billion  in  military  aid  to  Japan  and  another 
$3.08  billion  in  economic  aid;  after  repayments  the  net  total  was  approximately 
$3.5  billion.'^^  In  1970,  operating  costs  for  the  U.S.  bases  in  Japan  were  estimated 
at  $490  million  annually;  another  $460  million  went  into  support  of  U.S.  facilities 
and  personnel  in  Okinawa  each  year.^^  Estimates  of  "war  profits"  enjoyed  by 
Japan  in  the  post- 1965  Vietnam  war  boom  vary  greatly  depending  upon  one's 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  121 

criteria  of  indirect  war  benefits,  but  generally  appear  to  have  been  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  $1  billion  annually.^^  But  such  figures  barely  touch  the  surface  of  the 
problem.  They  do  not,  for  example,  reveal  the  fact  that  U.S.  aid  to  Japan  in  the 
1950s  was  so  structured  that  the  resurrection  of  Japan's  defense  industries, 
coupled  with  the  reemergence  of  monopolistic  control,  became  by  U.S.  design  the 
key  to  Japan's  economic  recovery. The  figures  do  not  reveal  the  manner  in 
which  the  United  States  bought  Japanese  acquiescence  in  the  Pax  Americana  by 
carefully  manipulating  "non-military"  international  trade,  aid,  and  monetary 
transactions  to  Japan's  benefit.  Similarly,  the  figures  are  inadequate  when  it  comes 
to  understanding  how  America's  wars  in  Asia  have  benefited  Japan  by  default, 
as  ruinous  military  outlays  drained  the  U.S.  economy  and  in  the  process  created 
new  global  markets  for  Japan.  The  military  context  of  the  Japanese  economic 
penetration  of  Southeast  Asia  is  likewise  not  apparent  in  the  surface  statistics — 
with  its  peculiarly  cynical  dimension  of  using  war  reparations  to  turn  the  savagery 
of  Imperial  Japan  into  a  profitable  new  co-prosperity  sphere  for  "peaceful"  post- 
war Japan.46 

One  of  the  more  recent  and  intriguing  examples  of  the  subtle  relationship 
between  America's  military  policies  and  Japan's  economic  growth  has  been  the 
Japanese  economic  penetration  of  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  (also  Indonesia)  be- 
ginning around  1964-1965.  In  certain  respects  the  situation  resembles  a  slightly 
distorted  looking-glass  version  of  moves  a  decade  and  a  half  earlier.  Thus  in  1950 
the  Japanese  economy  was  entering  a  severe  depression;  it  was  revitalized  by  the 
Korean  War  boom  and  remilitarization  of  Japan;  and  even  before  the  war  the 
United  States  had  begun  laying  plans  to  lock  Japan  into  an  anti-Communist  bloc 
with  itself  and  Southeast  Asia.  In  1964-1965  the  Japanese  economy  was  cooling 
off;  it  was  rekindled  by  the  Vietnam  war  boom  plus  sudden  economic  access  to 
Korea  and  Taiwan;  and  in  fact,  in  anticipation  of  its  escalation  in  Vietnam  the 
United  States  appears  to  have  worked  behind  the  scenes  to  help  Japan  drive  the 
opening  wedge  into  the  economies  of  its  two  former  colonies.  Washington's  goals 
were  transparent:  as  the  United  States  prepared  to  divert  enormous  resources  to 
an  expanded  war  in  Vietnam,  only  Japan  had  the  capability  of  assuming  part  of 
the  burden  of  shoring  up  the  Park  and  Chiang  regimes.  Japan's  post- 1965  trade 
and  investment  statistics  vis-d-vis  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  clearly  indicate  that 
for  Japan  it  has  once  again  been  lucrative  to  operate  in  the  shadows  of  other's 
wars. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  provide  little  information  on  the  U.S.  role  in  paving  the 
way  for  Japan's  rapid  economic  expansion  into  South  Korea  and  Taiwan,  al- 
though high  U.S.  officials  such  as  William  Bundy,  Dean  Rusk,  and  Walt  Kostow 
visited  Japan  in  quick  succession  during  the  crucial  period  in  late  1964  and  early 
1965  when  the  massive  escalation  of  the  Vietnam  war  was  on  the  U.S.  drawing 
boards.  It  is  hardly  likely  that  the  sudden  resolution  of  the  Japan-ROK  normaliza- 
tion talks  which  occurred  shortly  thereafter  was  purely  coincidental,  although 
it  may  well  turn  out  that  the  leverage  applied  by  the  United  States  against  the 
Koreans  was  most  instrumental  in  paving  the  way  to  restoration  of  Korean- 
Japanese  relations  after  more  than  a  decade  of  bitter  stalemate  between  the  two 
countries;  it  was  Korea,  after  all,  which  was  letting  the  tiger  into  the  house.  The 
Papers  do,  however,  provide  an  ironic  sideHght  on  this  period.  At  a  meeting  at 
the  State  Department  in  August  1963,  Roger  Hilsman  "reported  that  there  is  a 
Korean  study  now  underway  on  just  how  much  repression  the  United  States  will 
tolerate  before  pulling  out  her  aid"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:742).  The  answer  was  appar- 
ently plenty,  but  from  1965  on  an  immense  amount  of  U.S.  "aid"  to  South  Korea 
was  actually  directly  related  to  ROK  participation  in  the  Vietnam  war.  Japanese 


122      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

assistance  in  shoring  up  Korean  repression  became  increasingly  urgent  from  this 
time,  a  fact  recognized  no  matter  what  one's  stand  on  the  Vietnam  escalation. 
Thus  George  Ball,  in  advancing  his  critique  of  America's  Vietnam  policy  in  July 
1965,  stressed  that  Japan's  role  vis-a-vis  South  Korea  would  become  even  more 
imperative  if  the  United  States  decided  to  seek  a  "compromise  settlement"  in 
South  Vietnam: 

...  if  we  stop  pressing  the  Koreans  for  more  troops  to  Vietnam  (the 
Vietnamese  show  no  desire  for  additional  Asian  forces  since  it  affronts  their 
sense  of  pride)  we  may  be  able  to  cushion  Korean  reactions  to  a  compromise 
in  South  Vietnam  by  the  provision  of  greater  military  and  economic  assist- 
ance. In  this  regard,  Japan  can  play  a  pivotal  role  now  that  it  has  achieved 
normal  relations  with  South  Korea  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:619). 

The  implications  of  Japan's  new  level  of  involvement  in  Northeast  Asia  under 
these  conditions  cut  ominously  toward  the  future.  Immediate  questions  concern- 
ing the  extent  to  which  Japan's  overwhelming  economic  leverage  is  already 
crippling  economic  independence  in  Taiwan  and  South  Korea  are  compounded 
by  serious  long-range  questions  concerning  the  effects  of  this  tight  embrace  upon 
the  reunification  of  both  of  the  divided  countries.  Such  involvement  has  not 
alleviated  repression;  it  has  only  fed  corruption.  And  as  Japan's  economic  stakes 
in  the  ex-colonies  grow,  the  likelihood  of  committing  Japanese  troops  to  protect 
those  stakes  also  increases. 

The  overall  Problematik  implicit  here  is  crucial.  For  the  scholar  and  critic, 
such  developments  provide  useful  openings  for  an  increased  understanding  of 
strategic  planning,  capitalism,  and  imperialism.  For  nonscholars — for  the  Japanese 
people  and  their  neighbors  more  particularly — there  are  more  urgent  reasons  that 
the  system  be  comprehended,  for  the  wars  that  may  be  will  not  be  of  the 
imaginary  or  miraculous  variety.  Those  are  about  used  up. 

5.    THE  HOW-FAR-RIGHT-IS-LEFT  DILEMMA 

Washington's  decisionmakers  have  never  been  really  certain  whether  or  not  to 
trust  the  Japanese,  and  if  they  couldn't  why  they  shouldn't.  This  is  hardly  a  rare 
phenomenon  among  potentially  competitive  nation  states,  and  the  racial  differ- 
ences between  the  United  States  and  Japan  undoubtedly  contribute  to  mutual 
suspicion.  The  "Asian  mind,"  as  Americans  have  never  ceased  to  point  out  since 
they  first  encountered  it,  is  "different"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:685;  IV:  182).  And  in  the 
case  of  Japan,  that  "difference"  is  now  coupled  with  power  unprecedented  in  the 
history  of  Asia. 

The  paradoxes  implicit  in  the  formal  U.S.  attitude  toward  Japan  are  not  im- 
mediately apparent,  but  they  are  nonetheless  most  intriguing.  On  the  surface, 
Japan  has  until  fairly  recently  been  one  of  official  Washington's  least  problematic 
allies.  The  U.S. -Japan  alliance  has  seemed  relatively  stable.  Japan's  ruling  elites 
have  displayed  rather  impeccable  conservative,  anti-Communist  credentials.  The 
thrust  of  the  Japanese  economy  ostensibly  has  been  toward  capitalism  and  the 
capitalist  bloc.  No  external  military  threat  has  confronted  Japan,  and  the  country 
is  presumedly  entering  a  period  of  prosperity  and  a  placated  citizenry.  Since  1950 
Japan  has  allegedly  been  enjoying  a  great  "free  ride"  at  America's  expense,  and 
the  "regionalism"  and  "multilateralism"  of  the  Nixon  Doctrine  are  supposed  to 
work  to  the  continued  mutual  advantage  of  both  Japan  and  the  United  States. 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  123 

More  specifically,  particularly  since  1964  the  distribution  of  political  power 
within  Japan  could  not  have  been  more  fortunate  from  Washington's  point  of 
view.  As  it  happened,  U.S.  escalation  of  the  war  in  Indochina  coincided  with  the 
premiership  of  Eisaku  Sato,  whose  acquiescence  to  U.S.  policy  was  until  recently 
virtually  total.  Sato's  biannual  joint  communiques  with  the  American  presidents 
(1965,  1967,  1969)  read  like  State  Department  public  relations  releases  on  Viet- 
nam; his  endorsement  of  the  American  line  on  China  was  so  thorough  that  it 
split  his  own  party  (and  in  the  end,  with  Nixon's  reversal  of  China  policy,  left 
Sato  without  political  face  in  Japan).  On  the  surface,  the  Pentagon  Papers  sug- 
gest that  the  Kennedy  and  Johnson  administrations  had  considerable  confidence 
in  their  allies  in  Japan.  Thus  in  November  1964,  a  month  after  he  had  visited 
Japan,  William  Bundy  ventured  the  opinion  that  escalation  of  the  war  against 
North  Vietnam  would  in  fact  be  welcomed  by  Japan's  leaders,  although  it  might 
have  unfortunate  repercussions  within  Japan  itself : 

The  Japanese  government,  and  considerable  informed  opinion  in  Japan, 
would  be  quietly  pleased  by  the  US  action  against  the  DRV.  The  Japanese 
government  would  probably  attempt  to  stay  fairly  aloof  from  the  question, 
however,  for  fear  of  provoking  extreme  domestic  pressures  or  possible 
Chinese  Communist  action  against  Japan.  In  such  process,  the  Japanese  gov- 
ernment, especially  one  headed  by  Kono,  might  seek  to  restrict  certain  US 
base  rights  in  Japan  (Gravel  ed.,  III:598).47 

By  1967,  Japanese  support  of  U.S.  aggression  in  Asia  had  exceeded  even  Bundy's 
expectations,  and  he  was  expressing  surprise  that  Japan,  like  Britain,  "accepted 
our  recent  bombings  with  much  less  outcry  than  I,  frankly,  would  have  antici- 
pated" (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  156). 

Yet  even  with  the  agreeable  Mr.  Sato  on  tap,  and  a  postwar  history  of  official 
Japanese  endorsement  of  American  policy  in  Asia,  the  inner  record  also  reveals 
that  U.S.  policymakers  have  found  many  reasons  for  uncertainty  concerning  the 
stability  of  the  alliance.  In  fact,  it  might  be  argued  that  the  dominant  impression 
conveyed  by  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  not  that  of  confidence  in  the  stability  of  the 
U.S. -Japan  relationship,  but  on  the  contrary  an  almost  paranoid  fear  that  Japan 
could  easily  "go  communist."  Throughout  the  period  covered  in  these  documents 
(to  1968),  Japan  emerges  in  American  eyes  as  an  either/or  country,  capable  of 
no  constructive  middle  course  between  the  Communist  and  capitalist  camps — 
but  fully  capable,  on  the  other  hand,  of  swinging  its  weight  behind  the  other  side. 
Thus  from  the  Truman  through  the  Johnson  administrations,  the  dominant  fear 
expressed  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  that  an  American  failure  in  Vietnam  would 
drive  Japan  into  an  "accommodation  with  the  Communist  bloc,"  or  into  an  in- 
evitably ominous  relationship  with  Communist  China.  Even  the  "realistic"  George 
Ball  took  essentially  this  position  in  1965  in  developing  his  critique  of  Vietnam 
policy : 

Japan  is  a  much  more  complex  case.  If  its  confidence  in  the  basic  wisdom 
of  the  American  policy  can  be  retained,  Japan  may  now  be  in  the  mood  to 
take  an  increasingly  active  and  constructive  part  in  Asia.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Japanese  think  that  we  have  basically  misjudged  and  mishandled 
the  whole  Vietnam  situation,  they  may  turn  sharply  in  the  direction  of 
neutralism,  and  even  of  accommodation  and  really  extensive  relationships 
with  Communist  China.  Such  action  would  not  only  drastically  weaken 
Japan's  ties  with  the  U.S.  and  with  the  West,  but  would  render  the  situation, 


124      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

particularly  in  Korea,  extremely  precarious.  ...  It  is  Ambassador  Ray 
Shower's  judgment  that  Japanese  would  be  highly  sensitive — partly  on  Asian 
racial  grounds — to  any  bombing  of  Hanoi  and  presumably  Haiphong.  He 
concludes  that  such  bombing  would  "have  very  damaging  effects  on  the 
U.S./Japan  relationship." 

As  to  the  quest  of  the  extent  of  U.S.  ground  forces,  Ray  Shower  believes 
that  from  the  standpoint  of  Japanese  reaction,  "We  could  further  increase 
them  even  on  a  massive  scale  without  too  much  further  deterioration  of 
public  attitudes  toward  us.  However,  if  this  were  to  lead  to  a  slackening  of 
the  South  Vietnamese  effort  and  a  growing  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  local 
population  toward  us,  this  would  have  catastrophic  repercussions  here  in 
Japan.  This  is  exactly  what  the  Japanese  fear  may  already  be  the  situation, 
and  if  their  fears  were  borne  out  in  reality,  there  would  be  greatly  increased 
public  condemnation  of  our  position.  Even  the  Government  and  other  sup- 
porters here  would  feel  we  had  indeed  got  bogged  down  in  a  hopeless  war 
against  'nationalism'  in  Asia.  Under  such  circumstances  it  would  be  difficult 
for  the  government  to  resist  demands  that  Japan  cut  itself  loose  as  far  as 
possible  from  a  sinking  ship  of  American  policy  in  Asia"  (Gravel  ed., 
IV:614). 

Four  general  and  often  paradoxical  areas  of  concern  can  help  illuminate  the 
American  uncertainty  concerning  Japan.  First,  and  most  obviously,  the  fear  of 
"losing  Japan"  is  based  upon  arguments  of  economic  pressure.  It  is  a  familiar 
cliche  that  "Japan  must  trade  to  live";  moreover,  Japan's  continued  economic 
growth  will  depend  upon  expanded  trade.  Should  the  present  patterns  which  tie 
it  into  the  web  of  world  capitalism  be  disrupted,  then  Japan  will  be  forced  to 
seek  alternative  economic  relations.  In  the  particular  focus  of  the  Pentagon 
Papers,  loss  of  access  to  Southeast  Asia  (or  the  failure  of  the  area  to  develop 
rapidly  enough  to  meet  Japan's  needs)  will  inevitably  place  pressure  on  Japan  to 
move  toward  increased  "accommodations"  with  non-capitalist  countries.  Also, 
despite  the  immense  economic  relationship  which  has  developed  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States  in  the  postwar  period,  American  leaders  in  fact  have 
evinced  lack  of  confidence  in  the  stability  of  this  relationship.  On  the  one  hand, 
for  example,  it  is  stated  that  the  economic  ties  between  the  two  countries  are 
"natural"  and  beneficial  for  both  parties — and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  there  ex- 
ists no  comparable  potential  for  Japan  in  the  direction  of  economic  ties  with 
China.  As  U.  Alexis  Johnson  argued  before  the  Symington  committee,  China 
offers  Japan  neither  the  markets  nor  raw  materials  it  needs.  Moreover: 

.  .  .  the  history  of  trade  indicates  that  as  countries  develop  the  greatest 
trade  develops  between  developed  countries,  and  when  I  was  in  Japan  I  was 
struck  by  the  fact  that  when  the  Japanese  use  the  first  person  plural  "we" 
more  often  than  not  they  were  talking  about  "we,  the  developed  countries, 
Japan,  the  United  States,  and  Western  Europe."  They  find  their  interests  and 
their  problems  in  rough  terms  parallel  with  the  interests  of  the  developed 
countries. 

Yet  no  such  firm  faith  can  be  found  in  the  policy  papers  of  the  American  govern- 
ment. Despite  the  theory  of  the  naturalness  of  capitalist  relations;  despite  the  im- 
mensity of  Japan's  present  interlock  with  the  United  States  in  particular;  and 
without  necessarily  even  postulating  military  pressure  on  Japan — the  basic  U.S. 
position  of  Japan  as  the  superdomino  clearly  was  premised  upon  an  almost 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  125 

totalistic  view  of  Japan's  economic  complementariness  to  the  "communist  bloc," 
the  ease  with  which  it  might  simply  detach  itself  from  the  global  capitalist  economy 
and  "disappear"  behind  the  Iron  (or  Bamboo)  Curtain.  Is  Japan's  heavy  reliance 
upon  the  United  States  as  a  source  for  primary  products  really  "natural"?  Will  the 
American  market  for  Japanese  exports  continue  to  grow  despite  increasing  do- 
mestic pressures  for  protectionist  legislation  against  Japan?  Is  the  potential  for 
mutually  beneficial  economic  relations  between  Japan  and  China  (and  other  non- 
capitalist  countries)  really  as  limited  as  U.S.  spokesmen  publicly  allege?  In  prac- 
tice, American  policy  toward  Japan  appears  to  have  been  undercut  by  substantial 
uncertainty  on  such  matters,  bordering  at  times  on  paranoia. 

Secondly,  beginning  around  the  mid-1960s,  the  economic  concern  became 
compounded  by  concern  over  American  "credibility"  in  Japan — that  is,  it  was 
recognized  that  Japan's  consistent  official  endorsement  of  U.S.  policy  does  not 
necessarily  carry  with  it  either  agreement  or  respect,  and  may  reach  a  breaking 
point.  This  observation  was  undoubtedly  valid,  and  three  observations  may  help 
put  it  in  perspective:  (1)  There  was  no  reason  for  U.S.  officials  to  anticipate  that 
Japan  would  indefinitely  pretend  a  sense  of  "obligation"  to  the  United  States, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  the  United  States  has  never  done  anything  for  Japan 
that  it  did  not  believe  to  be  in  the  American  interest.  Even  Secretary  of  State 
Dean  Rusk  did  not  romanticize  this  point.  Fittingly  enough,  the  Gravel  edition 
of  the  Pentagon  Papers  concludes  with  a  flat  repudiation  by  Rusk  of  the  popular 
conceit  of  "American  benevolence"  in  Asia: 

Now,  the  basis  for  these  alliances  that  we  made  in  the  Pacific  was  that  the 
security  of  those  areas  was  vital  to  the  security  of  the  United  States.  We  did 
not  go  into  these  alliances  as  a  matter  of  altruism,  to  do  someone  else  a 
favor.  We  went  into  them  because  we  felt  that  the  security  of  Australia  and 
the  United  States,  New  Zealand  and  the  United  States,  was  so  interlinked 
that  we  and  they  ought  to  have  an  alliance  with  each  other,  and  similarly 
with  the  other  alliances  we  have  in  the  Pacific,  as  with  the  alliance  in  NATO. 
So  that  these  alliances  themselves  rest  upon  a  sense  of  the  national  security 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  not  just  on  a  fellow  feeling  for  friends  in 
some  other  part  of  the  world.^^ 

Certainly  there  was  no  reason  to  expect  the  Japanese  themselves  to  think  other- 
wise. (2)  As  indicated  earlier,  Japan  was  integrated  into  America's  Asia  in  the 
1950s  only  under  considerable  pressure  at  a  time  when  Japan  was  essentially 
powerless.  The  details  of  this  early  period  have  not  yet  been  fully  studied,  but 
some  of  the  complexity  of  the  situation  can  be  suggested  by  looking  at  the  posi- 
tion of  Shigeru  Yoshida,  usually  characterized  as  an  archconservative  and  Amer- 
ica's man-in-Japan.  In  fact,  the  record  indicates  that  Yoshida  opposed  the  United 
States  on  the  most  fundamental  issues  of  this  period,  namely  the  repressive 
economic  policies  of  the  Dodge  Plan,  isolation  of  China,  military  strings  attached 
to  U.S.  aid,  and  rapid  rearmament  of  Japan.  The  issues  of  Japanese  remilitariza- 
tion, U.S.  bases  in  Japan  and  Okinawa,  and  Japanese  acquiescence  in  the  general 
U.S.  line  on  China  and  Asia  never  had  unanimous  support  even  among  Japanese 
conservatives,  and  Yoshida's  ouster  from  the  premiership  in  December  1954 
came  about  to  a  large  extent  because  of  internal  disagreements  within  Japan  on 
such  issues.  By  the  mid-1960s,  this  had  been  exacerbated  by  opposition  within 
conservative  ranks  to  the  U.S.  war  policy  in  Vietnam.  (3)  By  the  mid-1960s 
Japan  was — and  it  seemed  to  occur  suddenly — entering  the  "superpower"  cate- 
gory. That  is,  the  underpinnings  of  American  credibility  in  Asia  were  being  chal- 


126      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

lenged  at  the  very  moment  that  it  became  recognized  Japan  no  longer  could  be 
treated  as  a  mere  dependent  power.  Sato  as  an  individual  undoubtedly  found 
himself  more  comfortable  in  the  familiar  role  of  subordinate,  but  it  was  increas- 
ingly and  painfully  obvious  that  the  Japanese  state  was  entering  a  period  of  un- 
precedented strength  at  the  very  moment  the  United  States  was  plummeting  to 
a  postwar  nadir. 

A  third  element  of  uncertainty  was  the  uncomfortable  recognition  on  the  part 
of  U.S.  officials  that  in  addition  to  its  internal  splits,  the  Japanese  ruling  class  as 
a  whole  does  not  reflect  the  view  of  the  majority  of  Japanese  people — particularly 
insofar  as  support  of  American  policy  is  concerned.  The  Ball  memorandum  cited 
above  is  fairly  typical  in  its  distinction  between  the  Japanese  "government"  and 
the  Japanese  "public."  Secretary  of  Defense  Robert  McNamara  voiced  a  similar 
grudging  appreciation  of  the  potential  political  potency  of  popular  anti-American 
sentiments  in  Japan: 

The  price  paid  for  improving  our  image  as  a  guarantor  has  been  damage 
to  our  image  as  a  country  which  eschews  armed  attacks  on  other  nations. 
.  .  .  The  objection  to  our  "warlike"  image  and  the  approval  of  our  fulfilling 
our  commitments  competes  in  the  minds  of  many  nations  (and  individuals) 
in  the  world,  producing  a  schizophrenia.  Within  such  allied  countries  as 
UK  and  Japan,  popular  antagonism  to  the  bombings  per  se,  fear  of  escala- 
tion, and  belief  that  the  bombings  are  the  main  obstacle  to  negotiation,  have 
created  political  problems  for  the  governments  in  support  of  US  policy 
(Gravel  ed.,  IV:54). 

Just  as  the  ambiguous  U.S.  position  on  the  prospects  of  Sino-Japanese  relations 
raises  the  question  of  how  great  the  potential  economic  ties  between  the  two 
countries  actually  may  be,  so  also  in  this  case  the  American  attitude  raises  the 
issue  of  how  great  the  potential  for  radical  mass  political  action  has  actually  been 
in  postwar  Japan.  Many  American  sociologists  and  historians  of  Japan  have 
tended  to  minimize  the  possibility  of  effective  political  action  from  below  in  Japan 
by  pointing  to  the  traditional  structures  of  authoritarianism  and  hierarchy  to 
which  most  Japanese  remain  fundamentally  acquiescent.  But  at  the  same  time, 
looking  not  to  scholarship  but  to  the  views  held  by  practicing  politicians,  one 
finds  in  countless  quarters  a  pervasive  fear  of  the  "revolutionary"  potential  of  the 
Japanese  masses.  Such  fear  is  in  fact  a  potent  theme  in  prewar  as  well  as  postwar 
Japan — one  which  has  received  little  scholarly  attention  as  yet,  although  primary 
documentation  is  voluminous  in  Japanese,  American,  and  British  sources.  It  was 
unquestionably  greatly  exacerbated  by  the  extraordinary  vigor  of  the  popular 
lower  and  middle-class  movements  which  burst  into  the  political  scene  in  the 
immediate  postwar  years  in  Japan  and  were  repressed  only  by  the  reverse  course 
in  occupation  policy.  George  Kennan's  Memoirs  offer  a  vivid  example  of  Amer- 
ican fear  of  leftist  insurrection  in  postwar  Japan,  and  the  primary  mission  of  the 
resurrected  postwar  military  establishment  (like  the  Meiji  army  of  the  1870s) 
originally  was  suppression  of  internal  threats  to  Japan.  Mass  action  culminating 
in  the  Security  Treaty  crisis  of  1960,  which  forced  cancellation  of  President 
Eisenhower's  visit  to  Japan,  and  the  dramatic  Japanese  street  demonstrations  of 
the  late  1960s,  could  be  taken  as  reconfirmation  of  these  fears.  Neither  Sato's 
accommodating  manner  nor  the  sociologists'  reassuring  patterns  of  submissive 
behavior  could  entirely  dispel  the  nagging  U.S.  fear  that  the  relationship  it  had 
so  carefully  knitted  with  the  conservative  ruling  classes  in  Japan  might  not  in 
fact  be  unravelled  from  the  left  within  Japan  itself. 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  127 

This  perspective  helps  explain  the  NSC  position  in  May  1951  that  insofar  as 
postoccLipation  Japan  was  concerned,  it  was  imperative  that  the  United  States 
"establish  appropriate  programs  designed  to  further  orient  the  Japanese  toward 
the  free  world  and  away  from  communism."  The  same  fear  also  underlies  the 
broad  and  subtle  brand  of  cultural  imperialism  which  American  officials  and 
scholars  have  pursued  in  Japan,  particularly  since  1960.  The  Asia  sections  of  the 
influential  Conlon  Report,  issued  in  November  1959,  were  written  by  one  of 
America's  most  articulate  hawks  and  best-known  Japan  specialists,  Robert 
Scalapino,  and  called  among  other  things  for  American  "diplomacy  in  depth." 
For  those  interested  in  the  scholar/government  symbiosis  as  manifested  in  U.S.- 
Japanese relations,  a  potentially  fascinating  study  remains  unexplored  here.  For 
it  was  at  this  juncture  that  Edwin  O.  Reischauer  of  Harvard  was  appointed 
ambassador  to  Japan,  with  the  self-described  mission  of  opening  a  "dialogue" 
with  that  country.  And  it  was  at  the  scholarly  Hakone  Conference  of  1960  that 
American  Japan  specialists  initiated  the  "modernization  theory"  focus  which  has 
subsequently  dominated  U.S.  scholarship  on  Japan  and  has  been,  at  root,  an 
attempt  to  present  Japan  as  a  nonrevolutionary,  anti-Marxist  model  of  develop- 
ment. The  goal  has  been  to  undercut  both  the  activist  and  academic  left  in  Japan, 
and  Japanese  journals  throughout  the  1960s  contain  a  heavy  array  of  articles  in 
Japanese  by  American  scholars  engaged  in  this  task  of  "diplomacy  in  depth." 

Finally,  however,  it  must  be  recognized  that  the  concerns  outlined  above  are 
not  self-contained  and  really  become  meaningful  only  when  they  are  placed  in  a 
broader,  more  theoretical  (and  more  illusive)  context.  Namely  this:  that  when 
one  views  the  world  from  a  liberal  or  quasi-liberal  perspective,  the  distinctions 
between  the  political  left  and  political  right  become  blurred.  Under  vague  rubrics 
such  as  "totalitarianism,"  the  archconservative  and  the  Communist  on  the  surface 
may  appear  to  offer  little  to  choose  between — except,  perhaps,  insofar  as  their 
foreign  policies  are  concerned.  Ostensibly  they  will  hold  opposing  attitudes 
toward  private  property  and  competition — but  what  is  one  to  say  in  the  case  of 
a  zaibatsu-conixoWQd  economy?  How  is  one  to  evaluate  the  close  mesh  of  govern- 
ment and  business  in  Japan?  And  whether  the  Japanese  masses  have  revolutionary 
potential  or  are  traditionally  submissive,  doesn't  either  imply  an  easy  susceptibility 
to  Communist  control? 

These  are  practical,  not  merely  academic  questions,  and  in  the  final  analysis 
they  are  probably  the  key  to  understanding  why  American  policymakers  have 
been  so  consistently  fearful  of  a  totalistic  Japanese  "accommodation  to  commu- 
nism." Having  resurrected  and  nurtured  the  political  right  in  postwar  Japan,  they 
were  faced  with  the  question  of  how  far  right  the  Japanese  would  move  before 
they  became,  potentially,  "left."  In  this  sense,  subsequent  American  administra- 
tions caught  the  whiplash  of  the  reverse  course  of  the  occupation  period:  that  is, 
they  could  never  be  certain  that  they  had  not  cut  the  early  reform  policies  off 
too  early,  and  too  close  to  the  root.  It  is,  on  the  surface,  unreasonable  to  assume 
that  a  Communist  Southeast  Asia  would  knock  a  powerful,  anti-Communist 
Japan  almost  entirely  into  the  "Communist  camp" — but  it  is  not  entirely  irrational 
to  believe  that  a  fundamentally  authoritarian  Japan  would,  if  somewhat  pressed, 
find  few  bars  to  seeking  an  accommodation  with  other  "authoritarian"  countries. 

This  line  of  analysis  gains  credence  from  the  fact  that  both  Japanese  and 
American  politicians  and  policymakers  faced  it  squarely  at  various  points.  This 
issue  became,  it  should  be  noted,  of  absolutely  central  concern  in  Japan  from  the 
late  1930s  up  to  1945;  the  heart  of  the  "peace"  movement  in  wartime  Japan,  as 
evidenced  most  dramatically  in  the  famous  Konoe  Memorial  of  February  1945, 
was  the  fear  that  the  war  was  leading  to  the  "communization"  of  Japan,  pri- 


128      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

marily  in  the  form  of  "right-wing  communism,"  and  even  "emperor  commu- 
nism." ^-  Again — a  prewar  example  with  postwar  implications — Kishi,  certainly 
the  most  reactionary  of  Japan's  postwar  prime  ministers,  was  in  the  prewar  period 
accused  of  Communist  sympathies  because  of  his  interest  in  National  Socialism. 
It  was  precisely  this  "rightist/leftist"  problem  which  underlay  the  position  ad- 
vanced by  the  NSC  in  1949  and  reproduced  at  some  length  here  in  Section  3. 
No  other  U.S.  document  now  available  on  Japan  sets  the  problem  down  so 
clearly,  and  this  must  certainly  be  judged  the  most  valuable  of  the  Pentagon 
Papers  insofar  as  an  understanding  of  this  dimension  of  the  postwar  U.S.-Japan 
relationship  is  concerned.  Overarching  all  other  apprehensions  concerning  Japan's 
reliability  as  an  ally — economic  pressure,  U.S.  credibility,  revolutionary  potential 
within  Japan — was  the  broad  structure  of  "totalitarian"  conceptualization,  the 
question  of  how  far  right  is  left.^^ 

6.    THE  SUPERINSCRUTABLE 

SENATOR  SYMINGTON:  "Well,  one  final  question.  Is  it  true  that  the 
less  we  do  in  Vietnam,  the  more  they  approve  our  policies  in  the  Far  East?" 
MR.  JOHNSON:  "No." 

SENATOR  SYMINGTON:  "I  am  trying  to  follow  your  logic." 

MR.  JOHNSON:  "Let  me  put  it  this  way:  They  do  not  want  to  see  us 
lose  in  Vietnam.  At  the  same  time,  they  do  not  want  to  see  us  do  things  that 
they  feel  carry  with  them  the  danger  of  our  being  drawn  into  a  larger  war 
and  in  turn — " 

SENATOR  SYMINGTON:  So  militarily  speaking,  they  do  not  want  us 
to  lose,  but  they  do  not  want  us  to  win." 

MR.  JOHNSON:  "Well,  you  could  express  it  that  way." 
SENATOR  SYMINGTON:  "It  is  a  mystery  to  me  what  has  been  going 
on  out  there  during  the  past  5  years.  I  am  glad  to  see  it  is  a  little  complicated 
to  you  also,  because  you  have  seen  more  of  the  inside  than  I." 

— testimony  of  U.  Alexis  Johnson, 
former  U.S.  ambassador  to  Japan, 
January  1970^4 

The  question  "where  is  Japan  going"  has  really  occurred  to  most  Americans 
only  in  the  period  subsequent  to  that  covered  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  that  is, 
primarily  during  the  Nixon  Administration.  It  derives,  to  begin  with,  from  the 
new  superpower  image  of  Japan  and  the  unexpectedly  anti-Japanese  actions  taken 
by  Nixon  in  handling  economic  policy  and  China  relations.  At  a  deeper  level  it 
reflects  a  significantly  new  stage  in  Japan's  economic  and  military  development; 
a  new,  still  uncertain  level  of  nationalistic  consciousness  in  Japan;  and  the  open 
emergence  of  serious  contradictions  in  the  U.S.-Japan  relationship. 

It  is  of  central  importance  to  note  the  timing  of  the  new  stage,  and  in  particular 
the  compression  of  the  timing.  For  the  bulk  of  the  postwar  period,  Japan  has 
undeniably  been  a  second-class  member  in  America's  Asia.  For  several  decades 
it  has  been  forced  to  nurse  substantial  wounds  of  pride,  because  the  "lackey" 
image  assigned  it  in  Communist  polemics  unfortunately  rings  true.^^  In  Senator 
Symington's  eyes,  for  example,  Japan  in  1970  still  remained  "a  conquered  na- 
tion, an  occupied  nation."  And  thus,  from  the  Japanese  perspective,  the  roles 
of  "superpower"  and  "subordinate"  have  coalesced  or  overlapped.  The  grooves 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  129 

of  the  long  unequal  relationship  with  the  United  States  run  deep  and  are  not 
easy  to  depart  from,  but  the  friction  in  those  grooves  is  heating  up. 

From  the  American  perspective  this  coalescence  is  also  true,  but  the  am- 
bivalence is  further  compounded  by  another  point  of  timing:  the  sudden  recog- 
nition in  the  mid-1960s  that  Japan  is  the  most  dynamically  expanding  power  in 
Asia  (if  not  the  world)  coincided  with  the  recognition  that  the  United  States,  on 
the  contrary,  is  a  power  in  disarray,  and  certainly  a  waning  Pacific  power.  Thus 
at  the  very  moment  that  Japan  approached  the  level  the  United  States  had  sup- 
posedly always  wanted  (the  capacity  for  major  military  and  economic  activity 
in  non-Communist  Asia),  many  Americans  discovered  that  perhaps  they  had 
not  wanted  this  after  all.  The  wedding  of  the  superdomino  and  superpower 
images,  in  short,  produced  not  a  super-ally  but  a  superthreat  in  the  view  of 
many.  Or,  in  the  more  neutral  jargon  of  the  political  scientist,  it  might  be  argued 
that  in  its  relationship  with  Japan  the  United  States  has  apparently  moved  di- 
rectly from  a  friendship  among  unequals  to  an  "adversary  friendship,"  without 
ever  having  been  able  to  sustain  even  temporarily  an  interlude  of  amicable 
equality. 

As  a  result,  since  the  period  covered  by  the  Pentagon  Papers  the  stereotyped 
apprehension  of  a  Japanese  accommodation  to  the  Communist  bloc  has  been 
replaced  by  other  alarming  visions — notably  fear  of  a  militarily  resurgent  Japan 
and  premonitions  of  a  global  trade  war  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  (in 
which  Japan  is  most  often  conceded  ultimate  victory)  or  the  Japanese  creation 
of  an  independent  and  autarkic  yen  bloc  in  Asia.^'''  These  more  current  appre- 
hensions are  not  necessarily  consistent  with  the  traditional  fear  of  a  "Red" 
Japan,  but  that  is  of  little  solace  to  America's  uneasy  political  and  economic 
leaders.  Nor  are  these  fears  really  new.  As  early  as  1949,  the  NSC  cautioned 
that  "in  the  course  of  time  a  threat  of  domination  [of  Asia]  may  come  from 
such  nations  as  Japan,  China,  or  India,  or  from  an  Asiatic  bloc,"  and  indeed 
virtually  all  of  the  world  warned  the  United  States  of  this  possibility  when  it 
unilaterally  decided  to  set  Japan  upon  the  reverse  course.  In  the  exigencies  of 
daily  policy,  however,  this  caution  was  thrown  to  the  winds,  and  the  United 
States  devoted  itself  to  encouraging  not  only  Japan's  remilitarization  and  eco- 
nomic penetration  of  Southeast  Asia,  South  Korea,  and  Taiwan,  but  also  the 
suppression  within  Japan  of  outspoken  opposition  to  such  policies.  The  question 
is  no  longer  what  the  United  States  has  sown,  but  what  Japan,  Asia,  and  the 
world  will  reap. 

Insofar  as  U.S.  attitudes  are  concerned,  as  the  decade  of  the  1970s  opened, 
the  Japanese,  somewhat  to  their  surprise,  discovered  that  in  conforming  to  U.S. 
postwar  policy  for  Asia  they  had  uhimately  aroused  American  hostility  and  dis- 
trust. In  August  1971,  in  the  midst  of  the  economic  and  diplomatic  "Nixon 
shocks,"  the  Japanese  Foreign  Ministry  prepared  a  memorandum  for  use  in 
government  and  business  circles  in  Japan,  summarizing  American  complaints. 
The  document,  subsequently  made  available  in  English,  concluded  with  this  sum- 
mation of  the  "General  Image  of  Japan  arising  out  of  the  above-mentioned 
Criticism": 

( 1 )  As  to  Japan  as  a  Country 

A.  Japan  is  a  strange  country  whose  attitudes  can't  be  measured  by 
standards  valid  in  America  and  Europe  and  therefore  Americans  can't 
but  conclude  that  Japan  is  a  country  whose  statements  and  actions  it 
is  impossible  for  Americans  to  interpret  reliably. 


130      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

B.  Japan  is  ungrateful  for  the  U.S.'s  generosity  and  help  to  Japan  after 
the  War. 

C.  Japan  is  pursuing  her  ambition  to  become  the  No.  1  country  in 
the  world  and  her  people  are  all  united  in  this  purpose,  without  re- 
flecting on  the  consequences  of  their  actions  to  others. 

D.  Japan  is  extremely  self-centered  and  insular-minded.  She  does  not 
understand  the  spirit  of  mutuality  or  fair-play  either  in  the  field  of 
politics  or  in  that  of  economics. 

E.  Envy  of  Japan's  success.  (On  the  other  hand  there  are  some  people 
saying  that  they  should  learn  from  Japan.) 

(2)  As  to  Japanese  Companies  and  People 

A.  They  are  determinedly  working  to  increase  their  share  of  the  world's 
markets  and  are  quite  willing  to  accept  very  small  profit  margins  in 
order  to  do  this. 

B.  They  are  arrogant  (too  self-conscious  of  Japan's  being  a  major 
power). 

C.  Japanese  work  always  in  groups  and  they  work  very  hard  even  at 
the  sacrifice  of  their  private  lives. 

D.  They  are  very  difficult  people  to  understand.  Many  prominent  poli- 
ticians and  businessmen  seem  to  make  a  habit  of  breaking  promises, 
and  being  inconsistent  in  their  words  and  actions,  and  are  two-faced. 
Therefore  Japanese  are  unreliable. 

E.  The  Japanese  are  hated  by  the  people  of  Southeast  Asian  countries 
as  "ugly  Japanese."  Japanese  are  unable  to  understand  the  spirit  of 
co-prosperity.'"^^ 

By  far  the  greatest  part  of  the  Foreign  Ministry's  document  dealt  with  com- 
plaints concerning  Japanese  economic  practices.  The  American  grievances  were 
broken  down  as  follows:  (1)  invasion  of  the  American  market  as  a  result  of 
Japan's  export  drive  (with  specific  mention  of  Japan's  extremely  favorable  bal- 
ance of  trade  with  the  United  States,  and  of  particular  resentments  over  textiles, 
electronics,  steel,  and  autos);  (2)  Japanese  export  practices  and  "system" 
(dumping,  the  "double  price  system  for  domestic  and  foreign  markets,"  unique 
labor  conditions,  low  wages,  unique  investment  and  borrowing  practices);  (3) 
Japanese  import  restrictions  (tariff  manipulation,  duties  and  quotas,  the  import 
deposit  system);  (4)  capital  liberalization  (ceilings  and  restrictions  on  foreign 
investment  in  Japan);  (5)  limitations  on  foreign  exchange  transactions  (par- 
ticularly in  short-term  capital  transactions  and  government  ordinances  restricting 
trade);  (6)  governmental  intervention  in  both  trade  and  capital  transactions 
(through  "administrative  guidance,"  manipulation  of  licenses,  discourtesy  to 
foreign  businessmen,  etc.);  (7)  the  "Japan  Inc."  nexus  of  government-private 
business  collusion  (including  export  targets,  tax  relief,  subsidies,  loose  anti-trust 
laws,  etc.);  (8)  criticisms  of  Japan's  economic  policy  in  general  (lack  of  co- 
operation in  yen  revaluation,  no  assistance  to  the  United  States  in  solving  its 
balance  of  payments  problem,  niggardly  and  self-serving  aid  programs,  lack  of 
concern  with  environmental  pollution  or  consumer  protection);  (9)  natural  re- 
sources (depletion  of  natural  resources  such  as  coal,  timber,  or  various  forms  of 
marine  life);  (10)  "other  criticisms"  (attempts  to  exclude  American  banks,  and 
"copying  foreign  machinery  and  components  for  atomic  reactors" )  .^^ 

The  Foreign  Ministry  list  is  without  question  a  thorough  summary  of  Amer- 
ican resentment  concerning  Japanese  economic  practices.  What  it  fails  to  convey, 
however,  is  a  sense  of  the  doomsday  rhetoric  actually  used  by  these  American 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  131 

critics.  The  task  of  disseminating  this  has  been  undertaken  by  Senator  Strom 
Thurmond,  among  others,  who  as  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  anti-Japan  movement 
in  the  United  States  frequently  introduces  into  the  Congressional  Record  materials 
containing  passages  such  as  the  following  (from  a  speech  to  an  Atlanta  audience) : 

The  economic  challenge  posed  by  Japan — and  I  suggest  that  you  think 
of  Japan  as  a  single,  giant  company  under  centraHzed  direction — is  the 
gravest  economic  challenge  this  country  has  ever  faced. 

Here  in  Atlanta,  I  am  reminded  of  Henry  Grady's  famous  speech  about 
the  Georgia  man  who  died  and  was  buried  in  a  Northern-made  suit,  in  a 
grave  dug  by  a  Northern-made  shovel  and  laid  to  rest  under  a  piece  of 
stone  from  the  North.  Georgia's  only  contribution  was  the  corpse  and  the 
hole  in  the  ground.  Well,  it  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  our  entire 
country  is  likely  to  approach  that  situation  by  the  end  of  the  1970s,  with 
Japan  in  the  role  of  the  North,  unless  there  is  a  change  in  national  policy. 
I  can  envision  a  grave  dug  by  a  Japanese-made  power  shovel,  a  body  clad 
in  Japanese  textiles,  and  a  hearse  made  by  a  Japanese  auto-maker.^^ 

This  sense  of  economic  war  with  Japan,  moreover,  has  obviously  influenced  the 
Nixon  Administration:  in  October  1970,  the  United  States  actually  threatened 
to  resolve  the  textile  dispute  by  recourse  to  legislation  in  the  Trading  with  the 
Enemy  Act.^^ 

The  Nixon  Administration's  poHcy  toward  Japan  is,  however,  complex,  for 
while  aligning  with  the  anti-Japan  economic  bloc  in  the  United  States  and  ac- 
cording the  Japanese  shabby  diplomatic  consideration  in  the  China  issue,  the 
Nixon  Doctrine  for  Asia  strongly  emphasizes  that  Japan  is  destined  to  become 
America's  primary  partner  in  (1)  the  economic  development,  and  (2)  military 
security  activities,  in  Asia.^^  As  the  statement  by  Secretary  of  State  Rogers  at 
the  beginning  of  Section  4  indicates,  official  American  policy  remains  the  en- 
couragement of  continued  mihtarization  by  Japan.  Such  rearmament,  it  is  argued, 
is  essential  for  the  expanded  role  Japan  must  eventually  play  as  a  participant 
in  "regional  security"  in  Asia;  and  there  exists  no  danger  it  will  get  out  of  hand. 
In  1953  Nixon,  then  Vice-President,  was  the  first  high  U.S.  official  to  publicly 
attack  the  "no  war"  clause  in  the  Japanese  constitution,  and  his  position  on  Japa- 
nese military  development  remains  essentially  unchanged  today.  The  Nixon 
Administration,  like  its  postwar  predecessors,  desires  a  Japanese  military  estab- 
lishment capable  of  action  beyond  Japan's  borders.  Even  more,  there  have  been 
strong  indications  that  some  members  of  the  Nixon  Administration,  particularly 
Defense  Secretary  Melvin  Laird,  have  actually  encouraged  Japan  to  develop 
nuclear  capability .^^ 

The  sanguine  view  of  Japan's  postwar  "pacifism"  which  enables  Washington 
to  regard  Japanese  remilitarization  as  low  risk  has  proven  increasingly  unpersua- 
sive  both  within  the  United  States  and  throughout  the  world.  The  counsel  for  the 
Symington  committee  attempted  (with  little  success)  to  pose  this  issue  in  the 
1970  hearings  on  U.S.  commitments  to  Japan: 

You  pointed  out  they  have  a  growing  military  budget,  we  noted  the 
tremendous  election  victory  of  Prime  Minister  Sato,  and  the  current  de- 
cline of  the  Socialist  Party  with  their  views  on  unarmed  neutrality.  General 
McGehee  pointed  out  that  Japan  has  less  and  less  of  the  nuclear  allergy 
which  we  have  known  her  to  have  over  the  years.  They  have  volunteered 


132      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

for  a  peacekeeping  role  in  Southeast  Asia.  They  have  a  missile  capability, 
and  one  commentator  ventures  a  prediction  that  they  will  have  a  missile  in 
being.  They  have  been  slower  to  sign  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  than 
we  thought,  and  you  pointed  out,  Mr.  Secretary  [Undersecretary  of  State 
U.  Alexis  Johnson],  this  was  in  part  due  to  a  desire  to  keep  open  their 
options.  There  are  other  evidences  of  a  reawakening  nationalism  in  Japan. 
On  the  basis  of  this  recitation,  do  we  understand  Japan's  intended  role  in 
the  Far  East  as  well  as  we  think  we  do? 

Blunter  assessments  of  the  situation  have  emanated  from  Congressional  bodies 
such  as  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  A  "Report  of  Special  Study 
Mission  to  Asia"  issued  by  this  committee  in  April  1970,  for  example,  reached 
this  conclusion  concerning  the  thrust  of  military  thinking  in  present-day  Japan: 

There  is  a  strong  effort  underway  by  some  groups  in  Japan  toward  re- 
armament and  a  seeming  return  to  the  old  "Greater  East  Asia  Co-prosperity  . 
Sphere."  The  study  mission  was  concerned  with  the  increased  emphasis  by 
some  on  enlarging  Japan's  military  prowess,  even  though  it  already  supports  j 
the  sixth  largest  military  establishment  in  the  world.  I 

While  the  Japanese  Constitution,  by  limiting  its  forces  to  island  defense,  ' 
does  provide  certain  basic  restrictions  on  rearming,  this  constitutional  pro- 
vision can  be  circumvented  by  broadening  the  definition  of  Japan's  defensive 
perimeter.  In  fact,  obviously  concerned  about  maintaining  a  steady  flow  of 
Mideast  oil  to  Japanese  industry,  some  in  Japan  now  consider  its  area  of  | 
defense  reaches  to  where  oil  shipments  must  traverse,  the  Straits  of  Malacca. 

Prime  Minister  Sato  recently  sounded  the  call  to  Japan's  new  militarism 
when  he  said:  "It  is  clear  that  the  (Japanese)  people  are  no  longer  satisfied 
with  a  merely  negative  pacifism  aiming  only  at  the  country's  safety." 

The  study  mission  was  told  that  Japan  has  decided  it  does  not  want  to 
remain  miUtarily  dependent  upon  the  United  States.  No  one  can  dispute 
this  aim,  however  far  they  look  beyond  this  premise.  Authoritative  Japanese 
officials  have  stated  that  efforts  be  advanced  to  accomplish  the  total  with- 
drawal of  American  forces  from  Japan  (not  merely  Okinawa)  within  this 
decade. 

The  Prime  Minister,  according  to  information  made  available  to  the 
study  mission,  interpreted  his  recent  reelection  as  a  mandate  to  proceed 
with  significant  military  expansion. 

Japan  has  been  spending  1  percent  of  its  GNP  for  arms.  With  an  annual 
25  [sic}  percent  increase  in  the  GNP,  Japan's  expenditures  for  military 
equipment  will  double  every  4  years.  In  addition  we  have  learned  it  is  now 
recommended  that  2  percent  of  GNP  be  devoted  to  defense  spending — 
geometrically  increasing  Japan's  military  power.  Is  this  not  a  return  to  the 
Bushido  of  old  Japan? 

The  study  mission  must  also  state  that  Japan  is  reported  to  possess  an 
advanced  nuclear  capability  and  will  soon  have  the  delivery  systems  for 
nuclear  weapons.  Although  Japan  did  recently  sign  the  nuclear  non-prolifera- 
tion treaty  we  were  made  to  understand  that  ratification  could  be  put  off 
indefinitely. 

In  our  discussions  it  was  indicated  that  Japan  intends  to  become  the 
great  seapower  once  again,  to  "protect"  its  trade  routes.  This,  too,  has 
ominous  overtones. 

Placing  this  aspect  of  our  report  in  perspective,  the  study  mission  evi- 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  133 

dences  concern  over  Japan's  emphasis  on  the  new  militarism.  There  seems 
to  be  a  readiness  to  commit  a  substantial  portion  of  Japan's  vast  wealth  to 
the  reestablishment  of  a  major  international  military  force.  This  involves 
increased  spending,  a  much  broader  definition  of  her  area  of  defense,  nuclear 
capability  and  a  clear  determination  to  be  a  military  power  on  a  scale  not 
contemplated  since  World  War  II. 

...  In  still  another  area,  we  were  impressed  by  the  renewed  popularity 
in  Japan  of  the  old  line  that  "Korea  is  a  daggar  pointed  at  the  heart  of 
Japan." 

This  is  actually  part  of  a  broader  effort  to  give  the  widest  possible  defini- 
tion to  Japan's  perimeter  for  defense  under  the  terms  of  its  constitution. 
The  area  that  Japan  now  seems  to  consider  within  its  immediate  area  of 
defense  extends  from  Korea  through  the  Straits  of  Malacca.^^ 

The  specter  of  resurgent  Japanese  militarism  has  naturally  been  most  alarming 
to  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  Indeed,  beginning  around  1969,  it  became 
clear  that  China's  leaders  had  come  to  regard  Japanese  militarism  as  a  potential 
threat  to  their  security  surpassed  if  at  all  only  by  that  of  the  Soviet  Union.  This 
represented  a  profound  change  in  the  Chinese  world  view:  for  while  the  relation- 
ship between  Japanese  remilitarization  and  the  U.S.  security  system  was  still 
acknowledged,  Japan  by  itself  was  for  the  first  time  in  the  postwar  period  seen 
as  potentially  more  dangerous  to  China  than  the  United  States.  This  change  be- 
came generally  known  to  the  American  public  only  several  years  later,  primarily 
through  the  interviews  which  Chou  En-lai  gave  to  the  Committee  of  Concerned 
Asian  Scholars  (July  1971)  and  James  Reston  (August  1971).  In  these  inter- 
views Chou  stressed,  first,  that  Japanese  military  expansion  in  Asia  was  inevitable 
given  the  "lopsided"  nature  of  postwar  Japanese  economic  development;  and 
second,  that  concrete  developments  in  Japan  confirmed  the  more  theoretical 
assumption : 

.  .  .  And  so  this  lopsided  development  of  Japan,  what  will  issue  from  it? 
She  needs  to  carry  out  an  economic  expansion  abroad.  Otherwise,  she  can- 
not maintain  her  economy.  And  so,  being  in  a  capitalist  system,  following 
this  economic  expansion,  there  is  bound  to  come  with  it  military  expansion. 
Isn't  that  so?  And  so,  precisely  because  of  that,  the  fourth  defense  plan  is 
from  1972  to  1976,  and  they  plan  to  spend  more  than  $16  billion.  About 
the  total  amount  of  military  expenditures  of  Japan  after  the  Second  World 
War  to  1971,  the  first  three  defense  plans,  was  only  a  bit  over  $10  billion. 
And  some  American  senators  [sic],  after  visiting  Japan,  reported  that  this 
fourth  Japanese  defense  plan  exceeded  the  requirements  of  Japan  for  self- 
defense. 

And  according  to  the  present  economic  capacity  of  Japan,  she  does  not 
require  five  years  to  carry  out  this  fourth  plan.  As  we  see  it,  they  may  be 
able  to  fulfill  it  in  only  two  or  two-and-a-half  years.  And  in  this  way,  it's 
all  further  proof  that  the  appetite,  the  ambitions  are  becoming  much  greater. 
And  so  they  are  thinking  not  only  of  having  up-to-date  equipment,  but  also 
thinking  of  manufacturing  nuclear  weapons  themselves.  Now  Japan  is  al- 
ready cooperating  with  the  United  States  and  Australia  in  building  a  nuclear 
reactor  and  nuclear  power,  and  Japan  is  already  able  to  manufacture  guided 
missiles,  ground-to-air  and  ground-to-ground  guided  missiles  without  a  nu- 
clear warhead.  So  the  only  problem  remaining  is  how  to  manufacture  a 
nuclear  warhead  to  put  on  these  missiles.  So  there  does  exist  this  danger.^"^ 


134      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

Chou  also  pointed  out  the  interrelationship  between  Japanese  economic  growth 
and  the  Korea,  Vietnam,  and  Indochina  wars;  the  particularly  dangerous  aspects 
of  Japanese  involvement  in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan;  and  the  contradictory  ele- 
ments of  competition/cooperation  in  the  Nixon  policy  toward  Japan.  His  re- 
marks, however,  still  failed  to  convey  a  sense  of  the  detailed  and  specific  analysis 
of  trends  in  Japan  which  underlies  the  current  Chinese  fear.  The  Chinese  press 
has  dealt  with  this  problem  at  length,  and  apart  from  its  distinctive  vocabulary, 
the  analysis  which  it  has  provided  in  fact  represents  a  fairly  comprehensive  sum- 
mary of  the  concerns  voiced  also  by  non-Chinese  observers.  A  nine-point  critique 
published  in  both  Renmin  Ribao  (People's  Daily)  and  Jiefangjun  Bao  (Libera- 
tion Army  Daily)  on  September  3,  1970,  aptly  draws  together  these  concerns: 
(1)  "Several  zaibatsu  which  used  to  be  the  behind-the-scene  bosses  of  the  Japa- 
nese fascist  'military  headquarters'  have  already  staged  a  come-back"  (a  recog- 
nition of  the  military-industrial  complex  which  has  been  built  up  in  Japan  under 
the  U.S.-Japan  security  agreements) ;  (2)  "Japanese  militarism  has  been  rearmed" 
(it  is  pointed  out  that  the  Japanese  military  now  numbers  280,000  men,  close  to 
the  force  level  maintained  just  prior  to  the  Japanese  attack  on  China  in  the 
1930s;  also  that  there  is  a  preponderance  of  active  officers,  numerous  reserve 
officers,  and  expansive  military  plans  for  the  future);  (3)  "The  militarist  forces 
have  again  taken  a  grip  on  the  military  and  political  power  in  Japan"  (notation 
of  the  dominance  of  prewar  figures  in  both  the  Sato  cabinet  and  officer  corps); 
(4)  "Japan's  ruling  clique  is  pushing  ahead  with  accelerated  pace  the  fascistiza- 
tion  of  its  political  system"  (police  expansion  to  beyond  the  prewar  level,  plus 
reactionary  legislation);  (5)  "Japanese  monopoly  capital  has  been  frenziedly 
carrying  out  expansion  and  aggression  abroad"  (statistics  on  Japanese  economic 
expansion  throughout  Asia);  (6)  "Japanese  militarism  has  openly  placed  our 
territory  Taiwan  Province  and  Korea  within  its  sphere  of  influence"  (quotations 
from  the  1969  Nixon-Sato  communique);  (7)  "The  Japanese  militarists  actively 
serve  as  U.S.  imperialism's  'gendarmes  in  Asia'  and  'overseers'  of  slaves  in  a 
futile  attempt  to  re-dominate  Asia  by  taking  this  opportunity"  (reference  to 
military  collusion  with  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  under  the  U.S.-Japan  security 
treaty,  plus  counterrevolutionary  alliances  such  as  ASP  AC,  the  Asian  and  Pacific 
Council);  (8)  "The  Japanese  militarists  try  hard  to  find  excuses  for  sending 
troops  abroad"  ("life-line"  rhetoric,  talk  of  defending  the  Straits  of  Malacca); 
and  (9)  "The  Japanese  ruling  circles  energetically  create  counter-revolutionary 
public  opinion  for  a  war  of  aggression"  (resurgence  of  military  themes  in  the 
mass  media,  textbooks,  organizations  devoted  to  restoring  the  "bushido"  spirit, 
etc.). 68 

Distrust  of  Japan  runs  deep  through  all  of  Asia,  and  is  based  on  vivid  recollec- 
tion of  the  brutal  realities  of  Japan's  earlier  quest  for  "coexistence  and  copros- 
perity."  Americans  easily  forget  that  the  United  States  suffered  least  among  par- 
ticipants in  the  Pacific  War — that  indeed  the  Japanese  had  kifled  some  2  million 
Chinese  before  Pearl  Harbor.  Thus  bland  assurances  that  Japan  has  learned  its 
lesson  meet  understandable  disbelief  in  Asia.  But  more  concretely,  it  is  possibly 
to  point  to  three  recent  official  documents,  all  supported  by  the  United  States, 
which  appear  to  give  firm  substance  to  the  fear  that  Japan  has  indeed  entered 
an  entirely  new  level  of  military  expansion:  the  Nixon-Sato  communique  of 
November  1969,  which  paved  the  way  for  the  U.S.-Japan  agreement  on  the 
reversion  of  Okinawa;  and  the  Defense  Agency  White  Paper  and  Fourth  Defense 
Plan  of  Japan,  issued  on  successive  days  in  October  1970. 

U.S.  spokesmen  have  pointed  with  pride  to  the  "new"  military  commitments 
agreed  upon  by  the  Japanese  in  the  1969  communique,  namely  "that  Japan  is 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  135 

interested  and  involved  in  the  defense  of  other  areas."  Specifically,  as  explained 
by  U.  Alexis  Johnson:  (1)  "you  have  for  the  first  time  in  an  official  Japanese 
Government  statement,  the  recognition  that  the  security  of  Japan  is  related  to 
the  peace  and  security  of  the  Far  East";  (2)  you  "have  the  specific  reference  to 
Korea,  in  which  the  flat  statement  is  made  that  the  security  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  is  essential  to  Japan's  own  security";  (3)  again  for  the  first  time,  it  is 
stated  by  the  Japanese  "that  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  security  in  the  Taiwan 
area  is  also  a  most  important  factor  for  the  security  of  Japan";  (4)  Prime  Min- 
ister Sato  agreed  that  Japan  would  consider  participating  in  an  international  peace- 
keeping force  in  Indochina  after  conclusion  of  hostilities;  (5)  in  connection  with 
the  projected  reversion  of  Okinawa,  Japan  assumed  responsibility  for  "a  further 
geographic  extension"  of  military  forces  by  moving  Japanese  military  personnel 
to  that  island;  (6)  Japan  for  the  first  time  acknowledged  its  interest  in  par- 
ticipating in  the  postwar  rehabilitation  of  Indochina  (meaning  primarily  con- 
tinued aid  to  anti-communist  regimes In  addition,  in  the  months  following 
the  Nixon-Sato  communique  it  became  widely  acknowledged  that  Japanese  of- 
ficials did  in  fact  see  the  Straits  of  Malacca  as  part  of  their  strategic  "lifeline," 
within  their  drastically  expanded  "defense  perimeter." 

The  1969  joint  communique  represented  Japan's  part  of  the  bargain  for  the 
reversion  of  Okinawa  to  Japanese  administrative  control.  This  reversion  was  to 
have  been  Sato's  crowning  political  achievement,  but  it  now  appears  that  he  may 
in  fact  have  made  Japan  even  more  vulnerable  to  embroilment  in  American 
military  adventures  in  Asia.  The  United  States  has  ostensibly  given  up  use  of 
Okinawa  as  a  nuclear  and  CBW  arsenal,  but  this  is  only  a  minor  inconvenience. 
The  single  strongest  point  made  by  all  U.S.  civilian  and  military  representatives 
who  testified  on  the  reversion  before  Congress  was  that  this  in  no  substantial  way 
altered  the  U.S.  base  structure  in  Okinawa.  And  at  the  same  time,  the  United 
States  has  interpreted  the  terms  of  the  reversion  and  the  1969  communique  as 
meaning  "Our  theoretical  action  with  respect  to  our  bases  in  Japan  is  enlarged."  '^'^ 
The  latter  point,  a  subtle  twist,  derives  from  the  American  position  that  Sato's 
agreement  to  the  new,  broad  definition  of  Japanese  security  in  effect  gives  the 
United  States  greater  freedom  to  use  its  bases  in  Japan  (as  in  Okinawa)  for 
action  in  Korea  and  Taiwan,  since  it  is  now  officially  agreed  that  this  would 
represent  "defense  of  Japan."  (The  Chinese  describe  this  as  the  "  'Okinawaniza- 
tion'  of  Japan  proper."  "'^)  Thus  it  would  appear  that  the  price  Sato  payed  for 
his  Okinawa  plum  included  not  only  moving  the  Japanese  military  a  stage  closer 
to  dispatch  abroad,  but  also  relinquishing  some  of  the  "prior  consultation"  lever- 
age Japan  had  hitherto  held  concerning  U.S.  use  of  its  bases  in  Japan.  Through 
the  Okinawa  reversion  trade-off,  the  United  States  thus  gained  both  a  freer  hand 
in  Japan  and  a  helping  in  Northeast  Asia  and  possibly  elsewhere  as  well.  Japan 
gained  administrative  rights  over  Okinawa,  a  new  level  of  rearmament,  a  dras- 
tically enlarged  military  mission,  and  better  odds  of  becoming  militarily  involved 
over  Korea  or  Taiwan  in  the  future. 

The  White  Paper  and  Fourth  Defense  Plan,  issued  under  the  facile  Yashuhiro 
Nakasone,  then  head  of  the  Defense  Agency,  were  aimed  at  creating  the  psy- 
chological and  material  militarism  necessary  to  fill  this  expanded  perimeter.  The 
former,  unprecedented  in  postwar  Japan,  was  fundamentally  directed  toward  the 
creation  of  a  patriotic  "defense  consciousness"  among  the  Japanese.  Amidst 
consoling  platitudes  (civilian  control,  "defensive"  orientation,  etc.),  however, 
critics  found  less  reassuring  lines  of  thought.  The  White  Paper  began  by  noting 
that,  noble  as  the  goals  of  the  United  Nations  may  be,  "the  rule  of  force  re- 
mains." "True  patriotism,"  it  said,  "demands  not  just  love  of  peace  and  country 


136      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 


but  also  eagerness  to  contribute  on  one's  own  initiative  to  the  defense  of  the 
country."  To  maintain  "national  consensus"  and  a  "sound  society,"  the  White 
Paper  stated,  "it  becomes  imperative  that  preventive  efforts  be  kept  up  in  the 
nonmihtary  field  at  all  times" — meaning  police  repression  of  domestic  dissent. 
In  a  strikingly  bold  departure,  the  paper  castigated  the  "nihilistic  feelings  about 
nuclear  weapons  prevailing  among  the  people,"  and  then  stated  that  whereas 
Japan  "should  not"  develop  ICBMs  or  strategic  bombers,  "as  for  defensive  nu- 
clear weapons,  it  is  considered  that  Japan  may  have  them  in  theory,  without 
contradicting  the  Constitution."  The  paper  called  for  sea  and  air  supremacy 
"around  Japan,"  without  defining  the  key  phrase. "^^  And,  an  act  of  omission,  it 
was  subsequently  learned  that  a  statement  denying  the  possible  future  introduc- 
tion of  mifitary  conscription  had  been  deleted  from  the  final  draft. "^^ 

The  significance  of  the  $16.9  billion  Fourth  Defense  Plan  (a  five-year  plan) 
lies  not  only  in  the  fact  that  it  was  50  percent  again  larger  than  all  previous 
military  budgets  combined,  but  also  that  this  major  change  in  the  scale  of  military 
expansion  was  introduced  after  it  had  become  widely  recognized  that  Japan  al- 
ready possessed  full  capability  for  conventional  defense  of  its  homeland.  In  the 
view  of  most  commentators,  the  goal  of  the  plan  is  to  provide  Japan  with  the 
capability  of  "strategic"  or  "forward"  or  "offensive"  defense — that  is,  the  ca- 
pacity for  "preventive  war."  Apologists  for  the  plan  point  out  that  under  it  Japan 
will  still  be  spending  a  smaller  percentage  of  GNP  (approximately  0.92  percent) 
than  any  other  major  power.  The  other  side  of  this  statistics  game,  however,  is 
(1)  the  Japanese  GNP  is  immense  and  expanding  rapidly;  (2)  growth  in  military 
spending  is  exceeding  growth  in  the  overall  economy;  and  (3)  in  per  capita  terms 
this  will  average  out  to  roughly  forty  dollars  per  Japanese  (China's  per  capita 
defense  spending  is  $6.50;  South  Korea's  $10).  Much  of  the  expenditures  under 
the  Fourth  Defense  Plan  will  go  to  increasing  air  and  sea  power;  strength  of  the 
air  force  will  grow  2.8  times,  navy  2.3  times,  and  ground  forces  1.9  times. 
Whereas  the  Third  Defense  Plan  alloted  $2.4  billion  to  expansion  of  equipment, 
the  sum  under  the  present  plan  will  be  $7  billion — an  increase  which  critics  re- 
gard as  extremely  significant  insofar  as  the  growth  of  a  military-industrial  com- 
plex in  Japan  is  concerned.  These  sums,  as  is  well  known,  flow  primarily  to  a 
small  number  of  giant  concerns  (notably  Mitsubishi),  which  wield  Extraordinary 
political  leverage  in  Japan  and  have  long  been  clamoring  for  a  rise  in  defense 
expenditures  up  to  4  percent  of  GNP.  As  Herbert  Bix  has  effectively  documented, 
most  of  these  firms  also  have  lock-ins  with  U.S.  defense  contractors.  This  is  an 
aspect  of  the  Nixon  Doctrine  which  is  often  overlooked — the  creation,  in  the 
phrase  of  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  of  a  "trans-Pacific  mihtary-industrial 
complex."  And,  in  appraising  the  ultimate  implications  of  the  Fourth  Defense 
Plan,  the  same  journal  concludes  that  "of  the  alternatives,  invasion  of  Japan  by 
a  hostile  force  or  the  despatch  of  Japanese  forces  to  'friendly'  or  'hostile'  soil, 
the  latter  is  considered  the  more  likely."  '^^ 

In  the  days  before  the  People's  Republic  of  China  became  an  acceptable 
entity  in  the  United  States,  the  late  Mary  Wright,  professor  of  Chinese  history 
at  Yale,  counseled  students  lecturing  on  China  in  their  communities  that  their 
major  task  was  elemental:  to  show  that  the  Chinese  were  people.  As  the  Japanese 
superpower  came  under  fire  both  internationally  and  within  the  United  States,  on 
both  economic  and  military  grounds,  defenders  of  the  U.S.-Japan  alliance  in 
effect  took  upon  themselves  a  comparable  task:  to  stress  that  the  Japanese  were 
good  folk,  and  more  than  that,  capitalist  and  peace-loving  like  ourselves.  Their 
position  was  most  fully  presented  before  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
in  November  1971  by  George  Ball,  Edwin  Reischauer,  Robert  Scalapino,  Henry 


I 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  137 

Rosovsky,  and  Hugh  Patrick.  Excerpts  from  these  hearings  were  subsequently 
published  by  the  United  States-Japan  Trade  Council  in  a  pamphlet  appropriately 
entitled  "United  States  &  Japan:  DANGER  AHEAD." 

The  Japan  specialists  attempted  to  demystify  Japanese  intentions  and  dispel 
popular  misconceptions  of  the  "unique"  dynamics  of  the  Japanese  economic 
miracle  by  hardnosed  reaffirmation  of  the  fundamental  and  essential  compatabil- 
ity  of  Japanese  and  American  capitalism  in  Asia's  future  ("after  all,"  in  Patrick's 
words,  "competition  is  inherent  in  the  actuality  and  the  ideology  of  our  private 
enterprise  systems").  Yet  over  their  presentations  hovered  the  shadow  of  George 
Kennan  and  the  ghost  of  John  Foster  Dulles.  For  in  the  end  they  rested  their 
arguments  on  the  fundamental  assumption  of  all  postwar  American  policy  in 
Asia.  Japan  is  the  superdomino.  Professor  Reischauer,  for  example,  provided 
the  Dulles-dimension  of  apocalypse: 

At  this  watershed  in  history,  we  could  be  witnessing  the  start  of  a  flow  in 
world  events  which  could  in  time  gain  irreversible  force  and  sweep  us  all 
to  ultimate  catastrophe. 

George  Ball,  in  turn,  evoked  George  Kennan,  chapters  1948  and  1949,  in  dis- 
missing China  and  citing  the  pivotal  importance  to  the  United  States  of  alliance 
with  the  industrial  and  military  power  of  Japan: 

Today  the  United  States  is  watching  with  fascination  the  emergence  of 
China  onto  the  world  stage.  .  .  .  From  the  vantage  point  of  the  United 
States,  there  is  only  one  large  industrialized  power  in  the  Far  East  and  that 
is  Japan.  China,  by  comparison,  is  an  industrial  primitive,  whose  GNP  is  not 
much  more  than  a  third  of  Japan's,  in  spite  of  an  eight  to  one  advantage  in 
population. 

We  must,  of  necessity,  build  our  policy  primarily  on  close  relations  with 
the  most  powerful  country  in  the  area:  Japan.  To  do  this  will  require  skill 
and  attention  and  a  great  deal  more  sensitivity  than  we  have  shown  in 
recent  months.  .  .  .  Japan  plays  two  major  roles  of  vital  interest  to  the 
United  States.  First,  it  has  the  potential  to  become  the  most  powerful  po- 
litical and  military  nation  in  the  East  Asian  and  Pacific  region  and  thus  is 
likely  to  become  the  dominant  power  in  the  area.  Second,  it  is  today  the 
third  greatest  industrial  power  in  the  world  and  may,  in  time,  overtake  the 
Soviet  Union  which  is  now  the  second  greatest. 

Ball  and  Scalapino  also  implictly  reaffirmed  the  traditional  bipolar  approach  to 
American  commitments  in  Asia.  Thus  Ball  saw  American  relations  with  China 
and  Japan  as  essentially  an  either/or  proposition:  "Under  no  circumstances 
could  we  envisage  a  relationship  to  China  that  would  serve  in  any  sense  as  an 
alternative  to  close  Japanese-American  cooperation."  And  Scalapino,  a  good  real- 
ist from  the  early  days  of  the  Vietnam  war,  derided  the  thought  of  abandoning 
confrontation: 

.  .  .  the  belief  that  in  Asia,  we  can  now  substitute  some  kind  of  loose,  yet 
equal  quadrilateral  relation  among  the  United  States,  the  Soviet  Union, 
Japan  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  for  the  American-Japanese  alli- 
ance is  a  form  of  romanticism  that  accords  neither  with  the  economic  nor 
the  political-military  realities  of  this  era. 


138      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 


Scalapino  also  coupled  skepticism  of  multipolar  relations  in  Asia  with  evocation 
of  another  familiar  apprehension:  the  threat  of  upheaval  within  Japan  itself.  "For 
the  first  time  since  1949,"  he  argued,  "political  instability  in  Japan  is  a  distinct 
possibility." 

Insofar  as  Japanese  mihtarism  is  concerned,  the  basic  argument  of  the  present 
defenders  of  the  alliance  is  simple,  and  somewhat  ironic.  Whereas  the  original 
rationale  of  the  security  relationship  had  been  that  the  U.S.  base  structure  would 
protect  Japan  until  Japan  had  remilitarized  to  the  point  of  being  capable  of  its 
own  conventional  defense,  the  current  argument  now  holds  that  the  United 
States  must  maintain  its  bases  and  forces  in  Japan  and  Okinawa  indefinitely  to 
prevent  massive  Japanese  remilitarization.  Thus  Ball  argued  that,  "To  my  mind 
there  is  nothing  more  important  for  the  peace  of  the  whole  Pacific  area  than  that 
the  treaty  [Mutual  Security  Treaty  with  Japan]  be  rigorously  observed  and  that 
the  United  States  do  nothing  to  encourage  Japanese  militarization."  Reischauer 
defended  a  similar  position  in  these  terms: 

On  the  defense  side,  if  the  Japanese  lose  confidence  in  us  or  believe  that 
we  will  not  treat  them  as  real  equals,  a  fairly  rapid  decline  in  the  effective- 
ness of  our  Mutual  Security  Treaty  with  them  will  follow.  Without  the  use 
of  Japanese  bases  and  tacit  Japanese  support,  we  could  not  reasonably  main- 
tain the  Seventh  Fleet  in  the  Western  Pacific  or  our  commitment  to  South 
Korea,  and  would  probably  be  forced  to  withdraw  to  mid-Pacific  .  .  .  the 
Japanese  might  drift  back  toward  major  military  power,  instability  might 
increase  in  Asia,  and  inter-regional  anxieties  might  reappear.  The  political 
and  economic  roads  would  then  merge  as  they  led  downward  toward  a 
great  world  tragedy. 

James  Reston  posed  this  same  question  to  Chou  En-lai.  "If  we  end  the  security 
pact  with  Japan,"  he  asked,  "is  it  in  your  view  that  it  is  more  likely  then  that 
Japan  will  become  more  militaristic  or  less  militaristic?"  "That  argument,"  Chou 
replied,  "is  quite  a  forced  argument,"  for  Japan  is  already  rapidly  remilitarizing 
under  the  security  treaty. '^^ 

And  of  course  it  is,  for  that  is  the  U.S.  policy. 

The  Chinese  press  answered  the  question  with  a  question  in  turn:  "Can  it  be 
that  there  is  no  revival  of  militarism  until  a  war  of  aggression  is  launched  one 
morning?"  '^^ 

Time  will  tell. 


Notes 

1.  The  major  references  to  Japan  which  appear  in  the  Senator  Gravel  edition  are  as 
follows:  Vol.  I,  39,  82,  84,  155,  187,  364,  366,  375,  386-387,  418-420,  425,  436,  438, 
450,  452,  469-470,  475,  511,  513,  589,  594,  597,  598,  600,  626-627.  Vol  II,  57,  459, 
664,  799,  817,  822.  Vol.  Ill,  3,  51,  87,  153,  219,  497,  500,  503,  598,  623,  627,  637, 
638,  658,  685,  723.  Vol.  IV,  54,  89,  91,  103,  108,  156,  174,  529,  614-615,  618-619, 
663,  669,  672,  683,  684.  Henceforth  this  source  will  be  cited  as  Gravel  edition. 

2.  George  F.  Kennan,  Memoirs  (1925-1950)  (1967:  Boston,  Little,  Brown),  Ch. 
XVI. 

3.  U.S.  Government  edition,  239,  254,  255,  257. 

4.  USG  ed.,  262. 

5.  Gravel  ed.,  1:415;  1:83-84.  Cf.  Roger  Hilsman  on  the  Chinese  menace  in  1963: 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  139 

"In  Asia  the  greatest  danger  to  independent  nations  comes  from  Communist  China, 
with  its  700  miUion  people  forced  into  the  service  of  an  aggressive  Communist  Party" 
{Ibid.,  II:  822). 

6.  USG  ed.,  258. 

7.  Ibid.,  260-261. 

8.  Ibid.,  262-264.  SCAP  [Supreme  Commander,  Allied  Powers]  refers  to  General 
Douglas  MacArthur,  who  had  command  over  the  occupation  of  Japan. 

9.  Ibid.,  434. 

10.  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  January  21,  1952.  Cf.  William  Sebald,  With  Mac- 
Arthur  in  Japan:  A  Personal  History  of  the  Occupation  (1965:  New  York,  W.  W. 
Norton),  284  ff;  and  Herbert  Morrison,  Herbert  Morrison,  An  Autobiography  (1960: 
London,  Odhams  Press),  280.  See  also  the  authoritative  history  of  the  Yoshida  cabinets, 
Iwao  Takeuchi,  ed.,  Yoshida  Naikaku  (1954:  Tokyo,  Yoshida  Naikaku  Kankokai), 
451  ff. 

11.  Gunnar  Adler-Karlson,  Western  Economic  Warfare  1947-1967:  A  Case  Study  in 
Foreign  Economic  Policy,  Acta  Universitatis  Stockhomienses,  Stockliolm  Economic 
Studies,  New  Series  IX  (1968:  Stockholm),  208.  See  Ch.  16  of  this  study  on  CHIN- 
COM. 

12.  The  details  of  these  transactions  demand  detailed  and  integrated  study,  but  this 
is  not  the  type  of  research  presently  encouraged  in  U.S.  scholarly  circles.  Fascinating 
but  uncoordinated  information  can  be  found  in  Chitoshi  Yanaga,  Big  Business  in 
Japanese  Politics  (1968:  New  Haven,  Yale).  One  early  abortive  plan  in  creating  the 
Japan-Southeast  Asia  link  involved  U.S.  endeavors  to  move  Japanese  economic  interests 
into  Southeast  Asia  by  using  Kuomintang  contacts  in  Taiwan  to  establish  an  entree  into 
Southeast  Asia  through  the  overseas  Chinese  there — a  pagodalike  form  of  neo-colonial- 
ism  indeed.  See  Yoshida  Naikaku,  495-578,  for  a  useful  summary  in  Japanese  of  the 
endeavors  to  create  a  U.S. -Japan-Southeast  Asia  nexus  in  the  1951-1954  period. 

13.  Joseph  M.  Dodge  Papers,  cited  in  Joyce  and  Gabriel  Kolko,  The  Limits  of  Power 
(1972:  New  York,  Harper  and  Row),  533. 

14.  United  Kingdom,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Documents  Relating  to 
British  Involvement  in  the  Indo-China  Conflict,  1945-1965,  66-67;  cited  in  Gabriel 
Kolko,  The  Roots  of  American  Foreign  Policy  (1969:  Boston,  Beacon),  105. 

15.  On  the  anticipation  that  Japan  will  gradually  assume  functions  such  as  those  now 
performed  by  the  United  States  under  the  Military  Assistance  Program  (MAP),  in- 
cluding training  of  foreign  military  personnel,  see  the  testimony  of  U.  Alexis  Johnson 
in  United  States  Security  Agreements  and  Commitments  Abroad:  Japan  and  Okinawa, 
Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  United  States  Security  Agreements  and  Commit- 
ments Abroad  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  United  States  Senate,  Ninety- 
first  Congress,  Second  Session  (Part  5),  January  26-29,  1970,  1222.  Hereafter  cited  as 
United  States  Security  Agreements. 

16.  Ibid.,  1225. 

17.  USG  ed.,  p.  261;  Cf.  the  May  1951  NSC  document  quoted  in  Section  3;  also 
Gravel  ed.,  1:98. 

18.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1165-1166. 

19.  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  Feb.  13,  1971.  Fujiyama  in  recent  years  has 
emerged  as  the  leader  of  a  group  of  conservative  Japanese  politicians  who,  even  prior 
to  the  U.S.  gestures  toward  China,  advocated  revision  of  the  ruling  Liberal-Democratic 
Party's  China  policy.  Following  his  trip  to  China  he  was  actually  stripped  of  his  party 
offices  by  the  disciplinary  committee  of  the  party. 

20.  Joyce  and  Gabriel  Kolko,  The  Limits  of  Power,  510,  525.  For  representative 
American  views  of  the  Occupation  see  Edwin  O.  Reischauer,  The  United  States  and 
Japan  rev.  ed.  (1957:  Cambridge,  Harvard);  also  Robert  E.  Ward,  "Reflections  on  the 
Allied  Occupation  and  Planned  Political  Change  in  Japan,"  in  Robert  E.  Ward,  ed., 
Political  Development  in  Modern  Japan  (1968:  Princeton).  In  Japanese,  extensive  doc- 
umentation on  the  occupation  period  and  its  aftermath  can  be  found  in  the  indispen- 
sable "official"  history  of  the  Yoshida  cabinets,  Yoshida  naikaku,  and  the  valuable 
six-volume  documentary  collection  Shiryo:  Sengo  nijunen  shi  (Documents:  A  History 
of  the  First  Twenty  Years  of  the  Postwar  Period)  published  in  1966-67  by  Nihon 


140      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

Hyoronsha.  The  introductory  chapter  by  Shigeki  Toyama  in  volume  6  of  the  latter 
work  is  a  useful  chronological  account  of  the  1945-1965  period,  with  sharp  focus  on 
the  continuing  unfolding  of  the  reverse  course.  Seizaburo  Shinobu's  four-volume  Sengo 
Nikon  seijishi  (Political  History  of  Postwar  Japan),  published  in  1965-67  by  Keiso 
Shobo,  is  actually  a  detailed  narrative  account  of  the  1945-1952  period. 

21.  I  have  dealt  with  aspects  of  the  reverse  course  in  occupied  Japan  prior  to  the 
Korean  War  in  two  previous  articles:  "The  Eye  of  the  Beholder:  Background  Notes  on 
the  U.S. -Japan  Military  Relationship,"  Bulletin  of  Concerned  Asian  Scholars,  II,  1 
(October  1969);  and  "Occupied  Japan  and  the  American  Lake,  1945-1950,"  in  Edward 
Friedman  and  Mark  Selden,  eds.,  America's  Asia:  Dissenting  Essays  in  U.S.-Asian  Re- 
lations (1971:  New  York,  Pantheon).  These  articles  provide  a  fuller  biography  on  this 
subject  than  can  be  listed  here. 

22.  Cf.  George  Kennan,  Memoirs,  414-418,  525. 

23.  USG  ed.,  239-242. 

24.  USG  ed.,  434-435. 

25.  Joyce  and  Gabriel  Kolko,  The  Limits  of  Power,  533. 

26.  For  a  gullible  but  fascinating  biography  of  Kishi  in  English  see  Dan  Kurzman, 
Kishi  and  Japan:  The  Search  for  the  Sun  (1960:  New  York,  Ivan  Obolensky,  Inc.). 
A  useful  and  neglected  English  source  on  reverse-course  trends  in  Japan  up  to  1960  is 
Ivan  Morris,  Nationalism  and  the  Right  Wing  in  Japan:  A  Study  of  Postwar  Trends 
(1960:  Oxford).  Other  useful  sources  on  postwar  trends  within  Japanese  conservative 
ranks  are  Haruhiro  Fukui,  Party  in  Power:  The  Japanese  Liberal-Democrats  and  Policy- 
making (1970:  University  of  California);  Eleanor  M.  Hadley,  Antitrust  in  Japan 
(1970:  Princeton);  and  Kozo  Yamamura,  Economic  Policy  in  Postwar  Japan:  Growth 
versus  Economic  Democracy  (1967:  University  of  California). 

27.  Okinawa  Reversion  Treaty,  Hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
United  States  Senate,  Ninety-second  Congress,  October  27,  28,  and  29,  1971,  14. 

28.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1167,  1205. 

29.  Kennan,  Memoirs,  415.  Even  the  role  of  the  USSR  in  the  events  leading  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  Korean  War  itself  remains  obscure. 

30.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1418.  Cf.  1207-1209,  1306-1307. 

31.  See  the  testimony  of  U.S.  China  experts  in  United  Slates-China  Relations:  A 
Strategy  for  the  Future,  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  House  of  Representatives,  Ninety-first  Congress, 
Second  Session,  September  15,  16,  22,  23,  24,  29,  and  October  6,  1970. 

32.  Washington  Post,  November  30,  1969.  For  various  statistics  see  United  States 
Security  Agreements,  especially  1214,  1237,  1248,  1294;  Okinawa  Reversion  Treaty, 
57;  and  Congressional  Quarterly,  Inc.,  Global  Defense:  U.S.  Military  Commitments 
Abroad  (Sept.  1969). 

33.  Cf.  Okinawa  Reversion  Treaty,  64. 

34.  Washington  Post,  November  30,  1969.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1214. 
Japan  does  play  an  indirect  role  in  the  nuclear  deterrence  by  servicing  the  Seventh 
Fleet,  the  SAC  force,  etc.  The  issue  of  exclusion  of  nuclear  weapons  from  Japan  and 
Okinawa  is  controversial  in  that  some  critics  believe  that,  particularly  with  regard  to 
postreversion  Okinawa,  the  U.S.  simply  does  not  intend  to  honor  its  pledge.  In  one  of 
the  more  dramatic  scenarios  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  two  contingency  plans  which 
"provide  for  either  non-nuclear  or  nuclear  options  against  China  (OPLAN  32-64  and 
OPLAN  39-65)  do  involve  use  of  U.S.  bases  in  Japan,  though  in  precisely  what 
capacity  is  not  clear.  Gravel  ed.,  111:636-639. 

35.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1166,  1243,  1415. 

36.  See,  for  example,  Morton  Halpsrin's  testimony  in  United  States-China  Relations. 

37.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1162. 

38.  The  plan  was  prepared  in  1963  and  made  public  in  the  Diet  in  February  1965 
by  a  representative  of  the  Socialist  party  in  connection  with  the  Japan-ROK  normaliza- 
tion controversy.  It  has  received  inadequate  attention  in  the  United  States.  See  Tsukasa 
Matsueda  and  George  E.  Moore,  "Japan's  Shifting  Attitudes  toward  the  Military: 
Mitsuya  Kenkyu  and  the  Self-Defense  Force,  Asian  Survey,  VII,  9  (Sept.  1969). 

39.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  IIS3,  1214. 


The  Superdomino  in  Postwar  Asia  141 


!  40.  Ronald  Dore,  "Japan  As  a  Model  of  Economic  Development,  Archives  Eu- 
I     ropiennes  de  Sociologie,  V,  1  (1964),  147-148,  153. 

j  41.  G.  C.  Allen,  A  Short  Economic  History  of  Modern  Japan,  1867-1937,  With  a 
\  Supplementary  Chapter  on  Economic  Recovery  and  Expansion,  1945-1960.  (1962:  New 
York,  Praeger),  214.  Special  Procurements  are  defined  by  Allen  as  "Allied  military 
i  expenditure  in  dollars  and  pounds,  yen  purchases  for  Joint  Defense  Account,  expendi- 
j  ture  of  Allied  soldiers  and  civilian  officials  in  Japan,  and  payments  in  respect  of  certain 
1  offshore  procurement  contracts."  The  U.S.  role  in  the  "Allied"  expenditures  is,  however, 
'  overwhelming. 

I  42.  Congressional  Quarterly,  Inc.,  Global  Defense,  40.  Cf.  United  States  Security 
1     Agreements,  1205. 

43.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1206,  1231,  1296. 

44.  Cf.  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  September  28,  1967,  April  4  and  11,  1968. 

45.  Yanaga,  Big  Business  in  Japanese  Politics,  esp.  251-272. 

46.  Yanaga,  Big  Business,  provides  interesting  insight  into  this. 

I       47.  Bundy  had  visited  Japan  the  previous  month.  Cf.,  however.  Gravel  ed.,  111:685. 

48.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  \\9A. 

49.  Rusk  was  in  fact  being  ingenuous  about  the  reason  the  United  States  entered 
{  into  the  security  treaty  with  Australia  and  New  Zealand  (ANZUS).  As  noted  previ- 
1    ously  here  in  the  text,  the  two  countries  demanded  the  treaty  of  Dulles  as  a  guarantee 

of  their  security  against  Japan  and  a  precondition  to  their  acquiescence  in  the  inde- 
pendence-cum-remilitarization  peace  settlement  which  Dulles  was  at  that  time  setting 
up  for  Japan. 
}       50.  USG  ed.,  435. 

I        51.  United  States  Foreign  Policy,  Asia  Studies  Prepared  at  the  Request  of  the  Com- 
I     mittee  on  Foreign  Relations,  United  States  Senate,  by  Conlon  Associates,  Ltd.  86th 
Congress,  1st  Session  (November  1,  1959),  85-109.  The  report  also  gives  a  prog- 
nosis of  future  U.S.  military  "disengagement"  from  Japan  and  Japan's  maintenance  of 
its  own  "forward"  defense,  and  stresses  that  Japan's  future  will  be  dependent  upon 
maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Asia. 
!j       52.  I  have  dealt  with  this  general  problem  at  some  length  in  my  doctoral  dissertation, 
1    "Yoshida  Shigeru  and  the  Great  Empire  of  Japan,  1878-1945,"  Harvard  University, 
'  1972. 

;       53.  The  Pentagon  Papers  indirectly  raise  an  interesting  question  as  to  the  extent  to 
\    which  the  United  States  took  Japan  into  its  confidence  insofar  as  U.S.  policy  regarding 
I    the  Vietnam  war  is  concerned.  This  emerges  most  notably  in  those  sections  of  the 
i    Papers  which  deal  with  the  crucial  period  in  late  1964  when  the  United  States  was 
I    planning  to  escalate  the  war,  for  in  virtually  every  document  relating  to  this  decision, 
j    wherever  the  problem  of  prior  coordination  with  "key  allies"  concerning  this  escalation 
I    is  concerned,  Japan  is  conspicuously  absent  from  the  listings  of  those  key  allies.  Cf. 
Gravel  ed.,  111:257,  290,  308,  593,  611,  613,  650,  658-659,  664,  677,  681,  717. 
54.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1197. 
I       55.  The  favorite  epithets  tacked  on  Japan  by  the  Chinese  have  been  the  "gendarme 
i    in  Asia,"  the  "running  dog,"  and  the  "fugle-man"  of  U.S.  imperialism. 
I       56.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  \259. 

'  57.  The  "trade  war"  fear  pervades  virtually  all  U.S.  articles  on  Japanese  economic 
expansion  which  have  appeared  in  both  popular  and  specialized  American  journals  dur- 

i  ing  the  past  several  years.  The  danger  of  provoking  Japan  to  the  extent  that  it  may 
endeavor  to  break  with  the  United  States  and  establish  an  independent  "third"  bloc  in 
Asia,  rivaling  the  United  States  and  Western  Europe,  has  been  particularly  strongly 

'  emphasized  by  Edwin  Reischauer.  Cf.  his  November  1971  testimony  before  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  as  abstracted  in  United  States-Japan  Trade  Council,  United 
States  and  Japan:  Danger  Ahead,  p.  4. 

58.  USG  ed.,  1949,  227;  cited  also  in  Gravel  ed.,  1:82. 

59.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Japan,  "Listing  of  Recent  U.S.  Criticisms  Against 
Japan,"  August  1971.  Mimeographed.  I  am  grateful  to  Jon  Sherwood  for  providing  me 
with  a  copy  of  this,  as  well  as  certain  other  materials  used  in  this  essay. 

'      60.  Ibid.  A  brief  section  of  the  document  also  listed  "Criticisms  concerning  Political 


142      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Matters,"  under  which  three  general  categories  were  noted:  (1)  inadequacy  of  Japan's 
efforts  in  the  field  of  defense;  (2)  dissatisfaction  concerning  the  return  of  Okinawa; 
and  (3)  criticism  concerning  the  Japanese  attitude  toward  American  foreign  policy. 
But  the  overwhelming  focus  of  the  document  is  on  economic  matters. 

61.  Congressional  Record,  November  29,  1971,  p.  E  12671.  Thurmond's  influential 
position  in  American  domestic  politics,  namely  the  "Southern  strategy"  on  which  Nixon 
came  to  power,  would  seem  to  be  of  central  importance  in  interpreting  what  otherwise 
appears  to  be  the  needless  offensiveness  of  the  "Nixon  shocks"  to  which  Japan  has  re- 
cently been  subjected.  For  the  Southern  bloc  which  figures  so  strongly  in  Republican 
national  politics  is  also  the  "textile  bloc"  which  harbors  most  blatant  anti-Japanese 
resentments. 

62.  United  States-Japan  Trade  Council,  op.  cit.,  9. 

63.  The  Chinese  constantly  emphasize  this  "contradiction."  See,  for  example,  Com- 
mittee of  Concerned  Asian  Scholars,  China!  Inside  the  People's  Republic  (1972: 
Bantam),  355;  also  The  New  York  Times,  Report  from  Red  China  (1972:  Avon),  99. 

64.  This  controversial  issue  arose  during  Laird's  visit  to  Japan  in  July  1971  and 
received  wide  press  coverage.  The  Senate  Republican  Policy  Committee  attempted  to 
discredit  the  rumor  that  the  Nixon  Administration  was  encouraging  Japanese  acquisition 
of  nuclear  weapons  in  its  Republican  Report  of  July  29,  1971.  The  issue  was  revived  in 
January  1972;  cf.  Washington  Post,  January  16,  1972. 

65.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1218. 

66.  The  report  was  authored  by  Representatives  Lester  L.  Wolff  of  New  York  and 
J.  Herbert  Burke  of  Florida  and  issued  by  the  House  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations 
on  April  22,  1970.  On  Japan's  economic  goals,  the  mission  observed  that  "The  general 
impression  of  the  Japanese  economy  was  of  a  healthy  animal  seeking,  on  one  hand,  to 
protect  itself  from  other  healthy  animals  and,  on  the  other  hand,  using  its  strength  to 
secure  some  measure  of  obedience  from  weaker  animals." 

67.  Committee  of  Concerned  Asian  Scholars,  China!,  358.  Cf.  The  New  York  Times, 
Report  from  Red  China,  62,  64-66,  69,  72-73,  84,  9  Iff. 

68.  The  article  is  reprinted  along  with  seven  other  pieces  in  Down  with  Revived 
Japanese  Militarism  (1971:  Peking,  Foreign  Languages  Press). 

69.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1445. 

70.  Ibid.,  1439ff. 

71.  In  addition  to  the  "Report  of  Special  Study  Mission  to  Asia"  quoted  in  the  text, 
see  Robert  Scalapino's  testimony  of  September  1970  in  United  States-China  Relations, 
193. 

72.  United  States  Security  Agreements,  1 184-1 186. 

73.  Down  with  Revived  Japanese  Militarism,  33. 

74.  The  quotations  are  from  an  abstract  of  the  White  Paper  published  in  the  Japan 
Times,  October  21,  1970. 

75.  Down  with  Revived  Japanese  Militarism,  16. 

76.  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  November  7,  1970,  and  May  15,  1971.  Herbert 
Bix,  "The  Security  Treaty  and  the  Japanese  Military  Industrial  Complex,"  Bulletin  of 
Concerned  Asian  Scholars,  II,  2  (January  1970). 

77.  The  New  York  Times,  Report  from  Red  China,  93-94. 

78.  Down  with  Revived  Japanese  Militarism,  7. 


143 


9.     The  Last  Line  of  Defense 
by  Nina  S.  Adams 

The  Pentagon  study  is  very  much  Hke  the  American  operation  it  tries  to 
describe — an  enormous,  overpowering,  resourceful  and  misdirected  effort  which 
could  crush  by  its  sheer  weight  if  it  failed  to  convince  by  its  arguments.  Dili- 
gently rather  than  perceptively  compiled,  the  Defense  Department  History  of 
U.S.  Decisionmaking  on  Vietnam  is  not  a  sudden  revelation  of  truth,  not  a  his- 
tory of  the  war  and  certainly  not  a  history  of  Vietnam  although  it  has  been 
mistaken  for  a  composite  of  all  three.  The  study's  significance  lies  in  its  initial 
impact  on  the  public  and  in  the  future  use  of  its  documents  by  historians;  it  is 
least  valuable  for  the  historical  analysis  it  purports  to  contain.  The  summary 
sections  pull  the  reader  into  a  maze  of  indigestible  detail  shot  through  with 
precisely  those  simplistic  generalizations  which  should  be  challenged  by  both 
scholars  and  activists. 

The  raw  materials,  the  choice  of  authors,  the  intended  Pentagon  audience 
and  the  methods  of  research  for  the  study  determined  its  hypotheses,  categories 
and  conclusions.  Confined  to  the  available  documents  and  guided  by  their  own 
political  inclinations,  the  authors  reflect  more  than  they  question  the  assumptions 
and  biases  of  earlier  decisionmakers.  Not  surprisingly,  the  authors  adopted  the 
peculiar  Pentagon  device  of  seeking  truth  by  choosing  the  middle  ground  among 
absurd  or  badly  formulated  "options."  As  loyalists  writing  a  work  for  policy- 
makers to  read,  the  authors  omitted  the  topics  and  questions  which  should  form 
the  core  of  a  historical  treatment  of  American  interference  in  Asia.  The  study 
fails  as  history  for  it  makes  no  attempt  to  deal  with  the  Vietnamese  reahty  and 
isolates  Vietnam  policy  entirely  from  other  American  foreign  policies  and  from 
American  history.  The  result  is  a  tedious  chronicle  which  makes  little  sense. 
Just  like  successive  American  administrations,  the  Pentagon  authors  pay  no 
attention  to  the  character  of  the  Indochinese  resistance  organizations  whose 
blending  of  political  and  military  concerns  into  revolutionary  warfare  has  been 
the  key  to  their  success  against  superior  forces  since  1945.  Rejecting  any  notion 
of  the  United  States  as  a  power  with  systemic  and  agency  interests,  the  authors 
passively  accept  the  conventional  rhetoric  which  conceals  rather  than  exposes 
the  roots  of  American  foreign  policy. 

The  Pentagon  team  was  not  commissioned  to  explore  the  past  objectively  but 
to  answer  the  question  "What  went  wrong?"  The  study's  message,  "Do  it  differ- 
ently," has  been  heeded  by  the  Nixon  administration,  which  ignored  the  study 
itself.  We  are  now  in  the  Third  Indochina  War,  characterized  by  reliance  on 
mercenaries,  computerized  warfare,  massive  bombing,  greater  secrecy  and  in- 
tensified destruction.  The  new  warfare,  aimed  at  total  destruction  of  revolutionary 
movements  by  complete  elimination  of  population,  differs  from  earlier  combat  in 
methods,  not  in  aims.  It  can  be  carried  on  without  loss  of  American  life  or  the 
damaging  publicity  that  hampered  earlier  operations.  The  Nixon  administration 
escalated  at  the  same  time  and  in  part  because  the  conviction  was  spreading  that 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Nina  S.  Adams 


144      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

the  war  was  winding  down.  The  information  and  analyses  needed  to  understand 
the  new  face  of  war  have  already  appeared;  we  don't  have  to  wait  for  the  de- 
classification of  documents  in  order  to  knowledgably  oppose  what  is  happening 
now. 

The  Pentagon  materials  which  have  been  released  to  the  public  are  useful  for 
showing  the  depth  of  self-  and  public  deception  of  which  the  government  is 
capable.  But  a  careful  reading  of  the  entire  work  will  yield  little  information 
that  was  not  published  before  nor  will  it  offer  any  protection  for  the  public  from 
future  lies  that  cover  up  aggression  in  Asia  and  elsewhere.  The  critiques  in  the 
study  stick  closely  to  instrumental  matters  such  as  non-coordination  among  de- 
partments or  the  failure  to  analyze  intelligence  reports  and  dissect  policy  pro- 
posals. The  chronologies,  maps  and  outlines  of  major  agreements  which  the 
study  offers  or  reproduces  from  unclassified  sources  are  themselves  too  incom- 
plete or  biased  to  be  used  even  in  settling  cocktail-party  arguments.  On  its  own 
the  effort  is  significantly  incomplete,  for  the  writers  were  not  able  to  use  White 
House  records  and  had  only  limited  access  to  State  Department  materials.  The 
authors  neither  interviewed  key  individuals  nor  examined  their  records.  Scholarly 
and  journalistic  accounts  of  events  in  the  United  States  and  in  Indochina  were 
rarely  and  selectively  consulted;  the  implications  and  substance  of  critics'  ac- 
counts were  completely  overlooked. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  can  be  of  value  to  three  groups,  as  much  for  what  they 
omit  as  for  what  Ihey  reveal.  Diplomatic  historians  and  Washington-watchers  who 
scrutinize  the  mechanisms  which  operate  in  the  closed  world  and  uptighter  minds 
of  "security  managers"  will  find  the  documents  useful  to  validate  or  inspire  more 
rigorous  examinations  of  the  past.  The  naive  scholars  who  dream  that  a  literate 
elite  will  accept  their  sophisticated  advice  on  how  to  deal  with  a  complex  world 
will  get,  hopefully,  a  beneficial  shock  at  the  crudity  of  thought  which  the  docu- 
ments reveal.  The  antiwar  movement  will  find  respectable  and  irrefutable  backing 
for  all  that  it  has  been  saying  for  the  past  eight  years.  Among  these  revelations 
are  details  of  covert  operations,  anti-Chinese  fanaticism  and  examples  of  brinks- 
manship  which  very  few  critics  have  dared  to  allege. 

But  the  most  important  question  to  ask  is,  what  use  are  the  papers  to  the 
citizen  whose  tax  dollars  supported  both  the  writing  of  the  study  and  the  war 
itself?  Frankly,  no  one  without  unlimited  leisure,  a  scholarly  background  and 
enormous  patience  will  get  much  from  the  study,  and  it  has  little  that  could  not 
be  found  elsewhere  in  infinitely  more  readable  form.*  Skimming  even  a  portion 
of  the  work  will  reveal  to  Americans  what  the  Indochinese,  judging  by  actions 
rather  than  words,  have  known  all  along. 

Successive  administrations  lied  to  the  American  public  about  everything  from 
weaponry  to  negotiations,  POWs  to  potential  bloodbaths,  escalation  to  Viet- 
namization  and  back  again.  Other  essays  in  Volume  V  of  the  Gravel  edition  of 
the  Pentagon  Papers  deal  with  these  and  related  issues.  The  Pentagon  study  does, 
however,  succeed  in  emphasizing  for  those  who  have  forgotten  or  who  never 
knew  John  Foster  Dulles  or  the  old  Nixon,  how  dangerously  rigid  the  crusaders 
are,  how  much  they  rely  on  military  operations  and  how  broadly  they  define 
"national  security." 

In  looking  at  the  study  as  a  historical  account,  one  is  struck  by  the  extent  to 
which  it  is  a  political  work  in  which  a  few  isolatable  assumptions  have  simplified 
the  issues  and  created  gaps  in  both  history  and  analysis.  The  Pentagon  authors 

*  Instead  of  extensive  footnotes  and  bibliography,  I  have  appended  to  this  article  a 
topical  list  of  books  on  Indochina,  the  war,  and  the  issues  I  have  tried  to  raise. 


The  Last  Line  of  Defense  145 

assume  that  their  readers  share  the  same  anti-Communist  view  that  pervades  the 
documents  and  thus  will  accept  their  simple  retrospective  rationalizations.  But 
communism  and  conspiracy  alone  cannot  explain  why  the  United  States  is  so 
involved  in  Asia  or  why  the  United  States  cannot  prevail  in  Indochina.  Fervent 
anticommunism  is  not  a  strong  enough  alibi  for  the  American  persistence  in 
finding  reasons  to  pursue  the  battle  for  a  "free"  Vietnam. 

Not  surprisingly,  a  spinoff  from  publication  of  the  study  has  been  a  series  of 
articles  by  former  government  loyalists  debating  whether  the  Vietnam  involve- 
ment was  generated  by  presidential  optimism  or  pessimism.  This  limited  argu- 
ment on  defining  a  "quagmire"  fits  neatly  into  the  Pentagon  study's  circum- 
scribed framework  of  discussion.  The  result  is  that  secondary  issues,  such  as 
the  accuracy  of  intelligence  estimates,  can  be  aired  endlessly;  no  man  or  institu- 
tion is  touched  by  guilt  for  war  crimes;  and  the  main  issues  are  again  overlooked 
by  the  public,  which  quite  sensibly  ignores  the  debate. 

The  documents  and  the  Pentagon  authors  take  for  granted  several  assump- 
tions which  are  worth  noting.  First  they  repeat  that  the  United  States  was  "un- 
expectedly pressed  into  world  leadership"  after  World  War  II  and  that  the 
United  States  continues,  unselfishly,  to  shoulder  that  responsibility  today.  The 
study  contends  that  the  United  States  had  difficulty  in  amassing  the  knowledge 
and  sophistication  needed  to  deal  with  individual  problems  such  as  the  Viet- 
namese revolution.  Furthermore,  the  authors  believe  that  due  to  American  naivete 
and  the  focus  on  European  affairs,  American  policies  were  so  ambivalent  that 
the  United  States  remained  basically  uninvolved  in  most  of  Asia's  postwar  con- 
1  flicts.  The  Pentagon  authors  are  most  anxious  to  prove  that  once  the  United 
I  States  began  to  involve  itself  in  Asian  affairs,  its  goals  were  altruistic  and  com- 
I  mendable,  but  it  often  chose  the  wrong  methods,  relying  too  heavily  on  military 
,  rather  than  political  tools.  Even  so,  the  Pentagon  writers  feel  that  American  aid 
and  counterinsurgency  programs,  particularly  those  of  the  1950s,  would  have 
been  successful  except  for  the  stubbornness  of  first  the  French  and  later  Ngo 
,  Dinh  Diem,  both  of  whom  took  advantage  of  American  generosity,  bureaucratic 
1.  confusion  and  blind  anti-Communist  reflexes. 

1  In  summarizing  the  sad  history  of  Vietnam  in  the  late  1940s,  the  Pentagon 
j  authors  offer  a  set  of  hindsight  questions  that  reveal  both  their  biases  and  their 

I'  limits  as  historical  analysts. 
For  example,  the  U.S.  could  have  asked  itself — "Did  we  really  have  to 
support  France  in  Southeast  Asia  in  order  to  support  a  noncommunist 
France  internally  and  in  Europe?"  Another  question  we  could  have  asked 
ourselves  was — "If  the  U.S.  choice  in  Vietnam  really  came  down  to  either 
French  colonialism  or  Ho  Chi  Minh,  should  Ho  automatically  be  excluded?" 
Again,  "If  the  U.S.  choice  was  to  be  France,  did  France  have  any  real 
chance  of  succeeding,  and  if  so,  at  what  cost?"  (Gravel  edition,  1:51). 

Apart  from  the  major  unasked  question,  "Why  couldn't  the  Pentagon  authors 
see  the  many  other  questions  which  should  be  asked?"  the  questions  themselves 
make  sense  only  in  the  fantasy  world  created  by  the  study.  In  that  world,  the 
United  States,  unlike  other  powers,  had  no  systemic  interests,  no  desire  to  ex- 

,  pand  its  power,  no  domestic  or  foreign  restraints  on  its  thinking  or  its  options. 

I  The  Pentagon  authors,  dealing  solely  with  specific  memoranda  rather  than  con- 
temporary American  conceptions  of  the  world,  see  no  link  between  the  foreign- 
policy  decisions  they  regret  and  the  factors  which  determined  them  from  1940 

,to  1968.  American  opposition  to  communism  in  Europe  is  neither  explained  nor 


146      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

placed  in  its  historical  setting.  While  the  study  deals  at  length  with  President 
Roosevelt's  vague  ideas  about  the  future  of  the  French  colonies,  it  ignores,  among 
many  other  things,  the  American  wartime  decision  to  oppose  communism  in 
Europe  by  supporting  the  Sicilian  and  Corsican  Mafias  against  anti-German 
resistance  groups  in  Italy  and  France.  In  recounting  what  some  high-level  de- 
cisionmakers were  pontificating  rather  than  what  lower-level  officials  were  doing, 
the  study  retains  the  same  level  of  ignorance  as  the  worst  of  the  documents. 

Hoping  to  prove  the  case  for  American  "ambivalence"  the  study  ignores  con- 
temporary accounts,  Office  of  Strategic  Services  evaluations  and  historians'  treat- 
ments of  the  complex  and  explosive  Indochinese  situation  after  World  War  II. 
Since  the  writers  pay  little  attention  to  either  the  French  or  the  Vietnamese 
postures  from  1945  to  1950,  the  reader  has  no  way  of  judging  the  realism  of 
American  decisions  to  permit  the  British  to  reoccupy  Saigon  for  the  French,  to 
ignore  appeals  for  recognition  from  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  government,  or  to  offer 
France  the  aid  which  freed  her  to  begin  colonial  reconquest.  The  study  seems 
to  reaffirm  the  correctness  of  these  decisions  by  summarizing  events  incompletely 
from  a  more  sophisticated  but  still  unmistakably  anti-Communist  point  of  view. 
Thus  the  authors  submit  their  study  of  "Ho  Chi  Minh:  Asian  Tito?"  and  regret- 
fully conclude  that  he  never  would  have  panned  out  in  that  role.  Unlike  most 
histories  of  the  period,  the  Pentagon  study  contends  that  American  actions  and 
refusals  to  take  action  did  not  influence  events  in  Asia;  in  fact  they  did,  although 
America  was  indeed  far  from  preoccupied  with  the  region.  For  the  Pentagon 
authors,  America  was  "neutral"  because  in  Indochina  "it  regarded  the  war  as 
fundamentally  a  matter  for  French  resolution"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:28).  To  most 
observers,  this  was  a  pro-French  stand. 

Examining  the  Vietnamese  situation  from  1950  (when  the  study  mistakenly 
assumes  American  involvement  to  have  begun)  to  1954,  the  Pentagon  authors  ; 
distort  the  history  of  the  period  and  focus  their  attention  again  on  American 
assumptions  of  omnipotence  and  international  guardianship. 

It  has  been  argued  that  even  as  the  U.S.  began  supporting  the  French  in  ! 
Indochina,  the  U.S.  missed  opportunities  to  bring  peace,  stability  and  inde-  : 
pendence  to  Vietnam.  The  issues  arise  [sic]  from  the  belief  on  the  part  of 
some  critics  that  (a)  the  U.S.  made  no  attempt  to  seek  out  and  support  a 
democratic-nationalist  alternative  in  Vietnam;  and  (b)  the  U.S.  commanded, 
but  did  not  use,  leverage  to  move  the  French  toward  granting  genuine  Viet- 
namese independence  (Gravel  ed.,  1:53.  Emphasis  added).  \ 

At  no  time  did  the  United  States  have  the  power  or  the  knowledge  to  force  any  ; 
solution  which  the  Vietnamese  found  unacceptable.  The  Pentagon  fantasy  em- 
bodied in  this  passage  is  significant  for  the  implicit  racism  which  then  and  later 
characterized  American  decisionmaking  on  Vietnam;  neither  the  documents  nor, 
the  study  can  accept  that  the  Vietnamese  themselves,  or  for  that  matter  the 
French  themselves,  could  know,  judge,  and  act  intelligently  to  preserve  their  ; 
interests.  Having  used  none  of  the  available  histories  of  the  French  colonial  war, 
the  Vietnamese  armed  struggle  or  the  background  to  either,  the  Pentagon  au- 
thors simplify  the  issues  down  to  supposed  American  failures  to  force  accom- 
modation to  our  guidance  and  ideas.  In  the  retrospective  Pentagon  study,  the 
defeat  of  American  allies — who,  through  an  inexplicable  lack  of  vision  insisted 
on  doing  much  of  their  own  planning — was  no  surprise  except  insofar  as  the 
Americans  had  been  hoodwinked  into  accepting  falsely  optimistic  reports  of 
forthcoming  victories. 


The  Last  Line  of  Defense  141 

The  problems  raised  by  the  Pentagon  study's  narrow  focus  can  be  seen  again 
in  the  analysis  of  "the  policy  context"  in  1950. 

Events  in  China  of  1948  and  1949  brought  the  United  States  to  a  new 
Ij  awareness  of  the  vigor  of  communism  in  Asia,  and  to  a  sense  of  urgency 

over  its  containment.  U.S.  policy  instruments  developed  to  meet  unequivocal 
communist  challenges  in  Europe  were  applied  to  the  problem  of  the  Far 
East.  Concurrent  with  the  development  of  NATO,  a  U.S.  search  began  for 
collective  security  in  Asia;  economic  and  military  assistance  programs  were 
j  inaugurated;  and  the  Truman  Doctrine  acquired  wholly  new  dimensions  by 

extension  into  regions  where  the  European  empires  were  being  dismantled 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:34-35). 

!  It  is  true  that  the  victory  of  Mao  Tse-tung's  revolutionary  forces  in  the  final 
Chinese  civil  war  of  1945  to  1949  showed  the  strength  of  an  armed  Communist 
movement  in  Asia.  But  certainly  the  U.S.  State  Department,  with  excellent  reports 
I  at  its  disposal,  knew  that  Chiang  Kai-shek's  government  had  lost  because  of  its 
i  own  corruption,  inefficiency  and  brutality.  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Acheson,  for 
i  example,  explained  at  a  press  conference  on  January  20,  1950,  "What  has  hap- 
I  pened  is  .  .  .  that  the  patience  of  the  Chinese  people  in  their  misery  has  ended. 
I  They  did  not  bother  to  overthrow  this  government.  There  was  simply  nothing 
\  to  overthrow.  They  simply  ignored  it  throughout  the  country." 
I  There  exist  innumerable  excellent  discussions  of  the  period  by  eyewitnesses, 
those  who  studied  the  official  U.S.  documents,  and  by  the  State  Department  it- 
;  self,  which  issued  The  China  White  Paper  of  1950  analyzing  carefully  why  U.S. 
1  support  could  not  have  saved  Chiang's  regime.  All  of  these  accounts  have  been 
,  ignored  by  the  Pentagon  authors,  who  seem  totally  unaware  of  the  American 
I  experience  in  China  and  how  it  might  have  been  weighed  against  the  later  inter- 
1    vention  in  Vietnam. 

1      While  the  study  implies  that  the  United  States  had  stayed  aloof  from  the 
'    Chinese  conflict,  almost  as  "neutral"  as  in  Vietnam  in  the  same  years,  American 
support  prolonged  Chiang's  hopeless  effort  to  redeem  his  politically  bankrupt 
regime.  Reports  from  Americans,  including  military  observers,  that  the  Chinese 
Communists,  like  the  Viet  Minh,  were  honest,  popular  and  effective  leaders,  were 
I   disregarded.  More  than  sheeplike  anticommunism  was  operating  here.  American 
,   interest  in  China  had  never  been  one  of  benevolence  alone.  In  1945  the  Ameri- 
cans were  still  hoping  for  internal  reforms  promoting  liberal  capitalism  which 
would  sustain  a  state  where  American  business  could  profit  and  expand.  In  China 
in  the  1940s  as  in  Vietnam  in  the  1950s  the  United  States  chose  to  bolster  a  client 
leadership  which  compromised  its  nationalism  by  allowing  American  access;  the 
alternative,  never  seriously  considered,  was  to  risk  dealing  with  a  revolutionary 
force  which  would  soon  reject  American  businessmen,  missionaries  and  political 
advisers. 

The  Pentagon  study  fails  most  strikingly  to  deal  with  the  facts  and  dynamics 
of  American  history.  The  United  States  did  not  begin  a  search  for  collective 
security  in  Asia  in  1948;  the  Open  Door  and  tutelage  of  China  in  uneasy  alliance 
with  Japan  had  been  American  policies  since  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
I  The  Truman  Doctrine  was  expanding  naturally  as  opportunities  opened  in  pre- 
viously restricted  colonial  areas.  Compared  to  the  other  nations  involved,  the 
I  United  States  emerged  from  the  Second  World  War  untouched  and  even  strength- 
l  ened,  knowing  itself  to  be  the  strongest  power  in  the  world.  The  American 
i  ^  military,  having  allied  with  private  industry,  scientists  and  scholars,  resisted  being 


148      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

dismantled  and  instead  found  threats  to  justify  its  continued  expansion  at  home 
and  abroad.  The  Pentagon's  greatest  achievement  was  in  public  relations,  for  it 
convinced  a  largely  willing  Congress  that  a  war  machine  could  be  purely  de-  \ 
fensive  and  subject  to  control.  The  self-interest  of  military  and  civilian  groups 
seeking  to  maximize  influence  and  profits  was  covered  by  an  ideological  gloss  of  ' 
defensive  anticommunism. 

Although  the  study  sees  the  Korean  War  as  the  major  turning  point  in  Ameri-  ! 
can  Far  Eastern  policy,  it  can  be  argued  that  American  actions  in  Asia  follow  a  . 
consistent  line  from  the  early  1800s  through  the  1970s.  The  United  States  was  \ 
always  concerned  with  the  free  movement  of  American  capital  overseas,  the 
sustenance  of  the  domestic  economy  by  making  profits  abroad,  and  the  expansion 
of  markets.  Government  acquiescence  to  and  support  of  these  goals,  if  necessary  ; 
by  military  force,  was  confirmed  again  as  policy  but  dubbed  with  a  new  title  i 
after  1945.  National  Security  Council  memorandum  68  (not  included  in  any  , 
edition  of  the  Pentagon  study),  which  was  approved  in  April  1950  by  President  \ 
Truman  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  War,  "envisioned  quadrupling  the  | 
Defense  budget  to  an  unprecedented  peacetime  figure  of  10%  of  the  Gross  \ 
National  Product  or  about  $50  billion."  i  j 

Colonialism  had  become  costly  and  obsolete  because  of  the  changes  which  had  \ 
been  climaxed  by  the  Second  World  War.  The  American  method  was  that  of  in-  ; 
direct  political  and  economic  manipulation.  The  meaning  and  uses  of  tools  like  j 
the  Agency  for  International  Development,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and 
the  CIA  were  concealed  behind  a  screen  of  rhetoric  which  worked  quite  well  in  | 
the  United  States;  it  never  deceived  those  opposing  the  recolonization  of  their 
countries. 

With  the  United  States  embarked  on  this  international  course,  all  threats  to 
American  access  if  not  hegemony  became  "Communist  subversion,"  and  Amer- 
ica's original  pragmatic  interests  disappeared  into  a  crusade  so  overladen  with  I 
emotionalism  that  far  too  many  people,  including  the  policymakers,  forgot  where  ; 
it  all  had  started.  In  reading  the  documents,  one  finds  only  scattered  references  > 
to  America's  fundamental  interests  in  Southeast  Asia.  But  one  does  find  sufficient 
acknowledgment  that  the  United  States,  rather  than  taking  a  belatedly  defensive  ! 
stand  against  communism  in  Indochina,  was  thinking  in  terms  of  the  global  econ-  ' 
omy  and  the  need  to  protect  economic  interests.  In  reading  the  study  based  on  \ 
the  documents,  it  is  clear  that  the  Pentagon  authors  accept  both  the  notion  of 
American  "rights"  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  rhetoric  which  extends  them. 

Occasionally  one  has  to  unravel  American  projections  and  read  backwards  i 
from  statements  of  the  motives  they  attribute  to  the  Russians,  Chinese  and  na-  \ 
tionalist  movements.  For  example,  the  National  Security  Council  study  com-  ; 
pleted  in  the  fall  of  1949  asserted  that  while  almost  no  Southeast  Asian  nation 
"is  fit  to  govern  itself,"  most  would  soon  do  so.  The  resulting  problem  of  "in- 
stability" would  have  to  be  solved  "on  a  non-imperialist  plane."  The  memorandum  \ 

continued :  ' 

i 

In  any  event,  colonial-nationalist  conflict  provides  a  fertile  field  for  sub-  i 

versive  communist  activities,  and  it  is  now  clear  that  southeast  Asia  is  the  j 

target  of  a  coordinated  off'ensive  directed  by  the  Kremlin.  In  seeking  to  gain  [ 

control  of  southeast  Asia,  the  Kremlin  is  motivated  in  part  by  a  desire  to  \ 
acquire  southeast  Asia's  resources  and  communications  lines,  and  to  deny 

them  to  us  (Gravel  ed.,  1:37).  ' 

Having  accepted  that  America  had  certain  "rights"  in  the  world,  signs  of  op- 
position were  taken  as  offensive  threats  stemming  from  a  conspiratorial  base.  It 


The  Last  Line  of  Defense  149 

then  became  easy  for  the  United  States  to  plan  "forward  deployment  contain- 
ment" while  honestly  viewing  it  as  a  solely  defensive  measure  having  little  to  do 
with  the  original  decision  to  expand.  Only  once  having  postulated  the  need  for  an 
American  empire  in  the  Pacific  Basin  could  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  define  the 
situation  in  April  1950  as  follows: 

1.  In  light  of  U.S.  strategic  concepts,  the  integrity  of  the  offshore  island 
chain  from  Japan  to  Indochina  is  of  critical  strategic  importance  to  the 
United  States. 

2.  The  mainland  states  of  Southeast  Asia  also  are  at  present  of  critical 
strategic  importance  to  the  United  States  because: 

a.  They  are  the  major  sources  of  certain  strategic  materials  required 
for  the  completion  of  United  States  stock  pile  projects. 

b.  The  area  is  a  crossroad  of  communications  (Gravel  ed.,  1:364). 

The  National  Security  Council  staff  study  dated  February  13,  1952,  went  into 
greater  detail  about  Southeast  Asia's  role  as  the  principal  supplier  of  rubber,  tin 
and  petroleum  for  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Strategically,  and  of  course 
thinking  only  in  purely  defensive  terms, 

Communist  domination  of  mainland  Southeast  Asia  would  place  unfriendly 
forces  astride  the  most  direct  and  best-developed  sea  and  air  routes  between 
the  Western  Pacific  and  India  and  the  Near  East.  .  .  .  Besides  disrupting 
established  lines  of  communication  in  the  area,  the  denial  of  actual  military 
facilities  in  mainland  Southeast  Asia  .  .  .  would  compel  the  utilization  of 
less  desirable  peripheral  bases  (Gravel  ed.,  1:376). 

I  am  not  attempting  to  argue  simplistically  that  an  American  hunger  for  raw 
materials  or  air  routes  led  the  United  States  to  underwrite  80  percent  of  the  costs 
of  the  Vietnam  war  after  1950.  Like  the  Pentagon  authors,  I  note  in  most  of  the 
pre-1950  documents  included  in  the  study  very  little  direct  mention  of  Vietnam. 
But  what  I  find,  and  the  Pentagon  authors  choose  to  misunderstand,  is  the  expan- 
sionist tone  and  international  focus,  the  drive  to  contain  communism  but  for 
reasons  which  go  beyond  simple  ideological  fervor. 

So  little  have  the  Pentagon  authors  studied  Indochina  that  they  even  accept  the 
totally  false  statement  of  General  Jean  de  Lattre  de  Tassigny  in  1951,  who  asserted 
that  the  French  were  no  longer  making  profits  in  Vietnam  and  that  they  had  no 
interests  to  safeguard  there  except  Western  civilization,  which  was  under  attack 
by  communism  (Gravel  ed.,  1:67).  De  Lattre  spoke  at  a  time  when  both  the 
French  and  the  Americans  had  a  strong  economic  stake  in  Indochina;  both  con- 
tinued to  make  money,  for  example,  from  the  Cochin-Chinese  plantations  into 
which  the  Viet  Minh  did  not  seriously  penetrate  until  very  late  1953.  Although 
the  war  cost  the  French  and  American  taxpayers  ten  times  the  value  of  French 
investments  in  Indochina,  the  private  interests  which  had  made  most  of  the  invest- 
ments kept  reaping  profits  right  to  the  bitter  end.  Many  French  colons,  banks, 
and  backers  in  metropolitan  France  made  their  fortunes  from  the  piaster  exchange 
racket  and  from  loopholes  in  aid  arrangements. 

As  for  the  Americans,  they  soon  began  to  take  over  the  predominant  economic 
role  from  the  French,  who  kept  a  close  and  unfriendly  eye  on  American  informa- 
tion-gathering, investment,  and  use  of  the  aid  program  (60  percent  of  whose  funds 
were  devoted  to  importing  commodities  to  generate  counterpart  funds).  Imports 
into  Indochina  from  the  United  States  went  from  2  million  piasters  in  1936  to 


150      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

298  million  piasters  in  1948.  In  that  year  the  United  States  supplied  42  percent  of 
the  imports  coming  into  the  Far  East.  American  investment  in  Indochina  shot  up 
from  $8,854,000  in  1946  to  $13,550,000  in  1950.2  The  United  States  did  not  see 
a  specific  economic  stake  in  Indochina  and  thus  move  in  to  support  the  French. 
But  by  a  happy  coincidence  that  has  been  noted  in  every  other  similar  situation, 
the  decision  to  resist  communism  brought  other  benefits  in  its  wake. 

Neither  the  documents  nor  the  commentary  deal  with  the  attitudes  and  organ- 
ization of  the  allied  French  or  opposing  Viet  Minh,  both  of  whom  noted  and 
feared  the  gradual  insinuation  of  America  into  Vietnam.  The  Pentagon  study, 
which  postulates  and  accepts  anticommunism  as  an  impetus  for  action,  does  not 
include  any  later  reassessment  of  the  1948  State  Department  analysis  which  found 
"evidence  of  Kremlin-directed  conspiracy  ...  in  virtually  all  countries  except 
Vietnam.  .  .  ."  The  State  Department  then  evaluated  the  situation  in  a  way 
whose  defiance  of  common  sense  I  leave  to  others  to  explain. 

Evaluation.  If  there  is  a  Moscow-directed  conspiracy  in  Southeast  Asia, 
Indochina  is  an  anomaly  so  far.  Possible  explanations  are: 

1 .  No  rigid  directives  have  been  issued  by  Moscow. 

2.  The  Vietnam  government  considers  that  it  has  no  rightist  elements  that 
must  be  purged. 

3.  The  Vietnam  Communists  are  not  subservient  to  the  foreign  policies 
pursued  by  Moscow. 

4.  A  special  dispensation  for  the  Vietnam  government  has  been  arranged 
in  Moscow. 

Of  these  possibilities,  the  first  and  the  fourth  seem  most  likely  (Gravel  ed., 
1:34). 

While  the  Pentagon  authors  strongly  criticize  (but  never  probe  the  reasons  for) 
Dulles'  virulent  anticommunism,  they  fail  to  explain  the  peculiar  Franco-Ameri- 
can minuet  of  the  early  1950s.  France  forever  promised  more  independence  to 
the  Associated  States  of  Indochina  and  the  United  States  accepted  each  declara- 
tion as  a  reason  to  offer  more  aid  to  an  anti-Communist  rather  than  colonial  war. 
Here  the  Pentagon  study  discusses  America's  poor  bargaining  behavior  and  mis- 
use of  leverage  but  fails  to  realize  that  American  policy  could  not  have  been 
changed  without  a  major  shift  in  American  thinking  about  the  nature  of  the 
world.  What  eventually  altered  the  French  posture  was  the  course  of  events  in 
Vietnam,  where  the  French  lost  to  an  opponent  whose  ideas  and  ideals  they  never 
understood. 

The  section  of  the  Pentagon  study  dealing  with  the  Geneva  conference  and  the 
diplomatic  activities  surrounding  it  concentrates  not  on  what  was  occurring  but 
rather  on  what  the  documents  try  to  reflect.  The  authors  wonder  if  fulfillment  of 
the  final  settlement  might  not  have  been  a  good  thing,  then  criticize  the  Geneva 
Accords  because  they  "countenanced  the  dissociation  of  the  U.S.  and  of  South 
Vietnam,"  and  depended  on  France  to  guarantee  enforcement.  What  has  struck 
other  historians  most  about  this  period  is  the  stubborn  American  preparation  to 
continue  the  war,  with  help  or  alone,  in  some  form  or  other.  The  Pentagon  study 
sees  only  a  minimal  connection  between  the  U.S.  activities  planned  and  then 
abandoned,  and  the  difficulties  which  the  Geneva  conference  faced. 

Buried  amid  the  documents  is  a  highly  significant  one  which  does  not  appear 
in  the  New  York  Times  or  U.S.  government  editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers.  On 


The  Last  Line  of  Defense  151 


I  July  14,  1954,  the  American,  French  and  English  governments  agreed  on  a  secret 

\  position  paper  outlining  seven  points  which  would  make  any  Geneva  settlement 

I  into  one  which  could  be  "respected."  The  position  paper  (which  had  been  dis- 

\  cussed  by  several  historians  before  it  appeared  in  full  in  the  Gravel  edition) 

\  specified  that  the  Viet  Minh  must  withdraw  from  Laos  and  Cambodia,  that  at 

\  least  southern  Vietnam  and  hopefully  an  enclave  in  the  northern  deltas  should  be 

;  kept,  and  that  the  Indochinese  states  not  accept  any  restrictions  "materially  im- 

!  pairing  their  capacity  to  maintain  stable  non-communist  regimes;  and  especially 

\  restrictions  impairing  their  right  to  maintain  adequate  forces  for  internal  security, 

j  to  import  arms,  and  to  employ  foreign  advisers."  Point  4  of  the  same  document 

!  stipulated  that  an  agreement  could  be  "respected"  only  if  it  "Does  not  (repeat 

}  not)  contain  political  provisions  which  would  risk  the  loss  of  the  retained  area  to 

\  Communist  control"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:555). 

j       The  American  negotiators  at  Geneva  never  grasped  the  crux  of  the  matter, 

!  which  was  the  continual  military  setbacks  and  the  total  political  defeat  which  the 

I  French  were  experiencing  in  Indochina.  The  Pentagon  authors  do  not  understand 

j  it  either,  which  enables  them  to  comment,  "The  French  had  cleverly  exploited 

i|  the  American  assistance  program  without  having  brought  in  the  Americans  in  full 

I  force,  yet  had  also  been  unable  to  save  Dien  Bien  Phu  from  being  overrun  on 

I  May  7,  [1954]"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:109).  To  the  Americans,  the  French  desire  to 

j  negotiate  was  evidence  solely  of  a  deplorable  lack  of  backbone.  In  retrospect  the 

\  Pentagon  authors  seem  to  agree  and  move  even  further  into  absurdity  by  allow- 

j  ing  themselves  and  the  reader  to  assume  that  the  South  Vietnamese  government 

I  was  then  not  only  independent  but  also  capable  of  carrying  on  the  civil  war.  One 

;  of  the  best  Western  analysts  of  the  French  Indochina  War,  the  late  Bernard  Fall, 

!  saw  the  key  to  France's  defeat  in  the  loss  of  almost  the  entire  northern  half  of 

j  North  Vietnam  in  the  fall  of  1950  and  the  subsequent  French  failure  to  offer  a 

I  viable  political  alternative  to  the  Viet  Minh. 

; 

For  the  French,  the  Indochina  War  was  lost  then  and  there.  That  it  was 
allowed  to  drag  on  inconclusively  for  another  four  years  is  a  testimony  to 
the  shortsightedness  of  the  civilian  authorities  who  were  charged  with  draw- 
ing the  political  conclusions  from  the  hopeless  military  situation.  American 
aid  .  .  .  was  to  make  no  difference  whatsoever  to  the  eventual  outcome  of 
the  war.^ 

i  The  political  and  military  lessons  which  Fall  and  others,  French  and  Vietnamese, 
I  drew  from  the  French  experience  did  not  influence  the  Americans,  who  repeated 
;    all  the  French  errors  more  expensively,  extensively  and  hopelessly.  By  1968 

neither  the  American  policymakers  nor  the  Pentagon  authors  had  learned  much 

at  all. 

The  Pentagon  study  is  very  coy  on  the  implications  of  the  American  plans  to 
establish  SEATO,  on  the  American  selection  and  support  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem 
I    and  on  the  role  of  the  CIA  in  Saigon  during  and  after  the  Geneva  conference. 

Work  which  has  been  done  on  the  first  two  issues  and  the  revelations  in  the 
,  documents  about  the  third  go  far  to  contradict  the  Pentagon  study's  contention 
f  that  the  United  States  was  merely  dubious  about,  rather  than  completely  opposed 
|i  to,  not  only  the  conference  but  its  outcome  as  well.  The  only  value  of  the  Penta- 
t;  gon  study  of  Geneva  is  to  make  even  clearer  than  earlier  accounts  why  the  Viet 
i  Minh,  who  were  aware  of  the  real  U.S.  posture,  then  and  later  doubted  the  value 


152      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

of  negotiated  settlements  involving  the  United  States  and  implemented  solely 
through  the  good  faith  of  the  parties. 

The  Pentagon  account  of  the  immediate  post-Geneva  period  shows  the  speed 
with  which  the  United  States  forced  the  French  out  of  Indochina  and  the  dili- 
gence with  which  they  torpedoed  the  French  attempts  to  fulfill  the  accords.  By 
the  end  of  the  conference,  the  first  of  what  was  to  be  an  endless  flow  of  American 
advisers,  researchers  and  intelHgence  agents  had  reached  Saigon.  There  they  be- 
gan the  process  of  "nationbuilding,"  disregarding  Vietnamese  history,  culture  and 
political  heritages.  Vietnam  was  to  become  a  living  laboratory  for  social  scientists 
imbued  with  Cold  War  liberalism  and  fortified  by  a  new  vocabulary  of  social 
engineering.  The  few  restrictions  the  new  colonialists  faced  in  Vietnam  were  not 
duplicated  in  Laos,  which  became  completely  an  American  sphere  of  influence 
and  a  testing  ground  for  new  forms  of  counterrevolution.  The  American  military 
arrived  in  Laos  and  Vietnam  to  build  the  army  and  police  forces  needed  to  sustain 
unpopular  governments  and  to  create  the  "bastions"  from  which  to  reconquer 
northern  Vietnam.  The  Vietnamization  idea  of  the  French,  and  the  further  divi- 
sion of  ethnic  minorities  by  organizing  special  forces  and  CIA  armies  from  among 
the  Montagnards,  were  significant  policies  in  the  1950s  although  they  are  not 
treated  at  all  in  the  Pentagon  study. 

In  looking  at  the  years  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem's  presidency  the  Pentagon  study 
focuses  exclusively  on  the  weaknesses  of  specific  programs  such  as  pacification 
(in  various  guises),  which  fell  apart,  in  their  view,  because  America's  "limited 
partnership"  with  the  Vietnamese  took  no  account  of  the  difficulties  of  coordina- 
tion and  the  problems  of  reconciling  opposing  objectives.  The  study  does  not  con- 
sider the  question  of  how  a  nation  could  be  built  from  the  outside  and  who  the 
beneficiaries  of  such  a  process  could  be.  Neither  the  policymakers  nor  the  Penta- 
gon authors  choose  to  recognize  that  a  neocolonial  effort  was  under  way;  little 
was  built  in  Vietnam  although  specific  industries  in  the  United  States  profited  by 
supplying  commodities  for  the  import  program,  arms  for  the  military,  and  bank- 
ing facilities  to  help  the  exchanges. 

In  the  Pentagon  study,  America's  error  is  seen  to  have  been  solely  the  selection 
of  the  wrong  individual,  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  and  the  failure  after  1963  to  find  an 
adequate  substitute  for  that  flawed  and  fallen  protege.  Vietnamese  and  observers 
from  the  West  have  seen  instead  America's  role  in  creating  a  fatal  cycle  of  de- 
pendence. Just  as  foreign  support  of  a  weak  regime  could  not  be  sustained  in 
China — where  the  greater  the  foreign  support  and  presence,  the  weaker  the  ruling 
clique  became — outside  manipulation  soon  made  the  postcolonial  state  of  Viet- 
nam unviable  as  a  nationalist  entity.  The  greater  the  foreign  support,  the  less  the 
popular  support;  the  less  the  ruler's  feeling  of  responsibility  to  his  own  people, 
the  less  he  could  govern  and  the  more  he  needed  foreign  assistance.  At  the  same 
time,  the  foreigners  were  trapped  into  a  cycle  of  frustration  and  escalation.  Each 
time  a  program  failed  to  influence  hearts  and  minds  or  to  fulfifl  a  given  aim,  the 
Americans  reached  further  into  their  pocketbooks  and  bags  of  tricks  to  force  the 
result  they  desired.  When  all  efforts  to  win  minds  failed,  the  liberal  Americans 
moved  naturally  to  dominate  behavior.  In  practice  this  meant  the  adoption  of  a 
genocidal  strategy. 

The  American  preoccupation  with  dominance  in  the  area  and  the  tactics  chosen 
to  pursue  limited  and  long-term  aims  were  no  secret  to  the  Vietnamese,  Laotians 
and  Cambodians  who  watched  and  suffered  American  maneuvers.  As  early  as 
1958,  the  Press  and  Information  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
in  Hanoi  had  published,  in  several  languages,  a  96-page  booklet  replete  with  maps 


I  The  Last  Line  of  Defense  153 

'  and  charts,  outlining  what  they  argued  was  a  longstanding  American  desire  to  use 
I  Vietnam  to  protect  strategic  interests  in  and  along  the  coast  of  Asia.  The  Viet- 
j  namese  authors  quoted  John  Foster  Dulles,  members  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
I  and  a  succession  of  American  generals  "advising"  the  new  anti-Communist  armed 
!  forces  in  Saigon.  The  Vietnamese  found  ample  documentation  in  Western  jour- 
j  nalists'  reports,  Saigon  newspapers  and  the  reports  of  the  International  Control 
;  Commission,  which  had  been  established  by  the  Geneva  Accords. 
I  The  Vietnamese,  because  of  America's  military  focus  in  their  country,  were 
j  most  aware  of  the  complex  group  of  advisory  organizations  which  controlled  the 
J  police,  the  militia,  the  air  force,  the  navy,  the  army  and  the  paratroops.  They 
followed  with  close  attention  as  the  Americans  built  bases,  increased  arms  ship- 
;  ments,  and  demonstrated  their  contempt  for  the  Geneva  Accords,  which  had 
i  sought  to  limit  these  and  to  neutralize  the  area.  The  Vietnamese  were  also  aware 
j  that  the  economy  in  the  south  was  becoming  so  closely  tied  to  that  of  the  United 
\  States  and  so  dependent  on  various  forms  of  aid  that  self-sufficiency  was  impos- 
sible. 

I  The  Pentagon  study  says  little  about  either  the  substance  or  the  implication  of 
I  this  type  of  "nationbuilding,"  even  when  discussing  "the  origins  of  insurgency  in 
the  south."  At  the  beginning  of  the  long  section  concerning  1954  to  1960,  the 
I  Pentagon  authors  set  the  stage  for  subsequent  distortions  of  Vietnamese  history 
i  and  continual  omission  of  more  complex  analyses. 
\ 

j  From  the  perspective  of  the  United  States,  the  origins  of  the  insurgency 

I         in  South  Vietnam  raise  four  principal  questions: 

I  1.  Was  the  breakdown  of  the  peace  of  1954  the  fault  of  the  U.S.,  or 

j  of  the  ambiguities  and  loopholes  of  the  Geneva  Accords? 

2.  Was  the  insurgency  in  essence  an  indigenous  rebellion  against  Ngo 
Dinh  Diem's  oppressive  government,  transformed  by  the  intervention  of 
first  the  U.S.,  and  then  the  DRV? 

3.  Or  was  it,  rather,  instigated,  controlled,  and  supported  from  its  in- 
ception by  Hanoi? 

4.  When  did  the  U.S.  become  aware  of  the  Viet  Cong  threat  to  South 
Vietnam's  internal  security,  and  did  it  attempt  to  counter  it  with  its  aid? 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:242) 

j  The  Pentagon  analysts,  typically,  formulate  "options"  as  interpretations  of  avail- 
able evidence;  that  the  DRV  intervened  in  response  to  escalation  by  President 

;  Kennedy  of  attacks  on  southern  resistance  forces;  that  "the  DRV  manipulated 
the  entire  war.  This  is  the  official  U.S.  position,  and  can  be  supported.  Nonethe- 
less, the  case  is  not  wholly  compelling,  especially  for  the  years  1955-1959";  or 
that  "the  DRV  seized  an  opportunity  to  enter  an  ongoing  internal  war  in  1959 
prior  to,  and  independent  of,  U.S.  escalation"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:243). 

The  analyst,  having  dealt  with  caution  with  the  second  option  to  which  his 
boss  had  always  publicly  subscribed,  then  predictably  concludes  that  the  truth  lies 
somewhere  between  the  second  and  third  options.  So  much  has  been  written 
about  these  issues  that  it  seems  pointless  to  start  balancing  evidence  again  here. 
But  one  should  note  that  the  Pentagon  questions  do  not  ask  what  was  happening, 
why  the  United  States  felt  compelled  to  intervene,  or  how  the  United  States  could 

1  have  acted  differently  or  not  at  all. 

Constant  attention  to  secondary  operational  issues  is  the  hallmark  of  the  Penta- 

I  gon  study.  The  authors  do  not  and  cannot  examine  the  unworkability  of  a  situa- 


154      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

tion  in  which  the  United  States  chose  the  political  leader,  ran  his  campaigns, 
provided  his  backstairs  CIA  advisers,  staffed  his  ministries,  armed  and  trained  his 
troops,  set  his  budget  requirements  and  income,  coordinated  his  land  and  indus- 
trial policies,  developed  his  factories,  devised  his  tax  schedules,  educated  his 
people  abroad,  wrote  his  textbooks  from  primary  school  through  teachers  college, 
manipulated  his  currency,  and  arranged  his  relations  with  neighboring  states.  The 
Pentagon  authors  also  cannot  grasp  that  such  a  state  of  affairs  could  arouse  a 
politically  conscious  population  to  oppose  outside  manipulation  and  to  struggle 
for  social  justice  without  planning  to  launch  an  attack  on  Hawaii.  The  Pentagon 
study  would  have  been  a  far  more  rewarding  work  if  it  had  dealt  with  any  of 
these  issues,  and  a  far  less  frightening  one  if  the  reader  had  a  sense  that  at  least 
the  authors  if  not  the  policymakers  were  aware  of  more  than  trivial  implications. 

For  example,  in  assessing  the  reasons  for  the  failure  of  pacification,  the  Penta- 
gon authors  tread  a  thin  line  between  criticizing  the  Diem  regime  and  wondering 
if  a  well-executed  program  might  have  had  some  success. 

This  inconclusive  finding,  in  turn,  suggests  that  the  sequential  phases  em- 
bodied in  the  doctrine  of  counterinsurgency  may  slight  some  very  important 
problem  areas.  The  evidence  is  not  sufficient  for  an  indictment;  still  less  is 
one  able  to  validate  [sic]  the  counterinsurgent  [sic]  doctrine  with  reference  , 
to  a  program  that  failed.  The  only  verdict  that  may  be  given  at  this  time  j 
with  respect  to  the  validity  of  the  doctrine  is  that  used  by  Scots  courts —  \ 
"case  not  proved"  (Gravel  ed.,  II:  131 ) .  \ 

! 

The  chicken-and-egg  problem  of  whether  loyalty  precedes  security  or  vice  versa,  | 

in  someone  else's  country,  is  still  unresolved.  The  unmistakable  implication  is  | 

that  experimentation  should  and  will  continue.  And  that  is  a  lot  of  the  problem  : 
not  only  with  the  study  but  with  the  Pentagon. 

As  the  Pentagon  study  moves  through  the  years,  it  becomes  more  cautious  and  i 

jargon  laden,  ending  with  a  total  paralysis  of  the  will  to  analyze.  The  short-run,  ' 

parochial  thinking  of  the  Pentagon  authors  fits  well  into  the  definition  C.  Wright  ; 

Mills  gave  for  "crackpot  realism,"  that  is,  the  warped  self-sustaining  logic  which  ' 

keeps  catastrophic  policies  in  operation  because  they  have  been  in  operation.  The  ! 
Pentagon  study  defends  rather  than  analyzes  how  the  American  system  works  and 
reinforces  the  fallacious  belief  that  the  foreign-policy  apparatus  was  functioning 

well  in  the  service  of  noble  causes.  Many  critics  and  more  and  more  of  the  public  i 
are  beginning  to  realize  that,  on  the  contrary, 

.  .  .  American  foreign  policy  is  all  too  readily  out  of  control  and  aggressive 
while  it  defines  itself  as  responsible  and  defensive.  The  other  side  sees  the 
reality  and  responds.  Failing  to  recognize  this  reality,  Americans  see  the  re- 
sponse of  others  as  provocations.^ 

Those  who  wonder  if  this  is  true  should  look  not  only  at  the  wars  in  Korea  and 
Vietnam,  but  now  in  Thailand  as  well.  Since  the  American  takeover  from  the 
British  in  that  traditionally  "independent"  state,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the 
use  of  Thailand  as  a  base  for  the  war  in  Indochina  and  for  the  growing  American 
air  war  in  response,  it  is  alleged,  to  the  provocations  of  the  Thai  liberation  move- 
ment, which  seeks  to  oust  a  corrupt  and  repressive  regime. 

The  Pentagon  study,  by  its  emphasis  on  the  technical  knowhow  and  alleged 


The  Last  Line  of  Defense  155 


highmindedness  of  the  American  efforts  in  Vietnam  since  1940,  contributes  di- 

I  rectly  to  an  increased  American  paranoia;  if  noble,  intelligent  programs  failed, 

j  one  must  look  for  enemies  and  incompetents  at  home  and  abroad  who  thwarted 

I  what  would  have  benefited  all.  At  the  same  time,  in  its  massive  unreadability,  the 

I  study  strengthens  the  belief  that  issues  of  war  and  peace  are  too  complex  for 

I  common  folk  to  understand.  If  one  survives  through  the  first  two  volumes,  the 

i  glossary  needed  to  cope  with  the  later  ones  convinces  the  reader  that  only  the 

I  "experts"  can  and  should  determine  vital  policies.  The  study  contributes  to  the 

I  view  that  only  those  who  are  "experts"  can  criticize  the  government  and,  even 

1  more  dangerously,  that  the  words  of  "experts"  are  the  only  levers  to  change 

;  society.  The  Pentagon  Papers  should  on  the  contrary  be  used  as  evidence  to 

!;  destroy  the  myth  of  "expertise."  The  contents  of  the  study  make  clear  that  the 

i  policymakers,  with  very  little  information  that  was  not  available  to  the  public, 

I  read  little  and  thought  less.  Those  who  seek  to  end  the  war  and  to  change 

'  America  have  thought  carefully  and  read  extensively;  but  they  will  not  and  need 

not  read  the  Pentagon  study. 

The  bureaucrats  who  find  meaning  in  the  study  and  accept  its  facile  excuses 

for  deliberate  and  destructive  policies  can  in  truth  claim  to  believe  what  they 

1  read.  The  victims  of  poverty  and  racism  in  America  have  heard  all  the  excuses, 

j  if  not  the  details,  before.  Citizens  who  are  concerned  with  America's  role  in  the 

I  world  need  more  understanding  of  the  connections  between  aggressive  foreign 

»  policy  and  domestic  repression,  between  adventures  undertaken  to  help  American 

I  capital  overseas  and  neglect  of  Americans  at  home.  None  of  this  is  to  be  found 

\  in  the  Pentagon  study,  which  still  does  not  explain  what  America  did  in  Asia  and 

'  why  it  went  so  wrong. 

The  GIs  in  Vietnam,  anxious  to  leave,  are  face  to  face  with  what  intellectuals 

;  only  write  about.  They  neither  know  nor  care  about  the  history  of  upper-level 

;  decisionmaking.  Many  of  them  strongly  suspect  that  what  they  were  fighting  for 

j  was  never  worth  it.  So  many  of  them  are  responsible  for  "war  crimes"  that  the 

i;  term  has  no  meaning.  But  they  have  grasped  what  most  Americans,  and  particu- 

i  larly  the  Pentagon  authors,  still  cannot  see;  the  whole  war  is  a  crime,  against 

;  them  and  against  the  Indochinese  people.  Why  should  it  be  necessary  to  experi- 

1  ence  total  immersion  in  the  minutiae  of  decisionmaking  in  order  to  function  as  a 

j  citizen?  Reading  the  materials  which  helped  trap  Washington  into  a  war  that 

;  seems  as  endless  as  it  is  destructive  seems  a  poor  way  to  begin  changing  policy 

t  or  processes. 


A  ppendix 

A  great  many  excellent  bibliographies  on  Indochina,  the  war,  and  American  foreign 
policy  have  appeared  in  the  past  few  years.  I  am  therefore  not  attempting  here  to 
give  more  than  an  outline  of  the  sources  on  which  I  rely  and  the  books  which  will  be 


156      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

more  valuable  to  read  than  the  Pentagon  study,  regardless  of  what  one  has  already 
read. 

On  Vietnamese  history,  with  attention  to  indigenous  sources  and  scholarly  criteria, 
the  best  works  for  the  period  up  to  1954  are  Le  Thanh  Khoi,  Le  Vietnam:  Histoire  et 
Civilisation  (Paris:  Les  Editions  de  Minuit,  1955);  David  G.  Marr,  Vietnamese  Anti- 
colonialism  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1971);  Jean  Chesneaux,  Con- 
tribution a  I'histoire  de  la  nation  vietnamienne  (Paris:  Editions  Sociales,  1955);  and 
Truong  Buu  Lam,  Patterns  of  Vietnamese  Response  to  Foreign  Intervention,  1858  to 
1900  (New  Haven:  Yale  Monograph  Series  #11,  1969).  One  will  also  gain  a  sym- 
pathetic understanding  of  how  the  Vietnamese  view  their  own  past  and  use  it  to  build 
the  present  in  Nguyen  Khac  Vien,  Experiences  Vietnameins  (Paris:  Editions  Sociales, 
1968);  and  Truong  Chinh,  The  August  Revolution  (Hanoi:  Foreign  Languages  Press, 
1958). 

On  the  roots  and  history  of  American  foreign  policy,  particularly  after  World  War 
II,  the  collection  edited  by  William  Appleman  Williams,  The  Shaping  of  American 
Diplomacy,  and  his  volume  The  Contours  of  American  History  are  excellent.  I  have 
also  used  The  Politics  of  War:  The  World  and  United  States  Foreign  Policy,  1943- 
1945,  by  Gabriel  Kolko  (New  York:  Random  House,  1968);  Walter  LaFeber,  Amer- 
ica, Russia  and  the  Cold  War;  and  David  Horowitz,  From  Yalta  to  Vietnam.  One  can 
obtain  further  background  on  economic  issues  from,  among  other  works,  Harry  Mag- 
doff,  The  Age  of  Imperialism  (New  York:  Monthly  Review  Press,  1968);  and  Sidney 
Lens,  The  Military-Industrial  Complex  (Boston:  Pilgrim  Press,  1971).  A  revealing  set 
of  discussions  and  debates  on  America's  past  and  current  foreign-policy  assumptions 
appears  in  Richard  Pfeffer,  editor,  No  More  Vietnams?  (New  York:  Harper  &  Row, 
1968). 

Material  on  the  American  decision  to  oppose  communism  in  Europe  and  to  work 
through  various  Mafia  groups  will  be  found  in  Kolko's  The  Politics  of  War.  The 
connection  between  Cold  War  politics,  the  American  heroin  problem  and  the  war  in 
Vietnam  is  examined  and  documented  in  Alfred  W.  McCoy,  Cathleen  Reade  McCoy 
and  Leonard  P.  Adams  II,  The  Politics  of  Heroin  in  Southeast  Asia  (New  York:  Harper 
&Row,  1972). 

The  best  general  summary  which  treats  the  Vietnamese  issues,  French  policies  and 
the  growth  of  American  intervention  is  George  McTurnan  Kahin  and  John  W.  Lewis, 
The  United  States  in  Vietnam  (New  York:  Delta,  1969,  second  edition).  For  back- 
ground on  Laos  and  the  American  war  there,  Nina  S.  Adams  and  Alfred  W.  McCoy, 
editors,  Laos:  War  and  Revolution  (New  York:  Harper  &  Row,  1970);  on  Cambodian 
events,  Jonathan  S.  Grant,  Laurence  A.  G.  Moss  and  Jonathan  Unger,  editors,  Cam- 
bodia: The  Widening  War  in  Indochina  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1970).  The 
most  readable  and  concise  coverage  of  the  issues  is  The  Indochina  Story,  by  the  Com- 
mittee of  Concerned  Asian  Scholars  (New  York:  Bantam,  1970). 

For  the  many  topics  which  the  Pentagon  study  omits  in  its  discussion  of  the  period 
1945  to  1954,  all  the  following  books  (or  any  one  of  them)  are  highly  recommended: 
Bernard  Fall,  The  Two  Vietnams  (New  York:  Praeger,  1963);  Jean  Lacouture,  Ho 
Chi  Minh:  A  Political  Biography  (New  York:  Random  House,  1967);  Lucien  Bodard, 
The  Quicksand  War  (Boston:  Little,  Brown,  1967);  Philippe  Devillers,  Histoire  du 
Vietnam  de  1940  a  1952  (Paris:  Editions  de  Seuil,  1952);  Jean  Chesneaux,  editor. 
Tradition  et  revolution  au  Vietnam  (Paris:  Editions  Anthropos,  1971). 

On  French  military  and  political  problems  in  Vietnam,  the  works  by  Bernard  Fall, 
Street  Without  Joy  (Harrisburg:  The  Stackpole  Company,  1961)  and  Hell  in  a  Very 
Small  Place:  The  Siege  of  Dien  Bien  Phu  (New  York:  Vintage,  1966),  are  fascinating, 
readable  and  superbly  documented  analyses  of  what  happened  and  what  failed.  Another 
account  is  by  Jules  Roy,  The  Battle  of  Dien  Bien  Phu  (New  York:  Harper  &  Row, 
1965).  Vietnamese  strategy  and  military-political  thinking  are  discussed  carefully  by 
Georges  Boudarel  in  the  Chesneaux  volume  mentioned  above. 

For  a  balanced  account  of  the  Geneva  Conference  and  the  important  events  which 
followed:  Philippe  Devillers  and  Jean  Lacouture,  End  of  a  War:  Geneva  1954  (New 
York:  Praeger,  1969).  One  gets  more  of  a  sense  of  the  conference  from  the  memoirs 
of  Chester  Cooper,  The  Last  Crusade,  than  one  does  from  the  Pentagon  account. 


The  Last  Line  of  Defense  157 


Reference  to  the  importance  of  the  July  14,  1954,  position  paper  is  found  in  Marek 
Thee,  "Background  Notes  on  the  1954  Geneva  Agreements  on  Laos  and  the  Vientiane 
Agreements  of  1956-1957"  in  the  volume  edited  by  Adams  and  McCoy  listed  above. 

My  own  feeling  is  that  the  best  book  on  China,  the  events  of  the  1940s  and  the 
American  role  is  Graham  Peck,  Two  Kinds  of  Time  (Boston,  Houghton  Mifflin,  1950) 
which  is  the  most  readable  and  illuminating  eyewitness  report  published.  Jack  Belden's 
China  Shakes  the  World  explains  clearly  why  the  Chinese  Communists  operated  as  they 
did  and  why  they  were  accepted  by  the  population.  The  period  from  1940  to  1948  is 
dealt  with  carefully  in  Barbara  Tuchmann,  Stilwell  and  the  American  Experience  in 
China.  Herbert  Feis,  writing  from  government  records  as  an  ex-government  official 
1     provides  a  detailed  and  useful  account  of  American-Chinese  relations  in  The  China 
I     Tangle.  One  gets  a  realistic  and  human  account  of  the  meaning  of  the  Chinese  revolu- 
I     tion  in  William  Hinton,  Fan  Shen:  Revolution  in  a  Chinese  Village  (New  York: 
I     Monthly  Review  Press,  1969),  while  America's  perceptions  of  China  are  evaluated  in 
the  book  America's  Asia:  Dissenting  Essays  on  American-Asian  Relations  (New  York: 
Pantheon,  1970). 

;        The  growth  of  the  National  Liberation  Front  in  Vietnam  has  seldom  been  studied 
■     from  other  than  the  perspective  of  the  counterinsurgency  expert  who  inevitably  misses 
the  meaning  and  achievements  of  an  organized  revolutionary  movement.  Several  ex- 
cellent studies  in  sympathy  with  the  Vietnamese  and  based  on  accurate  reporting  and 
good  research  have  been  written  by  Wilfred  Burchett:  The  Second  Indochina  War 
I     (New  York:  International  Publishers,  1970),  The  Furtive  War  (New  York:  Interna- 
j     tional  Publishers,  1963),  and  one  of  the  first  accounts  to  appear  in  English,  Mekong 
J     Upstream  (1957).  There  are  many  excellent  works  in  French,  including  those  already 
il  mentioned. 

j       The  Cambodian  United  National  Front  of  Campuchea  was  formed  after  the 
American-South  Vietnamese  invasion  of  that  country  in  1970.  Although  there  are  few 
materials  dealing  with  Cambodia  in  print,  articles  appear  frequently  in  periodicals  such 
as  The  Guardian  (32  West  22  Street,  New  York,  N.Y.  10010)  and  The  Indochina 
Chronicle  (1332  18  Street  N.W.,  Washington,  D.C.  20036).  A  new  and  fascinating 
!    book  on  all  aspects  of  Cambodia,  with  emphasis  on  the  period  after  the  overthrow  of 
j     Prince  Norodom  Sihanouk,  is  Charles  Meyer,  Derriere  le  Sourire  Khmer  (Paris:  Plon, 
1972).  Very  few  books  have  appeared  on  the  current  Thai  situation,  but  an  excellent 
;    background  is  Frank  C.  Darhng,  The  United  States  and  Thailand  (Washington,  D.C: 
\    Public  Affairs  Press,  1966),  and  articles  appear  frequently  in  Asian  Releases,  the  bi- 
j    weekly  publication  of  Dispatch  News  Service  (1826  R  Street  N.W.,  Washington,  D.C. 
I     20009).  Issues  in  Southeast  Asian  history  and  politics  appear  regularly  in  the  Bulletin 
'    of  the  Committee  of  Concerned  Asian  Scholars  (9  Sutter  Street,  San  Francisco,  94104). 

The  history  of  American  interference  in  Asia  with  special  reference  to  the  Philippines 
I  is  treated  well  in  William  Pomeroy,  American  Neo-Colonialism  in  the  Philippines  (New 
;    York:  International  Publishers,  1969). 

The  Vietnam  Courier  and  Vietnamese  Studies,  published  in  English  in  Hanoi,  offer 
readable  articles  on  a  wide  variety  of  things  Vietnamese  and  an  important  means  of 
learning  about  past  and  present  events  in  all  of  Vietnam.  Both  publications  are  avail- 
able at  university  bookstores  or  from  China  Books  and  Periodicals  (2929  24  Street, 
San  Francisco,  California  94110).  The  Foreign  Language  Publishing  House  in  Hanoi 
has  printed,  in  French  and  in  English,  The  Real  and  the  False  Secrets  of  the  Pentagon 
(Hanoi,  Le  Courrier  du  Viet  Nam,  1971),  matching  revelations  from  the  study  with 
quotations  from  Vietnamese  leaders  speaking  soon  after  the  events  described  in  the 
study,  and  long  before  publication  of  classified  information, 
j       Information  on  the  brutality  of  the  war  has  long  been  available  in  the  United  States 
;    and  much  of  it  has  been  offered  by  non-antiwar  writers.  Air  War,  by  Frank  Harvey, 
|;   and  Ecocide  in  Indochina,  edited  by  Barry  Weisberg  (San  Francisco,  Canfield  Press, 
1970),  are  two  of  the  most  convincing  accounts.  Vietnamese  reports  of  the  suffering 
caused  by  the  war  appear  in  many  periodicals  cited  above;  in  addition,  Americans  who 
i   have  worked  in  Vietnam  have  written  about  what  they  observed.  The  best  of  these 
IP    books  is  by  Don  Luce  and  John  Somer,  Vietnam:  The  Unheard  Voices  (Ithaca:  Cornell 
jj    University  Press,  1969).  Discussions  of  American  policies  in  warfare  and  strategic 


158      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

aims  can  be  found  in  Vietnamese  publications  such  as  the  DRV  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  La  politique  d' intervention  et  d'aggression  des  Etats-Unis  au  Sud  Vietnam 
(Hanoi,  1962)  and  in  Neo  Lao  Hak  Sat  writings  such  as  Twelve  Years  of  U.S.  Im- 
perialist Intervention  and  Aggression  in  Laos  (1966).  One  often  learns  more  details 
from  these  than  from  Western  publications. 


1.  David  Welsh  with  David  Horowitz,  "Attorney  at  War — Clark  Clifford."  Ramparts, 
1968,  p.  138. 

2.  This  information  comes  from  the  article  by  Henri  Lanoue,  "L'emprise  economique 
des  Etats-Unis  sur  I'lndochine  avant  1950,"  pages  292-327  of  Jean  Chesneaux,  ed., 
Tradition  et  Revolution  au  Vietnam.  Paris:  Anthropos,  1971.  The  statistics  Lanoue 
offers  are  taken  from  L'Annuaire  Statistique  de  I'lndochine,  1943-1946,  and  1948, 
published  by  the  French  colonial  government. 

3.  Bernard  Fall,  The  Two  Vietnams:  A  Political  and  Military  Analysis,  2nd  edition. 
New  York:  Praeger,  1963,  p.  111. 

4.  Edward  Friedman,  "Problems  of  Dealing  with  an  Irrational  Power:  America 
Declares  War  on  China"  in  Edward  Friedman  and  Mark  Selden,  eds.,  America's  Asia: 
Dissenting  Essays  on  American-Asian  Relations.  New  York:  Pantheon,  1970,  p.  208. 


159 


10.     "Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia? 
A  key  to  an  intelHgent  reading  of  Vol.  I 
of  the  Gravel  edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 

by  Philippe  Devillers 

United  States  involvement  in  the  Vietnam  war  is  said  to  have  originated  in 
President  Truman's  decision  to  provide  assistance  to  France  and  the  three  Indo- 
chinese  "Associated  States"  (Vietnam,  Cambodia,  Laos)  in  the  pivotal  month  of 
February  1950. 

Actually,  a  turning  point,  a  crucial  dilemma,  was  reached  when  the  United 
States  was  asked  by  France  to  recognize  the  "Associated  States,"  to  whom  sov- 
ereignty had  just  been  transferred.  While  there  was  no  particular  problem  with 
regard  to  Cambodia  and  Laos,  Vietnam,  on  the  contrary,  did  present  a  serious 
one.  France  wished  to  introduce  into  the  community  of  nations  a  "State  of  Viet- 
nam" headed  by  Bao  Dai  (a  former  emperor),  but  at  the  same  time,  Ho  Chi 
Minh,  President  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam,  claimed  (on  January 
14,  1950)  that  he  and  the  DRV  were  "the  only  legal  government  of  the  Vietnam- 
ese people."  The  DRV  was  recognized  as  such  by  Peking  and  Moscow  (January 
1950),  a  fact  which  hastened  the  American  decision. 

The  perception  of  a  powerful  Communist  threat  to  American  world  interests, 
the  collapse  of  the  Chinese  Nationalist  government,  the  apparent  alignment  of 
People's  China  with  Moscow  indeed  combined  to  induce  Washington  to  action. 
Southeast  Asia  seemed  to  be  "the  target  of  a  coordinated  offensive  directed  by 
the  Kremlin"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:186).  U.S.  policy  was  set  to  block  further  "Rus- 
sian" expansion  in  Asia,  the  domino  principle  being  at  the  root  of  this  policy. 

Indochina  was  of  special  importance  "because  it  was  the  only  area  adjacent  to 
China  which  contained  a  large  European  army  which  was  in  armed  conflict  with 
'communist'  forces"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:82).  "The  attempt  of  the  patently  Communist 
Ho  Chi  Minh  regime  to  evict  the  French  from  Indochina  was  seen  as  part  of  the 
Southeast  Asian  manifestation  of  the  communist  world-wide  aggressive  intent. 
The  resistance  of  France  to  Ho,  therefore,  was  seen  as  a  crucial  stand  on  the  line 
along  which  the  West  would  contain  Communism"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:81 ) . 

French  ratification  of  the  transfer  of  sovereignty,  the  French  government's  re- 
quest for  American  aid  in  Vietnam  (February  16,  1950),  prompted  the  United 
States  to  action.  Discussing  the  issue,  the  National  Security  Council,  in  NSC  64 
(February  27,  1950),  determined:  "It  is  important  to  United  States  security  in- 
terests that  all  practicable  measures  be  taken  to  prevent  further  communist  ex- 
pansion in  Southeast  Asia.  Indochina  is  a  key  area  of  Southeast  Asia  and  is  under 
immediate  threat"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:76). 

Urged  by  the  then  Deputy  Under-Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk  to  consider 
"the  strategic  aspects  of  the  situation,"  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  in  a  memo- 
randum for  the  President  dated  March  6,  1950,  described  U.S.  options  as  follows: 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Philippe  Devillers 


160      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

The  French  are  irrevocably  committed  in  Indochina  and  are  supporting 
the  three  states  as  a  move  aimed  at  achieving  non-Communist  political  sta- 
bility .  .  .  The  choice  confronting  the  United  States  is  to  support  the  legal 
[sic]  governments  in  Indochina  or  to  face  the  extension  of  Communism  over 
the  remainder  of  the  continental  area  of  Southeast  Asia  and  possibly  west- 
ward (Gravel  ed.,  1 : 1 95 ) . 

On  May  8,  1950,  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Acheson  announced  an  aid  program 
for  France  and  the  Associated  States  of  Indochina.  Thus,  six  weeks  before  the 
Korean  war,  a  crucial  decision  was  made  which  "directly  involved  [the  United 
States]  in  the  developing  tragedy  in  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:42).  The  die  was 
cast. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  introduce  an  impressive  amount  of  information  and  docu- 
ment well  a  period  which  was  neglected  (for  lack  of  space)  by  the  New  York 
Times  editors.  With  about  240  pages  of  "summary"  and  230  pages  of  documents, 
this  is  an  essential  book  for  understanding  American  policy  and  the  U.S.  decision- 
making process.  However,  even  in  the  "full  edition,"  the  perspective  is  disappoint- 
ing because  many  important  documents  are  missing^  and  this  gap  probably  will 
prevent  the  reader  from  getting  a  clear  idea  of  the  chain  of  events  leading  to  the 
early  (but  capital)  American  decisions.  Also  there  is  a  surprising  absence  of 
analysis  of  American  motivations  and  interests.  In  this  respect,  a  key  to  the  read- 
ing of  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  useful  because  the  official  language  must  be  de- 
coded in  order  to  determine  precisely  which  American  interests  were  being  served 
when  decisions  were  made. 

THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  FATAL  DECISION 
OF  FEBRUARY  1950 

When  the  United  States  decided  to  join  (and  support)  France  on  the  Indochina 
front,  a  war  had  been  going  on  there  for  three  long  years.  And,  far  from  being 
a  small  conflict,  it  had  already  become  a  major  issue  in  the  world  power-game. 

Much  has  been  said  about  U.S.  policies  in  Indochina  during  and  immediately 
after  World  War  II.  Did  the  United  States  back  the  Viet  Minh,  first  against  the 
pro-Vichy  administration  and  then  against  de  Gaulle's  representatives?  Did  it  sup- 
port policies  that  aimed  to  replace  a  colonial  administration  by  "international 
trustees"?  Did  it  really  back  France  to  reimpose  French  colonial  power,  as  the 
Viet  Minh  said? 

The  Pentagon  Papers  seek  to  restore  the  balance.  "Neither  interpretation 
squares  with  the  record,"  they  say.  The  United  States  was  less  concerned  over 
Indochina  and  less  purposeful  than  critics  assume.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  ambiva- 
lence and  ambiguity  had  characterized  U.S.  policy  regarding  Indochina 
during  World  War  II,  and  this  was  the  root  of  a  long  misunderstanding  between 
Paris  and  Washington.  On  the  one  hand,  Washington  repeatedly  reassured  the 
French  about  the  return  of  their  colonial  possessions;  on  the  other,  in  the  name 
of  self-determination,  it  stood  for  trusteeship  or  independence.  But  trusteeship  is 
now  said  to  have  foundered  as  early  as  March  1943,  and  as  of  April  3,  1945  (a 
week  before  the  death  of  Roosevelt),  the  new  doctrine  of  trusteeship  left  any 
decision  on  Indochina  to  France. 

Truman  did  not  question  French  sovereignty  over  Indochina,  but  wanted  to 
know  more  about  Paris  intentions  with  regard  to  establishing  civil  liberties  and 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  161 

I  increasing  measures  of  self-government  in  Indochina,  before  formulating  a 
|!     declaration  of  policy.  He  did  not  want  the  French  to  reassert  control  by  force. 

In  November  1945,  Washington  was  satisfied  with  French  explanations  and 
I     pledges  that,  once  order  was  restored  throughout  Indochina,  the  "natives"  would 
I     be  given  a  greater  voice  in  their  affairs  while  new  agreements  would  be  concluded 
with  the  individual  states. 

From  the  Pentagon  Papers,  it  appears  that  the  United  States  did  not  feel  con- 
Ij  cerned  about  the  turn  events  took  in  Indochina  after  the  Japanese  surrender.  They 
i  state  simply  that  "the  DRV  ruled  as  the  only  civil  government  in  all  of  Vietnam 
for  a  period  of  about  20  days.  On  23  September  1945  .  .  .  French  forces  over- 
threw the  local  DRV  government,  and  declared  French  authority  restored  in 
[  Cochinchina"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:16).  They  mention  that  Ho  Chi  Minh  sent  eight 
\  messages  to  the  United  States  between  October  1945  and  February  1946,  but  that 
i  the  United  States  did  not  reply.  They  go  on  to  report  "recognition  of  the  DRV 
I  as  a  Free  State,  part  of  the  French  Union,"  through  an  agreement  signed  on 
;  March  6,  1946,  between  Ho  Chi  Minh  and  Jean  Sainteny,  the  French  representa- 
I  live  in  Hanoi,  omitting  however  one  of  its  most  important  clauses  on  self-deter- 
l|  mination  of  Cochinchina.  In  April  1946,  the  United  States  acknowledged  to 
|i  France  that  all  of  Indochina  had  reverted  to  French  control.  Allied  occupation 
1  of  Indochina  was  officially  over.  "Thereafter,  the  problems  of  U.S.  policy  toward 
j     Vietnam  were  dealt  with  in  the  context  of  the  U.S.  relationship  with  France" 

! (Graveled. ,1:3;  emphasis  ours). 
This  is  fundamental  for  a  sound  understanding  of  the  situation:  Indochina  was 
not  in  the  same  theater  as  China  and  Japan  (in  which  West  Coast  and  Texan  in- 
i     terests  hoped  to  play  a  major  role),  but  part  of  the  "European  Theater,"  in  which 
I     France  played  a  capital  role. 

I  Washington  seemed  satisfied  with  the  "peaceful  cooperation  between  France 
and  the  DRV  in  North  Vietnam  for  eight  months,"  but  the  Papers  do  not  detail 

j     or  discuss  the  issues  at  stake  at  either  the  Dalat  or  the  Fontainebleau  conferences. 

j     They  mention  a  casual  contact  between  Ho  Chi  Minh  and  the  U.S.  ambassador 

I  in  Paris  (the  Catholic  Jefferson  Caffery).  The  September  14  (1946)  agreement 
between  the  French  government  and  Ho  Chi  Minh,  about  a  ceasefire  and  self- 

j     determination  in  the  South  as  a  quid  pro  quo  with  restoration  of  a  federal  eco- 

li     nomic  authority  in  Indochina,  is  hardly  mentioned,  nor  the  subsequent  failure  to 

j     implement  it. 

When  tensions  developed  between  Paris  and  Hanoi,  Washington  apparently  did 
its  best  to  help,  as  is  shown  by  an  extremely  interesting  telegram,  dated  December 
I     5,  1946,  from  Dean  Acheson  to  the  U.S.  representative  in  Hanoi,  warning  against 
j     violence  in  Vietnam,  stressing  the  dangers  of  provocateurs  and  the  risks  of  a 
'     conflict,  as  well  as  the  possibilities  for  compromise  (Gravel  ed.,  1:29).  And  then, 
on  December  19,  1946,  the  North  Vietnamese  attacked. 

In  a  memorandum  to  Undersecretary  Acheson  (December  23),  John  Carter 
Vincent,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  in  a  very  sharp  analysis 
indeed,  recommended  that  the  French  be  reminded  of  inherent  dangers  in  the 
situation.  However,  the  conflict  was  already  there,  and  the  United  States  regarded 
it  as  fundamentally  a  matter  for  French  resolution. 

The  French  government,  in  a  message  of  January  8,  1947,  assured  that  their 
"principal  objective  .  .  .  was  to  restore  order  and  reopen  communications  .  .  . 
and  that  after  this  was  done,  [they]  would  be  prepared  to  discuss  matters  with  the 
'     Vietnamese"  and  to  live  up  to  the  agreements  of  March  6  and  September  14. 

The  Americans  wanted  to  be  reassured;  they  accepted  the  French  version,  and 


I 


162      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

in  a  probably  sincere  desire  to  be  helpful,  did  try  to  prevent  the  conflict  from 
widening.  Secretary  of  State  George  Marshall  said  he  hoped  that  "a  pacific  basis 
of  adjustment  of  the  difficulties  could  be  found." 

Early  in  February  1947,  while  General  Leclerc  recommended  a  political  solu- 
tion, the  French  government's  position  shifted  to  state  that  "before  any  negotia- 
tions, it  was  necessary  to  have  a  military  decision'  (emphasis  ours).  The  U.S. 
ambassador  in  Paris,  however,  received  revealing  directives.  He  was  given  in- 
structions first  to  reassure  French  Premier  Ramadier  that  Indochina  was  of  course 
a  matter  of  French  sovereignty,  but  the  French  certainly  knew  that  colonialism 
was  dead,  as  shown  by  their  recent  agreements  with  Vietnam.  Washington  re- 
marked that  French  "understanding"  of  the  Vietnamese  position  was  more  pro- 
nounced in  Paris  than  in  Saigon,  but  understood  that  the  Vietnamese  had  attacked 
on  December  19  and  that  the  French  had  no  reason  to  be  generous.  Furthermore, 
Ho  Chi  Minh  was  a  Communist,  and  the  United  States  did  not  desire  to  see 
colonial  empires  replaced  or  controlled  by  the  Kremlin.  They  wanted  to  remain 
aloof,  and  had  no  solution  to  suggest  (Gravel  ed.,  1:4,  30-31,  50). 

The  solution  of  neutrality  was  thus  chosen.  The  issue  of  Vietnam  was  com- 
pletely overshadowed  by  the  role  France  could  be  expected  to  play,  on  the  West- 
ern side,  in  Europe.  The  Conference  of  "Big  Four"  foreign  ministers  opened  in 
Moscow  on  March  10,  1947,  and  the  Truman  Doctrine  was  enunciated  on  March 
12.  Even  if  "the  U.S.  knew  little  of  what  was  transpiring  inside  Vietnam,"  as  the 
Papers  say  (Gravel  ed.,  1:51 ),  it  is  true  that  it  "certainly  cared  less  about  Vietnam 
than  about  France." 

It  was  within  the  French  sphere,  and  by  the  French  themselves,  that  the  elimi- 
nation of  the  Communists  in  Vietnam  had  to  be  achieved.  Ramadier's  government 
favored  "independence  and  unity"  for  Vietnam.  In  accordance  with  Admiral 
d'Argenlieu's  suggestions,  it  turned  then  to  a  political  solution:  restoration  of 
Bao  Dai,  the  former  emperor.  It  was  with  him,  not  Ho  Chi  Minh,  that  the  French 
decided  to  negotiate  for  a  political  settlement  with  Vietnamese  nationalists.  With 
French  encouragement,  groups  of  Vietnamese  right-wing  "nationalists"  began 
advocating  the  installation  of  Bao  Dai  as  the  head  of  an  anti-Vietminh  Vietnamese 
regime. 

Very  early  in  the  war,  the  French  had  indeed  raised  the  specter  of  communism 
and  of  Red  conspiracy.  More  recently  Admiral  d'Argenlieu  had  stressed  that 
France's  role  in  Indochina  was  primarily  to  stem  the  expansion  of  communism 
there.  Implicitly  Washington  had  agreed  with  this  aspect  of  French  policy  and 
favored  a  non-Communist  political  solution,  even  if,  in  order  to  get  it,  the  French 
had  to  resort  to  "Vietnamization"  of  the  conflict,  as  was  proposed,  for  the  first 
time  (although  the  word  was  not  used),  in  Directive  No.  9  (January  4,  1947) 
of  the  Political  Section  of  the  French  High  Commissioner's  Office  in  Saigon.^ 
Actually,  the  French  approached  Bao  Dai  with  terms  not  unlike  those  accepted 
by  Ho  Chi  Minh  (unity,  and  autonomy  within  Indochinese  Federation  and  the 
French  Union),  "provided  Bao  Dai  formed  a  government  which  would  furnish 
a  clear  alternative  to  Ho  Chi  Minh"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:25;  emphasis  ours). 

The  United  States  could  then  go  ahead.  On  May  13,  1947,  a  few  days  after 
the  Communists  were  ousted  from  the  government  in  Paris,  and  immediately 
after  the  "rejection"  by  Ho  Chi  Minh  of  the  French  ultimatum  for  surrender,  a 
Department  of  State  guidance  affirmed  that  in  Southeast  Asia  the  United  States 
was  "in  [the]  same  boat  as  [the]  French"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:31),  that  to  prevent 
trouble,  it  sought  "close  association  between  newly-autonomous  peoples  and 
powers  which  have  long  been  responsible  [for]  their  welfare."  This  association, 
however,  should  be  voluntary,  avoid  bitterness  and  frustration.  Although  the 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  163 

United  States  would  not  interfere  in  French  affairs,  it  wanted  to  let  it  be  known 
that  it  felt  concerned.  It  was  important  to  find  "true  representatives  of  Vietnam," 
and  not  impotent  puppets.  A  restoration  of  Bao  Dai  could  do  harm  because  it 
would  show  the  world  that  the  democracies  were  reduced  to  resorting  to  mon- 
archy as  a  weapon  against  communism.  It  made  clear  that  the  United  States 
foresaw  France's  losing  Indochina  if  it  persisted  in  ignoring  American  advice, 
and  bypassing  "truly  nationalist  groups"  able  to  induce  actual  Vietminh  sup- 
porters to  come  to  the  Western  side. 

The  "True  Doctrine"  was  formulated,  but  for  a  long  time  French  and  Amer- 
icans were  to  differ  as  to  who  were  the  "true  nationalists." 

What  is  really  appalling  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  is  that  there  is  not  the  slightest 
hint  that  there  was  in  Washington,  at  any  level,  a  critical  examination  of  the 
French  theses  or  versions  of  events,  as  well  as  of  the  legality  of  the  French 
policy  from  an  "international  law,"  or  "peoples'  law"  (jus  gentium)  point  of 
view.  It  is  amazing  that  such  a  poor  analysis  of  the  origins  of  a  major  war  could 
be  made  by  "experts"  occupying  high  and  crucial  positions.  Summaries  and 
documents  never  go  to  the  roots  and  remain  for  the  most  part  superficial. 

At  the  base  of  the  whole  of  the  "Indochina  tragedy"  is  the  fact  that  the  West 
(France  first  and  the  United  States  afterwards)  ignored  the  evidence  that  the 
DRV  was  the  new,  but  legal,  form  of  the  Empire  of  Annam,  a  thousand-year-old 
j  nation-state,  one  of  the  oldest  in  Asia,  although  it  had  been  enslaved  for  eighty 
!  years  under  the  guise  of  a  French  protectorate.  As  the  Papers  acknowledge,  the 
j  DRV  enjoyed  full  independence  for  a  few  weeks  after  September  2,  1945,  re- 
\  storing  between  North  and  South  a  unity  that  had  been  broken  by  France  eighty 
\     years  before. 

j  It  was  fairly  reasonable  for  the  United  States  to  abstain  from  interference  in 
j  the  French  attempt  to  seek  new  relationships  with  the  different  states  of  Indo- 
i  china.  A  new  agreement  was  concluded  between  France  and  Cambodia  as  early 
j  as  January  7,  1946.  The  March  6,  1946,  agreement  was  signed  with  Ho  Chi  Minh 
;  as  leader  of  Vietnam  (the  new  name  of  Annam)  and  in  it  France  did  "recognize 
the  Republic  of  Vietnam  as  a  Free  State  with  its  Government,  its  Parliament,  its 
Treasury,  its  Army,  within  the  framework  of  the  Indochinese  Federation  and 
j  of  the  French  Union."  This  event,  which  was  of  international  significance,  was 
I  hailed  throughout  the  world,  from  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  Chou  En-lai  and  Attlee, 
j|  as  a  sign  of  great  French  wisdom  and  realism.  The  French  concluded  other 
j  agreements  with  the  DRV  government:  a  military  one  (April  3),  a  few  economic 
I  accords,  and  a  general  modus  vivendi  (September  14,  1946).  It  was  decided  that, 
i  despite  transformation  by  the  French  of  the  colony  of  Cochinchina  into  an  au- 
!  tonomous  republic,  the  people  of  Cochinchina  would  freely  decide  their  relation- 
i     ship  with  the  DRV. 

\  The  Ho  Chi  Minh  government  was  therefore  the  only  legal  government  of 
I     Vietnam  and  there  was  no  challenge  of  this  fact  from  the  French  side.  Former 

I(  emperor  Bao  Dai  had  abdicated  (not  under  force)  on  August  25,  1945,  and 
had  become  Ho  Chi  Minh's  "Supreme  Adviser."  Ho  Chi  Minh  had  been  received 
,  and  welcomed  in  Paris  as  Head  of  State  and  Government  (July-August  1946) 
I  and  in  this  capacity  he  had  signed  agreements  with  the  French  government.  There 
was  no  further  problem  for  anybody,  including  the  U.S.  Ambassador,  about  meet- 
ing with  him. 
How  is  it  then,  that  because  a  confusing  conflict  suddenly  flared  up  about 
customs  and  road  traffic  between  the  DRV  and  the  French  High  Commission  in 
Saigon  (and  their  military  in  Tonkin),  the  DRV  government  ceased  overnight  to 
be  "legal"  or,  to  quote  the  Papers,  "the  DRV  government  [sic,  emphasis  ours] 


164      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

took  to  the  hills  to  assume  the  status  of  a  shadow  state"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:47)?  In 
fact,  just  because  of  the  December  19  "attack"?  The  Pentagon  Papers,  however, 
cautiously  add:  "The  issue  of  who  was  the  aggressor  has  never  been  resolved" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:22). 

Actually  this  was  pure  French  right-wing  officials'  arrogance.  Alleging  Viet- 
namese breach  of  faith,  the  Bidault  government  and  High  Commissioner  Admiral 
d'Argenlieu  decided  that  the  Ho  government,  as  such,  no  longer  existed!  One 
may  wonder  if  the  explanation  should  not  be  looked  for  in  the  mind  of  Premier 
Georges  Bidault.  It  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  when  things  began  to  worsen 
in  Morocco,  in  1953,  Mr.  Bidault  suddenly  decided  to  depose  Sultan  Mohammed 
V  and  replace  him  by  Ben  Arafa.  The  same  psychological  process  could  have 
led  him  to  believe  (six  years  earlier)  that  since  "Sultan  Ho  Chi  Minh"  was  bad, 
it  was  necessary  to  get  rid  of  him  and  replace  him  by  a  more  amenable  man,  as 
the  French  generals  and  governors  had  done  with  the  Vietnamese  emperors  be- 
tween 1885  and  1916.  Nineteenth-century  colonial  thinking  was  still  prevalent 
among  right-wing  French  politicians  in  1946/47,  and  it  influenced  their  master- 
plans.  Looking  for  an  alternative  to  the  "opponents"  or  "resisters"  led  to  "Viet- 
namization"  of  the  conflict,  i.e.,  helping  right-wing  puppets  or  allies  of  the  West 
to  "replace"  leftist  nationalists. 

The  trouble  was  precisely  that  although  the  United  States  "regretted"  the 
risks  inherent  in  the  new  conflict,  it  neither  challenged  the  French  legal  position 
nor  interfered  in  the  French  field  of  responsibility.  For  reasons  of  sheer  oppor- 
tunism, the  United  States  failed  to  tell  France  that  it  could  not  ignore  the  legal 
government  of  Vietnam  and  especially  that  it  should  not  look  for  an  alternative, 
through  "Vietnamization"  of  the  war.  Actually,  the  United  States  agreed  with 
this  French  course,  and  abdicated  then  all  principles  of  morality.  This  essential, 
fundamental  aspect  of  the  story  is  totally  lacking  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  and 
therefore  remains  practically  hidden  from  the  American  public. 

Why  did  the  United  States  endorse  (at  least  implicitly)  the  French  position? 

Because  it  gave  priority  to  the  "Battle  for  Europe"!  France  was  an  essential 
piece  in  the  American  game  in  Europe,  and  at  the  time  France  was  causing 
some  anxiety  in  Washington  because  it  was  still  trying  to  remain  unaligned  and 
independent  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Anglo-American  bloc.  Also,  a 
powerful  Communist  party  was  participating  in  the  French  government  at  that 
moment.  Taking  sides  just  then  in  favor  of  Ho  Chi  Minh,  in  this  colonial  crisis, 
would  certainly  have  infuriated  the  French  right  wing  and  made  it  anti-American, 
unwilling  to  come,  under  the  Western  banner,  against  communism.  The  Com- 
munists would  have  exploited  U.S.  interference  for  their  own  benefit. 

Hardening  of  anticommunism  in  the  United  States,  plus  the  priority  given  to 
the  "necessary  containment  of  Soviet  Russia,"  made  it  impossible  to  weaken  the 
French  and  allow  them  to  be  replaced  in  Indochina  by  "Kremlin  agents."  There 
was  no  risk,  however,  in  having  them  replaced,  in  the  long  run,  by  "true  na- 
tionalists." At  that  moment,  these  latter  were  in  China,  protected  by  the  Chinese 
Kuomintang  and  their  friends  in  General  Donovan's  OSS,  with  support  of  the 
California-based  China  Lobby.  The  problem  now  was  to  decide  how  to  manage 
to  get  the  Chinese- American  agents  (the  "true  nationalists")  aboard  the  French 
"boat,"  Bao  Dai,  and  under  this  cover,  achieve  successful  "Vietnamization"  of 
the  conflict. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  do  not  say  a  word  about  the  activities  of  the  "true 
nationalists"  at  that  time,  or  about  the  OSS-CIA  plans.  The  Defense  Department 
probably  had  no  such  files.  The  writers,  consequently,  could  only  offer  poor, 
very  poor,  excuses  for  the  choice  Washington  made  in  1946-1947. 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  165 

Here  are  two  examples:  "No  French  government  is  likely  to  have  survived  a 
genuinely  liberal  policy  toward  Ho  in  1945  or  1946.  Even  French  Communists 
then  favored  redemption  [5/c]  of  control  in  Indochina"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:52).  Fur- 
ther, they  say  that  U.S.  support  for  Ho  Chi  Minh  would  have  involved  per- 
spicacity and  risk,  "a  perspicacity  unique  in  U.S.  history,"  but  Washington  could 
not  take  the  risk  of  having  a  domino  fall.  So  "the  path  of  prudence  rather  than 
the  path  of  risk  seemed  the  wisest  choice." 

This  was,  however,  also  a  risk.  As  the  Papers  say,  "Washington  and  Paris  did 
not  focus  on  the  fact  of  Ho's  strength,  only  on  the  consequences  of  his  rule": 
Ho  was  a  Communist.  .  .  . 

In  fact,  the  record  shows  that  the  United  States  well  knew  what  was  at  stake, 
and  how  extensive  was  the  strength  of  Ho.  In  an  interesting  analysis  ("The  Char- 
acter and  Power  of  the  Vietminh.  A  Summary"),  the  Pentagon  Papers  throw 
light  on  how  highly  appraised  Ho  Chi  Minh  and  the  Vietminh  were.  The  Viet- 
minh is  described  as  "the  principal  vehicle  for  Vietnamese  nationalism  and  anti- 
French  colonialism,"  and  Ho  Chi  Minh  as  "the  only  Vietnamese  wartime  leader 
with  a  national  following"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:49).  Elsewhere  the  report  adds:  "It 
seems  likely  that  in  the  absence  of  the  French,  the  Vietminh,  through  its  gov- 
ernmental creation,  the  DRV,  would  have  overridden  indigenous,  tribal,  religious 
and  other  opposition  in  short  order"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:43). 

Unfortunately  for  Washington,  the  ICP  (Indochinese  Communist  Party)  was 
the  controlling  element  in  the  Vietminh,  and  the  French  exploited  this  fact  in 
order  to  restore  by  force  their  control  over  Vietnam.  Consequently  "Ho  again 
became  the  head  of  Viet  resistance  and  the  Vietminh  became  the  primary  na- 
tionalist protagonist.  Hence  Ho  Chi  Minh,  both  on  his  own  merits  and  out  of 
lack  of  competition,  became  the  personification  of  Vietnamese  nationalism" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:49). 

Moreover,  the  Vietminh  was  not  even  anti-American.  In  the  fall  of  1948,  the 
Office  of  Intelligence  Research  (Department  of  State)  wrote  a  survey  of  Com- 
munist and  American  influence  in  Southeast  Asia  in  which  it  said  that  "evidence 
of  Kremlin-directed  conspiracy  was  found  in  virtually  all  countries  except  Viet- 
nam." It  added  that  "since  December  19,  1946,  there  have  been  continuous  con- 
flicts between  French  forces  and  the  nationalist  government  of  Vietnam  [emphasis 
ours].  This  government  is  a  coalition  in  which  avowed  communists  hold  influen- 
tial positions.  Although  the  French  admit  the  influence  of  this  government,  they 
have  consistently  refused  to  deal  with  its  leader.  Ho  Chi  Minh,  on  the  grounds 
that  he  is  a  Communist.  To  date  the  Vietnam  press  and  radio  have  not  adopted 
an  anti-American  position.  .  .  .  Although  the  Vietnam  radio  has  been  closely 
watched  for  a  new  position  toward  the  U.S.,  no  change  has  appeared  so  far" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:34). 

There  was  clearly  an  "anomaly"  in  the  Soviet  conspiracy,  but  the  State  De- 
partment rejected  as  unlikely  the  possibility  that  the  Vietnamese  Communists 
might  not  be  subservient  to  Moscow's  foreign  policy. 

However,  although  French  chances  of  crushing  Vietnamese  nationalism  were 
limited,  Washington  decided  to  back  French  policy  of  "Vietnamization"  on  the 
basis  of  anticommunism.  This  meant  that  in  a  different  context  of  course,  the 
United  States  approved  a  policy  which  was  not  basically  different  from  those 
followed  by  the  Third  Reich  in  Norway  {with  Quisling),  or  by  Japan  in  occupied 
China  {with  the  Nanking  government  of  Wang  Ching-wei).  It  was  the  policy  of 
imposing  a  regime  and  policy  on  a  country  through  Quisling  or  puppet  govern- 
ments. As  the  Papers  say:  "When  the  U.S.  was  faced  with  an  unambiguous 
choice  between  a  policy  of  anticolonialism  and  a  policy  of  anticommunism,  it 


166      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

chose  the  latter"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:179).  This  was  to  be  confirmed  again  in  the 
spring  of  1950. 

By  completely  omitting  the  crucial  legal  aspect  of  the  conflict,  the  Pentagon 
Papers  tend  to  give  some  legitimacy  to  the  French  action,  because  supporting 
the  French  in  the  name  of  anticommunism  is  the  only  presentable  basis  for  the 
American  involvement  in  Vietnam.  Within  the  framework  of  French  sovereignty,  j 
everything  became  honorable,  but  it  is  precisely  the  upturn  given  their  Indochina 
policy  by  the  French  right-wing  and  Socialist  parties  which  is  at  the  root  of  the 
tragedy.  , 

Taking  for  granted  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  "The  Enemy,"  and  that  the 
struggle  for  "containment"  had  to  be  fought  all  over  the  world,  it  was  legitimate 
to  help  France  resist  Communist  "subversion"  in  its  colonies.  As  long  as  Moscow 
did  not  push  too  much  in  Asia,  it  was  believed  that  France  would  do  the  job  in 
Indochina.  It  could  get  rid  of  the  Communists  there  through  its  own  ways  and 
means.  But  when  Russia  "conquered"  China  with  Maoism  and  made  it  a  "Slav 
Manchukuo"  (Dean  Rusk  dixit),  Red  China  became  the  main  danger,  and  France 
could  no  longer  cope  with  it  alone.  The  United  States  had  to  come  in  and  help. 
Anyway  it  was  the  Joint  Chief  of  Staff's  belief,  early  in  1950,  that  "attainment  of  ] 
United  States  objectives  in  Asia  can  only  be  achieved  by  ultimate  success  in  i 
China."  ^  j 

Basically,  this  was  the  theme  of  the  famous  "China  lobby."  Nobody  tells  us,  || 
in  this  volume,  why  "the  Communists"  won  in  China  and  why  they  came  to  be  j 
hostile  to  the  United  States.  There  is  not  a  word  about  the  American  intervention  | 
in  China  or  of  the  failure  of  "Sinization"'  of  the  conflict  there.  \ 

Fundamental  omissions  thus  make  the  Pentagon  Papers  rather  disappointing  | 
on  the  "French  period."  The  Papers  give  rare  clues  as  to  how  mistakes  or  mis-  | 
calculations  developed  in  the  formation  and  implementation  of  policies  but  offer 
only  very  superficial  insights  into  the  deep,  real  causes  or  origins  of  the  war. 
However,  it  is  clear  to  every  objective  historian  that  the  United  States  cautiously  ! 
but  graciously  supported  France  on  the  wrong  road  on  which  it  was  embarking.  ! 
In  Washington,  France  and  the  United  States  were  indeed  considered  to  be  "in  i 
the  same  boat."  j 

i: 

THE  AMBIGUITY  OF  AMERICAN-FRENCH 
RELATIONS  ON  VIETNAM 

'i 

While  cautiously  endorsing,  as  early  as  February  1947,  French  policy  in  Indo- 
china, the  Truman  Administration  was  nevertheless  skeptical  and  even  believed  ; 
that  the  French  were  unrealistic,  that  they  did  not  have  "the  technique"  to  wage  ' 
an  efficient  anti-Communist  battle,  and  would  eventually  fail. 

In  its  opinion,  France  had  to  win  the  support  of  the  "true  nationalists,"  i.e.,  | 
anti-Communist  Nationalists.^  It  was  prompUy  made  clear  by  Washington  that  i 
France  would  eventually  lose  Indochina  if  it  did  not  offer  the  "true  nationalists"  ij 
enough  (independence,  etc.)  to  induce  the  Vietminh  supporters  to  come  to  their  \ 
side.  The  French,  however,  were  reluctant  to  yield  anything  significant  to  Bao  t 
Dai.  ji 

The  Papers  briefly  report  that  Bao  Dai  was  "convinced  that  the  French  situa-  - 
tion  in  Indochina  was  sufficiently  desperate  that  they  would  have  to  honor  com-  ; 
mitments  they  made  to  him"  and  that  he  also  "seems  to  have  believed  that  he  I 
could  attract  American  support  and  material  aid — a  view  which  may  have  « 
stemmed  in  part  from  a  1947  Life  magazine  article  by  William  C.  Bullitt,  the 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  167 


influential  former  U.S.  ambassador  to  France,  endorsing  Bao  Dai  as  a  solution 
to  France's  dilemma"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:25). 

Actually,  while  remaining  a  private  person  without  a  clear  mandate,^  Bao  Dai 
negotiated  new  agreements  with  the  French.  Paris  had  been  urged  by  the  Amer- 
icans to  reach  "a  non-Communist  solution  in  Indochina  based  on  cooperation  of 
true  nationalists  of  that  country"  (September  1948)  and  warned  against  at- 
tempting to  set  up  a  puppet  government  (January  17,  1949).  On  March  8,  1949, 
France  recognized  Vietnam  as  an  independent  state  within  the  French  Union 
and  agreed  to  a  merger  of  Cochinchina  with  Vietnam.  Bao  Dai  returned  to  Viet- 
nam and  appointed  himself  head  of  the  newly  formed  "State  of  Vietnam." 

On  May  10,  1949,  the  French  raised  the  problem  of  U.S.  aid  and  recognition. 
They  stressed  that  a  decision  was  urgent  because  of  the  Communist  advance  in 
China.  In  their  opinion,  there  was  no  alternative  to  Bao  Dai. 

In  Washington,  however,  there  was  no  enthusiasm  for  and  even  reluctance  to 
support  the  French  and  Bao  Dai  in  Vietnam.  To  the  United  States,  "the  State  of 
Vietnam  [had  become]  a  camouflage  for  continued  French  rule  in  Indochina" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:59).  Nevertheless,  there  were,  in  1949,  significant  behind-the-scene 
negotiations  and  agreements  between  American  and  French  banking  concerns 
on  future  cooperation  in  "overseas  development"  and  this  apparently  encouraged 
the  New  York  and  possibly  San  Francisco  financial  and  economic  groups  to 
support  the  French  position  in  Indochina.  The  "loss"  of  China  accelerated  the 
process:  Southeast  Asia  could  now  be  a  substitute  market. 

At  the  end  of  1949,  after  the  Jessup  fact-finding  mission,  a  new  poHcy  was 
formulated:  increase  the  ability  of  the  free  peoples  to  resist  direct  and  indirect 
aggression  and  to  maintain  internal  security;  prevent  Southeast  Asia  from  being 
overrun  by  communism  and  encourage  European  friends  to  make  use  of  their 
knowledge  and  experience  and  Asian  non-Communist  states  to  join  the  UK  and 
the  U.S.  The  New  York  economic  establishment  would  be  happy  to  support  such 
schemes  because  its  "European  friends"  would  give  it  advantage  over  the  com- 
petitive West  Coast  interests  in  the  area.  The  National  Security  Council,  on 
December  30,  1949,  approved:  it  was  necessary  to  bring  the  "nationalists"  to 
back  Bao  Dai,  to  increase  the  Western  orientation  of  the  area,  to  block  further 
Communist  expansion  in  Asia.  This  was  the  green  light  for  recognition  of  Bao 
Dai. 

But  the  fatal  decision  of  February  1950  turned  out  badly.  Who  should  be  the 
recipient  of  the  aid?  Bao  Dai  or  France?  And  consequently  whose  policies  would 
U.S.  aid  support?  How  could  the  Americans  insist  upon  having  what  they  called 
a  "democratic-nationalist  government"  in  Vietnam?  A  decision  was  difficult.  The 
French  were  intransigent,  opposed  direct  U.S.  aid  for  the  Vietnamese  forces, 
even  though  they  could  not  instill  real  determination  and  elan  into  the  Bao  Dai 
army.  Strong-willed  French  military  commanders,  being  suspicious  of  the  United 
States  were  determined  on  a  military  victory  and  believed  they  could  win,  pro- 
vided they  got  American  weaponry. 

Washington  well  knew  that  the  Bao  Dai  regime  was  neither  popular  nor 
efficient  and  that  the  French  also  were  very  reluctant  to  yield  power  to  Bao  Dai. 
Americans  got  impatient  and,  going  over  the  head  of  the  French,  tried  to  en- 
courage Bao  Dai  to  play  a  more  active  role.  The  Papers  publish  an  extraordinary 
message  from  Dean  Acheson  to  Edmund  Gullion,  U.S.  representative  in  Saigon 
(October  18,  1950),  directing  him  to  tell  Bao  Dai  what  he  should  do:  abandon 
neutralism  and  passivity,  and  fight  the  Communists  (Gravel  ed.,  1:70-71 ). 

The  U.S.  efforts  were  in  vain,  and  critics  (probably  from  the  West  Coast 
circles  and  interests)  began  to  say  that  the  United  States  was  not  using  enough 


168      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  .Papers/Vol.  V 

leverage  to  move  the  French  toward  granting  genuine  Vietnamese  independence. 

The  Defense  Department  Papers  answered  the  critics  by  alleging  that  during 
this  period,  because  of  "the  primacy  accorded  in  U.S.  policy  to  the  containment 
of  communism  in  Southeast  Asia"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:75),  France  had  a  stronger 
bargaining  position  than  the  United  States. 

This,  however,  is  only  part  of  the  truth.  In  fact,  the  U.S.  interests  in  Europe 
(mainly  from  the  East  Coast,  i.e..  New  York)  had  given  France  prominence  and 
this  had  led  to  a  pragmatic  alliance  between  the  New  York  and  French  right- 
wing  bourgeoisie  against  the  Soviet  Union  and  "socialism"  in  general.  This  im- 
plied that  New  York  could  force  the  California-based  Far  Eastern  lobby  to  re- 
spect French  interests  in  Indochina  and  support  Bao  Dai.  To  the  extent  that  the 
United  States  needed  and  pursued  an  anti-Soviet  policy  in  Europe,  and  wanted 
to  discourage  neutralism  in  Paris,  it  had  to  respect  and  even  to  support  French 
Indochinese  policy. 

As  the  Papers  rightly  say: 

Neither  NATO  nor  the  Marshall  Plan  offered  usable  fulcrums  for  influencing 
French  policy  on  Indochina.  Both  were  judged  by  the  U.S.  government  and 
public  to  be  strongly  in  the  American  national  interest  at  a  time  when  the 
Soviet  threat  to  Western  Europe,  either  through  overt  aggression  or  internal 
subversion,  was  clearly  recognizable.  A  communist  take-over  in  France  was 
a  real  possibility.  .  .  .  Thus,  an  American  threat  to  withdraw  military  and 
economic  support  to  metropolitan  France  if  it  did  not  alter  its  policies  in 
Indochina  was  not  plausible.  To  threaten  France  with  sanctions  .  .  .  would 
have  jeopardized  a  U.S.  interest  in  Europe  more  important  than  any  in 
Indochina  (Gravel  ed.,  1:76). 

Actually,  the  real  bargaining  had  to  take  place,  within  the  U.S.  economic 
empire,  between  the  European-oriented  interests  and  the  Asian-oriented  ones. 
The  strength  of  the  former  allowed  France  to  resist  pressures  about  any  policies 
in  Indochina.  There  was  incompatibility,  not  (as  the  Papers  allege)  in  the  two 
stands  of  U.S.  policy,  but  between  the  foreign  policies  of  the  two  main  factions 
of  the  American  Economic  Establishment. 

Therefore,  rather  than  aiding  France  as  a  colonial  power  or  a  fellow  NATO 
ally,  the  rationale  for  the  decision  to  aid  the  French  was  simply  to  keep  Indo- 
china in  the  Western  domain,  to  avert  its  sliding  into  the  Communist  camp.  As 
far  as  the  distribution  of  "shares"  between  the  West  Coast  and  New  York  inter- 
ests was  concerned,  they  would  determine  that  later.  Both  agreed  that,  for  the 
moment,  the  United  States  should  support  independence  for  the  Associated  States 
of  Indochina,  encouraging  the  French  to  grant  them  full  independence  and  to 
train  good  public  servants  for  them. 

Certainly,  it  was  uncomfortable  for  the  United  States  to  find  itself  "in  the 
same  bed  as  the  French"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:76),  and  Washington  was  also  quite 
aware  of  the  high  sensitivity  of  the  French  to  any  interference  in  their  internal 
affairs,  but  it  thought  the  deal  was  worthwhile. 

With  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  war,  holding  the  line  in  Southeast  Asia  be- 
came essential  to  American  security  interests,  and  "the  French  struggle  in  Indo- 
china came  far  more  than  before  to  be  seen  as  an  integral  part  of  the  contain- 
ment of  Communism  in  that  region  of  the  world.  Accordingly,  the  United  States 
intensified  and  enlarged  its  program  of  aid  in  Indochina."  But  "a  consequence 
of  the  Korean  war,  and  particularly  the  Chinese  intervention,  was  that  China 
replaced  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  principal  source  of  the  perceived  communist 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  169 

threat  in  Southeast  Asia  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  1:82).  This  suited  perfectly  well  the 
West  Coast  economic  interests:  the  Chinese  Communists  were  their  main  ene- 
mies. They  now  had  good  leverage  against  New  York,  because  the  Pentagon 
would  now  support  them  more  than  before.  As  the  Papers  clearly  state:  "The 
French  [in  Indochina]  were,  in  a  way,  fighting  a  U.S.  battle"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:79) 
and  it  was  no  longer  useful  to  know  who  was  right  in  Vietnam  and  what  the 
Vietnamese  people  might  think  or  prefer. 

Primarily,  however,  it  was  still  France's  war,  and  French  leverage  had  not 
weakened.  France  could  now  use  the  threat  of  negotiating  a  pulling  out  from 
Vietnam  ["an  important  instrument  of  blackmail,"  the  Papers  say  (Gravel  ed., 
1:79)],  because  the  U.S.  leverage  in  Europe  was  losing  strength.  Washington 
and  New  York  wanted  to  rearm  West  Germany  against  the  Soviet  Union  to 
alleviate  the  U.S.  "burden."  French  opposition  to  German  rearmament  led  to  a 
compromise:  the  EDC  Project  (European  Defense  Community).  The  purpose 
was  to  "envelope"  a  West  German  army  into  an  integrated  six-nation  army  for 
the  defense  of  Western  Europe  (thus  making  possible  a  reduction,  not  the 
elimination,  of  American  ground  forces  in  Europe  and  a  sharing  of  the  "burden"). 
Because  of  the  necessity  to  push  the  EDC  through,  there  was  in  Washington 
further  reluctance  to  antagonize  the  French  in  Indochina.  But  the  French  gave 
EDC  a  far  lower  priority  than  expected.  They  did  not  feel  any  longer  that  there 
was  a  serious  threat  in  Europe;  they  were  wary  of  Germany  and  they  gave  low 
probability  to  a  Soviet  attack.  They  further  stressed  that  there  was  a  conflict  be- 
tween EDC  (West  German  rearmament  and  the  corresponding  French  balancing 
effort  in  Europe)  and  a  massive  French  drive  for  victory  in  Vietnam.  EDC  could 
start  only  after  2l  French  victory  in  Indochina,  they  said. 

The  Papers  stress  Washington's  poor  bargaining  position:  "The  U.S.  became 
virtually  a  prisoner  of  its  own  policy.  Containment  of  communism,  concern  for 
the  French  in  relation  to  the  postwar  Europe  of  NATO,  EDC,  and  the  Soviet 
threat  in  the  West,  combined  with  a  fear  .  .  .  that  a  French  withdrawal  from 
Indochina  would  leave  exposed  the  U.S.  flank  in  Korea,  all  compelled  the  U.S. 
to  continue  aid"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:203). 

It  can  thus  safely  be  said  there  was  great  ambiguity  in  the  relationship  of 
France  and  the  United  States  concerning  Indochina,  but  it  was  not  clear  that 
there  was,  as  the  Papers  write,  "incompatibility  of  American  and  French  ob- 
jectives" (Gravel  ed.,  1:80).  Were  these  objectives  and  interests  really  and  bas- 
ically different?  While  the  United  States  seemed  only  concerned  with  the  contain- 
ment of  communism  and  restricting  the  spread  of  Chinese  influence  in  Southeast 
Asia  (to  protect  potential  or  future  markets)  the  French  were  not  simply  fight- 
ing to  contain  communism,  but  primarily  to  maintain  their  influence  in  Indo- 
china and  to  avoid  a  crumbling  of  the  French  Union.  They  could  not  be  expected 
(as  the  United  States  wished)  to  just  "win  the  war"  and  then  gracefully  with- 
draw. And  if  their  enemy  now  was  the  same  as  the  United  States',  they  stiU 
nourished  a  deep  suspicion  that  the  United  States  desired  above  all  to  supplant 
them  in  Southeast  Asia. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  shed  some  light  on  the  ultimate  American  goals.  The 
United  States,  involved  in  the  Korean  war,  could  not  afford  to  wage  another  war 
in  Indochina  at  the  same  time.  But  it  was  willing  to  help  in  the  formation  of 
national  armies  (this  would  increase  the  influence  of  the  military).  This  would 
require  much  time  and  it  was  necessary  to  have  the  French  remain  there  at  least 
until  these  national  armies  were  ready,  because  no  American  troops  were  available. 
I,  A  National  Security  Council  paper  (NSC  64/1,  dated  November  28,  1950),  writ- 
ten just  after  Chinese  intervention  in  Korea  and  the  French  disaster  in  North 


170      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Tonkin  and  which  was  to  remain  the  basis  of  U.S.  policy  toward  Indochina  for 
the  duration  of  the  French  war,  set  short-  and  long-term  objectives:  deny  Indo- 
china to  communism,  promote  self-government  there,  help  in  the  formation  and 
training  of  national  armies.  This  policy,  it  was  added,  would  be  reconsidered  if 
France  abandoned  the  struggle  (Gravel  ed.,  1: 198-200). 

In  the  meantime,  there  was  an  apparently  serious  fear  of  Chinese  intervention  i 
in  Indochina,  and  although  this  fear  was  later  to  subside,  the  National  Security  ; 
Council  in  1952  listed  "courses  of  action"  to  defend  Indochina  (in  such  a  case)  : 
with  aerial  and  naval  action  against  China  itself  (which  was  to  be  the  point  ; 
of  "ultimate  success").  Thus,  the  anti-Peking  lobby  concentrated  on  the  less 
probable  hypothesis  (presenting  risks  of  major  and  even  world  conflict)  rather 
than  on  the  more  likely  course,  a  deterioration  of  the  French  military  position,  i 
which  would  have  to  be  alleviated,  but  without  giving  the  United  States  the 
leadership  or  relieving  France  of  its  basic  responsibility  for  the  defense  of  the 
Associated  States.  ; 

Assuming  power  in  January  1953,  the  Republican  Eisenhower-Nixon  Admin-  i 
istration  proposed  a  "new,  positive  foreign  policy,"  but  designated  China  as 
"the  principal  enemy,"  linking  from  the  start  Indochina  with  Korea.  j 

The  Vietminh  invasion  of  Laos  and  increasing  war-weariness  in  France  were  i 
a  source  of  worry  for  Washington.  Indochina's  importance  to  U.S.  "security 
interests"  in  the  Far  East  was  now  taken  for  granted  by  all  American  factions,  j 
Its  "loss"  would  not  be  permitted.  Although  Stalin's  death  had  introduced  pos-  • 
sible  flexibility  in  Communist  policies  and  let  the  French  wonder  why  they  I 
couldn't  have  in  Indochina  an  armistice  like  the  one  the  United  States  had  just 
concluded  in  Korea,  Dulles  urged  the  French  to  drive  toward  military  victory  ! 
rather  than  to  look  to  a  ceasefire  with  the  DRV.  He  barred  negotiations  until  ; 
France  had  "markedly  improved  its  bargaining  position  through  action  on  the 
battlefield"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:55). 

Of  course  Dulles,  at  that  moment,  was  not  ready  again  to  involve  American 
land  forces  in  another  war  on  the  continent  of  Asia.  He  thought  victory  could 
be  achieved  through  increased  military  assistance  to  France,  the  Associated  States  ; 
and  Thailand.  Strongly  supported  by  U.S.  General  O'Daniel,  the  French  "Navarre  ' 
Plan"  was  found  attractive,  and  an  expectation  of  French  military  victory,  or  at 
least  of  a  good  French  show  of  strength,  swept  Washington  in  the  fall  of  1953. 

There  was,  however,  considerable  risk  that  China,  now  relieved  from  the  war 
in  Korea,  would  intervene  in  Indochina  on  Ho  Chi  Minh's  side.  The  French 
wanted  to  get  American  guarantees  against  it.  Basically  they  were  now  eager  to 
find  an  honorable  end  to  the  war  and  hinted  that  they  would  welcome  negotia- 
tions once  the  military  situation  permitted  it.  Dulles  agreed  to  issue  warnings  to 
Peking,  in  order  to  deter  further  Chinese  involvement.  He  threatened  China  with 
massive  retaliation  if  it  shifted  its  offensive  to  Indochina,  but  "the  U.S.  sought 
to  convince  the  French  that  military  victory  was  the  only  guarantee  of  diplomatic 
success"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:96),  and  foreclosed  negotiating  in  Indochina  until  after 
a  Chinese  decision  to  eliminate  or  cut  down  aid  to  the  Vietminh.  Dulles  report-  ; 
edly  told  Bidault  that  "negotiations  with  no  other  alternative  usually  end  in 
capitulation"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:96) .  ' 

Quite  suddenly,  there  was  great  concern  about  French  political  determination,  i 
The  Papers  do  not  even  hint  that  Washington  officials  had  any  perception  of 
the  causes  of  French  hesitation.  With  the  emergence  in  Saigon  (in  the  fall  of 
1953)  of  an  anti-French  right  wing  (under  Ngo  Dinh  Nhu),  and  the  related 
change  in  Bao  Dai's  attitude,  the  public  urge  for  peace  gained  momentum,  and 
the  French  Assembly's  debate  expressed  it.  Although  the  French  government  dis- 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  171 

missed  as  "pure  propaganda"  Ho  Chi  Minh's  interview  (November  29,  1953)  and 
reassured  the  United  States,  the  peace-feelers  had  a  great  effect  on  opinion. 

The  antiwar  feehng  and  movement  led  by  the  influential  weekly  L'Express  de- 
veloped so  fast  that  in  January  1954  Laniel  could  no  longer  ignore  it.  When 
the  Big  Four  Conference  opened  in  Berlin,  French  Foreign  Minister  Georges 
Bidault  had  to  put  forward  the  idea  of  an  international  conference  on  Indo- 
china. He  could  pressure  Dulles  by  threatening  to  scuttle  the  project  for  the 
European  Defense  Community  (EDC),  which  then  was  a  top  U.S.  priority.  On 
January  18,  1954,  the  Big  Four  decided  that  a  conference  on  Indochina  would 
start  in  Geneva  on  April  26,  with  the  participation  of  People's  China.  In  Washing- 
ton, there  was  the  beginning  of  near  panic. 

TAKING  OVER  THE  WAR  FROM  FRANCE 

Indochina  was  seen  as  an  essential  area  mostly  by  the  West  Coast  interests 
and  the  Defense  industries  tied  to  them,  for  whom  the  containment  of  China 
had  high  priority.  They  also  feared  that  the  loss  of  Southeast  Asia  would  force 
Japan  into  an  accommodation  with  the  Communist  bloc.  These  circles  simply 
could  not  accept  the  prospect  of  a  settlement  which  would  either  leave  France 
in  control  (alone  or  in  alliance  with  New  York  interests)  or  (worse)  give  the 
Communists  a  part  of  the  area.  The  widening  audience  of  the  "Peace  faction"  in 
Paris  was  a  source  of  considerable  anxiety  and  perplexity. 

As  early  as  February  1952,  the  National  Security  Council  had  suggested  that 
the  United  States  might  be  forced  to  take  military  action  in  Indochina.  With  the 
deterioration  of  the  French  military  situation  there  in  December  1953,  serious 
attention  was  given  for  the  first  time  to  the  manner  and  size  of  a  possible  U.S. 
intervention,  which  could  at  least  deter  (or  prevent)  the  French  from  resorting  to 
negotiations. 

The  Defense  Department,  however,  was  not  of  a  single  mind  on  this  question. 
It  is  worth  recording  that  Vice-Admiral  A.  C.  Davis,  Director  of  the  Office  of 
Foreign  Military  Affairs  (Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense)  then  stressed  that 
"involvement  of  U.S.  forces  in  the  Indochina  war  should  be  avoided  at  all 
practical  costs,"  because  it  is  impossible  to  engage  "Naval  and  Air  units  only." 
"There  is  no  cheap  way  to  fight  a  war,  once  committed,"  he  said  (Gravel  ed., 
1:89). 

Evident  disparity  between  how  East  and  West  Coast  interests  appreciated 
strategic  evaluation  of  Indochina,  and  incapacity  to  reach  a  decision  on  the 
forces  required  to  defend  the  area,  led  to  an  important  NSC  meeting  on  Jan- 
uary 8,  1954.  It  appeared  that  the  State  Department  favored  intervention,  prob- 
ably as  insurance  against  French  "dissidence"  (the  Berlin  conference  was  to 
open  next  week).  The  Defense  Department  opposed  it,  arguing  that  France  could 
win  only  with  U.S.  aid  and  indigenous  support.  In  order  to  agree,  both  sides  de- 
cided to  set  up  a  special  working  group,  under  General  Erskine. 

An  important  NSC  paper  (5405,  January  16,  1954)  discussed  the  possibility 
of  negotiations  (Dulles  was  then  talking  about  that  at  Berlin),  and  the  author 
of  the  Papers'  summary  analyzed  it  as  follows : 

The  NSC  decided  the  U.S.  should  employ  every  feasible  means  to  influence 
the  French  Government  against  concluding  the  struggle  on  terms  "incon- 
sistent" with  the  basic  U.S.  objectives.  The  French  should  be  told  that:  (1) 
in  the  absence  of  a  marked  improvement  in  the  military  situation,  there  was 


172      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

no  basis  for  negotiations  on  acceptable  terms;  (2)  that  the  U.S.  would 
"flatly  oppose  any  idea"  of  a  cease-fire  as  a  preliminary  to  negotiations, 
because  such  a  cease-fire  would  result  in  a  irretrievable  deterioration  of  the 
Franco-Vietnamese  military  position  in  Indochina;  (3)  a  nominally  non- 
comnninist  coalition  regime  would  eventually  turn  the  country  over  to  Ho 
Chi  Minh  with  no  opportunity  for  the  replacement  of  the  French  by  the  j 
United  States  or  the  United  Kingdom  [Emphasis  added]. ^  ...  If  the 
French  actually  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  communists,  insist  that  the 
United  States  be  consulted  and  seek  to  influence  the  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions.'^ ■ 

General  Erskine's  two  reports,  which  were  discussed  on  February  6  and  March 
17,  were  extremely  negative  and  tough  about  the  possible  solutions  of  the  con- 
flict, successively  rejecting  (a)  imposition  of  a  ceasefire;  (b)  establishment  of  j 
a  coalition  government;  (c)  self-determination  through  free  elections  ("such  a  \ 
course  would  in  any  case  lead  to  the  loss  of  the  Associated  States  to  Communist  I 
control").  A  partition  of  the  country  would  be  bad  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  was  now  difficult.  In  brief,  Erskine's  report  concluded  that  from  the  I 
point  of  view  of  the  U.S.  strategic  position  in  Asia,  no  solution  to  the  Indochina  | 
problem  short  of  victory  was  acceptable.  It  recommended  that  prior  to  the  start  \ 
of  the  Geneva  conference  the  United  States  should  inform  Britain  and  France  | 
that  it  was  only  interested  in  victory  in  Indochina  and  would  not  associate  itself  i 
with  any  settlement  which  fell  short  of  that  objective.  Acknowledging  that  "the  ; 
French  desire  for  peace  in  Indochina  almost  at  any  cost  represents  our  greatest  j 
vulnerability  in  the  Geneva  talks"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:452),  it  further  recommended  j 
that  in  the  event  of  an  unsatisfactory  outcome  at  Geneva,  the  United  States 
should  pursue  ways  of  continuing  the  struggle  in  concert  with  the  Associated 
States,  the  UK  and  other  allies.  The  NSC  had  therefore  to  determine  the  extent 
of  American  willingness  to  commit  forces  to  the  region  with  or  without  French  j 
cooperation.  With  the  siege  of  Dien  Bien  Phu  just  beginning,  and  the  Geneva  i 
Conference  six  weeks  away,  Erskine  nonetheless  suggested  that  the  United  States 
observe  (and  influence)  developments  at  the  conference  before  deciding  on  ac- 
tive involvement  (Gravel  ed.,  1:91 ). 

However,  the  problem  now  was  to  know  whether  the  United  States  could  even- 
tually accept  the  "loss"  of  "French"  Indochina  (while  doing  everything  to  prevent 
further  deterioration),  or  undertake  new  direct  action  to  save  Indochina  before 
some  unacceptable  settlement  should  emerge  at  Geneva.  * 

The  military  chiefs  were  against  direct  U.S.  intervention,  but  would  agree  to 
help  the  French  to  hold  and  even  to  "rectify"  French  deficiencies.  In  this  respect, 
the  Pentagon  Papers  say  that  no  record  of  Operation  Vulture  (U.S.  bombing  i 
against  Communist  forces  besieging  Dien  Bien  Phu)  has  been  found  in  the  files  . 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:97).  It  seems,  nevertheless,  that  Admiral  Radford  (Chairman  of 
the  JCS)  and  Vice-President  Nixon,  then  a  clever  spokesman  for  West  Coast  i 
interests,  favored  strong,  swift  and  decisive  action  on  the  side  of  the  French.  \ 

President  Eisenhower  was  opposed  to  any  direct  intervention,  and  probably  . 
Dulles,  too.  The  Pentagon  Papers,  however,  do  not  throw  light  on  their  motiva-  \ 
tions,  which  are  left  to  the  reader's  guess.  They  record  almost  incidentally  i 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:134)  that  "the  partition  alternative,  specifically  at  the  16th  parallel, 
[was]  intimated  to  American  officials  as  early  as  March  4  by  a  member  of  the  i 
Soviet  Embassy  in  London,  apparently  out  of  awareness  of  Franco-American 
objections  to  a  coalition  arrangement  for  Vietnam."  This  certainly  had  given 
Dulles  a  clue  that  the  other  side  might  accept  a  territorial  compromise.  Was  this 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  173 

not  an  opportunity  for  the  United  States  to  take  over  the  poHtical  leadership  of 
the  truncated  Vietnam  State?  Dulles  was  then  to  develop  a  subtle  maneuver  that 
the  Papers,  without  mentioning  it,  document  well. 

Actually  Dulles  was  to  hide  the  maneuver  behind  various  smokescreens,  and 
first  of  all  strong  militant  words  basically  aimed  at  giving  the  US  an  ultimately 
controlling  position  in  the  negotiation,  while  preventing,  in  the  interval,  negotia- 
tions by  others  and  primarily  by  France. 

Dulles'  maneuver  developed  fast.  In  a  memorable  speech  on  March  29,  he 
stressed  the  alarming  situation  in  Indochina,  alleged  and  dramatized  the  Chinese 
threat,  delivered  a  strong  warning  to  Peking,  and  called  for  the  "united  action" 
of  the  West.  This  was  to  reassure  and  please  right-wing  (Southern  and  Western) 
opinion  inside  the  United  States.  It  also:  (a)  gave  apparent  support  to  the  French, 
who  would  be  tempted  at  least  to  delay  negotiation  and  wait  for  improvement  of 
their  military  situation;  and  (b)  extended  East  Coast  leverage  (through  a  NATO- 
like  structure),  probably  bring  genuine  "nationalists"  into  power  in  Saigon,  and 
offer  a  scapegoat  (the  British)  if  something  failed.  Anyway,  at  least  for  a  while, 
"united  action"  would  be  used  as  an  alternative  both  to  negotiation  and  to  U.S. 
unilateral  intervention. 

On  April  3,  President  Eisenhower  and  John  Foster  Dulles  got  the  approval  of 
congressional  leaders  on  the  course  they  had  chosen.  The  United  States  would 
not  undertake  unilateral  intervention.  Its  participation  in  the  war  would  be  con- 
tingent upon  the  formation  of  a  coalition  (with  the  UK  and  Asian  powers),  a 
French  declaration  giving  full  independence  to  the  Associated  States,  and  con- 
gressional approval  (which  was  dependent  upon  the  first  two  conditions).  The 
French  would  continue  the  war,  with  allied  support,  until  victory,  except  if  negoti- 
ations were  just  a  face-saving  device  to  cover  a  Communist  withdrawal. 

As  everyone  knows,  the  British  government's  answer  was  negative.  They  would 
do  nothing  before  the  Geneva  Conference,  they  said,  but  would  decide  later, 
according  to  the  results.  Meanwhile  they  would  give  full  diplomatic  support  to 
the  French,  and  in  their  view,  the  best  outcome  would  be  a  negotiated  partition 
(In  March  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  London  had  also  approached  the  British). 

France  remained  the  key.  Was  she  ready,  with  allied  support,  to  pursue  the  war 
until  victory?  Washington  intensified  U.S.  pressure  on  the  French  to  deter  them 
from  negotiation.  On  April  17,  Nixon  went  so  far  as  to  advocate  sending  the 
boys  to  Indochina  (Gravel  ed.,  1: 104).  At  the  end  of  April,  a  dramatic  show  (of 
strength)  to  force  the  British  to  accept  a  commitment  ended  in  complete  failure. 
The  United  States  was  forced  to  accept  the  fact  that  at  least  the  negotiations 
would  start  at  Geneva. 

However,  Washington  was  sure  that  Communist  terms  would  be  "unaccept- 
able" and  defined  its  position  in  "maximalist"  terms,  equivalent  to  victory,  to  be 
imposed  upon  the  others.  A  National  Security  Council  meeting,  on  May  8,  set 
forth  the  guidelines  of  U.S.  policy  on  negotiations  for  the  U.S.  delegation  at 
Geneva.'*  The  United  States  would  stand  for  nothing  less  than  territorial  integrity, 
political  independence,  security  against  aggression  and  subversion,  stability  of 
government,  economic  expansion,  etc.,  but  would  not  associate  with  a  settlement, 
nor  guarantee  it,  retaining  the  possibility  of  retaking  the  initiative.  Moreover,  in 
this  meeting 

the  NSC  .  .  .  decided  that  the  French  had  to  be  pressured  into  adopting  a 
strong  posture  in  the  face  of  probable  Communist  intransigence.  The  Presi- 
dent was  urged  to  inform  Paris  that  French  acquiescence  in  a  Communist 
takeover  of  Indochina  would  bear  not  only  on  France's  future  position  in 


174      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

the  Far  East,  but  also  on  its  status  as  one  of  the  Big  Three;  that  abandon- 
ment of  Indochina  would  grievously  affect  both  France  s  position  in  North 
Africa  and  Franco-U.S.  relations  in  that  region  [emphasis  ours];  that  U.S. 
aid  to  France  would  automatically  cease  upon  Paris'  conclusion  of  a  un- 
satisfactory settlement;  and,  finally,  that  Communist  domination  of  Indo- 
china would  be  of  such  serious  strategic  harm  to  U.S.  interests  as  to  produce 
•'consequences  in  Europe.  .  .  ."  In  addition,  the  NSC  recommended  that  the 
United  States  determine  immediately  whether  the  Associated  States  should  be 
approached  with  a  view  to  continuing  the  anti-Viet  Minh  struggle  in  some 
other  form,  including  unilateral  American  involvement  "if  necessary."  The 
NSC  clearly  viewed  the  Indochina  situation  with  extreme  anxiety,  and  its 
action  program  amounted  to  unprecedented  proposals  to  threaten  France 
with  the  serious  repercussions  of  a  sell-out  in  Southeast  Asia.^ 

But  the  American  leverage  was  not  good.  The  Administration  had  carefully 
made  direct  involvement  conditional  on  a  range  of  French  concessions  and  prom- 
ises, especially  concerning  Vietnamese  independence  and  separate  peace.  They 
said  it  was  just  to  provide  an  alternative,  once  the  French  had  conceded  that 
negotiation  was  a  wasteful  exercise.  Dulles  still  thought  the  French  would  like  to 
win  the  war  (rather  than  negotiate),  and  hoped  that  through  "united  action"  and 
U.S.  "aid,"  Washington  would  quietly  take  over  leadership  of  the  struggle,  eventu- 
ally imposing  "true  nationalists"  (in  fact,  obvious  CIA  agents  or  puppets)  in  the 
Saigon  government. 

The  French,  however,  had  different  thoughts.  Premier  Laniel  reaffirmed  in 
Paris  that  his  government  would  not  directly  or  indirectly  turn  Indochina  over  to 
the  Communists.  But  the  French  desired  only  local  assistance,  not  an  "interna- 
tionalization of  the  war"  (in  which  they  would  lose  control).  At  bottom,  they  did 
not  wish  American  intervention.  For  them  it  was  just  an  option,  to  be  kept  open 
until  every  effort  to  reach  serious  agreement  at  Geneva  had  been  exhausted. 
Moreover  the  American  conditions  were  unacceptable  to  them:  they  could  not 
accept  having  the  Associated  States  secede  from  France  (to  become  Washington's 
satellites),  while  France  would  still  continue  to  fight  for  their  defense,  as  the 
Pentagon's  infantry. 

Just  here  a  great  turningpoint  was  reached,  and  strangely  enough  the  Papers  do 
not  throw  light  on,  and  even  seem  to  avoid  mentioning  two  often-unnoticed  but 
capital  events  which  suddenly  changed  the  whole  American  approach. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  "Saigon  Military  Mission"  (SMM) — a  cover  for  the 
CIA — with  its  chief.  Colonel  Ed  Lansdale,  USAF,  arrived  in  Saigon  on  June  1 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:574),  and  met  General  Donovan  (a  CIA  boss)  there  on  June  3. 
Awkwardly  the  Papers  do  not  publish  the  decisions  reached  at  the  200th  NSC 
meeting  on  June  3.  On  the  other  hand,  French  sources  had  revealed  that  at  this 
very  moment,  Bao  Dai,  under  U.S.  pressure,  called  on  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  to  become 
Vietnam's  Prime  Minister.  Dulles  had  got  his  trump  cards  and  aces.  The  United 
States  could  quietly  drop  "united  action." 

Actually,  Washington  security  planners  then  began  to  focus  on  the  future  pos- 
sibilities of  collective  defense  in  Southeast  Asia,  a  system  to  be  set  up  after  a 
Geneva  settlement.  The  consequence  was  a  sudden  determination  to  help  to  bring 
about  the  best  possible  settlement  terms. 

After  the  fall  of  the  Laniel-Bidault  government  in  Paris,  Dulles  decided  on 
June  15  that  "united  action  was  no  longer  tenable."  The  new  French  Cabinet, 
with  Pierre  Mendes  France  as  Premier,  had  a  quite  different  approach  and  Wash- 
ington feared  that  the  French  would  yield  in  Geneva  or  even  accept  some  "sell- 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  175 

out."  "Paris,  it  was  felt,  could  no  longer  be  counted  on  as  an  active  participant 
in  regional  security"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:131). 

With  the  softening  of  Chinese  attitudes,  the  possibility  of  a  compromise  no 
longer  looked  grim,^*^  and  at  this  point  "the  United  States  began  to  move  in  the 
direction  of  becoming  an  influential  actor  at  the  negotiations.  .  .  .  Washington 
believed  that  inasmuch  as  a  settlement  was  certain  to  come  about,  and  even 
though  there  was  near-equal  certainty  it  could  not  support  the  final  terms,  basic 
American  and  Western  interests  in  Southeast  Asia  might  still  be  preserved  if 
France  could  be  persuaded  to  toughen  its  stand"  (Gravel  ed.,  1: 141). 

The  British  then  still  believed  in  the  possibility  of  a  "neutral  belt"  giving  the 
Communists  the  security  they  needed;  they  still  believed  in  the  possibility  of 
dividing  Vietnam  in  this  framework,  and  accepted  the  view  that  once  a  settlement 
had  been  achieved,  a  system  for  guaranteeing  the  security  of  the  "neutral  states" 
thus  formed  would  be  required. 

A  partition  settlement  would  certainly  offer  many  dangerous  aspects,  but  the 
question  then  was  turning  out  to  be  "how  much  territory  the  Communists  could 
be  granted  without  compromising  non-Communist  Indochina's  security,  what 
measures  were  needed  to  guarantee  that  security,  and  what  other  military  and 
political  principles  were  vital  to  any  settlement  which  the  French  would  also  be 
willing  to  adopt  in  the  negotiations"  (Gravel  ed.,  1: 142). 

It  has  to  be  understood  (and  this  aspect  is  totally  absent  from  the  Pentagon 
Papers)  that  once  Diem  had  come  to  power  in  Saigon  (June  17),  the  United 
States  could  accept  partition.  The  United  States  needed  British  support  and  par- 
ticipation in  the  Collective  Defense  arrangement.  "American  acceptance  of  parti- 
tion as  a  workable  arrangement  put  Washington  and  London  on  even  terms" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:143).  Eisenhower  and  Churchill  could  agree,  on  June  29,  on  the 
"Seven  Points":  the  United  States  "would  not  oppose  a  settlement  which  con- 
formed to  the  Seven  Points"  and  would  even  "respect"  it.  On  July  13,  Mendes 
France,  in  order  to  bring  the  Americans  to  support  him  at  Geneva  in  the  final 
bargaining,  "formally  subscribed  to  the  Seven  Points  and  .  .  .  agreed  to  Ameri- 
can plans  for  dealing  with  the  aftermath  of  the  Conference"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:152). 

The  Chinese,  however,  made  plain  that  a  settlement  was  contingent  upon  West- 
ern acceptance  of  their  neutralization  plans:  foreign  military  bases  had  to  be 
barred  from  Indochina,  and  the  Associated  States  denied  admission  to  any  mili- 
tary bloc.  Mendes  France  accepted  that  too. 

France,  on  July  20,  concluded  agreements  with  the  DRV  on  the  basis  of  "inde- 
pendence, sovereignty,  unity  and  territorial  integrity  of  Vietnam"  and  the  designa- 
tion of  a  "provisional  military  demarcation  line"  between  the  French  Union's 
forces  and  the  Vietnamese  People's  Army  (a  de  facto  partition)  tied  to  a  date  for 
all-Vietnam  elections.  The  United  States  only  took  note,  but  pledged  it  would 
"refrain  from  the  threat  or  the  use  of  force  to  disturb  the  accords." 

Washington  had  to  concede  that  the  Geneva  Accords  represented  a  reasonable 
outcome,  given  the  military  conditions  prevailing  in  Indochina.  Bedell-Smith  said 
he  was  "convinced  that  the  results  are  the  best  that  we  could  possibly  have  ob- 
tained in  the  circumstances"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:176). 

However,  "the  view  that  Geneva  had  come  out  better  than  could  have  been 
expected  was  the  one  offered  publicly"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:176).  Although  the  major 
provisions  of  the  settlement  conformed  surprisingly  well  with  the  Seven  Points, 
the  fact  that  another  territory  had  been  formally  ceded  to  the  Communists,  that 
American  military  assistance  to  Indochina  (at  a  cost  of  $2.6  billion)  had  neither 
assured  the  French  a  military  or  diplomatic  success  nor  prevented  the  "loss"  of 
North  Vietnam  weighed  heavily  on  the  Administration.  In  its  meetings  of  August 


176      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

8-12,  1954,  the  National  Security  Council  evaluated  the  Geneva  Accords  as  "a 
major  defeat  for  United  States  diplomacy  and  a  potential  disaster  for  United 
States  security  interests  ...  a  major  forward  stride  of  communism  which  may 
lead  to  the  loss  of  Southeast  Asia."  A  new  objective  was  set:  at  all  costs  "to  pre- 
vent a  Communist  victory  through  all-Vietnam  elections"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:177). 

Having  failed  in  their  attempt  to  dominate  (with  the  French)  the  whole  of 
Vietnam  through  a  "national"  government  of  the  Quisling  or  Wang  Ching-wei 
type,  the  United  States  was  then  retreating  on  a  "separatist"  (secessionist)  solu- 
tion, the  model  of  which  could  be  found  in  a  Japanese-type  Manchukuo,  or  in 
the  German-type  Slovakia,  with  a  puppet  government  manipulated  by  "advisers." 

Washington  was  eager  to  strengthen  "free"  Vietnam,  needed  French  coopera- 
tion and  support  to  implement  its  "aid"  programs,  but  demanded  that  France 
treat  South  Vietnam  as  an  independent  sovereign  nation,  in  the  hope  of  winning 
nationalist  support  away  from  the  Vietminh.  Economic  and  financial  aid  would 
be  given  directly  to  Diem,  as  a  way  to  accelerate  the  "dissociation  of  France  from 
economic  levers  of  command"  and  boost  Vietnamese  independence.  French  dom- 
ination in  this  area,  the  Papers  admit,  "also  inhibited  American  economic  inter- 
ests" (Gravel  ed.,  1:214;  emphasis  ours).  Militarily,  the  United  States  would 
build  up  "indigenous  military  forces  necessary  for  internal  security  .  .  .  working 
through  the  French  only  insofar  as  necessary."  In  other  words,  the  United  States 
asked  the  French  to  stay  in  Vietnam  militarily,  but  to  get  out  of  Vietnamese 
economic  and  political  life.  As  the  Papers  say,  "this  was  probably  asking  too 
much."  11 

Decisions  reached  in  Washington  in  August  1954  probably  reflected  the  out- 
come of  the  behind-the-scenes  inner  struggle  which,  within  what  could  be  called 
the  "Central  Committee  of  the  American  Mammonist  (or  Capitalist)  Party," 
opposed  the  Eastern  Economic  Establishment  and  the  Western  Military-Industrial 
Complex.  The  Dulles-Robertson- Young  team  offered  two  courses:  (a)  to 
strengthen  the  Diem  government  by  political  and  economic  means  (this  suited  the 
East  Coast  interests;  and  (b)  to  bolster  this  government  by  strengthening  the 
army  that  supports  it  (good  news  for  the  West  Coast,  the  Pentagon  and  the 
Military-Industrial  Complex). 

Political  considerations  were  to  bring  U.S.  policy  to  shift  to  a  decision  to  re- 
place France  in  Vietnam  as  rapidly  as  possible.  With  the  arrival  of  the  Sainteny 
Mission  in  Hanoi  in  early  October  1954,  the  fear  swept  official  Washington  that 
France  and  the  DRV  might  make  a  deal  and  agree  to  keep  the  United  States  on 
the  outside.  This  was  now  too  great  a  risk  to  be  accepted. 

Resolutions  of  differences  within  the  Eisenhower  Administration  on  military 
issues  (the  training  of  the  Vietnamese  army)  opened  the  way  for  U.S.  assumption 
of  responsibilities  in  Vietnam.  To  back  Diem  and  oust  the  French  became  the 
basic  motivations  as  early  as  October  1954.  Washington  first  cut  down  by  two- 
thirds  funds  for  supporting  the  French  military  presence  in  Indochina.  In  Novem- 
ber, the  outbreak  of  the  Algerian  uprising  gave  timely  help  to  the  American  plans 
in  Vietnam.  There  was  thereafter  "strong  sentiment  in  France  for  sending  the 
French  Expeditionary  Corps  to  North  Africa"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:224). 

Tensions  arose  between  the  United  States  and  France  about  Diem  and  the 
Saigon  army.  "To  support  or  not  to  support  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  was  the  issue  over 
which  France  and  America  split"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:225).  Washington  stood  firm. 
"No  other  suitable  leader  can  be  seen,"  Dulles  said,  and  the  Papers  add:  Diem 
"for  all  his  failings  and  weaknesses  was  the  only  available  leader  for  South  Viet- 
nam." He  actually  was  the  only  important  American  stooge  in  Vietnam  and  had 


"Supporting"  the  French  in  Indonesia?  Ill 

strong  U.S.  economic  interests  and  hopes  behind  him.  Moreover  he  had  already 
refused  to  be  bound  by  the  Geneva  Accords  in  any  way. 

Both  countries,  France  and  the  United  States,  remained  deadlocked  until  Febru- 
ary 11,  1955,  when  the  terms  (not  the  form)  of  the  original  Ely-Collins  agree- 
ment were  finally  agreed  upon  during  the  "power  vacuum"  which,  in  Paris,  fol- 
lowed Mendes  France's  resignation.  Colonel  Lansdale  (CIA)  got  the  direction  of 
the  key  office  in  the  military  training  mission  in  Saigon:  "Operations."  He  first 
set  out  to  help  Diem  liquidate  the  French-oriented  sects,  bringing  in  Northern 
Catholics  instead.  In  May  1955,  rather  than  break  with  the  United  States,  French 
Premier  Edgar  Faure  preferred  to  withdraw  from  Vietnam. 

Although  remnants  of  the  French  forces  remained  until  April  1956,  "France 
was  out  of  Vietnam  to  all  intents  and  purposes  by  May  1955,  ten  months  after 
Geneva."  Diem  had  then  established  his  rule  with  almost  unwavering  American 
support,  and  "the  anti-Communist  moralism  of  Dulles  and  Diem  rejected  any 
rapprochement  with  the  North,  ultimately  assuring  that  the  temporary  military 
demarcation  line  would  become  a  permanent  division  of  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:211). 

With  American  advisers,  the  war  then  resumed  against  the  people  of  South 
Vietnam,  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  clauses  of  the  Geneva  agreements.  Diem  had 
to  terrorize  the  people  in  order  not  to  lose  the  elections,  if  any  had  to  be  held. 
Intense  and  quite  permanent  mopping-up  operations  and  repression  were  to  lead, 
in  1956,  to  the  Southern  Insurrection.  The  course  of  the  American  War  was  set. 

Once  decoded,  and  though  the  evidence  they  contain  is  quite  scattered  and 
rather  difficult  to  gather  and  grasp  by  anyone  not  aware  of  what  was  at  stake, 
the  Pentagon  Papers  (Gravel  edition)  are  helpful  for  clarification  of  the  long 
process  by  which  the  United  States  became  involved  in  the  Vietnam  war.  As  they 
show  well,  this  involvement  was  not  at  all  accidental,  but  the  logical  result  of  a 
determined  and  deliberate  approach  to  Asia,  with  a  precise  view  of  what  was 
meant  by  "the  security  of  U.S.  interests."  Notwithstanding  many  gaps,  the  "thread 
of  the  story"  is  quite  perceptible  and  the  book  reveals  a  lot  about  decisionmaking 
processes  and  approaches. 

For  the  French,  this  first  volume  certainly  makes  sad  reading;  but  it  is  also 
illuminating,  especially  on  the  nature  of  Franco-American  relations  during  the 
Cold  War  era.  It  shows  how  U.S.  policy  was  basically  calculated  to  ensure  the 
success  of  right-wing  forces  in  France  and  enlist  France  in  the  anti-Soviet  alliance 
in  Europe.  Indochina  then  was  low  on  the  priority  list.  At  all  times,  since  1947, 
French  and  American  policies  in  Europe  as  in  Indochina  were  closely  related. 
This  alliance  between  Paris  and  Washington  was  decidedly  a  "right-wing  Front," 
a  "conservative  solidarity,"  and  in  this  respect  the  Papers  give  evidence  of  a  real 
conspiracy,  born  in  1946/47,  to  crush  the  liberation  movement  in  Indochina, 
destroy  the  newly  emerged  "free"  and  proud  Republic  of  Vietnam,  and  reimpose 
upon  its  people  a  puppet  government.  This  kind  of  conspiracy  at  Nuremberg  was 
called  "crime  against  peace." 

It  is  not  easy,  even  now,  to  determine  which  ideologies  or  interests  kept  France 
*i  involved  so  long  in  a  war  in  Indochina,  nor  is  the  tie-up  between  French  and 
i  American  private  or  public  interests  which  led  Washington  to  subscribe  to  the 
French  goals  and  pay  for  70  percent  (in  1953)  of  France's  war  costs  better 
understood.  But  what  the  Papers  document  well  is  the  way  the  U.S.  Repubhcan 
[  Administration  made  this  war  its  own  war.  Actually,  when  the  French  govern- 
I  ment  late  in  1953  changed  its  mind  and  decided  to  put  an  end,  through  negotia- 


178      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 


tion,  to  what  had  been  a  folly,  Washington  decided  to  enter  the  scene  and,  later, 
to  get  rid  of  the  French,  to  take  over  the  immoral  undertaking  and  to  go  alone 
with  what  was  to  become  pure  aggression. 

Considering  the  sufferings  imposed  by  the  war  upon  the  Vietnamese  people, 
and  the  utter  devastation  of  this  old,  serene  and  beautiful  country,  no  French 
reader  of  this  book  will  shut  it  without  a  deep  and  sad  feeling:  indeed,  the 
colonial  war  was  wrong,  from  the  start,  even  if  it  developed  later,  through  skillful 
maneuver,  into  an  anti-Communist  or  Christian  crusade;  but  probably  worse  has 
been,  at  the  very  moment  when  peace  was  near,  the  surrender  of  French  re- 
sponsibilities to  those  people  who,  in  Vietnam  as  well  as  in  America,  rejected 
peace  and  thought  only  of  revenge  and  victory. 


Notes 

1.  In  the  letter  of  transmittal  to  Secretary  of  Defense  Clark  M.  Clifford,  Leslie  Gelb 
wrote:  "Because  many  of  the  documents  in  this  period  were  lost  or  not  kept  (except  for  , 
the  Geneva  conference  era)  we  had  to  rely  more  on  outside  resources"  (Gravel  ed.,  | 
I:xvi).  : 

2.  Mentioned  in  P.  Devillers  and  J.  Lacouture,  End  of  a  War:  Indochina  1954,  New  j 
York,  Praeger,  1969,  p.  12. 

3.  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff's  memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  April  10,  1950  | 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:366).  5 

4.  The  rationale  is  "If  you  are  'true  nationalists,'  you  can't  be  inclined  toward  com-  1 
munism,  and  if  you  are  a  leftist,  you  can't  be  a  'true  nationalist.'  "  | 

5.  The  Pentagon  Papers  ignore  persistently  the  fact  that  the  French  and  Bao  Dai  had  i 
agreed  to  set  up  a  "provisional  government  of  Vietnam"  in  May-June  1948.  The  posi- 
tion of  Bao  Dai,  however,  remained  unsettled. 

6.  Gravel  ed.,  1:87.  A  coalition  government,  Dulles  thought,  would  be  "the  beginning  > 
of  disaster"  (Gravel  ed.,  1 : 1 1 6 ) .  ; 

7.  The  full  text  of  NSC  5405  is  published  in  the  Papers  as  Document  20  (pp.  434-  ; 
443).  This  sentence  is  "Point  29"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:442). 

8.  On  the  opening  day  of  the  conference  at  Geneva,  Soviet  officials  had  again  ap- 
proached American  delegates  on  the  subject  of  partition,  averring  that  the  establishment 
of  "a  buffer  state  to  China's  south  would  be  sufficient  satisfaction  of  China's  security 
needs"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:134).  The  Department  of  Defense  (on  May  5)  drew  up  a  settle- 
ment plan  that  included  provision  for  a  territorial  division.  (This  amounted  to  contain- 
ing the  Communist  forces  above  the  20th  Parellel,  while  denying  them  sovereign  access 
to  the  sea.  The  Hanoi-Haiphong  area  would  be  held  by  Bao  Dai.) 

9.  Gravel  ed.,  1:117.  The  Erskine  report  had  suggested  "political  action"  to  ensure  a  i 
French  agreement  "with  particular  attention  to  possible  pressure  against  the  French  ; 
position  in  North  Africa,  and  in  NATO"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:454;  emphasis  ours).  ; 

10.  The  Papers  say  "The  Communist  side  was  not  so  intransigent  as  to  make  agree-  I 
ment  impossible"  (Gravel  ed.,  1: 139).  \ 

11.  Gravel  ed.,  1:214.  "It  would  be  militarily  disastrous  to  demand  the  withdrawal  of  i 
French  forces  before  the  creation  of  a  new  national  army,"  Dulles  said. 


179 


11.  The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda 
and  as  History* 

by  Noam  Chomsky 


Though  in  no  sense  a  history  of  American  involvement  in  Indochina,  the 
Pentagon  study  adds  many  important  details  to  the  historical  record.  As  a  general 
assessment,  it  seems  to  me  fair  to  say  that  it  corroborates,  with  direct  documenta- 
tion, reasonable  inferences  that  have  been  drawn  in  the  most  critical  literature  on 
the  war.^  The  Pentagon  historians  do,  at  times,  try  to  distinguish  the  evidence 
that  they  present  from  the  conclusions  in  the  critical  literature,  but  unsuccess- 
fully. As  an  example,  consider  the  crucial  question  of  the  origins  of  the  insurgency 
in  South  Vietnam  (1954-1960).  The  director  of  the  study,  Leslie  Gelb,  has  a 
long  analytic  summary  in  which  he  takes  some  pains  to  demonstrate  that  critics 
of  the  war  have  been  in  error  in  crucial  respects,  adding  that  "few  Administra- 
tion critics  have  had  access  to  the  classified  information  upon  which  [these] 
judgments  are  based"  (Gravel  edition,  1:260).^  Gelb  claims  to  provide  a  sub- 
stantial correction  in  his  discussion  of  the  May  1959  meeting  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  DRV  Lao  Dong  Party  (Fifteenth  Plenum),  which  he  regards 
(citing  Communist  sources)  as  "the  point  of  departure  for  DRV  intervention," 
when  a  decision  was  taken  "actively  to  seek  the  overthrow  of  Diem"  (Gravel  ed., 
L264,  260). 

Turning  to  the  critics,  Gelb  asserts  that  "Most  attacks  on  U.S.  policy  have  been 
based  on  the  proposition  that  the  DRV  move  on  the  South  came  with  manifest 
reluctance,  and  after  massive  U.S.  intervention  in  1961."  As  his  sole  example  to 
support  this  assertion,  he  cites  the  following  passages  from  Kahin  and  Lewis: 

Contrary  to  U.S.  policy  assumptions,  all  available  evidence  shows  that  the 
revival  of  the  civil  war  in  the  South  in  1958  was  undertaken  by  Southerners 
at  their  own — not  Hanoi's — initiative.  .  .  .  Insurrectionary  activity  against 
the  Saigon  government  began  in  the  South  under  Southern  leadership  not  as 
a  consequence  of  any  dictate  from  Hanoi,  but  contrary  to  Hanoi's  injunc- 
tions.^ 

Evidently,  the  quoted  remarks  are  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  conclusion  they  are 
adduced  to  support.  Neither  in  these  remarks  nor  elsewhere  do  Kahin  and  Lewis 
state  or  imply  that  "the  DRV  move  on  the  South  came  .  .  .  after  massive  U.S. 
intervention  in  1961."  In  fact,  they  cite  a  DRV  statement  of  September  1960  as 
the  first  official  "encouragement  of  militant  tactics  by  the  Southerners."  In  this 
public  statement,  according  to  Kahin  and  Lewis,  the  "Northern  leadership  [made] 
it  clear  that  it  sanctioned  formation  of  a  United  Front  and  approved  a  program 
for  the  violent  overthrow  of  the  Diem  government"  (p.  115).  As  to  the  remarks 
Gelb  quotes,  he  himself  claims  only  that  "Hanoi  moved  thereafter  [i.e.,  after 

;  Copyright  ©  1972  by  Noam  Chomsky 

i  ■  *This  IS  part  of  a  much  longer  study  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  that  will  appear  elsewhere. 


180      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol  V  ' 

1958]  to  capture  the  revolution"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:265).  He  gives  no  evidence  to  ! 
refute  the  contention  that  insurrectionary  activity  against  the  Saigon  regime 
through  1958  was  independent  of  Hanoi.  The  evidence  presented  in  the  Pentagon  i 
Papers  in  no  way  contradicts  the  passages  he  quotes,  irrelevantly,  from  Kahin 
and  Lewis. 

A  few  pages  earlier,  Gelb  attributes  to  "Critics  of  U.S.  policy  in  Vietnam"  the  i 
view  that  the  DRV  was  "impelled  to  unleash  the  South  Vietnamese"  regroupees  ! 
"only  after  it  became  clear,  in  late  1960  [sic],  that  the  U.S.  would  commit  massive  ; 
resources  to  succor  Diem  in  his  internal  war"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:251).  French  \ 
analysts,  Gelb  claims,  "have  long  been  advancing  such  interpretations,"  and  he  j 
cites  specifically  Philippe  Devillers,  giving  several  long  quotations  from  an  article  , 
that  appeared  in  1962.^  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  U.S.  commitment  did  not  [ 
become  clear  in  late  1960,  Devillers  says  nothing  of  the  sort,  and  the  quotes  Gelb  \ 
cites  are  as  irrelevant  to  the  claim  he  is  attempting  to  establish  as  those  from  j 
Kahin  and  Lewis.  Neither  Devillers  nor  Kahin  and  Lewis  put  forth  the  view  that  1! 
Gelb  is  trying  to  refute,  namely,  that  DRV  moves  to  "capture  the  revolution"  ii 
were  a  response  to  "massive  U.S.  intervention  in  1961."  They  argue,  rather,  that  ? 
"the  insurrection  is  Southern  rooted;  it  arose  at  Southern  initiative  in  response  to  | 
Southern  demands,"  led  initially  by  "Southern  Vietminh  veterans  who  felt  be-  { 
trayed  by  the  Geneva  Conference  and  abandoned  by  Hanoi,"  which,  initially  re-  ; 
luctant,  "was  then  obliged  to  sanction  the  Southerners'  actions  or  risk  forfeiting  | 
all  chance  of  influence  over  the  course  of  events  in  South  Vietnam"  (Kahin  and  | 
Lewis,  p.  119).  Their  position  can  no  doubt  be  challenged,  and  perhaps  modified,  ? 
on  the  basis  of  evidence  that  has  since  come  to  light,  but  the  crucial  point,  in  the  j 
present  connection,  is  that  they  never  so  much  as  hint  at  the  position  that  Gelb  \ 
attempts  to  refute  in  his  effort  to  distinguish  the  conclusions  of  the  critical 
literature  from  the  material  unearthed  by  the  Pentagon  historians. 

Gelb  further  notes  that  Diem  was  "entirely  correct  when  he  stated  that  his  was 
a  nation  at  war  in  early  1959"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:265).  Pursuing  the  matter  further, 
we  discover  that  "early  1959"  happens  to  be  March  1959,^  that  is,  two  months 
prior  to  the  meeting  which  Gelb  takes  to  be  "the  point  of  departure  for  DRV 
intervention,"  when  a  decision  was  taken  "actively  to  seek  the  overthrow  of  Diem" 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:264,  260).  Thus  Gelb's  account  not  only  does  not  contradict  the 
quoted  passages  from  Kahin  and  Lewis,  but  actually  supports  them,  when  relevant 
details  are  made  explicit.  ■ 

There  remains  the  interesting  question  whether  Hanoi  did  "capture  the  revolu- 
tion" after  1958,  as  Gelb  evidently  believes.  The  conclusion  is  not  implausible  on 
the  basis  of  the  little  that  is  known,  but  the  arguments  that  Gelb  presents  are 
hardly  compelling,  nor  do  they  make  the  best  case.  Thus  he  argues  that  the  rapid  \\ 
growth  of  the  NLF  "is  a  further  indication  that  the  Hanoi-directed  communist  ( 
party  apparatus  had  been  engaged  to  the  fullest  in  the  initial  organization  and  ; 
subsequent  development  of  the  NLF"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:265).  This  is  on  a  par  with  ' 
Douglas  Pike's  proof  that  the  "master  planner"  of  the  NLF  must  have  been  Ho 
Chi  Minh  from  the  beginning,  when  it  "sprang  full-blown  into  existence  and  then  | 
was  fleshed  out"  exploiting  "grievances  .  .  .  developed  or  manufactured  almost 
as  a  necessary  afterthought."  The  proof  is  that  the  NLF  "projected  a  social  con-  [ 
struction  program  of  such  scope  and  ambition  that  of  necessity  it  must  have  been  ji 
created  in  Hanoi  and  imported."  ^  In  the  face  of  such  powerful  argumentation,  | 
one  can  only  lapse  into  silence. 

Notice  further  that  Devillers,  in  the  article  cited,  in  fact  refers  to  the  May  1959 
meeting — though  Gelb  does  not  mention  this — stating  that  there  was  a  debate 
over  the  issue  of  "effective  support  for  Southern  comrades,"  and  that  the  tendency 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  181 
in  favor  of  such  support  "had  made  itself  felt  in  the  field  in  the  shape  of  the  aid 
given  at  the  beginning  of  1960  to  the  maquis.  .  .  ."  Thus  we  see,  still  more 
clearly,  that  in  this  instance  the  Pentagon  Papers  add  little  of  substance  to  the 
earlier  conclusions  of  the  critical  literature,  which  Gelb  misrepresents.  Further- 
more, access  to  classified  information  was  not  needed  to  determine  the  basic  facts. 
Rather,  as  has  generally  been  the  case,  inattention  to  the  public  record  has  ob- 
scured the  facts.  Gelb's  speculations  (they  are  no  more  than  this)  as  to  the  initial 
DRV  intervention  do,  as  is  noted,  contradict  the  conclusion  of  P.  J.  Honey  that 
Hanoi  was  committed  to  the  Moscow  line  of  peaceful  coexistence  until  late  1960 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:261),  but  Honey,  who  is  described  as  "a  British  expert"  or  "the 
British  authority  on  North  Vietnam,"  is  hardly  one  of  those  who  direct  "attacks 
on  U.S.  policy"  in  the  sense  Gelb  intends. 

Though  Gelb  fails  entirely  to  engage  the  critical  literature,  nevertheless  the 
issue  that  he  raises  is  of  interest  in  itself.  His  interpretation  of  the  Fifteenth  Ple- 
num of  May  1959  is  somewhat  different  from  Devillers',  and  though  there  is  little 
relevant  evidence  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  it  is  possible  to  pursue  the  issue  using 
other  sources.  Gelb  concludes  that  not  later  than  spring  1959 — i.e.,  at  the  Fif- 
teenth Plenum — the  DRV  leaders  made  a  clear  decision  "actively  to  seek  the  over- 
throw of  Diem.  Thereafter,  the  DRV  pressed  toward  that  goal  by  military  force 
and  by  subversive  aggression,  both  in  Laos  and  in  South  Vietnam."  The  "principal 
strategic  debate  over  this  issue,"  he  maintains,  "took  place  between  1956  and 
1958."  He  concedes  that  during  this  period  "some  DRV  leaders"  perhaps  "did 
attempt  to  hold  back  southern  rebels  on  the  grounds  that  'conditions'  were  not 
ripe  for  an  uprising"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:260).  In  contrast,  Devillers  (in  an  article 
dated  November  1961)  held  that  the  debate  concerned  possible  "international 
complications  likely  to  hinder  the  diplomacy  of  the  Socialist  camp,"  though  some 
I  "activist"  elements  succeeded,  in  the  May  1959  meeting,  in  setting  in  motion  a 
'  program  of  aid  for  the  Southern  resistance.  As  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  fighting 
j  in  South  Vietnam  is  directed  from  Hanoi,  Devillers  asserts  that  it  "is  certainly  a 
plausible  one,"  and  he  cites  an  article  in  the  Nhan  Dan  of  Hanoi  as  one  of  several 
that  "make  it  seem  very  likely,"  but  he  remains  cautious,  noting,  in  particular, 
that  "to  formulate  [the  hypothesis  of  DRV  control]  serves  the  purposes  of  Com- 
munist propaganda."  His  point  is  that  both  the  United  States  and  the  Vietnamese 
Communists  have  a  stake  (for  different  reasons)  in  establishing  that  the  NLF  is 
under  the  control  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Vietnam.  Therefore,  evidence  on 
,  this  matter  from  these  sources  must  be  treated  critically. 

,  We  return  to  Gelb's  discussion  of  alleged  DRV  resort  to  military  force  and 
subversive  aggression,  consequent  to  the  May  1959  meeting.  Let  us  consider  first 
the  other  matter  at  issue,  namely,  the  content  and  significance  of  the  meeting. 
Available  evidence  is  conflicting.  Allan  Goodman  reports  that  "Vietcong  who  de- 
fected in  1961-1962,  in  part,  gave  as  their  reason  for  changing  sides  the  reluc- 
tance of  Hanoi  to  authorize  anything  beyond  political  action  among  the  popula- 

,  tion."  ^  In  fact,  surveys  of  Vietcong  prisoners  and  defectors  just  prior  to  the 

,  American  escalation  of  early  1965  found  "most  native  South  Vietnamese  guer- 
rillas unaware  of  any  North  Vietnamese  role  in  the  war,  except  as  a  valued  ally" 

1  (and  revealed,  as  well,  that  few  considered  themselves  to  be  Communists,  and  that 
"persuasion  and  indoctrination"  appeared  to  be  the  major  devices  used  by  the 
Vietcong,  rather  than  "the  authoritarianism  of  traditional  armies,"  ^  confirming 
the  general  conclusion  of  even  such  a  hostile  observer  as  Douglas  Pike — see  also 

,  below,  pp.  186,  187f.). 

j  Jeffrey  Race's  very  valuable  study  (see  my  note  6),  on  the  other  hand,  supports 
Gelb's  interpretation  of  the  decision  of  the  Fifteenth  Plenum,  while  at  the  same 


182      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

time  adding  considerable  depth  of  evidence  to  the  (uncontested)  view  that  the 
insurrection  was  well  underway  at  that  time  and  confirming  the  general  interpre- 
tation of  the  origins  of  the  insurgency  given  by  Devillers  and  Kahin-Lewis.  Race 
includes  that  "sometime  around  the  middle  of  1956  the  Party  made  the  decision 
to  rebuild  its  apparatus  in  the  South"  (Race,  p.  39).  According  to  the  highest 
ranking  Party  cadre  Race  was  able  to  locate  (captured  in  1962),  this  was  "a  very 
dark  period,"  given  the  realization  that  the  Geneva  Accords  would  not  be  im- 
plemented and  that  the  Diem  government,  which  had  already  severely  damaged 
the  underground  apparatus  (with  ample  use  of  terror)  and  was  now  turning  to 
the  countryside,  might  well  consolidate  its  position.  From  1956,  the  Party's  politi- 
cal activity  was  carried  out  under  the  cover  of  the  "Vietnamese  People's  Libera- 
tion Movement."  Its  programs  appealed  primarily,  and  with  much  success,  to  the 
demands  for  social  justice  that  had  been  aroused  by  the  Vietminh  resistance, 
which  (in  Long  An  at  least)  had  demonstrated  to  the  peasantry  that  it  was  pos- 
sible to  overthrow  the  power  of  the  local  elite.  This,  Race  argues,  was  the  primary 
significance  of  the  resistance  (Race,  p.  40).  In  the  late  1950s,  "the  revolutionary 
organization  [was]  being  ground  down  while  the  revolutionary  potential  was  in- 
creasing," the  reason  for  this  "anomaly"  being  "the  Central  Committee's  decision 
that,  except  in  limited  circumstances,  violence  would  not  be  used,  even  in  self- 
defense,  against  the  increasing  repressiveness  of  the  government"  (Race,  p.  104). 

This  is  the  background  of  the  May  1959  meeting  in  Hanoi.  Though  no  record 
is  available  of  its  decisions,  Race  concludes  from  interviews  and  subsequent  in- 
structions that  it  "set  forth  a  new  line  for  the  revolution  in  the  South,"  with  the 
"political  struggle  line"  replaced  by  a  decision  to  combine  political  and  armed 
struggle,  taken  after  a  "sharp  conflict  within  the  Central  Committee"  (Race,  p. 
105).  Although  "the  grievances  on  which  the  campaign  was  founded  lay  in  the 
South,  nevertheless  the  major  strategic  decisions  were  made  by  the  Central  Com- 
mittee in  Hanoi."  He  reports  that  the  few  high-level  cadres  in  government  hands 
are  insistent  on  this  point,  and  concludes  that  although  Kahin  and  Lewis  and 
Devillers  were  correct  in  emphasizing  "the  effect  of  the  increasing  repressiveness 
of  the  Diem  regime  in  generating  pressure  for  armed  action  in  the  South,"  evi- 
dence that  has  come  to  light  since  they  wrote  indicates  that  they  tended  to 
exaggerate  the  independence  of  the  southern  movement  (Race,  pp.  107-108; 
recall,  however,  Devillers'  qualified  statements). 

The  high-ranking  captive  mentioned  earlier  refers  to  the  anger  of  southern 
Party  members  toward  the  Central  Committee  and  their  demand  for  armed  action 
to  preserve  their  existence  in  the  face  of  the  Diem  repression  of  the  former 
Vietminh  (in  explicit  violation  of  the  Geneva  Agreements,  it  might  be  noted). 
The  Fifteenth  Plenum,  he  reports,  decided  to  permit  "the  southern  organization 
...  to  develop  armed  forces  with  the  mission  of  supporting  the  political  struggle 
line"  (Race,  pp.  1 10-1 11).  Race  believes  that  the  reluctance  of  the  Central  Com- 
mittee to  authorize  even  armed  self-defense  during  these  years  derived  from  the 
concern  for  internal  problems  in  the  North,  Soviet  pressure,  and  "a  natural  con- 
flict between  those  making  sacrifices  at  the  front  and  those  making  policy  deci- 
sions in  the  rear,"  who  regarded  the  situation  as  not  yet  "ripe"  (Race,  p.  111). 
The  southerners  hesitated  to  undertake  armed  struggle  for  fear  of  violating  the 
Party  line,  but  after  the  May  1959  meeting  they  were  no  longer  so  constrained 
(Race,  p.  113).  From  this  point  on,  the  threat  of  terror  was  "equalized,"  and 
violence  was  no  longer  a  government  monopoly.  The  Party  quickly  became  the 
ruler  in  considerable  areas  of  the  province;  by  1960,  government  forces  in  Long 
An  province  were  collapsing  without  a  shot  being  fired,  undermined  from  within 
by  Party  propaganda,  and  the  government  apparatus  quickly  disappeared  from 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  183 

the  scene  (Race,  pp.  94-95,  116,  184ff.).  The  revolutionary  potential  had  become 
reality. 

Race  describes  the  measures  approved  at  the  May  1959  meeting  as  "stopgap 
moves  intended  to  catch  up  with  events  which  had  in  fact  overtaken  the  Party  in 
the  South."  The  September  Party  Congress  cited  by  Kahin  and  Lewis  (see  above, 
p.  179)  "definitively  approved  the  new  direction  of  Party  poUcy  in  the  South  .  . 
(Race,  pp.  120-121).  In  late  1964  the  situation  had  so  deteriorated  that  a  free 
strike  zone  was  established  in  the  northwestern  part  of  the  province  and  ten  to 
fifteen  thousand  residents  were  moved  by  government  decree  (Race,  pp.  135, 
168).  "By  early  1965  revolutionary  forces  had  gained  victory  in  virtually  all  the 
rural  areas  of  Long  An"  (Race,  p.  140). 

The  analysts  in  the  Pentagon  study  generally  exhibit  a  commitment  to  the 
ideological  underpinnings  of  U.S.  policy  and  its  specific  aims.  One  refers  to  Marx, 
Mao  and  "French  revolutionary  romanticism"  as  "the  most  virulent,  and  vicious 
social  theories  of  the  era"  (Gravel  ed.,  L333).  The  reader  may  rest  assured  that 
none  of  the  analysts  would  be  so  irresponsible  and  emotional  as  to  use  such  terms 
as  "virulent"  or  "vicious"  in  discussing,  say,  American  military  tactics  in  South 
Vietnam,  or  the  general  policies  and  assumptions  that  brought  them  into  "opera- 
tional reality."  For  the  most  part,  the  bias  of  the  analysts  is  not  concealed — a 
virtue,  not  a  defect,  of  the  presentation. 

In  case  after  case,  the  analysts  reiterate  U.S.  government  claims  as  if  they  are 
established  fact.  Consider  again  Gelb's  assertion  that  after  the  May  1959  meeting, 
with  its  decision  "actively  to  seek  the  overthrow  of  Diem,"  "the  DRV  pressed 
toward  that  goal  by  military  force  and  by  subversive  aggression,  both  in  Laos 
and  in  South  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:260).  Expanding  on  this  claim,  he  states 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:264)  that  "Within  a  month  of  the  Fifteenth  Plenum,  the  DRV 
began  to  commit  its  armed  forces  in  Laos.  .  .  ."  No  evidence  is  presented  in  the 

I  summary  or  elsewhere  to  demonstrate  that  the  DRV  sent  its  armed  forces  into 

;Laos  in  June  1959,  let  alone  that  this  was  an  outcome  of  the  May  meeting  in 
Hanoi.  The  earliest  claim  that  Viet  Minh  forces  were  involved  in  the  fighting  in 
Laos  was  a  Royal  Lao  Government  [RLG]  report  of  July  29.  No  one,  to  my 
knowledge,  holds  that  the  Pathet  Lao  offensive  of  the  summer  of  1959  was  a 
consequence  of  the  meeting  of  May  1959  in  Hanoi.  As  to  the  intervention  of 

:DRV  armed  forces,  careful  studies  disagree,  the  general  attitude  being  one  of 
considerable  skepticism.  Hugh  Toye  concludes  that  the  allegations  were  false.^^ 

;  Langer  and  Zasloff  maintain  that  Laotian  intelligence  has  evidence  of  North  Viet- 
namese participation  in  the  summer  offensive. They  also  note,  as  Gelb  does  not, 
that  this  offensive  followed  the  American-backed  civil-military  takeover  in  Vien- 

itiane,  the  attempt  to  disarm  Pathet  Lao  battalions  in  May  1959,  and  the  arrest  of 
sixteen  leaders  of  the  political  arm  of  the  Pathet  Lao  (among  them,  the  delegates 
who  had  just  been  elected  to  the  National  Assembly  in  a  left-wing  victory  that  set 
off  the  U.S.  effort  at  large-scale  subversion  in  Laos). 12  In  the  most  recent  study 

I  to  appear,  Charles  Stevenson  takes  the  claim  of  North  Vietnamese  intervention 
to  be  unbsubstantiated,  citing  also  Bernard  Fall's  skepticism.  He  concludes  fur- 
ther that,  contrary  to  U.S.  government  claims,  "The  initiation  of  the  hostilities 
should  be  attributed  to  the  [U.S.-backedl  Phoui  Sananikone  government,  as  it 
;*vas  in  a  Rand  corporation  study  a  year  later,"  not  to  the  Pathet  Lao,  let  alone 
(:he  DRV.^3  If  there  was  North  Vietnamese  involvement  in  the  summer  offensive, 

I I  was  more  likely  a  response  to  the  events  of  May  and  the  direct  U.S.  interven- 
hion^^  than  a  consequence  of  a  Lao  Dong  Party  decision  to  take  over  South 

Vietnam,  as  Gelb  implies. 


184      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Gelb's  comments  on  this  matter  are  particularly  surprising  in  the  light  of  the 
documentation  available  to  him.  A  SNIE  of  September  18,  1959  {DOD,  book 
10,  1244  ff.),  concludes  that  "the  initiation  of  Communist  guerrilla  warfare  in 
Laos  in  mid-July  was  primarily  a  reaction  to  a  series  of  actions  by  the  Royal 
Lao  Government  which  threatened  drastically  to  weaken  the  Communist  position 
in  Laos,"  in  particular,  a  reaction  to  the  success  of  the  new  Laotian  government, 
with  increased  U.S.  backing,  in  blocking  Communist  efforts  "to  move  by  legal 
political  competition  toward  its  objective  of  gaining  control  of  Laos."  Intelligence 
estimated  that  the  total  number  of  guerrillas  involved  was  about  1,500  to  2,000 
at  most.  It  believed  "it  is  almost  certain  some  [North  Vietnamese]  are  involved 
in  the  guerrilla  activity,  particularly  in  coordination,  communication,  and  ad- 
visory roles,"  though  "we  have  no  conclusive  evidence."  Even  this  assessment 
must  be  taken  with  a  grain  of  skepticism  at  least,  given  the  long-standing  preju- 
dice in  the  "intelligence  community"  with  regard  to  "international  communism" 
and  its  alleged  responsibility  for  local  initiatives  everywhere  in  Indochina. 

In  short,  it  will  hardly  do  to  describe  the  situation  in  Laos  in  the  summer  of 
1959  by  stating,  with  not  a  word  of  additional  background:  "Within  a  month 
of  the  Fifteenth  Plenum,  the  DRV  began  to  commit  its  armed  forces  in  Laos, 
and  steadily  escalated  its  aid  to  the  Pathet  Lao,"  pressing  toward  the  goal  of 
overthrowing  Diem,  established  at  the  Fifteenth  Plenum,  by  military  force  and 
subversive  aggression. 

Continuing  with  his  discussion  of  consequences  of  the  May  1959  meeting  in 
Hanoi,  Gelb  states:  "moreover,  by  that  time  [December  1960],  the  Soviet  Union 
had  entered  the  fray,  and  was  participating  in  airlift  operations  from  North 
Vietnam  direct  to  Pathet  Lao-NVA  units  in  Laos."  The  remark  does  not  quite 
do  justice  to  the  actual  situation.  The  Soviet  airlift,  which  began  in  December 
1960,  was  in  support  of  the  pro-Western  Souvanna  Phouma  and  the  neutralist 
Kong  Le,  whose  government  was  under  attack  by  right-wing  troops  backed  by 
the  CIA  and  U.S.  military  after  a  long  period  of  well-documented  American 
subversion.  There  is  not  a  hint  of  this  in  Gelb's  account,  which  conveys  the  im- 
pression of  a  Communist  initiative  to  subvert  Laotian  independence,  set  in  mo- 
tion by  the  May  1959  meeting  of  the  Lao  Dong  Party  Central  Committee  in 
Hanoi,  and  by  the  end  of  1960  involving  also  the  Soviet  Union.  Gelb  claims 
that  "Both  Soviet  and  Chinese  policy  seems  to  have  bent  to  [Hanoi's]  ends," 
namely,  reunification  and  "Vietnamese  hegemony  in  Southeast  Asia"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:265).  This  is  an  amazing  construction  to  found  on  the  flimsy  evidence  that  he 
presents,  and  when  the  factual  gaps  are  filled,  as  in  the  cases  just  noted,  his 
proposal  seems  little  more  than  a  flight  of  fancy.  In  any  event,  his  references 
to  Laos  are  hardly  more  than  a  repetition  of  U.S.  government  propaganda  that 
is  generally  discounted  even  by  highly  sympathetic  historians. 

One  further  example,  from  a  different  part  of  the  study,  may  suffice  to  illustrate 
the  tendency  to  accept  U.S.  government  claims  uncritically  unless  they  are  con- 
clusively refuted  by  the  evidence  at  hand,  often  with  neglect  of  evidence  that  is 
not  in  serious  dispute.  Consider  the  explanation  of  why  the  Wilson-Kosygin  peace 
initiative  failed  during  the  Tet  truce  of  February  1967.  The  reason,  according 
to  the  analyst,  is  that  "the  enormous  DRV  resupply  effort  force[d]  the  President 
to  resume  the  bombing  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 9,  139,  143).  The  careful  reader 
will  note  that  these  alleged  violations  of  the  truce  consisted  only  of  "the  massive 
North  Vietnamese  effort  to  move  supplies  into  its  southern  panhandle"  (Gravel 
ed.,  IV:  143),  that  is,  movement  of  supplies  within  North  Vietnam.  The  U.S. 
Command  issued  no  reports  of  traffic  moving  south  of  Dong  Hoi,  about  forty 
miles  north  of  the  17th  parallel,  and  had  no  way  of  knowing  whether  the  sighted 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  185 

convoys  were  supplying  the  millions  of  people  in  the  southern  panhandle  who 
had  been  living  under  merciless  bombardment. 

Meanwhile,  unremarked  by  the  analyst,  the  United  States  was  not  only  moving 
supplies  westward  toward  California  and  across  the  Pacific,  but  was  setting  a 
one-day  record  on  the  first  day  of  the  truce  for  air-delivered  cargo  to  units  in 
the  field.  U.S.  planes  alone  carried  more  than  7,000  tons  of  supplies  and  17,000 
men  during  the  first  three  days  of  the  cease-fire — within  South  Vietnam.  Re- 
porters described  long  files  of  trucks  protected  by  tanks  and  helicopters  hauling 
munitions  to  the  outskirts  of  VC-controlled  Zone  C,  though  U.S.  sources  in 
Vietnam  tried  to  conceal  this  fact  in  misleading  dispatches.  Immediately  after 
the  truce,  Operation  Junction  City  was  launched  against  Zone  C.  According  to 
AFP  in  Le  Monde,  the  offensive  had  been  prepared  during  the  Tet  truce.  The 
U.S.  press  mentioned  neither  this  matter,  nor  a  Parliamentary  debate  in  London 
inspired  by  the  facts  brought  together  by  I.  F.  Stone. The  Pentagon  conceded 
Stone's  charges,  with  this  amazing  comment:  'The  point  that  Mr.  Stone  is 
missing  is  that  we  have  air  and  naval  supremacy  and  have  no  need  of  a  truce  of 
any  kind  to  move  supplies."  Therefore,  the  onus  falls  entirely  on  North  Vietnam 
for  violating  the  truce  by  the  unconscionable  act  of  moving  supplies  within  its 
own  territory,  thus  forcing  the  President  to  resume  bombing  and  dashing  hopes 
for  a  negotiated  settlement.  Stone  describes  the  whole  incident  as  the  govern- 
ment's most  "successful  Operation  Brain  Wash."  No  brains  were  washed  more 
successfully  than  those  of  the  Pentagon  historian,  who  continued  blithely  to 
repeat  government  propaganda,  oblivious  to  uncontested  facts. 

However,  though  the  analyst  misrepresents  the  facts,  he  probably  does  ac- 
curately depict  the  perception  of  the  facts  in  Washington.  Chester  Cooper,  who 
was  involved  in  the  London  negotiations  at  the  time,  reports  that  the  President 
decided  to  renew  the  bombing  despite  the  ongoing  Wilson-Kosygin  efforts:  "The 
North  Vietnamese  troop  movements  over  the  past  several  days  had  apparently 
thrown  Washington  into  panic."  '^^ 

The  incident  is  interesting  not  only  as  an  illustration  of  the  pro-government 
bias  of  the  analyst,  but  also,  once  again,  as  an  indication  of  the  power  of  govern- 
ment propaganda  to  overwhelm  the  facts,  given  the  general  submissiveness  of 
the  mass  media.  It  is  easy  to  comprehend  why  statist  ideologues  complain  so 
bitterly  when  the  press  begins  to  show  some  signs  of  intellectual  independence. 

A  more  subtle,  and  rather  pervasive  bias  is  well  illustrated  by  other  comments 
of  Gelb's  in  the  analytic  summary  cited  above.  He  notes  that  "no  direct  links 
have  been  established  between  Hanoi  and  perpetrators  of  rural  violence"  in  the 
1956-1959  period  (Gravel  ed.,  1:243).  By  the  phrase  "perpetrators  of  rural 
violence,"  he  does  not  refer  to  President  Diem  and  his  associates,  who  organized 
massive  expeditions  in  1956  to  peaceful  Communist-controlled  regions  killing 
hundreds,  perhaps  thousands  of  peasants  and  destroying  whole  villages  by  ar- 
tillery bombardment,  18  nor  to  the  "vengeful  acts"  of  the  South  Vietnamese  army 
in  areas  where  the  Vietminh  had  withdrawn  after  Geneva,  "arbitrarily  arresting, 
harassing,  and  torturing  the  population  and  even  shooting  the  villagers."  In 

,  this  regard,  Gelb  merely  states  that:  "At  least  through  1957,  Diem  and  his  gov- 
ernment enjoyed  marked  success  with  fairly  sophisticated  pacification  programs 

I  in  the  countryside"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:254),  though  he  concedes  that  Diem  in- 
stituted "oppressive  measures"  such  as  the  so-called  "political  reeducation  cen- 
ters" which  "were  in  fact  litde  more  than  concentration  camps  for  the  potential 
foes  of  the  government"  and  a  "Communist  Denunciation  Campaign"  which 
"thoroughly  terrified  the  Vietnamese  peasants"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:253,  255).  But  he 

'    concludes  that  the  Diem  regime  "compared  favorably  with  other  Asian  govern- 


186      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V  \ 

ments  of  the  same  period  in  its  respect  for  the  person  and  property  of  citizens"  I 
(Gravel  ed.,  1:253;  in  particular,  for  the  property  of  the  2  percent  of  landowners 
who  owned  45  percent  of  the  land  by  1960;  Gravel  ed.,  1:254).  And  phrases  such  j 
as  "perpetrators  of  rural  violence"  are,  typically,  restricted  to  the  resistance  in  j 
South  Vietnam.  ■ 

We  learn  a  little  more  about  Diem's  sophisticated  pacification  programs  in  the  j 
countryside  from  the  accompanying  historical  analysis.  "In  early  1955,  ARVN  \ 
units  were  sent  to  establish  the  GVN  in  the  Camau  Peninsula.  .  .  .  Poorly  led,  | 
ill-trained,  and  heavy-handed,  the  troops  behaved  towards  the  people  very  much  j 
as  the  Viet  Minh  had  led  the  farmers  to  expect"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:306;  the  Camau  | 
experience,  the  analyst  adds,  was  "more  typical  of  the  ARVN  than  the  Binh  j 
Dinh  affair,"  which  "went  off  more  smoothly"  and,  he  claims,  revealed  popular 
hostility  to  the  Vietminh).  In  interrogations  of  prisoners  and  defectors,  the  j 
analyst  reports,  most  "spoke  of  terror,  brutality  and  torture  by  GVN  rural  of-  j 
ficials  in  carrying  out  the  Communist  Denunciation  campaigns,  and  of  the  arrest  i 
and  slaying  of  thousands  of  old  comrades  from  the  'resistance'  "  (Gravel  ed.,  !| 
1:329).  They  also  "spoke  of  making  person-to-person  persuasion  to  bring  in  \ 
new  members  for  the  movement,  relying  mainly  on  two  appeals:  nationalism  | 
and  social  justice."  The  analyst  concludes  that  many  were  not  "dedicated  com-  |! 
munists  in  the  doctrinaire  sense,"  that  "the  Viet  Minh  were  widely  admired  |j 
throughout  the  South  as  national  heroes,"  and  that  "the  GVN  created  by  its  li 
rural  policy  a  climate  of  moral  indignation  which  energized  the  peasants  po-  1 
litically,  turned  them  against  the  government,  sustained  the  Viet  Cong,  and  | 
permitted  'communists'  to  outlast  severe  GVN  repressions  and  even  to  recruit  \ 
during  it"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:329-330).  Thus  the  unqualified  anti- Vietminh  cam-  | 
paign  of  the  GVN  was  "a  tactical  error  of  the  first  magnitude." 

Race  reaches  some  rather  similar  conclusions  in  his  far  more  detailed  study. 
Until  1959,  the  government  had  a  near  monopoly  on  violence  and  by  employing 
it,  succeeded  in  demonstrating  to  the  population  that  there  was  no  alternative  to 
violence.  The  Party  maintained  an  official  policy  of  nonviolence,  with  the  excep-  ; 
tion  of  the  "extermination  of  traitors"  policy  undertaken  in  response  to  govern- 
ment terror  in  order  to  protect  the  existence  of  the  Party.  Although  abstention 
from  violence  in  the  face  of  mounting  government  terror  cost  the  Party  dearly,  ' 
the  policy  helped  create  the  "revolutionary  potential"  that  quickly  turned  the 
tide  when  the  Central  Committee  rescinded  its  prohibition  against  armed  struggle, 
and  "the  threat  was  equalized  for  both  sides"  (Race,  pp.  184,  82-84,  113  ff.).  ; 
Much  the  same  was  true  in  subsequent  years:  ".  .  .  the  government  terrorized  I 
far  more  than  did  the  revolutionary  movement — for  example,  by  liquidations  of 
former  Vietminh  by  artillery  and  ground  attacks  on  'communist  villages,'  and  i 
by  roundups  of  'communist  sympathizers.'  Yet  it  was  just  these  tactics  that  led  i 
to  the  constantly  increasing  strength  of  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Long 
An  from  1960  to  1965"  (Race,  p.  197). 

The  fundamental  source  of  strength  for  the  revolutionary  movement  was  the 
appeal  of  its  constructive  programs,  for  example,  the  land  program,  which  j 
"achieved  a  far  broader  distribution  of  land  than  did  the  government  program,  | 
and  without  the  killing  and  terror  which  is  associated  in  the  minds  of  Western  j 
readers  with  communist  practices  in  land  reform"  (Race,  p.  166;  in  this  case  |: 
too,  "the  principal  violence  was  brought  about  not  by  the  Party  but  by  the 
government,  in  its  attempts  to  reinstall  the  landlords").  The  lowest  economic 
strata  benefited  the  most  from  the  redistributive  policies  of  the  Party.  Authority 
was  decentralized  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  local  people,  in  contrast  to  the  rule 
of  the  GVN,  perceived  (accurately)  as  "outside  forces"  by  major  segments  of 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  187 

the  local  population  (Race,  p.  169  ff.);  "what  attracted  people  to  the  revolution- 
ary movement  was  that  it  represented  a  new  society  in  which  there  would  be 
an  individual  redistribution  of  values,  including  power  and  status  as  well  as 
material  possessions"  (Race,  p.  176).  "The  Party  leadership  .  .  .  structured  its 
forces  so  that  they  were  inextricably  bound  into  the  social  fabric  of  rural  com- 
munities by  ties  of  family,  friendship,  and  common  interest"  (Race,  p.  177). 
Thus  forces  were  of  local  origin,  locally  supplied,  and  oriented  toward  local 
interests. 

Returning  to  Gelb's  quite  typical  form  of  expression,  something  is  surely  over- 
looked when  the  local  cadres  are  portrayed  simply  as  "perpetrators  of  rural 
violence." 

The  same  summary  and  analysis  (Gravel  ed.,  1:242-269)  gives  a  remarkable 
interpretation  of  the  post-Geneva  period.  In  Gelb's  view,  the  United  States  and 
the  GVN,  though  not  "fully  cooperative,"  nevertheless  "considered  themselves 
constrained  by  the  Accords"  and  did  not  "deliberately  .  .  .  breach  the  peace." 
"In  contrast,  the  DRV  proceeded  to  mobilize  its  total  societal  resources  scarcely 
without  pause  from  the  day  the  peace  was  signed,  as  though  to  substantiate  the 
declaration"  of  Pham  Van  Dong  that  "We  shall  achieve  unity"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:250).  Thus  by  mobilizing  its  total  societal  resources  for  social  and  economic 
reconstruction,  the  DRV  clearly  demonstrated  its  intent  to  upset  the  Accords,  "in 
contrast"  to  the  peace-loving  GVN  and  United  States,  who  were  merely  main- 
taining the  status  quo  as  established  at  Geneva.  The  DRV  could  have  demon- 
strated its  sincerity  only  by  succumbing  to  the  famine  that  appeared  imminent  in 
1954,  refraining  from  programs  of  economic  development,  and  permitting  the 
United  States  to  succeed  in  its  efforts  to  undermine  it.^^ 

Gelb  believes  that  "it  is  possible  ...  to  accept  the  view  that  through  1958 
the  DRV  still  accorded  priority  to  butter  over  guns,  as  part  of  its  base  develop- 
ment strategy,"  namely,  the  strategy  of  making  the  North  "a  large  rear  echelon 
of  our  army,"  "the  revolutionary  base  for  the  whole  country,"  in  General  Giap's 
words  of  January  1960  (Gravel  ed.,  1:263-264).  But  these  priorities  changed, 
Gelb  believes,  at  the  May  1959  meeting.  Comparing  Gelb's  remarks  with  the 
facts  that  he  cites,  we  might  say,  with  somewhat  greater  precision,  that  the  facts 
permit  no  interpretation  other  than  the  view  he  finds  it  possible  to  accept,  namely, 
that  the  DRV  through  1958  accorded  priority  to  butter  over  guns  (and,  as  he 
notes.  Honey,  as  well  as  others,  believe  this  to  be  the  case  through  1960).  The 
claim  that  this  concern  for  internal  development  through  1958  was  nothing  other 
than  a  part  of  the  "base  development  strategy"  is  supported  by  no  particle  of 
evidence.  It  is,  presumably,  a  logical  possibility  at  least  that  the  North  Vietnamese 
leadership  was  interested  in  economic  development  for  reasons  other  than  "as 
part  of  its  base  development  strategy,"  just  as  it  is  possible  to  imagine  that  the 
mobilization  of  "total  societal  resources"  for  internal  development  might  have 
some  explanation  other  than  the  intention  to  disrupt  the  Geneva  agreements.  But 
these  alternative  possibilities  arise  only  on  the  assumption  that  the  Vietminh 
leadership  had  some  concern  for  the  welfare  of  the  Vietnamese  people,  and  it 
would  appear  that  this  hypothesis  is  excluded  by  the  canons  of  neutral  scholar- 
ship. 

In  fact,  Gelb's  logic  is  rather  like  that  of  Dean  Acheson  when  he  declared 
in  1950  that  recognition  of  Ho  Chi  Minh  by  China  and  the  USSR  "should  re- 
move any  illusion  as  to  the  nationalist  character  of  Ho  Chi  Minh's  aims  and 
reveals  Ho  in  his  true  colors  as  the  mortal  enemy  of  native  independence  in 
Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:51).  To  Acheson,  apparently.  Ho  could  prove  his  na- 


188      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

tionalist  credentials  only  by  capitulating  to  the  French,  who  were  defending 
liberty  and  national  independence  in  Vietnam  against  the  assault  of  the  Viet- 
minh. 

There  is  hardly  a  page  of  this  summary  and  analysis  section  that  is  not  mis- 
leading or  inaccurate  in  some  respect.  To  cite  one  final  example,  consider 
Gelb's  remark  that  the  refugees  from  the  North  after  the  Geneva  settlement 
"provided  the  world  the  earliest  convincing  evidence  of  the  undemocratic  and 
oppressive  nature  of  North  Vietnam's  regime  .  .  .  the  refugees  were  the  most 
convincing  support  for  Diem's  argument  that  free  elections  were  impossible 
in  the  DRV"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:248).  One  may  argue  that  the  DRV  regime  was 
undemocratic  and  oppressive  and  that  elections  conducted  there  would  not  be 
free,  but  it  is  patently  absurd  to  point  to  the  flight  of  the  refugees  as  "convincing 
evidence"  for  these  judgments.  It  would  be  rational  to  argue  that  the  flight  of 
the  refugees  indicated  a  fear  that  the  regime  would  be  undemocratic  and  op- 
pressive— to  argue,  in  the  analyst's  phrase,  that  "The  flight  from  North  Vietnam 
reflected  apprehension  over  the  coming  to  power  of  the  Viet  Minh"  (Gravel  ed., 
1:291).  Even  this  statement  is  misleading  unless  it  is  also  noted  that  many  of 
the  predominantly  Catholic  refugees  had  been  French  collaborators  and  had  even 
been  mobilized  in  "an  autonomous  Vietnamese  militia  against  the  Vietminh."  ^2 
Would  Gelb  argue  that  the  flight  of  Loyalists  to  Canada  provided  the  world  with 
the  earliest  convincing  evidence  of  the  undemocratic  and  oppressive  nature  of 
George  Washington's  regime,  and  showed  that  free  elections  were  impossible  in 
the  United  States?  23 

The  analytic  summary  of  the  post-Geneva  period  is  unusual  in  the  degree  of 
misrepresentation,  and  contrasts  unfavorably  with  other  summaries,  some  of 
which  are  quite  perceptive.  As  to  the  reasons  for  this,  one  can  only  speculate. 
The  summary  seeks  to  establish  that  the  United  States  and  GVN  accepted  the 
Geneva  settlement  more  or  less  in  good  faith,  and  that  blame  for  disrupting  the 
peaceful  status  quo  in  Laos  and  South  Vietnam  lies  primarily  with  the  DRV 
(and  its  Russian  ally,  drawn  in  by  Hanoi).  From  it,  a  reader  who  knows  nothing 
of  events  in  Indochina  or  of  the  critical  literature  (and  who  does  not  note  the 
disparity  between  what  is  alleged  to  be  true  of  the  critical  literature  and  what 
is  actually  quoted)  might  draw  the  conclusion  that  critics  of  the  war  are  mis- 
guided in  their  "attacks  on  U.S.  policy."  Rather,  they  should  be  directing  attacks 
on  the  DRV  and  its  allies  and  should  support  the  U.S.  "reaction"  to  the  aggression 
from  the  North.  The  U.S.  government  White  Papers  of  1961  and  1965  quite  ex- 
plicitly attempted  to  demonstrate  just  this. 

Gelb's  misrepresentation  of  the  views  of  critics  of  the  war  also  serves  the 
ends  of  government  propaganda  in  a  slightly  more  subtle  way.  In  the  view  of 
the  critics,  DRV  intervention  was  a  response  to  a  situation  that  developed  in  the 
South.  In  Gelb's  revision  of  their  views,  the  contention  is  that  the  DRV  inter- 
vention was  a  response  to  U.S.  intervention.  The  critics  focused  attention  on 
internal  Vietnamese  affairs.  Gelb  reformulates  their  argument,  shifting  the  focus 
to  an  interaction  between  the  United  States  and  the  DRV.  Whatever  may  have 
been  on  his  mind,  the  fact  is  that  this  move  is  typical  of  U.S.  government  propa- 
ganda, which  seeks  to  show  that  the  people  of  the  South  are  victims  of  aggression 
from  the  North,  with  the  United  States  coming  to  their  defense.  In  this  frame- 
work, the  interaction  between  the  United  States  and  North  Vietnam  is  the  cen- 
tral element  in  the  conflict,  not  the  internal  situation  in  South  Vietnam.  Within 
this  framework,  it  is  natural  that  the  Pentagon  Papers  should  contain  a  detailed 
study  of  the  bombing  of  the  North,  while  scarcely  mentioning  the  far  heavier  and 
more  destructive  bombardment  of  South  Vietnam  which  was  initiated  on  a  regular 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  189 

basis  at  about  the  same  time.  The  government  has  half  won  the  argument  if 
critics  accept  its  framework  and  then  debate  the  timing  of  the  U.S.-DRV  inter- 
action, neglecting  the  Southern  insurgency. It  is  interesting,  therefore,  that 
Gelb  recasts  the  argument  of  the  critics  within  the  framework  of  government 
propaganda,  ehminating  the  central  concern  with  the  Southern  insurgency  (though 
the  reader  can  detect  it  from  the  quotes  he  cites)  and  placing  U.S.-DRV  inter- 
action in  the  foreground.  Had  the  critics  formulated  their  position  in  his  terms, 
they  would  have  tacitly  conceded  a  significant  part  of  the  government's  case. 

In  this  connection,  four  points  might  be  mentioned.  In  the  first  place,  as 
has  already  been  shown,  Gelb's  account  is  shot  through  with  misrepresentation. 
Secondly,  it  is  striking  that  these  distortions  are  so  excessive  in  a  discussion  of 
the  "origins  of  the  insurgency  in  South  Vietnam"  (the  chapter  title),  a  question 
that  might  be  regarded  as  crucial  for  determining  one's  attitude  toward  "massive 
U.S.  intervention  in  1961."  Thirdly,  Gelb  claims  only  that  information  that 
appeared  long  after  the  events  supports  the  interpretation  he  proposes.  A 
rational  person  will  evaluate  an  action  in  the  light  of  evidence  available  to  those 
who  carried  it  out.  A  murderer  is  no  less  guilty  if  later  evidence  reveals  that 
without  his  knowledge  his  victim  was  just  about  to  commit  some  horrible  crime. 
Finally,  a  critic  of  the  American  intervention  who  bases  his  criticism  on  the 
principle  that  the  United  States  has  no  unique  right  to  engage  in  forceful  inter- 
vention in  the  internal  affairs  of  others,  or  who  simply  believes  that  the  U.S. 
executive  should  be  bound  by  established  law,  would  in  no  way  be  swayed  from 
his  condemnation  of  the  U.S.  intervention  of  1961  even  if  it  had  been  shown 
that  the  facts  were  as  Gelb  presents  them,  and  were  known  to  the  U.S.  executive 
at  the  time.  Since  this  is  clear  from  the  critical  literature  that  Gelb  misrepresents, 
and  from  earlier  discussion  here,  I  will  pursue  this  matter  no  further  at  this 
point. 

When  the  Pentagon  study  appeared  there  was  loud  protest  that  it  was  biased, 
misleading,  a  chorus  of  doves,  etc.  In  a  sense,  this  is  correct.  The  analysts  do  in 
general  seem  to  believe  that  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Vietnam  may  well  have 
been  a  costly  error.  At  the  same  time,  they  tend  to  accept  uncritically  the  frame- 
work of  official  ideology,  and  rarely  question  government  assertions.  As  the 
term  has  been  used  in  American  political  discourse,  they  are  doves,  by  and 
large. 

The  work  of  the  analysts  must  be  understood  as  a  distillation  of  the  docu- 
mentary record  that  they  were  studying — they  claim  little  more  than  this — and 
it  is  not  therefore  surprising  that  the  implicit  assumptions  in  this  record  are 
generally  carried  over  into  their  work.  With  this  limitation,  the  analyses  are 
often  excellent,  intelligent,  and  highly  illuminating.  There  is  also  some  variety  in 
the  character  of  the  analyses,  difficult  to  discuss  in  view  of  the  way  the  work 
was  done  and  the  anonymity  of  the  presentation — one  cannot  know,  for  example, 
to  what  extent  a  particular  section  was  the  work  of  a  single  author.  See  Leslie 
Gelb's  introductory  "Letter  of  transmittal"  for  such  information  as  there  is. 
Furthermore,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  this  material  was  not  prepared  for 
publication.  Undoubtedly  it  would  have  been  revised  and  corrected,  had  it  been 
intended  for  publication.  Finally,  footnotes  are  missing,  and  it  is  therefore  im- 
possible to  know  what  qualifications  and  further  comments  they  might  contain. 
The  general  bias  of  the  analysts  must,  however,  be  appreciated  by  anyone  who 
hopes  to  make  serious  use  of  this  material.  Disinterested  scholarship  on  con- 
temporary affairs  is  something  of  an  illusion,  though  it  is  not  unusual  for  a 
commitment  to  the  dominant  ideology  to  be  mistaken  for  "neutrality."  Such 


190      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

naivete  is  apparent,  not  infrequently,  in  these  analyses,  though  no  more  so  than 
in  most  professional  work.^"*  Nevertheless,  no  reader  will  fail  to  learn  a  good 
deal  about  the  U.S.  involvement,  and  the  attitudes  and  goals  that  underlie  it, 
from  a  careful  reading  of  the  analyses  and  the  documentation  on  which  they  are 
based. 

To  cite  a  small  example,  it  was  not  generally  known  that  North  Vietnamese 
villages  were  apparently  bombed  and  strafed  by  T-28s  on  the  eve  of  the  Tonkin 
Gulf  incident  in  August  1964,  or  that  Thai  pilots  under  direct  U.S.  command 
were  shot  down  over  the  DRV  two  weeks  later,  though  the  Pathet  Lao  had 
provided  evidence,  generally  disregarded  in  the  West,  that  Thai  pilots  were 
taking  part  in  the  bombing  of  Laos.^**''  Given  the  timing,  the  facts  are  of  some 
interest. 

Consider  a  more  important  example:  the  escalation  of  the  war  in  Laos  in 
1964.27  It  is  claimed  by  U.S.  officials  that  the  American  involvement  in  an  ex- 
panding war  in  Laos  in  1964  was  in  response  to  North  Vietnamese  aggression. 
Evidence  to  support  this  interpretation  of  events  is  slim,^^  but  it  is  a  fact  that 
North  Vietnamese  soldiers  entered  Laos  in  February  1964.  A  report  of  the 
ICC  "notes  with  interest"  that  the  complaint  of  October  1964  from  the  Royal 
Lao  Government  is  the  first  since  the  reconvening  of  the  Commission  in  1961 
reporting  the  capture  of  prisoners  "alleged  to  have  been  North  Vietnamese."  A 
few  days  prior  to  the  RLG  complaint  of  October,  the  Pathet  Lao  had  notified 
the  ICC  that  U.S.  aircraft  had  attacked  Laotian  territory  and  parachuted  South 
Vietnamese  soldiers  into  Laos.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  three  soldiers  were  re- 
ported captured  (two  identified  by  name),  the  Pathet  Lao  charge  is  plausible, 
given  that  three  years  earlier  (October  1961)  President  Kennedy  had  directed 
that  the  United  States  "initiate  guerrilla  ground  action,  including  the  use  of 
U.S.  advisers  if  necessary,"  in  Southern  Laos,  seven  months  after  he  had  in- 
structed that  "we  make  every  possible  effort  to  launch  guerrilla  operations  in 
Viet-Minh  territory  at  the  earliest  possible  time"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:140).  In  May 
1961,  an  interdepartmental  task  force  proposed  extensive  covert  operations  in 
Southern  Laos,  approved  by  the  President  (Gravel  ed.,  11:641-642;  111:140; 
see  also  my  note  33).  These  operations  were  perhaps  called  off  after  the  Geneva 
agreements  of  1962,  though  the  United  States  continued  to  supply  guerrillas 
operating  behind  Pathet  Lao  lines  and  by  mid- 1963  had  reportedly  begun  to 
reintroduce  CIA  military  advisers. In  mid-November  1963  the  CIA  reported 
"first  results  just  coming  in"  from  a  new  series  of  cross-border  operations  into 
Laos  (Gravel  ed.,  111:141). 

The  ICC  investigation  confirmed  the  charge  concerning  the  North  Vietnamese 
soldiers,  who  entered  Laos  in  February.  The  most  convincing  evidence  of  direct 
North  Vietnamese  involvement  presented  by  Langer  and  ZaslofT  is  the  testimony 
of  a  North  Vietnamese  defector,  who  had  been  a  Pathet  Lao  battalion  adviser.^^ 
He  was  given  a  month's  leave  in  late  January  1964  before  undertaking  a  new  (un- 
specified) assignment,  but  was  suddenly  notified  on  February  5  to  report  to 
Headquarters  to  accept  an  assignment,  as  he  then  learned,  as  a  military  adviser 
to  the  408th  Pathet  Lao  Battalion,  which  operated  along  the  borders  of  China. 
He  entered  Laos  sometime  after  February  18,  from  China.  He  reports  having 
met  an  NVA  battalion  in  North  Vietnam  near  the  Chinese  border  on  February 
12,  also  headed  for  Laos. 

Why  should  the  DRV  have  infiltrated  advisers  (and  possibly  troops)  into 
Northern  Laos  in  February  1964?  The  Pentagon  Papers  suggest  a  possible  an- 
swer. In  late  1963  plans  were  laid  for  a  significant  escalation  of  the  war,  and 
on  February  1,  the  covert  operations  of  the  U.S.-GVN  in  Laos  and  North 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  191 

Vietnam  were  stepped  up  considerably  and  placed  under  direct  American  com- 
mand in  Saigon.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  the  plans  were  known  to  the  North 
Vietnamese  even  before,  given  the  generally  porous  character  of  the  Saigon 
Administration  and  military.  The  purpose  of  this  much  expanded  program  of 
sabotage,  kidnapping,  commando  raids  and  psychological  warfare  was  to  in- 
dicate to  the  DRV  the  depth  of  American  commitment  to  the  achievement  of 
its  war  aims,  specifically,  surrender  of  the  Pathet  Lao  and  the  NLF  and  the 
establishment  of  non-Communist  governments  in  Laos  and  South  Vietnam.  Basing 
himself  on  material  obtained  prior  to  the  publication  of  the  Pentagon  Papers, 
Anthony  Austin  states  correctly  that  February  1,  1964,  must  "go  down  as  one  of 
the  key  dates  of  the  American  involvement."  These  covert  operations,  involving 
Vietnamese  and  foreign  mercenaries  (Chinese  nationalists,  European  adven- 
turers, and  possibly  some  Thais had  "the  primary  motive  ...  to  convey  a 
message  to  Hanoi:  'We  are  changing  the  rules.  You  no  longer  have  a  sanctuary. 
The  war  is  entering  a  new  phase.'  "  The  official  purpose  of  these  and  related 
operations  was  to  "warn  and  harass  North  Vietnam  and  to  reduce  enemy  capa- 
bilities to  utilize  the  Lao  Panhandle  for  reinforcing  the  Viet  Cong  in  South 
Vietnam  and  to  cope  with  PL/VM  pressures  in  Laos"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:606). 

The  covert  program  initiated  on  February  1  was  "spawned"  in  May  of  1963,^^ 
approved  by  the  Joint  Chiefs  on  September  9,  and  finally  approved  by  the 
President  on  January  16.  This  "elaborate  program  of  covert  military  operations 
against  the  state  of  North  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed.,  IK:  149)  was  a  significant 
expansion  of  CIA  efforts  from  1961  to  organize  resistance  and  sabotage  in  North 
Vietnam.  It  was  very  different  in  scale  and  concept  from  earlier  programs.  "A 
firebreak  had  been  crossed"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:106).  Quite  possibly,  the  DRV 
received  the  "signal"  that  was  so  deliberately  sent,  and  appreciated  that  "by 
early  February  1964,  the  United  States  had  committed  itself  to  a  policy  of 
attempting  to  improve  the  situations  in  South  Vietnam  and  Laos  by  subjecting 
North  Vietnam  to  increasing  levels  of  direct  pressure"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:152). 
The  DRV  perhaps  concluded,  reasonably  enough,  that  Laos  might  be  used  as 
a  base  for  an  attack  on  North  Vietnam — as  indeed  proved  to  be  the  case,  shortly 
after,  with  the  establishment  of  radar  posts  to  guide  American  bombers  near 
the  Laos-DRV  border.^^  North  Vietnamese  spokesmen  have  stated  exactly  this; 
for  an  example,  see  At  War  with  Asia,  p.  233,  presented  there  without  comment, 
though  I  would  now  be  inclined  to  say  that  the  remark  is  quite  credible.  They 
may  then  have  decided  to  respond  to  the  threat  by  protecting  their  Western 
borders. 

All  of  this  is  interesting.  The  U.S.  Executive  has  justified  its  clandestine 
operations  in  Laos  on  grounds  of  alleged  North  Vietnamese  aggression.  The 
case  has  never  been  strong.  The  information  released  in^the  Pentagon  study 
weakens  it  still  further. 

It  was  immediately  obvious  that  the  Pentagon  Papers  presented  decisive  evi- 
dence of  U.S.-initiated  escalation  in  late  1963  and  early  1964,  leading  directly 
to  the  expanded  war  in  later  years.  Immediately  upon  the  publication  of  the 
Pentagon  Papers,  the  U.S.  Mission  in  Vietnam  released  the  text  of  a  "captured 
North  Vietnamese  political  directive"  of  December  1963  which,  the  Mission 
claims,  "was  the  formal  authorization  for  increasing  North  Viet-Nam's  military 
presence  in  the  South  in  1964  and  the  years  which  followed."  ^6  According  to 
the  Mission,  the  period  after  Diem's  fall  "seemed  to  Hanoi  an  opportune  time  to 
attempt  the  military  conquest  of  the  South,"  and  this  Resolution  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Lao  Dong  Party,  December  1963,  presents  "the  decision  which 
raised  the  civil  war  in  South  Viet-Nam,  where  both  government  and  insurgents 


192      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

had  been  receiving  external  assistance,  to  the  level  of  an  international  conflict"  ! 

— a  decision  "made  in  Hanoi  in  December,  1963."  The  timing  suggests  that  the  ; 

release  of  the  document  was  an  effort  to  counter  the  evidence  presented  in  the  \ 

Pentagon  Papers  that  the  decision  to  escalate  was  made  in  Washington,  but  the  1 

document  is  (assuming  its  authenticity)  no  less  interesting  for  that  reason. ^"^  ; 

According  to  a  report  by  Arthur  Dommen,  this  document  discloses  that  "The  | 

Hanoi  government  had  decided  upon  escalation  of  the  war  in  South  Vietnam  | 

more  than  a  year  before  the  Johnson  Administration  committed  combat  troops  I 
to  the  conflict."  '^^  The  document  reveals,  he  claims,  that  shortly  after  Diem's 

overthrow  Hanoi  "decided  ...  on  a  step-up  of  the  fighting  in  South  Vietnam,  | 

using  their  own  army  if  necessary."  This  "appears  to  constitute  the  most  au-  j 

thoritative  proof  from  the  hand  of  Hanoi's  leaders  themselves  that  they  were  \ 

planning  a  big  war  in  South  Vietnam  long  before  American  forces  began  to  take  j 

an  active  part  in  the  conflict,"  and  had  it  been  known  to  U.S.  intelligence,  it  | 

could  have  been  used  by  the  Administration  in  1964  to  explain  U.S.  involvement  i! 

as  a  response  to  North  Vietnamese  aggression.  Dommen  gives  a  few  quotations  I 

from  the  document,  which,  however,  do  not  substantiate  his  assertions.  1; 

The  document  itself  says  nothing  about  a  decision  to  use  North  Vietnamese  | 
troops  in  the  South  or  even  about  covert  North  Vietnamese  operations  in  the  jj 
South  (analogous,  say,  to  those  that  the  CIA  had  been  conducting  for  many  j 
years  in  the  North  and  that  were  sharply  escalated  on  February  1,  1964).  It  || 
speaks  of  the  "struggle  of  the  South  Vietnamese  people  against  the  United  States  j 
for  national  independence,"  which  is  at  the  same  time  a  class  struggle  waged  by  j 
SVN  workers  and  peasants  against  "feudalist  landowners"  and  "pro-U.S.  hour-  I 
geois  compradors."  The  document  discusses  the  "successes  of  our  Southern  com-  j 
patriots"  and  the  "achievements  of  the  South  Vietnamese  people"  who  now  | 
"show  themselves  capable  of  beating  the  enemy  in  any  situation."  "The  South 
Vietnamese  people  is  one  half  of  the  heroic  people"  of  Vietnam;  they  wage  a 
revolutionary  war,  exploiting  their  political  and  moral  strength  to  combat  the  > 
material  and  military  superiority  of  the  enemy.  "The  war  waged  by  the  people 
in  South  VN  is  a  protracted  one  because  we  are  a  small  people  having  to  fight  ; 
an  imperialist  ringleader  which  is  the  U.S.A."  "The  general  guideline  for  our  i 
people's  revolutionary  war  in  SVN  is  to  conduct  a  protracted  war,  relying  mainly  ij 
on  our  own  forces  .  .  .";  ".  .  .  the  revolutionary  people  in  SVN  must  promote 
a  spirit  of  self-reliance."  With  a  proper  "emphasis  on  self-reliance  and  coordina- 
tion between  political  struggle  and  armed  struggle  .  .  .  the  SVN  people  ...  . 
have  achieved  many  great  victories."  But  "the  people  in  the  South  must  not  j 
only  have  a  big  and  strong  political  force  but  a  big  and  strong  military  force  as  ^ 
well."  Therefore,  concerted  political  and  military  efforts  must  be  made  in  the  ii 
mountainous,  rural,  and  urban  areas,  "to  motivate  the  people  and  ethnic-minority  | 
groups  ...  to  participate  in  our  political  struggle,"  to  wage  protracted  war,  to  \ 
prepare  for  a  General  Uprising.  "The  South  Vietnamese  people's  war"  will  sue-  || 
ceed,  and  the  Party  "will  lead  the  South  Vietnamese  Revolution  to  final  victory."  [ 

There  is  further  discussion  of  the  military  and  political  tactics  that  "the  South  | 
Vietnamese  people  must  adopt":  annihilation  tactics,  helping  the  people,  in-  j 
creasing  production,  mobilizing  military  forces,  protecting  the  material  and  cul- 
tural life  of  the  people,  heightening  the  sense  of  self-reliance,  developing  democ-  \ 
racy  and  trusting  the  masses.  "Revolution  is  a  creative  achievement  of  the  \ 
masses";  "To  win  or  to  lose  the  war  depends  on  many  factors,  but  the  basic  one 
is  man."  "We  must  develop  democracy  to  promote  the  subjective  activism"  of 
the  people.  "We  should  bring  democracy  into  full  play  in  political  and  armed 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  193 

struggles,"  and  learn  from  the  experiences  of  the  people,  eliminating  "command- 
ism,"  "detachment  from  the  masses,"  etc. 

The  "SVN  Revolutionary  Armed  Forces"  must  be  constructed  in  accordance 
with  the  same  "fundamental  principles  .  .  .  applied  for  the  building  up  the 
Vietnamese  People's  Army,"  with  main  force,  local  force,  and  militia  guerrilla 
force  "under  the  absolute  leadership  of  the  Party."  "This  army  is  not  only  a 
combat  army,  but  also  an  action  and  production  army,"  as  is  necessary  in  a 
struggle  in  which  the  political  and  social  component  is  central.  The  "all-people, 
all-sided  war"  must  be  expanded  "Even  if  the  U.S.  imperialists  bring  fifty  to  a 
hundred  thousand  additional  troops  to  SVN." 

After  thirty-nine  pages  in  this  vein,  there  is  a  two-page  statement  of  "The 
Mission  of  North  Vietnam."  It  begins  as  follows: 

To  fulfill  the  above-mentioned  mission,  not  only  the  Party  and  people  in 
the  South  must  make  outstanding  efforts  but  the  Party  and  people  in  the 
North  must  make  outstanding  efforts  as  well.  The  role  of  the  two  "mien" 
[parts:  North  and  South  Vietnam]  in  the  revolutionary  undertaking  of  the 
country,  as  defined  by  the  Party's  third  National  Congress  [September  1960], 
is  unchanged,  however  it  is  time  for  the  North  to  increase  aid  to  the  South, 
the  North  must  bring  into  fuller  play  its  role  as  the  revolutionary  base  for 
the  whole  nation. 

"We  should  plan  to  aid  the  South  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Revolution," 
to  encourage  our  people  in  the  North  to  work  harder  to  "increase  our  economic 
and  defensive  strength  in  North  Viet-Nam"  and  "to  be  ready  to  fulfill  their 
obligation  toward  the  southern  Revolution  under  any  form  and  in  any  circum- 
stance" (for  example,  say,  if  the  outright  U.S.  invasion  with  50  to  100,000 
troops  takes  place).  The  Party  must  "direct  the  revolution  in  the  South";  "we 
must  coordinate  with  concerned  branches  of  service  in  the  North  in  order  to 
'  better  serve  the  revolution  in  the  South."  Following  the  anti-French  war,  "the 
;  revolutionary  struggle  of  our  Southern  compatriots  has  been  going  on  for  almost 
'  the  last  ten  years  .  .  .  the  entire  Party,  the  entire  people  from  North  to  South 
must  have  full  determination  and  make  outstanding  efforts  to  bring  success  to 
the  revolution  of  our  Southern  compatriots  and  achieve  peace  and  unification  of 
the  country,  to  win  total  victory,  to  build  a  peaceful,  unified,  independent,  demo- 
cratic, prosperous  and  strong  Viet-Nam." 
'     In  short,  the  document  states  that  the  people  of  North  Vietnam  must  be 
i  prepared  to  aid  the  popular  revolutionary  struggle  being  conducted,  in  a  spirit 
;  of  self-reliance,  by  their  Southern  compatriots,  the  other  half  of  the  Vietnamese 
people.  One  need  not  turn  to  captured  documents  to  read  such  exhortations. 
English-language  publications  from  Hanoi  commonly  refer  to  "the  great  support 
of  the  Northern  people  for  the  struggle  against  U.S.  aggression  of  the  Southern 
kith  and  kin."  The  English  text  of  the  Third  Congress  (1960)  Resolution  pub- 
lished in  Hanoi  speaks  of  the  two  tasks  of  the  Vietnamese  Revolution:  "to  carry 
out  the  socialist  revolution  in  the  North"  and  "to  liberate  the  South  from  the 
rule  of  the  American  imperialists  and  their  henchmen,  achieve  national  reunifica- 
tion and  complete  independence  and  freedom  throughout  the  country."  See  also 
■  the  public  statement  of  General  Giap  in  January  1960  cited  above  (p.  187).  The 
'  U.S.  government  White  Paper  of  1965  cites  many  other  public  statements  of 
the  same  sort  in  its  rather  pathetic  effort  to  demonstrate  North  Vietnamese  ag- 
gression. In  later  years,  there  is  frequent  reference  to  the  1967  statement  of  Ho 


194      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

Chi  Minh  that  "Viet  Nam  is  one,  the  Vietnamese  people  are  one,  and  no  one  i 

can  encroach  upon  this  sacred  right  of  our  people  .  .  .  [to]  .  .  .  independence,  i 

sovereignty,  unity  and  territorial  integrity  of  Viet  Nam."     The  captured  docu-  I 

ment  released  by  the  U.S.  mission  is  also  typical  in  its  reference  to  the  struggle  i 

conducted  by  the  South  Vietnamese  people  in  a  spirit  of  self-reliance,  with  aid  ] 

from  the  North,  and  with  the  goal  of  eventual  reunification  (cf.  the  Constitution  i 

of  the  G VN ) ;  and  in  its  emphasis  on  the  central  importance  of  the  political  and  , 

social  struggle,  which  of  course  can  only  be  conducted  by  indigenous  forces,  in  \ 

the  face  of  the  military  superiority  of  the  United  States  and  the  Vietnamese  armed  ? 

forces  it  has  established.  It  might  be  noted  that  the  GVN  constitution  contains  i 

one  non-amendable  Article,  namely  Article  1,  which  states  that  "Vietnam  is  an  | 

independent,  unified  and  territorially  indivisible  Republic,"  thus  extending  from  j 

China  to  the  Camau  Peninsula.  \ 

One  must  assume  that  the  U.S.  mission  has  done  its  best  to  support  the  con-  j 

elusion  it  announced  in  the  introduction  to  this  document,  a  conclusion  duly  \ 

repeated  by  a  sympathetic  reporter,  but  not  founded  on  the  actual  text.  If  so,  | 

the  case  that  the  United  States  is  unilaterally  responsible  for  escalation  of  the  ; 
war  in  1964  seems  to  be  demonstrated  beyond  serious  question.  Incidentally,  if 

the  war  in  the  South  was  a  "civil  war"  prior  to  this  point,  as  the  U.S.  Mission  1 

states,  then  the  direct  engagement  of  U.S.  military  forces  in  combat  from  1961,  | 

and  the  CIA-Special  Forces  covert  operations  throughout  Indochina,  were  surely  \ 

in  violation  of  the  UN  Charter,  which  grants  an  outside  power  no  right  to  en-  i 

gage  in  combat  in  a  civil  war.  \ 

It  has  repeatedly  been  argued  that  the  interpretation  of  the  Indochina  war  is  i 

biased  against  the  United  States  because  we  have  no  access  to  internal  DRV  } 

documents.  The  statement  is  at  best  misleading.  In  fact,  the  U.S.  government  has  i 

been  selectively  releasing  "captured  documents"     for  years  on  a  significant  scale  ; 

in  an  effort  to  buttress  its  case,  whereas  internal  U.S.  documents,  prior  to  the  i 

publication  of  the  Pentagon  study,  have  been  available  only  when  leaked  by  the  i 

U.S.  Executive  or  in  memoirs  of  its  former  members.  The  DRV  and  the  NLF,  ' 

of  course,  do  not  capture  and  selectively  release  U.S.  government  documents,  j 

Therefore  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  state  that  in  the  past,  internal  documents  i 

have,  for  the  most  part,  been  selected  by  the  U.S.  Executive  for  public  release,  ' 
for  its  own  purposes,  from  both  U.S.  and  Vietnamese  sources.  Nevertheless,  the 

record  both  prior  to  and  with  the  publication  of  the  Pentagon  study  would  seem  I 

to  leave  little  doubt  as  to  who  is  responsible  for  the  successive  stages  of  escala-  j 
tion,  quite  apart  from  the  respective  rights  of  the  U.S.  government  and  contend- 
ing Vietnamese  to  carry  out  military  and  political  actions  in  Vietnam. 

In  the  same  connection,  the  Pentagon  Papers  add  valuable  documentation  with 

regard  to  the  commitment  of  North  Vietnamese  troops  to  South  Vietnam.  Over  i 
the  past  few  years  there  has  been  a  running  debate  about  this  matter.  The  docu- 
mentary record  previously  available  had  indicated  that  regular  North  Vietnamese 

units  were  first  identified  in  April  1965,^1  However,  some  pro-government  spokes-  : 

men  have  repeatedly  claimed  in  public  discussion  that  the  U.S.  government  knew  i 
that  regular  units  of  the  North  Vietnamese  army  (NVA,  PAVN)  were  operating 
in  the  South  even  before  the  November  election  of  1964,  but  chose  not  to  reveal 

this  fact  for  domestic  political  reasons.  (Why  the  Pentagon  should  have  main-  \ 
tained  this  deception  through  1965  and  1966  remains  a  mystery,  under  this 
theory.)  Joseph  Alsop  asserts  (with  no  cited  evidence)  that  "In  1965,  when 
President  Johnson  intervened  on  the  ground,  Hanoi  had  two  North  Vietnamese 
divisions  'in  country'  " — that  is,  "on  the  order  of  28,000  of  Hanoi's  troops." 
The  date  of  U.S.  ground  intervention  would  be  sometime  between  February  26, 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  195 

when  the  deployment  of  combat  marines  was  approved  (March  8  "was  the  first 
time  that  U.S.  ground  combat  units  had  been  committed  to  action"),  and  June  27, 
when  U.S.  forces  took  part  in  their  first  search-and-destroy  operation  into  Viet 
Cong  base  areas  (Gravel  ed.,  111:390,  417,  461). 

The  published  documents  reveal  exactly  what  Washington  believed  to  be  the 
case  duing  this  period.  The  first  reference  to  regular  North  Vietnamese  units 
is  in  a  CIA-DIA  memorandum  of  April  21,  1965,  which  "reflected  the  acceptance 
into  the  enemy  order  of  battle  of  one  regiment  of  the  325th  PAVN  Division 
said  to  be  located  in  [Northwestern]  Kontum  province."  "^'^  Of  the  various  signs 
of  deterioration  noted,  this  was  the  "most  ominous,"  "a  sobering  harbinger  of 
things  to  come."  Westmoreland,  on  June  7,  informed  CINCPAC  that  "Sorhe 
PAVN  forces  have  entered  SVN"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:438),  and  on  June  13,  re- 
ported that  the  PAVN  325th  Division  "may  be  deployed  in  Kontum,  Pleiku  and 
Phu  Bon"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 607).  An  NVA  regiment  "reportedly"  overran  a 
district  headquarters  in  Kontum  Province  on  June  25  (Gravel  ed.,  11:473;  the 
earliest  such  report  in  this  particular  record). 

Apparently,  these  reports  were  not  too  persuasive.  On  July  2,  1965,  a  memo- 
randum from  McNaughton  to  General  Goodpaster  reports:  "I  am  quite  con- 
cerned about  the  increasing  probability  that  there  are  regular  PAVN  forces  either 
in  the  II  Corps  area  [the  area  of  the  previous  reports]  or  in  Laos  directly  across 
,     the  border  from  II  Corps"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:291,  277). 

I  On  July  14,  the  Joint  Chiefs  included  one  regiment  of  the  325th  PAVN 
i  Division  in  their  estimate  of  48,500  "Viet  Cong  organized  combat  units"  (Gravel 
i  ed.,  IV:  295).  An  intelligence  estimate  (SNIE)  of  July  23  predicted  that  if  the 
I     United  States  increased  its  strength  in  SVN  to  175,000  by  November  1,  then  in 

order  to  offset  this  increase,  the  Communists  would  probably  introduce  a  PAVN 
'  force  totaling  20,000  to  30,000  by  the  end  of  1965  (Gravel  ed.,  111:484-485; 
I  this,  the  analyst  adds,  "they  were  already  in  the  process  of  doing").  The  absence 
!  of  any  considerable  number  of  PAVN  troops  was  reflected  in  the  "Concept  for 
i     Vietnam"  presented  on  August  27,  which  specified  as  the  major  military  tasks: 

"To  cause  the  DRV  to  cease  its  direction  and  support  of  the  Viet  Cong  in- 
I  surgency,"  while  defeating  the  Viet  Cong  and  deterring  Communist  China  (Gravel 
I     ed.,  IV:300). 

1        For  comparison,  note  that  on  April  21,  1965,  McNamara  reported  that  33,500 
;     U.S.  troops  were  already  in-country,  in  addition  to  2,000  Koreans  who  had  been 
dispatched  on  January  8,  1965  (Gravel  ed.,  111:706,  139).  He  reported  the 
unanimous  recommendation  of  the  Honolulu  meeting  of  April  20  that  U.S. 
;    forces  be  raised  to  82,000,  supplemented  with  7,250  Korean  and  Australian 
:     troops.  The  analyst  concludes  that  by  the  time  of  the  Honolulu  meeting,  "we 
were  inexorably  committed  to  a  military  resolution  of  the  insurgency"  since 
;    "The  problem  seemed  no  longer  soluble  by  any  other  means"  (Gravel  ed., 
i    111:105) — the  day  before  the  "ominous"  CIA-DIA  report.  By  June,  the  United 
States  decided  "to  pour  U.S.  troops  into  the  country  as  fast  as  they  could  be 
deployed"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:362).  On  July  1,  the  day  before  McNaughton  ex- 
!    pressed  his  concern  over  the  possibility  that  PAVN  forces  might  intervene, 
planned  U.S.  deployments  were  85,000  troops  (Gravel  ed.,  111:473).  In  mid-July, 
i    when  the  JCS  were  estimating  one  PAVN  regiment  in  South  Vietnam,  the 
;    President  approved  the  request  that  the  U.S.  troop  level  be  raised  to  175,000  in 
1965,  with  estimated  U.S.  killed-in-action  of  500  per  month,  and  another  100,000 
recommended  for  1966  (Gravel  ed.,  111:396,  416;  IV:297,  299).  Recafl  that 
h  April  1965  was  two  months  after  the  initiation  of  regular  and  intensive  bombing 
of  North  and  South  Vietnam,  eight  months  after  the  bombing  of  strategic  targets 


196      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon-  Papers/Vol.  V 

in  North  Vietnam  in  "retaliation"  for  the  Tonkin  incident,  and  fourteen  months 
after  the  escalation  of  military  pressure  against  the  North  on  February  1,  1964.^^ 
Recall  also  that  the  U.S.  troop  level  reached  23,000  by  the  end  of  1964  (Gravel 
ed.,  11:160),  and  that  the  U.S.  military  had  been  directly  engaged  in  combat 
operations  for  three  years,  at  that  point. 

The  record  is  clear,  then,  that  when  the  United  States  undertook  the  February 
escalation,  it  knew  of  no  regular  North  Vietnamese  units  in  South  Vietnam,  and 
that  five  months  later,  while  implementing  the  plan  to  deploy  85,000  troops,^^ 
the  Pentagon  was  still  speculating  about  the  possibility  that  there  might  be 
PAVN  forces  in  or  near  South  Vietnam.  In  the  light  of  these  facts,  the  discussion 
of  whether  the  U.S.  was  defending  South  Vietnam  from  an  "armed  attack"  from 
the  North — the  official  U.S.  government  position — is  ludicrous. 

The  most  striking  feature  of  the  historical  record,  as  presented  in  the  Pentagon 
study,  is  its  remarkable  continuity.  I  have  noted  several  examples  already,  but 
perhaps  the  most  significant  has  to  do  with  the  political  premises  of  the  four 
Administrations  covered  in  the  record.  Never  was  there  the  slightest  deviation 
from  the  principle  that  a  non-Communist  regime  must  be  imposed,  regardless  of 
popular  sentiment.  True,  the  scope  of  the  principle  was  narrowed  when  it  was 
finally  conceded,  by  about  1960,  that  North  Vietnam  was  "lost."  Apart  from 
that,  the  principle  was  maintained  without  equivocation.  Given  this  principle, 
the  strength  of  the  Vietnamese  resistance,  the  military  power  available  to  the 
United  States,  and  the  lack  of  effective  constraints,  one  can  deduce,  with  almost 
mathematical  precision,  the  strategy  of  annihilation  that  was  gradually  under- 
taken. 

In  May  1949,  Acheson  informed  U.S.  officials  in  Saigon  and  Paris  that  "no 
effort  should  be  spared"  to  assure  the  success  of  the  Bao  Dai  government  (which, 
he  added,  would  be  recognized  by  the  United  States  when  circumstances  permit), 
since  there  appeared  to  be  "no  other  alternative  to  estab[lishment]  Commie 
pattern  Vietnam."  He  further  urged  that  the  Bao  Dai  government  should  be 
"truly  representative  even  to  extent  including  outstanding  non-Commie  leaders 
now  supporting  Ho."  Of  course  Acheson  was  aware  that  Ho  Chi  Minh  had 
"captured  control  of  the  nationalist  movement,"  that  he  was  "the  strongest  and 
perhaps  the  ablest  figure  in  Indochina  and  that  any  suggested  solution  which 
excludes  him  is  an  expedient  of  uncertain  outcome."  ^"^  But  to  Acheson,  Ho's 
popularity  was  of  no  greater  moment  than  his  nationalist  credentials.^^ 

In  May  1967,  McNaughton  and  A4cNamara  presented  a  memorandum  that 
the  analyst  takes  to  imply  a  significant  reorientation  of  policy,  away  from  the 
early  emphasis  on  military  victory  and  toward  a  more  limited  and  conciliatory 
posture.  McNaughton  suggested  that  the  United  States  emphasize  "that  the  sole 
U.S.  objective  in  Vietnam  has  been  and  is  to  permit  the  people  of  South  Vietnam 
to  determine  their  own  future."  Accordingly,  the  Saigon  government  should  be 
encouraged  "to  reach  an  accommodation  with  the  non-Communist  South  Viet- 
namese who  are  under  the  VC  banner;  to  accept  them  as  members  of  an  opposi- 
tion political  party,  and,  if  necessary,  to  accept  their  individual  participation  in 
the  national  government."  This  is  precisely  Acheson's  proposal  of  eighteen 
years  earlier  (restricted,  now,  to  South  Vietnam). 

The  final  words  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  analysis  describe  a  new  policy,  under- 
taken after  the  Tet  offensive  of  1968  had  shattered  the  old:  "American  forces 
would  remain  in  South  Vietnam  to  prevent  defeat  of  the  Government  by  Com- 
munist forces  and  to  provide  a  shield  behind  which  that  Government  could  rally, 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  197 

become  effective,  and  win  the  support  of  its  people"  (Gravel,  ed.,  IV:604). 
Again,  the  same  assumption:  the  United  States  must  provide  the  military  force 
to  enable  a  non-Communist  regime,  despite  its  political  weakness,  corruption 
and  injustice,  somehow  to  manage  to  stabilize  itself.  Nowhere  is  there  the  slightest 
deviation  from  this  fundamental  commitment. The  same  policy  remains  in 
force  today,  despite  tactical  modifications.'''^ 

Small  wonder,  then,  that  many  Vietnamese  saw  the  United  States  as  the 
inheritors  of  French  colonialism.  The  analyst  cites  studies  of  peasant  attitudes 
demonstrating  "that  for  many,  the  struggle  which  began  in  1945  against  colonial- 
ism continued  uninterrupted  throughout  Diem's  regime:  in  1954,  the  foes  of 
nationalists  were  transformed  from  France  and  Bao  Dai,  to  Diem  and  the  U.S. 
.  .  .  but  the  issues  at  stake  never  changed"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:295;  see  also  1:252). 
Correspondingly,  the  Pentagon  considered  its  problem  to  be  to  "deter  the  Viet 
Cong  (formerly  called  Viet  Minh)"  (May  1959;  DOD,  book  10,  11860;  also 
Gravel  ed.,  11:409).  Diem  himself,  on  occasion,  seems  to  have  taken  a  rather 
similar  position.  Speaking  to  the  departing  French  troops  on  April  28,  1956,  he 
pledged  that  "your  forces,  who  have  fought  to  defend  honor  and  freedom,  will 
find  in  us  worthy  successors."     General  Minh  in  January  1964  warned  of  the 
"colonial  flavor  to  the  whole  pacification  effort."  The  French,  in  their  "worst  and 
clumsiest  days,"  never  went  into  villages  or  districts  as  the  Americans  were  about 
to  do.  Note  the  date.  In  response  to  Lodge's  argument  that  most  of  the  teams 
were  Vietnamese,  General  Minh  pointed  out  that  "they  are  considered  the  same 
as  Vietnamese  who  worked  for  the  Japanese."  The  U.S.  reaction  was  to  reject 
\     Minh's  proposals  as  "an  unacceptable  rearward  step"  and  to  extend  the  adviser 
■     system  even  below  "sector  and  battalion  level"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:307-308).  A  year 
!     and  a  half  later,  it  was  quite  appropriate  for  William  Bundy  to  wonder  whether 
i     people  in  the  countryside,  who  already  may  be  tempted  to  regard  the  Americans 
as  the  successors  to  the  French,  might  not  "flock  to  the  VC  banner"  after  the  full- 
I     scale  U.S.  invasion  then  being  planned  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:61 1 ). 

The  Thieu  regime  today  has  a  power  base  remarkably  like  Diem's,  perhaps 
even  narrower.^-'^  By  now,  substantial  segments  of  the  urban  intelligentsia — "the 
ij  people  who  count,"  as  Lodge  put  it  (Gravel  ed.,  n:738) — regard  U.S.  interven- 
I  tion  as  blatant  imperialism.  Of  course,  one  may  argue  that  the  popular  mood 
\  counts  for  less  than  in  former  years,  now  that  the  United  States  has  succeeded, 
;  partially  at  least,  in  "grinding  the  enemy  down  by  sheer  weight  and  mass"  (Robert 
I     Komer  in  Graveled.,  IV:  420). 


Notes 

1.  Cf.  F.  Schurmann,  P.  D.  Scott  and  R.  Zelnick,  T/ze  Politics  of  Escalation  in  Viet- 
1     nam,  Fawcett,  1966;  E.  S.  Herman  and  R.  B.  Du  BofF,  America's  Vietnam  Policy, 

Public  Affairs  Press,  1966;  and  many  later  works. 

2.  The  "Letter  of  Transmittal"  identifies  Gelb  as  the  author  of  the  summary  and 
analysis  sections  (Gravel  ed.,  I:xvi).  References,  unless  otherwise  indicated,  are  to  the 
Gravel  Edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  Beacon,  1971.  References  to  the  Government 

j     offset  edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  {United  States-Vietnam  Relations,  1945-1967, 
Government  Printing  Office,  1 97 1 )  are  identified  as  DOD. 

3.  George  McT.  Kahin  and  John  Lewis,  The  United  States  in  Vietnam,  Dial,  1967, 
i  pp.  119-120.  I  give  here  the  original,  which  is  slightly  different,  but  in  no  material  way, 
I     from  the  quotation  as  Gelb  cites  it. 


I 


198      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

4.  Philippe  Devillers,  "The  struggle  for  unification  of  Vietnam,"  The  China  Quarterly, 
January-March  1962,  reprinted  in  M.  E.  Gettleman,  ed.,  Vietnam:  History,  Documents, 
and  Opinions,  Fawcett,  1965. 

5.  Devillers,  op.  cit.,  citing  an  interview  with  Diem  in  Figaro.  The  analyst  later  cites 
an  article  by  George  Carver  of  the  CIA  who  states  that  "By  the  end  of  1958  the 
participants  in  this  incipient  insurgency  .  .  .  constituted  a  serious  threat  to  South  Viet 
Nam's  political  stability"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:335;  emphasis  his). 

6.  Cited  by  the  analyst.  Gravel  ed.,  1:345-346.  The  quotations  are  from  Pike's  Viet 
Cong,  MIT,  1966,  p.  76,  and  give  a  fair  indication  of  the  general  level  of  his  analysis, 
though  the  book  is  useful  for  the  documentation  it  contains.  For  a  serious  discussion 
of  the  origins  of  the  NLF  see  Jeffrey  Race,  War  Comes  to  Long  An,  Univ.  of  Cali- 
fornia, 1972. 

7.  Honey  is  an  extreme  anti-Communist  whose  fanaticism  on  the  subject  leads  him 
to  outlandish  statements.  See  my  American  Power  and  the  New  Mandarins,  Pantheon, 
1969,  p.  290,  for  examples.  While  Honey  is  described  merely  as  an  authority  or  an 
expert,  Burchett  is  identified  as  "the  Communist  journalist  Wilfred  Burchette"  (sic; 
Gravel  ed.,  IV: 207,  151). 

8.  "Diplomatic  and  strategic  outcomes  of  the  conflict,"  in  Walter  Isard,  ed.,  Viet- 
nam: Issues  and  Alternatives,  Schenkman  Publishing  Company,  Cambridge,  1969. 

9.  New  York  Times,  June  7,  1965;  cited  in  American  Power  and  the  New  Mandarins, 
chapter  3,  note  49. 

10.  Laos:  Buffer  State  or  Battleground,  Oxford,  1968,  pp.  127  IT.,  139,  149.  A  UN 
Commission  was  unable  to  substantiate  charges  by  the  Lao  government  that  there  was 
a  North  Vietnamese  invasion.  Arthur  Dommen  maintains  that  "the  fact  that  the  sub- 
committee did  not  report  that  there  were  no  North  Vietnamese  troops  in  Laos  is  signifi- 
cant" (Conflict  in  Laos,  revised  edition,  Praeger,  1971,  p.  124),  but  is  unwilling  to  go 
beyond  that. 

11.  North  Vietnam  and  the  Pathet  Lao,  Harvard,  1970,  pp.  68-69.  This  book  is  an 
attempt  to  make  the  case  for  North  Vietnamese  control  of  the  Pathet  Lao.  I  have 
discussed  it,  in  its  earlier  incarnation  as  a  RAND  report,  in  my  At  War  with  Asia, 
Pantheon,  1970,  chapter  4,  along  with  other  RAND  reports  by  these  authors. 

12.  For  background,  in  addition  to  the  references  cited  earlier,  see  J.  Mirsky  and 
S.  E.  Stonefield,  "The  United  States  in  Laos,  1945-1962,"  in  E.  Friedman  and 
M.  Selden,  eds.,  America's  Asia,  Pantheon,  1970. 

13.  Charles  A.  Stevenson,  The  End  of  Nowhere:  American  Policy  Toward  Laos 
since  1954,  Beacon,  1972,  p.  73. 

14.  Barely  noted  in  the  Pentagon  Papers.  DOD  book  10  contains  some  relevant  docu- 
ments. For  example,  an  intelligence  analysis  of  December  1958  indicates  that  the 
NLHS  (the  political  arm  of  the  Pathet  Lao)  "appears  to  be  making  strong  gains  in 
almost  every  sector  of  Laotian  society"  after  the  electoral  victory  {DOD  1172),  and 
an  NSC  report  a  few  weeks  later  mentions  the  introduction  of  U.S.  military  officers 
"in  civilian  clothing"  {DOD  1165;  January  1959;  both  facts  commonly  noted  else- 
where). In  an  appendix,  Stevenson  reviews  the  Pentagon  Papers  documentation  with 
reference  to  Laos.  See  also  Jonathan  Mirsky,  "High  Drama  in  Foggy  Bottom," 
Saturday  Review,  January  1,  1972,  for  comment  on  this  matter. 

15.  /.  F.  Stone's  Weekly,  February  27  and  March  6,  1967,  from  which  the  informa- 
tion given  here  is  taken.  Much  of  his  evidence  derives  from  reporting  by  Raymond 
Coffey,  one  of  the  small  group  of  U.S.  correspondents  who,  over  the  years,  refused  to 
be  fooled. 

16.  The  New  York  Times  edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  (Bantam,  1971,  p.  525) 
repeats  President  Johnson's  claim  that  the  renewed  bombing  was  a  response  to  the 
"unparalleled  magnitude  of  the  North  Vietnamese  supply  effort,"  mentioning  none  of 
the  facts  just  cited,  though  the  Times  had  carried  some  of  this  information.  See 
"Vietnam  Cease-Fire  Ends  without  Sign  of  Extension,"  Special  to  the  New  York  Times, 
datelined  Saigon,  February  12,  which  cites  reports  from  correspondents  in  the  provinces 
north  and  northwest  of  Saigon  that  "the  highways  were  much  more  crowded  than  usual 
with  United  States  convoys,"  and  also  notes  that  U.S.  military  officers  confirmed  "that 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  199 

they  were  moving  extraordinary  amounts  of  food,  fuel  and  ammunition  to  forward 
positions." 

17.  The  Lost  Crusade,  Dodd,  Mead,  1970,  p.  362. 

18.  Joseph  Buttinger,  Neues  Forum,  Vienna,  1966,  cited  by  E.  Herman,  Atrocities 
in  Vietnam,  Pilgrim  Press,  1970,  p.  22. 

19.  M.  Maneli,  The  War  of  the  Vanquished,  Harper,  1971,  p.  32,  referring  to  the 
findings  of  the  ICC.  Maneli  was  the  legal  and  political  adviser  to  the  Polish  delegation 
of  the  ICC  at  the  time,  and  is  strongly  anti-Communist. 

20.  The  actual  U.S.-GVN  altitude  toward  the  Geneva  settlement  is  revealed  not  only 
by  the  rejection  of  the  central  elections  provision — contrary  to  Gelb,  the  most  severe 
violation  of  the  status  quo  established  at  Geneva — but  also  by  the  violent  repression  of 
the  Vietminh.  Article  14c  of  the  Accords  protects  individuals  and  organizations  from 
reprisal  or  discrimination  on  account  of  their  activities  during  the  hostilities.  The  re- 
pression of  the  anti-French  resistance  not  only  reveals  the  U.S.-GVN  attitude  toward 
the  Geneva  Accords,  but  also  exhibits  quite  clearly  the  character  of  the  new  regime. 

21.  See  Gravel  ed.,  1:573  ff.  NSC  5429/2,  August  20,  1954,  immediately  after 
Geneva,  urged  "covert  operations  on  a  large  and  effective  scale"  in  support  of  such 
policies  as  "mak[ing]  more  difficult  the  control  by  the  Viet  Minh  of  North  Vietnam" 
(DOD,  book  10,  p.  737). 

The  behavior  of  France  after  Geneva  was,  incidentally,  almost  as  deplorable  as  that 
of  the  DRV:  "French  insistence  on  strict  legal  interpretation  of  the  Geneva  Accords 
was  one  example  of  accommodation  thinking"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:221;  analyst).  There  were 
others,  hardly  less  insidious. 

22.  Kahin  and  Lewis,  op.  cit.,  p.  74,  referring  to  the  bishoprics  of  Phat  Diem  and 
Bui  Chu,  which,  according  to  Bernard  Fall,  "packed  up  lock,  stock,  and  barrel,  from 
the  bishops  to  almost  the  last  village  priest  and  faithful"  ( The  Two  Viet-Nams,  revised 
edition,  Praeger,  1964,  p.  154).  For  accuracy  one  should  also  add  Fall's  observation 
that  an  extremely  intensive  and  well-conducted  American  psychological  warfare  opera- 
tion was  a  major  factor  in  the  mass  flight. 

23.  What  is  at  issue  is  the  logic  of  Gelb's  argument  and  the  significance  of  the  facts 
he  omits,  not  an  impossible  comparison  of  historically  very  different  revolutions. 

24.  Critics  of  the  war  sometimes  fall  into  this  trap.  For  an  example,  see  my  discus- 
sion of  Telford  Taylor's  important  book  Nuremberg  and  Vietnam:  An  American 
Tragedy,  Quadrangle  Books,  1970,  in  "The  rule  of  force  in  international  affairs,"  Yale 
Law  Journal,  June  1971. 

25.  To  cite  an  example,  selected  virtually  at  random,  consider  this  remark  by  a 
reviewer  in  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
January  1972,  p.  244:  "Since  De  Caux  is  an  unreconstructed  radical,  he  makes  no 
pretense  of  objectivity."  How  often  does  one  come  across  the  statement:  "Since  X  is 
an  unreconstructed  liberal  (or  conservative,  or  adherent  of  capitalist  democracy),  he 
makes  no  pretense  of  objectivity"? 

26.  One  was  captured  on  August  18,  the  same  day  that  Hanoi  claimed  to  have  shot 
down  a  Thai  pilot  over  DRV  territory  according  to  the  document  confirming  the  DRV 
reports  (Gravel  ed.,  111:609).  See  Gareth  Porter,  "After  Geneva:  Subverting  Laotian 
Neutrality,"  in  N.  S.  Adams  and  A.  W.  McCoy,  Laos:  War  and.  Revolution,  Harper, 
1970,  p.  201. 

27.  These  remarks  are  expanded  from  my  article  on  the  Pentagon  Papers  in  Ameri- 
can Report,  July  2,  1971.  Similar  points  are  discussed  by  T.  D.  Allman,  Far  Eastern 
Economic  Review,  July  3,  1971. 

28.  What  is  available  is  reviewed  in  At  War  with  Asia,  chapter  4. 

29.  See  Porter,  op.  cit.  Arthur  Dommen  suggests  that  the  Meo  guerrillas,  "sitting 
astride  the  natural  communication  route  between  Vientiane  and  the  NLHS  base  area 

i  in  Sam  Neua,"  may  have  hampered  communication  sufficiently  to  have  caused  deteriora- 
'  lion  of  the  well-developed  NLHS  infrastructure  in  Vientiane  Province  {op.  cit.,  p.  308). 
'  He  does  not  go  on  to  point  out,  as  Porter  does,  that  U.S.  support  for  the  guerrillas 
constituted  a  very  serious  violation  of  the  Geneva  Agreements,  from  the  outset,  and  a 
ji  major  factor  in  the  renewal  of  conflict. 


200      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V  \ 

30.  Paul  F.  Langer  and  Joseph  J.  Zasloff,  The  North  Vietnamese  Military  Adviser  l 
/■//  Laos,  RM-5688,  RAND  Corporation,  July  1968.  Cf.  At  War  with  Asia,  pp.  230  ff.,  ' 
for  summary  and  discussion.  The  ICC  report  noted  above  states  that  the  earlier  Pathet  j 
Lao  complaint  is  discussed  "in  a  separate  message."  The  British  government  has  so  far  ? 
released  only  the  report  investigating  the  RLG  complaint.  Perhaps  this  is  another  ex-  | 
ample  of  the  "continuing  support  for  your  policy  over  Vietnam"  voiced  by  Prime  | 
Minister  Wilson  when  informed  about  the  impending  attack  on  North  Vietnamese  j 
petroleum  facilities  (despite  his  "reservations  about  this  operation"  [Gravel  ed.,  IV:  \ 
102]).  j 

31.  Fred  Branfman  estimates  that  by  1970  the  U.S.  had  brought  at  least  10,000 
Asians  into  Laos  as  mercenaries,  in  comparison  with  the  perhaps  5,000  North  Viet-  | 
namese  engaged  in  combat  ("Presidential  War  in  Laos,  1964-1970,"  in  Adams  and  | 
McCoy,  op.  cit.,  266,  278  ff.,  where  the  basis  for  the  latter  figure  is  discussed).  ; 
Lansdale's  report  of  July  1961  (Gravel  ed.,  11:643  ff.)  describes  some  of  the  early  [ 
stages  of  these  operations.  The  White  Star  Mobile  Training  Teams,  consisting  of  U.S.  | 
Special  Forces  personnel,  which  were  introduced  into  Laos  covertly  in  the  last  few  | 
weeks  of  the  Eisenhower  Administration  (Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  185),  or  perhaps  in  1! 
1959  (Porter,  op.  cit.,  p.  183)  "had  the  purpose  and  effect  of  establishing  U.S.  control  j 
over  foreign  forces"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:464).  Laos  was  serving  as  a  model  for  Vietnam,  \ 
in  this  and  other  instances.  | 

32.  Austin,  The  President's  War,  1971,  pp.  229-230. 

33.  Gravel  ed.,  Ill:  150.  The  chronology  on  p.  117  states  that  on  May  11,  1963,  CIA-  j 
sponsored  covert  operations  against  NVN  were  "authorized,"  but  this  appears  to  be  an  j 
error,  apparently  referring  to  NSAM  52  of  11  May  1961.  I 

34.  According  to  official  testimony  in  the  Symington  Subcommittee  Hearings  on  | 
Laos,  the  radar  installation  at  Phou  Pha  Thi,  near  the  DRV  border,  was  constructed  in  j 
1966.  T.  D.  Allman  cites  "reliable  American  sources"  who  give  the  date  as  late  1964.  1 
Cf.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  310.  \ 

35.  Admiral  Felt  (CINCPAC)  had  warned  of  just  this  possibility  more  than  two  j 
years  before  (Gravel  ed.,  11:83).  l 

36.  Introduction  to  Document  No.  96,  "The  Viet-Nam  Worker's  Party's  1963  De-  \ 
cision  to  Escalate  the  War  in  the  South,"  American  Embassy,  Saigon,  July  1971.  I  am  i 
indebted  to  Arthur  Dommen  for  providing  me  with  a  copy.  The  title,  of  course,  is 
given  by  the  U.S.  Mission. 

37.  The  timing  of  the  "discovery"  of  captured  documents  has,  more  than  once,  been  ' 
slightly  suspicious.  For  example,  shortly  after  the  exposure  of  the  My  Lai  massacre  a 
document  was  "discovered"  that  had  been  mysteriously  mislaid  for  a  year  and  a  half  i 
"purporting  to  boast  that  at  least  2,748  persons  were  'eliminated'  "  in  Hue  during  the 
Tet  offensive  (Fred  Emery,  London  Times,  November  27,  1969;  the  document  was 
reportedly  found  in  April  1968  but  had  been  "overlooked").  ; 

38.  Boston  Globe-L.A.  Times,  June  30,  1971.  i 

39.  Cf.  An  Outline  History  of  the  Vietnam  Worker's  Party,  Hanoi,  1970,  pp.  123,  ] 
181-182,  136;  and  elsewhere,  repeatedly. 

40.  Obviously,  a  question  arises  as  to  the  authenticity  of  the  documents.  We  know 
that  U.S.  inntelligence  has  been  planting  forged  Vietnamese  documents  since  1954 
(Gravel  ed.,  1 : 579 ) .  See  my  note  37.  i 

41.  The  first  careful  study  of  this  matter  is  T.  Draper's  Abuse  of  Power,  which  is  ; 
also  useful  for  its  revealing  analysis  of  the  internal  contradictions  in  the  U.S.  govern- 
ment accounts,  in  particular,  the  remarkable  statements  of  Dean  Rusk. 

42.  Boston  Globe,  October  19,  1971. 

43.  Gravel  ed.,  111:438.  This  reference  is  said  to  have  confirmed  a  report  of  Febru- 
ary 1965.  In  the  appended  chronology,  the  analyst  states  that  "As  of  late  1964  the 
supply  of  repatriated  southerners  infiltrated  back  from  NVN  had  dried  up  and  NVN  I 
volunteers  were  coming  down  the  trail"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:410).  There  is  no  incon-  i 
sistency.  The  distinction  is  between  individual  soldiers  coming  down  the  trail  and  * 
regular  units  in  military  operations.  Public  Pentagon  reports,  Chester  Cooper's  report 
{op  cit,),  and  Senator  Mansfield,  refer  to  one  battalion,  rather  than  one  regiment,  in 


The  Pentagon  Papers  as  Propaganda  and  as  History  201 

April-May.  The  analyst  refers  to  the  "confirmed  presence"  in  the  South  of  at  least  one 
battalion"  in  April  1965  (Gravel  ed.,  111:392). 

44.  Roger  Hilsman  claims  that  in  summer  1965  it  was  learned  that  at  least  one 
battalion  of  North  Vietnamese  regulars  had  entered  the  South  by  February  1965. 
There  is  no  record  of  this  in  the  Pentagon  Papers.  "Two  American  Counterstrategies 
to  Guerrilla  Warfare,"  in  Tang  Tsou,  ed.,  China  in  Crisis,  vol.  2,  Chicago,  1968,  note  9, 
p.  294-295.  On  p.  293  he  states  inconsistently  that  fear  of  bombing  "had  deterred 
Hanoi  from  infiltrating  any  of  their  250,000  regular  North  Vietnamese  troops  into 
South  Vietnam."  He  also  states  that  there  were  fewer  infiltrators  in  1964  than  in  1962. 
This  is  interesting.  The  analyst  remarks  that  the  judgments  of  "rise  and  change  in  the 
nature  of  infiltration"  in  August  1964  may  have  been  influenced  by  the  fact  that  they 
were  expected,  in  reaction  to  the  "Tonkin  reprisals,"  and  that  evidence  of  greatly  in- 
creased infiltration  from  the  North  was  an  explicit  condition  for  "systematic  military 
action  against  DRV,"  which  leading  officials  were  beginning  to  regard  as  "inevitable" 
(Gravel  ed.,  111:192). 

45.  The  French,  following  a  more  classical  imperial  pattern,  relied  primarily  on 
mercenaries  rather  than  French  nationals,  and  never  sent  conscripts  to  Vietnam.  There 
were  about  20,000  French  nationals  fighting  in  all  Indochina  in  February  1949,  about 
51,000  (plus  6,000  advisers)  in  all  Indochina  as  of  April  1953  {DOD,  book  8,  p.  179; 
Gravel  ed.,  1:400).  Of  course,  French  firepower  was  a  tiny  fraction  of  that  available 
to  U.S.  forces. 

46.  DOD,  book  8,  190-191.  Characteristically,  he  added  that  this  appeared  to  be 
the  only  way  to  safeguard  Vietnam  from  "aggressive  designs  Commie  Chi[na]." 

47.  Ibid.,  145,  148,  State  Dept.  Policy  Statement  of  September  1948. 

48.  Ibid.,  196,  May  1949:  "Question  whether  Ho  as  much  nationalist  as  Commie  is 
irrelevant."  He  is  an  "outright  Commie,"  and  that  is  all  that  matters. 

49.  Gravel  ed.,  IV:488-489.  He  also  points  out  once  again  (487)  that  in  the  Delta, 
with  40  percent  of  the  population,  the  VC  effort  is  primarily  indigenous  and  the  North 
Vietnamese  main  force  units  play  almost  no  role  (though  U.S.  combat  forces  were 
operating).  Still,  he  is  able  to  say  that  our  objective  is  to  permit  the  people  of  South 
Vietnam  to  determine  their  own  future.  On  reports  of  NVA  forces  in  the  Delta,  see 
At  War  with  Asia,  pp.  99-100. 

50.  It  might  be  added  that  the  policy  later  called  "Vietnamization"  was  recom- 
mended in  mid-1967  by  systems  analysis;  Gravel  ed.,  IV:459,  467;  cf.  also  558,  option 
(4);  564. 

51.  My  reasons  for  believing  this  are  presented  in  articles  in  Ramparts,  April,  May, 
1972.  See  also  Gabriel  Kolko,  "The  Nixon  Administration's  strategy  in  Indochina — 
1972,"  Paris  World  Assembly,  February  1972. 

52.  Cited  from  AFP,  in  South  Vietnam:  Realities  and  Prospects,  Vietnamese  Studies, 
no.  18/19,  Hanoi,  1968,  p.  27. 

53.  See  Peter  King,  "The  Political  Balance  in  Saigon,"  Pacific  Affairs,  fall  1971,  for 
a  detailed  analysis.  Also  Gareth  Porter,  "The  Diemist  restoration,"  Commonweal,  July 
11,  1969. 


202 


12.     The  Rise  and  Fall 

of  "Counterinsurgency":  1961-1964 

by  David  G.  Man 


John  F.  Kennedy  came  to  the  White  House  in  early  1961  on  only  the  slimmest  I 

of  pluralities.  Yet  he  had  taken  the  measure  of  the  public,  beyond  party  affilia-  j 

tions,  and  judged  it  to  be  deeply  troubled  by  the  Sputnik  diplomacy  of  the  Soviet  1 

Union  and  painfully  eager  for  reassertion  of  the  American  Dream  throughout  \ 

the  world.  The  myth  of  a  monolithic  international  Communist  conspiracy  directed  I 

against  a  pristine  Free  World  continued  to  energize  millions.  j 

Ngo  Dinh  Diem  was  Vietnamese  anticommunism  incarnate.  He  had  helped  ; 

repress  the  Indochinese  Communist  party  in  the  1930s.  His  elder  brother  had  { 

been  killed  by  the  Viet-Minh  in  1945.  With  American  assistance  he  had  mounted  | 

a  massive  propaganda  campaign  in  1954  to  persuade  the  Catholic  minority  of  \ 

north  and  north-central  Vietnam  that  the  Holy  Virgin  Mary  was  leaving  for  j 

Saigon,  and  that  those  who  failed  to  follow  her  would  be  ruthlessly  exterminated  j 

by  the  victorious  Viet-Minh.  Then,  from  1956  onward,  he  had  himself  proceeded  I 

to  kill  or  incarcerate  tens  of  thousands  of  South  Vietnamese  as  suspected  Com-  ' 

munists.  ' 

Three  confrontations  preoccupied  President  Kennedy  during  his  first  year  in  \ 
office:  Cuba,  Berlin  and  Laos.  In  Cuba,  the  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco  gave  the  entire  ' 
Kennedy  Administration  a  touchy  inferiority  complex,  which  often  led  it  to  be 
more  combative  elsewhere.  Berlin,  however,  could  not  be  settled  on  American  ! 
terms  without  risk  of  nuclear  holocaust.  And  Laos  was  a  tormented,  confusing  i 
mudhole.  The  United  States,  it  was  said  by  mid- 1961,  would  be  lucky  to  stave 
off  complete  Communist  victory  in  Laos  with  some  sort  of  internationally  sanc- 
tioned neutralist  coalition,  no  matter  how  shaky.  : 

This  sort  of  thinking  led  the  Kennedy  Administration  to  fix  its  eyes  more  ' 
and  more  on  South  Vietnam.  There,  despite  massive  increments  of  U.S.  military 

and  economic  assistance,  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  was  again  facing  millions  of  South  i 

Vietnamese  who  openly  denied  the  legitimacy  of  his  regime.  Whatever  the  reali-  ' 

ties  of  the  situation.  Diem  clearly  regarded  the  new  National  Liberation  Front,  ! 
founded  in  December  1960,  as  a  mere  appendage  thrust  at  him  by  his  real  Com- 
munist enemies — Nikita  Khrushchev,  Mao  Tse-tung  and  Ho  Chi  Minh.  He  was 

very  upset  by  evident  U.S.  unwillingness  to  attack  forcefully  in  Laos,  and  he  | 

badgered  every  American  he  met  with  quotations  from  Khrushchev's  January  \ 

1961  speech  on  Soviet  support  for  wars  of  national  liberation.  ' 

Diem  need  not  have  bothered.  Cold  War  warriors  like  Rostow,  Rusk,  Taylor,  | 

Lansdale  and  McNamara  were  all  on  the  same  wavelength.  As  the  Laos  negotia-  \ 

tions  dragged  on  through  the  summer  and  fall  of  1961,  the  Kennedy  Admin-  1 
istration  made  deadly  serious  plans  to  "draw  the  line"  in  South  Vietnam.  Simi- 
larly to  China  in  the  late  1940s,  the  United  States  would  try  to  do  the  impossible 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  David  G.  Marr. 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  "Counterinsurgency":  1961-1964  203 

— "save"  a  country  from  its  own  people. ^  Inevitably  this  was  phrased  in  terms 
of  preventing  a  Communist  sweep  of  not  only  South  Vietnam,  but  of  all  main- 
land Southeast  Asia  and  perhaps  the  entire  western  Pacific. ^ 

The  great  hope  of  the  Kennedy  Administration  in  Vietnam  was  counterinsur- 
gency.  As  with  most  theories,  this  quickly  came  to  mean  different  things  to  dif- 
ferent people.  Nevertheless,  as  counterinsurgency  was  in  fact  applied  in  South 
Vietnam,  it  bore  striking  resemblances  to  nineteenth-century  French  techniques 
going  by  the  title  of  "pacification,"  or  for  that  matter,  earlier  tactics  used  by 
Vietnamese  monarchs  to  suppress  peasant  rebellions.^ 

From  the  very  beginning,  counterinsurgency  in  Vietnam  emphasized  military 
considerations  over  political  ones,  enforcement  of  "physical  security"  over  more 
subtle  questions  of  social  change  or  psychological  loyalties.  In  short,  it  was  blatant 
counterrevolution  over  revolution,  although  few  Americans  involved  at  the  time 
seemed  prepared  to  acknowledge  this. 

As  a  young  U.S.  Marine  Corps  intelligence  officer  I  learned  these  things  slowly, 
more  or  less  from  the  ground  floor  working  upward.  Sent  to  the  Monterey  Army 
Language  School  in  1961  to  study  Vietnamese,  for  example,  I  soon  discovered 
that  almost  all  of  the  vocabulary  was  military  and,  worse  yet,  Vietnamese  in- 
structors were  being  forced  to  coin  entirely  new  words  to  conform  with  a  set  of 
technical  English  terms  prescribed  for  all  thirty-four  languages  taught  at  the 
school.  Not  surprisingly,  when  tried  out  in  Vietnam  such  words  received  nothing 
but  blank  stares,  and  were  promptly  forgotten. 

More  seriously,  as  the  only  Vietnamese-speaking  American  among  550  marines 
making  up  the  first  marine  helicopter  squadron  sent  to  Vietnam  by  President 
Kennedy,  I  was  surprised  to  discover  that  my  immediate  superiors  were  only 
interested  in  classical  combat  intelligence,  not  the  "new"  counterinsurgency  varia- 
bles taught  by  Thompson,  Trager,  Lansdale,  Fall  or  Valeriano.  My  colonel  sim- 
ply wanted  to  know  if  "the  enemy"  was  located  in  village  "A"  or  village  "B," 
whether  he  had  weapons  larger  than  30  caliber  that  would  force  us  to  fly  above 
1,500  feet,^  and  what  the  weather  was  going  to  be  like  tomorrow.  The  colonel 
cared  not  a  wink  about  the  political  "infrastructure,"  the  relationship  of  the 
"insurgents"  to  the  local  population,  or  the  social  program  and  essential  motiva- 
tions of  the  NLF. 

In  August  1962  we  had  a  key  role  in  one  of  the  first  division-size  search-and- 
destroy  operations  conducted  by  the  Saigon  army.  Code-named  "Binh  Tay" 
(Pacify  the  West),  the  objective  was  to  break  up  several  elite  NLF  battalions 
and  to  scare  the  local  populace  into  submission  with  a  massive  display  of  heli- 
copters, fighter-bombers,  armored  personnel  carriers  and  gunboats.  As  might 
have  been  predicted,  however,  the  NLF  saw  what  was  happening  several  days 
in  advance  and  quickly  moved  into  inaccessible  mangrove  forests  or  broke  into 
small  teams,  hid  their  weapons,  and  blended  with  the  villagers  for  the  duration 
of  the  operation.  Once  the  aircraft,  armored  vehicles  and  trucks  left  the  area — 
leaving  behind  smoking  villages,  plowed-up  rice  fields,  and  several  hundred  dead 
citizens — the  NLF  battalions  resumed  their  operations  with  more  success  and 
public  support  than  before.  A  report  that  I  filed  up  the  U.S.  Marine  chain-of- 
command,  strongly  critical  of  this  approach  to  counterinsurgency,  received  no 
attention  whatsoever.^ 

While  my  superior  officers  on  the  one  hand  thus  showed  no  interest  in  the 
!  political  subtleties  of  the  conflict,  on  the  other  hand  they  did  many  things  of 
i  a  political  nature  that  played  right  into  the  hands  of  the  NLF.  For  example, 
i  helicopters  were  sent  almost  every  day  to  several  fortified  Catholic  communities 
^  in  the  area,  laden  with  a  shopping  list  ranging  from  barbed  wire  to  beer.  These 


204      Grovel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

were  militantly  anti-Communist  refugees  from  the  North,  in  a  surrounding  sea  of  j 
antagonized  Buddhists,  Hoa  Hao  and  ethnic  Cambodians,  and  their  only  reliable  I 
means  of  supply  were  our  U.S.  helicopters.  In  another  incident,  taking  place  | 
after  our  squadron  had  been  switched  with  a  U.S.  Army  squadron  and  sent  to  | 
Da-Nang,  reckless  marine  drivers  ran  over  several  innocent  Vietnamese  pedes-  j 
trians.  The  marine  colonel  in  command  alienated  not  only  the  local  townspeople,  j 
but  also  the  Vietnamese  police  investigators  by  deciding  unilaterally  to  spirit  the  ' 
offenders  out  of  the  country,  on  the  grounds  that  a  court  case  would  "damage 
their  military  careers."  Another  colonel  flew  in  a  piano  and  a  stereo  set  for  his 
favorite  Vietnamese  girl  friend,  and  provided  her  family  with  the  lucrative  fresh  ' 
vegetable  and  garbage  contracts  for  the  marine  base.  Yet  when  the  mayor  of 
Da-Nang  proposed  that  rampant  prostitution  be  handled  by  concentrating  it  in  ; 
one  large,  inspected  whorehouse  for  Americans,  the  colonels  all  protested  that  \ 
the  merest  whiff  in  U.S.  Capitol  corridors  of  such  an  arrangement  would  cost  f 
them  their  careers.  While  in  retrospect  each  of  these  incidents  may  appear  minor,  | 
particularly  when  compared  with  American-perpetrated  outrages  after  1965,  it  | 
is  important  to  see  how  things  really  got  started,  and  why  many  ordinary  Viet-  | 
namese  had  reason  to  hate  the  United  States  long  before  the  first  combat  battal-  j 
ions  set  foot  on  their  soil.  | 

Reassigned  to  the  U.S.  Pacific  command  headquarters  in  Hawaii  in  mid-1963,  | 
it  was  a  revelation  for  me  to  discover  that  not  only  the  colonels,  but  also  the  | 
generals  and  admirals  were  fundamentally  bored  by  the  political  complexities  . 
of  Vietnam.  After  the  overthrow  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  in  November  1963,  I  \ 
thought  it  particularly  important  to  try  to  brief  them  on  all  the  changes  taking  r 
place,  on  each  of  the  new  faces  showing  up.  Soon  my  feelings  were  hurt,  how- 
ever, when  they  cut  my  regular  political  analysis  in  half,  a  mere  five  minutes  out 
of  a  one-hour  briefing.  Whenever  they  had  no  choice  but  to  mention  the  name  : 
of  a  Vietnamese  personality,  they  would  resort  to  nicknames  such  as  "Big"  and  ^ 
"Little"  Minh,  the  "Dragon  Lady"  (Madame  Nhu),  and  "Colonel  Yankee."  ®  ; 

Later,  in  a  major  marine  training  exercise  on  Molokai  Island,  I  tried  to  in-  ! 
corporate  some  rudimentary  political  elements  into  a  rather  standard  intelligence 
scenario.  But  the  commander  of  the  attacking  blue  forces,  the  "good  guys"  of 
the  operation,  simply  ignored  those  aspects  and  marched  his  forces  from  one 
ridgeline  to  the  next  in  classic  Korean  War  fashion.  Back  at  headquarters  in 
Honolulu,  I  got  into  an  intense  argument  with  my  intelligence  contemporaries 
over  which  had  to  come  first  in  counterinsurgency,  physical  security  of  the 
populace  against  "guerrilla  terrorism,"  or  fundamental  political  and  social  changes  i 
that  would  make  the  government  legitimate  and  security  a  more  manageable  , 
problem. 

When  I  left  the  Marine  Corps  in  June  1964  it  was  already  obvious  that  enforce-  ' 
ment  of  physical  security — convenient  rhetoric  for  violent  repression — had  be- 
come the  overwhelming  theme  in  counterinsurgency.  At  the  time  it  seemed  to 
me  a  clear  case  of  stupidity,  due  to  our  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  particular 
historical  situation  in  Vietnam,  and  perhaps  too  our  more  general  insensitivity  , 
toward  the  problems  of  nonwhite  peoples  in  the  world.  Since  then  I  have  come 
to  the  realization  that  neither  more  knowledge  nor  more  sensitivity  would  have 
changed  U.S.  policy  much,  assuming  that  our  overall  strategic  objective  of  de-  \ 
feating  communism  in  Vietnam  remained  the  same,  \ 

Grim  anticommunism,  aimed  at  combating  a  supposedly  grim,  monolithic  . 
communism,  made  any  serious,  high-level  consideration  of  the  history,  culture 
and  political  dynamics  of  Vietnam  essentially  irrelevant.  If  the  real  enemies  were 
in  Moscow  and  Peking,  and  the  local  people  were  mere  pawns  in  a  giant  power 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  "Counterinsurgency" :  1961-1964  205 

play,  then  what  did  it  matter  that  local  Communists  had  led  the  mass  victorious 
anticolonial  struggle  in  Vietnam,  or  that  the  NLF  was  more  popular  than  the 
Saigon  regime?  To  a  certain  extent,  American  policymakers  knew,  or  at  least 
sensed,  that  they  were  working  from  a  position  of  real  political  weakness  in 
South  Vietnam.  Yet  they  went  ahead  anyway,  and  developed  all  sorts  of  financial, 
military  and  technocratic  gimmicks  to  try  to  compensate.  When  it  was  perceived, 
in  late  1964  or  early  1965,  that  all  these  measures  had  failed,  it  became  necessary 
to  take  more  drastic  steps  that  had  been  implicit  all  along:  bombing  the  North 
and  throwing  in  U.S.  combat  troops.  Meanwhile,  many  of  the  practices  developed 
in  the  1961-1964  period  continued,  but  with  a  ruthlessness  that  made  a  mockery 
of  any  political  program  put  forth  by  either  the  U.S.  or  Saigon.  The  original 
Eisenhower  phrase,  "winning  hearts  and  minds,"  had  been  reduced  in  the  field 
to  an  acronym — WHAM — and  ironically  this  brought  out  the  true  content  of 
counterinsurgency. 

The  complete  ascendancy  of  repressive  military  tactics  and  thinking  during 
the  counterinsurgency  phase  had  many  other  implications.  First  of  all,  it  almost 
always  led  to  sublime  overconfidence.  General  Lansdale,  who  had  helped  estab- 
lish Diem  and  might  have  known  how  frail  the  system  really  was,  wrote  policy 
papers  for  President  Kennedy  in  early  1961  that  exuded  optimism  and  recom- 
mended simply  a  little  more  muscle  for  the  Saigon  army  (ARVN)  and  some 
minor  bureaucratic  reshuffling  (Gravel  edition,  11:23-27,  52-53).  Since  NLF 
strength  was  usually  viewed  in  terms  of  a  certain  number  of  soldiers  and  weapons, 
not  as  a  mass  revolutionary  movement,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  U.S.  military 
contingency  planners  consistently  underestimated  the  number  of  troops  and 
I    amounts  of  money  needed  to  defeat  the  enemy."^ 

f  Paradoxically,  each  new  increment  of  American  military  technology  in  Viet- 
nam represented  an  unwitting  admission  of  counterinsurgency  failure,  and  indeed 
further  served  to  nail  the  lid  on  the  coffin.  Our  glistening  helicopter  squadrons, 
such  sources  of  pride  and  expectation  among  the  generals,  were  a  prime  example. 
I  "The  sky  is  a  highway  without  roadblocks,"  rhapsodized  Senator  Henry  Jackson 
I  in  1963  after  careful  briefings  from  his  Pentagon  cronies.  "The  helicopter,"  he 
|i  continued,  "frees  the  government  forces  from  dependence  on  the  poor  road 
1  system  and  the  canals  which  are  the  usual  arteries  of  communication."  ^  How- 
ever, such  mobility  bore  a  very  serious,  if  hidden  pricetag.  Since  about  80  percent 
of  the  people  of  Vietnam  happened  to  live  along  those  "usual  arteries,"  and 
since  the  helicopter  could  never  hope  to  tie  in  all  or  most  of  the  villages  on  a 
day-to-day  basis,  increased  air  travel  tended  inevitably  to  draw  the  Saigon  regime 
ever  further  away  from  the  humdrum  realities  of  creating  political  and  social 
credibility  at  the  local  level.  As  the  American  crews  and  ARVN  soldiers  floated 
blithely  across  the  monsoon  clouds,  swooping  down  occasionally  to  wreak  de- 
struction or  supply  an  isolated  blockhouse,  the  NLF  went  ahead  patiently  to 
expand  its  organization  along  the  roads  and  canals,  gradually  surrounding  the 
district  and  provincial  towns.  When  it  finally  became  evident  to  U.S.  military 
planners  that  helicopters  were  not  stopping  the  enemy,  it  was  natural  they  would 
miss  or  ignore  the  real  reasons  and  choose  instead  to  escalate  the  technology 
with  fighter-bombers,  gunships,  and — eventually — B-52s,  that  penultimate  weapon 
of  mass,  indiscriminate  terror. 

But  generals  were  not  the  only  ones  subject  to  grave  miscalculation.  Dean 
i   Rusk  and  Robert  McNamara  thought  that  a  combination  of  Vietnamese  draft 
reform,  stepped  up  mobilization  and  streamlining  of  the  ARVN  command  struc- 
ture  would  be  enough  to  turn  the  tide.^  Sir  Robert  Thompson  proposed  to  com- 
|>  bine  "clear  and  hold"  operations  with  the  most  stringent  police  measures,  out 


I 


206      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

of  which  grew  the  ambitious  and  abortive  strategic  hamlet  program  (Gravel  ed.,  I 

11:139-140).^*^  Even  Roger  Hilsman,  who  perhaps  spoke  up  more  often  than  j 

most  on  the  NLF  as  a  political  rather  than  military  threat,  still  accepted  the  | 

argument  that  physical  security  was  an  essential  prerequisite  to  his  pet  "civic  \ 

action"  programs  (Gravel  ed.,  11:142).  ^ 

Behind  such  security  fixations  lay  several  a  priori  judgments  on  the  Vietnamese  j 
people  and  Vietnamese  society.  It  was  usually  assumed,  for  example,  that  the 

Vietnamese  peasants  worried  only  about  where  their  next  bowl  of  rice  was  \ 

coming  from.  They  had  little  interest  in  affairs  beyond  their  home  village.  Their  | 

ideal  was  to  be  "left  alone."  Unlike  more  advanced  Westerners,  it  was  said,  ] 
Vietnamese  peasants  found  little  meaning  or  value  in  political  ideology,  except 
perhaps  some  archaic  Confucian  maxims.  Those  accepting  Communist  ideology 

had  been  duped  or  coerced,  or  perhaps  attracted  by  promises  of  bigger  rice  : 

bowls.  In  short,  with  neither  the  desire  nor  capability  for  profound  national  | 

identifications,  the  peasants  were  mere  "reeds  in  the  wind,"  and  would  lean  i 

whichever  way  the  guns  were  pointed.  It  thus  followed  that  the  outside  elite  | 

with  the  best  techniques  of  organized  violence  would  inevitably  triumph.  From  j 

physical  security  all  else  flowed.  j 

Needless  to  say,  the  French  colonials  had  harbored  such  patronizing,  racist  j 

ideas  about  the  Vietnamese  peasantry  long  before  American  counterinsurgency  j 

specialists  picked  them  up.  At  Dien  Bien  Phu  and  scores  of  lesser-known  battle-  1 

fields,  the  French  paid  with  their  lives  for  their  prejudices,  simply  refusing  to  ) 

believe  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Vietnamese  peasants  would  fight  and  die,  * 

willingly,  for  a  cause  beyond  themselves.  American  specialists  like  Lansdale,  | 

Trager  and  Pike  never  got  this  message,  or  if  they  did,  they  blanked  it  out  in  j 
favor  of  a  neater,  less  disturbing  Communist/anti-Communist  dynamic. i 

In  somewhat  similar  fashion,  all  Vietnamese,  including  the  educated  elites, 
were  expected  by  American  policymakers  to  respond  in  fairly  obvious  fashion  to 

U.S.  applications  of  pleasure  or  pain.  From  Walt  Rostow  in  Washington,  with  \ 

his  programs  of  graduated  terror  against  Hanoi,  to  U.S.  privates  in  the  field,  ' 

tossing  chewing  gum  to  scurrying  Vietnamese  children,  Pavlovian  carrot-and-  ' 
stick  reasoning  held  complete  sway.^^  Once  in  a  while  even  the  canine  aspect  of 

Pavlov's  model  peeked  through,  as  when  Rostow  recommended  that  we  tell  ' 
Moscow  to  "use  its  influence  with  Ho  Chi  Minh  to  call  his  dogs  off,  mind  his 
business,  and  feed  his  people." 

When  Vietnamese  failed  to  salivate  on  schedule,  the  inevitable  U.S.  reaction  i 

was  to  escalate  the  increments  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Sometimes  our  own  Saigon  \ 

clients  were  the  least  predictable,  as  in  August  1963  when  Diem  and  his  brother  \ 

Nhu  ignored  intense  American  pressures  and  proceeded  to  raid  the  Buddhist  ' 
pagodas. In  the  end,  Diem  and  Nhu  became  so  angry  and  cynical  about  Amer- 
ican attitudes  and  activities  that  they  put  out  vague  feelers  to  Ho  Chi  Minh  and 
the  NLF.  This  was  a  deadly  mistake  on  their  part,  however,  since  we  only  valued 

them  for  their  militant  antipathy  to  the  Communists.  The  United  States  ended  \ 

up  having  the  old  dogs  killed  and  picking  some  new  ones  to  work  on.  ; 

The  entire  relationship  between  U.S.  master  and  Vietnamese  client  deserves  ; 

some  exploration  here,  since  it  was  an  integral  part  of  each  counterinsurgency  \ 

scheme  in  the  period  1961-1964,  and  since  the  basic  arrangement  existing  today  \ 
really  solidified  by  no  later  than  June  1965.  American  military  and  government 
personnel,  particularly  those  with  extensive  field  experience  in  Vietnam,  have 
often  vehemently  denied  the  whole  master-client  relationship,  citing  numerous 
factual  examples  where  South  Vietnamese  "counterparts"  ignored  or  even  re- 
jected their  "advice."  On  the  other  hand,  most  critics  of  U.S.  involvement  have 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  "Counterinsurgency" :  1961-1964  207 

developed  an  image  whereby  an  all-powerful  American  puppeteer  simply  pulled 
the  strings  on  an  otherwise  inert  Saigon  puppet.  And  certain  events  can  be  cited 
to  buttress  this  position  too — for  example,  the  overthrow  of  Diem,  the  dumping 
of  General  Duong  Van  Minh  three  months  later,  and  the  strong  anticoup  pro- 
tection given  Nguyen  Cao  Ky  and  Nguyen  Van  Thieu  after  mid- 1965. 

However,  neither  position  is  completely  accurate.  First  of  all,  the  U.S. -Saigon 
relationship  changed  perceptively  over  time.  In  1954-1956  the  U.S.  was  very 
deeply  involved  in  selecting  Diem,  pushing  him  ahead  of  all  French  candidates, 
and  then  giving  him  the  necessary  money,  guns  and  political  protection  to  crush 
each  opposition  element,  one  by  one.  During  the  next  four  years,  nevertheless, 
the  United  States  stepped  back  from  day-to-day  management  and  allowed  Diem 
to  handle  matters  in  more  or  less  his  own  way,  confident  of  course  that  his 
staunch  anticommunism  was  the  best  servant  of  our  interests. 

But  by  late  1961  Diem's  position,  and  that  of  the  entire  Saigon  regime,  was 
clearly  eroding  away.  President  Kennedy  reacted  by  sending  in  not  only  the 
armed  U.S.  helicopter  squadrons,  mentioned  previously,  but  also  modem  prop- 
jet  transports,  logistical  support  groups,  and  numerous  overt  and  covert  intelli- 
gence teams.  Equally  significant  was  the  shift  in  missions  for  U.S.  advisory  ele- 
ments already  in  place.  From  late  1961  onward,  there  was  to  be  "U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  the  direction  and  control  of  GVN  military  operations,"  and  on 
the  civilian  side  U.S.  personnel  were  briefed  for  "insertion  into  the  Governmental 
machinery  of  South  Viet-Nam."  Although  it  was  to  be  several  years  before 
such  arrangements  were  put  in  writing  with  the  Saigon  regime,  in  fact  a  parallel 
U.S.  hierarchy  had  been  established  and  came  to  assume  progressively  more 
power  as  the  political  and  military  situation  continued  to  deteriorate  inside  South 
Vietnam. 

An  interesting  case  of  how  the  system  developed  and  operated  is  in  intelli- 
gence and  counterintelligence.  By  1961  American  officials  could  see  that  the 
South  Vietnamese  regime  was  not  getting  reliable  information  at  village  and 
district  levels.  And  since  there  was  a  jumble  of  separate  intelligence  agencies, 
sometimes  conflicting  with  each  other,  what  little  information  the  regime  did 
acquire  was  not  being  handled  properly.  In  Quang  Tri  province,  for  example,  I 
found  that  while  the  seven  district  chiefs  passed  their  data  and  captured  NLF 
suspects  to  the  Secret  Police  (Cong  An),  the  latter  refused  to  let  the  military 
Sector  Commander's  S-2  (intelligence  officer)  see  any  of  it  or  interrogate  the 
prisoners.  The  Secret  Police  also  kept  a  tight  hold  over  their  personality  files, 
which  were  heavy  on  former  Viet-Minh  activists.  However — and  this  is  the 
important  part — the  Secret  Police  did  grudgingly  allow  the  American  provincial 
adviser  the  access  that  they  denied  to  the  Sector  Commander,  so  that  the  Amer- 
ican served  increasingly  as  an  informed  intermediary. 

Meanwhile,  the  regular  ARVN  units  in  Quang  Tri  were  out  of  both  of  these 
channels  entirely,  sending  their  scant  information  back  to  First  Division  head- 
quarters in  Hue.  This  problem  was  "solved"  by  having  the  U.S.  advisers  assigned 
to  these  regular  army  echelons  exchange  data  with  the  U.S.  provincial  adviser. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  latter  individual  became  increasingly  powerful  in  Quang 
Tri,  especially  since  he  also  had  a  special  "slush-fund"  to  pay  off  his  own  agents, 
and  to  parcel  out  to  his  "counterpart"  on  an  achievement  basis. 

Beyond  the  three  networks  mentioned  above,  there  was  also  a  Vietnamese 
"DMZ  Security"  group,  which  sent  intelligence  directly  to  the  Presidential  Palace 
in  Saigon.  And  there  was  an  apparatus  called  SMI  AT  (Special  Military  Intelli- 
^   gence  Advisory  Team),  completely  controlled  by  Americans,  which  was  trying 
to  build  a  major  clandestine  agent  net  across  the  border  into  Laos  and  North 


208      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

Vietnam.  All  five  elements,  however,  relied  heavily  on  a  relatively  small  number 
of  paid  informants,  often  the  same  people  who  had  lived  well  off  the  French  in 
a  similar  capacity.  i 

The  admittedly  cursory  analysis  I  made  of  the  intelligence  situation  in  all  of  ' 
central  Vietnam  in  1962-1963  led  me  to  some  unsettling  conclusions  about  the 
various  Vietnamese  involved,  and,  beyond  that,  their  apparent  alienation  from  \ 
the  bulk  of  the  populace. From  the  Pentagon  Papers  it  is  evident  that  Amer- 
icans at  much  higher  levels  in  both  Saigon  and  Washington  saw  essentially  the  \ 
same  things,  in  other  bureaus  and  ministries  as  well  as  intelligence.  Yet  their  j 
responses  were  always  technocratic,  half-baked,  as  if  they  were  trying  to  avoid  il 
probing  too  far  for  fear  the  whole  house  of  cards  might  come  tumbling  down.  ■ 

In  intelligence,  for  example  again,  they  moved  on  the  one  hand  to  pressure 
Diem  to  reorganize  and  consolidate  the  Vietnamese  "intelligence  community,"  i! 
although  he  still  saw  solid  anticoup  benefits  in  keeping  it  divided.  On  the  other  j 
hand,  the  United  States  steadily  expanded  its  own  autonomous  network  in  Viet-  i 
nam,  as  a  bypass  mechanism  and  a  powerful  means  of  manipulation.  After  the  | 
army's  overthrow  of  Diem,  U.S.  knowledge  of  the  thoughts  and  activities  of  \ 
Saigon's  top  leadership  increased  considerably,  since  the  military  was  the  one  j 
group  we  had  infiltrated  early,  had  plenty  of  files  on,  and  could  easily  surround  j 
with  "advisers"  on  a  day-to-day  basis.  As  might  be  expected,  nevertheless,  such  5 
developments  tended  to  startle,  to  antagonize,  many  Vietnamese  officers  (usually  | 
under  the  rank  of  colonel)  who  had  been  shielded  from  the  true  master-client  \ 
relationship  during  the  Diem  period.  Some  of  them  withdrew  from  the  army  in  ] 
disgust.  Others  stayed  on,  but  showed  their  displeasure  at  American  manipulation  t 
so  much  that  they  were  given  "bad  marks"  and  confined  to  paper-pushing  jobs  in  \ 
supply,  transportation,  engineering  and  the  like.^^  There  were  always  other  ! 
officers  to  take  their  places,  however,  men  who  knew  they  were  servants  of  the  ; 
Americans  and,  for  one  reason  or  another,  were  ready  to  make  a  good  thing  of  it.  j 

Thus  it  was  that,  not  only  in  intelligence,  but  in  all  other  sensitive  fields,  a 
crew  of  sycophants,  money-grubbers  and  psychopaths  moved  to  the  fore.  Essen- 
tially serving  as  power-brokers,  they  found  endless  ways  both  to  oppress  their  I 
fellow  countrymen  and  to  delude  their  American  masters.  General  Nguyen  ' 
Khanh  was  the  epitome  of  this  new  "leadership."  For  twelve  months  after  de-  : 
railing  General  Minh  in  January  1964,  he  held  center  stage  in  Saigon,  posturing, 
shifting  ground,  bluffing  Ambassador  Taylor,  trying  to  neutralize  his  yotunger 
rivals,  preaching  militant  anticolonialism  for  public  consumption  while  working 
feverishly  behind  the  scenes  for  ever-deeper  U.S.  involvement.  By  early  1965  the  , 
United  States  was  "in"  as  never  before,  but  General  Khanh  had  incurred  the 
wrath  of  Ambassador  Taylor  to  such  a  degree  that  he  must  have  known  his 
days  were  numbered. Unlike  the  Diem/Lodge  situation,  however.  General 
Khanh  had  taken  the  necessary  personal  precautions.  Today  he  lives  a  com- 
fortable emigre  existence  in  Paris. 

General  Khanh  also  demonstrates  in  many  ways  why  these  cynical,  corrupt 
people  were  clients  or  servants  of  the  United  States,  but  not  really  "puppets."  , 
For  example,  Khanh  played  upon  deep  American  fears  of  a  "neutralist  solution" 
to  discredit  the  Duong  Van  Minh  leadership  group  and  gain  support  for  his 
coup.^^  Once  in  power,  Khanh  kept  stalling  on  his  commitments  to  the  United  i 
States  to  mobilize  the  army  and  populace  against  the  "Viet  Cong  threat,"  perhaps 
knowing  it  was  futile.  Instead,  he  pushed  constantly  for  U.S.  bombing  of  the  \ 
North,  U.S.  ground  troops  in  the  South,  and  a  commitment  to  him  as  the  dictator- 
president  of  the  country.  Ironically,  the  more  the  United  States  committed  itself 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  "Counterinsurgency :  1961-1964  209 


to  Vietnam,  the  less  reason  there  was  for  Khanh  or  any  of  his  successors  to  think 
about  "internal  reform,"  much  less  social  revolution. 

Without  question,  it  was  the  very  weakness  of  the  combined  U.S.-Saigon  posi- 
tion that  gave  Khanh,  Ky,  Thieu,  Khiem,  and  all  the  others  a  significant  degree 
of  leverage  with  their  masters.  Once  these  men  were  convinced  that  U.S.  power 
and  prestige  was  irrevocably  committed,  they  could  let  the  energetic,  grim-faced 
Americans  worry  about  holding  off  the  Communists,  while  they  spent  most  of 
their  time  trying  to  consolidate  personal  and  clique  power  and  privilege.  When- 
ever the  Americans  protested  about  the  Vietnamese  not  "carrying  their  share  of 
the  burden,"  they  could  make  some  more  promises  and  reshuffle  a  few  command- 
ers or  ministers.  If  this  wasn't  enough,  they  might  strike  a  pained,  anticolonialist 
posture  and  hint  at  negotiations  with  the  enemy  (both  Khanh  and  Ky  did  this)  — 
although  this  was  always  a  risky  last  resort. 

The  United  States  could  and  did  respond  to  these  tactics  several  times  by  dump- 
ing one  man  or  one  clique.  But  the  overall  situation  was  always  so  tenuous  that 
we  could  never  risk  throwing  out  the  entire  crew.  Since  our  clients  understood 
this  fully  as  well  as  we  did,  they  eventually  made  tacit  arrangements  among  them- 
selves to  slow  down  the  political  attrition,  "divide  up  the  territory,"  and  share  the 
spoils.  Being  highly  ambitious  men,  this  has  not  always  worked. 21  Nevertheless, 
the  continuity  since  June  1965,  when  General  Ky  took  over  as  premier,  has  been 
striking.  And  it  is  likely  to  continue  for  as  long  as  the  United  States  remains 
committed  to  killing  Vietnamese  in  order  to  save  them.  But  not  a  day  longer. 


Notes 

1.  The  "saving"  metaphor  crops  up  repeatedly  in  documents  of  the  period.  In  the 
Pentagon  Papers,  Gravel  ed.,  see  for  example:  Gen.  Lansdale,  11:38;  Vice-President 
Johnson,  11:59;  and  Rusk/McNamara,  II:  111, 

2.  Vice-President  Johnson  presents  perhaps  the  most  fearful  picture.  Gravel  ed., 
11:57. 

3.  The  fact  that  even  today  American  policymakers  adhere  to  the  term  "pacification," 
and  that  their  Saigon  counterparts  still  employ  the  old  feudal  Vietnamese  equivalent, 
binh-dinh,  is  testimony  to  how  little  they  know,  or  care,  about  Vietnamese  history  and 
popular  historical  memories. 

4.  Back  in  these  "good  old  days"  of  U.S.  intervention,  the  NLF  had  very  few  50 
caliber  machine  guns,  seized  from  ARVN.  20  millimeter  antiaircraft  guns  were  non- 
existent, not  to  mention  larger-caliber  weapons  and  missiles. 

5.  A  glowing  if  brief  account  of  Operation  Binh  Tay  is  contained  in  Time  magazine, 
August  31,  1962. 

6.  The  latter  refers  to  Colonel  Nguyen  Van  Y,  head  of  Saigon's  "Central  Intelligence 
Organization" — an  apparatus  originally  forced  on  Diem  by  the  United  States  to  try 
to  unify  intelligence  processing  and  interpretation.  Surprisingly,  the  "Yankee"  nickname 
even  crops  up  in  a  1961  cable  from  Ambassador  Durbrow.  Gravel  ed.,  11:28. 

7.  See  for  example  the  1961  JCS  estimates  whereby  40,000  U.S.  troops  would  be 
sufficient  to  "clean  up"  the  Viet-Cong,  or  205,000  to  handle  the  situation  if  both  the 
DRV  and  China  entered  the  conflict  too.  Gravel  ed.,  II:  108-109. 

8.  Senator  Henry  Jackson,  "A  Key  to  Victory  in  Vietnam,"  Army,  March  1963,  p. 
62. 

9.  "Memorandum  for  the  President,"  November  11,  1961.  Gravel  ed.,  11:115. 

10.  11:139-140.  Thompson's  subordinate,  Denis  Duncanson,  has  written  the  most 
comprehensive  defense  of  these  repressive  tactics,  in  Government  and  Revolution  in 
Vietnam  (Oxford,  1968). 


210      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

11.  Douglas  Pike,  Viet-Cong,  the  Organization  and  Techniques  of  the  National 
Liberation  Front  of  South  Vietnam  (MIT  Press,  1966).  Edward  G.  Lansdale,  In  the 
Midst  of  Wars  (Harper  and  Row,  1972). 

12.  In  the  period  1961-1964,  see  especially  the  famous  Staley  Report,  where  the 
overall  objective  is  to  "surpass  the  critical  threshold  of  the  enemy  resistance"  (Gravel 
ed.,  11:63).  The  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  are  no  less  guilty  of  such  reasoning, 
as  when  on  the  basis  of  1961-1967  experiences  they  conclude  that  there  is  a  need  for 
more  "stick"  and  less  "carrot"  with  the  Saigon  regime  (Gravel  ed.,  11:415).  In  late 
1962  I  traveled  from  village  to  village  with  U.S.  Special  Forces  "civic  action"  teams 
and  watched  them  gain  public  attention  by  passing  out  thousands  of  pieces  of  hard 
candy  to  children.  The  candy  had  been  donated  in  big  tins  by  an  American  manu- 
facturer. 

13.  See  also  the  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  using  such  images,  as  when  they 
state  that  the  United  States  forced  General  Nguyen  Chanh  Thi  to  get  "back  on  his 
leash  before  it  was  too  late"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:99). 

14.  The  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  label  this  an  "impudent"  slap  in  the  face  to 
the  United  States.  Gravel  ed.,  11:203. 

15.  "Memorandum  for  the  President,"  November  11,  1961.  Gravel  ed.,  11:114. 

16.  In  aU  fairness  I  should  state  here  that  I  had  not  yet  come  to  question  the  right 
of  the  United  States  to  be  in  Vietnam,  only  the  seemingly  shoddy  way  we  were  doing 
things.  It  wasn't  until  early  1966  that  I  concluded  we  had  no  business  there  at  all. 

17.  During  this  period  American  "advisers"  regularly  sent  in  evaluations  of  their 
counterparts.  These  were  combined  with  meticulous  reports  from  supervisory  personnel 
at  bases  in  the  United  States  where  almost  all  South  Vietnamese  officers  underwent 
training,  and  with  gossip  from  paid  agents,  to  make  up  an  ever-expanding  U.S.  in- 
telligence personality  file.  If  a  Vietnamese  officer  was  listed  as  "friendly,"  "cooperative," 
"eager  to  learn,"  "competent  in  English,"  he  had  a  bright  future.  However,  if  he  was 
"reserved,"  "suspicious,"  "reluctant  to  accept  advice,"  he  was  in  for  trouble. 

18.  A  serious  student  of  this  whole  master-client  symbiosis  could  begin  with  the 
relationship  between  Taylor  and  Khanh  over  time.  Taylor  was  outfoxed  so  often  that 
it  became  something  of  a  joke  in  top  Saigon  circles.  But  when  Taylor  came  to  realize 
this,  of  course  he  had  the  last  word. 

19.  There  is  far  more  evidence  than  is  presented  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  to  indicate 
that  the  United  States  was  very  worried  about  President  de  Gaulle's  neutralization 
proposals  and  the  effects  they  might  be  having  on  the  Saigon  regime.  David  Marr, 
"Background  on  Coup  in  South  Vietnam,  30  Jan.  1964,"  unpublished  manuscript.  David 
Marr,  "The  Political  Crisis  in  Viet-Nam:  1963-1964,"  also  unpublished.  General 
Khanh,  in  a  recent  interview,  has  claimed  that  his  American  adviser.  Colonel  Jasper 
Wilson,  helped  him  take  over.  Pacific  News  Service  press  release,  February  1972. 

20.  The  Pentagon  Papers  demonstrate  that  whereas  U.S.  policymakers  occasionally 
perceived  this  dilemma,  they  had  no  real  answers  to  it.  Gravel  ed.,  11:96,  202-203, 
280-281,  309,  330-332,  336,  345. 

21.  One  of  the  best  examples  is  the  continuing  cutthroat  competition  at  the  highest 
levels  for  control  of  the  illicit  drug  traffic.  See  Albert  McCoy,  The  Politics  of  Heroin 
in  Southeast  Asia,  Harper  and  Row,  1972. 


211 


13.  Vietnamization  and  the  Drama 
of  the  Pentagon  Papers 

by  Peter  Dale  Scott 


The  Nixon  strategy  which  underlies  both  Vietnamization  and  the  Peking  visit 
envisages  a  return  from  overt  to  covert  operations  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  U.S. 
Army  is  being  withdrawn  from  Vietnam,  while  Congressional  exposures  reveal 
the  Mafia  influence  behind  the  corruption  there  of  its  senior  personnel.^  But  the 
Army's  place  is  being  filled  by  a  billion-dollar  "pacification"  program,  including 
an  expansion  of  the  CIA's  controversial  assassination  project,  Operation  Phoenix. ^ 
Generally  speaking,  the  responsibility  for  ground  operations  in  Indochina  (as 
opposed  to  the  ongoing  air  war)  is  being  taken  from  the  regular  military,  and 
given  back  to  the  various  U.S.  intelligence  agencies,  particularly  the  CIA.  The 
political  success  or  "momentum"  of  the  antiwar  movement,  at  this  point,  is  thus 
being  exploited  to  strengthen  the  very  intelligence  activities  which  did  so  much  to 
bring  about  the  war  in  the  first  place. 

This  amazing  capacity  of  the  intelligence  apparatus  to  gather  strength  from 
its  defeats  was  illustrated  earlier  after  the  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco.  Then  as  now  the 
response  of  the  government  to  the  fiasco  (an  interagency  fiasco,  involving  not 
only  CIA  but  Air  America,  air  force,  and  special  forces  personnel)  was  to 
strengthen,  consolidate,  and  rationalize  the  "Special  Group"  or  "303  Committee" 
apparatus  which  had  produced  it.^  In  1971  there  were  similar  signs  that  the  Viet- 
nam fiasco  is  being  used  to  strengthen  the  case  for  relying  on  the  "expertise"  of 
the  intelligence  professionals. 

The  elaborate  drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  must  be  assessed  in  the  light  of 
this  bureaucratic  retrenchment  and  consolidation.  One  feels  about  their  publica- 
tion as  one  does  about  Mr.  Nixon's  Peking  visit  (which  was  announced  just  fifteen 
days  after  the  courtroom  drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  had  brought  public  sup- 
port for  the  Vietnam  military  adventure  to  a  probable  all-time  low).  It  is  possible 
to  approve  of  both  events,  while  fearing  that  they  will  help  to  perpetuate  the 
imperialist  intervention  which  superficially  they  appear  to  challenge.  Daniel  Ells- 
berg  is  undoubtedly  a  powerful  and  moving  critic  of  conventional  warfare  in 
Vietnam,  and  one  does  not  wish  to  sound  ungrateful  for  his  courageous  revela- 
tions. When,  however,  he  told  the  American  nation  on  TV  that  "for  the  first  time 
we  are  hearing  the  truth"  about  the  war,  he  was  proclaiming  a  false  millennium. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  are  of  value,  but  more  for  what  they  reveal  inadvertently 
than  for  what  they  reveal  by  design.  It  would  be  foolish  to  expect  candor  from 
any  government  documents  on  Vietnam,  whether  written  for  internal  or  external 
consumption:  at  least  one  disaffected  veteran  from  the  White  House  staff  has 
commented  that  he  would  have  a  less  biased  picture  of  the  war  if  he  had  con- 
fined his  reading  to  the  newspapers.  One  Pentagon  study  repeats  the  old  cliche 
about  a  "pro-communist  .  .  .  offensive"  of  May  1964  in  Laos:  it  is  considerably 

^'Copyright  ©  1972  by  Peter  Dale  Scott. 


212      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol  V 

more  misleading  than  the  original  New  York  Times  story  which  it  partly  echoes, 
and  is  inexcusable  in  the  light  of  authoritative  accounts  which  had  already  been 
published^  Another  Pentagon  study's  account  of  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents  is 
little  more  than  an  abridgment  of  McNamara's  clumsy  misrepresentations  of  1964 
and  1968  to  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee.^  The  House  Committee's 
censored  text  of  this  study  deletes  its  references  to  McNamara's  "proof"  of  the 
second  incident  from  alleged  radio  intercepts,  including  one  "indicating  that 
'North  Vietnamese  naval  forces  had  been  ordered  to  attack  the  patrol.'  "  ^  The 
most  likely  reason  for  censoring  this  already-published  "proof"  is  that  its  false- 
hood had  already  been  demonstrated  J 

More  serious  than  such  particular  instances  of  self-serving  disinformation  is 
the  overall  inherent  bias  in  a  record  of  Defense  Department  papers.  Though  the 
true  history  of  our  escalating  involvement  in  Indochina  is  a  history  of  covert  and 
intelligence  operations,  most  of  the  recent  ones  are  barely  recorded  (two  striking 
exceptions,  the  Diem  coup  of  1963  and  the  34A  Operations  Plan  of  1964,  had 
already  been  amply  publicized).  Needless  to  say,  there  is  even  less  documentation 
of  key  escalation  decisions  (such  as  Johnson's  decision  of  12  November  1966  to 
bomb  Hanoi)  which  the  President  arrived  at  privately — either  alone,  or  after  con- 
sulting with  his  political  intimates,  such  as  Ed  Weisl,  Tommy  Corcoran,  and 
James  Rowe,  who  represented  the  highest  financial  interests  in  the  nation.^ 

With  respect  to  events  in  November  1963,  the  bias  and  deception  of  the 
original  Pentagon  documents  are  considerably  reinforced  in  the  Pentagon  studies 
commissioned  by  Robert  McNamara.  Nowhere  is  this  deception  more  apparent 
than  in  the  careful  editing  and  censorship  of  the  Report  of  a  Honolulu  Confer- 
ence on  November  20,  1963,  and  of  National  Security  Action  Memorandum  273, 
which  was  approved  four  days  later.  Study  after  study  is  carefully  edited  so  as  to 
create  a  false  illusion  of  continuity  between  the  last  two  days  of  President  Ken- 
nedy's presidency  and  the  first  two  days  of  President  Johnson's.  The  narrow  divi- 
sion of  the  studies  into  topics,  as  well  as  periods,  allows  some  studies  to  focus  on 
the  "optimism"  ^  which  led  to  plans  for  withdrawal  on  November  20  and  24, 
1963;  and  others  on  the  "deterioration"  and  "gravity"  which  at  the  same  meet- 
ings led  to  plans  for  carrying  the  war  north.  These  incompatible  pictures  of  con- 
tinuous "optimism"  or  "deterioration"  are  supported  generally  by  selective  censor- 
ship, and  occasionally  by  downright  misrepresentation: 

.  .  .  National  Security  Action  Memorandum  273,  approved  26  November 
1963.  The  immediate  cause  for  NSAM  273  was  the  assassination  of  President 
Kennedy  four  days  earlier;  newly-installed  President  Johnson  needed  to  re- 
affirm or  modify  the  policy  lines  pursued  by  his  predecessor.  President  John- 
son quickly  chose  to  reaffirm  the  Kennedy  policies.  .  .  . 

Emphasis  should  be  placed,  the  document  stated,  on  the  Mekong  Delta  area, 
but  not  only  in  military  terms.  Political,  economic,  social,  educational,  and 
informational  activities  must  also  be  pushed:  "We  should  seek  to  turn  the 
tide  not  only  of  battle  but  of  belief.  .  .  ."  Military  operations  should  be 
initiated,  under  close  political  control,  up  to  within  fifty  kilometers  inside  of 
Laos.  U.S.  assistance  programs  should  be  maintained  at  levels  at  least  equal 
to  those  under  the  Diem  government  so  that  the  new  GVN  would  not  be 
tempted  to  regard  the  U.S.  as  seeking  to  disengage. 

The  same  document  also  revalidated  the  planned  phased  withdrawal  of 
U.S.  forces  announced  publicly  in  broad  terms  by  President  Kennedy  shortly 
before  his  death : 

The  objective  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  the  withdrawal  of 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  213 

U.S.  military  personnel  remains  as  stated  in  the  White  House  statement  of 
October  2,  1963. 

No  new  programs  were  proposed  or  endorsed,  no  increases  in  the  level  or 
nature  of  U.S.  assistance  suggested  or  foreseen.  .  .  .  The  emphasis  was  on 
persuading  the  new  government  in  Saigon  to  do  well  those  things  which  the 
fallen  government  was  considered  to  have  done  poorly.  .  .  .  NSAM  273 
had,  as  described  above,  limited  cross-border  operations  to  an  area  50  kil- 
ometers within  Laos.^^ 

The  reader  is  invited  to  check  the  veracity  of  this  account  of  NSAM  273 
against  the  text,  as  reconstructed  from  various  sources,  in  our  Appendix  A.  If  the 
author  of  this  study  is  not  a  deliberate  and  foolish  liar,  then  some  superior  had 
denied  him  access  to  the  second  and  more  important  page  of  NSAM  273,  which 
"authorized  planning  for  specific  covert  operations,  graduated  in  intensity,  against 
the  DRV,"  i.e..  North  Vietnam. As  we  shall  see,  this  covert  operations  planning 
'  soon  set  the  stage  for  a  new  kind  of  war,  not  only  through  the  celebrated  34A 
Operations  which  contributed  to  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents,  but  also  through  the 
military's  accompanying  observations,  as  early  as  December  1963,  that  "only  air 

■  attacks"  against  North  Vietnam  would  achieve  these  operations'  "stated  objec- 
;    tive."  1^  Leslie  Gelb,  the  Director  of  the  Pentagon  Study  Task  Force  and  the 

■  author  of  the  various  and  mutually  contradictory  Study  Summaries,  notes  that, 
with  this  planning,  "A  firebreak  had  been  crossed,  and  the  U.S.  had  embarked  on 
a  program  that  was  recognized  as  holding  little  promise  of  achieving  its  stated 

)  objectives,  at  least  in  its  early  stages."  We  shall  argue  in  a  moment  that  these 
I  crucial  and  controversial  "stated  objectives,"  proposed  in  CINCPAC's  OPLAN 
f  34-63  of  September  9,  1963,  were  rejected  by  Kennedy  in  October  1963,  and 
!   first  authorized  by  the  first  paragraph  of  NSAM  273. 

i  The  Pentagon  studies,  supposedly  disinterested  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  De- 
'  fense,  systematically  mislead  with  respect  to  NSAM  273,  which  McNamara  him- 
;  self  had  helped  to  draft.  Their  lack  of  bona  fides  is  illustrated  by  the  general 
phenomenon  that  (as  can  be  seen  from  our  Appendix  A),  banal  or  misleading 
paragraphs  (like  2,  3,  and  5)  are  quoted  verbatim,  sometimes  over  and  over, 
i  whereas  those  preparing  for  an  expanded  war  are  either  omitted  or  else  referred 
j  to  obliquely.  The  only  study  to  quote  a  part  of  the  paragraph  dealing  with  North 
I  Vietnam  does  so  from  subordinate  instructions:  it  fails  to  note  that  this  language 
'  was  authorized  in  NSAM  27 3. 

And  study  after  study  suggests  (as  did  press  reports  at  the  time)  that  the  effect 
j  of  NSAM  273,  paragraph  2,  was  to  perpetuate  what  Mr.  Gelb  ill-advisedly  calls 
"the  public  White  House  promise  in  October"  to  withdraw  1,000  U.S.  troops. 
In  fact  the  public  White  House  statement  on  October  2  was  no  promise,  but  a 
personal  estimate  attributed  to  McNamara  and  Taylor.  As  we  shall  see,  Kennedy's 
decision  on  October  5  to  implement  this  withdrawal  (a  plan  authorized  by  NSAM 
263  of  October  11),  was  not  made  public  until  the  Honolulu  Conference  of  No- 
vember 20,  when  an  Accelerated  Withdrawal  Program  (about  which  Mr.  Gelb  is 
silent)  was  also  approved. NSAM  273  was  in  fact  approved  on  Sunday,  Novem- 
ber 24,  and  its  misleading  opening  paragraphs  (including  the  meaningless  re- 
affirmation of  the  "objectives"  of  the  October  2  withdrawal  statement)  were 
leaked  to  selected  correspondents. Mr.  Gelb,  who  should  know  better,  pretends 
j  that  NSAM  273  "was  intended  primarily  to  endorse  the  policies  pursued  by  Pres- 
'  ident  Kennedy  and  to  ratify  provisional  decisions  reached  [on  November  20]  in 
;  Honolulu."     In  fact  the  secret  effect  of  NSAM  273's  sixth  paragraph  (which 
.  unlike  the  second  was  not  leaked  to  the  press)  was  to  annul  the  NSAM  263  with- 


I 


214      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

drawal  decision  announced  four  days  earlier  at  Honolulu,  and  also  the  Accelerated  j 
Withdrawal  Program:  "both  military  and  economic  programs,  it  was  emphasized, 

should  be  maintained  at  levels  as  high  as  those  in  the  time  of  the  Diem  regime."  20  : 

The  source  of  this  change  is  not  hard  to  pinpoint.  Of  the  eight  people  known 

to  have  participated  in  the  November  24  reversal  of  the  November  20  withdrawal  i 

decisions,  five  took  part  in  both  meetings. Of  the  three  new  officials  present,  the  j 

chief  was  Lyndon  Johnson,  in  his  second  full  day  and  first  business  meeting  as  \ 
President  of  the  United  States. 22  The  importance  of  this  second  meeting,  like  that 
of  the  document  it  approved,  is  indicated  by  its  deviousness.  One  can  only  con- 
clude that  NSAM  273 (2) 's  public  reaffirmation  of  an  October  2  withdrawal 

"objective,"  coupled  with  273 (6) 's  secret  annulment  of  an  October  5  withdrawal  j 

plan,  was  deliberately  deceitful.  The  result  of  the  misrepresentations  in  the  Penta-  ^ 

gon  studies  and  Mr.  Gelb's  summaries  is,  in  other  words,  to  perpetuate  a  decep-  i 

tion  dating  back  to  NSAM  273  itself.  j 

This  deception,  I  suspect,  involved  far  more  than  the  symbolic  but  highly  sensi-  1 
five  issue  of  the  1,000-man  withdrawal.  One  study,  after  calling  NSAM  273  a  i 
"generally  sanguine"  "don't-rock-the-boat  document,"  concedes  that  it  contained  i 
"an  unusual  Presidential  exhortation":  "The  President  expects  that  all  senior  j 
officers  of  the  government  will  move  energetically  to  insure  full  unity  of  support  j 
for  establishing  U.S.  policy  in  South  Vietnam."  in  other  words,  the  same  docu-  ; 
ment  which  covertly  changed  Kennedy's  withdrawal  plans  ordered  all  senior  offi-  ( 
cials  not  to  contest  or  criticize  this  change.  This  order  had  a  special  impact  on  j 
one  senior  official:  Robert  Kennedy,  an  important  member  of  the  National  Se- 
curity Council  (under  President  Kennedy)  who  was  not  present  when  NSAM  273  i 
was  rushed  through  the  forty-five  minute  "briefing  session"  on  Sunday,  Novem-  1 
ber  24.  It  does  not  appear  that  Robert  Kennedy,  then  paralyzed  by  the  shock  of  \ 
his  brother's  murder,  was  even  invited  to  the  meeting.  Chester  Cooper  records  i 
that  Lyndon  Johnson's  first  National  Security  Council  meeting  was  not  convened 
until  Thursday,  December  5.^4  i 

NSAM  273.  PARAGRAPH  1:  THE  CENTRAL  OBJECTIVE  j 

While  noting  that  the  "stated  objectives"  of  the  new  covert  operations  plan 
against  North  Vietnam  were  unlikely  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  OPLAN  itself,  Mr. 
Gelb,  like  the  rest  of  the  Pentagon  Study  Authors,  fails  to  inform  us  what  these 
"stated  objectives"  were.  The  answer  lies  in  the  "central  objective"  defined  by  the  ; 
first  paragraph  of  NSAM  273: 

It  remains  the  central  objective  of  the  United  States  in  South  Vietnam  to 
assist  the  people  and  Government  of  that  country  to  win  their  contest  against 
the  externally  directed  and  supported  communist  conspiracy.  The  test  of  all  i 
U.S.  decisions  and  actions  in  this  area  should  be  the  effectiveness  of  their 
contribution  to  this  purpose.^^  \ 

To  understand  this  bureaucratic  prose  we  must  place  it  in  context.  Ever  since  ' 
Kennedy  came  to  power,  but  increasingly  since  the  Diem  crisis  and  assassination,  ' 
there  had  arisen  serious  bureaucratic  disagreement  as  to  whether  the  U.S.  com- 
mitment in  Vietnam  was  limited  and  political  ("to  assist")  or  open-ended  and 
military  ("to  win").  By  its  use  of  the  word  "win,"  NSAM  273,  among  other 
things,  ended  a  brief  period  of  indecision  and  division,  when  indecision  itself  was 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  215 

favoring  the  proponents  of  a  limited  (and  political)  strategy,  over  those  whose 
preference  was  unlimited  (and  military 

In  this  conflict  the  seemingly  innocuous  word  "objective"  had  come,  in  the 
Aesopian  double-talk  of  bureaucratic  politics,  to  be  the  test  of  a  commitment. 
As  early  as  May  1961,  when  President  Kennedy  was  backing  off  from  a  major 
commitment  in  Laos,  he  had  willingly  agreed  with  the  Pentagon  that  "The  U.S. 
objective  and  concept  of  operations"  was  "to  prevent  Communist  domination  of 
South  Vietnam."  27  In  November  1961,  however,  Taylor,  McNamara,  and  Rusk 
attempted  to  strengthen  this  language,  by  recommending  that  "We  now  take  the 
decision  to  commit  ourselves  to  the  objective  of  preventing  the  fall  of  South  Viet- 
nam to  Communism."  McNamara  had  earlier  concluded  that  this  "commitment 
...  to  the  clear  objective"  was  the  "basic  issue,"  adding  that  it  should  be  accom- 
panied by  a  "warning"  of  "punitive  retaliation  against  North  Vietnam."  Without 
this  commitment,  he  added,  "We  do  not  believe  major  U.S.  forces  should  be 
introduced  in  South  Vietnam." 

Despite  this  advice,  Kennedy,  after  much  thought,  accepted  all  of  the  recom- 
mendations for  introducing  U.S.  units,  except  for  the  "commitment  to  the  ob- 
jective" which  was  the  first  recommendation  of  all.  NSAM  1 1 1  of  November  22, 
1961,  which  became  the  basic  document  for  Kennedy  Vietnam  policy,  was  issued 
without  this  first  recommendation. Instead  he  sent  a  letter  to  Diem  on  Decem- 
ber 14,  1961,  in  which  "the  U.S.  officially  described  the  limited  and  somewhat 
ambiguous  extent  of  its  commitment:  .  .  .  'our  primary  purpose  is  to  help  your 
people.  .  .  .  We  shall  seek  to  persuade  the  Communists  to  give  up  their  attempts 
of  force  and  subversion.'  "  One  compensatory  phrase  of  this  letter  ("the  cam- 
paign .  .  .  supported  and  directed  from  the  outside")  became  (as  we  shall  see) 
a  rallying  point  for  the  disappointed  hawks  in  the  Pentagon;  and  was  elevated  to 
new  prominence  in  NSAM  273(1  )'s  definition  of  a  Communist  "conspiracy." 
It  would  appear  that  Kennedy,  in  his  basic  policy  documents  after  1961,  avoided 
any  use  of  the  word  "objective"  that  might  be  equated  to  a  "commitment."  The 
issue  was  not  academic:  as  presented  by  Taylor  in  November  1961,  this  commit- 
ment would  have  been  open-ended,  "to  deal  with  any  escalation  the  communists 
might  choose  to  impose."  ^- 

In  October  1963,  Taylor  and  McNamara  tried  once  again:  by  proposing  to  link 
the  withdrawal  announcement  about  1,000  men  to  a  clearly  defined  and  public 
policy  "objective"  of  defeating  communism.  Once  again  Kennedy,  by  subtle 
changes  of  language,  declined  to  go  along.  His  refusal  is  the  more  interesting 
when  we  see  that  the  word  and  the  sense  he  rejected  in  October  1963  (which 
would  have  made  the  military  "objective"  the  overriding  one)  are  explicitly  sanc- 
tioned by  Johnson's  first  policy  document,  NSAM  273. 

A  paraphrase  of  NSAM  273's  seemingly  innocuous  first  page  was  leaked  at  the 
time  by  someone  highly-placed  in  the  White  House  to  the  Washington  Post  and 
the  New  York  Times  (see  Appendix  B).  As  printed  in  the  Times  by  E.  W.  Ken- 
worthy  this  paraphrase  went  so  far  as  to  use  the  very  words,  "overriding  objec- 
tive," which  Kennedy  had  earlier  rejected. This  tribute  to  the  words'  symbolic 
importance  is  underlined  by  the  distortion  of  NSAM  273,  paragraph  1,  in  the 
Pentagon  Papers,  so  that  the  controversial  words  "central  objective"  never  once 
appear. 37  Yet  at  least  two  separate  studies  understand  the  "objective"  to  consti- 
tute a  "commitment":  "NSAM  273  reaffirms  the  U.S.  commitment  to  defeat  the 
yC  in  South  Vietnam."  This  particular  clue  to  the  importance  of  NSAM  273 
in  generating  a  policy  commitment  is  all  the  more  interesting,  in  that  the  Govern- 
ment edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  has  suppressed  the  page  on  which  it  appears. 


216      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 


PROPOSED 
STATEMENT 
OCT.  2,  1963 
( McNamara-Taylor ) 

The  security  of  South  Viet- 
nam remains  vital  to 
United  States  security.  For 
this  reason  we  adhere  to 
the  overriding  objective  of 
denying  this  country  to 
Communism  and  of  sup- 
pressing the  Viet  Cong  in- 
surgency as  promptly  as 
possible. 

Although  we  are  deeply 
concerned  by  repressive 
practices,  effective  per- 
formance in  the  conduct 
of  the  war  should  be  the 
determining  factor  in  our 
relations  with  the  GVN.^^* 


ACTUAL  STATEMENT 

OCT.  2,  1963 
(White  House-Kennedy) 

The  security  of  South  Viet- 
nam is  a  major  interest  of 
the  United  States  as  other 
free  nations.  We  will  ad- 
here to  our  policy  of  work- 
ing with  the  people  and 
Government  of  South  Viet- 
nam to  deny  this  country 
to  communism  and  to  sup- 
press the  externally  stimu- 
lated and  supported  insur- 
gency of  the  Viet  Cong 
as  promptly  as  possible. 
Effective  performance  in 
this  undertaking  is  the  cen- 
tral objective  of  our  policy 
in  South  Vietnam. 

While  such  practices  have 
not  yet  significantly  af- 
fected the  war  effort,  they 
could  do  so  in  the  future. 

It  remains  the  policy  of 
the  United  States,  in  South 
Vietnam  as  in  other  parts 
of  the  world,  to  support 
the  efforts  of  the  people  of 
that  country  to  defeat  ag- 
gression and  to  build  a 
peaceful  and  free  society.^ 


NSAM  273  (SECRET) 

NOV.  26,  1963 
(White  House-Johnson) 

It  remains  the  central  ob- 
jective of  the  United  States 
in  South  Vietnam  to  assist 
the  people  and  Govern- 
ment of  that  country  to 
win  their  contest  against 
the  externally  directed  and 
supported  communist  con- 
spiracy. The  test  of  all 
U.S.  decisions  and  actions 
in  this  area  should  be  the 
effectiveness  of  their  con- 
tributions to  this  purpose.^ 


NSAM  273,  PARAGRAPH  9(?):  THE  "CASE"  FOR  ESCALATION 

NSAM  273's  suppression  of  Kennedy's  political  goal  ("to  build  a  peaceful  and 
free  society"),  is  accompanied  by  its  authorization  of  planning  for  "selected 
actions  of  graduated  (i.e.,  escalating)  scope  and  intensity"  against  North  Viet- 
nam.This  shift  from  political  to  military  priorities  was  properly  symbolized  by 
NSAM  273's  use  of  the  word  "objective":  for  in  November  1961  the  rejected 
word  had  been  linked  to  escalation  proposals  such  as  "the  'Rostow  plan'  of  apply- 
ing graduated  pressures"  on  North  Vietnam,^^  which  Kennedy  had  then  also  re- 
jected and  which  Johnson  now  also  revived.  Rostow  personally  was  able  to  sub- 
mit to  the  new  President  "a  well-reasoned  case  for  a  gradual  escalation"  within 
days  of  Kennedy's  assassination and  it  is  clear  that  NSAM  273  saw  where  such 
escalations  might  lead.  In  its  last  provision,  which  sounds  almost  as  if  it  might 
have  been  drafted  by  Rostow  personally,  "State  was  directed  to  develop  a  strong, 
documented  case  'to  demonstrate  to  the  world  the  degree  to  which  the  Viet  Cong 
is  controlled,  sustained,  and  supplied  from  Hanoi,  through  Laos  and  other  chan- 
nels." 42 


Vietnamizatinn  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  217 

At  the  time  of  this  directive  it  was  known,  and  indeed  admitted  in  the  U.S. 
press,  that  "all  the  weapons  captured  by  the  United  States  .  .  .  were  either 
homemade  or  had  been  previously  captured  from  the  GVN/USA."  WiUiam 
Jordan,  an  official  directed  in  January  1963  to  get  information  on  Northern  in- 
filtration, had  already  reported  on  April  5  that  he  could  not:  "we  are  unable  to 
document  and  develop  any  hard  evidence  of  infiltration  after  October  1,  1962."  "^"^ 
In  the  words  of  a  State  Department  representative  on  the  Special  Group,  "the 
great  weight  of  evidence  and  doctrine  proved  'that  the  massive  aggression  theory 
was  completely  phony.'  " 

But  where  the  January  directive  was  to  get  information,  NSAM  273's  was 
different,  to  make  a  "case."  The  evidence  for  the  "case"  seems  to  have  been 
uncovered  soon  after  the  directive,  but  at  the  price  of  controversy. 

By  February  1964,  apparently, 

The  Administration  was  firmly  convinced  from  interceptions  of  radio  traffic 
between  North  Vietnam  and  the  guerrillas  in  the  South  that  Hanoi  controlled 
and  directed  the  Vietcong.  Intelligence  analyses  of  the  time  [February  12, 
1964]  stated,  however,  that  "The  primary  sources  of  Communist  strength  in 
South  Vietnam  are  indigenous." 

This  is  interesting,  for  radio  intercepts  also  supplied  firm  grounds  for  escalation 
during  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents  of  August  1964,  the  Pueblo  incident  of  January 
1968,  and  the  Cambodian  invasion  of  May  1970 — three  escalations  which  were 
all  preceded  by  like  controversies  between  intelligence  operations  and  analysts. 
And  in  these  three  escalations  the  key  intercept  evidence  later  turned  out  to  be 
highly  suspicious  if  not  indeed  deliberately  falsified  or  "phony."  In  like  manner 
Congress  should  learn  whether  the  radio  intercepts  establishing  Hanoi's  external 
direction  and  control  of  the  Vietcong  emerged  before  or  (as  it  would  appear) 
I    after  the  directive  to  develop  just  such  a  "case." 

;  It  is  clear  that  at  the  time  the  military  and  CIA  understood  the  novel  oppor- 
tunities afforded  them  by  NSAM  273:  within  three  weeks  they  had  submitted  an 
operations  plan  (the  famous  OPLAN  34A  memorandum  of  December  19)  which 

j    unlike  its  predecessors  included  overt  as  well  as  covert  and  nonattributable  oper- 

'  ations  against  North  Vietnam,  up  to  and  including  air  attacks.^^  Yet  this  novelty 
is  denied  by  all  the  Pentagon  studies  which  mention  NSAM  273;  it  is  'admitted 
by  only  one  Pentagon  study  (IV.C.2.b),  which  (as  we  shall  see)  discusses  NSAM 
273  without  identifying  it. 

The  full  text  of  NSAM  273  of  November  26,  1963,  remains  unknown.  In  all 
three  editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  there  are  no  complete  documents  between 

i  the  five  cables  of  October  30  and  McNamara's  memorandum  of  December  21; 
the  600  pages  of  documents  from  the  Kennedy  Administration  end  on  October 
30.  It  is  unlikely  that  this  striking  lacuna  is  accidental.  We  do,  however,  get  an 
ominous  picture  of  NSAM  273's  implications  from  General  Maxwell  Taylor's 
memorandum  of  January  22,  1964: 

National  Security  Action  Memorandum  No.  273  makes  clear  the  resolve  of 
the  President  to  ensure  victory  over  the  externally  directed  and  supported 
communist  insurgency  in  South  Vietnam.  .  .  .  The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  are 
convinced  that,  in  keeping  with  the  guidance  in  NSAM  273,  the  United 
States  must  make  plain  to  the  enemy  our  determination  to  see  the  Vietnam 
campaign  through  to  a  favorable  conclusion.  To  do  this,  we  must  prepare 


218      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

for  whatever  level  of  activity  may  be  required  and,  being  prepared,  must 
then  proceed  to  take  actions  as  necessary  to  achieve  our  purposes  surely  and 
promptly. ^0 

The  Joint  Chiefs  urged  the  President  to  end  "self-imposed  restrictions,"  to  go 
beyond  planning  to  the  implementation  of  covert  34A  operations  against  the 
North  and  Laos,  and  in  addition  to  "conduct  aerial  bombing  of  key  North  Viet- 
nam targets." 

It  was  not  only  the  military  who  drew  such  open-ended  conclusions  from  the 
apparently  "limited"  wording  of  NSAM  273.  As  a  State  Department  official  told 
one  Congressional  committee  in  February  1964,  "the  basic  policy  is  set  that  we 
are  going  to  stay  in  Vietnam  in  a  support  function  as  long  as  needed  to  win  the 
war."  ^1  McNamara  himself  told  another  committee  that  the  United  States  had  a 
commitment  to  win,  rather  than  "support": 

The  survival  of  an  independent  government  in  South  Vietnam  is  so  important 
.  .  .  that  I  can  conceive  of  no  alternative  other  than  to  take  all  necessary 
measures  within  our  capability  to  prevent  a  Communist  victory.^^ 

All  of  this,  like  the  text  of  NSAM  273  itself,  corroborates  the  first-hand  ac- 
count of  the  November  24  meeting  reported  some  years  ago  by  Tom  Wicker. 
According  to  that  account  Johnson's  commitment,  a  message  to  the  Saigon  gov- 
ernment, was  not  made  lightly  or  optimistically.  The  issue  was  clearly  understood, 
if  not  the  ultimate  consequences: 

Lodge  .  .  .  gave  the  President  his  opinion  that  hard  decisions  would  be 
necessary  to  save  South  Vietnam.  "Unfortunately,  Mr.  President,"  the  Am- 
bassador said,  "you  will  have  to  make  them."  The  new  President,  as  recalled 
by  one  who  was  present,  scarcely  hesitated.  "I  am  not  going  to  lose  Viet- 
nam," he  said.  "I  am  not  going  to  be  the  President  who  saw  Southeast  Asia 
go  the  way  China  went."  .  .  .  His  instructions  to  Lodge  were  firm.  The 
Ambassador  was  to  return  to  Saigon  and  inform  the  new  government  there 
that  the  new  government  in  Washington  intended  to  stand  by  previous  com- 
mitments and  continue  its  help  against  the  Communists.  In  effect,  he  told 
Lodge  to  assure  Big  Minh  that  Saigon  "can  count  on  us."  That  was  a  pledge. 
.  .  .  All  that  would  follow  .  .  .  had  been  determined  in  that  hour  of  politi- 
cal decision  in  the  old  Executive  Office  Building,  while  .  .  .  Oswald  gasped 
away  his  miserable  life  in  Parkland  Hospital. ^'"^ 

The  new  President's  decisions  to  expand  the  war  by  bombing  and  to  send  U.S. 
troops  would  come  many  months  later.  But  he  had  already  satisfied  the  "military" 
faction's  demand  for  an  unambiguous  commitment,  and  ordered  their  "political" 
opponents  to  silence. 

NSAM  273(2)  AND  273(6):  THE  DOUBLETALK 
ABOUT  "WITHDRAWAL" 

The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  had  consistently  and  persistently  advised  their  civilian 
overseers  (e.g.,  on  May  10,  1961  and  January  13,  1962)  that  for  what  they  con- 
strued as  the  "unalterable  objectives"  of  victory  a  decision  should  be  made  to 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  219 

deploy  additional  U.S.  forces,  including  combat  troops  if  necessary. They  were 
opposed  from  the  outset  by  the  proponents  of  a  more  political  "counterinsurgency" 
concept,  such  as  Roger  Hilsman.  But  in  April  1962  Ambassador  Galbraith  in 
New  Delhi  proposed  to  President  Kennedy  a  different  kind  of  (in  his  words) 
"political  solution."  Harriman,  he  suggested,  should  tell  the  Russians 

of  our  determination  not  to  let  the  Viet  Cong  overthrow  the  present  gov- 
ernment. .  .  .  The  Soviets  should  be  asked  to  ascertain  whether  Hanoi  can 
and  will  call  off  the  Viet  Cong  activity  in  return  for  phased  American  with- 
drawal, liberalization  in  the  trade  relations  between  the  two  parts  of  the 
country  and  general  and  non-specific  agreement  to  talk  about  reunification 
after  some  period  of  tranquillity.^-'' 

It  is  of  course  highly  unusual  for  ambassadors  to  report  directly  to  presidents 
outside  of  "channels."  Contrary  to  usual  practice  the  memorandum  did  not  come 
up  through  Secretary  Rusk's  office;  the  White  House  later  referred  the  memo- 
randum for  the  comments  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  (and  the  Joint  Chiefs), 
but  not  of  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  very  existence  of  such  an  unusual  memo- 
randum and  procedure  demonstrates  that  President  Kennedy  was  personally  inter- 
ested in  at  least  keeping  his  "political"  options  open.  This  was  the  second  occasion 
on  which  Kennedy  had  used  the  former  Harvard  professor  as  an  independent 
"watchdog"  to  evaluate  skeptically  the  Rusk-McNamara  consensus  of  his  own 

j  bureaucracy;  and  there  are  rumors  that  Professor  Galbraith  (who  for  some  un- 
explained reason  saw  President  Johnson  on  November  23,  1963)  continued  to 
play  this  role  in  late  1963,  after  his  return  to  Harvard.  Another  such  independent 

I  "watchdog"  was  Kennedy's  White  House  assistant,  Michael  Forrestal. 

j  The  response  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  to  Galbraith's  "political  solution"  was  pre- 
dictably chilly.  They  argued  that  it  would  constitute  "disengagement  from  what 
is  by  now  a  well-known  commitment,"  and  recalled  that  in  the  published  letter  of 
December  14,  1961  to  Diem,  President  Kennedy  had  v^ritten  that  "we  are  pre- 
pared to  help"  against  a  campaign  "supported  and  directed  from  outside."  In 
their  view  this  language  affirmed  "support  ...  to  whatever  extent  may  be 
necessary,"  but  their  particular  exegesis,  which  Kennedy  declined  to  endorse  in 
October  1963,  did  not  become  official  until  Johnson's  NSAM  273(1). 

On  the  contrary,  for  one  reason  or  another,  the  Defense  Department  began  in 
mid- 1962  "a  formal  planning  and  budgetary  process"  for  precisely  what  Galbraith 
had  contemplated,  a  "phased  withdrawal  of  U.S.  forces  from  Vietnam."  ^'^  Penta- 
gon Paper  IV.B.4,  which  studies  this  process,  ignores  the  Galbraith  memorandum 
entirely;  and  refers  instead  to  what  Leslie  Gelb  calls  "the  euphoria  and  optimism 
of  July  1962."  Assuredly  there  were  military  professions  of  optimism,  in  secret 
as  well  as  public  documents. These  professions  of  optimism  do  not,  however, 
explain  why  in  1963  the  actual  level  of  U.S.  military  personnel  continued  to  rise, 
from  9,865  at  New  Year's^^*  (with  projected  highs  at  that  time  of  11,600  in  Fiscal 
Year  1963,  12,200  in  February  1964,  and  12,200  in  February  1965)  to  un- 
anticipated levels  of  14,000  in  June  and  16,500  on  October.^i  About  these  troop 
increases,  which  Diem  apparently  opposed,^^  Pentagon  Papers  are  silent, 
j  By  mid- 1963,  with  the  aggravating  political  crisis  in  Vietnam,  the  pressure  to 
move  ahead  with  withdrawal  plans  was  increasing.  This  increased  pressure  was 
motivated  not  by  military  "euphoria"  (if  indeed  it  ever  had  been)  but  by  political 
dissatisfaction.  A  State  Department  telegram  from  Rusk  to  Lodge  on  August  29, 
il963,  expresses  the  opinion  that  U.S.  political  pressures  on  Diem  would  otherwise 
futile: 


220      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 


Unless  such  talk  included  a  real  sanction  such  as  a  threatened  withdrawal  of 
our  support,  it  is  unlikely  that  it  would  be  taken  seriously  by  a  man  who  may 
feel  that  we  are  inescapably  committed  to  an  anti-Communist  Vietnam.^^ 

Pentagon  Paper  IV. B. 4  ignores  this  telegram  as  well;  yet  even  it  (in  marked  con- 
trast to  Leslie  Gelb's  "Summary  and  Analysis"  of  it)  admits  that  I 

Part  of  the  motivation  behind  the  stress  placed  on  U.S.  force  withdrawal, 
and  particularly  the  seemingly  arbitrary  desire  to  effect  the  1,000-man  with- 
drawal by  the  end  of  1963,  apparently  was  as  a  signal  to  influence  both  the 
North  Vietnamese  and  the  South  Vietnamese  and  set  the  stage  for  possible  ! 
later  steps  that  would  help  bring  the  insurgency  to  an  end.^^ 

At  the  time  of  Galbraith's  proposal  for  talks  about  phased  U.S.  withdrawal 
between  Harriman  and  the  Russians,  Harriman  was  Chairman  of  the  American 
delegation  to  the  then  deadlocked  Geneva  Conference  on  Laos,  which  very  ; 
shortly  afterwards  reconvened  for  the  rapid  conclusion  of  the  1962  Geneva 
Agreements.  Relevant  events  in  that  development  include  a  sudden  U.S.  troop  j 
buildup  in  Thailand  in  May,  the  agreement  among  the  three  Laotian  factions  \ 
to  form  a  coalition  government  on  June  1 1 ,  and  Khrushchev's  message  the  next  { 
day  hailing  the  coalition  agreement  as  a  "pivotal  event"  in  Southeast  Asia  and  |' 
good  augury  for  the  solution  of  "other  international  problems  which  now  divide  !,' 
states  and  create  tension."     The  signing  of  the  Geneva  Accords  on  July  23  was  ': 
accompanied  by  a  partial  withdrawal  of  U.S.  troops  in  Thailand,  as  well  as  by  \ 
a  considerable  exacerbation  of  Thai-U.S.  relations,  to  the  extent  that  Thailand,  j 
infuriated  by  lack  of  support  in  its  border  dispute  with  Cambodia,  declared  a  ' 
temporary  boycott  of  SEATO.^*'' 

The  1962  Geneva  Agreements  on  Laos  were  marked  by  an  unusual  American 
willingness  to  "trust"  the  other  side.^^  Chester  Cooper  confirms  that  their  value 
lay  in 

a  private  deal  worked  out  between  the  leaders  of  the  American  and  Soviet  j 
delegations — the  "Harriman-Pushkin  Agreement."  In  essence  the  Russians  , 
agreed  to  use  their  influence  on  the  Pathet  Lao,  Peking,  and  Hanoi  to  assure 
compliance  with  the  terms  agreed  on  at  the  Conference.  In  exchange  for 
this,  the  British  agreed  to  assure  compliance  by  the  non-Communists.^^ 

He  also  confirms  that,  before  Harriman  and  Kennedy  could  terminate  U.S. 
support  for  the  CIA's  protege  in  Laos,  Phoumi  Nosavan,  "some  key  officials  in 
our  Mission  there  .  .  .  had  to  be  replaced,"  The  U.S.  Foreign  Service  List 
shows  that  the  officials  recalled  from  Vientiane  in  the  summer  of  1962  include 
both  of  the  resident  military  attaches  and  also  the  CIA  Station  Chief,  Gordon  L. 
Jorgensen.'^o 

This  purge  of  right-wing  elements  in  the  U.S.  Mission  failed  to  prevent  im-  t 
mediate  and  conspicuous  violation  of  the  Agreements  by  Thai-based  elements  of 
the  U.S.  Air  Force  through  jet  overflights  of  Laos.  These  same  overflights,  ac- 
cording to  Hilsman,  had  been  prohibited  by  Kennedy,  on  Harriman's  urging,  at  j 
a  National  Security  Council  meeting.  In  late  October  1963  Pathet  Lao  Radio  be-  i 
gan  to  complain  of  stepped-up  intrusions  by  U.S.  jet  aircraft,  as  well  as  of  a  new  1 
military  offensive  by  Phoumi's  troops  (about  which  we  shall  say  more  later) .''^  j 

According  to  Kenneth  O'Donnell,  President  Kennedy  had  himself  (like  Gal- 
braith)  abandoned  hopes  for  a  military  solution  as  early  as  the  spring  of  1963. 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  111 

O'Donnell  allegedly  heard  from  Kennedy  then  "that  he  had  made  up  his  mind 
that  after  his  re-election  he  would  take  the  risk  of  unpopularity  and  make  a 
complete  withdrawal  of  American  forces  from  Vietnam  ...  in  1965."  '^^ 
Whether  the  President  had  so  unreservedly  and  so  early  adopted  the  Galbraith 
perspective  is  debatable;  there  is,  however,  no  questioning  that  after  the  Buddhist 
crisis  in  August  the  prospect  of  accelerated  or  total  withdrawal  was  openly  con- 
templated by  members  of  the  bureaucracy's  "political"  faction,  including  the 
President's  brother. 

How  profoundly  this  issue  had  come  to  divide  "political"  and  "military"  inter- 
preters of  Administration  policy  is  indicated  by  General  Krulak's  minutes  of  a 
meeting  in  the  State  Department  on  August  31,  1963: 

Mr.  Kattenburg  stated  ...  it  was  the  belief  of  Ambassador  Lodge  that,  if 
we  undertake  to  live  with  this  repressive  regime  ...  we  are  going  to  be 
thrown  out  of  the  country  in  six  months.  He  stated  that  at  this  juncture  it 
would  be  better  for  us  to  make  the  decision  to  get  out  honorably.  .  .  . 
Secretary  Rusk  commented  that  Kattenburg's  recital  was  largely  speculative; 
that  it  would  be  far  better  for  us  to  start  on  the  firm  basis  of  two  things — 
that  we  will  not  pull  out  of  Vietnam  until  the  war  is  won,  and  that  we  will 
not  run  a  coup.  Mr.  McNamara  expressed  agreement  with  this  view.  Mr. 
Rusk  .  .  .  then  asked  the  Vice  President  if  he  had  any  contribution  to 
make.  The  Vice  President  stated  that  he  agreed  with  Secretary  Rusk's  con- 
clusions completely;  that  he  had  great  reservations  himself  with  respect  to 
a  coup,  particularly  so  because  he  had  never  really  seen  a  genuine  alternative 
to  Diem.  He  stated  that  from  both  a  practical  and  a  political  viewpoint,  it 
would  be  a  disaster  to  pull  out;  that  we  should  stop  playing  cops  and  robbers 
and  .  .  .  once  again  go  about  winning  the  war.'''^ 

I  At  this  meeting  (which  the  President  did  not  attend)  the  only  opposition  to 
;  this  powerful  Rusk-McNamara-Johnson  consensus  was  expressed  by  two  more 
junior  State  Department  officials  with  OSS  and  CIA  backgrounds:  Paul  Katten- 
burg (whom  Rusk  interrupted  at  one  heated  point)  and  Roger  Hilsman.  One 
week  later,  however,  Robert  Kennedy,  who  was  the  President's  chief  trouble- 
shooter  in  CIA,  Vietnam,  and  counterinsurgency  affairs,  himself  questioned 
Secretary  Rusk's  "firm  basis"  and  entertained  the  solution  which  Johnson  had 
called  a  "disaster": 

The  first  and  fundamental  question,  he  felt,  was  what  we  were  doing  in 
Vietnam.  As  he  understood  it,  we  were  there  to  help  the  people  resisting  a 
Communist  take-over.  The  first  question  was  whether  a  Communist  take- 
over could  be  successfully  resisted  with  any  government.  If  it  could  not, 
now  was  the  time  to  get  out  of  Vietnam  entirely,  rather  than  waiting.  If  the 
answer  was  that  it  could,  but  not  with  a  Diem-Nhu  government  as  it  was 
now  constituted,  we  owed  it  to  the  people  resisting  Communism  in  Vietnam 
to  give  Lodge  enough  sanctions  to  bring  changes  that  would  permit  success- 
ful resistance.'''^ 

One  way  or  another,  in  other  words,  withdrawal  was  the  key  to  a  "political" 
jiolution. 

These  reports  show  Robert  Kennedy  virtually  isolated  (save  for  the  support 
bf  middle-echelon  State  officials  like  Hilsman  and  Kattenburg)  against  a  strong 
pusk-McNamara  bureaucratic  consensus  (supported  by  Lyndon  Johnson).  Yet 

|| 


\ 


222      Gravel  Edition/The  PentagQH  Papers /Vol.  V 

in  October  and  November  both  points  of  Mr.  Rusk's  "firm  basis"  were  under-  | 

mined  by  the  White  House:  unconditional  plans  for  an  initial  troop  withdrawal  | 

were  announced  on  November  20;  and  the  United  States,  by  carefully  meditated  i 
personnel  changes  and  selective  aid  cuts,  gave  signals  to  dissident  generals  in 
Saigon  that  it  would  tolerate  a  coup.  The  first  clear  signal  was  the  unusually 

publicized  removal  on  October  5  of  the  CIA  station  chief  in  Saigon,  John  i 
Richardson,  because  of  his  close  identification  with  Diem's  brother  Ngo  dinh 

Nhu.  And,  as  Leslie  Gelb  notes,  "In  October  we  cut  off  aid  to  Diem  in  a  direct  ; 

rebuff,  giving  a  green  light  to  the  generals. "^^  j 

But  this  brief  political  trend,  publicly  announced  as  late  as  November  20,  was  \ 

checked  and  reversed  by  the  new  President  at  his  first  substantive  policy  meeting  ; 

on  November  24.  As  he  himself  reports,  [ 

i 

I  told  Lodge  and  the  others  that  I  had  serious  misgivings.  .  .  .  Congres-  j 
sional  demands  for  our  withdrawal  from  Vietnam  were  becoming  louder  || 
and  more  insistent.  I  thought  we  had  been  mistaken  in  our  failure  to  support  j 
Diem.  ...  I  told  Lodge  that  I  had  not  been  happy  with  what  I  read  about  ? 
our  Mission's  operations  in  Vietnam  earlier  in  the  year.  There  had  been  i 
too  much  internal  dissension.  I  wanted  him  to  develop  a  strong  team.  •  .  .  jj 
In  the  next  few  months  we  sent  Lodge  a  new  deputy,  a  new  CIA  chief,  a  j 
new  director  of  the  U.S.  Information  Agency  (USIA)  operations,  and  re-  !; 
placements  for  other  key  posts  in  the  U.S.  Embassy."^^  I 

In  other  words,  Richardson's  replacement  (presumably  Frederick  W.  Flott)  was  ^• 
himself  replaced  (by  Peer  de  Silva,  an  Army  Intelligence  veteran).  Others  who  i 
were  purged  included  the  number  two  Embassy  of^cial,  William  Trueheart,  a  i 
former  State  intelligence  officer,  and  John  W.  Mecklin,  the  USIA  director:  both  ' 
Trueheart  and  Mecklin  were  prominent,  along  with  Kattenburg  and  Hilsman,  in  , 
the  "get  Diem"  faction.  This  purge  of  the  Embassy  was  accompanied  by  the  i 
replacement,  on  January  7,  1964,  of  Paul  Kattenburg  as  Chairman  of  the  Vietnam 
Inter-Department  Working  Group,  and  soon  after  by  the  resignation  of  Roger 
Hilsman. '^^  The  State  Department's  Foreign  Service  List  failed  to  reflect  the  ; 
rapidity  with  which  this  secret  purge  was  affected.'''^ 

Above  all  NSAM  273  sent  a  new  signal  to  the  confused  Saigon  generals,  to  < 
replace  the  "political"  signals  of  October  and  November.  For  the  first  time  (as 
we  shall  see)  they  were  told  to  go  ahead  with  a  "graduated"  or  escalating  pro-  ' 
gram  of  clandestine  military  operations  against  North  Vietnam. "^^  On  January  16  ' 
these  34A  Operations  were  authorized  to  begin  on  February  1.  In  Saigon  as  in 
Washington,  a  brief  interlude  of  government  by  politically  minded  moderates 
gave  way  to  a  new  "military"  phase.  On  January  30,  Nguyen  Khanh  ousted  the  ' 
Saigon  junta  headed  by  Duong  van  Minh,  on  the  grounds  that  some  of  its  mem-  \ 
bers  were  "paving  the  way  for  neutralism  and  thus  selling  out  the  country."  I 
According  to  the  Pentagon  Papers  Khanh  notified  his  American  adviser.  Col.  \ 
Jasper  Wilson,  of  the  forthcoming  coup;  but  in  a  recent  interview  Khanh  has  j 
claimed  Wilson  told  him  of  the  American-organized  coup  less  than  twenty-four  ; 
hours  in  advance. | 

Lyndon  Johnson,  like  other  observers,  discounts  the  novelty  of  NSAM  273,  J 
by  referring  back  to  President  Kennedy's  firm  statements  in  two  TV  interviews 
of  early  September.  In  one  of  these  Kennedy  had  said,  "I  don't  agree  with  those 
who  say  we  should  withdraw."  In  the  other,  he  had  argued  against  any  cut  in 
U.S.  aid  to  South  Vietnam:  "I  don't  think  we  think  that  would  be  helpful  at 
this  time.  .  .  .  You  might  have  a  situation  which  could  bring  about  a  col- 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  223 

lapse."  From  these  two  statements  Ralph  Stavins  has  also  concluded  that 
"had  John  F.  Kennedy  lived,  he  would  not  have  pulled  out  of  Southeast  Asia 
and  would  have  taken  any  steps  necessary  to  avoid  an  ignominious  defeat  at  the 
hands  of  the  Viet  Cong.^^ 

But  Kennedy  had  clearly  shifted  between  early  September  1963  (when  he 
had  pulled  back  from  encouraging  a  reluctant  Saigon  coup)  and  late  November 
(after  he  had  given  the  signals  for  one).  The  TV  interviews  soon  proved  to  be 
poor  indicators  of  his  future  policy:  by  mid-October  Kennedy  was  making  sig- 
nificant aid  cuts,  as  requested  by  dissident  generals  in  Saigon,  in  order  to  weaken 
Diem's  position,  and  above  all  to  remove  from  Saigon  the  CIA-trained  Special 
Forces  which  Diem  and  Nhu  relied  on  as  a  private  guard. And  on  October  2 
the  White  House  statement  had  announced  that 

Secretary  McNamara  and  General  Taylor  reported  their  judgment  that  the 
major  part  of  the  U.S.  military  task  can  be  completed  by  the  end  of  1965, 
though  there  may  be  a  continuing  requirement  for  a  limited  number  of 
U.S.  training  personnel.  They  reported  that  by  the  end  of  this  year,  the  U.S. 
program  for  training  Vietnamese  should  have  progressed  to  the  point  where 
1,000  U.S.  military  personnel  assigned  to  South  Viet-Nam  can  be  with- 
drawn. 

This  language  constituted  a  personal  "judgment"  rather  than  an  authorized 
"plan"  (or,  as  Mr.  Gelb  calls  it,  a  "public  .  .  .  promise").  The  distinction  was 
recognized  by  the  secret  McNamara-Taylor  memorandum  of  October  2  which 
proposed  it.  McNamara  and  Taylor,  moreover,  recommended  an  announcement 
as  "consistent"  with  a  program  whose  inspiration  was  explicitly  political: 

an  application  of  selective  short-term  pressures,  principally  economic,  and 
the  conditioning  of  long-term  aid  on  the  satisfactory  performance  by  the 
Diem  government  in  meeting  military  and  political  objectives  which  in  the 
aggregate  equate  to  the  requirements  of  final  victory. 

The  memo  called  for  the  Defense  Department  "to  announce  in  the  very  near 
future  presently  prepared  plans  [as  opposed  to  intentions]  to  withdraw  1,000  U.S. 
military  personnel"  (p.  555).  This  recommendation  was  approved  by  the 
President  on  October  5,  and  incorporated  in  NSAM  263  of  October  11,  but 
with  the  proviso  that  "no  formal  announcement  be  made  of  the  implementation 
of  plans  to  withdraw  1,000  U.S.  military  personnel  by  the  end  of  1963." 

Instead  the  President  began  to  leak  the  NSAM  263  plans  informally.  In  his 
press  conference  of  October  31,  on  the  eve  of  the  coup  against  Diem,  the  Presi- 
dent answered  an  informed  question  about  "any  speedup  in  the  withdrawal  from 
Vietnam"  by  speculating  that  "the  first  contingent  would  be  250  men  who  are 
not  involved  in  what  might  be  called  front-line  operations."  ^9  A  fortnight  later 
he  was  more  specific,  in  the  context  of  a  clearly  political  formulation  of  U.S. 
policy  objectives: 

That  is  our  object,  to  bring  Americans  home,  permit  the  South  Vietnamese 
to  maintain  themselves  as  a  free  and  independent  country,  and  permit  demo- 
cratic forces  within  the  country  to  operate.  .  .  .  We  are  going  to  bring  back 
several  hundred  before  the  end  of  the  year.  But  on  the  question  of  the  exact 
number,  I  thought  we  would  wait  until  the  meeting  of  November  20\h.^^ 


224      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol  V 

The  November  20  meeting  was  an  extraordinary  all-agency  Honolulu  Con- 
ference of  some  45  to  60  senior  Administration  officials,  called  in  response  to 
the  President's  demand  for  a  "full-scale  review"  of  U.S.  policy  in  Southeast  Asia, 
following  the  overthrow  of  Diem.^i  This  all-agency  Conference,  like  the  follow-up 
"Special  Meeting"  of  June  1964,  is  apparently  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
regular  SecDef  Honolulu  Conferences,  such  as  the  Seventh  in  May  1963  and  the  j 
Eighth  in  March  1964.^^  It  was  extraordinary  in  its  size  and  high-level  participa-  \ 
tion  (McNamara,  Rusk,  McCone,  McGeorge  Bundy,  Lodge,  Taylor,  Harkins), 
yet  Robert  Kennedy,  the  President's  Vietnam  trouble-shooter,  did  not  attend:  on  ! 
November  20  he  celebrated  his  birthday  at  home  in  Washington.  (The  only  j 
Cabinet  members  left  in  Washington  were  Attorney  General  Robert  Kennedy,  j 
HEW  Secretary  Celebrezze,  and  the  new  Postmaster  General  John  Gronouski.  \ 
Because  of  a  coincident  Cabinet  trip  to  Japan,  Dillon  of  Treasury,  Hodges  of  j 
Commerce,  Wirtz  of  Labor,  Freeman  of  Agriculture,  and  Udall  of  the  Interior  | 
were  also  in  Honolulu  during  this  period.  )^'^  | 

As  the  President's  questioner  of  October  31  was  apparently  aware,  the  issue  '! 
was  no  longer  whether  1,000  men  would  be  withdrawn  (with  a  Military  As- 
sistance Program  reduction  in  Fiscal  1965  of  $27  million),  but  whether  the  ' 
withdrawal  program  might  not  be  accelerated  by  six  months,  with  a  correspond-  \ 
ing  MAP  aid  reduction  of  $33  million  in  Fiscal  1965.^^  Planning  for  this  second  j 
"Accelerated  Plan"  had  been  stepped  up  after  the  October  5  decision  which  j 
authorized  the  first. ^^^^  The  issue  was  an  urgent  one,  since  the  Fiscal  1965  budget  | 
would  have  to  be  presented  to  Congress  in  January,  i; 

The  chronology  of  Pentagon  Paper  IV. B. 4,  on  Phased  Withdrawal  of  U.S.  I 
Forces,  tells  us  that  on  November  20,  two  days  before  the  assassination,  the  j 
Honolulu  Conference  secretly  "agreed  that  the  Accelerated  Plan  (speed-up  of  ; 
force  withdrawal  by  six  months  directed  by  McNamara  in  October)  should  be  ! 
maintained."      In  addition  the  Honolulu  Conference  issued  a  press  release  ! 
which,  according  to  the  New  York  Times,  "reaffirmed  the  United  States  plan  i 
to  bring  home  about  1,000  of  its  16,500  troops  from  South  Vietnam  by  Jan- 
uary 1."^^  Thus  the  language  of  NSAM  273  of  November  26,  by  going  back  i 
to  the  status  quo  ante  October  5,  was  itself  misleading,  as  is  the  careful  selection  ! 
from  it  in  the  Pentagon  Study.  By  reverting  to  the  informal  "objective"  of  Octo-  ! 
ber  2,  NSAM  273(2)  tacitly  effaced  both  the  formalized  plans  of  NSAM  263 
(October  5  and  11)  announced  on  November  20,  and  also  the  Accelerated  Plan 
discussed  and  apparently  agreed  to  on  the  same  day.  NSAM  273(6),  according 
to  most  citations  of  it,  would  have  explicitly  "maintained  both  military  and 
economic  programs  ...  at  levels  as  high  as  those  ...  of  the  Diem  regime."  ^® 

Most  volumes  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  attribute  the  letter  and  spirit  of  NSAM 
273  to  a  misplaced  military  "optimism."     But  President  Johnson's  memoirs  con-  ' 
firm  the  spirit  of  urgency  and  "serious  misgivings"  which  others  have  attributed 
to  the  unscheduled  Sunday  meeting  which  approved  it.i^^  President  Kennedy  ; 
had  envisaged  no  formal  meetings  on  that  Sunday:  instead  he  would  have  met 
Lodge  privately  for  lunch  at  his  private  Virginia  estate  (or,  according  to  William  | 
Manchester  at  Camp  David). But  President  Johnson,  while  still  in  Dallas  on  j 
November  22,  "felt  a  national  security  meeting  was  essential  at  the  earliest  pos-  \ 
sible  moment";  and  arranged  to  have  it  set  up  "for  that  same  evening."  j 

Johnson,  it  is  true,  tells  us  that  his  "first  exposure  to  the  details  of  the  problem  ; 
of  Vietnam  came  forty-eight  hours  after  I  had  taken  the  oath  of  office,"      i.e.,  i 
on  Sunday,  November  24.  But  Pentagon  Study  IV.B.4  and  the  New  York  Times 
make  it  clear  that  on  Saturday  morning,  for  fifty  minutes,  the  President  and 
McNamara  discussed  a  memorandum  of  some  four  or  five  typewritten  pages: 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  225 

In  that  memo,  Mr.  McNamara  said  that  the  new  South  Vietnamese  gov- 
ernment was  confronted  by  serious  financial  problems,  and  that  the  U.S. 
must  be  prepared  to  raise  planned  MAP  levels. 

The  Chronology  adds  to  this  information  the  statement  that  "funding  well  above 
current  MAP  plans  was  envisaged." 

The  true  significance  of  the  symbolic  1,000-man  withdrawal  was  as  a  political 
signal;  and  politics  explains  why  NSAM  263  was  overridden.  As  we  have  seen, 
another  Pentagon  study  admits  that 

The  seemingly  arbitrary  desire  to  effect  the  1,000-man  reduction  by  the 
end  of  1963,  apparently  was  as  a  signal  to  influence  both  the  North  Viet- 
namese and  the  South  Vietnamese  and  set  the  stage  for  possible  later  steps 
that  would  help  bring  the  insurgency  to  an  end.^^^^ 

Different  officials  no  doubt  had  different  "possible  later  steps"  in  mind.  But,  as 
the  Kennedy  Administration  must  have  known  in  early  October,  the  August  29 
proposal  by  de  Gaulle  for  the  reunification  and  neutralization  of  Vietnam  could 
only  have  been  strengthened  by  this  signal. ^^"^  Precisely  the  same  thinking,  as 
we  have  seen,  dictated  the  policy  reversal  of  November  24:  U.S.  programs  would 
be  maintained  at  at  least  their  old  levels,  "so  that  the  new  GVN  would  not  be 
tempted  to  regard  the  U.S.  as  seeking  to  disengage." 

NSAM  263  of  October  11,  which  approved  Kennedy's  ill-fated  withdrawal 
plan,  formalized  a  presidential  decision  of  October  5,  sandwiched  between  the 
return  of  his  Paris  Ambassador,  Charles  Bohlen,  on  October  3,  and  the  arrival 
in  Washington  on  October  5  of  French  Foreign  Minister  Maurice  Couve  de 
Murville.109  On  October  7  Couve  de  Murville,  after  seeing  the  President,  sent 
up  another  signal  by  his  announcement  (later  confirmed  by  Arthur  Schlesinger) 
that  a  visit  to  Washington  by  General  de  Gaulle  was  planned  for  "some  time" 
(i.e.,  February)  in  1964.^i« 

The  month  of  November  1963  saw  significant  signals  from  the  other  side  of 
renewed  interest  in  a  "political  solution,"  signals  which  appalled  Rusk  and  other 
members  of  the  State  Department: 

The  situation  since  the  November  coup  had  been  further  complicated  by 
new  proposals  for  a  negotiated  settlement  involving  the  reunification  of  all 
of  Vietnam,  as  envisaged  in  the  1954  agreements,  and  its  neutralization  on 
something  like  the  Laotian  pattern.  The  Ho  Chi  Minh  regime  .  .  .  gave 
indications  of  renewed  interest  in  a  "political"  solution  of  much  the  same 
character  that  General  de  Gaulle  had  suggested. m 

The  Pentagon  Papers  note  tersely  in  one  chronology  that  in  November  1963 
"FRANCE  proposed  talks  leading  towards  the  establishment  of  a  neutral,  inde- 
pendent South  Vietnam."  y  Thant  also  presented  Washington  with  proposals 
for  a  neutralist  coalition  government  that  would  have  included  some  of  the 
pro-French  Vietnamese  exiles  living  in  Paris. i^*^  The  clandestine  radio  of  the 
National  Liberation  Front,  broadcasting  in  South  Vietnam,  began  in  November 
a  series  of  appeals  for  negotiations  aimed  not  only  at  the  Vietnamese  people  but 
also  at  members  of  the  new  military  junta  that  succeeded  Diem.^i^ 

It  is  true  that  Rusk  (like  Johnson  and  others  in  the  Administration)  was 
bitterly  opposed  to  disengagement  and  said  so  both  privately  and  publicly. 
,flut  it  is  clear  that  through  the  last  month  of  the  Diem  crisis  (i.e.,  October)  the 


226      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon,  Papers/ Vol.  V  j 

White  House  communicated  more  and  more  with  Lodge  directly  via  the  CIA 
network,  rather  than  through  Rusk  and  regular  State  Department  channels.  It 
is  also  known  that,  in  this  same  period,  Kennedy  authorized  exploratory  talks 
with  Cuban  representatives,  in  which  his  envoy,  Ambassador  William  Atwood,  i 
was  instructed  to  report  to  the  White  House  directly,  rather  than  through  the  | 
State  Department. 

Assessed  in  military  terms,  the  matter  of  a  1,000-man  troop  withdrawal  was 
not  important,  and  one  can  speak  loosely  of  a  continuity  between  the  bureaucratic  j 
policies  of  the  Defense  and  State  Departments  (or  of  McNamara  and  Rusk)  \ 
before  and  after  the  assassination.  But  in  the  steps  taken  by  Kennedy,  par- 
ticularly after  Diem's  death,  to  implement  and  announce  a  withdrawal,  the 
President  was  indeed  giving  signals  of  his  own  dissatisfaction  with  the  existing 
policies  of  his  own  bureaucracy,  and  his  willingness  to  entertain  a  new  alterna- 
tive.!!"^ 

It  is  possible  that  the  secret  approval  on  November  20  of  the  Accelerated 
Troop  Withdrawal  Plan  should  be  seen  as  flowing  not  from  either  military  or 
diplomatic  opportunity,  so  much  as  from  financial  necessity.  The  President  was 
under  double  pressure  to  reduce  government  expenditure  in  general  and  the 
balance  of  payments  deficit  in  particular.  To  strengthen  both  the  domestic  econ- 
omy and  his  own  political  prospects  he  had  already  decided  on  a  tax  cut  in  1964; 
in  September  as  a  consequence  he  had  ordered  "a  policy  of  severe  restraint"  in  I 
the  next  budget,  for  fear  of  a  huge  $12  to  $15  billion  deficit-^^^  With  respect  to  , 
foreign  aid  in  particular.  Congress  was  even  more  economy-minded  than  the 
President,  slashing  his  $4.5  billion  request  for  Fiscal  Year  1964  by  almost  $1 
billion.119 

But  if  the  tax  cut  and  projected  budget  deficit  were  not  further  to  threaten  i 
the  stability  of  the  dollar  in  the  international  monetary  system,  it  was  particularly  i 
urgent  that  the  President  take  steps  to  improve  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments,  and  \ 
reduce  the  increasing  outflow  of  gold.  In  early  1963  many  U.S.  government  de- 
partments were  ordered  to  balance  their  overseas  expenditures  against  earnings  ,i 
(through  so-called  "gold  dollar  budgets" Stringent  measures  taken  by  the  ; 
Pentagon  to  curb  overseas  spending  by  U.S.  army  personnel  and  their  dependents  i 
made  it  clear  this  was  a  significant  factor  in  the  balance  of  payments  problem  ' 
and  gold  outflow. 

Partly  to  reduce  this  factor,  the  Pentagon  proceeded  with  its  much-publicized 
program  to  develop  mobile  task  forces  based  in  the  United  States.  In  October,  on 
the  eve  of  Operation  "Big  Lift,"  an  unprecedented  airlift  of  such  mobile  forces  i 
from  America  to  Germany,  Roswell  Gilpatric  predicted  in  a  major  policy  speech  ; 
that  the  time  was  near  when  the  "United  States  should  be  able  to  make  useful  , 
reductions  in  its  heavy  overseas  military  expenditures."  As  the  Times  noted,  his 
"diplomatically  phrased  comments  on  reducing  overseas  forces"  were  approved  , 
by  the  White  House. 121 

In  this  way  the  issue  of  U.S.  overseas  troop  levels  was,  for  both  budgetary  and 
monetary  reasons,  closely  linked  to  the  overall  Kennedy  strategy  for  movement  , 
towards  international  relaxation  of  the  cold  war  and  conversion  to  a  full-employ-  ' 
ment  civilian  economy  at  home.  On  both  scores  the  Kennedy  Administration  i 
claimed  progress  in  the  second  part  of  1963,  progress  attested  to  by  the  increasing  1 
concern  of  spokesmen  for  the  defense-aerospace  industries.  The  signing  of  the 
U.S.-Soviet  test-ban  treaty  on  August  5  in  Moscow,  while  a  Soviet  band  played  , 
Gershwin's  "Love  Walked  In,"  had  been  followed  by  a  series  of  hints  in  both  I 
capitals  of  U.S.-Soviet  cooperation,  in  the  fields  of  space,  civilian  air  travel,  and 
arms  limitation.  In  November  1963  Roswell  Gilpatric  announced  a  "major  gov- 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  111 

ernment-industry  planning  effort"  for  possible  transition  from  defense  to  civilian 
spending,^ 22  while  McNamara  himself,  in  the  week  leading  up  to  the  assassina- 
tion, hinted  at  a  U.S.-Soviet  strategic  parity,  "perhaps  even  at  a  lower  level  than 
today."  Business  Week,  in  its  last  pre-assassination  issue,  saw  no  ambiguity 
in  this  delicate  language:  "The  word  came  loud  and  clear  this  week  from  De- 
fense Secretary  Robert  S.  McNamara:  A  major  cut  in  defense  spending  is  in  the 
works." 

This  prediction,  of  course,  proved  false:  the  projected  "major  cut"  never 
came,  and  a  chief  reason  for  this  was  the  Vietnam  war.  I  am  not  at  all  trying  to 
suggest  here  that  the  new  Johnson  Administration  moved  consciously  and  at 
once  to  arrest  the  projected  "civilianization"  of  the  U.S.  budget  and  economy. 
In  fact  the  overall  budget  levels  of  the  Fiscal  '65  budget,  initiated  by  Kennedy 
and  presented  by  Johnson  in  January  1964,  did  show  token  reductions  in  spend- 
ing overair,~ln  defense,  and  even  in  defense  research  and  development.  It  is 
said  that,  as  late  as  the  beginning  of  1965,  "aerospace  companies  were  fully  pre- 
pared for  a  decline  in  business,"  until  the  sudden  "steep  escalation  of  the  Vietnam 
war." 

Yet  it  is  striking  that  the  new  Johnson  Administration,  while  sHghtly  reducing 
its  overall  defense  procurement  program  (through  a  fall-off  in  the  nearly  com- 
pleted missile  procurement  program)  did  move  rapidly  and  significantly  to  in- 
crease its  procurements  of  aircraft  (the  aircraft  used,  when  finally  delivered,  in 
the  Vietnam  air  war).i26  it  is  true  that  the  1963-1964  Kennedy  budget  had 
put  forward  $6.4  billion  for  aircraft  procurement,  but  in  fact  the  Kennedy  Ad- 
ministration made  commitments  from  July  to  November  at  an  annual  rate  of 
only  $5  billion,  while  the  Johnson  Administration  finished  the  fiscal  year  with  a 
whopping  cumulative  total  of  $6.8  billion  in  new  obligations.  This  was  the  highest 
aircraft  procurement  total  in  five  years. 

The  huge  commitment  of  $1.1  billion  for  new  aircraft  procurement  in  Feb- 
ruary 1964  (as  opposed  to  $368  million  in  November  1963),  can  and  indeed 
must  be  directly  related  to  the  JCS  proposals  in  that  month  for  the  bombing  of 
North  Vietnam.  These  proposals,  as  we  have  seen,  were  put  forward  on  the 
authority  of  NSAM  273  of  November  26,  1963.  Thus  the  budgetary  and  strategic 
implications  of  abandoning  the  November  20  decision  (for  an  Accelerated  With- 
drawal Program)  were  far  greater  and  more  immediate  than  is  indicated  by 
the  external  budgetary  outlines  of  overall  defense  spending. 

It  is  clear  that  the  Accelerated  Withdrawal  Program  was  abandoned  three  or 
four  days  after  its  approval  on  November  20,  for  it  entailed  the  kind  of  reduc- 
tion in  support  which  NSAM  273  prohibited.  In  addition  it  would  appear  that 
the  new  Johnson  Administration  even  cancelled  the  published  decision  for  a 
1,000-man  troop  withdrawal  in  late  1963.  I  myself  believe-that  there  was  never 
any  such  withdrawal,  or  anything  like  it.  Mr.  Gelb's  summary  of  Pentagon  Study 
IV.B.4  states  categorically  that  "the  U.S.  did  effect  a  1,000  man  withdrawal  in 
December  of  1963";  but  the  study  itself  calls  this  an  "accounting  exercise"  that 
"did  not  even  represent  a  decline  of  1,000  from  the  October  peak  of  16,732."  127 
Its  Chronology  adds  that  "Although  1,000  men  were  technically  withdrawn,  no 
actual  reduction  of  U.S.  strength  was  achieved."  ^28 

Another  study  states  that  on  January  1,  1964,  there  were  only  15,914  U.S. 
military  personnel  in  Vietnam ;i -'9  and  this  figure,  if  true,  might  represent  an 
appreciable  decline  from  the  October  high  of  16,500  (up  from  14,000  in 
June). But  this  year-end  figure  has  already  been  revised  downwards  too  many 
^  times  in  recent  years  for  any  Pentagon  estimate  to  have  much  credibility.  In 
1966,  for  example,  the  Pentagon  told  one  Congressional  Committee  that  the 


228      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Tapers/ Vol.  V 

1963  year-end  figure  was  16,575  (which  if  true  would  represent  an  actual  in- 
crease of  75  men);^'^i  and  in  1968  it  told  another  Committee  that  the  figure 
was  16,263  (a  reduction  of  237 )  J It  seems  possible  that  the  only  significant 
reduction  was  that  of  from  220  to  300  men  on  December  3,  which  had  been 
publicly  forecast  by  the  President  on  October  31,  and  confirmed  by  the  Novem- 
ber 20  Honolulu  press  release.  (This  withdrawal,  unlike  the  more  drastic  pro- 
posals, did  not  appear  to  entail  any  lowering  of  the  MAP  levels,  and  thus  might 
be  compatible  with  NSAM  273.) 

NSAM  273,  PARAGRAPH  7(?):  GRADUATED 
COVERT  MILITARY  OPERATIONS 

All  of  this  suggests  that  the  Pentagon  Studies  misrepresent  NSAM  273 
systematically.  Although  it  is  of  course  possible  that  NSAM  273  had  already 
been  censored  before  it  was  submitted  to  some  or  all  of  the  authors  of  the 
Pentagon  Papers,  it  is  striking  that  different  studies  use  different  fragments  of 
evidence  to  arrive  (by  incompatible  narratives)  at  the  same  false  picture  of 
continuity  between  November  20  and  24.  One  study  (IV.B.3,  p.  37)  suggests 
'  that  these  wgre  ''no  new  programs"  proposed  either  at  the  Honolulu  Conference 
or  in  NSAM  273,  because  of  the  "cautious  optimism"  on  both  occasions.  Another 
(IV.C.2.a,  pp.  1-2)  speaks  of  a  "different  .  .  .  new  course  of  action"  in  early 
1964 — the  34A  covert  operations — that  flowed  from  a  decision  "made"  at  the 
Honolulu  Conference  under  Kennedy  and  ratified  on  November  26  under 
Johnson: 

The  covert  program  was  spawned  in  May  of  1963,  when  the  JCS  directed 
CINCPAC  to  prepare  a  plan  for  GVN  "hit  and  run"  operations  against 
NVN.  These  operations  were  to  be  "non-attributable"  and  carried  out  "with 
U.S.  military  material,  training  and  advisory  assistance."  4/  Approved  by 
the  JCS  on  9_September  as  CINCPAC  OPLAN  34-63,  the  plan  was  dis- 
cussed during  the  Vietnam  policy  conference  at  Honolulu,  20  November 
1963.  Here  a  decision  was  made  to  develop  a  combined  COMUSMACV- 
CAS,  Saigon  plan  for  a  12-month  program  of  covert  operations.  Instructions 
forwarded  by  the  JCS  on  26  November  specifically  requested  provision  for: 
"(1)  harassment;  (2)  diversion;  (3)  political  pressure;  (4)  capture  of 
prisoners;  (5)  physical  destruction;  (6)  acquisition  of  intelligence;  (7) 
>  generation  of  intelligence;  and  (8)  diversion  of  DRV  resources."  Further, 
that  the  plan  provide  for  "selected  actions  of  graduated  scope  and  intensity 
to  include  commando  type  coastal  raids."  5/  To  this  guidance  was  added 
that  given  by  President  Johnson  to  the  effect  that  "planning  should  include 
.  .  .  estimates  of  such  factors  as:  (1)  resulting  damage  to  NVN;  (2)  the 
plausibility  of  denial;  (3)  possible  NVN  retaliation;  and  (4)  other  inter- 
national reaction."  6/  The  MACV-CAS  plan,  designated  OPLAN  34A,  and 
providing  for  "a  spectrum  of  capabilities  for  RVNAF  to  execute  against 
NVN,"  was  forwarded  by  CINCPAC  on  19  December  1963.  7/  The  idea 
of  putting  direct  pressure  on  North  Vietnam  met  prompt  receptivity  on  the 
part  of  President  Johnson. 

The  density  of  misrepresentations  in  this  study,  and  especially  this  paragraph, 
suggest  conscious  deception  rather  than  naive  error.  The  footnotes  have  unfor- 
tunately been  suppressed,  so  we  do  not  have  the  citation  for  the  alleged  directive 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  229 

of  May  1963.  The  chronology  summarizing  this  Study  gives  a  clue,  however,  for 
it  reads  "11  May  63#  NSAM  52#  Authorized  CIA-sponsored  operations  against 
NVN."  But  the  true  date  of  NSAM  52,  as  the  author  must  have  known,  was 
May  11,  1961;  and  indeed  he  makes  a  point  of  contrasting  the  sporadic  CIA 
operations,  authorized  in  1961  and  largely  suspended  in  1962,  with  the  34A 
"elaborate  program"  of  sustained  pressures,  under  a  military  command,  in  three 
planned  "graduated"  or  escalating  phases,  which  began  in  February  1964. 

The  inclusion  in  planning  of  MACV  was  in  keeping  with  the  Kennedy  doc- 
trine, enacted  after  the  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco,  that  responsibility  for  "any  large 
paramilitary  operation  wholly  or  partly  covert  ...  is  properly  the  primary  j 
responsibility  of  the  Department  of  Defense."  ^"^^  Before  November  26,  1963, 
U.S.  covert  operations  in  Asia  had  always  (at  least  in  theory)  been  "secret" 
and  "plausibly  deniable";  these  were  the  two  criteria  set  for  itself  in  1948  by 
the  National  Security  Council  when  it  first  authorized  CIA  covert  operations 
under  its  "other  functions  and  duties"  clause  in  the  1947  National  Security 
Act. Throughout  1963  the  Kennedy  Administration  was  under  considerable 
pressure,  public  as  well  as  within  its  personnel,  to  go  beyond  these  guidelines, 
and  intervene  "frankly"  rather  than  "surreptitiously."  In  May  1963  this  appeal 
for  escalation  was  publicly  joined  by  William  Henderson,  an  official  of  Socony 
Mobil  which  had  a  major  economic  interest  in  Southeast  Asia,  to  an  appeal  to  ' 
move  from  a  "limited"  to  an  "unlimited"  commitment  in  that  area.^^"^^ 

The  covert  operations  planning  authorized  by  NSAM  273  seems  to  have  been 
the  threshold  for  at  least  the  first  of  these  policy  changes,  if  not  both.  In  contrast 
both  were  wholly  incompatible  with  the  Kennedy  Administration's  last  move- 
ments toward  withdrawal.  In  May  1963  McNamara  had  authorized  changes  in 
long-range  planning  "to  accomplish  a  more  rapid  withdrawal"  ^^"^  and  on 
November  20  in  Honolulu,  as  we  have  seen,  the  resulting  initial  withdrawal  of 
1,000  men  was  supplemented  by  the  so-called  Accelerated  Plan.^-^^  It  is  hard 
to  imagine,  at  either  date,  the  same  man  or  men  contemplating  a  new  34A 
"elaborate  program"  of  acts  which  threatened  war,  to  coincide  with  an  accelerated 
withdrawal  of  U.S.  forces.  ^ 

The  next  sentence  of  Study  IV.C.2.a  tells  us  that  CINCPAC  OPLAN  34-63 
was  "approved  by  the  JCS  on  9  September" — this  "approval"  means  only  that, 
at  the  very  height  of  the  paralytic  stand-off  between  the  "political"  and  "military" 
factions,  the  Joint  Chiefs  forwarded  one  more  tendentious  "military"  alternative 
for  consideration  by  McNamara  and  above  all  by  the  303  Committee  (about 
whom  the  author  is  silent).  One  Gravel  Pentagon  Papers  Chronology  (111:141) 
suggests  that  Kennedy  and  his  White  House  staff  never  were  consulted  by  Mc- 
Namara about  OPLAN  34-63. 

The  same  Gravel  chronology  reports  that  CJ[A_jcross-bor^  operations,  rad- 
ically curtailed  after  the  1962  Geneva  Agreements  on  Laos,  were  resumed  by 
November  19,  1963,  one  day  before  the  Honolulu  Conference,  even  though  the 
first  Presidential  authorization  cited  for  such  renewed  operations  is  Johnson's 
NSAM  273  of  November  26.^'^^  Kennedy's  NSAM  249  of  June  25,  1963,  in 
rejecting  State's  proposals  for  actions  against  North  Vietnam,  had  authorized 
planning  for  operations  against  Laos  conditional  on  further  consultation;  and 
it  had  urged  review  whether  "additional  U.S.  actions  should  be  taken  in  Laos 
before  any  action  be  directed  against  North  Vietnam." 

Although  the  overall  language  of  NSAM  249  (which  refers  to  an  unpublished 
memorandum)  is  obscure,  this  wording  seems  to  indicate  that  in  June  1963  ) 
Kennedy  had  delayed  authorization  of  any  action  against  North  Vietnam.  Yet  { 
North  Vietnamese  and  right-wing  U.S.  sources  agree  that  in  this  very  month  of 


230      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 


'  June  1963  covert  operations  against  North  Vietnam  were  resumed  by  South 
I  Vietnamese  commandoes;  these  actions  had  the  approval  of  General  Harkins 
I  in  Saigon,  but  not  (according  to  the_  U.S.  sources)  of  President  Kennedy. 
The  same  sources,  further  corroborated  by  the  Pentagon  Papers,  both  linked 
these  raids  to  increased  military  operation  between  South  Vietnam  and  the 
Chinese  Nationalists,  whose  own  commandoes  began  turning  up  in  North  Viet- 
'  nam  in  increasing  numbers. ^"^^ 

It  has  also  been  suggested  that  KMT  influences,  and  their  sympathizers  in 
Thailand  and  the  CIA,  were  behind^  the  right-wing  political  assassinations  and 
military  offensive  which  in  1963  led  to  a  resumption  of  fighting  in  Laos,  "with 
new  American  supplies  and  full  U.S.  political  support."  This  autumn  1963 
military  offensive  in  Laos  coincided  with  escalation  of  activities  against  Prince 
Sihanouk  in  Cambodia  by  the  CIA-supported  Khmer  Serei  in  South  Vietnam. 
After  two  infiltrating  Khmer  Serei  agents  had  been  captured  and  had  publicly 
confessed,  Cambodia  on  November  19  severed  all  military  and  economic  ties 
with  the  United  States,  and  one  month  later  broke  off  diplomatic  relations. 

All  of  these  disturbing  events  suggest  that,  in  late  1963,  covert  operations 
were  beginning  to  escape  the  political  limitations,  both  internal  and  international 
(e.g.,  the  Harriman-Pushkin  agreement),  established  during  the  course  of  the 
Kennedy  Administration.  During  the  months  of  September  and  October  many 
established  newspapers,  including  the  New  York  Times,  began  to  complain  about 
the  CIA's  arrogation  of  power;  and  this  concern  was  echoed  in  Congress  by 
Senator  Mansfield.  The  evidence  now  published  in  the  Pentagon  Papers,  in- 
cluding Kennedy's  NSAM  249  of  June  and  the  Gravel  chronology's  testimony  to 
the  resumption  of  crossborder  operations,  also  suggests  that  covert  operations 
may  have  been  escalated  in  defiance  of  the  President's,  secret  .directives. 

If  this  chronology  is  correct,  then  Pentagon  Study  IV.C.2.a's  efforts  to  show 
continuity  between  the  Kennedy  and  Johnson  regimes  suggest  instead  that 
President  Kennedy  had  lost  control  of  covert  planning  and  operations.  OPLAN 
34-63,  which  "apparently  .  .  .  was  not  forwarded  to  the  White  House" 

was  discussed  during  the  Vietnam  policy  conference  at  Honolulu,  20  Novem- 
ber 1963.  Here  a  decision  was  made  to  develop  a  combined  COMUSMACV- 
CAS,  Saigon  plan  for  a  12-month  program  of  covert  operations. 

That  NSAM  273 's  innovations  were  hatched  at  Honolulu  is  suggested  also  by 
the  Honolulu  press  communique,  which,  anticipating  NSAM  273(1),  spoke  of 
"an  encouraging  outlook  for  the  principal  objective  of  joint  U.S.-Vietnamese 
policy  in  South  Vietnam."  In  Pentagon  Study  IV.B.4,  this  anticipatory  quotation 
is  completed  by  language  reminiscent  of  Kennedy's  in  early  1961  " — the  success- 
ful prosecution  of  the  war  against  the  Viet  Cong  communists."  ^'^'^  But  at  the 
Honolulu  press  conference  the  same  key  phrase  was  pointedly  (and  presciently) 
^ '  .  (  glossed  by  Defense  and  State  spokesmen  Arthur  Sylvester  and  Robert  C.  Man- 
JU>-^"^  nm^,  in  language  which  Kennedy  had  never  used  or  authorized,  to  mean  "the 
successful  promotion  of  the  war  against  the  North  Vietnam  Communists." 

Study  IV.C.2.a's  implication  that  the  escalation  planning  decision  was  made 
officially  by  the  Honolulu  Conference  (rather  than  at  it  without, Kennedy's  ajj- 
thorization)  is  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  other  Studies'  references  to  the  Con- 
ference's "optimism"  and  projections  of  withdrawal.  The  author  gives  no  foot- 
note for  these  and  crucial  sentences;  and  in  contrast  to  his  own  Chronology  he 
does  not  even  mention  NSAM  273.  His  next  citation  is  to  the  JCS  directive  on 
November  26  (which,  we  learn  from  his  own  Chronology  and  Stavins,  repeats 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  231 

that  of  NSAM  273  itself)  i^^^  but  this  citation  clearly  begs  the  question  of  what 
official  decision,  if  any,  was  reached  on  November  20.  What  is  left  of  interest 
in  the  author's  paragraph  is  the  speedy  authorization  by  the  infant  Johnson 
Administration,  and  the  personal  guidance  added  to  the  new  JCS  directives  by 
the  new  President  himself. 

NSAM  273,  it  seems  clear,  was  an  important  document  in  the  history  of  the 
1964  escalations,  as  well  as  in  the  reversal  of  President  Kennedy's  late  and  ill- 
fated  program  of  "Vietnamization"  by  1965.  The  systematic  censorship  and., 
distortion  of  NSAM  273  in  1963  and  again  in  1971,  by  the  Pentagon  study  and  ( 
later  by  the  New  York  Times,  raises  serious  questions  about  the  bona  fides  of  ' 
the  Pentagon  study  and  of  its  release.  It  also  suggests  that  the  Kennedy  assassina- 
tion was  itself  an  important,  perhaps  a  crucial,  event  in  the  history  of  the  Indo- 
china war. 

Assuredly  there  is  much  truth  to  be  learned  from  the  Pentagon  Papers.  Never- 
theless their  preparation,  if  not  the  drama  of  their  release,  represents  one  more 
manipulation  of  "intelligence"  in  order  to  influence  public  policy.  Someone  is 
being  carefully  protected  by  the  censorship  of  NSAM  273,  and  by  the  conceal- 
ment of  the  way  in  which  the  assassination  of  President  Kennedy  affected  the 
escalation  of  the  Indochina  War.  It  is  almost  certain  that  McCone,  perhaps  the 
leading  hawk  in  the  Kennedy  entourage,  played  a  role  in  this  secret  policy 
reversal. 

Elsewhere  in  the  Times  version  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  one  finds  the  intelli- 
gence community,  and  the  CIA  in  particular,  depicted  as  a  group  of  lonely  men 
who  challenged  the  bureaucratic  beliefs  of  their  time,  but  whose  percipient  warn- 
ings were  not  listened  to.  In  June  1964,  we  are  told,  the  CIA  "challenged  the 
domino  theory,  widely  believed  in  one  form  or  another  within  the  Administra- 
tion," but  the  President  unfortunately  was  "not  inclined  to  adjust  policy  along 
the  lines  of  this  analysis  challenging  the  domino  theory."  late  1964  the 

"intelligence  community,"  with  George  Ball  and  almost  no  one  else,  "  'tended  to- 
ward a  pessimistic  view'  of  the  effect  of  bombing  on  the  Hanoi  leaders.  ...  As 
in  the  case  of  earlier  intelligence  findings  that  contradicted  policy  intentions,  the 
study  indicates  no  effort  on  the  part  of  the  President  or  his  most  trusted  advisers 
to  reshape  their  policy  along  the  lines  of  this  analysis." 

In  part,  no  doubt,  this  is  true;  just  as  the  intelligence  community  did  include 
within  it  some  of  the  administration's  more  cautious  and  objective  advisers.  But 
once  again  the  impression  created  by  such  partial  truth  is  wholly  misleading,  for 
throughout  this  period  McCone  used  his  authority  as  CIA  Director  to  recom- 
mend a  sharp  escalation  of  the  war.  In  March  1964  he  recommended  "that 
North  Vietnam  be  bombed  immediately  and  that  the  Nationalist  Chinese  Army 
be  invited  to  enter  the  war."  ^  yg^r  later  he  criticized  McNamara's  draft 
guidelines  for  the  war  by  saying  we  must  hit  North  Vietnam  "harder,  more 
frequently,  and  inflict  greater  damage."  Meanwhile,  at  the  very  time  that 
some  intelligence  personnel  discreetly  revived  the  possibility  of  a  Vietnam  dis- 
engagement, other  intelligence  operations  personnel  proceeded  with  the  planning 
which  led  to  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents. 

As  presented  by  the  New  York  Times,  the  Pentagon  Papers  suggested  that 
the  Indochina  war  was  the  result  of  a  series  of  mistakes.  According  to  this  model, 
the  war  was  to  be  analyzed  as  a  sequence  of  official  decisions  reached  by  public 
officials  through  constitutional  procedures,  and  these  officials  (now  almost  all 
departed  from  office)  erred  in  their  determination  of  the  national  interest.  The 
Times  Pentagon  Papers  suggested  further  that  good  intelligence  was  in  fact 
available  at  the  time,  but  was  unfortunately  ignored  in  a  sequence  of  bad  de- 


232      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

cisions.  One  is  invited  to  conclude  that  the  intelHgence  community  should  have 
greater  influence  in  the  future. 

In  my  researches  of  the  past  six  years  I  have  reached  almost  precisely  the 
)  opposite  conclusion.  The  public  apparatus  of  government,  with  respect  to  Indo- 
china, has  been  manipulated  for  the  furtherance  of  private  advantage,  whether 
bureaucratic,  financial,  or  both  simultaneously.  The  policies  which  led  to  escala- 
tion after  escalation,  though  disastrous  when  evaluated  publicly,  served  very  well 
the  private  purposes  of  the  individuals  and  institutions  that  consciously  pursued 
them.  And  the  collective  influence  of  the  so-called  "intelligence  community" 
(no  community  in  fact,  but  a  cockpit  of  competing  and  overlapping  cabals)  has 
been  not  to  oppose  these  disasters,  but  to  make  them  possible. 

This  is  not  a  blanket  accusation  against  all  intelligence  personnel,  least  of  all 
against  the  relatively  enlightened  professionals  of  the  CIA.  It  is  a  blanket  chal- 
lenge to  the  system  of  secret  powers  which  permits  the  manipulation  of  intelli- 
gence, and  the  staging  of  so-called  "political  scenarios"  in  other  nations,  with 
impunity  and  without  public  control.  This  country's  constitution  will  be  still 
further  weakened  if,  as  after  the  Bay  of  Pigs,  the  exposure  of  an  intelligence 
"fiasco"  becomes  the  prelude  for  a  further  rationalization  and  reinforcement  of 
a  secret  intelligence  apparatus. 

I  In  the  evolution  of  the  Indochina  war,  the  impact  of  the  intelligence  com- 
munity has  not  been  represented  by  the  neglected  memoranda  of  cautious  and 
scholarly  analysts.  The  power  and  influence  of  these  agencies  has  lain  in  the 

[convergence  of  intelligence  and  covert  operations,  and  even  more  in  the  proximi- 
ties of  the  agencies  and  their  "proprietaries"  (like  Air  America)  to  ultimate 

[centers  of  private  power  such  as  the  firms  of  Wall  Street  and  the  fortunes  of 

'the  Brook  Club.  If  the  American  public  is  to  gain  control  of  its  own  government, 
then  it  must  expose,  and  hopefully  repeal,  those  secret  sanctions  by  which  these 
ostensibly  public  agencies  can  engage  us  in  private  wars. 

After  the  Bay  of  Pigs,  Congress  allowed  the  executive  to  clean  its  own  house. 
This  time  it  must  struggle  to  recover  its  lost  control  of  the  power  to  make  war. 
It  is  obvious  that  at  present  the  majority  of  Congressmen  are  not  so  inclined. 
There  may,  however,  be  some  who  will  exercise  their  investigatory  powers  to 
pursue,  expose,  and  ultimately  end  the  full  story  of  the  war  conspiracy. 
And  if  not,  then,  in  the  name  of  peace,  others  must  do  it  for  them. 


Notes 

1.  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  Fraud  and  Cor- 
ruption in  Management  of  Military  Club  Systems,  Hearings,  92nd  Cong.  1st  Sess.  (8 
October  1969),  pp.  275-279.  Capital  for  the  supply  and  kickback  operations  of  Sgt. 
William  Higdon  and  Sgt.  Major  William  Woolridge,  the  Army's  senior  noncommis- 
sioned officer,  came  "from  Deak  &  Co.  ...  in  Hong  Kong  .  .  .  through  an  individual 
name[d]  Frank  Furci."  Frank's  father,  Dominic  Furci,  was  a  lieutenant  in  the  Florida 
Mafia  family  of  Santos  Trafficante,  allegedly  a  major  narcotics  trafficker.  Trafficante 
and  Dominic  Furci  visited  Frank  Furci  in  Hong  Kong  in  1968  (p.  279;  cf.  U.S.,  Con- 
gress, Senate,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  Organized  Crime  and  Illicit 
Traffic  in  Narcotics,  Hearings,  88th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Washington:  G.P.O.,  1964,  pp. 
522-523,  928). 

2.  Nyr,  7  April  1971,  pp.  1,  15. 

3.  Ralph  Stavins,  "Kennedy's  Private  War,"  New  York  Review  of  Books,  22  July 
1971,  p.  26;  cp.  Ralph  Stavins  et  al.,  Washington  Plans  an  Aggressive  War  (New  York: 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  233 

Vintage,  1971),  p.  60.  While  Mr.  Stavins'  account  is  useful,  he  is  wrong  in  asserting 
that  the  "303  Committee  .  .  .  came  into  being  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the  egregi- 
ous blundering  at  the  Bay  of  Pigs."  In  fact  this  committee  of  deputy  secretaries,  known 
earlier  as  the  "54-12  Committee,"  had  been  established  in  December  1954;  Kennedy's 
innovation  was  to  bureaucratize  and  expand  its  activities,  particularly  by  establishing 
a  Special  Group  (Counter-Insurgency)  to  insure  the  development  of  programs  for  it 
(NSAM  124,  18  January  1962;  cf.  Harry  Howe  Ransom,  The  Intelligence  Establish- 
ment, Cambridge,  Mass.,  1970,  p.  89). 

4.  U.S.  Government  edition,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  20;  Gravel  edition,  111:165.  Cf.  NYT, 
May  18,  1964,  p.  1;  Arthur  J.  Dommen,  Conflict  in  Laos  (New  York:  Praeger,  1964), 
p.  256.  The  USG  ed.  claims  that  on  May  21  "the  United  States  obtained  Souvanna 
Phouma's  permission  to  conduct  low-level  reconnaissance  operations,"  but  this  "per- 
mission" was  apparently  deduced  from  a  general  request  for  assistance.  Souvanna 
Phouma's  first  known  response  to  the  question  of  reconnaissance  flights  in  particular 
was  to  request  their  discontinuance  (NYT,  June  11,  1964,  p.  1;  Peter  Dale  Scott, 
The  War  Conspiracy  [New  York:  Bobbs  Merrill,  1972],  pp.  37-39). 

5.  The  Study  even  repeats  (p.  10)  McNamara's  discredited  claim  that  "Our  ships 
had  absolutely  no  knowledge"  of  the  34A  swift-boat  operations  in  the  area,  although 
McNamara  himself  had  already  backed  down  when  confronted  with  references  to  the 
34A  operations  in  our  ships'  cable  traffic.  (Gulf  of  Tonkin  .  .  .  Hearing  [1968],  p. 
31:  "Secretary  McNamara:  The  Maddox  did  know  what  34A  was.  ...  I  did  not 
say  they  did  not  know  anything  about  it.") 

6.  Gravel  ed.,  111:184-185.  This  passage  corresponds  to  the  suppressed  page  seven 
of  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.b.  The  full  text  is  reprinted  in  this  volume. 

7.  Anthony  Austin,  The  President's  War  (Philadelphia:  Lippincott,  1971),  pp.  334- 
335;  cf.  Scott,  pp.  58,  71-75.  The  same  Study  reveals  (p.  8)  that  the  Maddox's  Task 
Group  was  itself  the  source  of  the  disputed  "Intercept  Group  No.  4,"  which  McNamara 
cited  as  "proof"  of  the  second  incident  on  August  4,  but  which  probably  derives  in 
fact  from  the  first  incident  on  August  2. 

8.  Johnson's  decision  to  bomb  Hanoi  was  made  in  the  isolation  of  the  LBJ  ranch 
on  November  12,  1966  (a  date  supplied  by  Admiral  Sharp).  One  day  earlier,  on 
November  11,  he  received  a  personal  report  from  Ambassador  Harriman  on  current 
prospects  for  negotiation.  Cf.  Scott,  The  War  Conspiracy,  pp.  105-106;  NYT,  Novem- 
ber 12,  1966,  p.  8. 

9.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  pp.  ii,  2;  Gravel  ed.,  111:2,  17. 

10.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.5,  pp.  viii,  67;  Gravel  ed.,  11:207,  275-276.  Leslie  Gelb,  Director 
of  the  Pentagon  Study  Task  Force  and  author  of  the  study  summaries,  himself  talks 
in  one  study  summary  of  "optimism"  (111:2);  and  in  another  of  "gravity"  and  "de- 
terioration" (11:207). 

11.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.3,  pp.  37-38;  Gravel  ed.,  11:457-459;  emphasis  added. 

12.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  viii;  Gravel  ed.,  111:117;  cf.  Pentagon  Papers  (New  York 
Times/Bantam),  p.  233.  Another  study  on  Phased  Withdrawal  (IV.B.4,  p.  26;  Gravel 
ed.,  11:191)  apparently  quotes  directly  from  a  close  paraphrase  of  NSAM  273(2), 
not  from  the  document  itself.  Yet  the  second  page  of  NSAM  273  was,  as  we  shall  see, 
a  vital  document  in  closing  off  Kennedy's  plans  for  a  phased  withdrawal  of  U.S. 
forces. 

13.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  ix;  Gravel  ed.,  Ill:  1 17. 

14.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  i;  Gravel  ed.,  Ill:  106. 

15.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  2;  Gravel  ed.,  111:150-151;  cf.  Stavins  et  al,  pp.  93-94. 

16.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  v;  Gravel  ed.,  II:  163. 

17.  NYT,  November  21,  1963,  pp.  1,  8;  Richard  P.  Stebbins,  The  United  States  in 
World  Affairs,  1963  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  for  the  Council  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, 1964),  p.  193:  "In  a  meeting  at  Honolulu  on  November  20,  the  principal  U.S. 
authorities  concerned  with  the  war  could  still  detect  enough  evidence  of  improvement 
to  justify  the  repatriation  of  a  certain  number  of  specialized  troops."  Jim  Bishop 
{The  Day  Kennedy  Was  Shot,  New  York:  Funk  and  Wagnalls,  1968,  p.  107)  goes 
further:  "They  may  also  have  discussed  how  best  to  extricate  the  U.S.  from  Saigon;  in 
fact  it  was  a  probable  topic  and  the  President  may  have  asked  the  military  for  a 


234      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon.  Papers/Vol.  V 

timetable  of  withdrawal."  Cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  d;  Gravel  ed.,  11:170:  "20  Nov.  63 
.  .  .  officials  agreed  that  the  Accelerated  Plan  (speed-up  of  force  withdrawal  by  six 
months  directed  by  McNamara  in  October)  should  be  maintained." 

18.  NYT,  November  25,  1963,  p.  5;  Washington  Post,  November  25,  1963,  A2.  See 
Appendix  B. 

19.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  ii;  Gravel  ed.,  111:2. 

20.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  3;  Gravel  ed..  Ill:  18. 

21.  Rusk,  McNamara,  Lodge,  McGeorge  Bundy,  and  apparently  McCone.  McCone 
was  not  known  earlier  to  have  been  a  participant  in  the  Honolulu  Conference,  but  he 
is  so  identified  by  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  25  (Gravel  ed.,  II:  190). 

22.  It  would  appear  that  the  only  other  new  faces  were  Averell  Harriman  (who 
represented  State  in  the  interdepartmental  "303  Committee"  for  covert  operations)  and 
George  Ball. 

23.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  pp.  1-3;  Gravel  ed..  Ill:  17-18. 

24.  Chester  Cooper,  The  Lost  Crusade:  America  in  Vietnam  (New  York:  Dodd 
Mead,  1970),  p.  222.  Cooper  should  know,  for  he  was  then  a  White  House  aide  to 
McGeorge  Bundy,  Special  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National  Security  Affairs.  If 
he  is  right,  then  Pentagon  study  references  to  an  NSC  meeting  on  November  26  (USG 
ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  26;  Gravel  ed.,  11:191)  are  wrong — naive  deductions  from  NSAM 
273's  misleading  title. 

25.  Lyndon  Baines  Johnson,  The  Vantage  Point  (New  York:  Holt,  Rinehart  & 
Winston,  1971),  p.  45.  Cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  pp.  46-47,  which  for  "objective"  reads 
"object." 

26.  Some  disgruntled  officials  told  the  New  York  Times  that  as  late  as  the  Honolulu 
Conference  on  November  20,  two  days  before  the  assassination,  "there  had  been  a 
concentration  on  'something  besides  winning  the  war' "  (NYT,  November  25,  1963, 
p.  5). 

27.  NSAM  52  of  May  11,  1961,  in  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam,  p.  126). 

28.  Rusk-McNamara  memorandum  of  November  11,  1961,  in  Pentagon  Papers 
(NYT/Bantam),  p.  152;  Gravel  ed.,  11:113. 

29.  McNamara  memorandum  of  November  8,  1961,  commenting  on  Taylor  Report 
of  November  3,  1961;  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  pp.  148-149;  Gravel  ed., 
11:108-109. 

30.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  pp.  107,  152;  Gravel  ed.,  11:110,  113,  117. 

31.  G.  M.  Kahin  and  J.  W.  Lewis,  The  United  States  in  Vietnam  (New  York:  Delta, 
1967),  p.  129;  letter  in  Department  of  State,  Bulletin,  January  1,  1962,  p.  13;  Gravel 
ed.,  11:805-806. 

32.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  p.  148. 

33.  McNamara-Taylor  Report  of  October  2,  1963,  in  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/ 
Bantam),  p.  213;  Gravel  ed.,  11:753. 

34.  Gravel  ed.,  11:188. 

35.  L.  B.  Johnson,  The  Vantage  Point,  p.  45. 

36.  NYT,  November  25,  1963,  pp.  1,  5:  "President  Johnson  reaffirmed  today  the 
policy  objectives  of  his  predecessor  regarding  South  Vietnam.  .  .  .  The  adoption  of 
all  measures  should  be  determined  by  their  potential  contribution  to  this  overriding 
objective." 

37.  In  one  case  the  disputed  word  "objective"  is  misquoted  as  "object"  (USG  ed., 
IV.C.l,  p.  46;  Gravel  ed.,  111:50).  In  another,  it  is  paraphrased  as  "purpose"  (USG  ed., 
IV.B.5,  p.  67;  Gravel  ed.,  11:276).  In  all  other  studies  this  sentence  is  ignored. 

38.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.5,  p.  xxxiv  (suppressed);  Gravel  ed.,  11:223.  Cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.3, 
p.  37;  Gravel  ed.,  11:457:  "that  the  U.S.  reaffirm  its  commitment." 

39.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  viii;  Gravel  ed.,  111:117.  Cf.  The  inexcusable  nan 
sequitur  by  Leslie  Gelb  in  USG  ed.,  IV.B.3,  p.  v;  Gravel  ed.,  11:412:  "If  there  had 
been  doubt  that  the  limited  risk  gamble  undertaken  by  Eisenhower  had  been  trans- 
formed into  an  unlimited  commitment  under  Kennedy,  that  doubt  should  have  been 
dispelled  internally  by  NSAM  288's  statement  of  objectives."  NSAM  288  of  17  March 
1964  was  of  course  a  Vietnam  policy  statement  under  Lyndon  Johnson,  the  first  after 
NSAM  273,  and  a  document  which  dealt  specifically  with  the  earlier  noted  discrepancy 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  235 

between  NSAM  273's  "stated  objectives"  and  the  policies  it  envisaged.  As  USG  ed., 
IV.C.l  points  out  (p.  46;  Gravel  ed.,  111:50),  "NSAM  288,  being  based  on  the  official 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  situation  in  Vietnam  was  considerably  worse  than 
had  been  realized  at  the  time  of  .  .  .  NSAM  273,  outlined  a  program  that  called 
for  considerable  enlargement  of  U.S.  effort.  ...  In  tacit  acknowledgment  that  this 
greater  commitment  of  prestige  called  for  an  enlargement  of  stated  objectives,  NSAM 
288  did  indeed  enlarge  these  objectives.  .  .  .  NSAM  288  escalated  the  objectives  into 
a  defense  of  all  of  Southeast  Asia  and  the  West  Pacific." 

40.  Taylor  Report  of  November  3,  1961,  in  Gravel  ed.,  11:96,  emphasis  added;  cf. 
USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.b,  p.  21  (not  in  Gravel  edition). 

41.  Hilsman,  To  Move  a  Nation,  p.  527;  quoted  in  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  2,  Gravel 
ed.,II:151. 

42.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.5,  p.  67;  Gravel  ed.,  11:276;  cf.  W.  W.  Rostow,  "Guerrilla  War- 
fare in  Underdeveloped  Areas,"  in  Lt.  Col.  T.  N.  Greene  ed..  The  Guerrilla — and  How 
to  Fight  Him:  Selections  from  the  Marine  Corps  Gazette  (New  York:  Praeger,  1962), 
p.  59:  "We  are  determined  to  help  destroy  this  international  disease,  that  is,  guerrilla 
war  designed,  initiated,  supplied,  and  led  from  outside  an  independent  nation." 

43.  Stavins,  p.  70. 

44.  Report  to  Special  Group,  in  Stavins,  p.  69.  Roger  Hilsman  (p.  533,  cf.  p.  529) 
later  revealed  that,  according  to  official  Pentagon  estimates,  "fewer  infiltrators  had 
come  over  the  trails  in  1963  [7,400]  than  in  1962  [12,400]." 

45.  Stavins,  pp.  70-71. 

46.  This  changed  attitude  towards  the  facts  must  have  especially  affected  Roger 
Hilsman,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  who  had  just  circulated 
a  contrary  memorandum  inside  the  government:  "We  have  thus  far  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  Vietcong  have  more  than  a  Umited  need  for  outside  resources"  (Hils- 
man, p.  525).  Hilsman  soon  resigned  and  made  his  opposing  case  publicly. 

47.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  p.  242;  quoting  SNIE  50-64  of  February  12, 
1964,  in  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  4. 

48.  Cf.  my  forthcoming  book,  The  War  Conspiracy,  cc.  3,  5,  6. 

49.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  46;  Gravel  ed..  Ill:  151. 

50.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  pp.  274-275. 

51.  U.S.  Cong.,  House,  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  Winning  the  Cold  War:  the 
U.S.  Ideological  Offensive,  Hearings,  88th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  (Feb.  20,  1964),  statement 

]      by  Robert  Manning,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Public  Affairs),  p.  811. 

'  52.  U.S.,  Cong.,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Department  of  Defense  Ap- 
propriations for  1965,  Hearings,  88th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  (Washington:  G.P.O.,  1964), 
Part  IV,  p.  12;  cf.  pp.  103-104,  117-118. 

53.  Tom  Wicker,  JFK  and  LB  J:  The  Influence  of  Personality  Upon  Politics  (New 
York:  William  Morrow:  1968),  pp.  205-206.  Cf.  I.  F.  Stone,  New  York  Review  of 
Books,  March  28,  1968,  p.  11;  Marvin  Kalb  and  Elie  Abel,  Roots  of  Involvement  (New 
York:  Norton,  1971),  p.  153:  "Lyndon  Johnson,  President  less  than  forty-eight  hours, 
had  just  made  a  major  decision  on  Vietnam  and  a  worrisome  one." 

54.  JCSM-33-62  of  13  Jan.  1962;  Gravel  ed.,  11:663-666. 

55.  Memorandum  for  the  President  of  April  4,  1962;  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  pp.  461-462; 
Gravel  ed.,  11:671,  emphasis  added. 

56.  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  p.  464;  Gravel  ed.,  11:671-672. 

57.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  i;  Gravel  ed.,  II:  160. 

58.  Ibid. 

59.  Arthur  Sylvester,  the  Pentagon  press  spokesman,  reported  after  a  Honolulu 
Conference  in  May  1963  the  hopes  of  officials  that  U.S.  forces  could  be  reduced  "in 
one  to  three  years"  (NYT,  May  8,  1963,  p.  10;  Cooper,  The  Lost  Crusade,  p.  208). 

60.  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Department  of  Defense 
Appropriations  for  1967,  Hearings,  89th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  Washington:  G.P.O.,  1966, 
Part  1,  p.  378. 

61.  Projected  levels  in  January  1963  from  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  10;  Gravel  ed., 
,    11:179,  cf.  p.  163  (Gelb). 

62.  Cooper,  The  Lost  Crusade,  p.  207;  NYT,  April  27,  1963.  Cooper  also  tells  us 


I 


236      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

that  he  "was  sent  to  Vietnam  in  the  spring  [of]  1963  to  search  for  the  answer  to  'Can 
we  win  with  Diem?'  The  very  phrasing  of  the  question  implied  more  anxiety  about 
developments  in  Vietnam  that  official  statements  were  currently  admitting"  (p.  202). 

63.  State  272  of  August  29,  1963  to  Lodge,  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  p.  538;  Gravel  ed., 
11:738;  emphasis  added. 

64.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  23;  Gravel  ed.,  II:  189. 

65.  NYT,  June  13,  1962,  p.  3. 

66.  Richard  P.  Stebbins,  The  United  States  in  World  Affairs  1962  (New  York: 
Harper  and  Row,  for  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations),  1963,  pp.  197-200. 

67.  Stebbins  [1962],  p.  199:  "This  was  not  the  kind  of  ironclad  arrangement  on 
which  the  United  States  had  been  insisting  in  relation  to  such  matters  as  disarmament, 
nuclear  testing,  or  Berlin." 

68.  Cooper,  p.  190. 

69.  Cooper,  p.  189. 

70.  Hilsman,  pp.  152-153;  Scott,  The  War  Conspiracy,  pp.  33-35. 

71.  FBIS  Daily  Report,  October  24,  1963,  PPP3;  October  28,  1963,  PPP4;  October 
31,  1963,  PPP4.  About  the  same  time  State  Department  officials  began  to  refer  to 
"intelligence  reports"  of  increased  North  Vietnamese  activity  in  Laos,  including  the 
movement  of  trucks;  but  it  is  not  clear  whether  these  intelligence  sources  were  on  the 
ground  or  in  the  air  {NYT,  October  27,  1963,  p.  27;  October  30,  1963,  p.  1). 

72.  Kenneth  O'Donnell,  "LBJ  and  the  Kennedy's,"  Life  (August  7,  1970),  p.  51; 
NYT,  August  3,  1970,  p.  16.  O'Donnell's  claim  is  corroborated  by  his  correct  reference 
(the  first  I  have  noted  in  print)  to  the  existence  of  an  authorized  plan  in  NSAM  263 
of  October  1 1 :  "The  President's  order  to  reduce  the  American  personnel  in  Vietnam 
by  1,000  men  before  the  end  of  1963  was  still  in  effect  on  the  day  that  he  went  to 
Texas"  (p.  52). 

73.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  pp.  204-205;  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  pp.  541-543; 
Gravel  ed.,  11:742-743,  emphasis  added. 

74.  Hilsman,  p.  501,  emphasis  added. 

75.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.5,  p.  viii;  Gravel  ed.,  11:207.  Cf.  Chester  Cooper,  The  Lost 
Crusade  (New  York:  Dodd  Mead,  1970),  p.  220:  "The  removal  of  Nhu's  prime  Amer- 
ican contact,  the  curtailment  of  funds  for  Nhu's  Special  Forces,  and,  most  importantly, 
the  cutting  off  of  import  aid  must  have  convinced  the  generals  that  they  could  proceed 
without  fear  of  subsequent  American  sanctions." 

76.  Johnson,  The  Vantage  Point,  p.  44. 

77.  Kattenburg  had  been  named  Chairman  on  August  4,  1963,  the  same  day  that 
Frederick  Flott  assumed  his  duties  in  Saigon.  IVIecklin's  replacement,  Barry  Zorthian, 
assumed  duties  in  Saigon  on  February  2,  1964. 

78.  For  the  purposes  of  the  April  1964  State  Department  Foreign  Service  List  de 
Silva  remained  attached  to  Hong  Kong,  and  both  Richardson  and  Flott  were  still  in 
Saigon.  In  fact  de  Silva  was  functioning  as  Saigon  CAS  station  chief  by  February  9 
(USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  33).  Trueheart  did  not  surface  in  Washington  until  May;  his 
replacement,  David  Nes,  officially  joined  the  Saigon  Embassy  on  January  19,  but  was 
already  in  Saigon  during  the  McNamara  visit  of  mid-December  1963  (USG  ed.,  IV.C.8 
[alias  IV.C.l  1],  p.  59;  (Gravel  ed.,  111:494). 

79.  USG  ed.,  IV,B.5,  p.  67. 

80.  Franz  Schurmann,  Peter  Dale  Scott,  Reginald  Zelnik,  The  Politics  of  Escalation 
(New  York:  Fawcett,  1966),  p.  26. 

81.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  35;  Gravel  ed.,  111:37;  Stern  (January  1970). 

82.  Lyndon  Baines  Johnson,  The  Vantage  Point,  p.  61. 

83.  Ralph  Stavins  et  al.,  Washington  Plans  an  Aggressive  War,  p.  81. 

84.  A  White  House  message  on  September  17  had  authorized  Lodge  to  hold  up 
any  aid  program  if  this  would  give  him  useful  leverage  in  dealing  with  Diem  (CAP 
Message  63516;  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  II,  p.  545;  Gravel  ed.,  11:743). 

85.  Public  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  John  F.  Kennedy:  1963  (Washington:  G.P.O., 
1964),  pp.  759-760;  Gravel  ed.,  11:188. 

86.  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  Book  II,  pp.  555,  573;  Gravel  ed.,  11:766;  emphasis  added. 

87.  Loc.  cit.,  p.  555. 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  237 

88.  Loc.  cit.,  p.  578;  cf.  IV.B.4,  p.  d. 

89.  Public  Papers,  p.  828. 

90.  Press  Conference  of  November  14,  1963;  Public  Papers,  pp.  846,  852. 

91.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  24;  Johnson,  The  Vantage  Point,  p.  62;  NYT,  November  21, 
1963,  p.  8;  Weintal  and  Bartlett,  p.  71. 

92.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  pp.  a,  e;  Gravel  ed.,  II:  166,  171. 

93.  William  Manchester,  The  Death  of  a  President:  November  20-25,  1963  (New 
York:  Harper  and  Row,  1967),  pp.  101,  158. 

94.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  29;  cf.  pp.  14-16;  cf.  Gravel  ed.,  11:180-192.  Another 
study  (USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  15)  quotes  different  figures,  but  confirms  that  a  reduction 
in  the  Fiscal  '65  support  level  was  agreed  to  at  Honolulu. 

95.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  23. 

96.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  d;  Gravel  ed.,  11:170.  The  text  of  the  same  study  cor- 
roborates this  very  unclearly  (IV.B.4,  p.  25;  11:190),  but  the  text  is  strangely  self- 
contradictory  at  this  point  and  may  even  have  been  editorially  tampered  with.  In 
comparing  Honolulu  to  NSAM  273,  the  Study  assures  us  of  total  continuity:  "Uni- 
versally operative  was  a  desire  to  avoid  change  of  any  kind  during  the  critical  inter- 
regnum period."  Yet  the  same  Study  gives  us  at  least  one  clear  indication  of  change. 
McNamara  on  November  20  "made  it  clear  that  he  thought  the  proposed  CINCPAC 
MAP  [Military  Assistance  Program]  could  be  cut  back"  (p.  25;  11:190);  yet  Mc- 
Namara on  November  23,  in  a  written  memorandum  to  the  new  President,  "said 
that  ...  the  U.S.  must  be  prepared  to  raise  planned  MAP  levels"  (p.  26;  11:191; 
the  Chronology  adds  that  "funding  well  above  current  MAP  plans  was  envisaged"). 
The  study  itself,  very  circumspectly,  calls  this  "a  hint  that  something  might  be  differ- 
ent," only  ten  lines  after  speaking  of  the  "universally  operative  .  .  .  desire  to  avoid 
change  of  any  kind." 

What  is  most  striking  is  that  this  Study  of  Phased  Withdrawal  makes  no  reference 
whatsoever  to  NSAM  273(6),  which  emphasized  that  "both  military  and  economic 
programs  .  .  .  should  be  maintained  at  levels  as  high  as  those  in  the  time  of  the 
Diem  regime"  (USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  3;  Gravel  ed.,  111:18).  Yet  the  Study  refers  to 
McNamara's  memorandum  of  November  23,  which  apparently  inspired  this  directive. 
Mr,  Gelb's  summary  chooses  to  skip  from  October  2  to  December  21,  and  is  silent 
about  the  Accelerated  Withdrawal  Plan. 

97.  NYT,  November  21,  1963,  p.  8,  emphasis  added.  Cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.5,  p.  67: 
"An  uninformative  press  release  .  .  .  pointedly  reiterated  the  plan  to  withdraw  1,000 
U.S.  troops."  Inasmuch  as  this  was  the  first  formal  revelation  of  the  plan  the  press 
release  does  not  deserve  to  be  called  "uninformative."  I  have  been  unable  to  locate 
anywhere  the  text  of  the  press  release. 

98.  Pentagon  Study  IV.C.l,  p.  2;  Gravel  ed.,  111:18,  in  Appendix  A.  Cf.  USG  ed., 
IV.C.9.a,  p.  2;  Gravel  ed.,  11:304,  in  Appendix  C. 

99.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.3,  p.  37;  IV.C.l,  p.  ii. 

100.  Johnson,  p.  43;  cf.  p.  22:  "South  Vietnam  gave  me  real  cause  for  concern." 
Chester  Cooper  {The  Lost  Crusade,  New  York,  Dodd,  Mead,  1970)  also  writes  of  the 
"growing  concern"  and  "the  worries  that  were  subsumed"  in  this  memorandum;  cf. 
I.  F.  Stone,  New  York  Review  of  Books,  March  28,  1968,  p.  11. 

101.  Johnson  writes  that  Lodge  "had  flown  to  Washington  a  few  days  earlier  for 
scheduled  conferences  with  President  Kennedy,  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk,  and 
other  administration  officials"  (p.  43).  But  Rusk,  if  he  had  not  been  turned  back  by 
the  assassination,  would  have  been  in  Japan. 

102.  Johnson,  p.  16. 

103.  Johnson,  p.  43. 

104.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  26;  NYT,  November  24,  1963,  p.  7:  "The  only  word  over- 
heard was  'billions,'  spoken  by  McNamara." 

105.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  d;  Gravel  ed.,  11:170.  A  page  in  another  Pentagon  study, 
suppressed  from  the  Government  volumes  but  preserved  in  the  Gravel  edition,  claims, 
perhaps  mistakenly,  that  Lodge  first  met  with  the  President  in  Washington  on  Friday, 
November  22,  the  day  of  the  assassination  itself.  Gravel  ed.,  11:223  (suppressed  page 
following  USG  ed.,  IV.B.5,  p.  xxxiii);  cf.  IV,B,5,  p,  67. 


238      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

106.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  23;  Gravel  ed.,  11:189.  ! 

107.  A  New  York  Times  editorial  of  October  7,  1963  (p.  30),  observed  that  the  ' 
"disengagement"  deadline  of  1965  was  "a  warning  to  the  Diem-Nhu  regime";  and  added  i 
that  de  Gaulle's  neutralization  proposal  "should  not  be  excluded  from  the  Administra-  i 
tion's  current  reappraisal."  \ 

108.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.3,  p.  37. 

109.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  pp.  d,  23;  NYT,  October  4,  1963,  p.  2,  October  6,  1963,  p.  1.  j 

110.  NYT,  October  8,  1963,  p.  5;  Arthur  J.  Schlesinger,  Jr.,  A  Thousand  Days  \ 
(Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin,  1965),  p.  1016.  President  Kennedy,  if  he  had  lived,  would  [ 
have  visited  Asia  in  the  same  month;  this  was  one  reason  for  the  advance  trip  of  so  { 
many  Cabinet  members  to  Japan  in  November.  I 

111.  Stebbins,  pp.  193-194.  ' 

112.  USGed.,  VI.A.l,p.  1. 

113.  NYT,  9  March  1965,  p.  4;  cited  in  Franz  Schurmann,  Peter  Dale  Scott, 
Reginald  Zelnik,  The  Politics  of  Escalation  in  Vietnam  (New  York:  Fawcett,  1966), 

p.  28.  i 

1 14.  Schurmann,  Scott,  and  Zelnik,  pp.  28-29. 

115.  Dean  Rusk  explicitly  rejected  the  French  proposal  at  his  Press  Conference  of  , 
November  8,  1963:  "To  negotiate  on  far-reaching  changes  in  South  Viet-Nam  without 
far-reaching  changes  in  North  Viet-Nam  seems  to  be  not  in  the  cards."  U.S.  Department  j 
Of  State  Bulletin,  25  November  1963,  p.  811. 

116.  William  Attwood,  The  Reds  and  the  Blacks  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  | 
1967),  p.  144.  There  are  unconfirmed  rumors  that  in  late  1963  Kennedy  sent  former  ' 
Ambassador  Galbraith  for  similar  private  exploratory  talks  with  the  mainland  Chinese  \ 
in  Nepal.  This  action  would  make  sense  in  the  light  of  both  the  President's  Vietnam  j 
initiative  and  his  decision  to  have  Roger  Hilsman  prepare  his  important  address  of 
December  13,  1963,  to  the  Commonwealth  Club  in  San  Francisco,  which  hinted  sig-  ; 
nificantly  at  a  new  era  of  improved  U.S. -Chinese  relations.  j 

117.  A  collation  of  the  McNamara-Taylor  Report  of  October  2  with  the  White  i 
House  announcement  of  the  same  day  shows  that  although  the  1963  withdrawal  an-  I 
nouncement  was  attributed  to  McNamara  and  Taylor  and  recommended  by  them  for 
"the  very  near  future,"  it  did  not  form  part  of  the  policy  announcement  they  had  > 
proposed  (Gravel  ed.,  11:188,  752-754).  Cf.  Weintal  and  Bartlett,  p.  207.  ] 

118.  NYT,  September  15,  1963,  p.  1.  ; 

1 19.  U.S.  News  and  World  Report,  December  2,  1963,  p.  50.  j 

120.  NYT,  August  4,  1963,  p.  1.  j 

121.  NYT,  October  20,  1963,  p.  66.  j 

122.  Aviation  Week,  November  11,  1963,  p.  31;  cf.  November  18,  p.  25. 

123.  NYT,  November  19,  1963,  p.  11. 

124.  Business  Week,  November  23,  1963,  p.  41.  Aviation  Week  took  the  speech 

to  mean  merely  that  "the  defense  budget  will  level  off"  (November  25,  1963,  p.  29),  yet  j 

was  obviously  concerned  about  "these  Soviet-engineered  cold  war  thaws"  (January  6,  ; 

1964,  p.  21).  All  these  professional  analysts  agreed  that,  with  the  imminent  completion  i 
of  the  original  Kennedy-McNamara  five-year  program  of  defense  spending  on  a  new 
missile-oriented  defense  system,  the  U.S.  defense  budget  was  now  at  a  critical  turning 

point:  "Most  heavy  spending  for  major  strategic  weapons  such  as  Polaris  missiles,  and  j 

big  bombs,  has  been  completed.  No  new  costly  weapons  systems  are  contemplated."  ! 

(NYT,  January  6,  1964,  p.  55.)  \ 

125.  NYT,  January  17,  1966,  p.  117.  | 

126.  U.S.  Department  of  Defense,  Military  Functions  and  Military  Assistance  Pro-  \ 
gram:  Monthly  Report  of  Status  of  Funds  by  Functional  Title;  FAD  470  (Washing-  j 
ton:  Department  of  Defense,  1964),  p.  6.  1 

127.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  pp.  v,  30;  Gravel  ed.,  II:  163,  191.  \ 

128.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  e;  Gravel  ed.,  II:  171.  ; 

129.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.9.a,  p.  5;  Gravel  ed.,  11:306.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4  (p.  30)  claims  | 
that  the  authorized  ceiling  projected  for  this  date  under  Kennedy  was  15,732,  a  ceiling 
raised  under  Johnson  to  15,894  (Gravel  ed.,  II:  192). 

130.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4  claims  an  October  1963  high  of  16,732;  but  the  same  study 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  239 

makes  it  clear  elsewhere  that  this  was  a  planning  or  projected  figure,  not  an  actual  one 
(USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  c,  p.  30;  Gravel  ed.,  11:191,  cf.  183).  Stavins  (p.  83)  claims  that 
under  Kennedy  the  actual  figure  "never  exceeded  16,000." 

131.  U.S.  Cong.,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Department  of  Defense  Ap- 
propriations for  1967,  Hearings,  89th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  (Washington:  G.P.O.,  1966) 
Part  I,  p.  378. 

132.  U.S.  Cong.,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  Gulf  of  Tonkin,  1964 
Incidents,  Part  Two,  Supplement,  Documents,  90th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  (Washington: 
G.P.O.,  1968),  p.  2.  None  of  these  figures  supports  McNamara's  informal  estimate  in 
February  1964  that  the  figure  was  then  not  16,000  but  "15,500,  approximately";  U.S. 
Cong.,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Department  of  Defense  Appropriations 
for  1965,  Hearings,  88th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  (Washington:  G.P.O.,  1964),  Part  IV.,  p.  98. 

133.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  viii. 

134.  NSAM  57  of  1961,  in  Gravel  ed.,  n:683. 

135.  David  Wise  and  Thomas  B.  Ross,  The  Invisible  Government  (New  York: 
Bantam,  1964),  pp.  99-100. 

136.  William  Henderson,  "Some  Reflections  on  United  States  Policy  in  Southeast 
Asia,"  in  William  Henderson,  ed.,  Southeast  Asia:  Problems  of  United  States  Policy 
(Cambridge,  Mass.:  M.I.T.  Press,  1963),  p.  263;  cf.  pp.  253-254:  "We  shall  ultimately 
fail  to  secure  the  basic  objectives  of  policy  in  Southeast  Asia  until  our  commitment  to 
the  region  becomes  unlimited,  which  it  has  not  been  up  till  now.  This  does  not  mean 
simply  that  we  must  be  prepared  to  fight  for  Southeast  Asia,  if  necessary,  although  it 
certainly  means  that  at  a  minimum.  Beyond  this  is  involved  a  much  greater  commitment 
of  our  resources.  .  .  ." 

137.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  12. 

138.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  pp.  25,  d. 

139.  Gravel  ed.,  111:141;  Stavins,  p.  93. 

140.  USG  ed.,  V.B.4,  p.  525;  Gravel  ed.,  11:726. 

141.  Robert  S.  Allen  and  Paul  Scott,  "Diem's  War  Not  Limited  Enough,"  Peoria 
Journal-Star,  September  18,  1963,  reprinted  in  Congressional  Record,  October  1,  1963, 
p.  A6155:  "Since  Diem — under  a  plan  prepared  by  his  brother,  Ngo  Dinh  Nhu — began 
sending  guerrillas  into  North  Vietnam  in  June,  powerful  forces  within  the  administra- 
tion have  clamored  for  the  President  to  curb  the  strong  anti-Communist  leader.  .  .  . 
General  Paul  D.  Harkins,  head  of  the  U.S.  Military  Assistance  Command  in  Saigon, 
who  favors  the  initiative  by  Diem's  forces,  violently  disagreed  .  .  .  but  President  Ken- 
nedy accepted  the  diplomatic  rather  than  the  military  view."  Cf.  Radio  Hanoi,  FBIS 
Daily  Report,  October  22,  1963,  JJJ13;  April  8,  1964,  JJJ4. 

142.  Allen  and  Scott,  loc  cit.:  "Diem  also  notified  the  White  House  that  he  was  open- 
ing talks  with  a  representative  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  on  his  offer  to  send  Chinese  Nation- 
alist troops  to  South  Vietnam  from  Formosa  for  both  training  and  combat  purposes. 
This  ...  so  infuriated  President  Kennedy  that  he  authorized  an  undercover  effort  to 
curb  control  of  military  operations  of  the  South  Vietnam  President  by  ousting  Nhu  .  .  . 
and  to  organize  a  military  junta  to  run  the  war";  Hanoi  Radio,  November  10,  1963 
(FBIS  Daily  Report,  November  14,  1963,  JJJ2):  "The  47  U.S.-Chiang  commandos 
captured  in  Hai  Ninh  declared  that  before  intruding  into  the  DRV  to  seek  their  way 
into  China,  they  had  been  sent  to  South  Vietnam  and  received  assistance  from  the  Ngo 
Dinh  Diem  authorities."  Cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.9.b,  p.  vii  (censored);  Gravel  ed.,  11:289- 
290:  "GVN  taste  for  foreign  adventure  showed  up  in  small,  irritating  ways.  ...  In 
1967,  we  discovered  that  GVN  had  brought  in  Chinese  Nationalists  disguised  as  Nungs, 
to  engage  in  operations  in  Laos."  Hilsman  (p.  461)  relates  that  in  January  1963  Nhu 
discussed  with  him  "a  strategy  to  defeat  world  Communism  for  once  and  for  all — by 
having  the  United  States  lure  Communist  China  into  a  war  in  Laos,  which  was  'an  ideal 
theater  and  battleground.'  "  Bernard  Fall  confirmed  that  in  Washington,  also,  one  fac- 
tion believed  "that  the  Vietnam  affair  could  be  transformed  into  a  'golden  opportunity' 
to  'solve'  the  Red  Chinese  problem  as  well"  {Vietnam  Witness  1953-1966  [New  York: 
Praeger,  1966]  p.  103;  cf.  Hilsman,  p.  311;  Scott,  The  War  Conspiracy,  pp.  21-23,  208). 

143.  D.  Gareth  Porter,  in  Nina  S.  Adams  and  Alfred  W.  McCoy,  eds.,  Laos:  War 
and  Revolution  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1970),  p.  198.  An  Air  America  plane 


240      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V  \ 

shot  down  in  September  1963  carried  an  American  pilot  along  with  both  Thai  and  j 
KMT  troops,  like  so  many  other  Air  America  planes  in  this  period.  The  political  | 
assassinations  of  April  1963,  which  led  to  a  resumption  of  fighting,  have  been  frequently  | 
attributed  to  a  CIA-trained  assassination  team  recruited  by  Vientiane  Security  Chief  : 
Siho  Lamphoutacoul,  who  was  half  Chinese  (Scott,  The  War  Conspiracy,  p.  36).  After  \ 
Siho's  coup  of  April  19,  1964,  which  ended  Laotian  neutralism  and  led  rapidly  to  the  i 
U.S.  air  war,  the  New  York  Times  noted  of  Siho  that  "In  1963  he  attended  the  general  j 
staff  training  school  in  Taiwan  and  came  under  the  influence  of  the  son  of  Generalissimo  i 
Chiang  Kai-shek,  General  Chiang  Ching-kuo,  who  had  learned  secret  police  methods  in  j 
Moscow  and  was  the  director  of  the  Chinese  Nationalist  security  services"  (NYT,  j 
April  27,  1964,  p.  4). 

144.  NYT,  November  20,  1963,  p.  1:  The  two  prisoners  "said  they  had  conducted  | 
activities  against  the  Cambodian  Government  in  a  fortified  hamlet  in  neighboring  South  I 
Vietnam  under  control  of  U.S.  military  advisers.  They  said  Radio  Free  Cambodia  trans-  [ 
mitters  had  been  set  up  in  such  villages.  One  prisoner  said  he  had  been  supplied  with  j 
a  transmitter  by  U.S.  officials."  For  U.S.  corroboration  of  CIA  involvement  in  Khmer  \ 
Serei  operations,  cf.  Scott,  The  War  Conspiracy,  pp.  158-159.  \ 

145.  A  New  York  Times  editorial  (October  6,  1963,  IV,  8),  noting  "long- voiced  I 
charges  that  our  intelligence  organization  too  often  tends  to  'make'  policy,"  added  that  j 
"there  is  an  inevitable  tendency  for  some  of  its  personnel  to  assume  the  functions  of 
kingmakers,"  in  answer  to  its  question  "Is  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  a  state 
within  a  state?"  Cf.  Washington  Daily  News,  October  2,  1963,  reprinted  in  Congres-  i 
sional  Record,  October  1963,  p.  18602:  "If  the  United  States  ever  experiences  a  'Seven  | 
Days  in  May'  it  will  come  from  the  CIA,  and  not  the  Pentagon,  one  U.S.  official  com-  \ 
mented  caustically.  .  .  .  People  .  .  .  are  beginning  to  fear  the  CIA  is  becoming  a  i 
third  force,  coequal  with  President  Diem's  regime  and  the  U.S.  government  and  answer- 
able to  neither." 

146.  Gravel  ed.,  111:141. 

147.  USG  ed.,  IV.B.4,  p.  25;  Gravel  ed..  Ill:  190. 

148.  Washington  Post,  November  21,  1963,  A19;  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  Novem- 
ber 21,  1963,  p.  13;  emphasis  added. 

149.  Stavins  et  al.,  pp.  93-94;  cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  viii:  "NSAM  273  Authorized 
planning  for  specific  covert  operations,  graduated  in  intensity,  against  the  DRV." 

150.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  p.  254  (summary  by  Neil  Sheehan),  em- 
phasis added;  cf.  USG  ed.,  IV.C.2.a,  p.  36. 

151.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  pp.  331-332;  cf.  NSG  ed.,  IV.C.2(c),  p.  8. 
A  similar  story  of  good  intelligence  neglected  is  told  by  General  Lansdale's  friend  and 
admirer,  Robert  Shaplen,  in  The  Lost  Revolution  (New  York:  Harper,  1966,  e.g.,  pp. 
393-394),  a  work  frequently  cited  by  the  Pentagon  study. 

152.  Edward  Weintal  and  Charles  Bartlett,  p.  72. 

153.  Pentagon  Papers  (NYT/Bantam),  p.  441. 


APPENDIX  A 

NSAM  273  of  November  26,  1963:  a  partial  reconstruction  of  the  text 

IV.C.l,  pp.  46-47;  = 
Or.  111:50;  Johnson, 

p.  45  TO:  [All  the  senior  officers  of  the  government  respon- 

sible for  foreign  affairs  and  military  policy] 

^object,  IV.C.l  1.  It  remains  the  central  objective^  of  the  United  States 

in  South  Vietnam  to  assist  the  people  and  Government 
of  that  country  to  win  their  contest  against  the  externally 
directed  and  supported  communist  conspiracy.  The  test 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  241 


^overriding  objective, 
NYT,  Nov.  25,  1963, 
p.  5 

IV.C.l,  p.  2;  =Gr. 
111:18.  IV.B.3,  p.  37; 
=  Gr.  11:276 
^objectives,  IV.B.2,  p. 
26;  IV.B.5,  p.  67.  ob- 
jective, IV.B.3,  p.  37 

IV.C.l,  p.  3;  =Gr. 
111:19 


IV.C.l,  p.  2;  = 
111:18;  Johnson, 
45;  IV.B.5,  p.  67 


Or. 
P- 


IV.C.l,  p.  3; 
111:18;  IV.B.5, 


=  Gt. 
p.  67 


IV.B.5,  p.  67;  =  Or. 
11:276 

IV.C.l,  p.  2;  =Gr. 
111:18 

Cooper,  p.  224 


IV.B.3,  p.  37;  =  Gr. 
11:458 


IV.C.2.a,  p.  viii;  = 
Gr.  111:117 


of  all  U.S.  decisions  and  actions  in  this  area  should  be 
the  effectiveness  of  their  contribution  to  this  purpose.^ 


[2.]  The  objectives'^  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to 
the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  military  personnel  remains  as 
stated  in  the  White  House  statement  of  October  2,  1963. 


3.  It  is  a  major  interest  of  the  United  States  government 
that  the  present  provisional  government  of  South  Viet- 
nam should  be  assisted  in  consolidating  itself  in  holding 
and  developing  increased  public  support  .  .  .  [NYT: 
for  programs  directed  toward  winning  the  war]. 

[4.]  The  President  expects  that  all  senior  officers  of  the 
government  will  move  energetically  to  insure  the  full 
unity  of  support  for  established  U.S.  policy  in  South 
Vietnam.  Both  in  Washington  and  in  the  field,  it  is  essen- 
tial that  the  government  be  unified.  It  is  of  particular 
importance  that  express  or  implied  criticism  of  officers 
of  other  branches  be  assiduously  avoided  in  all  contacts 
with  the  Vietnamese  government  and  with  the  press. 

5.  We  should  concentrate  our  efforts,  and  insofar  as  pos- 
sible we  should  persuade  the  government  of  South  Viet- 
nam to  concentrate  its  effort,  on  the  critical  situation  in 
the  Mekong  Delta.  This  concentration  should  include 
not  only  military  but  economic,  social,  educational  and 
informational  effort.  We  should  seek  to  turn  the  tide  not 
only  of  battle  but  of  belief,  and  we  should  seek  to  in- 
crease not  only  the  controlled  hamlets  but  the  produc- 
tivity of  this  area,  especially  where  the  proceeds  can  be 
held  for  the  advantage  of  anti-Communist  forces. 

[6.]  [Economic  and  military  aid  to  the  new  regime  should 
be  maintained  at  the  same  levels  as  during  Diem's  rule.] 
[6.]  [Both  military  and  economic  programs,  it  was  em- 
phasized, should  be  maintained  at  levels  as  high  as  those 
in  the  time  of  the  Diem  regime.] 

[Johnson  .  .  .  stressed  that  all  military  and  economic 
programs  were  to  be  kept  at  the  levels  maintained  dur- 
ing the  Diem  regime.] 

[U.S.  assistance  programs  should  be  maintained  at  levels 
at  least  equal  to  those  under  the  Diem  government  so 
that  the  new  GVN  would  not  be  tempted  to  regard  the 
U.S.  as  seeking  to  disengage.] 

[7?]  [NSAM  273  Authorized  planning  for  specific  covert 
operations,  graduated  in  intensity,  against  the  DRV.] 


242      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 


Stavins,  pp.  94-95 
Stavins,  p.  93;  =  Gr. 
111:141;  cf.  IV.C.2.a, 
p.  2 


IV.B.5,  p.  xxxiv  (sup- 
pressed); =:  Gr.  II: 
223 

IV.B.5,  p.  67;  =  Gr. 
11:276 


Gr.  111:141 


IV.B.3,  p.  37;  =  Gr. 
11:458 


IV.B.5,  p.  67;  =  Gr. 
11:276;  =  NYT/Ban- 
tam,  p.  233 


Johnson,  p.  45 


[NSAM  273  authorized  Krulak  to  form  a  committee  and 
develop  a  coherent  program  of  covert  activities  to  be 
conducted  during  1964,  while  the  rest  of  the  national 
security  apparatus  explored  the  feasibility  of  initiating  a 
wider  war  against  the  North.  .  .  .  This  NSAM  pro- 
vided that]  .  .  .  planning  should  include  different  levels 
of  possible  increased  activity,  and  in  each  instance  there 
should  be  estimates  of  such  factors  as: 

a.  Resulting  damage  to  NVN; 

b.  The  plausibility  of  denial; 

c.  Possible  NVN  retaliation; 

d.  Other  international  reaction. 

[Clandestine  operations  against  the  North  and  into  Laos 
are  authorized.] 

[And  in  conclusion,  plans  were  requested  for  clandestine 
operations  by  the  GVN  against  the  North  and  also  for 
operations  up  to  50  kilometers  into  Laos.] 

[8.]  [The  directive  also  called  for  a  plan,  to  be  submitted 
for  approval,  for  military  operations]  "up  to  a  line  up  to 
50  km.  inside  Laos,  together  with  political  plans  for 
minimizing  the  international  hazards  of  such  an  enter- 
prise" (NSAM  273). 

[Military  operations  should  be  initiated,  under  close 
political  control,  up  to  within  fifty  kilometers  inside  of 
Laos.] 

[9?]  [As  a  justification  for  such  measures,  State  was  di- 
rected to  develop  a  strong,  documented  case]  "to  demon- 
strate to  the  world  the  degree  to  which  the  Viet  Cong  is 
controlled,  sustained,  and  supplied  from  Hanoi,  through 
Laos  and  other  channels." 

[The  NSAM  also  assigned  various  specific  actions  to  the 
appropriate  department  or  agency  of  government.] 


APPENDIX  B 

Clues  to  the  existence  on  November  24,  1963,  of  a  White  House  paraphrase  of 
NSAM  273  (paragraphs  1  to  4)  for  press  purposes.  i 

Both  the  New  York  Times'^  and  Washington  Post,^  referring  in  customary  li 

terms  to  a  White  House  source  or  sources,  printed  paraphrases  of  NSAM  273's  | 

first  (i.e.,  more  innocuous  and  misleading)  page,  and  these  paraphrases  share  ; 

certain  divergences  from  the  official  text.  These  shared  divergences  suggest  the  f 

existence  of  an  intermediary  written  archetype,  a  background  paper  for  the  use  j 

of  certain  preferred  correspondents.  (The  Times  paraphrase  was  printed  in  a  \ 

1.  NYT,  November  25,  1963,  p.  5. 

2.  Washington  Post,  November  25,  1963,  A2. 


Vietnamization  and  the  Drama  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  243 

story  by  E.  W.  Kenworthy,  who  later  helped  write  and  edit  the  New  York  Times/ 
Bantam  Pentagon  Papers.) 

Sample  Divergences: 

NSAM  27 3 {I )      It  remains  the  central  objective  of  the  United  States 
Washington  Post    central  point  of  United  States  policy  remains 
New  York  Times    central  point  of  United  States  policy  remains 

NSAM  273(1)  contribution  to  this  purpose 

Washington  Post  directed  toward  that  objective 

New  York  Times  contribution  to  this  overriding  objective 

NSAM  273(4)  senior  officers  .  .  .  move  ...  to  insure  the  full  unity  of 
support 

Washington  Post  all  Government  agencies  .  .  .  complete  unity  of  purpose 

New  York  Times  All  agencies  .  .  .  full  unity  of  purpose 

The  press  reports  of  this  paraphrase  suggest  that  the  closing  words  of  NSAM 
273(3),  as  quoted  in  USG  ed.,  IV.C.3  (p.  3),  may  have  been  suppressed;  and 
that  the  increased  "public  support"  referred  to  was  not  in  fact  political  but  mili- 
tary: 

NYT,  November  25,  1963,  p.  5:  "development  of  public  support  for  pro- 
grams directed  toward  winning  the  war." 

San  Francisco  Chronicle  (AP  and  UPI),  November  25,  1963,  p.  5:  "to  de- 
velop public  support  for  its  policies  aimed  at  winning  the  war  against  the 
Communist  Viet  Cong." 

Los  Angeles  Times,  November  25,  1963,  p.  6:  "development  of  programs  to 
oppose  the  Viet  Cong." 

AP,  as  quoted  by  Peking  Radio,  November  25,  1963  (FBIS  Daily  Report, 
November  26,  1963,  BBB4) :  "consolidate  its  position  and  win  public  sup- 
port for  the  policy  mapped  out  by  it,  in  order  to  win  the  war  against  the 
Vietnamese  Communists." 

NSAM  273(3),  as  quoted  in  USG  ed.,  IV.C.l,  p.  3:  "the  present  provisional 
government  of  South  Vietnam  should  be  assisted  in  consolidating  itself  in 
holding  and  developing  increased  public  support." 


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248 


14.  The  Pentagon  Papers  and  the  United  States 
Involvement  in  Laos 

by  Walt  Haney 


I.  INTRODUCTION 

We  incur  hundreds  of  thousands  of  U.S.  casualties  [in  Indochina]  because 
we  are  opposed  to  a  closed  society.  We  say  we  are  an  open  society,  and  the 
enemy  is  a  closed  society. 

Accepting  that  premise,  it  would  appear  logical  for  them  not  to  tell  their  , 
people;  but  it  is  sort  of  a  twist  on  our  basic  philosophy  about  the  importance 
of  containing  Communism.  Here  we  are  telling  Americans  they  must  fight 
and  die  to  maintain  an  open  society,  but  not  telling  our  people  what  we  are  j 
doing.  That  would  seem  the  characteristic  of  a  closed  society.  We  are  fighting  : 
a  big  war  in  Laos,  even  if  we  do  not  have  ground  troops  there.  Testimony 
for  3  days  has  been  to  that  effect,  yet  we  are  still  trying  to  hide  it  not  only 
from  the  people  but  also  from  the  Congress. 

— Senator  Stuart  Symington^ 

Many  times  in  years  past,  the  war  in  Laos  has  been  called  the  "forgotten  war."  , 
Forgotten  because  the  U.S.  government  has  not  been,  as  Senator  Symington  puts 
it,  "telling  our  people  what  we  are  doing."  Indeed,  because  of  U.S.  government  ; 
secrecy,  the  war  in  Laos  has  been  so  completely  forgotten  that  William  Fulbright,  j 
the  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  could  testify  in  , 
October  1969  that  he  "had  no  idea  we  had  a  full-scale  war  going  on"  in  Laos.^ 
Now,  after  publication  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  in  three  different  versions,  we  have 
further  evidence  of  how  much  Laos  has  been  forgotten,  not  only  by  the  public  i 
but  by  U.S.  policymakers  as  well.  For  most  of  the  last  twenty  years,  excepting  the 
crises  of  1960  through  1963,  Laos  has  been  for  the  United  States  little  more  than 
a  sideshow  to  the  conflict  in  Vietnam. 

Though  the  United  States  has  spent  billions  of  dollars  in  the  Kingdom  of  Laos,  : 
top  U.S.  officials  in  Washington  have  only  rarely  given  their  attention  to  this  i 
small  country  and  then  only  in  times  of  mihtary  crises,  or  in  terms  of  how  events  : 
in  Laos  affect  U.S.  involvement  in  Vietnam.  As  one  American  official  in  Vientiane 
put  it  in  1960,  "This  is  the  end  of  nowhere.  We  can  do  anything  we  want  here  j 
because  Washington  doesn't  seem  to  know  it  exists."  ^  f 

Because  the  documents  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  reflect  largely  the  views  of  [ 
Washington,  and  because  they  focus  on  Vietnam,  they  provide  insight  into  only  ■ 
a  small  portion  of  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos.  It  is  the  fuller  account  of  U.S.  in- 
volvement in  Laos'  forgotten  war,  both  that  revealed  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  and  , 
that  omitted  from  them,  which  we  will  treat  in  this  essay.  j 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Walt  Haney 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  249 


II.    THE  EARLY  YEARS  OF  U.S.  INVOLVEMENT:  1950-1954 

The  course  of  U.S.  policy  was  set  to  block  further  Communist  expansion 
in  Asia. 

—NSC  48/2 

December  30,  1949^ 

In  April  1946,  French  troops  reoccupied  Vientiane  and  the  leaders  of  the  Lao 
independence  movement,  the  Lao  Issara,  fled  across  the  Mekong  into  Thailand. 
Shortly  thereafter  occurred  what  Arthur  Dommen  in  his  book  Conflict  in  Laos 
calls  "the  first  in  a  long  series  of  contacts  between  the  Lao  Issara  and  Americans 
in  territory  outside  Laos."  ^  In  that  meeting  in  the  spring  of  1946,  Prince 
Souphanouvong"^  of  the  Lao  Issara  asked  OSS  Major  Jim  Thompson  for  "official 
United  States  support  for  removal  of  the  French  from  Laos."  ^  There  is  no 
record,  however,  that  the  United  States  provided  any  support  for  the  Lao  inde- 
pendence movement.  U.S.  sentiments  against  the  reimposition  of  French  colonial 
rule  were  held  in  check  by  the  fact  that  the  strongest  independence  movements 
in  Indochina  displayd  Communist  leanings.  And  after  the  defeat  of  the  Chinese 
Nationalists  in  1949,  and  the  growing  conflict  in  Korea,  U.S.  ambivalence  toward 
the  French-sponsored  colonial  governments  of  Indochina  gave  way  completely  to 
;  anti-Communist  sentiments.  On  February  3,  1950,  President  Truman  approved  a 
memorandum  from  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Acheson  recommending  U.S.  recog- 
nition of  the  "three  legally  constituted  governments  of  Vietnam,  Laos  and  Cam- 
bodia .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  1:65).  On  May  1,  1950  Truman  approved  $10  miflion 
"for  urgently  needed  military  assistance  items  for  Indochina"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:67). 
In  December  of  that  year,  the  United  States  concluded  mutual  defense  agreements 
with  the  governments  of  the  three  French  Union  States  of  Indochina;  Laos, 
Cambodia  and  Vietnam.^ 

One  stipulation  of  these  agreements  was  that  all  U.S.  military  assistance  to 
!  Indochina  go  directly  to  the  French,  who  then  controlled  its  distribution.  There- 
fore, exactly  how  much  U.S.  military  aid  went  to  Laos  during  the  period  of 
French  control,  1950-1954,  is  not  precisely  known,  but  has  been  estimated  at 
roughly  $30  million. ^  Despite  the  agreement  to  channel  U.S.  military  assistance 
to  Laos  through  the  French,  this  period  saw  the  first  instance  of  direct  U.S. 
military  involvement  in  Laos. 

In  March  and  April  of  1953  Viet  Minh  troops  moved  into  northern  Laos  from 
Dien  Bien  Phu.  They  advanced  down  the  valley  of  the  River  Ou  toward  Luang 
Prabang.  In  response  to  this  threat  on  the  Royal  Capital  of  Laos,  the  United 
States  "rushed  supplies  to  Laos  and  Thailand  in  May  1953  and  provided  six 
iC-119's  with  civilian  crews  for  the  airlift  into  Laos"  (Gravel  ed.,  1:86).  This 
form  of  involvement  displayed  elements  which  were  to  become  familiar  to  U.S. 
involvement  in  Laos  in  the  next  twenty  years;  expanded  involvement  as  a  response 
to  crisis,  the  use  of  civilians  in  military  and  para-military  operations,  and  the 
reliance  on  air  power. 

Only  in  1954  after  the  Geneva  Conference  did  Laos  achieve  true  independence 
outside  the  umbrella  of  the  French  Union.  For  Laos,  the  Geneva  agreements 
stipulated  a  general  ceasefire,  the  withdrawal  of  Viet  Minh  and  French  Union 
jforces  and  the  regroupment  of  Pathet  Lao  forces  in  Sam  Neua  and  Phong  Saly 
jorovinces  pending  a  political  settlement.  Also,  the  agreements  prohibited  intro- 
lyluction  of  foreign  military  personnel  and  military  advisers  except  for  1,500 


250      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

French  officers  and  men  to  train  the  Laotian  armyJ  It  was  this  last  stipulation 
which  was  to  prove  most  troublesome  for  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos. 

IIL    NOTHING  THAT  WE  DID:  1954-1958 

\ 

Our  fear  of  communism  has  been  so  great  as  to  be  irrational.  We  have 
virtually  imbued  it  with  superhuman  powers.  Its  very  nature,  in  our  thinking, 
assures  its  success.  We  fail  to  see  that,  like  other  political  ideologies,  it  can  « 
only  take  root  among  a  receptive  population.  .  .  .  We  do  not  consider  the 
possibility  that  our  antagonists  in  fact  may  be  in  better  tune  with  the  griev- 
ances of  the  people  whose  loyalty  we  seek  to  win,  and  thus  have  been  able 
to  promise  remedies  which  to  the  latter  appear  realistic  and  just. 

—Roger  M.  Smithi  ^ 

! 

On  October  20,  1954,  barely  three  months  after  Geneva,  Prince  Souvanna  1 
Phouma  resigned  as  Prime  Minister  of  Laos.  He  had  only  just  begun  the  difficult  ! 
task  of  reaching  a  political  settlement  with  the  Pathet  Lao,  and  the  circumstances  j 
surrounding  his  resignation  have  yet  to  be  explained  completely.  Most  accounts  \ 
link  the  fall  of  Souvanna  Phouma  in  October  1954  to  the  assassination  of  his 
Minister  of  Defense,  Kou  Voravong,  in  September.  However,  years  later,  in  1961, 
Souvanna  Phouma  attributed  his  fall  in  1954  to  foreign  interference. ^  After  the 
Prince's  resignation,  a  new  government  was  formed  under  Katay  Don  Sasorith, 
who  favored  closer  relations  with  Thailand  and  evidently  harbored  reservations  ' 
on  the  sagacity  of  coalition  with  the  Pathet  Lao.^  At  any  rate,  talks  with  the 
Pathet  Lao  foundered  and  were  broken  off  in  April  1955.  Twice  more,  once  in 
the  summer  and  once  in  the  fall,  talks  between  Katay  and  the  Pathet  Lao  were 
resumed  only  to  be  broken  off.  During  all  this  time  the  Pathet  Lao  resisted  Royal 
Lao  government  attempts  at  reimposition  of  control  over  Sam  Neua  and  Phong  : 
Saly  provinces.  As  former  British  military  attache  to  Laos  Hugh  Toye  recounts 
it,  "The  Pathet  Lao  argued,  against  the  obvious  intention  of  the  Geneva  Agree-  \ 
ment,  that  the  provinces  were  theirs  until  a  full  political  settlement  was  reached."  ^ 

General  elections  were  held  in  December  1955  without  Pathet  Lao  participa-  i 
tion,  but  when  the  new  assembly  convened  Katay  found  himself  lacking  enough 
support  to  continue  as  Prime  Minister.  Souvanna  Phouma  gathered  support  and 
formed  a  new  government  in  March  1956,  on  a  pledge  of  reconciliation  with 
the  Pathet  Lao.  He  resumed  talks  with  them  and  from  August  1956  through  ; 
February  1957,  signed  the  first  seven  of  ten  agreements  between  the  Royal 
Government  and  the  Pathet  Lao  which  came  to  be  known  as  the  Vientiane 
Agreements.^  Souvanna  Phouma's  efforts  at  reconciliation  with  the  Pathet  Lao 
were  interrupted  in  May  1957  when  upon  receiving  only  a  qualified  vote  of  con-  \ 
fidence  in  the  National  Assembly,  he  resigned.  However,  after  an  extended  period  j 
of  confusion,  when  no  other  leaders  were  able  to  muster  enough  support  to  form  i 
a  government,  Souvanna  Phouma  returned  as  Prime  Minister  in  August.  He  again  j 
resumed  talks  with  the  Pathet  Lao  and  reached  final  agreement  for  the  inclusion  \ 
of  two  Pathet  Lao  representatives  as  Ministers  in  a  new  coalition  cabinet.  • 

During  all  of  this  period,  the  United  States  was  by  no  means  inactive  in  Laos.  \ 
The  chief  characteristic  marking  all  of  U.S.  policy  in  Laos  throughout  the  1950s  ' 
was  quite  simply  anticommunism.  An  NSC  memorandum  (5612/1,  5  September 
1956)  clearly  reveals  this  attitude.  Among  the  stated  elements  of  U.S.  policy 
toward  Laos  were  the  following: 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  251 

— In  order  to  prevent  Lao  neutrality  from  veering  toward  pro-Communism, 
encourage  individuals  and  groups  in  Laos  who  oppose  dealing  with  the  Com- 
munist blow,  [sic]* 

— Support  the  expansion  and  reorganization  of  police,  propaganda  and  army 
intelligence  services,  provided  anti-Communist  elements  maintain,  effective 
control  of  these  services. 

— Terminate  economic  and  military  aid  if  the  Lao  Government  ceases  to 
demonstrate  a  will  to  resist  internal  Communist  subversion  and  to  carry  out 
a  policy  of  maintaining  its  independence.^ 

In  Congressional  hearings  Walter  S.  Robertson,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Far  Eastern  Affairs  under  Eisenhower,  stated  U.S.  objectives  in  Laos  even 
more  bluntly; 

Our  policy  objectives  in  relation  to  Laos  have  been  and  are  to  assist  the 
Lao: 

1.  In  keeping  the  Communists  from  taking  over  Laos. 

2.  In  strengthening  their  association  with  the  free  world;  and 

3.  In  developing  and  maintaining  a  stable  and  independent  government 
willing  and  able  to  resist  Communist  aggression  or  subversion." 

For  Assistant  Secretary  Robertson  there  was  no  question  as  to  Laos'  strategic 
significance : 

.  .  .  when  you  look  at  the  map  you  will  see  that  Laos  is  a  finger  thrust 
right  down  into  the  heart  of  Southeast  Asia.  And  Southeast  Asia  is  one  of 
the  prime  objectives  of  the  international  Communists  in  Asia  because  it  is 
rich  in  raw  materials  and  has  excess  food.  We  are  not  in  Laos  to  be  a  fairy 
godfather  to  Laos,  we  are  in  there  for  one  sole  reason,  and  that  is  to  try 
to  keep  this  little  country  from  being  taken  over  by  the  Communists.  .  .  . 
It  is  part  of  the  effort  we  are  making  for  the  collective  security  of  the  free 
world.  Every  time  you  lose  a  country,  every  time  you  give  up  to  them,  they 
become  correspondingly  stronger  and  the  free  world  becomes  weaker. 

This  isn't  happening  only  in  this  little  country  of  Laos,  it  is  happening  all 
over  the  world,  everywhere.  We  are  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  the  survival  of 
what  we  call  a  free  civilization.^ 

The  only  difficulty  with  the  implementation  of  this  policy  was  that  under  the 
Geneva  Agreeements  the  United  States  was  prohibited  from  establishing  a  mili- 
tary mission  in  Laos.  An  alternative  possibility  would  have  been  to  work  through 
the  French  military  mission  in  Laos,  but  such  an  alternative  was  clearly  less 
than  wholly  satisfactory.  As  stated  in  a  NSC  memorandum  (NSC  5429/2,  20 
August  1954)  on  Indochina  policy,  the  United  States  should  work  "through  the 
French  only  insofar  as  necessary.  .  .  ."  ^  This  obstacle  was  overcome  in  Jan- 
uary 1956  when  the  United  States  established  a  military  mission,  but  called  it 
by  a  different  name — a  Program  Evaluation  Office  (PEO)  attached  to  the  U.S. 
aid  mission.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  PEO  violated  the  spirit  if  not  the 

*Throughout  this  paper  explanatory  comments  added  to  quotations  will  be  placed 
within  brackets. 


252      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

letter  of  the  Geneva  Agreements.  PEO  clearly  served  as  the  functional  equivalent 
of  a  military  advisory  group.  For  example,  the  chief  of  PEO  from  February 
1957  to  February  1959  was  Brigadier  General  Rothwell  H.  Brown,  U.S.  Army 
(retired).  Before  coming  to  Laos,  Brown  had  served  as  chief  of  the  Army  sec- 
tion in  the  U.S.  Military  Assistance  Advisory  Group  (MAAG)  Pakistan,  as 
deputy  chief  of  MAAG  South  Vietnam,  and  as  chief  of  MAAG  Pakistan.  After 
retiring  from  the  last  position  in  1956,  he  was  "asked  by  Admiral  Radford  and 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  November  1956"  to  go  to  Laos  on  an  inspection  tour 
and  shortly  thereafter  he  was  appointed  as  chief  of  PEO  Laos.^^  Indeed,  the  ; 
PEO  ploy  was  so  obvious  that  even  the  U.S.  State  Department  on  one  occasion  ; 
in  1957  forgot  the  pretense  and  listed  Laos  as  one  of  the  "countries  where  j 
MAAG  personnel  are  stationed."  1 

In  addition  to  the  military  mission,  U.S.  involvement  was  growing  in  other 
realms.  A  United  States  Operations  Mission  (USOM)  had  been  established  in 
Vientiane  in  January  1955  and  in  July  of  that  year  an  agreement  was  reached 
with  the  Katay  government  on  new  economic  aid  and  an  increase  in  military  i 
assistance.  The  aid  program  mushroomed  to  such  an  extent  that  from  1955  f 
through  1958  U.S.  aid  to  Laos  totaled  approximately  $167  million.12  The  bulk  | 
of  this  aid  went  for  support  of  the  army  of  Laos,  "the  only  country  in  the  world  |i 
where  the  United  States  supports  the  military  budget  100%.  .  .         Yet  it  j 
was  clear  that  U.S.  interests  in  Laos  were  suffering.  Souvanna  Phouma's  negotia-  I 
tions  with  the  Pathet  Lao  evidenced  a  Laotian  veering  away  from  "pro-Western  j 
neutrality,"  and  with  the  scheduling  of  elections  in  May  1958,  U.S.  officials  were  | 
clearly  worried.  f 

Despite  the  magnitude  of  the  U.S.  aid  program  very  little  of  it  ever  trickled 
down  to  reach  the  average  Laotian  peasant.  In  December  1957,  with  the  dis- 
covery of  import  irregularities  in  the  U.S.  commodity  import  program,  U.S.  aid 
was  briefly  withheld.  One  authority  recounts  that  the  aid  abuses  served  as  a 
"pretext  for  disciplining  the  Laotian  government."     What  clearly  upset  U.S.  j 
officials  was  Souvanna  Phouma's  flirtation  with  the  Communists,  and  this  as  i 
much  as  anything  prompted  the  aid  cutoff.  Indeed,  if  corruption  had  been  the  Ij 
real  reason  for  "disciplining  the  Laotian  Government,"  many  American  officials  :i 
ought  also  to  have  been  disciplined.  For  corruption  was  by  no  means  limited  to  i 
the  Laotian  side  of  the  aid  program.  As  a  U.S.  House  Government  Operations  | 
Committee  later  reported:  | 

1.  One  U.S.  aid  officer  "accepted  bribes  totaling  at  least  $13,000"  for  help-  ^ 
ing  a  construction  company  "secure  lucrative  contracts  and  overlooking 
deficiencies  in  their  performance." 

2.  The  former  USOM  director  sold  his  inoperable  1947  Cadillac  to  the 
head  of  the  same  construction  company  at  an  inflated  price  and  shortly  ' 
thereafter  the  car  was  "cut  up  and  the  pieces  dropped  down  an  aban- 
doned well." 

3.  The  former  director's  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  Government  I 
Operations  was  "misleading  and  conflicting." 

4.  The  same  USOM  director  was  charged  with  violating  aid  contract  regula- 
tions "in  several  respects"  including  "writing  two  contracts  for  one  job"  i 
and  writing  a  contract  which  included  "a  provision  that  the  contractor 

.  .  .  was  not  required  to  complete  any  work  under  the  contract."  * 

When  confronted  with  the  charges  of  their  corruption  the  aid  officials  "sought 
to  excuse  deficiencies  and  maladministration  in  the  aid  program  in  Laos  •  •  •  i 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  253 

with  the  assertion  that  our  aid  program,  however  poorly  administered,  has  saved 
Laos  from  going  Communist." 

The  exposure  in  public  testimony  of  corruption  among  U.S.  aid  officials  no 
doubt  made  it  more  difficult  thereafter,  or  at  least  more  embarrassing,  for  the 
U.S.  mission  to  object  too  strenuously  when  Laotian  officials  siphoned  off  their 
own  share  of  aid  money  and  cried  communist  "Wolf!"  to  divert  attention.  After 
all,  such  officials  could  claim,  they  were  only  learning  from  the  Americans! 

The  real  battle,  though,  was  not  against  corrupt  officials.  The  main  task  was 
preventing  a  "Communist  takeover."  Such  an  aim  had  intrinsic  value  for  U.S. 
policymakers  but  also  was  geared  toward  preventing  the  spread  of  insurgency 
into  neighboring  Thailand.  An  Operations  Coordinating  Board  (OCB)  Report 
on  Southeast  Asia,  28  May  1958,  recounted  the  setbacks  for  the  United  States 
in  this  struggle: 

The  formation  in  November,  1957  of  a  coalition  cabinet  with  Communist 
Pathet  Lao  participation,  additional  communist  gains  of  places  in  army  and 
civil  service,  and  permission  for  the  Pathet  to  operate  as  a  legal  political 
party  throughout  the  country,  were  generally  considered  as  a  setback  for 
U.S.  objectives. 

With  the  scheduling  of  special  elections  for  May  1958  to  include  Pathet  Lao 
participation,  U.S.  officials  were  fearful.  A  Congressional  report  summed  up  the 
situation: 

In  the  fall  of  1957,  with  an  awareness  of  the  forthcoming  elections.  Am- 
bassador Parsons  contemplated  the  cumulative  results  of  the  U.S.  aid  pro- 
gram to  date.  He  was  concerned  with  the  possibility  that  its  shortcomings 
might  become  election  issues  for  the  Communists. 

He  was  apparently  impressed  by  the  aid  program's  obvious  neglect  of 
the  needs  of  the  typical  Lao,  the  rural  villager  or  farmer.  In  an  effort  to 
remedy  this  shortcoming,  the  Ambassador  conceived  Operation  Booster 
Shot.18 

Operation  Booster  Shot  was  an  emergency  attempt  to  extend  the*  impact  of 
the  U.S.  aid  program  into  rural  Laos.  Clearly  inspired  by  the  upcoming  elections, 
it  was  an  early  version  of  "winning  hearts  and  minds."  The  Operation  included 
well-digging,  irrigation  projects,  repair  of  schools,  temples  and  roads;  altogether 
more  than  ninety  work  projects.  Incredibly,  the  program  also  included  the  air 
dropping  of  "some  1,300  tons  of  food,  medical  and  construction  supplies  and 

1  other  useful  supplies"  into  areas  inaccessible  by  road.  One  Congressman  rather 
undiplomatically  referred  to  the  latter  aspect  of  the  program  as  "drop[ping]  a 

I  flock  of  supplies  in  the  jungle."  Congressman  cited  "one  airplane  pilot 

who  participated  in  the  airdrop  who  thought  what  he  was  supposed  to  do  was 
haphazard."  21  But  as  Assistant  Secretary  Robertson  put  it. 

This  was  a  crash  program.  Such  a  program,  we  felt,  would  do  much  to 
counter  the  anticipated  vigorous  Communist  campaign  in  the  villages  and 
the  growing  criticism  that  American  aid  benefits  the  few  in  the  cities  and 
fails  to  reach  the  rural  population. 22 

Yet  despite  the  crash  nature  of  the  Booster  Shot  program  and  the  expense 
Ip which  "may  have  exceeded  $3  million,"  2:^  the  operation  failed  to  succeed.  In 


254      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

the  May  elections,  nine  out  of  thirteen  Pathet  Lao  candidates  won  seats  in  the 
National  Assembly.  Additionally,  four  candidates  of  the  neutralist  Santiphab 
(Peace)  party,  or  as  they  were  called  by  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Laos  Graham  Par- 
sons, "the  fellow  travelers,"  won  election. Thus  "Communists  or  fellow  trav- 
elers" had  won  thirteen  out  of  twenty-one  seats  contested.  Also,  Prince  Sou- 
phanouvong,  leader  of  the  Pathet  Lao,  standing  for  election  in  the  capital 
province  of  Vientiane,  won  more  votes  than  any  other  candidate  in  the  elections. 
A  few  days  after  the  May  4  elections,  when  the  new  National  Assembly  con- 
vened, Souphanouvong  was  elected  Chairman.-^ 

Interpretations  concerning  the  reasons  behind  the  Pathet  Lao  electoral  suc- 
cesses varied  widely.  The  OCB  Report  maintained  that  the  "Communists'  show 
of  strength  .  .  .  resulted  largely  from  the  conservatives  failure  to  agree  on  a 
minimum  consolidated  list  of  candidates."  The  conservatives  had  run  a  total  of 
eighty-five  candidates  for  the  twenty-one  contested  positions.  A  Laotian  official, 
Sisouk  Na  Chanpassak,  who  is  the  current  Laotian  Minister  of  Finance  gave  a 
different  reason : 

Black  market  deals  in  American  aid  dollars  reached  such  proportions  that 
the  Pathet  Lao  needed  no  propaganda  to  turn  the  rural  people  against  the 
townspeople.  2  7 

Yet  whatever  the  vote  was  against,  it  also  was  a  vote  for  the  Pathet  Lao.  They 
had  organized  well  for  the  election.  Former  Pathet  Lao  soldiers  and  cadres  acted 
as  grass-roots  campaigners  and,  in  contrast  to  the  Laotian  government  officials, 
they  were  honest.  As  Hugh  Toye,  former  British  military  attache  to  Laos,  de- 
scribed them,  "they  behaved  with  propriety,  with  respect  for  tradition,  and  with 
utmost  friendliness  as  far  as  the  people  were  concerned.  Their  soldiers  were 
well-disciplined  and  orderly  like  [their  mentors]  the  Viet  Minh.  .  .  ." 

The  electoral  victories  clearly  gave  the  Pathet  Lao  added  authority  in  the 
coalition  government.  United  States  reaction  was  quick  to  follow.  First,  the  CIA 
helped  to  organize  a  group  of  young  conservatives,  the  Committee  for  the  De- 
fense of  National  Interests  (CDNI),  in  opposition  to  Prime  Minister  Souvanna 
Phouma.29  Second,  on  June  30,  the  United  States  again  shut  off  aid  to  Laos. 
As  Roger  Hilsman,  who  served  as  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and 
Research  and  later  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Far  Eastern  Affairs  in  the 
Kennedy  Administration,  later  wrote, 

...  by  merely  withholding  the  monthly  payment  to  the  troops,  the  United 
States  could  create  the  conditions  for  toppling  any  Lao  government  whose 
policies  it  opposed.^^ 

Surely  enough  on  July  23,  in  a  National  Assembly  vote,  Souvanna  Phouma's 
government  was  toppled.  One  observer  charged  that  the  United  States  paid  huge 
sums  for  votes  against  Souvanna,^i  and  another  maintains  that  the  CIA  was 
"stage-managing  the  whole  affair."  Whatever  the  exact  circumstances,  the 
United  States  was  clearly  and  deeply  implicated  in  the  fall  of  Souvanna  Phouma 
in  1958  as  again  it  would  be  in  1960. 

Yet  in  a  height  of  pretense  bordering  on  the  absurd.  Assistant  Secretary 
Robertson,  when  asked  in  Congressional  hearings  whether  the  United  States 
had  done  anything  to  cause  the  "coalition  of  the  non-Communist  elements  in 
the  Government  which  was  successful  in  getting  rid  of  the  Communist  min- 
isters," answered,  "Nothing  that  we  did,  no."     Such  innocence  is  all  the  more 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  255 

remarkable  in  light  of  Robertson's  testimony  on  the  formation  of  coalition  gov- 
ernment. Former  Ambassador  Parsons  had  testified  "I  struggled  for  sixteen 
months  to  prevent  a  coalition  government."  Robertson  elaborated, 

.  .  .  there  is  no  difference  whatsoever  in  our  evaluation  of  the  threat  to 
Laos  which  was  posed  by  this  coalition.  That  is  the  reason  we  did  every- 
thing we  could  to  keep  it  from  happening.^^ 

The  U.S.  did  "everything  we  could"  to  prevent  the  coalition  government,  but 
when  it  fell,  "Nothing  that  we  did,  no." 

IV.    ANTI-COMMUNIST,  PRO-FREE  WORLD  NEUTRALITY 

After  Souvanna  Phouma  lost  the  July  23  vote  of  confidence  in  the  National 
Assembly,  he  still  tried  to  form  a  new  government,  but  CIA  agents  "had  per- 
suaded the  CDNI  to  oppose  Souvanna"  ^  and  his  attempt  failed.  On  August  18, 
■  Phoui  Sananikone  gathered  enough  support  to  form  a  government.  His  cabinet 
excluded  the  two  Pathet  Lao  ministers  who  had  been  in  Souvanna's  govern- 
ment, but  did  include  four  CDNI  members  who  were  not  members  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly.2  The  coalition  government  was  broken. 

Phoui  soon  demonstrated  his  own  brand  of  neutrality.  He  established  rela- 
i  tions  with  Nationalist  China  and  upgraded  the  Lao  mission  in  Saigon  to  embassy 
status.  After  agreements  on  reforms  in  the  aid  program  and  devaluation  of  the 
Laotian  currency  in  October,  the  United  States  resumed  aid  to  Laos.  Then  in 
January  1959,  U.S.  aid  to  Laos  was  increased. 

In  December,  Phoui  seized  upon  the  occurrence  of  a  skirmish  between  Laotian 
and  DRV  soldiers  in  the  region  near  the  demilitarized  zone  between  North  and 
South  Vietnam  to  charge  North  Vietnam  with  initiating  a  campaign  against  Laos 
"by  acts  of  intimidation  of  all  sorts,  including  the  violation  and  occupation  of 
its  territory."  ^  The  validity  of  the  charges  was  questionable,  but  Phoui  never- 
theless used  the  incident  as  a  pretext  to  request  emergency  powers  from  the 
National  Assembly.^  On  January  15,  he  was  granted  emergency  powers  for  one 
year.  On  the  same  day,  he  reshuffled  his  cabinet  to  include  for  the  first  time 
three  army  officers  who  were  also  CDNI  members.  On  February  1 1 ,  Phoui  de- 
clared that  Laos  was  no  longer  bound  by  the  Geneva  Conventions  or  the  limita- 
tions on  acceptance  of  foreign  military  aid.^  As  the  government  became  more 
conservative,  now  including  seven  CDNI  members,  purges  were  initiated  against 
Pathet  Lao  officials  and  sympathizers.^  In  the  meantime,  two  Pathet  Lao  battal- 
ions awaited  integration  into  the  Royal  Lao  Army,  as  called  for  in  the  agreements 
reached  earlier  between  Souvanna  Phouma  and  the  Pathet  Lao.  In  early  May 
details  of  the  integration  were  agreed  upon,  but  at  the  last  minute  on  May  1 1  the 
two  battalions,  fearing  a  trick  by  the  increasingly  anti-Communist  Phoui  govern- 
ment, refused  to  comply  with  the  plan.'''  Thereupon,  Phoui  ordered  Prince 
Souphanouvong  and  the  other  Pathet  Lao  leaders  in  Vientiane  arrested,  and 
commanded  the  Royal  Army  to  encircle  the  two  recalcitrant  PL  battalions.  He 
then  issued  an  ultimatum  to  the  PL  troops;  either  they  be  integrated  into  the 
Royal  Army  immediately  or  be  disbanded.  The  First  Battalion  complied,  the 
'Second  did  not.  Toye  relates  their  escape: 

t     On  the  night  of  18  May,  the  whole  seven  hundred  men,  complete  with 
their  families,  their  chickens,  pigs,  household  possessions  and  arms  slipped 


I 


256      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

out  of  their  camp  on  the  Plain  of  Jarres  and  followed  a  long-planned  route  j 
to  an  isolated  valley  near  the  North  Vietnamese  border  some  forty-five  miles  j 
away."  ^  I 

An  OCB  Report  on  Southeast  Asia,  12  August  1959,  commented: 

the  Lao  Army  displayed  a  disappointing  lack  of  capacity  to  control  a  small  ! 
scale  internal  security  problem  when  it  permitted  the  battalion  to  escape.^ 

The  Royal  Lao  government,  incensed,  declared  the  Pathet  Lao  troops  would  be 
considered  deserters.  The  coalition  government,  if  only  broken  earlier,  was  clearly 
shattered  now.  | 
In  July  the  Royal  Lao  government  (RLG)  reported  Communist  guerrilla  at-  j 
tacks  in  the  north. lo  A  Special  National  Intelligence  Estimate  (SNIE  68-2-59,  18 
September  1959)  later  analyzed  the  situation  as  follows:  { 

7.  We  believe  that  the  initiation  of  Communist  guerrilla  warfare  in  Laos  | 
in  mid-July  was  primarily  a  reaction  to  a  series  of  actions  by  the  Royal  Lao  '■ 
Government  which  threatened  drastically  to  weaken  the  Communist  posi- 
tion in  Laos.  For  a  period  of  about  one  year  after  the  November  1957 
political  agreements  between  the  Laotian  Government  and  the  Pathet  Lao, 
the  Communist  controlled  party  in  Laos — the  Neo  Lao  Hak  Zat — attempted 
to  move  by  legal  political  competition  toward  its  objective  of  gaining  control 
of  Laos.  The  Laotian  Government  had  taken  counteraction  which  checked  j 
this  effort.  Moreover,  the  U.S.  had  stepped  up  its  activities  to  strengthen  j 
the  Laotian  Government,  notably  through  the  decision  to  send  military  train-  I 
ing  teams,  and  clearly  was  increasing  its  presence  in  Laos.  The  Communist  j 
advance  in  Laos  was  losing  impetus.  To  the  Communist  world,  the  future  t 
probably  appeared  to  be  one  of  increasing  political  repression,  declining  j 
assets,  and  a  strengthened  anti-Communist  position  in  the  country. f 

The  onus  of  blame  for  the  resumption  of  hostilities  clearly  lay  with  the  Phoui 
Sananikone  government, ^nd  indirectly  with  the  United  States.  | 

Throughout  the  year  the  tension  and  particularly  the  rhetoric  of  crisis  height- 
ened. One  particularly  notable,  though  perhaps  not  atypical  example  of  the 
exaggerated  air  of  crisis  is  recounted  by  Bernard  Fall.  On  August  24,  1959,  the  \ 
New  York  Times  titled  a  story  on  Laos  with  the  alarming  report  "Laos  Insurgents  ' 
Take  Army  Post  Close  to  Capital."  As  Fail  points  out,  the  headline  should  have 
read  "Rain  Cuts  Laos  Vegetable  Supply,"  for  there  had  in  fact  been  no  attack. 
The  whole  story  had  mushroomed  out  of  a  washed-out  bridge  which  had  caused 
a  cutoff  in  traffic  to  Vientiane  and  thus  prevented  the  daily  vegetable  supply 
from  coming  through.  The  story  of  the  attack  on  the  outpost  had  been  built 
from  speculation  as  to  the  cause  of  the  cutoff  in  traffic! 

Although  the  U.S.  did  expand  the  PEO  group  in  July  and  in  August  increased  | 
aid  to  Laos,  direct  military  intervention  was  avoided.  In  September,  the  RLG  * 
reported  Communist  attacks  on  Sam  Neua  and  again  charged  North  Vietnam  j 
with  aggression,  but  this  time  the  charges  were  presented  before  the  United  f 
Nations.i4  The  secret  U.S.  government  SNIE  of  September  18,  1959,  acknowl- 
edged, however,  that  there  was  "no  conclusive  evidence  of  participation  by 
North  Vietnamese,"      and  a  UN  team  of  observers  reached  very  much  the  ; 
same  conclusion  later  in  September. After  these  setbacks  in  gaining  additional 
international  support  in  his  battle  against  the  Communists,  Phoui  considered  ; 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  257 

reorganizing  his  cabinet.  The  move  was  resisted  by  CDNI  members  who  re- 
portedly were  advised  to  do  so  by  the  CIA.^"  Then  in  December,  army  General 
Phoumi  Nosavan  and  other  CDNI  members  called  for  Phoui's  resignation  and 
sent  troops  to  surround  his  house.  On  December  30,  Phoui  resigned. 

Phoumi  Nosavan  was  now  clearly  the  darling  of  the  CIA.  Both  CIA  and  the 
Program  Evaluatoin  Office  were  backing  him  for  Prime  Minister.!^  Phoumi 
had  been  a  member  of  the  Lao  Issara  in  the  late  1940s  and  as  such  had  been  a 
close  companion  of  Souphanouvong^^  but  by  the  late  fifties  had  become  a 
staunch  anti-Communist.  His  early  role  as  such  had  been  questioned  by  some  on 
the  basis  of  his  early  association  with  Souphanouvong,  but  by  1959  the  CIA 
believed  in  him  enough  to  back  him  in  his  move  against  the  Phoui  Sananikone 
government.  At  this  point  the  CIA  clearly  had  a  strong  hand  in  formulating  and 
directing  U.S.  policy  in  Laos,  even  though  sometimes  opposed  by  the  State 
Department.  As  Hilsman  described  it, 

where  the  State  Department,  for  example,  at  one  time  had  three  people  on 
its  Laos  desk,  the  CIA  had  six.  This  meant  that  the  CIA  could  always  afford 
1  to  be  represented  at  an  inter-departmental  meeting,  that  it  could  spare  the 
manpower  to  prepare  papers  that  would  dominate  the  meeting,  and  that 
it  could  explore  the  byways  and  muster  the  information  and  arguments  that 
gave  its  men  authority  at  those  meetings.-^' 

I  Nevertheless,  despite  CIA  backing,  Phoumi  was  not  named  Prime  Minister 
and  instead  the  King  appointed  a  caretaker  government  until  the  elections 
scheduled  for  April  1960.  In  the  meantime,  however,  Phoumi,  holding  the  posi- 
tion of  Minister  of  Defense  and  Veteran  Affairs,  remained  dominant  in  the 

'  government.  It  appears  from  the  Pentagon  Papers  that  the  United  States,  having 
finally  brought  staunch  anti-Communists  to  power,  may  have  received  more  than 
it  bargained  for.  An  OCB  Report  on  Southeast  Asia,  10  February  1960,  noted 

;  that 

Our  problem  in  the  last  few  months  has  not  been  "to  strengthen  the  de- 
termination of  the  RLG  to  resist  subversion"  or  "to  prevent  Lao  neutrality 
from  veering  toward  pro-communism."  Without  minimizing  the  importance 
of  these  objectives,  our  immediate  operational  problem  has  been  to  persuade 
the  Lao  leadership  from  taking  too  drastic  actions  which  might  provoke 
a  reaction  on  the  part  of  the  North  Vietnamese  and  which  might  alienate 
free-world  sympathy  for  Laos — as  for  instance,  outlawing  and  eliminating 
by  force  the  NLHX  or  taking  a  hard  anti-communist  position  in  international 
affairs. 21  - 

In  January  1960  an  American  reporter  had  observed,  "If  free  elections  were 
held  today  in  Laos,  every  qualified  observer  including  the  American  Embassy, 
concedes  this  hermit  kingdom  would  go  Communist  in  a  landslide."  22  Yet  in 
the  April  1960  election  the  Pathet  Lao  were  soundly  defeated.  The  explanation, 
:0f  course,  was  that  the  elections  were  completely  rigged.  Not  only  were  the 
electoral  rules  rigged  against  PL  candidates,  and  village  headmen  bribed,  but 
also  Prince  Souphanouvong,  the  PL  leader  and  top  vote-getter  in  the  1958  elec- 
tions, was  still  held  under  arrest  and  not  allowed  to  run.-^  The  manipulation  of 
[the  election  and  the  increased  power  of  the  conservative  elements  in  the  Vien- 
Ijiane  government,  no  doubt  made  Souphanouvong  fear  for  his  safety.  He  and 
*  lis  Pathet  Lao  colleagues  who  had  been  languishing  in  jail  in  Vientiane  for  over 


258      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

a  year  decided  to  wait  no  longer.  On  the  night  of  May  24,  they  escaped.  Evidently 
the  Pathet  Lao  leaders  had  convinced  the  soldiers  guarding  them  of  the  validity 
of  the  PL  cause,  for  the  "guards"  accompanied  the  PL  leaders  in  their  escape.^^ 
Events  moved  peacefully  for  the  next  few  months  and  the  United  States  was 
evidently  pleased  with  the  new  conservative  government.  In  language  reminiscent 
of  George  Orwell's  "doublethink,"  a  NSC  memorandum  in  July  noted  among 
U.S.  policy  objectives  in  Laos,  that  of  "helping  maintain  the  confidence  of  the 
Royal  Lao  Government  in  its  anti-Communist,  pro-Free  World  'neutralism.'  " 
Events  in  August,  unique  even  to  the  remarkable  world  of  Laotian  politics,  were 
to  prove,  however,  that  not  everyone  was  happy  with  the  new  policy  of  "anti- 
Communist,  pro-Free  World  neutralism." 

V.    YEARS  OF  CRISIS:  1960-1962 

So  it  was  that  by  the  start  of  1964,  after  a  decade  of  humiliating  reverses 
and  the  expenditure  of  close  to  half  a  billion  dollars,  United  States  policy 
had  come  full  circle:  during  the  1950s  Souvanna  Phouma  and  his  plan  for 
a  neutral  Laos  had  been  opposed  with  all  the  power  of  the  Invisible  Gov- 
ernment [the  CIA];  now  the  United  States  was  ready  to  settle  for  even  less 
than  it  could  have  had  five  years  earlier  at  a  fraction  of  the  cost.^ 

The  events  of  August  1960  and  the  tragically  needless  fighting  over  the  next 
two  years  were  to  bring  Laos  to  the  forefront  of  American  attention.  In  all  of  the 
almost  two  decades  of  the  second  Indochina  war  this  was  the  only  time  during 
which  Laos  was  for  the  United  States  much  more  than  a  mere  sideshow  to  the 
conflict  in  Vietnam,  As  the  Pentagon  Papers  point  out. 

For  although  it  is  hard  to  recall  that  context  today,  Vietnam  in  1961  was  a  i 
peripheral  crisis.  Even  within  Southeast  Asia  it  received  far  less  of  the  ! 
Administration's  and  the  world's  attention  than  did  Laos.  The  New  York 
Times  Index  for  1961  has  eight  columns  on  Vietnam,  twenty-six  on  Laos 
(Graveled.,  11:18). 

The  individual  who  precipitated  the  1960  crisis  was  a  diminutive,  dedicated. 
Army  Captain  named  Kong-le.  Ethnically  a  member  of  a  minority  group  from 
southern  Laos,  Kong-le  was  the  commander  of  the  best  unit  in  the  Royal  Lao  : 
Army,  the  Second  Paratroop  Battalion.  He  was,  as  Bernard  Fall  put  it,  a  "soldier's 
soldier,"  and  "much  too  unsophisticated  for  playing  the  favorite  Laotian  game 
of  political  musical  chairs."  ^ 

In  the  early  morning  hours  of  August  9  with  General  Phoumi  and  the  entire  ' 
cabinet  in  Luang  Prabang  confering  with  the  King,  Kong-le  and  his  paratroopers, 
politically  unsophisticated  though  they  may  have  been,  shocked  the  world  and  i 
no  doubt  their  French  and  American  military  advisers.  They  executed  a  coup  < 
d'etat  and  occupied  all  of  Vientiane.  A  few  days  later  Kong-le  explained  his  I 
motives  for  overthrowing  the  government: 

What  leads  us  to  carry  out  this  revolution  is  our  desire  to  stop  the  bloody 
civil  war;  eliminate  grasping  public  servants  [and]  military  commanders  ... 
whose  property  amounts  to  much  more  than  their  monthly  salaries  can 
afford;  and  chase  away  foreign  armed  forces  as  soon  as  possible.  ...  It  is 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  259 

the  Americans  who  have  bought  government  officials  and  army  commanders, 
and  caused  war  and  dissension  in  our  country.  .  .  .  We  must  help  each 
other,  drive  these  sellers  of  the  fatherland  out  of  the  country  as  soon  as 
possible.  Only  then  can  our  country  live  in  peace.^ 

i  Kong-le  quickly  formed  a  provisional  committee  and  called  on  Souvanna 
j  Phouma  to  head  a  new,  truly  neutral  government.  After  a  vote  of  the  National 
\  Assembly  and  with  the  King's  approval.  Prince  Souvanna  organized  a  new 
j  cabinet.  In  the  meantime  Phoumi  Nosavan  flew  to  his  stronghold  in  Savannakhet. 
!  Souvanna,  working  once  again  to  build  a  government  of  national  union,  flew  to 

Savannakhet  for  talks  with  Phoumi,  who  finally  agreed  to  join  the  government.  In 
I  late  August  the  Assembly,  meeting  in  Luang  Prabang,  approved  the  new  cabinet 
j  including  Phoumi  Nosavan  as  Vice-Premier  and  Minister  of  Interior.  The  settle- 
I  ment  was  backed  by  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Vientiane  and  by  the  newly  arrived 

U.S.  Ambassador,  Winthrop  Brown,  who  was  convinced  of  Souvanna's  neutrality. 

However,  other  more  conservative  forces  were  at  work  in  the  U.S.  government, 

and  in  September,  Brown  was  instructed  to  find  a  substitute  for  Souvanna  Phouma 
;  who  was  pro-Western.'^  While  the  Embassy  delayed  and  evidently  fought  for  the 
I  support  of  Souvanna,  the  CIA  and  the  U.S.  military  advisers  of  PEO  turned  once 
\  again  to  their  protege — Phoumi  Nosavan. 

I     After  the  agreement  with  Souvanna  in  Luang  Prabang,  Phoumi  had  returned 
!  not  to  Vientiane  but  once  again  to  his  headquarters  at  Savannakhet.  On  Septem- 
i  her  10,  despite  his  agreement  with  Souvanna,  Phoumi  announced  the  establish- 
t  ment  of  a  countercoup  committee  against  Souvanna's  government  and  of  which 
he  was  nominally  a  member.  A  week  later  with  at  least  the  tacit  support  of  the 
United  States,  Thailand  instituted  a  blockade  on  Vientiane.  Nevertheless,  a  flood 
of  supplies  including  those  intended  for  Vientiane  continued  to  pour  in  to 
ji  Phoumi's  forces  at  Savannakhet.^  Additionally,  despite  a  promise  to  Souvanna 
I  to  the  contrary,  two  hundred  Laotian  paratroops  who  had  been  training  in  Thai- 
•  land  under  U.S.  sponsorship  were  turned  over  to  General  Phoumi.^  Souvanna 
^  Phouma  pleaded  with  U.S.  officials  to  discontinue  the  blockade,  but  no  help 
j  was  forthcoming.  Finally  he  turned  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  help.  On  October  1 
!  Souvanna  announced  his  approval  for  the  establishment  of  a  Soviet  Embassy  in 
!j  Vientiane.  His  announcement  only  confirmed  U.S.  suspicions  of  his  pro-Com- 
j  munist  tendencies.  Indeed,  this  assessment  had  proved  in  effect  to  be  a  self- 
'  fulfilling  prophecy.  Calling  him  pro-Communist,  the  United  States  refused  him 
help.  In  desperation,  he  turned  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  aid,  thus  "proving"  the 
original  assessment  of  his  pro-Communist  tendencies.  Nevertheless,  a  U.S.  dele- 
gation was  dispatched  to  Vientiane  in  October  to  talk  with  Souvanna.  In  effect 
the  delegation,  including  former  Ambassador  Parsons,  demanded  that  the  Prince 
I  abandon  his  policy  of  neutrality.'''  Souvanna  refused.  Shortly  thereafter,  the  U.S. 

decided  that  "Souvanna  must  go."  ^  As  it  was  to  happen  again  in  Vietnam  just 
;  three  years  later,  the  United  States  decided  that  a  legally  constituted  government 
"must  go." 

In  the  meantime  U.S.  aid  had  continued  to  pour  into  Savannakhet  for  Phoumi's 
forces.  In  mid-December,  "with  plans  drawn  up  by  his  American  advisers,"  ^ 
General  Phoumi  marched  on  Vientiane.  A  tragically  bloody  battle  followed  which 
j  inflicted  as  many  as  500  civilian  casualties. Greatly  outnumbered,  Kong-le's 
I  forces  withdrew  to  the  north.  With  Vientiane  and  Luang  Prabang  controfled  by 
{'  Phoumist  forces,  the  King  on  December  13  named  Prince  Boun  Oum  to  form 
a  new  government.  The  United  States  quickly  recognized  the  Boun  Oum  govern- 


260      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

ment  (almost  three  weeks  before  it  was  approved  by  the  National  Assembly) 
and  on  December  17,  in  a  remarkable  distortion  of  the  truth,  declared  that  "the  j 
responsibility  for  the  present  fratricidal  war  in  Laos  .  .  .  rests  squarely  and  j 
solely  upon  the  Soviet  Government  and  its  partners."  i 

By  this  time  the  conflict  had  become  potentially  explosive.  The  Soviet  Union  j 
had  been  airlifting  supplies  to  the  forces  of  Kong-le  since  early  December,  and  I 
in  January  1961,  the  United  States  provided  Phoumi  with  a  half  dozen  AT-6  i 
Harvard  trainers  adapted  as  light  fighter-bombers.  Additionally  the  United  ) 
States  sent  in  400  Special  Forces  troops  organized  into  "White  Star  teams."  One  j 
team  was  assigned  to  each  of  Phoumi  Nosavan's  battalions.  As  the  Pentagon  \ 
Papers  now  reveal,  "The  'White  Star  teams'  used  in  Laos  .  .  .  had  the  purpose  s 
and  effect  of  establishing  U.S.  control  over  foreign  forces"  (Gravel  ed.,  n:464).  ; 
Nevertheless,  Phoumi's  forces  continued  to  perform  abysmally.  On  December  31, 
Kong-le's  forces  captured  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  from  the  rightists  and  began  re-  t 
ceiving  regular  supplies  flown  into  the  Plaine  via  the  Soviet  airlift.  Also,  by  this  i 
time  Kong-le  had  entered  into  a  de  facto  alliance  with  the  Pathet  Lao.^^  ' 
attempt  to  explain  away  the  rout  of  their  troops  on  December  31,  the  Boun 
Oum/Phoumi  government  claimed  the  intervention  of  seven  North  Vietnamese 
battalions.  The  charge  later  proved  to  be  a  complete  fabrication. The  Kong-le/ 
Pathet  Lao  forces,  though  numerically  inferior,  had  proved  more  than  a  match  n 
for  the  Phoumist  forces. The  Pentagon  Papers,  commenting  on  the  situation  'i 
at  that  time,  note  "it  turned  out  that  the  neutralist/communist  forces  were  far 
more  effective  than  those  favored  by  the  U.S.,  and  so  it  became  clear  that  only  by 
putting  an  American  army  into  Laos  could  the  pro-Western  faction  be  kept  in 
power"  (Gravel  ed.,  n:22). 

On  January  19,  1961,  in  a  conference  on  Laos,  President  Eisenhower  briefed  ( 
President-elect  Kennedy  on  the  situation  in  Laos: 

President  Eisenhower  said  with  considerable  emotion  that  Laos  was  the  key  j 
to  the  entire  area  of  Southeast  Asia.  He  said  that  if  we  permitted  Laos  to  j 
fall,  then  we  would  have  to  write  off  all  the  area.  He  stated  that  we  must  } 
not  permit  a  Communist  take-over.  He  reiterated  that  we  should  make  ' 
every  effort  to  persuade  member  nations  of  SEATO  or  the  ICC  to  accept 
the  burden  with  us  to  defend  the  freedom  of  Laos. 

As  he  concluded  these  remarks.  President  Eisenhower  stated  it  was  im- 
perative that  Laos  be  defended.  He  said  that  the  United  States  should 
accept  this  task  with  our  allies,  if  we  could  persuade  them,  and  alone  if  we 
could  not.  He  added  that  "our  unilateral  intervention  would  be  our  last 
desperate  hope"  in  the  event  we  were  unable  to  prevail  upon  the  other  sig- 
natories to  join  us. 

At  one  time  it  was  hoped  that  perhaps  some  type  of  arrangement  could 
be  made  with  Kong  Le.  This  had  proved  fruitless,  however,  and  President 
Eisenhower  said  "he  was  a  lost  soul  and  wholly  irretrievable." 

.  .  .  This  phase  of  the  discussion  was  concluded  by  President  Eisenhower 
in  commenting  philosophically  upon  the  fact  that  the  morale  existing  in  the 
democratic  forces  in  Laos  appeared  to  be  disappointing.  He  wondered  aloud 
why,  in  interventions  of  this  kind,  we  always  seem  to  find  that  the  morale  of 
the  Communist  forces  was  better  than  that  of  the  democratic  forces.  His 
explanation  was  that  the  Communist  philosophy  appeared  to  produce  a 
sense  of  dedication  on  the  part  of  its  adherents,  while  there  was  not  the 
same  sense  of  dedication  on  the  part  of  those  supporting  the  free  forces 
(Gravel  ed.,  IL636-637).i5 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  261 

The  new  Administration,  however,  delayed  action  on  Laos.  In  late  January, 
Kennedy  set  up  a  Task  Force  to  review  American  policy  in  Laos.^^  In  the  mean- 
time the  Kong-le/Pathet  Lao  forces  had  consolidated  their  position  on  the  Plaine 
des  Jarres  and  in  early  March  attacked  the  Sala  Phou  Khoun  junction  on  the 
road  from  Vientiane  to  Luang  Prabang.  Again  the  Phoumist  troops,  despite 
their  American  advisers,  panicked  and  fled.^"  To  the  United  States  the  crisis 
appeared  to  be  nearing  explosive  proportions.  In  Washington,  according  to  one 
participant,  the  meetings  on  the  Laotian  crisis  were  "long  and  agonizing." 
Various  proposals  for  intervention  were  discussed.  One  called  for  American 
paratroops  to  seize  and  occupy  the  Plaine  des  Jarres.  Another  called  for  the 
occupation  of  the  panhandle  in  southern  Laos  and  the  Vientiane  Plain  by  60,000 
troops.  1^  The  Laos  task  force  also  developed  a  contingency  plan  containing 
seventeen  steps  of  escalation.  Nevertheless,  the  new  President  still  temporized. 
Without  actually  ordering  any  U.S.  troops  to  Laos,  he  put  U.S.  Marines  in 
Okinawa  on  alert  for  possible  intervention  and  dispatched  helicopters  and  sup- 
plies to  Thai  bases  near  Laos.  By  March  24,  Kennedy  seems  to  have  decided 
to  pursue  a  diplomatic  rather  than  military  solution  to  the  crisis.  On  that  day 
Kennedy  appeared  on  nationwide  television  and  declared: 

I  want  to  make  it  clear  to  the  American  people  and  to  all  of  the  world 
that  all  we  want  in  Laos  is  peace  and  not  war,  a  truly  neutral  government 
and  not  a  cold  war  pawn,  a  settlement  concluded  at  the  conference  table 
and  not  on  the  battlefield  (Gravel  ed.,  11:800). 

In  the  same  month  progress  did  develop  on  the  diplomatic  front.  The  United 
Kingdom  called  for  a  new  Geneva  Convention  on  Laos.  And  on  April  24,  Russia 
joined  Britain  in  calling  for  an  armistice  in  Laos  and  a  reconvention  of  the 
Geneva  Conference.  In  the  same  week  opinion  in  the  U.S.  government  became 
much  more  amenable  to  a  diplomatic  settlement,  for  it  was  during  the  week 
of  April  twentieth  that  the  blunder  of  the  Bay  of  Pigs  invasion  became  known. 
A  Kennedy  aide  later  quoted  the  President  as  having  said  'Thank  God  the  Bay 
of  Pigs  happened  when  it  did.  Otherwise  we'd  be  in  Laos  by  now — and  that 
would  be  a  hundred  times  worse."  Nevertheless,  with  Pathet  Lao/Neutralist 
forces  gaining  ground  throughout  Laos — as  Toye  says  "gain[ing]  as  much  cheap 
territory  as  they  could"  — some  people  within  the  U.S.  government  still  spoke 
of  U.S.  intervention.  On  April  29,  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara  talked  of 
landing  U.S.  forces  in  Vientiane  and  declared  that  "we  would  have  to  attack 
the  DRV  if  we  gave  up  Laos."  22  The  possibility  of  overt  U.S.  intervention  in 
Laos  was  not  yet  dead.  The  Pentagon  Papers  reveal  that  in  a  May  1  meeting 
on  Laos,  Kennedy  "deferred  any  decision  on  putting  troops  into  Laos,"  but  in- 
stead approved  "a  cable  alerting  CINCPAC  to  be  ready  to  move  5000-men  task 
forces  to  Udorn,  Thailand,  and  to  Touraine  (Da  Nang),  South  Vietnam.  .  .  . 
The  alert  was  intended  as  a  threat  to  intervene  in  Laos  if  the  communists  failed 
to  go  through  with  the  cease  fire  which  was  to  precede  the  Geneva  Conference" 
(Gravel  ed.,  11:41-42).  This  meeting  seems  to  have  been  the  last  time,  at  least 
for  this  crisis,  at  which  overt  intervention  was  considered.  The  United  States 
had  backed  into  the  decision  to  seek  a  political  settlement  on  grounds  which 
were  completely  functional; 

1.  The  Phoumist  forces,  the  only  alternative  to  negotiated  settlement  or 
U.S.  military  intervention  had  repeatedly  demonstrated  their  abysmal 
fighting  capabilities.23 


262      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papcrs/Vol.  V 

2.  The  Pentagon  opposed  limited-scale  intervention  in  an  Asian  land-war 
and  particularly  after  the  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco  were  reluctant  to  approve 
intervention  which  was  restricted  "in  terms  of  either  territory  or  the 
weapons  to  be  used." 

3.  The  United  States  at  the  time  simply  did  not  have  the  strategic  reserves 
necessary  to  mount  a  massive  intervention.^-'' 

4.  U.S.  Congressional  leaders  "had  no  stomach  for  further  military  ad- 
ventures." 

5.  Major  allies  of  the  United  States  resisted  intervention and 

6.  There  was  no  conclusive  evidence  of  North  Vietnamese  troop  involve- 
ment, which  could  have  served  as  a  pretext  for  a  major  U.S.  interven- 
tion. 

As  Dommen  put  it,  "the  'decision'  to  accept  a  coalition  in  Laos  was  virtually 
thrust  upon  the  Kennedy  Administration."  ^9 

Although  Kennedy  had  thus  "rejected"  overt  military  intervention  he  did  not 
shy  away  from  covert  operations.  In  a  NSC  meeting  on  April  29,  only  two  weeks 
before  the  opening  of  the  second  Geneva  Conference  he  approved  plans  to 
"dispatch  agents  to  North  Vietnam"  for  sabotage  and  harassment  and  to  in- 
filtrate commando  teams  into  Southeast  Laos  (Gravel  ed.,  H : 640-64 1  A  July 
report  by  counterinsurgency  expert  Brigadier  General  Edward  G.  Lansdale  told 
of  other  covert  operations  in  Laos: 

About  9,000  Meo  tribesmen  have  been  equipped  for  guerrilla  operations, 
which  they  are  now  conducting  with  considerable  effectiveness  in  Com- 
munist-dominated territory  in  Laos.  .  .  .  Command  control  of  Meo  opera- 
tions is  exercised  by  the  Chief  CIA  Vientiane  with  the  advice  of  Chief 
MAAG  Laos.  The  same  CIA  paramilitary  and  U.S.  military  teamwork  is 
in  existence  for  advisory  activities  (9  CIA  operations  officers,  9  LTAG/ 
Army  Special  Forces  personnel  in  addition  to  the  99  Thai  PARU  [Police 
Aerial  Resupply  Unit]  under  CIA  control)  and  aerial  resupply  (Gravel  ed., 
11:646). 

In  an  aura  of  Orwellian  doublethink  Lansdale  continues: 

There  is  also  a  local  veteran's  organization  and  a  grass-roots  political 
organization  in  Laos,  both  of  which  are  subject  to  CIA  direction  and  con- 
trol and  are  capable  of  carrying  out  propaganda,  sabotage  and  harassment 
operations  (Gravel  ed.,  11:647). 

Did  the  renowned  counterinsurgency  expert  really  believe  that  a  grass-roots 
political  organization  could  be  "subject  to  CIA  direction  and  control"?  This 
doublethink  reflects  the  dilemma  of  much  of  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Indochina. 
U.S.  leaders  knew  theoretically  that  to  be  effective,  an  organization  had  to 
have  grass-roots  support.  Yet  viscerally  they  also  wanted  control. 

The  fact  that  the  United  States  did  not  directly  intervene  in  Laos  had  reper- 
cussions with  many  allies.  Vice-President  Lyndon  Johnson  noted  after  his  trip 
through  Southeast  Asia  in  May  1961 : 

There  is  no  mistaking  the  deep — and  long  lasting — impact  of  recent  de- 
velopments in  Laos.  Country  to  country,  the  degree  differs  but  Laos  has 
created  doubt  and  concern  about  intentions  of  the  United  States  throughout 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  263 

Southeast  Asia.  No  amount  of  success  at  Geneva  can,  of  itself,  erase  this. 
The  independent  Asians  do  not  wish  to  have  their  own  status  resolved  in 
like  manner  in  Geneva.  Sarit  and  Ayub  more  or  less  accept  that  we  are 
making  "the  best  of  a  bad  bargain"  at  Geneva.  Their  charity  extends  no 
further  (Gravel  ed.,  11:56). 

Diem  expressed  his  sentiments  along  this  line  directly  to  President  Kennedy  in 
a  May  15  letter:  "the  recent  developments  in  Laos  have  emphasized  our  grave 
concern  for  the  security  of  our  country  with  its  long  and  vulnerable  frontiers." 

Yet,  despite  the  reservations  of  U.S.  allies  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the  con- 
tinuing covert  operations  in  Laos,  the  conference  in  Geneva  opened  on  May  16. 
It  was  to  last  more  than  a  year,  during  which  time  parallel  talks  among  the 
three  Laotian  factions  continued  sporadically.  The  chief  U.S.  negotiator  at 
Geneva  was  the  former  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet  Union,  Averell  Harriman. 
His  orders  from  Kennedy  were  explicit.  The  President  told  him,  "Did  you  under- 
stand? I  want  a  negotiated  settlement  in  Laos.  I  don't  want  troops  put  in." 

The  early  weeks  of  the  Geneva  Conference  were  troubled  by  ceasefire  viola- 
tions. In  early  June  the  Kong-le/Pathet  Lao  forces  shelled  a  Meo  guerrilla  base  in 
northern  Laos^^'^  resulting  in  a  five-day  suspension  of  talks.  However,  after  July 
20,  with  negotiations  in  restricted  sessions,  the  conference  proceeded  without 
interruptions  for  the  rest  of  the  year.  Yet  despite  the  ongoing  talks,  the  United 
States  continued  to  increase  covert  operations  in  Laos.  On  August  29,  1961, 
President  Kennedy  approved: 

An  immediate  increase  in  mobile  training  teams  in  Laos  to  include  ad- 
visers down  to  the  level  of  the  company,  to  a  total  U.S.  strength  in  this  area 
of  500;  together  with  an  attempt  to  get  Thai  agreement  to  supply  an  equal 
amount  of  Thais  for  the  same  purpose. 

And  on  the  same  day  he  also  approved: 

An  immediate  increase  of  2,000  in  the  number  of  Meos  being  supported  to 
bring  the  total  to  a  level  of  1 1,000.35 

Among  actions  directed  by  the  President  on  October  13  was  the  initiation 
of  "guerrilla  ground  action  including  use  of  U.S.  advisers  if  necessary,  against 
aerial  resupply  missions  in  the  Tcehpone  area." 

This  continuing  covert  military  support  undoubtedly  contributed  to  what 
became  the  biggest  stumbling  block  in  the  path  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of 
the  crisis:  the  intransigence  of  the  Laotian  rightist  faction  led  by  Prince  Boun 
Gum  and  Phoumi  Nosavan.  After  meetings  of  the  princely  leaders  of  the  three 
Laotian  factions  in  Ban  Hin  Heup  in  October,  Boun  Oum  rejected  the  division 
of  portfolios  in  a  proposed  coalition  cabinet.  Then  for  two  months  he  refused 
to  meet  with  Souvanna  Phouma  and  Souphanouvong  to  help  work  out  a  com- 
promise.In  December  Phoumi  launched  new  military  actions  in  central  Laos 
,  east  of  Thakhek  and  in  northern  Laos  near  Muong  Sai.  Hugh  Toye,  British 
military  attache  to  Laos  at  that  time  describes  Phoumi's  actions.  "Both  were 
areas  where  his  opponents  could  be  expected  to  be  sensitive  and  where  probes 
would  provoke  military  reactions  which  could  then  be  used  as  excuses  for  delay 
^  on  the  political  front."  With  the  rightists'  intransigence  becoming  more  appar- 
ent, Harriman  persuaded  his  superiors  that  more  effective  persuasion  was  neces- 


264      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon-  Papers/Vol.  V 

sary.  In  January  1962,  the  U.S.  withheld  economic  aid.  On  January  10,  Prince  ; 
Boun  Oum  then  in  Vientiane  relented  and  announced  his  intentoin  of  returning  ; 
to  Geneva  to  resume  negotiations.  Two  days  later  the  United  States  responded  ; 
with  an  announcement  of  its  intention  to  resume  aid.  Phoumi  Nosavan,  however,  ! 
proved  more  intransigent.  In  late  January,  the  Pathet  Lao  mortared  the  town  of  \ 
Nam  Tha  in  northern  Laos.  Their  actions  were  a  clear  breach  of  the  ceasefire,  j 
but  Souphanouvong  defended  them  by  claiming  that  Nam  Tha  had  been  the  \ 
base  for  probes  by  Phoumi's  forces  into  Pathet  Lao  territory.  Also  the  Prince  [ 
complained  of  continuing  air  attacks  on  Pathet  Lao  villages. Contrary  to  official  | 
American  advice,  Phoumi  responded  by  building  up  his  troops  at  Nam  Tha  to  j 
5,000  by  the  end  of  January.  It  was  again  Averell  Harriman,  chief  U.S.  negotia-  | 
tor  at  Geneva,  who  pushed  for  U.S.  sanctions  against  the  buildup  by  Phoumi.  \ 
In  addition,  Harriman  sought  and  obtained  the  removal  of  the  CIA  station  chief  J 
whom  he  suspected  of  unofficially  backing  Phoumi  in  his  venture.^^  In  March,  j 
Harriman  himself  even  met  with  Phoumi.  He  told  the  General  flatly,  that  "the  | 
Phoumist  forces  were  finished  in  Laos  if  they  did  not  agree  to  coalition."  Li 

But  the  situation  had  already  reached  the  threshold  of  crisis.  In  February  the  I 
nervous  Thais  had  moved  troops  to  the  Thai-Lao  border.  And  on  May  6,  the  1 
crisis  reached  its  denouement.  Accounts  differ  as  to  whether  there  actually  was  || 
a  battle  at  Nam  Tha.  Apparently  there  was  not,  only  the  "possibility  of  one."  *2 

Whatever  the  case,  Phoumi's  troops  fled  in  panic  toward  the  Mekong  River 
town  of  Ban  Houei  Sai  and  crossed  into  Thailand.  Once  again  Phoumi  cried 
"Wolf!"  and  this  time  not  just  "North  Vietnamese!"  but  "Chinese  wolf!"  Amid 
the  panic  and  confusion  rumor  had  it  that  an  attack  on  Ban  Houei  Sai  was 
imminent.  So  Phoumi's  troops  fled  right  on  across  the  Mekong  into  Thailand.  An 
American  patrol,  displaying  rather  more  courage,  probed  back  toward  Nam 
Tha.  They  encountered  only  scattered  Pathet  Lao  patrols,  no  Vietnamese  or 
Chinese. 43  One  American  officer,  displaying  a  sense  of  humor,  undoubtedly  \ 
necessary  for  his  work  as  military  adviser  to  Phoumi's  troops,  reported  to  his 
superiors : 

The  morale  of  my  battalion  is  substantially  better  than  in  our  last  engage-  ! 
ment.  The  last  time  they  dropped  their  weapons  and  ran.  This  time  they 
took  their  weapons  with  them.^^ 

General  Phoumi's  ploy  had  failed.  Backed  by  CIA  agents  he  had  hoped  to 
provoke  a  crisis  which  would  force  the  United  States  to  intervene  militarily  and 
destroy  the  forthcoming  coalition. The  U.S.  reaction  was  more  restrained  than 
Phoumi  had  hoped. 

On  June  15,  in  a  show  of  force  President  Kennedy  announced  the  deployment 
of  3,000  U.S.  troops  to  Thailand.  While  contingency  plans  were  drawn  up  for 
the  "investing  and  holding  by  Thai  forces  with  U.S.  backup  of  Sayaboury  Prov- 
ince (in  Laos)"  and  for  the  "holding  and  recapture  of  the  panhandle  of  Laos 
.  .  .  with  Thai,  Vietnamese  or  U.S.  forces"  (Gravel  ed.,  11:672-673),  neither 
plan  was  implemented.  Again,  overt  intervention  was  avoided  while  the  focus 
for  action  remained  with  covert  operations.  A  NSAM  No.  162,  June  19,  1962) 
recommended  the  increased  use  of  third-country  personnel  with  particular  atten- 
tion to 

The  whole  range  of  this  concept  from  the  current  limited  use  of  Thai  and 
Filipino  technicians  in  Laos  to  the  creation  of  simply  equipped  regional 
forces  for  use  in  remote  jungle,  hill,  and  desert  country.  Such  forces  would 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  265 

be  composed  of  foreign  volunteers  supported  and  controlled  by  the  U.S. 
(Gravel  ed.,  11:683). 

After  the  Nam  Tha  fiasco  and  despite  continuing  covert  operations,  progress 
toward  coalition  came  quickly.  In  June,  the  three  princes  reached  agreement  on 
the  composition  of  a  coalition  cabinet.  Seven  positions  were  alloted  to  Souvanna 
Phouma's  neutralist  faction,  four  each  to  the  Pathet  Lao  and  to  the  rightists  of 
Boun  Oum  and  Phoumi.  The  remaining  four  cabinet  positions  went  to  a  fourth 
group,  the  Vientiane  neutralists.  On  July  23  the  fourteen  member  nations  of 
the  Geneva  Conference  gave  official  sanction  to  the  new  Government  of  Na- 
tional Union. 46  Regrettably,  it  was  to  prove  shortlived. 

VI.    THE  SIDESHOW  WAR,  1963-1968 

After  1963  Laos  was  only  the  wart  on  the  hog  of  Vietnam. 

— Dean  Rusk^ 

As  I  have  repeatedly  stated  here,  we  have  no  obligational  commitment  to 
Laos.  ...  In  fact  we  used  to  use  as  a  rule  of  thumb  our  ability  to  make 
it  (U.S.  military  involvement  in  Laos)  reversable  and  terminate  it  within 
eight  hours.  It  would  probably  take  24  hours  now,  but  it  still  could  be  done. 

— William  Sullivan 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
and  former  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Laos^ 

Despite  the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  military  advisers  from  Laos  following  the 
second  Geneva  conference,  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos  continued  to  grow.  The 
United  States  maintained  its  support  of  Souvanna  Phouma  and  the  guise  of  a 
coalition  government,  not  for  its  own  sake  so  much  as  to  allow  the  United  States 
to  continue  actions  in  Laos  aimed  at  furthering  American  objectives  in  Vietnam. 
After  1962  a  general  attitude  of  anticommunism  and  a  desire  to  prevent  revolu- 
tionary hegemony  in  territory  adjacent  to  Thailand  continued  to  motivate  U.S. 
policymakers.  Yet  after  this  time  Laos,  itself,  was  for  the  United  States  little 
more  than  a  sideshow  to  the  growing  conflict  in  Vietnam. 

The  1962  Geneva  Agreements  on  Laos  gave  only  short  and  imperfect  peace 
to  the  small  kingdom.  Different  observers  have  laid  the  blame  for  the  breakdown 
of  the  agreements  variously  to  each  of  the  participants  in  the  Laotian  conflict;  to 
the  United  States,  to  the  North  Vietnamese,  to  the  rightist  faction  in  Laos  and  to 
the  Pathet  Lao.^  There  was,  however,  no  corner  on  the  market.  The  blame  was 
ample,  to  be  shared  by  all. 

As  required  by  the  Geneva  Accords,  the  U.S.  withdrew  its  military  advisers, 
totaling  666  men,  from  Laos  by  the  October  7  withdrawal  deadline.  Roger  Hils- 
man,  a  member  of  the  Kennedy  Administration  involved  in  planning  U.S.  policy 
on  Laos,  later  wrote, 

Harriman,  especially,  felt  strongly  that  the  United  States  could  comply 
with  both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  agreements  in  every  detail,  that  its 
record  should  be  absolutely  clear.^ 

Hilsman,  quoting  Harriman,  goes  on  to  explain  what  prompted  the  adoption 
of  this  policy,  "If  Souvanna's  government  of  national  union  breaks  up,  we  must 


266      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

be  sure  the  break  comes  between  the  Communists  and  the  neutralists,  rather  than 
having  them  teamed  up  as  they  were  before."  While  the  United  States  may  have 
obeyed  the  letter  of  the  Geneva  Agreements,  adherence  to  their  spirit  was  ques- 
tionable. The  aspect  of  U.S.  involvement  after  Geneva  to  which  the  Pathet  Lao 
objected  most  vehemently  was  the  continuing  provision  of  ammunition  and  sup- 
plies to  the  CIA-organized  Meo  tribesmen,  some  of  whom  still  lived  in  enclaves 
behind  the  ceasefire  line  in  Pathet  Lao-controlled  territory.  The  United  States 
maintained  that  such  supplies,  airdropped  to  the  Meo,  were  warranted  under  a 
clause  in  the  Agreements  allowing  for  the  introduction  of  war  materials  which 
'"the  Royal  Government  of  Laos  may  consider  necessary  for  the  national  defense 
of  Laos."  6  The  Pathet  Lao  objected  to  the  supply  flights  to  the  Meo  forces  on 
the  grounds  that  such  flights  could  be  legally  approved  only  through  the  agree- 
ment of  all  three  factions  in  the  tripartite  government.'^  The  PL  chagrin  over  the 
continuing  supply  of  the  Meo  forces  is  understandable  in  light  of  the  fact  that 
even  after  Geneva  the  Meo  forces  were  by  no  means  quiescent.  As  Roger  Hilsman 
wrote, 

The  Meo  were  undoubtedly  troublesome  to  the  Communist  Pathet  Lao 
and  their  North  Vietnamese  cadre.  And  it  should  also  be  said  that  there 
were  occasions  of  tension  in  1962  and  1963  when  it  was  useful  to  have  the 
Meo  blow  up  a  bridge  or  occupy  a  mountaintop  in  the  deadly  game  of 
"signaling"  that  the  United  States  had  to  play  to  deter  the  Communists  from 
adventuring  with  the  Geneva  accords.^ 

But  while  the  United  States  clearly  can  be  held  partially  to  blame  for  the  failure 
of  the  1962  Agreements,  neither  were  the  North  Vietnamese  guiltless.  Only  forty 
North  Vietnamese  advisers  to  the  Pathet  Lao  were  officially  withdrawn  after 
Geneva.^  Even  though  their  presence  in  Laos  had  never  been  acknowledged 
officially  by  the  DRV,  very  probably  a  much  larger  number  were  involved.  While 
some  of  them  may  have  been  withdrawn  unofficially,  it  also  seems  likely  that  a 
substantial  number  remained  behind  after  the  withdrawal  deadline. 

In  light  of  the  only  partial  adherence  to  the  Geneva  Agreements  on  the  part 
of  outside  powers,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  three  Lao  factions  met  with  little 
success  in  their  attempt  to  form  a  coalition  government.  After  the  termination  of 
the  Soviet  airlift  to  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  in  November,  the  neutralist  troops  of 
Kong-le  were  left  with  no  indepedendent  source  of  supply.  As  a  result  they  had 
to  depend  on  supplies  coming  from  North  Vietnam,  as  did  the  Pathet  Lao. 
Whether  as  a  result  of  disagreement  over  the  allocation  of  the  supplies  from 
North  Vietnam  or  for  some  other  reason,  fighting  broke  out  between  the  Pathet 
Lao  and  Kong-le's  troops. One  group  of  neutralist  troops  led  by  Colonel  Deuan 
Sunnalath  sided  with  the  Pathet  Lao.  In  February  1963,  neutralist  Ketsana 
Vongsavong  was  assassinated  in  his  home  on  the  Plaine,  and  on  April  1  the 
neutralist  Foreign  Minister  in  Souvanna's  government,  Quinim  Pholsena,  was 
assassinated  in  Vientiane.  Shortly  thereafter  Prince  Souphanouvong,  fearing  for 
his  safety  and  no  doubt  recalling  his  arrest  in  1959,  left  Vientiane  for  Khang 
Khai  on  the  Plaine  des  Jarres.  The  prospects  for  a  coalition  were  waning.  Also 
in  April  the  United  States  began  supplying  Kong-le's  neutralist  forces  and  re- 
newed fighting  broke  out  between  the  neutralist  factions  on  the  Plaine. 

There  is  little  evidence  that  the  United  States  contributed  directly  to  the  re- 
newal of  fighting,  though  its  initiation  of  supply  flights  to  Kong-le's  forces  was, 
no  doubt,  viewed  with  alarm  by  the  leftist  forces.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that 
the  United  States  did  not  persevere  in  its  fulfillment  of  the  Geneva  Agreements 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  267 

with  much  compunction.  In  October  1962,  the  same  month  as  the  announced 
withdrawal  of  all  U.S.  military  advisers  from  Laos,  the  American  mission  to  Laos 
established  a  successor  to  the  PEO,  a  military  mission  incognito,  now  called  the 
Requirements  Office. ^2  Lij^g  the  old  Peo,  the  Requirements  Office  was  nominally 
a  part  of  the  U.S.  aid  mission.  As  Stevenson  points  out,  U.S.  "Covert  operations 
continued  despite  the  ostensible  withdrawal  of  all  'foreign  military  personnel'  as 
provided  in  the  Geneva  agreements."  In  June  1963,  President  Kennedy  decided 
to  supply  the  RLG  with  more  modern  T-28  aircraft  and  initiated  a  training  pro- 

igram  for  Laotian  pilots  in  Thailand  early  in  1964.^^  In  March  General  Phoumi 
reached  a  secret  agreement  with  Premier  Khanh  of  South  Vietnam  to  allow  South 
Vietnamese  soldiers  to  enter  Laos  in  chase  of  enemy  troops. Also  during  this 
time  evidence  accumulated  on  growing  DRV  involvement  in  southern  Laos  in 
opening  up  the  fledgling  Ho  Chi  Minh  trail. 1^ 

In  mid- April  1964,  Souvanna  Phouma,  Souphanouvong,  and  Phoumi  Nosavan 
!  met  on  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  for  talks  aimed  at  reaching  agreement  on  the  coali- 
;  tion  government.  The  primary  issue  discussed  was  the  neutralization  of  Luang 
j  Prabang.i^  It  had  been  proposed  that  the  government  move  to  that  more  neutral 
I  city  since  Vientiane  was  clearly  in  the  firm  control  of  the  rightist  forces.  The 
j  talks  foundered — largely  because  of  Phoumi  Nosavan's  refusal  to  make  significant 
j  concessions.  He  evidently  felt  that  any  concessions  to  the  leftist  and  neutralist 
\    factions  would  weaken  his  position  as  leader  of  the  rightists  and  feared  a  challenge 

!to  his  role  as  spokesman  for  the  group.  If  such  were  Phoumi's  fears,  they  quickly 
proved  well  founded. 
After  the  breakup  of  the  talks  on  the  Plaine,  a  disheartened  Souvanna  returned 
I  to  Vientiane  on  April  18.  The  same  day  he  announced  his  resignation  as  Prime 
I  Minister.  The  following  day  two  rightist  generals,  Kouprasith  Abhay  and  Siho 
ij  Lamphouthacoul  acted  to  usurp  power.  They  executed  a  coup  d'etat  and  arrested 
Souvanna  Phouma. The  United  States  reacted  quickly  to  the  grab  for  power  by 
!    the  right-wing  generals.  The  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Laos,  Leonard  Unger,  had  been 

Iin  Vietnam  for  meetings  with  U.S.  officials  there.  Upon  hearing  of  the  coup  he 
immediately  flew  back  to  Vientiane  and  informed  Kouprasith  that  the  United 
1    States  still  supported  Souvanna  Phouma.  Threatened  with  a  cutoff  in  U.S.  aid,  the 
generals,  on  April  23,  released  Souvanna  and  called  on  him  to  return  as  leader  of 
a  "coalition  government."     While  the  form  of  the  new  government  resembled 
I    the  old  coalition,  the  substance  was  clearly  not  the  same.  On  May  2,  Souvanna 
announced  the  merger  of  the  rightist  and  neutralist  factions.  The  partnership  was 
lopsided  at  best.  With  the  rightists  in  effective  control  Souvanna  "became  daily 
j    more  of  a  figurehead  in  a  situation  over  which  he  had  little  control."  20 
t       On  May  17,  the  Pathet  Lao  began  an  offensive  on  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  against 
Kong-le's  forces,  which  were  by  then  formally  under  the  command  of  the  new 
rightist-neutralist  unified  General  Staff.21  In  the  United  Nations,  the  United  States 
charged  the  Pathet  Lao  with  "an  outright  attempt  to  destroy  by  violence  what  the 
whole  structure  of  the  Geneva  Accords  was  intended  to  preserve."  22  Yet  from 
I   the  Pathet  Lao  point  of  view,  the  Accords  had  already  been  shattered;  by  the 
I   rightist  coup  on  April  19,  by  the  rightist-neutralist  agreements  and  by  the  con- 
,   tinuing  guerrilla  actions  of  the  Meo  forces  in  northern  Laos.  The  Pathet  Lao 
subsequently  charged  that  it  was  the  United  States  who  "staged"  the  April  19 
coup.23  Given  the  U.S.  involvement  in  the  toppling  of  Souvanna's  governments 
in  1958  and  1960,  the  charge  clearly  had  precedent.  Yet  as  previously  noted  it 
was  the  intervention  of  U.S.  Ambassador  Unger  and  the  threat  of  an  aid  cutoff 
which  prompted  the  generals  to  return  Souvanna  to  his  position  of  Prime  Minis- 
ter. The  PL  charge  of  U.S.  perfidy  was,  for  once,  groundless. 


268      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V  i 

On  May  21,  the  United  States  obtained  Souvanna's  permission  to  conduct  | 

reconnaissance  flights  over  PL-held  territory  (Gravel  ed.,  III:524).24  Armed  \ 

escort  planes  were  soon  added  to  the  reconnaissance  missions  which  were  code-  I 

named  YANKEE  TEAM.  On  June  6,  the  Pathet  Lao  shot  down  one  U.S.  plane  j 

and  the  next  day  downed  a  second  U.S.  jet.^^  In  retaliation,  a  squadron  of  U.S.  j 

jets  attacked  Pathet  Lao  positions  on  the  Plaine.  Apparently  alarmed  by  Commu-  j 

nist  denunciations  of  the  raids,  Souvanna  declared  that  he  would  resign  unless  the  \ 

United  States  stopped  the  attacks.  The  flights  were  discontinued,  but  two  days  \ 

later,  after  meeting  with  Ambassador  Unger,  Souvanna  announced  the  resump-  j 

tion  of  the  escorted  reconnaissance  flights.  The  attack  sorties  by  U.S.  jets  over  j 

northern  Laos  had  not  been  announced  by  the  U.S.  government.  They  were  first  j 

revealed  by  the  New  China  News  Agency.  On  June  17,  the  Washington  Post  '[ 

editorialized,  j 

The  country  has  come  to  a  sad  pass  when  it  must  turn  to  Communist  | 
China's  New  China  News  Agency  for  reports  on  covert  military  operations  j 
being  conducted  by  the  United  States.  ...  In  Laos,  Communist  China  | 
claimed  that  American  planes  had  flown  attack  missions  against  installations 
on  the  Plain  of  Jars.  First  the  State  Department  refused  comment,  but  soon  j 
the  story  leaked  out  in  quite  the  form  that  the  Communists  had  charged,  i 
.  .  .  What  in  heaven's  name  does  the  United  States  think  it  is  doing  by  \ 
trying  to  keep  these  air  strikes  secret?  Does  the  Government  really  have  the  ! 
naivete  to  believe  that  its  hand  in  these  operations  can  be  concealed?  If  it  is  i 
to  conduct  or  sponsor  such  raids,  then  let  the  matter  be  decided  openly  in  i 
terms  of  whether  American  interests  require  it.  .  .  .^^  i 

i 

Despite  complaints  such  as  the  above,  U.S.  air  operations  in  Laos  were  to  con- 
tinue with  neither  open  discussions  nor  public  knowledge  of  them.  From  June 
1964  to  March  1970,  the  U.S.  government  never  acknowledged  conducting  any- 
thing more  than  "armed  reconnaissance"  flights  in  northern  Laos.^^  Yet  during 
this  time  the  fighter-bomber  sortie  rate  of  U.S.  planes  over  northern  Laos  reached  t 
a  peak  of  300  per  day.^s  j 

Among  the  reasons  later  given  for  the  official  U.S.  secrecy  over  its  involvement  | 
in  Laos  was  that  Prime  Minister  Souvanna  Phouma  wanted  it  so.  In  testimony  j 
before  the  Symington  Subcommittee  in  October  1969,  William  Sullivan,  U.S.  Am-  j 
bassador  to  Laos  from  1964  to  1969,  addressed  the  issue.  In  explaining  "why  it  | 
is  that  the  United  States  is  reluctant  to  place  on  the  public  record  through  the 
statements  of  officials  precise  definition  of  what  the  U.S.  involvement  or  opera-  Ij 
tions  in  Laos  have  entailed,"  Sullivan  cited  an  "understanding  between  my  p 
predecessor  [Leonard  Unger]  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Laos  .  .  .  premised 
upon  statements  being  limited,  [and]  admissions  publicly  stated  being  very  care- 
fully structured."  29 

Such  an  explanation  of  course  implies  that  the  Laotian  Prime  Minister  was  | 
kept  informed  of  U.S.  operations  in  Laos.  The  Pentagon  Papers  make  clear, 
however,  that  U.S.  officials  considered  it  desirable,  but  by  no  means  essential,  to 
keep  Souvanna  informed  on  U.S.  actions.  A  cable  from  Dean  Rusk  to  the  U.S.  ' 
Embassies  in  Saigon,  Vientiane  and  Bangkok  dated  August  9,  1964,  reported 
"Meeting  today  approved  in  principle  early  initiation  air  and  limited  ground  oper- 
ations in  Laos.  .  .  ."  Rusk  suggested  a  meeting  between  the  respective  Ambas- 
sadors to  "clarify  scope  and  timing  [of]  possible  operations."  As  one  of  the  crucial  , 
issues  to  be  discussed  at  the  meeting  he  questioned  "whether  we  should  inform  i 
Souvanna  before  undertaking  or  go  ahead  without  him"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:524). 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  269 

The  Embassay  in  Saigon  replied  on  August  18  that  "It  appears  to  U.S.  that 
Souvanna  Phouma  should  be  informed  at  an  appropriate  time  of  the  full  scope  of 
our  plans  and  one  would  hope  to  obtain  his  acquiescence  in  the  anti-infiltration 
actions  in  Laos.  In  any  case  we  should  always  seek  to  preserve  our  freedom  of 
action  in  the  Laotian  corridor"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:547). 

The  meeting  between  the  representatives  of  the  U.S.  missions  in  Laos,  Thailand 
and  Vietnam  to  discuss  implementation  of  the  plans  for  crossborder  ground  and 
air  operations  into  Laos  took  place  on  September  1 1  in  Saigon.  The  group  con- 
cluded that  "while  the  Lao  Government  would  of  course  know  about  the  opera- 
tions of  their  T-28s,  Souvanna  was  not  to  be  informed  of  GVN/U.S.  operations" 
(Gravel  ed.,  Ill:  195-196). 

The  reason  for  keeping  Souvanna  in  the  dark  was  quite  simple.  In  a  July  27 
cable  from  the  Embassy  in  Vientiane  to  the  State  Department  it  was  noted  that 

.  .  .  fundamental  attitude  of  Souvanna,  which  generally  shared  by  Lao 
[is],  that  use  of  corridor,  even  though  involving  Lao  territory,  not  primarily 
their  problem,  and  anyway  they  have  their  hands  full  trying  to  protect  heart 
of  their  country  for  defense  of  which  corridor  not  essential.  Our  creating 
new  military  as  well  as  international  political  conflict  over  corridor  will  be 
regarded  by  them  as  another  instance  Laos  being  involuntarily  involved  in 
struggle  among  big  powers  on  matter  outside  Laos  own  prime  interests 
(Gravel  ed.,  111:515). 

After  Rusk's  proposal  of  crossborder  operations.  Ambassador  Unger,  on  August 
17,  reiterated  Souvanna's  position  and  also  suggested  a  possible  circumvention  of 
the  problem: 

In  reply  to  second  key  question  I  frankly  find  it  difficult  to  say  in  abstract 
how  much  panhandle  action  Souvanna  could  and  would  accept.  Principal 
danger  as  already  noted  in  earlier  messages,  aside  from  his  understandable 
preoccupation  about  provoking  Communist  escalation,  is  that  stepped-up 
action  in  Panhandle  makes  it  more  difficult  for  U.S.  to  enforce  counsels  of 
moderation  as  regards  his  and  Lao  military  actions  in  areas  of  country  which 
are  of  more  immediate  concern  to  them. 

As  earlier  noted  I  believe  we  could  gradually  establish  pattern  U.S.  sup- 
pressive strikes  in  panhandle  without  adverse  Souvanna  reaction  and  this 
perhaps  even  truer  of  T-28  strikes.  Even  though  strictly  speaking  suppressive 
strikes  would  not  be  in  response  to  RLG  request  nevertheless  believe 
Souvanna  would  back  U.S.  up  if  we  represented  them  as  being  authorized  by 
RLG  (Graveled.,  111:541). 

Via  such  reasoning  was  the  decision  reached  that  Souvanna  "was  not  to  be  in- 
formed" of  U.S./GVN  plans  for  operations  into  Laos. 

Though  no  plans  for  large-scale  crossborder  operations  were  actually  imple- 
mented in  the  summer  of  1964,  small-scale  operations  continued  in  the  South 
(Gravel  ed.,  III:160)'^"  and  a  major  operation  was  mounted  in  the  North.  The 
small-scale  GVN  operations  into  Laos  met  with  only  limited  success.  A  Novem- 
ber 7  memorandum  prepared  by  William  Bundy  for  an  interagency  Vietnam 
Working  Group  noted  that, 

Earlier  in  the  year  several  eight-man  reconnaissance  teams  were  para- 
chuted into  Laos  as  part  of  Operation  Leaping  Lena.  All  of  these  teams  were 


270      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V  \ 

located  by  the  enemy  and  only  four  survivors  returned  to  RVN.  As  a  result  i 
of  Leaping  Lena,  Cross  Border  Ground  Operations  have  been  carefully  re-  \ 
viewed  .  .  .  (Gravel  ed.,  in:610).3i  j 

The  operation  in  northern  Laos,  code-named  Operation  Triangle  (also  called 

Operation  Three  Arrows  or  Samsone)  proved  more  successful.  The  operation,  j 

mounted  during  July  of  1964,  was  aimed  at  clearing  the  Vientiane-Luang  Pra-  | 

bang  road.  A  number  of  U.S.  Army  personnel  were  brought  into  Laos  to  help  1 

coordinate  the  operation. jj^^i  artillerymen  were  brought  in  to  support  the  | 

offensive.  By  this  time  Thai  pilots  were  also  operating  in  Laos  in  Laotian-marked  j 
T-28  aircraft.3'^  An  August  17  cable  from  CINCPAC  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

noted  that  "Progress  in  Laos  [is]  due  almost  entirely  to  T-28  operations  and  Thai  | 

artillery"  (Gravel  ed.,  IIL543).  \ 

Despite  the  success  of  Operation  Triangle  and  the  deepening  U.S.  military  in-  I 

volvement  in  the  Kingdom,^^        evident  that  by  the  summer  of  1964,  Laos  was  j 

for  U.S.  policymakers  little  more  than  a  sideshow  to  the  conflict  in  Vietnam.  In  \ 
August,  Unger  cabled  Washington, 

resolution  Laos  problem  depends  fundamentally  on  resolution  Vietnam  j 

and  therefore  our  policy  here  (leaving  aside  corridor  question)  is  necessarily  ; 

an  interim  one  of  holding  the  line  but  trying  avoid  escalation  of  military  | 
contest  (Gravel  ed.,  111:542). 

Laos  was  subordinated  to  U.S.  interests  in  Vietnam  to  such  an  extent  that  U.S. 
officials  opposed  moves  toward  a  resumption  of  an  international  conference  to 
bring  peace  to  Laos,  because  a  ceasefire  in  Laos  would  have  hindered  U.S.  actions  \ 
related  to  the  conflict  in  Vietnam.  In  a  cable  from  Saigon  Ambassador  Taylor  ! 
revealed  the  U.S.  attitude:  1 

Intensified  pressures  for  Geneva-type  conference  cited  in  Reftel  would  i 
appear  to  U.S.  to  be  coming  almost  entirely  from  those  who  are  opposed  to  \ 
U.S.  policy  objectives  in  SEA  (except  possible  UK  which  seems  prepared  \ 
jump  on  bandwagon).  Under  circumstances,  we  see  very  little  hope  that  \ 
results  of  such  conference  would  be  advantageous  to  U.S.  (Gravel  ed., 
111:523). 

In  a  memorandum  dated  August  11,  William  Bundy  stated  the  U.S.  position  even 
more  bluntly, 

L  We  would  wish  to  slow  down  any  progress  toward  a  conference  and  to 
hold  Souvanna  to  the  firmest  possible  position.  .  .  . 

2.  If,  despite  our  best  efforts,  Souvanna  on  his  own,  or  in  response  to  third- 
country  pressures,  started  to  move  rapidly  toward  a  conference,  we  would 
have  a  very  difficult  problem  (Gravel  ed.,  111:528-529). 

The  American  opposition  to  the  peace  moves  on  Laos  reflected  not  any  desire 
for  open  war  in  that  country  but  rather  a  wish  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  to  j 
prevent  losses  and  to  keep  options  open.  A  memorandum  by  Defense  Department  * 
official  John  McNaughton  on  October  13  noted  two  aims  for  U.S.  policy  in  Laos: 
"a)  To  preserve  Souvanna's  position  (no  coup),  b)  To  prevent  significant  PL 
land  grabs"  (Gravel  ed.,  III:581).35 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  111 

And,  as  Bundy  noted  in  August,  "We  particularly  need  to  keep  our  hands  free 
for  at  least  limited  measures  against  the  Laos  infiltration  areas"  (Gravel  ed., 
111:526). 

A  "very  difficult  problem"  for  the  United  States  was  avoided,  however,  and  the 
status  quo  maintained,  when  preliminary  talks  between  Souvanna  Phouma  and 
Souphanouvong  fell  through.  The  Laotian  rightists  refused  to  agree  to  a  plan  for 
the  return  of  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  to  centrist  control, '^^  and  the  talks  ended. 

After  the  breakup  of  the  preliminary  peace  talks  in  September,  the  forgotten 
war  in  Laos  continued  with  increasing  intensity.  In  October  President  Johnson 
gave  his  authorization  for  Unger  to  "urge  the  RLG  to  begin  air  attacks  against 
Viet  Cong  infiltration  routes  and  facilities  in  Laos  Panhandle  by  RLAF  T-28 
aircraft  as  soon  as  possible"  (Gravel  ed.,  IIL 576-577).  By  that  time  South  Viet- 
namese T-28  aircraft  were  also  "bombing  the  Laotian  corridor"  (Gravel  ed., 
n:344;  IIL  160).  These  early  strikes  against  the  fledgling  Ho  Chi  Minh  trail  were 
of  militarilly  questionable  significance  both  because  of  the  limited  effectiveness  of 
the  RVNAF  and  the  RLAF-^"  and  because  of  the  fledgling  character  of  the  trail 
itself.  In  December  1963,  Ambassador  Unger  had  reported  that  "the  recent  use 
of  the  Laotian  corridor  was  not  extensive  enough  to  have  influenced  significantly 
the  then  intensive  VC  efforts  in  South  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed..  Ill:  160).  A  Novem- 
ber 1964  summary  of  MACV  and  CIA  cables  on  infiltration  concluded  that  on 
the  "basis  of  the  presently  available  information,  it  considers  19,000  infiltrators 
from  1959  to  the  present  as  a  firm  (confirmed)  minimum"  and  34,000  as  a 
maximum  number  during  the  same  time  period.  The  summary  concluded  further 
that  "the  significance  of  the  infiltration  to  the  insurgency  cannot  be  defined  with 
precision"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:673-674). 

Although  the  early  strikes  on  the  trail  area  of  southeastern  Laos  may  not  have 
been  terribly  important  strategically  they  did  afford  a  psychological  boost  to  the 
regime  in  Saigon.^^ 

While  Ambassador  Unger  was  authorized  in  October  "to  inform  Lao  that 
YANKEE  TEAM  suppressive  fire  strikes  against  certain  difficult  targets  in  Pan- 
handle .  .  .  are  part  of  the  over-all  concept  and  are  to  be  anticipated  later  .  .  ." 
(Gravel  ed.,  111:577),  no  strikes  by  U.S.  aircraft  were  carried  out  in  southern 
Laos  until  after  the  November  elections  in  the  United  States.  The  U.S.  air  strikes 
both  in  Laos  and  in  the  DRV  were  reportedly  contingent  on  reform  in  ^he  Saigon 
government.  In  December  1964,  Ambassador  Taylor,  just  back  from  Washing- 
ton, presented  the  Saigon  government  with  a  statement  that  if  the  GVN  would 
demonstrate  a  "far  greater  national  unity  against  the  Communist  enemy  at  this 
critical  time  than  exists  at  present,"  then  the  U.S.  would  add  its  air  power  "as 
needed  to  restrict  the  use  of  Laotian  territory  as  a  route  of  infiltration  into  South 
Vietnam."  After  the  new  unity  and  effectiveness  of  the  GVN  became  visible, 
promised  Taylor,  "the  USG  would  begin  bombing  North  Vietnam"  (Gravel  ed., 
■  11:344). 

(  Also  in  early  December,  the  JCS  developed  an  air  strike  program  to  comple- 
ment the  YANKEE  TEAM  reconnaissance  missions  in  northern  and  central 
Laos.  Their  proposals  were  presented  to  a  meeting  of  the  National  Security 
Council  on  December  12.  The  JCS  plans  were  approved  with  only  one  amend- 
ment. The  use  of  napalm  by  U.S.  planes  in  Laos  was  excluded.  In  an  unusual 
act  of  deference  the  NSC  decided  that  for  the  first  use  of  napalm  in  Laos,  "the 

i'  RLAF  would  be  the  only  appropriate  user."  It  was  also  agreed  at  the  December 
12  meeting  that  there  would  be  no  public  statements  about  armed  reconnaissance 
^operations  in  Laos  "unless  a  plane  were  lost."  If  a  plane  were  to  be  downed,  the 


272      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V  \ 

U.S.  government  would  "continue  to  insist  that  we  were  merely  escorting  recon-  j 

naissance  flights  as  requested  by  the  Laotian  government"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:253-  ; 

254).  The  bombing  program  in  northern  Laos  code-named  BARREL  ROLL  got  \ 

under  way  on  December  14.  The  program  of  twice  weekly  missions  by  four  air-  \ 

craft  each  was  carried  on  into  January  when  after  the  loss  of  two  U.S.  planes  \ 

over  Laos  "the  whole  lid  blew  on  the  entire  YANKEE  TEAM  operation  in  \ 

Laos  since  May  of  1964"  (Gravel  ed.,  in:264).  The  bombing  in  Laos  was  soon  i 

overshadowed,  however,  by  Operation  ROLLING  THUNDER,  the  bombing  of  | 

North  Vietnam,  which  began  in  February  1965.  j 

The  man  in  charge  of  the  U.S.  air  war  in  Laos  was  William  Healy  Sullivan,  j 

the  new  U.S.  Ambassador.  Sullivan  assumed  his  post  as  U.S.  envoy  to  Laos  in  | 

November  1964,  but  was  by  no  means  a  newcomer  to  Laotian  affairs.  Despite  j 

the  objections  of  more  senior  Foreign  Service  Officers,  Sullivan  had  been  hand-  1: 

picked  by  Averell  Harriman  in  1961  to  serve  as  second  in  command  of  the  U.S.  j 

delegation  to  the  second  Geneva  Conference.-^'*  In  March  1962,  Harriman  sent  \ 

Sullivan  to  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  to  confer  with  Souvanna  and  Souphanovong  in  j 

an  attempt  to  break  the  stalemate  on  the  coalition  talks. Evidently  Sullivan  had  j 

won  the  confidence  of  Souvanna  in  those  early  contacts  because  after  meeting  j 

with  the  Prime  Minister  on  December  10,  only  two  weeks  after  assuming  his  new  j 

post,  Sullivan  cabled  Washington  that  Souvanna  "Fully  supports  the  U.S.  pres-  \ 

sures  program  and  is  prepared  to  cooperate  in  full"  (Gravel  ed.,  111:253).  Since  || 

the  establishment  of  a  U.S.  military  mission  in  Laos  was  proscribed  by  the  Geneva  j 

Agreements  of  1962,  Sullivan  as  Ambassador  was  nominally  in  charge  of  all  U.S.  \ 

military  actions  in  Laos.^^  As  a  result,  the  new  Ambassador  came  to  be  called  j 

"General  Sullivan"  or  the  "Field  Marshal."      By  all  reports,  Sullivan  kept  a  j 

tight  rein  on  U.S.  military  activities  in  Laos.  According  to  William  Bundy,  "There  \ 

wasn't  a  bag  of  rice  dropped  in  Laos  that  he  didn't  know  about."     He  was  = 

influential  in  preventing  the  U.S.  combat  role  in  South  Vietnam  from  spilling  \ 

over  into  Laos  and,"*^  unlike  his  successor,  evidently  tried  hard,  if  not  always  | 

successfully,  to  monitor  and  control  U.S.  bombing  in  Laos.^^  During  his  tenure  j 

as  Ambassador,  Sullivan^  a  graduate  of  Brown  University  and  the  Fletcher  School  ; 

of  Law  and  Diplomacy  and  a  former  Navy  officer,  was  respected  and  well-liked  \ 

by  virtually  everyone  in  the  U.S.  mission  to  Laos.  Yet,  despite  his  personal  quail-  I 

ties  and  evident  role  in  limiting  the  conflict  in  Laos,  Sullivan  was  a  no-nonsense  i 
pragmatist  when  it  came  to  the  U.S.  role  in  Indochina.  A  memorandum  written 

by  Sullivan  in  May  1964,  before  he  became  the  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Laos,  reveals  j 

this  aspect  of  the  man.  At  that  time  Sullivan  was  head  of  an  interagency  com-  | 

mittee  on  Vietnam.  In  the  memorandum  he  observed,  "The  Vietnamese  Govern-  \ 

ment  is  not  operating  efficiently  enough  to  reverse  the  adverse  trend  in  the  war  \ 

with  the  Viet  Cong."  To  remedy  the  problem  Sullivan  proposed  that  Americans  | 

assume  de  facto  control  of  the  governmental  machinery  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-  < 

nam.  ; 

American  personnel,  who  have  hitherto  served  only  as  advisors,  should  j 

be  inntegrated  into  the  Vietnamese  chain  of  command,  both  military  and  | 

civil.  They  should  become  direct  operational  components  of  the  Vietnamese  | 

Governmental  structure.  For  cosmetic  purposes  American  personnel  would  i 

not  assume  titles  which  would  show  command  functions  but  would  rather  be  \ 

listed  as  "assistants"  to  the  Vietnamese  principals  at  the  various  levels  of  | 

government.  ...  ! 

Americans  should  be  integrated  to  all  levels  of  Vietnamese  Government 

.  .  .  (Gravel  ed.,  H: 3 19;  Sullivan's  italics) .  ; 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  273 

In  Laos,  Sullivan  instituted  no  similar  plans  calling  for  Americans  to  become 
"direct  operational  components"  of  the  Laotian  government.  Rather  he  relied  on 
the  USAID  mission  which  operated  for  the  most  part  quite  independently  of  the 
RLG.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  key  departments  (for  example  the  Public 
Safety  Advisory  group  and  a  handful  of  advisers  to  the  Finance  Minister  who 
worked  daily  with  their  counterparts  in  the  RLG)  the  USAID  advisers  in 
Vientiane  usually  remained  ensconced  in  their  air-conditioned  offices  in  the 
USAID  compound.  The  aid  mission  remained  separated  from  the  RLG  to  such 
an  extent  that  it  came  to  be  called  the  "parallel  government"  and  the  USAID 
director  was  referred  to  as  the  "second  Prime  Minister."  "General"  Sullivan 
I  remained  in  command,  however,  and  the  focus  of  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos  re- 
!    mained  in  the  realm  of  the  military. 

j       In  early  January  1965,  after  a  trip  to  Southeast  Asia,  the  U.S.  Army  Chief  of 
!    Staff,  Harold  K.  Johnson,  recommended  that  Operation  BARREL  ROLL  be  re- 
oriented "to  allow  air  strikes  on  infiltration  routes  in  the  Lao  Panhandle  to  be 
conducted  as  a  separate  program  from  those  directed  against  the  Pathet  Lao  and 
I    the  North  Vietnamese  units"  in  northern  Laos.  His  recommendation  was  sub- 
i    sequently  implemented.  The  code  name  for  the  program  of  U.S.  airstrikes  against 
the  infiltration  routes  in  southern  Laos  was  STEEL  TIGER  (Gravel  ed.,  111:338, 
i  341). 

(  Thus,  as  one  observer  has  pointed  out,  the  "secret  war  [in  Laos]  was  really 
four  wars.  .  .  ."  Two  of  the  "wars"  were  fought  by  American  war  planes, 
STEEL  TIGER  in  southern  Laos,  and  BARREL  ROLL  in  northern  Laos.  A  third 
and  less  secret  "war"  was  conducted  by  the  Laotian  Forces  Armee  Roy  ale 
(FAR).  This  has  been,  no  doubt,  the  least  efficient  aspect  of  the  conflict  at  least 
from  the  American  point  of  view.  The  five  regional  military  commanders  of  the 
FAR  have  often  been  likened  to  warlords  and  seemed  always  to  be  more  intent 

1  on  making  money  than  on  making  war  against  the  Communists.*^  The  fourth 
war  was  that  conducted  by  the  irregular  forces  known  variously  as  the  Secret 

;  Army,  the  CIA  Army,  the  Special  Guerrilla  Units  (SGUs)  or  the  Bataillons 
Guerriers  (BGs).  These  irregular  forces  were  an  outgrowth  of  the  CIA  directed 
Meo  Army  of  the  early  1960s.  By  the  late  1960s  the  war  had  taken  such  a  heavy 
toll  of  the  Meo  that  the  irregular  forces  then  contained  soldiers  from  other  Lao 
ethnic  groups  as  well  as  Thai  "volunteers."  The  SGUs  were,  however,  still  con- 
trolled largely  by  the  CIA.  Although  nominally  under  the  command  of  Royal  Lao 
Army  General  Vang  Pao,  the  irregular  forces  were  beyond  the  control  of  the 
RLG  to  such  an  extent  that  once  when  Prime  Minister  Souvanna  Phouma  asked 
for  irregular  units  to  defend  the  Royal  Capital  of  Luang  Prabang,  his  request  was 
reportedly  refused. 

The  Pentagon  Papers  reveal  very  little  about  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos  after 
1964.  All  of  the  post-1964  references  to  Laos  come  only  in  a  context  of  how 
events  in  Laos  relate  directly  to  the  war  in  Vietnam.  The  single  item  of  recurring 
mention  is  the  problem  of  North  Vietnamese  infiltration  of  men  and  supplies 
through  the  Laotian  Panhandle  into  South  Vietnam.  The  resolution  of  this  prob- 
lem had  been  the  object  of  the  initiation  of  the  STEEL  TIGER  operation  in 
early  1965.  In  September  1966,  General  Westmoreland  confronted  with  a  Com- 
I  munist  buildup  in  northern  SVN,  put  forward  a  new  plan  for  action  against  the 
I  infiltration.  His  idea  which  he  termed  "SLAM"  (for  seek,  locate,  annihilate  and 
'  monitor)  called  for  both  B-52  and  tactical  air  strikes  along  the  trail  through  Laos 
[  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:337).5o  During  the  summer  of  1966,  a  Defense  Department- 
j;.  sponsored  thing-tank  group  was  formed  to  study  the  Vietnam  war  and  particularly 
the  infiltration  problem.  The  group,  formed  under  the  auspices  of  the  JASON  divi- 


274      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V  \ 

sion  of  the  Institute  for  Defense  Analyses,  concluded  that  the  bombing  of  North  | 

Vietnam  "does  not  limit  the  present  logistic  flow  into  SVN  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  j 

IV: 354).  As  an  alternative  the  JASON  group  proposed  an  anti-infiltration  barrier  | 

across  Laos.  The  group's  findings  clearly  influenced  Secretary  of  Defense  Mc-  \ 

Namara  who  in  October  proposed  limiting  the  bombing  of  the  North  and  sug-  \ 

gested  the  building  of  a  barrier  "across  the  trails  of  Laos"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 356).  j 

His  proposals  were  opposed  both  by  the  JCS,  who  disagreed  on  the  assessment  of  i 

the  effectiveness  of  the  bombing,  and  by  Sullivan,  who  feared  undermining  | 

Souvanna.  I 

After  the  temporary  coup  of  1964,  the  U.S.  had  continued  to  support  Sou-  j 

vanna's  government.  As  a  result  of  this  continuing  American  favor,  the  Prince  \ 

remained  in  office  despite  a  coup  attempt  by  army  officers  in  1965.  The  firm  ; 

U.S.  backing  of  the  Prince  was  crucial  in  preventing  further  coup  attempts,  j 
although  such  were  often  rumored.  In  October  1966,  the  Royal  Lao  government 

requested  additional  U.S.  assistance  and  the  U.S.  mission  decided  that  what  the  \ 

RLG  needed  was  American  Forward  Air  Controllers  (FACs).^i  Also  in  October  j| 

1966  came  the  curious  incident  of  Royal  Lao  Air  Force  General  Ma.  General  I 

Ma  was  the  commander  of  the  RLAF  and  was  highly  rated  by  American  Air  1 

Attaches.  As  a  result  of  the  RLAF  bombing  over  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  trail.  General  |j 

Ma  had  achieved  increased  status  within  the  RLG  military  hierarchy.  He  soon  ji 

came  into  conflict,  however,  with  Laotian  army  generals.  Ma  objected  to  the  li 

generals'  use  of  RLAF  planes  for  personal  errands — reportedly  including  the  | 

smuggling  of  opium.  General  Ma's  conflict  with  the  army  generals  reached  such  I 

proportions  that,  despite  the  intervention  of  Ambassador  Sullivan,  Ma  led  a  'i 

bombing  raid  on  the  army  headquarters  in  Vientiane. The  raid  failed  to  put  out  } 

of  commission  any  of  Ma's  antagonists  and  the  general  was  forced  to  flee  into  ; 
exile  in  Thailand. 

The  United  States  was  little  concerned  with  such  internecine  struggles,  except 

insofar  as  they  might  inhibit  U.S.  operations  in  Laos  aimed  at  interdicting  the  j 
Ho  Chi  Minh  trail. In  April  1967,  General  Westmoreland's  attentions  again 

turned  to  Laos  and  a  new  plan  for  operations  into  the  Laotian  Panhandle.  The  \ 

operation,  code-named  HIGH  PORT,  called  for  the  invasion  of  southern  Laos  i 

by  an  elite  South  Vietnamese  division.  Westmoreland  envisioned  "the  eventual  | 
development  of  Laos  as  a  major  battlefield,  a  development  which  would  take 
some  of  the  military  pressure  off  the  south"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 443).  Civilian 

officials  again  held  sway,  however,  with  their  arguments  against  such  a  move,  on  j 

the  grounds  that  it  would  probably  be  ineffective  and  it  might  lead  to  Souvanna's  ' 

downfall  and  the  escalation  of  the  war  in  Laos  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 444).^^  j 

Despite  the  decisions  not  to  intervene  openly  in  Laos,  the  covert  intervention  : 
was  continued  unabated.  In  1966,  the  United  States  initiated  Project  404.  Under  ;; 
this  program  more  than  100  U.S.  military  personnel  were  brought  in  from  Thai-  * 
land  to  advise  the  Laotian  army  and  air  force.^^  Also  in  1966,  several  naviga- 
tional stations  were  established  in  Laos  to  guide  U.S.  planes  bombing  the  DRV.^^  j 
Since  these  stations  were  clearly  in  violation  of  the  Geneva  Accords,  which  pro-  | 
hibited  the  use  of  "Laotian  territory  for  military  purposes  or  for  the  purposes  of  \ 
interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  countries,"  their  existence  was  a  | 
closely  guarded  secret.  The  Communist  forces  in  Laos,  however,  knew  of  these 
navigational  sites.  One  site  at  Muong  Phalane  in  central  Laos,  was  overrun  on  | 
December  25,  1967,  killing  two  Americans.  Another  site  at  Phou  Pha  Thi,  in  \ 
northern  Laos,  only  seventeen  miles  from  the  North  Vietnamese  border,  was  ' 
overrun  by  Communist  forces  in  March  1968.  Twelve  U.S.  Air  Force  men  were 
killed  at  Phou  Pha  Thi,  while  a  thirteenth  escaped.^^  ; 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  275 

Three  weeks  after  the  loss  of  the  navigational  outpost  on  Phou  Pha  Thi,  on 
March  31,  1968,  President  Johnson  announced  a  partial  bombing  halt  over  North 
Vietnam.  The  day  before  the  announcement  the  State  Department  sent  out  a 
cable  to  the  U.S.  Ambassadors  in  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Thailand,  the  Philip- 
pines, South  Korea  and  Laos.  The  cable  revealed  that 

In  view  of  weather  limitations,  bombing  north  of  the  20th  parallel  will  in 
any  event  be  limited  at  least  for  the  next  four  weeks  or  so — which  we 
tentatively  envisage  as  a  maximum  testing  period  in  any  event.  Hence,  we 
are  not  giving  up  anything  really  serious  in  this  time  frame.  Moreover,  air 
power  now  used  north  of  the  20th  can  probably  be  used  in  Laos  (where  no 
policy  change  is  planned)  and  in  SVN  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 595;  italics  added). 

The  next  day.  President  Johnson  announced  the  partial  bombing  halt  as  "the 
first  step  to  de-escalate  the  conflict.''  He  added,  "We  are  reducing — substantially 
reducing — the  present  level  of  hostilities"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 597). 

VII.    POST-PENTAGON  PAPERS 

We  made  a  big  thing  in  the  Johnson  administration  about  stopping  the 
North  Vietnam  air  strikes.  But  at  the  same  time  we  were  increasing  in  secret 
the  air  strikes  against  Laos.  In  fact,  as  the  general  just  said,  which  I  knew, 
orders  were  that  if  you  do  not  need  the  planes  against  Vietnam,  use  said 
planes  against  Laos. 

— Senator  Stuart  Symington 
(Symington  Hearings,  p.  713) 

Johnson's  claim  of  a  "substantial  reduction"  in  the  level  of  hostilities  was  com- 
pletely disingenuous.  The  planes  which  were  no  longer  bombing  north  of  the 
twentieth  parallel  were  diverted  to  Laos.  The  same  pattern  of  deception  was  re- 
peated in  November  1968,  after  the  complete  bombing  halt  over  North  Vietnam. 
On  the  night  of  October  31,  in  announcing  the  total  bombing  halt  over  North 
Vietnam,  President  Johnson  proclaimed,  "The  overriding  consideration  that  gov- 
erns us  at  this  hour  is  the  chance  and  the  opportunity  that  we  might  have  to  save 
human  lives  on  both  sides  of  the  conflict."  ^ 

If  such  was  the  "overriding"  concern  of  Johnson,  clearly  it  did  not  extend  to 
Laos.  The  Cornell  University  Air  War  Study  Group  noted, 

Following  the  bombing  halt  over  North  Vietnam  in  November  1968,  the 
U.S.  increased  its  air  activity  against  Laos  dramatically,  taking  advantage 
of  the  sudden  increase  in  planes  available. - 

As  one  U.S.  official  put  it,  "We  just  couldn't  let  the  planes  rust."  ^  With  the 
vastly  increased  sortie  rate  in  Laos  and  the  departure  of  Sullivan  as  Ambassador 
in  March  1969,  the  controls  on  U.S.  air  attacks  designed  to  avoid  the  bombing 
of  civilian  targets  were  substantially  relaxed.^  In  April  1969  the  town  of  Xieng 
Khouang  on  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  was  completely  leveled.^  Shortly  thereafter, 
the  Communists  launched  a  drive  westward  from  the  area  of  the  Plaine  toward 
the  town  of  Muong  Soui.  Despite  vastly  increasing  fighter-bomber  sortie  rates, 
Muong  Soui  fell  to  the  Communists  on  June  27.  In  an  attempt  to  recoup  some 


276      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

of  their  losses  the  Royalist  forces  launched  a  counteroffensive.  Supported  by 
massive  U.S.  airpower  (at  rates  approaching  300  sorties  daily  in  northern  Laos 
alone)  the  offensive  met  with  very  little  resistance.  The  CIA-backed  SGUs  of 
Meo  General  Vang  Pao  quickly  captured  all  of  the  Plaine.  The  SOU  forces 
occupied  the  Plaine  for  nearly  six  months.^  In  January  and  February  1970,  faced 
with  an  imminent  attack  on  the  Plaine  by  PL/NVN  forces,  the  RLG  evacuated 
all  of  the  civilians  from  the  area — totaling  roughly  20,000  persons.  Despite 
saturation-bombing  by  B-52s,^  the  Communist  forces  regained  complete  control 
of  the  Plaine  in  March  1970. 

The  evacuation  of  the  refugees  from  the  area  of  the  Plaine  provided  the  first 
opportunity  for  Western  observers  to  learn  of  what  life  was  like  under  the 
Pathet  Lao.^  Numerous  accounts  of  life  under  the  PL  soon  began  appearing  in 
newspapers  and  magazines.'^  Many  of  the  accounts  from  the  refugees  dealt  with 
various  aspects  of  the  regimentation  of  life  under  the  PL.  Yet  the  common 
denominator  to  all  accounts,  what  the  refugees  almost  invariably  talked  about, 
was  the  bombing.  Perhaps  the  most  concise  account  of  the  bombing  was  given 
by  a  United  Nations  advisor  in  Laos,  George  Chapelier.  After  interviewing  dozens 
of  refugees,  Chapelier  wrote. 

By  1968  the  intensity  of  the  bombings  was  such  that  no  organized  life 
was  possible  in  the  villages.  The  villages  moved  to  the  outskirts  and  then 
deeper  and  deeper  into  the  forest  as  the  bombing  reached  its  peak  in  1969 
when  jet  planes  came  daily  and  destroyed  all  stationary  structures.  Nothing 
was  left  standing.  The  villagers  lived  in  trenches  and  holes  or  in  caves. 
They  only  farmed  at  night.  All  of  the  informants,  without  any  exception,  had 
his  village  completely  destroyed.  In  the  last  phase,  bombings  were  aimed  at 
the  systematic  destruction  of  the  materials  [sic]  basis  of  the  civilian  so- 
ciety. 

Even  an  official  U.S.  government  survey  made  similar  findings.  The  survey, 
conducted  by  the  United  States  Information  Service  (USIS)  in  Laos  and  re- 
vealed publicly  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  U.S.  Congressman  Paul  McCloskey,  re- 
ported that 

97%  of  the  people  [that  is,  of  the  more  than  200  refugees  from  96 
different  villages  and  17  different  sub-districts  interviewed]  said  they  had 
seen  a  bombing  attack.  About  one  third  had  seen  bombing  as  early  as  1964, 
and  a  great  majority  had  seen  attacks  frequently  or  many  times.  .  .  .  96% 
of  the  169  persons  who  responded  to  the  question  said  their  villages  had 
been  bombed;  75%  said  their  homes  had  been  damaged  by  bombing.  .  .  .^^ 

The  testimony  of  the  refugees  revealed  once  again  the  continuing  deception  by 
U.S.  officials  over  American  involvement  in  Laos.  These  officials  had  maintained 
that  U.S.  aircraft  operating  over  Laos  were  bound  by  strict  Rules  of  Engagement 
specifically  designed  to  prevent  bombardment  of  civilian  targets. Congres- 
sional hearings,  the  U.S.  Air  Attache  to  Laos  had  even  testified  that  "villages, 
even  in  a  freedrop  zone,  would  be  restricted  from  bombing."  How  then  did 
it  happen  that  95  percent  of  169  villagers  from  dozens  of  different  villages 
reported  that  their  villages  had  been  bombed? 

One  U.S.  Foreign  Service  Officer  who  served  in  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Laos 
gave  me  the  following  explanation. 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  111 

The  Rules  of  Engagement  are  good  and  probably  as  thorough  as  they 
could  be.  The  trouble  is  though  that  given  the  sociology  of  the  Air  Force, 
they  cannot  be  enforced  eflfectively.  Pilots  are  rated  not  on  how  many 
civilians  they  avoid  bombing.  They're  rated  on  bomb  damage  assessment, 
on  the  number  of  structures  destroyed.  They  have  no  incentive  to  go  out 
of  their  way  to  avoid  bombing  civilians. ^'^ 

A  less  specific  but  perhaps  more  revealing  explanation  comes  from  an  examina- 
tion of  how  money  is  spent  in  Laos.  The  total  Royal  Lao  government  budget  for 
fiscal  year  (FY)  1971  was  $36.6  million.  Roughly  half  of  this  amount  came  from 
RLG  revenues  and  half  from  foreign  aid.  In  contrast,  U.S.  economic  aid  to  Laos 
in  FY  1971  totaled  $52  million.  In  the  same  year  U.S.  military  assistance  to 
Laos  was  valued  at  $162.2  million,  and  the  FY  1971  CIA  budget  at  roughly  $70 
million.  The  estimated  annual  cost  of  U.S.  bombing  over  Laos  in  1971  was  $L4 
billion.  1^  In  other  words,  the  United  States  spent  in  FY  1971  roughly  twenty- 
eight  times  more  to  bomb  Laos  than  on  economic  aid  to  the  country. 

The  cost  of  the  bombing  can  be  compared  also  with  the  estimated  $66  per 
capita  income  of  Laos'  citizens.  Using  2.5  million  persons  as  an  estimate  of 
Laos'  population,  we  find  that  the  per  capita  cost  of  U.S.  bombing  in  Laos  is 
$560  or  more  than  eight  times  Laos'  estimated  per  capita  income.  When  queried 
as  to  how  the  United  States  can  spend  such  a  vast  amount  on  destruction  in 
Laos,  how  the  United  States  can  spend  so  much  more  on  destruction  than  on 
construction,  a  State  Department  official  replied,  "our  air  operations  [in  Laos] 
are  directed  primarily  at  interdicting  the  flow  of  weapons  and  other  military 
supplies  down  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  trail  which  would  be  used  against  our  forces  in 
South  Vietnam."  The  same  official  also  insisted  that  "The  rules  [Rules  of 
Engagement  for  U.S.  aircraft  over  Laos]  do  not  permit  attacks  on  nonmilitary 
targets  and  place  out  of  bounds  all  inhabited  villages." 

Yet  as  the  U.S.  Senate  Refugee  Subcommittee  put  it  in  1 970,  "the  sheer  volume 
and  constancy  of  bombing  activity  [in  Laos]  since  1968  makes  effective  control 
of  these  strikes  almost  impossible."  Senator  Edward  Kennedy,  Chairman  of 
the  Refugee  Subcommittee,  in  fact,  estimated  that  the  "bombing  in  Laos  con- 
tributed to  at  least  75  percent  of  the  refugees"  in  that  country.^^ 

On  March  6,  1970,  in  response  to  "intense  public  speculation"  over  U.S.  in- 
volvement in  Laos,  President  Nixon  gave  an  address  on  U.S.  policy  and  activities 
in  Laos. 20  For  the  first  time  Nixon  admitted  that  the  United  States  was  flying 
"combat  support  missions  for  Laotian  forces  when  requested  to  do  so  by  the 
Royal  Laotian  Government."  Yet  despite  this  one  refreshingly  candid  admission, 
Nixon  continued  to  perpetuate  most  of  the  deception  over  U.S.  involvement.  For 
example,  Nixon  stated,  "No  American  stationed  in  Laos  has  ever  been  killed  in 
ground  combat  operations."  On  March  9  the  Los  Angeles  Times  revealed,  how- 
ever, the  story  of  how  an  American  army  adviser  to  the  Royal  Laotian  Army, 
Captain  Joseph  Bush,  had  been  killed  in  northern  Laos  on  February  10,  1969.^1 
The  White  House  belatedly  admitted  the  captain's  death,  but  maintained  that 
Bush  had  died  not  in  combat,  but  as  a  result  of  "hostile  action."  22  This  sort  of 
deceptive  semantic  distinction  provided  the  rationale  for  Nixon's  omission  of 
the  fact  that  in  reality  hundreds  of  Americans  had  died  in  the  war  in  Laos.^s 
The  President  had  carefully  limited  his  assertion  to  Americans  "stationed  in 
Laos  and  who  were  killed  in  "ground  combat."  The  phrases  were  crucial  to 
Nixon's  assertion  because  many  American  servicemen  in  Laos  are  technically 
not  stationed  there.  They  are  in  Laos  only  on  "temporary  duty."  ^4  Also,  the 


278      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

majority  of  Americans  involved  in  the  war  in  Laos  never  set  foot  on  Lao  soil. 
They  fight  the  war  from  airplanes  flying  out  of  Thailand  or  South  Vietnam  or 
from  aircraft  carriers  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin. 

Nixon  also  asserted  that  "The  level  of  our  air  operations  has  been  increased 
only  as  the  number  of  North  Vietnamese  in  Laos  and  the  level  of  their  aggression 
has  increased."  Yet,  as  already  noted,  U.S.  air  operations  in  Laos  were  increased 
dramatically  in  1968  simply  because  aircraft  were  available  after  the  bombing 
halts  over  North  Vietnam.  In  attempting  to  justify  the  increased  American  in- 
volvement in  Laos,  Nixon  also  asserted  that  the  North  Vietnamese  troop  level 
in  Laos  had  increased  to  "over  67,000."  The  contention  was  more  than  slightly 
questionable  because  Nixon's  figure  was  more  than  17,000  greater  than  that 
given  out  at  the  very  same  time  by  U.S.  officials  in  Vientiane.^^  Additionally, 
Nixon  was  clearly  guilty  of  misrepresentation  by  omission.  His  "precise  de- 
scription of  our  current  activities  in  Laos"  failed  to  mention  the  extensive  CIA 
operations  in  Laos,  the  recent  use  of  B-52s  in  northern  Laos,  or  the  full  extent 
of  American  military  advisory  operations  to  the  Lao  army  and  air  force. 

In  light  of  such  deception  at  the  very  highest  level  of  government,  it  is  hardly 
surprising  that  the  pattern  was  continued  at  the  lower  echelons.  A  particularly 
blatant  example  came  to  light  in  April  1971.  In  that  month,  the  U.S.  Embassy 
published  a  small  book  entitled  Facts  on  Foreign  Aid.  In  a  section  of  the  book 
headed  "Causes  and  Motives  in  Refugee  Movements"  the  Embassy  stated, 

The  motives  that  prompt  a  people  to  choose  between  two  kinds  of  rule  are 
not  always  clear,  but  three  conditions  of  life  under  the  Pathet  Lao  appear  to 
have  prompted  the  choice  of  evacuation:  the  rice  tax,  portage,  and  the 
draft.  The  people  grew  more  rice  than  they  had  ever  grown  before,  but  they 
had  less  for  themselves.  They  paid  it  out  in  the  form  of  taxes — rice  to  help 
the  state,  trading  rice,  and  rice  from  the  heart.  The  Pathet  Lao  devised  an 
elaborate  labor  system  of  convoys  and  work  crews.  They  drafted  all  the 
young  men  for  the  army.  The  refugees  from  the  Plain  of  Jars  say  that  pri- 
marily for  these  reasons  they  chose  to  leave  their  homes. 

Contrast  this  with  the  USIS  report  on  refugees  from  the  Plain  of  Jars,  which  in 
a  section  titled  "Reasons  for  moving  to  the  RLG  Zone"  related  that, 

49%  of  the  226  [refugees]  who  were  asked  the  question  said  that  fear  of 
bombing  was  the  reason  they  had  sought  refuge  by  moving  away  from  home; 
20%  gave  dislike  of  the  Pathet  Lao  as  the  reason  for  leaving  their  home 
areas.^''' 

The  USIS  report  concluded  that  "The  bombing  is  clearly  the  most  compelling 
reason  for  moving." 

The  USIS  survey  was  conducted  in  June  and  July  of  1970.  Facts  on  Foreign 
Aid  was  published  more  than  eight  months  later,  in  April  1971.  It  is  difficult  to 
imagine  that  the  authors  of  Facts  on  Foreign  Aid  were  unaware  of  the  findings 
of  the  USIS  report.  How  then  can  the  gross  distortion  of  the  only  empirical  data 
available  be  accounted  for?  How  is  it  that  the  Embassy  document  did  not  even 
mention  bombing  as  an  ancillary  cause  of  refugee  movement?  Again,  what  comes 
to  one's  mind  is  a  form  of  Orwellian  "doublethink"  and  "newspeak."  Policy  says 
that  the  United  States  does  not  bomb  civilians.  Policy  is  true.  Therefore  refugees 
could  not  have  moved  on  account  of  the  bombing.  Because  they  were  not 
bombed.  Because  policy  says  they  were  not  bombed.  .  .  . 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  279 

And  so  the  pattern  of  secrecy  and  deception  concerning  U.S.  involvement 
in  Laos  evidenced  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  continues.  Perhaps  the  only  difference 
is  that  as  the  war  in  Laos  continues  in  time  and  in  escalation,  the  sea  of  destruc- 
tion enveloping  the  lives  and  homes  of  more  Laotians  sweeps  wider  and  wider. 

Vin.  CONCLUSION 

United  States  policy  toward  Laos  can  be  viewed  as  having  three  phases.  During 
j     the  first  phase,  from  1950  until  approximately  1960,  U.S.  policy  in  Laos  was 
ij     dominated  by  a  concern  for  the  prevention  of  a  Communist  takeover.  While  after 
1     the  Geneva  Agreements  of  1954,  the  United  States  paid  lip-service  to  the  con- 
j     cept  of  Laotian  neutrality,  covert  U.S.  involvement  was  aimed  at  bringing  to 
I     power  the  most  conservative  anti-Communist  elements  of  Laotian  society.  After 
the  Agreements  and  despite  growing  U.S.  involvement,  Prince  Souvanna  Phouma 
achieved  real  success  in  his  efforts  to  establish  a  coalition  government.  As  a  re- 
sult, the  Pathet  Lao  participated  in  the  1958  supplementary  elections  as  a  legal 
political  party.  After  the  Pathet  Lao  successes  in  those  elections,  conservative 
j    elements  in  Laos  led  by  Phoumi  Nosavan  and  Phoui  Sananikone,  and  backed 
j    by  the  United  States,  coalesced  to  oust  the  Pathet  Lao  from  the  government. 
!       The  second  phase,  from  1960  through  1962,  was  a  transitional  period  during 
'    which  U.S.  policy  shifted  from  opposition  to  Souvanna  Phouma  toward  an  at 
i    least  nominal  support  of  the  Prince's  neutral  Government  of  National  Union, 
i    The  United  States  supported  Souvanna  not  so  much  out  of  any  real  U.S.  com- 
mitment to  a  truly  neutral  Laos,  but  because  he  was  the  only  leader  of  sufficient 
stature  to  maintain  a  relatively  stable  government  supported  at  least  nominally 
,    by  both  Communist  and  non-Communist  nations. 

The  third  phase  of  U.S.  diplomacy  in  Laos,  from  roughly  1963  to  the  present, 
I:    has  been  dominated  by  considerations  for  American  interests  in  Vietnam.  While 
;    continuing  to  support  Souvanna,  the  United  States  has  incessantly  carried  on 
covert  military  operations  against  the  Communist  Pathet  Lao  and  North  Viet- 
namese in  Laos.  While  focused  primarily  on  the  interdiction  of  the  Communist 
supply  lines  through  southern  Laos  into  South  Vietnam,  this  policy  has  also 
entailed  a  continuing  buildup  of  CIA-directed  irregular  forces,  first  in  northern 
Laos  and  gradually  spreading  throughout  the  country.  Additionally,  this  phase 
has  also  seen  the  devastatingly  heavy  U.S.  bombing  attacks  in  northern  Laos, 
most  notably  in  1968  and  1969. 
;      Yet  while  these  three  phases  are  valid  and  useful  in  understanding  U.S. 
I  diplomacy  toward  Laos,  there  remain  certain  elements  of  American  involve- 
ment which  are  disconcertingly  common  to  all  three  phases;  namely  the  covert 
and  deceptive  nature  of  U.S.  involvement  and  the  recurring  subversion  of  Laotian 
interests  in  favor  of  those  of  which  American  policymakers  arrogantly  thought 
best.  In  1958,  the  United  States  attempted  to  influence  the  Laotian  elections  via 
Operation  Booster  Shot.  After  those  elections  the  U.S.  actions  of  shutting  off 
aid  to  Laos  and  covertly  supporting  rightist  forces  led  to  the  downfall  of  Sou- 
vanna's  neutralist  government.  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Walter  Robertson 
I  flatly  denied  any  U.S.  involvement  in  the  Prince's  downfafl.  In  1960,  the  United 
I  States  again  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  overthrow  of  Souvanna's  neutral  govem- 
I  ment  which  was  ostensibly  supported  by  the  United  States.  The  United  States 
claimed  that  the  responsibility  for  the  "fratricidal  war"  of  that  year  rested  "solely 
[on  the  Soviet  Government  and  its  partners."  In  1964  the  United  States  opposed 
'  a  peace  conference  on  Laos  because  such  a  conference  would  have  limited 


1 


280      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

America's  "free  hand"  in  its  interdiction  of  the  Communist  infiltration  routes 
through  southern  Laos.  After  1966,  the  United  States  secretly  used  bases  in  Laos 
to  direct  U.S.  aircraft  bombing  the  DRV.  In  1968  and  1969  American  bombing  j 
over  Laos  was  dramatically  escalated  simply  because  U.S.  warplanes  were  avail- 
able for  use  after  the  bombing  halts  over  North  Vietnam.  Even  at  the  height  of 
U.S.  bombing  over  northern  Laos  in  the  summer  of  1969,  the  United  States 
acknowledged  conducting  nothing  more  than  "armed  reconnaissance."  The 
United  States  continues  to  claim,  despite  substantial  evidence  to  the  contrary, 
that  strict  Rules  of  Engagement  for  U.S.  aircraft  operating  over  Laos  prevent 
the  bombing  of  civilian  targets.  In  short,  the  pattern  of  covert  U.S.  involvement 
in  Laos  and  deceptive  public  statements  regarding  that  involvement  continues 
right  up  to  the  present  day. 

The  U.S.  government  has  often  cited  Communist  activities  in  Laos  and  par- 
ticularly North  Vietnamese  intervention  as  the  raison  d'etre  for  U.S.  actions  in 
Laos.  In  this  essay  I  have  touched  only  occasionally  on  North  Vietnamese  actions 
in  Laos.  I  have  done  so  primarily  because  this  paper  has  focused  on  U.S.  in- 
volvement in  Laos.  Nevertheless,  only  the  most  myopic  of  observers  could  fail 
to  recognize  that  the  DRV,  like  the  United  States,  has  used  Laotian  territory  in 
pursuance  of  its  own  ends.^  Most  notably  this  has  been  so  in  southern  Laos,  where 
the  DRV  has  even  subordinated  the  interests  of  its  allies  in  Laos,  the  Pathet 
Lao,  to  its  own  ends.  While  some  observers  may  argue  that  North  Vietnamese 
intervention  in  Laos  is  legitimized  by  reason  of  historical  circumstance  or  by  j 
reason  of  geographic  propinquity,^  we  shall  approach  this  issue  from  the  op- 
posite direction.  That  is,  can  U.S.  actions  in  Laos  be  justified  in  terms  of  reaction  j 
to  North  Vietnamese  intervention  in  Laos?  j 

U.S.  involvement  in  Laos  can,  of  course,  be  judged  in  either  of  two  ways;  j 
firstly  in  terms  of  the  standards  by  which  one  hopes  the  world's  most  powerful 
democracy  might  be  (and  indeed  usually  claims  to  be)  governed  or  secondly, 
as  suggested  above,  relative  to  the  actions  of  those  to  whom  the  United  States 
is  opposed.  By  the  first  standard,  the  conduct  of  the  U.S.  government  or  more 
precisely  the  conduct  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  U.S.  government  in  Laos 
is  clearly  a  travesty.  Twice  the  U.S.  government  has  subverted  legally  constituted  \ 
governments  of  Laos.  Repeatedly  it  has  violated  both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  j 
of  international  agreements  on  Laos.  More  recently  the  U.S.  Executive  has 
rained  down  literally  billions  of  dollars'  worth  of  bombs  on  a  country  with  whom 
the  United  States  is  not  at  war  and  without  Congressional  or  international  sane-  j 
tions  or  even  public  knowledge  of  its  actions.  j 

Yet,  international  conflict  and  diplomacy  are  realms  which  seldom  conform 
to  any  absolute  standards  of  right  and  wrong.  Therefore,  we  might  better  examine  f 
U.S.  involvement  in  Laos  according  to  the  second  standard;  namely  in  com-  | 
parison  to  the  actions  of  North  Vietnam.  First,  it  is  relevant  to  point  out  that  \ 
the  DRV,  like  the  United  States,  has  incessantly  violated  Article  4  of  the  1962  i 
Geneva  Agreements,  which  proscribes  the  introduction  into  Laos  of  foreign  mili- 
tary and  paramilitary  personnel.  Also,  the  DRV  has  probably  matched,  or  even  |l 
surpassed  the  U.S.  record  of  deception  concerning  its  involvement  in  Laos.  | 
However,  in  terms  of  sheer  destruction  of  Laotian  lives  and  homes  and  country-  [ 
side,  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos  has  been  far  more  disastrous  than  anything  \ 
the  DRV  has  done.  According  to  the  Cornell  Air  War  Study,  from  1965  through  i 
1971  the  United  States  dropped  more  than  1.6  million  tons  of  bombs  over  \ 
Laos.^  In  a  country  of  91,000  square  miles  this  amounts  to  more  than  seventeen  ■ 
tons  for  every  square  mile  of  the  Kingdom.  On  a  per  capita  basis  this  amounts  to  * 
roughly  six-tenths  of  a  ton  of  bombs  for  every  man,  woman  and  child  in  the  ! 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  281 

country.  The  bombing  has  not,  of  course,  been  spread  evenly  across  the  whole 
country.  It  has  been  concentrated  on  the  panhandle  region  of  southern  Laos 
and  the  Pathet  Lao-controlled  areas  of  northern  Laos.  The  bombing  has  resulted 
in  the  destruction  of  all  urban  centers  under  Pathet  Lao  control  and,  in  at  least 
some  areas,  the  destruction  of  virtually  every  village. ^  Such  vast  destruction 
wrought  so  casually  on  one  of  the  least-developed  countries  of  the  world  surely 
cannot  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  any  comparable  destruction  wrought  by  Com- 
munist action  in  Laos.^ 

Much  of  the  deception  and  the  casually  arrogant  nature  of  the  U.S.  interven- 
tion in  Laos  has  been  documented  in  detail  in  the  Pentagon  Papers.  Yet  after 
reading  through  the  myriad  details  of  those  documents,  after  reading  the  memos 
and  cables  of  U.S.  policymakers  speaking  of  "scenario  development"  and  "grad- 
ual, orchestrated  acceleration  of  tempo  ...  of  the  reprisal  strikes,"  and  of 
John  McNaughton's  view  of  U.S.  aims  in  South  Vietnam,  to  which  U.S.  policy 
in  Laos  was  subordinated,  that  is, 

70% — To  avoid  a  humiliating  U.S.  defeat  (to  our  reputation  as  a  guarantor) 
20% — To  keep  SVN  (and  then  adjacent)  territory  from  Chinese  hands. 
10% — To  permit  the  people  of  SVN  to  enjoy  a  better,  freer  way  of  life. 
ALSO — To  emerge  from  crisis  without  unacceptable  taint  from  methods  used, 

and  after  reading  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense's  opinion  on  the  essential 
aspect  of  U.S.  policy  in  Southeast  Asia, 

It  is  essential — however  badly  SEA  may  go  over  the  next  2-4  years — that 
the  U.S.  emerge  as  a  "good  doctor."  We  must  have  kept  promises,  been 
tough,  taken  risks,  gotten  bloodied,  and  hurt  the  enemy  very  badly,^ 

after  reading  these  things,  one  is  left  with  a  single  overwhelming  impression:  that 
to  U.S.  policymakers,  the  people  of  Laos,  the  people  of  Indochina  never  mat- 
tered. Even  Robert  McNamara's  often-quoted  memorandum  on  the  bombing  of 
North  Vietnam,  relating  that 

The  picture  of  the  world's  greatest  superpower  killing  or  seriously  injuring 
1000  non-combatants  a  week  while  trying  to  pound  a  tiny  backward  nation 
into  submission  on  an  issue  whose  merits  are  hotly  disputed,  is  not  a  pretty 
one  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:172)7 

comes  not  in  the  context  of  whether  such  bombing  is  morally  defensible  or  out 
of  any  evident  concern  for  those  civilians  who  were  killed  and  injured.  Rather  it 
comes  in  the  context  of  concern  for  the  "world  image  of  the  United  States." 

Reading  these  things  my  mind  goes  back  to  some  of  the  people  I  met  in  Laos. 
I  recall  the  refugee  named  Xieng  Som  Di,  who  returned  to  his  village  one  day 
in  the  summer  of  1967.  He  returned  from  working  in  his  rice  fields  only  to  find 
that  his  village  had  been  bombed.  His  house  and  all  his  possessions  were  de- 
stroyed, and  his  mother,  father,  wife  and  all  three  of  his  children  had  died  in 
the  bombing  raid.  And  I  remember  the  refugee  woman  named  Sao  La  who  told 
me  of  how  her  two  sons,  aged  four  and  eight,  were  killed  in  two  separate  bomb- 
1  ing  attacks  by  jets.  She  related  that  in  both  incidents  the  boys  had  been  playing 
i  near  the  rice  field.  When  the  jets  came  over,  they  had  not  run  for  shelter  fast 
enough.  They  were  killed  by  antipersonnel  bombs,  or  what  Sao  La  called  "bombi." 
And  too,  there  were  victims  who  were  not  injured  by  any  weapons.  One  refugee 


282      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon'  Papers/Vol.  V 

woman,  Sao  Siphan,  related  to  me  how  her  children  died.  After  the  CIA-backed 
irregular  forces  captured  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  in  the  summer  of  1969,  all  of  the 
civilians  of  the  area  were  gathered  into  refugee  camps.  Sao  Siphan  and  her 
family  were  moved  into  a  camp  at  a  place  called  Nalouang.  There,  within  a 
period  of  two  months,  all  of  Sao  Siphan's  children,  ranging  in  age  from  one  to 
sixteen  years,  died  in  an  epidemic  which  swept  the  refugee  camp.  She  told  me, 
"All  of  my  children,  all  seven,  died."  ^ 

And  the  victims  are  not  just  the  civilians,  for  even  the  soldiers  fighting  in 
Laos  are  in  many  ways  themselves  victims.  One  soldier  with  whom  I  talked  in 
the  spring  of  1971  illustrates  this  fact.  His  name  was  Bounthong.  He  was  twenty- 
five  and  had  been  a  soldier  for  seven  years.  His  father  had  been  killed  in  fighting 
with  the  Communists  in  1970.  In  early  1971  his  mother  was  badly  wounded 
during  the  Communist  shelling  of  Long  Cheng,  the  headquarters  of  the  CIA 
irregular  forces.  Bounthong  came  to  Vientiane  with  his  younger  brothers  and 
sisters  to  bring  his  wounded  mother  to  the  hospital.  He  wanted  to  sell  me  his 
army  jacket  in  order  to  buy  medicine  which  doctors  told  him  was  needed  to 
help  his  mother.  He  got  the  medicine  but  his  mother  died  anyway.  A  few  days 
later,  with  newspaper  stuffed  into  his  shoes,  whose  bottoms  had  worn  through, 
and  leaving  his  younger  brothers  and  sisters  in  a  Buddhist  temple  because  he  had 
no  relatives  in  Vientiane,  Bounthong  flew  back  to  Long  Cheng  to  resume  his 
soldiering. 

Perhaps  these  people  and  their  relatives  cannot  matter  in  the  formulation  of 
United  States  policy,  or  in  the  fighting  of  a  war,  yet  still  one  cannot  help  but 
wonder.  If  U.S.  policymakers  had  not  been  so  concerned  with  being  tough  and 
hurting  the  enemy  very  badly,  if  the  United  States  had  not  opposed  the  peace 
initiatives  in  1964  in  order  to  preserve  America's  "free  hand"  in  Laos,  one  can- 
not help  but  ask  whether  these  people  would  have  suffered  so  tragically. 

One  wonders  whether  U.S.  policymakers  are  pleased  with  the  results  of  our 
involvement  in  Laos.  Clearly  we  have  "been  tough"  in  Laos  and  have  "gotten 
bloodied." 

But  the  blood  is  not  our  own.^ 


NOTES 

1. 

1.  U.S.  Senate,  Subcommittee  on  United  States  Security  Agreements  and  Commit- 
ments Abroad  Hearings,  October  20,  21,  22  and  28,  1969  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the 
Symington  Hearings) ,  p.  543. 

2.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  673. 

3.  Charles  Stevenson,  The  End  of  Nowhere:  American  Policy  toward  Laos  Since 
1954  (Boston:  Beacon,  1972),  p.  240.  Significantly  this  quotation  provides  the  title  for 
Stevenson's  book.  j 

//.  j 

1.  Neil  Sheehan  et  al,  The  Pentagon  Papers  (New  York  Times/Bantam,  1971),  p.  9.  1 

2.  Arthur  Dommen,  Conflict  in  Laos  (New  York:  Praeger,  1964,  1971),  p.  26.  All  \ 
citations  of  this  book  refer  to  the  second  edition  unless  stated  otherwise.  ; 

3.  Prince  Souphanouvong  was  officially  ousted  from  his  positions  in  the  Lao  Issara 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  283 

government  in  exile  in  1949  before  its  official  dissolution.  Souphanouvong  now  leads 
the  Pathet  Lao  in  opposition  to  U.S.  presence  in  Laos. 

4.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  27. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  37. 

6.  U.S.  House,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  U .S.  Aid  Operations  in  Laos: 
!   Seventh  Report  by  the  Committee,  House  Rept.  546,  86th  Cong.,  1st  session,  1959,  p.  7 

(hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Porter  Hardy  Report). 

7.  For  a  more  complete  account  of  the  major  provisions  of  the  1954  Geneva  Accords, 
see  Gravel  ed.,  L 270-282. 


///. 

1.  Roger  M.  Smith  in  epilogue  in  Bernard  Fall,  Anatomy  of  a  Crisis:  The  Laotian 
Crisis  of  1960-1961  (New  York:  Doubleday  and  Company,  Inc.,  1969),  p.  237. 

2.  Hugh  Toye,  Laos:  Buffer  State  or  Battleground  (London:  Oxford  University  Press, 
1968),  p.  107.  Also,  for  further  speculation  on  the  cause  of  Souvanna  Phouma's  fall 
see  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 

3.  Accounts  differ  as  to  Katay's  attitude  toward  coalition  with  the  Pathet  Lao.  For 
instance,  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  83  relates  that  he  "spoke  hopefully  of  prevailing  upon 
Souphanouvong's  nationalism  and  bringing  the  Pathet  Lao  back  into  the  national  com- 

:  munity."  Other  accounts,  however,  give  evidence  of  his  anti-Pathet  Lao  attitude.  For 
^  example,  Katay  authored  a  tract  entitled  Laos — Ideal  Cornerstone  in  the  Anti-Commu- 
nist Struggle  in  Southeast  Asia  (Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  31.  See  also  Toye,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
107-108). 
\     4.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  108. 

I  5.  There  is  some  discrepancy  in  the  usage  of  the  term  Vientiane  Agreements.  Toye, 
I  for  instance,  uses  the  term  narrowly  only  to  refer  to  agreements  signed  in  November 
1956.  Marek  Thee  (in  Nina  Adams  and  Alfred  McCoy,  Laos:  War  and  Revolution, 
New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1970,  pp.  131-138),  however,  uses  it  to  refer  to  all  ten 
agreements  signed  from  August  1956  to  November  1957.  We  shall  use  the  term  in  the 
latter  sense. 

6.  United  States-Vietnam  Relations  1945-1967.  Study  prepared  by  the  Department 
of  Defense  (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971,  12  vols.),  10:1092. 
'  Hereafter  this  study  will  be  referred  to  as  simply  USG  ed. 

|i  7.  U.S.  House,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  United  States  Aid  Operations 
![  in  Laos,  Hearings,  before  a  subcommittee  of  the  committee  on  Government  Operations, 
[  86th  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  1959.  p.  180  (hereafter  these  hearings  will  be  called  the  Porter 
,  Hardy  Hearings,  after  the  subcommittee  chairman). 

8.  Porter  Hardy  Hearings,  pp.  184-185.  Next  to  Robertson  even  John  Foster  Dulles 
appeared  somewhat  soft  on  the  Communist  threat  to  Laos.  In  a  news  conference  on 
May  11,  1954,  following  the  fall  of  Dien  Bien  Phu,  he  remarked  that  Laos  and  Cam- 
bodia were  "important  but  by  no  means  essential"  because  they  were  poor  countries 
with  meager  populations.  The  lapse  was  only  momentary,  however,  for  the  remarks 
were  subsequently  deleted  from  the  official  transcript.  Gravel  ed.,  1:56. 

As  Stevenson  {op.  cit.,  p.  20)  points  out,  "American  policy  toward  Laos  between 
1954  and  1959  was  much  more  a  product  of  Robertson's  vigorous  anti-communism 
than  of  any  of  the  traits  or  attitudes  of  Eisenhower." 

9.  USG  ed.,  10:737.  Also  for  further  details  on  Franco-American  estrangement  in 
1  Laos  during  this  period  see  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  20,  44,  63. 

10.  Porter  Hardy  Hearings,  pp.  709-710.  See  also  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  102,  on  how 
j  Brown's  successor  "vanished  into  thin  air"  into  Laos  as  PEO  chief. 

I     11.  U.S.  House  Appropriations  Committee,  Hearings,  Mutual  Security  Appropria- 
\  tions  for  1959,  p.  354,  quoted  in  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  39. 
i     12.  Porter  Hardy  Report,  p.  7. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

14.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  43. 


284      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

15.  These  and  other  accounts  of  corruption  among  USOM  officials  in  Laos  are  cited 
in  the  Porter  Hardy  Report,  pp.  2-4.  See  also  Porter  Hardy  Hearings. 

1 6.  Porter  Hardy  Report,  p.  5. 

17.  Operations  Coordinating  Board  (OCB)  Report  on  Southeast  Asia,  28  May  1958, 
inUSG  ed.,  10:1142. 

18.  Porter  Hardy  Report,  p.  45. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  46. 

20.  Porter  Hardy  Hearings,  p.  223. 

21.  Ibid.,  p.  224. 

22.  Ibid.,  p.  225. 

23.  Porter  Hardy  Report,  p.  46. 

24.  Porter  Hardy  Hearings,  p.  193. 

25.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  109;  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  114. 

26.  OCB  Report  on  Southeast  Asia,  28  May  1958  in  USG  ed.,  10:1143. 

27.  Sisouk  Na  Champassak,  Storm  Over  Laos  (New  York:  Praeger,  1961),  p.  64. 

28.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  114. 

29.  See  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  64. 

30.  Roger  Hilsman,  To  Move  a  Nation  (New  York:  Dell,  1964),  pp.  111-112. 
Opinion  is  almost  unanimous  that  the  aid  cutoff  in  June  1968  was  done  merely  on  the 
pretext  of  the  need  for  monetary  reform;  the  real  target  was  Souvanna  Phouma's  coali- 
tion government.  See  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  110;  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  118;  Hilsman,  op.  cit., 
p.  118.  The  only  exception  to  this  view,  except  of  course  for  U.S.  government  officials 
such  as  Robertson,  is,  curiously  enough,  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  59,  whose  book  is  most 
recent.  He  argues  that  pressures  in  the  United  States  had  been  building  up  for  some 
time  against  abuses  in  the  aid  program  to  Laos,  and  that  "the  evidence  is  strong  that 
American  aid  would  have  been  suspended  no  matter  who  was  Premier."  Evidence  from 
the  Pentagon  Papers  suggests  that  the  earlier  interpretations  were  correct.  In  the  OCB 
Report,  28  May  1958,  the  ominous  sentence  "We  are  now  considering  various  possibili- 
ties relating  to  a  reappraisal  of  our  effort  in  Laos,"  comes  at  the  end  of  a  section  dis- 
cussing the  election  results.  The  report's  discussion  of  monetary  reform  comes  afterward 
and  includes  the  statement  that  "scandalous  import  licensing  was  stopped  when  negotia- 
tions led  to  acceptance  by  the  Lao  Government  of  new  procedures  proposed  by  the 
U.S.  There  have  been  no  abuses  since"  (USG  ed.,  10:1143).  At  any  rate,  the  United 
States  could  not  have  been  unaware  that  the  aid  cutoff  for  whatever  reasons,  coming 
less  than  two  months  after  the  May  elections,  would  put  great  pressure  on  Souvanna's 
government. 

31.  Wilfred  Burchett,  The  Furtive  War:  The  United  States  in  Vietnam  and  Laos 
(New  York:  International  Publishers,  1963),  p.  172. 

32.  U.S.  source  quoted  in  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  65. 

33.  Porter  Hardy  Hearings,  p.  191-192. 

34.  Ibid.,  p.  195-196. 

IV. 

1.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  66. 

2.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  118.  Stevenson  suggests  that  Sananikone's  inclusion  of  the 
CDNI  members  was  done  "under  pressure  from  the  Crown  Prince  as  well  as  some 
Americans"  op.  cit.,  p.  66. 

3.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  120;  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  118. 

4.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  115,  indicates  that  the  DRV  was  at  fault  in  the  incident  but 
Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  121,  counters  that  the  clash  was  precipitated,  perhaps  deliberately,  by 
a  Laotian  army  patrol.  Toye  also  suggests  that  Phoui,  in  maneuvering  for  emergency 
powers,  may  have  been  emulating  Marshal  Sarit  of  Thailand. 

5.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  pp.  123-124. 

6.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  70. 

7.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  125.  Also  see  Bernard  Fall,  Street  Without  Joy  (New  York: 
Schrocken  Books,  1972,  originally  published  in  1964)  pp.  331-332. 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  285 

8.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  125. 

9.  USGed.,  10:1239. 

10.  See  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  120,  for  a  description  of  these  attacks. 

11.  USG  ed.,  10:1244. 

12.  As  two  RAND  analysts  put  it,  "In  retrospect  it  is  apparent  that  the  Sananikone 
government  precipitated  the  final  crisis  that  led  to  war  in  Laos";  in  A.  M.  Halpern  and 
H.  B.  Fredman,  Communist  Strategy  in  Laos  (Santa  Monica:  RAND  Corp.,  June  14, 
1960). 

13.  B.  B.  Fall,  Anatomy  of  a  Crisis  (New  York:  Doubleday,  1969)  pp.  130-131. 
See  also  William  J.  Lederer,  A  Nation  of  Sheep  (New  York:  Norton,  1961)  for  an 
account  of  this  time  period  in  Laos  and  what  Lederer  calls  the  "Big  Deception  from 
Laos." 

14.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  80-81  suggests  that  the  reserved  U.S.  reaction  to  the 
"crisis"  in  Laos  might  have  been  due  to  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  Christian  Herter, 
who  was  much  less  interested  in  Asia  than  his  predecessor,  John  Foster  Dulles. 

15.  USGed.,  10:1246. 

16.  Fall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  154-155;  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  79. 

17.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  85. 

18.  Ibid.,  p.  85.  As  Stevenson  points  out,  the  CIA's  sponsorship  of  Phoumi  was 
opposed  by  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Vientiane. 

19.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  77. 

20.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  65-66.  For  a  description  of  the  split  between  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  Vientiane  and  the  CIA  mission  there,  see  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  85-86. 

21.  USGed.,  10:1250. 

22.  Jim  Lucas  of  Scripps-Howard  newspapers  quoted  in  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  89. 

23.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  129,  133.  He  reports  that  "CIA  agents  participated  in  the 
election  rigging.  .  .  ." 

24.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  138,  suggests  that  the  escape  of  the  Pathet  Lao  leaders  was 
actually  a  blessing  in  disguise  for  the  rightists.  They  had  previously  announced  that 
they  would  try  the  PL  leaders  for  "offenses  against  the  security  of  the  state."  It  had 
become  apparent,  however,  that  a  trial  of  Souphanouvong  and  his  comrades  would 
have  been  "exceedingly  embarrassing  to  the  Vientiane  government."  Thus  the  escape  of 
the  PL  leaders  obviated  the  potentially  embarrassing  trial. 

25.  NSC  memorandum  6012,  25  July  1960.  USG  ed.,  10:1293. 

V, 

1.  David  Wise  and  Thomas  Ross,  The  Invisible  Government  (London:  Mayflower, 
1964,  1968),  p.  149. 

2.  Bernard  B.  Fall,  Anatomy  of  a  Crisis:  The  Laotian  Crisis  of  1960-1961  (New 
York:  Doubleday,  1969),  p.  185.  Fall  gives  a  fascinating  account  of  Kong-le's  earlier 
career  that  Kong-le  received  instructions  from  his  French  and  American  military  ad- 
visers on  the  tactical  problem  of  occupying  and  holding  a  major  city  only  the  day 
before  the  coup!  See  also  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  143. 

3.  Joel  M.  Halpern,  Government,  Politics  and  Social  Structure  in  Laos:  A  Study  in 
Tradition  and  Innovation  (Los  Angeles:  UCLA,  Dept.  of  Anthropology,  1961),  p.  40. 

4.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  104. 

5.  Ibid.,  pp.  105-106. 

6.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  154. 

7.  See  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  110,  for  a  full  description  of  the  delegation's  demands. 
Souvanna  later  described  Parsons  as  "the  most  reprehensible  and  nefarious  of  men," 

j  who  was  the  "ignominious  architect  of  [the]  disastrous  American  policy  toward  Laos." 
;  The  Prince  continued,  "What  I  shall  never  forgive  the  United  States  for,  however,  is 
t  the  fact  that  it  betrayed  me  and  my  government."  Souvanna  Phouma's  remarks  come 
j  from  an  oft-quoted  interview  in  the  New  York  Times,  January  20,  1961. 
I  8.  Arthur  Schlesinger,  Jr.,  A  Thousand  Days:  John  F.  Kennedy  in  the  White  House 
r (Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin,  1965),  p.  328.  Schlesinger  says  the  decision  on  the  removal 


286      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

of  the  Prince  was  reached  in  "late  October."  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  114,  says  the  de- 
cision was  not  reached  until  November  10. 

9.  Schlesinger,  op.  cit.,  p.  328. 

10.  Fall,  op.  cit.,  p.  196.  Curiously  enough,  Fall  had  related  in  an  earlier  book, 
Street  Without  Joy  (1964),  p.  337,  that  about  1,000  civilians  were  killed  in  the  "Battle 
of  Vientiane."  It  is  not  explained  why  this  earlier  figure,  supposedly  based  on  an  "on- 
the-spot  investigation"  by  Fall  himself,  is  reduced  so  drastically  in  the  1969  book. 

11.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  173. 

12.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  178-179. 

13.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  120.  See  also  Toye,  op.  cit.,  pp.  163-165;  Fall,  Anatomy 
of  a  Crisis,  pp.  123,  126-127,  132,  148-156,  170  and  Street  Without  Joy,  pp.  334-337; 
and  USG  ed.,  10:1238-1239.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  185,  alone  among  all  the  observers 
seems  to  accept  the  charges  of  Vietnamese  troop  intervention. 

14.  Fall,  Street  Without  Joy,  p.  338,  estimates  that  the  available  Phoumist  forces 
outnumbered  the  Kong-le/  Pathet  Lao  troops  roughly  4  to  1. 

15.  Writing  in  1964,  Bernard  Fall  gave  a  succinct  answer  to  questions  such  as  those 
posed  by  Eisenhower.  He  wrote  ".  .  .  it  had  been  forgotten  that  the  main  ingredient  in 
revolutionary  war  is  revolution.  And  'our'  Laotians  simply  had  nothing  to  be  revolu- 
tionary about"  {Street  Without  Joy,  op.  cit.,  p.  342). 

16.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  132. 

17.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  187. 

18.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  127. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  128. 

20.  Theodore  Sorenson,  Kennedy  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1965),  p.  644. 

21.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  167. 

22.  USGed.,  11:62-63. 

23.  Fall,  op.  cit.,  p.  338;  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  137. 

24.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  133. 

25.  Schlesinger,  op.  cit.,  pp.  286^287.  An  additional  factor  in  this  respect  was  that  a 
massive  U.S.  intervention  in  far-off  Laos  would  present  tremendously  difficult  logistic 
problems  in  contrast  to  the  relatively  very  short  supply  lines  of  the  Communists.  See 
Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  188. 

26.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 

27.  Fall,  Anatomy  of  a  Crisis,  pp.  212-213. 

28.  See  note  3.  As  pointed  out  by  Fall  and  Stevenson,  the  absence  of  North  Viet- 
namese troops  did  not  mean  that  there  was  no  North  Vietnamese  involvement  at  all. 
The  DRV  had  been  supplying  both  advisers  and  material  to  the  Pathet  Lao,  but  not 
regular  troops.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  163,  does  suggest,  however,  that  in  addition  to  advisers, 
the  DRV  aided  the  Pathet  Lao  with  mortar  detachments. 

29.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  205. 

30.  These  plans  were  approved  April  29  not  May  11  as  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  153, 
has  written.  On  the  latter  date  NSAM  52  announced  the  President's  decisions  (Gravel 
ed.,  n:641). 

31.  USGed.,  11:155. 

32.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  154. 

33.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  177-178;  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  162;  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  207- 
208;  Fall,  op.  cit.,  p.  226. 

34.  USGed.,  11:247-248. 

35.  Ibid.,  pp.  247-248.  Both  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  179,  and  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  160, 
344,  indicate  that  the  Meo  guerrilla  force  levels  were  raised  to  18,000  in  the  summer 
of  1961.  In  light  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  their  figure  appears  to  be  exaggerated.  Also, 
Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  160-161,  suggests  that  the  covert  actions  of  that  summer  may 
have  come  without  Kennedy's  full  knowledge.  Again,  the  Pentagon  Papers  make  it 
clear;  this  was  not  the  case. 

36.  USG  ed.,  11:328.  The  aerial  resupply  missions  referred  to  here  are  those  by 
Soviet  aircraft  which  were  flown  into  that  town  after  the  PL/Kong-le  territorial  gains 
prior  to  Geneva. 

37.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  167;  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  179. 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  287 

38.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  179.  See  also  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  167,  who  quotes  an  observer 
as  saying,  "There  was  considerable  evidence  that  the  Pathet  Lao  were  not  abiding  by 
the  ceasefire.  .  .  ." 

39.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  180.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  216-219,  gives  an  account  of  Nam 
Tha  strikingly  different  from  any  other  observers.  He  depicts  it  throughout  as  carried 
out  on  the  Communist  side  almost  entirely  by  the  North  Vietnamese  and  suggests  that 
for  the  Pathet  Lao  it  was  only  "excellent  field  training."  The  only  evidence  he  cites  to 
substantiate  North  Vietnamese  dominance  in  the  operation  is  the  diary  of  a  North 
Vietnamese  soldier  purportedly  picked  up  by  Phoumi's  troops.  The  accounts  of  Toye 
and  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  173-174,  suggest  little  if  any  North  Vietnamese  participa- 
tion. The  account  of  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  140-141,  usually  refers  to  "Pathet  Lao  and 
North  Vietnamese  forces,"  though  he  does  mention  an  attack  by  "four  Vietnamese 
battalions." 

40.  Harriman's  suspicions  appear  to  have  been  correct.  See  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  170. 

41.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  216. 

42.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  174.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  p.  196. 

43.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  174. 

44.  Ibid.,  As  Stevenson  points  out  the  account  may  have  been  apocryphal  but  could 
well  have  been  true. 

45.  Toye,  op.  cit.,  pp.  183-184. 

46.  For  the  text  of  the  Declaration  on  the  Neutrality  of  Laos,  and  the  Protocol  to 
that  Declaration,  see  Symington  Hearings,  pp.  413-418. 

Vl. 

1.  Quoted  in  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  180. 

2.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  521. 

3.  D.  Gareth  Porter,  "After  Geneva:  Subverting  Laotian  Neutrality,"  in  Adams  and 
McCoy,  op.  cit.,  lays  the  blame  entirely  on  the  United  States  and  the  Laotian  rightists. 
Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  223-260,  tends  to  lay  the  blame  much  more  with  North  Vietnam 
and  the  Pathet  Lao.  A  more  balanced  account  is  given  by  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  180- 
199.  As  he  puts  it  (p.  183),  "Blame  for  breaking  the  Geneva  Accords  cannot  be  placed 
on  only  one  group.  There  was  no  one  point  in  time  when  the  agreed  provisions  were  in 
effect,  and  after  which  there  were  violations." 

4.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  153. 

6.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  268. 

7.  Porter  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  186.  See  also  Symington  Hearings,  p.  473. 

8.  Hilsman,  op.  cit.,  p.  115. 

9.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  239. 

;  10.  Ibid.,  p.  240.  The  DRV,  like  the  United  States,  had  tried  to  conceal  its  involve- 
ment in  Laos.  As  a  result,  the  number  of  North  Vietnamese  remaining  in  Laos  after 
the  withdrawal  deadline  is  a  point  of  controversy  and  vague  speculation.  Stevenson, 
op.  cit.,  p.  183,  recounts  that  the  DRV  withdrew  "only  about  half  of  their  forces  in 
Laos."  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  240,  cites  the  State  Department's  estimate  that  "  'several 
thousand'  Vietnamese  troops  had  left  Laos  by  the  deadline,  but  this  left  several  other 
thousands  still  within  the  country." 
I    11.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  234. 

12.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  473.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  268. 
'    13.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  186. 
■    14.  Ibid.,  pp.  193,  195. 
I    15.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  258-259. 

16.  See  Aggression  from  the  North.  The  Record  of  North  Viet-Nam's  Campaign  to 
^Conquer  South  Viet-Nam  (Department  of  State  Publication  7839,  Washington,  D.C.; 
[iJ.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1965).  This  document  indicates  that  in  the  early 
'1960s  most  of  the  personnel  infiltrating  through  Laos  into  South  Vietnam  were  native 
'Outherners  who  had  gone  north  after  the  1954  Geneva  Agreements.  In  1964,  however, 
in  increasingly  larger  proportion  of  the  infiltrators  were  native  northerners.  Message 


288      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

No.  35  of  16  September  1965  from  the  International  Commission  for  Supervision  and 
Control  in  Laos  to  the  Co-Chairmen  of  the  Geneva  Conference  shows  also  that  DRV 
supported  the  Pathet  Lao  in  northern  Laos  in  1964  with  both  supplies  and  DRV  troops. 
The  Message  also  indicates  that  the  DRV  tried  to  hide  its  involvement  in  Laos  by 
dressing  NVA  troops  in  Laos  in  Pathet  Lao-style  uniforms. 

17.  Porter  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  207. 

18.  Stevenson,  o/?.  c//.,  p.  195. 

19.  Ibid.,  pp.  196-197.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  267.  Porter  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op. 
cit.,  p.  204. 

20.  Dommen,  op.  cit.  (1964  edition),  p.  258. 

21.  Porter  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  205.  [ 

22.  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  50:910,  June  8,  1964,  quoted  in  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  i 
p.  198.  ; 

23.  Neo  Lao  Hak  Sat,  Twelve  Years  of  American  Intervention  and  Aggression  in  \ 
Laos  (Neo  Lao  Haksat  Publications,  1966),  p.  48.  ; 

24.  See  also  Gravel  ed..  Ill:  145,  wherein  it  is  reported  that  on  "11  June  1964  Laotian 
Premier  Souvanna  Phouma  reaffirms  original  agreement  (8  June)  to  U.S.  armed  escort  i 
of  reconnaissance  flights  over  'South  Laos'  and  the  Plaine  des  Jarres,  with  authority  to 
attack  ground  units  first  firing  on  them."  This  information  seems  to  belie  Souvanna 
Phouma's  denunciation  of  the  subsequent  U.S.  air  strikes.  Evidently  Souvanna  had 
agreed  only  to  armed  reconnaissance  and  not  to  retaliatory  strikes.  This  interpretation 
is  indicated  by  Ambassador  Unger's  evasive  testimony  in  the  Symington  Hearings  (p. 
667),  "...  I  know  that  we  discussed  with  Souvanna  Phouma  both  the  kinds  of  flights 
that  he  was  interested  in  and  we  also  talked  about  the  things  that  were  contemplated. 

.  .  .  Since  Souvanna  Phouma  himself  had  asked  to  have  certain  kinds  of  flights  made,  ; 
of  course,  he  was  not  as — he  had  obviously  opened  the  door  to  that  extent.  .  .  ."  See 
also  Porter  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  206. 

25.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  274. 

26.  Washington  Post,  June  14,  1964.  The  editorial  also  cited  the  case  of  American 
pilots  flying  air  strikes  in  the  Congo.  Again,  these  operations  were  first  revealed  by  the 
New  China  News  Agency.  i 

27.  As  the  Cornell  Air  War  study  group  pointed  out,  "the  technical  significance  of 
'armed  reconnaissance' — an  attack  sortie  flown  in  search  of  targets  of  opportunity — 
is  not  widely  understood.  Hence,  the  terminology  has  some  potential  for  deception." 
Raphael  Littauer  and  Norman  Uphoff,  eds..  The  Air  War  in  Indochina  (Boston:  Beacon  i 
Press,  1972),  p.  77. 

28.  Ibid.,  p.  79. 

29.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  399. 

30.  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara  after  a  trip  to  Saigon  in  early  1964,  had  recom- 
mended "  'hot  pursuit'  and  small-scale  operations  across  the  Laotian  border  by  GVN 
ground  forces."  The  recommendation,  along  with  others  by  McNamara,  was  approved 
by  President  Johnson  in  a  National  Security  Council  meeting  on  March  17,  along  with 
a  directive  "for  all  agencies  'to  proceed  energetically'  in  executing  them."  Gravel  ed.,  ; 
111:157.  There  is  some  evidence  that  GVN  soldiers  were  operating  in  Laos  much  prior 
to  1964.  For  example,  in  the  prisoner  exchange  called  for  in  the  1962  Geneva  Agree- 
ments, the  Pathet  Lao  released  three  Vietnamese  soldiers  whom  they  claimed  to  have 
captured  near  Tchepone  after  infiltrating  from  South  Vietnam  (Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p. 
235).  See  also  Porter  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  203,  and  Neo  Lao  Hak  Sat, 
op.  cit.,  p.  65,  for  the  "deposition"  of  one  of  the  captured  South  Vietnamese.  In  con-  \ 
trast,  the  RLG  reported  capturing  six  North  Vietnamese  soldiers  prior  to  the  Agree- 
ments of  1962  (Paul  F.  Langer  and  Joseph  J.  Zasloff,  North  Vietnam  and  the  Pathet 
Lao:  Partners  in  the  Struggle  for  Laos,  Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  1970,  f 
p.  226).  I 

31.  The  same  memo  notes  Thai  involvement  in  a  covert  intelligence  gathering  opera- 
tion code-named  Hardnose  in  southern  Laos. 

32.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  479. 

33.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  275.  The  memorandum  cited  on  p.  269  reveals  that  "Hanoi 
claims  to  have  shot  down  a  T-28  over  DRV  on  August  18  and  to  have  captured  the 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  289 

Thai  pilot  flying  the  plane.  Although  the  information  the  North  Vietnamese  have  used 
in  connection  with  this  case  appears  to  be  accurate,  it  is  not  clear  the  pilot  is  alive  and 
can  be  presented  to  the  ICC.  The  possibility  cannot  be  excluded,  however,  nor  that 
other  Thai  pilots  might  be  captured  by  the  PL."  Gravel  ed.,  111:609.  See  also  Gravel 
ed.,  111:552-553  for  cable  evidently  to  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Vientiane,  in  which  Rusk 
grants  "discretionary  authority  to  use  AA  (Air  America)  pilots  in  T-28s  for  SAR 
[search  and  rescue]  operations  when  you  consider  this  indispensable  rpt.  indispensable 

.   to  success  of  operation.  .  .  ." 

34.  It  was  during  the  summer  of  1964  that  U.S.  pilots  over  Laos  were  allowed  "to 

[  fire  on  targets  on  the  ground  even  if  they  were  not  fired  upon."  Symington  Hearings, 

i  p.  476. 

{  35.  It  was  in  this  memorandum  that  McNaughton  gave  his  view  on  the  essential 
j  aspect  of  U.S.  policy  in  SEA.  "It  is  essential — however  badly  SEA  may  go  over  the 
j  next  2-4  years — that  U.S.  emerge  as  a  'good  doctor.'  We  must  have  kept  promises, 

been  tough,  taken  risks,  gotten  bloodied,  and  hurt  the  enemy  very  badly"  (Gravel  ed., 

111:582). 

36.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  p.  278. 

37.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  207. 

38.  Ibid.,  p.  208. 

39.  Ibid.,  p.  157. 

40.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  421. 

41.  Symington  Hearings,  pp.  486,  517-518.  See  also  p.  485  for  a  description  of 
"Ambassador  Sullivan's  Air  Force." 

42.  T.  D.  Allman,  "Less  Holy  Than  Godley,"  in  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review, 
:  December  11,  1971. 

43.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  209. 

i     44.  Ibid.,  p.  209.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  490. 

45.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  209,  225.  See  also  Fred  Branfman,  "Laos  Bombing  Limits 
I  Ended,"  in  the  Boston  Globe,  December  7,  1970. 

I  46.  See  Fred  Branfman,  "Presidential  War  in  Laos,  1964-1970,"  in  Adams  and 
i  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  257-264,  for  a  description  of  the  parallel  government.  Perhaps 
'  something  about  the  priorities  of  the  U.S.  effort  in  Laos  is  reflected  in  these  informal 
;  subtitles.  The  U.S.  Ambassador  was  called  "the  General"  or  "the  Field  Marshal" 

whereas  his  subordinate,  the  USAID  director,  was  called  "the  second  Prime  Minister." 

For  another  description  on  the  "parallel  government"  see  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  220. 

The  extent  of  the  "parallel  government"  was  indicated  by  a  USAID  worker  when  he 

testified  that  the  aid  program  in  Laos"  is  probably  the  only  mission  that  we  have  that 
i  is — that  more  or  less  sits  on  a  bag  of  cement  until  it  gets  into  a  school''  (Symington 
I  Hearings,  p.  581). 
}    47.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  210. 

!  48.  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  on  U.S.  Security  Agreements  and  Commitments 
Abroad,  Laos:  April  1971,  a  Staff  Report  (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1971),  p.  14.  This  report  will  hereinafter  be  called  simply  the  Moose-Lowenstein 
Report.  See  also  Fred  Branfman  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  223-225. 

49.  Moose-Lowenstein  Report,  pp.  14-15. 

50.  Exactly  how  Westmoreland  planned  to  monitor  anything  after  annihilating  it  is 
not  clear.  But,  of  course,  "SLMA"  wouldn't  have  made  near  so  nice  an  acronym. 
Whether  Westmoreland's  plan  was  implemented  or  not  is  not  clear  from  the  Pentagon 
study.  Evidently  it  was  not. 

5L  Symington  Hearings,  p.  439. 

52.  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  289-290.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  219.  See  David  Feingold, 
;  "Opium  and  Politics  in  Laos,"  in  Adams  and  McCoy  for  a  brief  account  of  the  involve- 
ment of  General  Ouane  Rattikone  (General  Ma's  chief  antagonist)  in  the  opium  trade. 
I  53.  See  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  279-281,  303-304,  for  a  description  of  the  develop- 
(ment  of  the  trail. 

54.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  217,  quotes  one  U.S.  official  as  saying,  "the  biggest  job 
iill  Sullivan  had  was  to  keep  Westmoreland's  paws  off  Laos." 

55.  Symington  Hearings,  pp.  409-410,  457-458. 


290      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 


56.  Ibid.,  p.  465. 

57.  Ibid.,  pp.  425,  465,  470,  489-490.  See  also  Dommen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  297-298,  for 
an  account  of  how  the  navigational  station  on  Phou  Pha  Thi  was  captured.  Another 
account  (Washington  Post,  March  16,  1970)  reported  that  Phou  Pha  Thi  also  served 
as  a  base  camp  for  "American-led  teams  of  Meo  mercenaries  entering  North  Vietnam 
on  special  harassment  operations."  A  memorandum  by  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara 
dated  May  19,  1967,  tells  also  of  plans  for  American  led  South  Vietnamese  Special 
Forces  teams  to  operate  in  eastern  Laos.  Gravel  ed.,  IV:  172. 

Vll. 

1.  New  York  Times,  November  1,  1968. 

2.  Littauer  and  Uphoff,  op.  cit.,  p.  78. 

3.  T.  D.  Allman,  "Waiting  for  A  Miracle,"  in  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review, 
March  12,  1970. 

4.  See  Symington  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  p.  784,  wherein  the  deputy  commander  of  the 
U.S.  7/1 3th  Air  Force,  Udorn,  Thailand,  testified  that  in  the  summer  of  1969  "certain 
restrictions  were  removed  and  we  were  allowed  to  use  airpower  [in  Laos]  in  a  little 
freer  manner." 

5.  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  224. 

6.  A  number  of  observers  have  reported  that  the  SGUs'  treatment  of  the  civilians  of 
the  Plaine  was,  by  Laotian  standards,  exceptionally  brutal.  For  example,  see  Jack 
Foise,  "  'Scorched  Earth'  Reported  in  Laos.  U.S.  Aids  Plan,"  in  the  Washington  Post, 
March  2,  1970;  and  Fred  Branfman,  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  249. 

7.  Littauer  and  Uphoff,  op.  cit.,  pp.  79-80. 

8.  A  few  reports  by  Western  observers  (such  as  those  by  Jacques  Decornoy  in  Le 
Monde,  July  3-8,  1968  and  reprinted  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.)  of  life  under 
the  PL  and  American  bombing  of  the  PL  zone  had  been  made  previous  to  this  time, 
but  had  received  very  little  attention  in  the  United  States. 

9.  For  example,  Daniel  Southerland,  "What  U.S.  Bombing  Feels  Like  to  Laotians," 
Christian  Science  Monitor,  March  14,  1970;  Ian  Wright,  "The  Laotians — Caught  in  the 
Cross  Fire,"  Manchester  Guardian,  March  14,  1970;  Laurence  Stern,  "Laotian  Refugees 
Want  a  Sanctuary,"  Washington  Post,  March  26,  1970;  Hugh  D.  S.  Greenway,  "The 
Pendulum  of  War  Swings  Wider  in  Laos,"  Life,  April  3,  1970. 

10.  Georges  Chapelier  and  Josyane  Van  Malderghem,  "Plain  of  Jars,  Social  Changes 
Under  Five  Years  of  Pathet  Lao  Administration,"  Asia  Quarterly,  I,  1971,  p.  75. 

11.  The  full  text  of  the  USIS  report  is  printed  in  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  to  In- 
vestigate Problems  Connected  with  Refugees  and  Escapees  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Judiciary,  War-Related  Civilian  Problems  in  Indochina,  Part  II,  Laos  and  Cambodia. 
Hearings,  April  21  and  22,  1971.  Hereafter,  this  document  is  referred  to  as  the  Refugee 
Hearings,  April  1971. 

12.  For  a  discussion  of  the  Rules  of  Engagement  see  the  Moose-Lowenstein  Report, 
pp.  9-12,  and  Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  214-215.  Stevenson  reports  that  the  most  severe 
punishment  given  to  pilots  for  violation  of  the  Rules  of  Engagement  was  "transfer  out 
of  Laos." 

13.  Symington  Hearings,  p.  514. 

14.  Personal  conversation  with  the  author,  September  1971,  Washington,  D.C.  See 
also  note  4  in  the  next  section. 

15.  Most  of  these  figures  came  from  the  Moose-Lowenstein  Report,  p.  3.  The  cost 
of  CIA  expenditures  is  estimated  from  the  figures  given  in  this  report.  The  cost  of 
U.S.  bombing  over  Laos  has  never  been  officially  revealed.  The  figure  cited  herein  is 
one  used  by  Time  magazine,  August  16,  1971.  A  slightly  lower  figure  is  given  by 
Stevenson,  op.  cit.,  p.  2.  He  cites  figures  totaling  $1.14  billion  as  the  1971  cost  of  the 
bombing  over  Laos.  A  larger  figure  of  roughly  $2  billion  can  be  calculated  from  the 
sortie  cost  figure  given  in  the  Pentagon  Papers  ($20  million/ 1,000  sorties,  Sheehan 
et  al,  op.  cit.,  p.  545)  and  the  total  sorties  over  Laos  in  1970  as  given  by  the  Cornell 
Air  War  Study  Group  (101,000,  Littauer  and  Uphoff,  op.  cit.,  p.  275). 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  291 

i        16.  Letter  from  David  Abshire,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Congressional  Re- 

■  lations,  to  Senator  Robert  Griffin,  October  1,  1971. 

17.  Letter  from  Abshire  to  Senator  Griffin,  dated  November  23,  1970. 

18.  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  to  Investigate  Problems  Connected  with  Refugees  and 
Escapees  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  Refugee  and  Civilian  War  Casualty  Prob- 

i    lems  in  Indochina,  A  Staff  Report,  September  28,  1970  (Washington:  U.S.  Government 

Printing  Office,  1970),  p.  30. 
I        19.  Refugee  Hearings,  April  1971,  p.  61.  The  total  number  of  civilians  displaced 

in  Laos  over  the  last  decade  is  estimated  at  700,000,  or  roughly  one  quarter  of  Laos' 

total  population.  Ibid.,  p.  47.  Many  of  these  people  were,  of  course,  displaced  previous 

to  the  heavy  U.S.  bombing  in  Laos. 

20.  For  the  full  text  of  Nixon's  statement  see  the  New  York  Times,  March  7,  1970, 
1    or  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit. 

21.  Los  Angeles  Times,  March  9,  1970,  New  York  Times  of  the  same  date. 

I  22.  The  White  House  distinction  is  especially  curious  in  light  of  the  fact  that  U.S. 
!  military  personnel  stationed  in  Laos  including  even  the  Marine  guards  at  the  Embassy 
I    in  Vientiane  receive  combat  pay  allowances. 

j  23.  Although  exact  figures  on  Americans  killed  in  Laos  have  not  been  released, 
bits  and  pieces  of  information  are  available  from  a  variety  of  sources.  Stevenson,  op. 
\  cit.,  p.  3,  estimates  that  "From  1964  through  1970,  over  400  Americans  died  in  the 
j  fighting  in  Laos  and  another  230  men  were  listed  as  missing."  The  Moose-Low enstein 
Report,  p.  12,  relates  that  between  January  1970  and  April  1971,  81  aircraft  and  66 
U.S.  Air  Force  personnel  were  lost  over  Laos.  Not  included  in  these  figures,  the  loss 
of  eight  American  Forward  Air  Controllers  over  Laos  in  the  same  time  period.  For 
other  accounts  of  American  deaths  in  the  Laotian  conflict  see  the  Washington  Post, 

■  March  16,  1970,  and  the  Symington  Hearings,  p.  470,  489. 

24.  Symington  Hearings,  pp.  457,  465. 
'       25.  Hugh  D.  S.  Greenway,  "The  Pendulum  of  War  Swings  Wider  in  Laos,"  in  Life 
magazine,  April  3,  1970,  and  Fred  Branfman,  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  p.  269, 
26.  U.S.  Embassy  Laos,  Facts  on  Foreign  Aid  (Vientiane:  Embassy  of  the  United 
j    States,  USAID,  Mission  to  Laos,  April  1971 ),  p.  105. 
!       27.  Refugee  Hearings,  April  1971,  p.  15. 

j      28.  Ibid.,  p.  17.  While  the  USIS  report  deals  only  with  the  refugees  from  the  Plain 
of  Jars  there  is  substantial  evidence  that  the  bombing  has  been  the  primary  causative 
factor  in  the  creation  of  refugees  in  many  other  parts  of  the  country.  For  example, 
I    Langer  and  Zasloff,  op.  cit.,  p.  104,  speak  of  tribal  people  from  eastern  Laos  who 
j   have  "been  forced  out  by  the  pressures  of  war — primarily  the  intensified  bombing."  See 
\    also  the  Moose-Lowenstein  Report,  p.  20,  and  Refugee  Hearings,  April  21  and  22, 
,   1971,  pp.  37,  89-113.  Another  article,  about  refugees  in  southern  Laos  cites  the 
bombing  as  only  an  ancillary  cause  of  refugee  movement.  The  article  (Tammy  Ar- 
buckle,  "Ground  Combat — Laotian  Refugees  Cite  Life  Under  the  Reds,"  in  the 
Washington  Evening  Star,  January  17,  1971)  reports  "Ground  combat,  higher  living 
costs  and  poorer  living  conditions  under  the  communists  provide  the  greatest  incen- 
j  lives  to  leave  their  homes,  refugees  in  southern  Laos  say." 
i 

I  VHI. 

1.  One  prime  example  of  this  myopia  is  D.  Gareth  Porter's  "Subverting  Laotian 
Neutrality"  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.  While  cataloging  the  machinations  of  the 
I  United  States  and  its  "military  clients"  in  Laos  after  the  1962  Geneva  Agreements, 
I  Porter  omits  any  discussion  of  the  issue  of  North  Vietnamese  violations  of  the  Agree- 
[  ments.  He  does  not  say  whether  he  believes  there  were  no  DRV  violations  or  whether 
he  feels  that  DRV  intervention  was  somehow  warranted.  Rather,  he  ignores  the  whole 
issue  completely.  A  reverse  myopia  is  exhibited  by  Langer  and  Zasloff,  op.  cit.,  who 
focus  on  North  Vietnamese  intervention  and  completely  ignore  that  of  the  United 
i  States.  Langer  and  Zasloff  do,  however,  document  DRV  intervention  and  deception 
over  its  role  in  Laos.  See  Langer  and  ZaslofT,  op.  cit.,  pp.  164-180. 


292      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 

2.  See,  for  example,  Noam  Chomsky,  At  War  with  Asia  (New  York:  Vintage  Books 
of  Random  House,  1970),  pp.  213-234,  who  argues  that  DRV  involvement  in  Laos  has 
come  largely  after  and  in  response  to  U.S.  intervention  in  Laos.  The  evidence  now 
available  from  the  Pentagon  Papers  certainly  does  nothing  to  detract  from  such  a 
thesis.  It  is  also  relevant  to  point  out  that  official  U.S.  government  sources  recently 
acknowledged  that  "about  80  percent  of  all  North  Vietnamese  [in  Laos]  are  in  southern 
Laos  .  .  ."  {Moose-Lowenstein  Report,  p.  6).  These  forces  are  presumably  engaged 
chiefly  in  activities  connected  with  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  trail.  Thus  it  would  be  impossible 
to  judge  this  aspect  of  North  Vietnamese  involvement  in  Laos  without  also  judging 
the  whole  history  of  the  Vietnam  conflict  and  U.S.  intervention  in  it. 

3.  The  Cornell  Air  War  Study  Group  estimates  that  during  this  time  period,  the 
United  States  dropped  1,150,000  tons  of  bombs  on  the  trail  area  of  southern  Laos  i 
and  494,000  tons  on  northern  Laos,  Littaur  and  Uphoff,  op.  cit.,  p.  287.  For  a  de-  \ 
scription  of  what  the  bombing  has  done  to  the  once  verdant  Plain  of  Jars  see  T.  D. 
Allman,  "Landscape  Without  Figures"  in  the  Manchester  Guardian  (weekly),  Jan- 
uary 1,  1972.  Allman  writes,  "All  vegetation  has  been  destroyed  and  the  craters,  lit-  t 
erally,  are  countless."  | 

4.  In  addition  to  the  reports  of  Chapelier,  Decornoy,  USIS,  and  others  already 
cited,  an  Associated  Press  dispatch  in  October  1970  relates  how  villages  in  northern  \ 
Laos  were  bombed : 

Vientiane  (AP) 

Reliable  sources  confirmed  yesterday  a  report  that  U.S.  pilots  flying  bombing 
missions  over  northern  Laos  frequently  save  a  final  bomb  or  rocket  for  hitting 
unauthorized  civilian  targets.  .  .  . 

The  sources  said  unauthorized  bombing  by  individual  pilots  has  largely  destroyed 
the  Pathet  Lao  capital  of  Sam  Neua  and  many  other  Laotian  towns,  although  i 
population  centers  are  technically  off  limits  for  U.S.  fliers.  i 
Competition  among  pilots  often  begins  with  the  pilots  trying  to  see  who  can  I 
come  the  closest  to  a  town  without  actually  hitting  it  and  quickly  degenerates  I 
into  wiping  out  the  town,  the  sources  said  (Bangkok  World,  October  7,  1970). 

A  recent  column  by  Jack  Anderson  (Washington  Post,  February  19,  1972)  gives 

further  evidence  of  the  incredibly  grotesque  nature  of  U.S.  bombing  over  northern 

Laos.  Anderson  quotes  a  former  U.S.  Air  Force  sergeant: 

In  one  case  there  was  a  guy  in  the  Plain  of  Jars  area  who  was  crawling  away  ; 
after  they'd  hit  a  village  with  500  pounders.  So  they  dropped  a  250  pounder  on  | 
him.  That  blew  off  one  leg.  J 

He  was  still  moving  so  two  planes  went  in  and  dropped  anti-personnel  bombs 
and  they  got  that  one  guy  crawling  away. 

The  same  ex-Air  Force  man  also  recounted  the  bombing  of  a  Pathet  Lao  hospital. 

5.  Indeed  the  Laotian  Communists  seem  to  have  exercised  more  restraint  than  have  { 
their  comrades  elsewhere  in  Indochina.  For  example,  they  have  never  subjected  Vientiane  i 
to  any  rocket  attacks  similar  to  those  launched  against  Phnom  Penh  and  Saigon.  The 
Pathet  Lao  have,  however,  occasionally  launched  a  few  rockets  against  the  airfields  in 
Luang  Prabang  and  Pakse.  And  regardless  of  what  the  Pathet  Lao  have  done  in  Laos,  ii 
their  actions,  whatever  they  could  conceivably  have  done,  could  not  possibly  justify  I 
the  unilateral  U.S.  intervention  in  Laos. 

6.  The  foregoing  quotations  come  respectively  from  Gravel  ed.,  111:166,  316,  695, 
526. 

7.  In  justice  to  McNamara,  one  should  point  out  that  next  to  some  of  his  colleagues, 
the  Secretary  of  Defense,  at  least  after  his  "disenchantment,"  comes  across  as  a 
moderate.  For  example  in  March  1965  Maxwell  Taylor  cabled  Washington,  "'Current 
feverish  diplomatic  activity  particularly  by  French  and  British'  was  interfering  with  • 
the  ability  of  the  United  States  to  'progressively  turn  the  screws  on  D.R.V.'  "  (Sheehan  i 
et  ai,  op.  cit.,  p.  394).  Even  as  late  as  May  1967  Walt  Rostow  could  write,  "We  have  , 
held  that  the  degree  of  military  and  civilian  cost  felt  in  the  North  and  the  diversion  of 
resources  to  deal  with  our  bombing  could  contribute  marginally — and  perhaps  sig- 
nificantly— to  the  timing  of  a  decision  to  end  the  war"  (ibid.,  p.  574).  By  the  time 
Rostow  wrote  this  memo,  the  term  "civilian  cost"  was  no  longer  a  vague  supposition. 


The  Pentagon  Papers  and  U.S.  Involvement  in  Laos  293 

A  CIA  study  in  January  1967  had  reported  that  the  bombing  casualties  in  North 
Vietnam  were  "about  80  percent  civilians"  (Ibid.,  p.  523). 

8.  The  preceding  case  histories  are  documented  in  "A  Survey  of  Civilian  War 
Casualties  Among  Refugees  from  the  Plain  of  Jars,"  printed  in  U.S.  Senate,  Subcom- 

1     mittee  to  Investigate  Problems  Connected  with  Refugees  and  Escapees  of  the  Com- 
!      mittee  on  the  Judiciary,  World  Refugee  and  Humanitarian  Problems,  Hearings,  July  22, 
1971  (U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971). 

9.  There  are  a  number  of  indications  that  at  least  some  U.S.  officials  are  pleased  with 
f  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Laos,  For  example  see  the  Washington  Post,  January  11,  1972, 
I     for  a  letter  to  the  editor  from  Thomas  F.  McCoy,  a  former  CIA  agent  in  Laos.  McCoy 

asserts  that  the  job  done  by  the  CIA  in  Laos  "based  on  any  comparison  with  the  U.S. 
j     military  effort  in  Vietnam  would  have  to  be:  A  spectacular  success.""  Even  Senator 
1     Jacob  Javits  declared  the  conflict  in  Laos  "one  war  that  is  a  success"  (Symington 
j     Hearings,  p.  792).  And  Senator  Symington  expressed  a  similar  opinion:  "Why  do  we 
I     publish  our  military  failures  ...  in  Vietnam,  but  do  not  tell  the  people  about  our 
!     successes  in  Laos?"  (ibid.,  p.  790).  Implicit  in  these  declarations  of  success  is,  of 
course,  a  racist  assumption  that  a  war  is  more  "successful"  if  Asian  blood  is  shed  in- 
stead of  American.  For  a  discussion  of  the  U.S.  experience  of  "success"  in  Laos  as  a 
"model  for  future  American  counter-insurgency  operations  in  the  third  world,"  see 
I     Branfman  in  Adams  and  McCoy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  273-278. 


294 


15.  Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  The  Pathology 
of  Power 

by  Fredric  Branjman 


I.    THE  AGE  OF  SPEER 

Speer  is,  in  a  sense,  more  important  for  Germany  today  than  Hitler,  Himm- 
ler,  Goering,  Goebbels,  or  the  generals.  They  all  have,  in  a  way,  become 
the  mere  auxiliaries  of  the  man  who  directs  the  giant  power  machine — 
charged  with  drawing  from  it  the  maximum  effort  under  maximum  strain 
...  in  him  is  the  very  epitome  of  the  "managerial  revolution."  Speer  is 
not  one  of  the  flamboyant  and  picturesque  Nazis.  Whether  he  has  any 
other  than  conventional  political  opinions  is  unknown.  He  might  have 
joined  any  other  political  party  which  gave  him  a  job  and  a  career.  He  is 
very  much  the  successful  average  man,  well-dressed,  civil,  non-corrupt,  very 
middle  class  in  his  style  of  life,  with  a  wife  and  six  children.  Much  less 
than  any  of  the  other  German  leaders  does  he  stand  for  anything  par- 
ticularly German  or  particularly  Nazi.  He  rather  symbolizes  a  type  which  is 
becoming  increasingly  important  in  all  belligerent  countries;  the  pure  tech- 
nician, the  classless,  bright  young  man,  without  background,  with  no  other 
original  aim  than  to  make  his  way  in  the  world,  and  no  other  means  than 
his  technical  and  managerial  ability.  It  is  the  lack  of  psychological  and  spir- 
itual ballast  and  the  ease  with  which  he  handles  the  terrifying  technical  and 
organizational  machinery  of  our  age  which  makes  this  slight  type  go  ex- 
tremely far  nowadays.  .  .  . 

This  is  their  age;  the  Hitlers  and  Himmlers  we  may  get  rid  of,  but  the 
Speers,  whatever  happens  to  this  particular  special  man,  will  long  be  with  us. 

— London  Observer,  April  9,  1944. 

My  generation — I  was  nineteen  when  the  first  GI  was  killed  in  Vietnam  in 
1961 — does  not  share  the  same  sense  of  "betrayal"  that  so  many  of  Dan  Ells- 
berg's  peers  have  expressed  on  reading  the  Pentagon  Papers. 

Passing  our  teens  in  the  apolitical  fifties,  we  never  really  believed  in  John 
Kennedy  till  after  he  died,  nor  in  his  brother  till  just  before  he  was  killed.  And 
a  generation  immersed  in  Tolkien's  Lord  of  the  Rings  responded  to  Lyndon 
Johnson  and  Richard  Nixon  more  as  symbols  of  evil  than  as  men.  Whether  we 
called  it  the  System,  Capitalism,  Racism,  Amerika,  or  were  too  turned  off  to 
try,  we  felt  instinctively  that  such  men  were  but  expressions  of  a  deeper  malaise. 
We  felt  betrayed  by  the  very  existence  of  a  Johnson  or  Nixon,  not  because  as 
President  they  failed  our  trust  in  them. 

For  many  of  us,  then,  the  real  importance  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  does  not 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Fredric  Branfman. 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  295 

lie  in  the  machinations  of  the  McNamaras,  McNaughtons,  Rostows,  Bundys, 
and  Johnsons.  It  is,  rather,  in  the  men  who  wrote  the  Papers  themselves. 

These  men,  after  all,  were  the  real  key  to  American  activities  in  Indochina. 
The  President  and  his  advisers  may  have  made  the  rules.  But  it  was  the  Papers' 
1    authors,  filling  top  posts  in  the  CIA,  Pentagon,  State  Department,  and  Depart- 
j    ment  of  Defense,  who  played  the  game  out.  A  President  and  his  advisers  said 
I    "win."  The  Papers'  authors  designed  the  Phoenix  programs,  strategic  hamlets, 
search  and  destroy  missions,  B-52  bombing  raids,  in  an  attempt  to  do  so.  Johnson 
and  Kennedy  were  safely  back  in  the  White  House.  These  younger  men  between 
j    thirty  and  forty-five,  the  cream  of  their  generation,  were  out  in  "the  field"  direct- 
!    ing  military  operations,  fingering  Vietnamese  for  assassination  or  torture,  spying 
or  being  fired  at  themselves,  making  studies  aimed  at  breaking  guerrilla  morale 
I    and  dismantling  an  ancient  culture. 

:  And  so,  perusing  the  Pentagon  Papers,  one  finds  oneself  pondering  the  minds 
of  those  writing  it  as  they  gritted  their  teeth  and  ground  on  through  twenty  years 
of  trickery  and  deceit.  What  is  it  like  to  realize  that  your  leaders  were  simply 

;  using  you  as  vehicles  for  their  own  vanity  and  careers?  That  a  cause  to  which 
you  devoted  the  best  years  of  your  life  was  a  fraud?  That  an  effort  for  which 
you  risked  your  very  life  was  only  mounted  through  manipulation  and  deceit  of 
the  people  back  home  for  whom  you  were  supposedly  fighting?  That  you  have 
participated  in  the  murder  of  an  officially  estimated  2  million  Asians  and  Amer- 
icans as  a  result  of  an  aggressive  war  waged  not  by  the  enemy  but  by  your  own 
leaders? 

\  Some  of  the  Papers'  authors,  of  course,  have  clearly  reacted  with  a  shock  and 
1  concern  which  extends  beyond  themselves.  Few  who  know  EUsberg  and  Russo, 
for  example,  doubt  their  concern  for  both  the  suffering  of  the  Indochinese  abroad 
and  the  assault  on  democracy  at  home.  But  what  of  the  others?  Were  it  not  for 
Ellsberg  and  Russo,  after  all,  the  Papers  would  never  have  even  been  made 
public.  More  importantly,  few  of  the  other  authors  have  followed  their  lead 
by  similar  revelations,  in-depth  critiques,  public  protest,  or  even  public  support 
for  Ellsberg  and  Russo.  Is  it  mere  indifference?  Cowardice?  Or  is  it,  perhaps, 
something  a  bit  more  profound?  A  feeling  of  power  manque,  perchance?  Do 
their  real  objections  to  policy — as  voiced  so  obliquely  but  frequently  in  the 
Pentagon  Papers — stem  from  the  belief  that  they  could  have  done  it  better?  Do 
these  men,  for  all  their  frustrations  over  the  misuse  of  power  in  this  particular 
war,  still  secretly  hanker  for  some  of  their  own?  Are  they  still  holding  on  within 
the  Pentagon,  CIA,  law  firms,  corporations,  think  tanks,  universities,  hoping  for 
,   their  day  at  the  helm? 

i  Well,  we  certainly  won't  all  agree  on  the  answers.  But,  having  been  asked  to 
write  this  chapter  on  the  post-Pentagon  Papers  phase  of  the  Indochina  war,  I  find 
it  necessary  to  begin  with  such  questions.  For  any  description  of  what  occurred 
after  March  1968  must  begin  with  the  following  concluding  passage  from  the 
Papers — surely  one  of  the  most  remarkable  and  incomprehensible  in  the  political 

\  history  of  this  nation : 

The  speech  [Johnson's  announcement  of  the  partial  bombing  halt]  had 
an  electric  effect  on  the  U.S.  and  the  whole  world  ...  it  was  unmistakably 
clear  throughout  all  this  time  that  a  major  corner  in  the  war  and  in  American 
policy  had  been  turned  and  that  there  was  no  going  back.  .  .  .  The  Presi- 
dent's speech  at  the  end  of  March  was,  of  course,  not  the  end  of  the  bomb- 
ing much  less  the  war,  and  a  further  history  of  the  role  of  the  limited  strikes 
could  and  should  be  undertaken.  But  the  decision  to  cut  back  the  bombing. 


296      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

the  decision  that  turned  American  policy  toward  a  peaceful  settlement  of 
the  war  [emphasis  added]  is  a  logical  and  fitting  place  to  terminate  this 
particular  inquiry  about  the  policy  process  that  surrounded  the  air  war. 
Henceforth,  the  decisions  about  the  bombing  would  be  made  primarily  in 
the  Pacific  by  the  field  commanders.  ...  A  very  significant  chapter  in  the 
history  of  U.S.  involvement  in  the  Vietnam  war  had  come  to  a  close  .  .  . 
partial  suspension  [of  the  bombing]  in  part  did  produce  what  most  had  least 
expected — a  breakthrough  in  the  deadlock  over  negotiations.  And  that  in 
the  longer  view  of  history  may  turn  out  to  be  its  most  significant  contribution 
(Gravel  edition,  IV:275-276). 

One  is  prepared  to  find  John  Q.  Public,  lied  to  and  manipulated  by  his  leaders 
at  every  turn,  ready  to  believe  the  incredible  assertion  that  the  March  3 1  bombing 
halt  over  North  Vietnam  was  "the  decision  that  turned  American  policy  toward 
a  peaceful  settlement  to  the  war."  But  the  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers? 

These  men,  after  all,  had  just  completed  months  of  reading  tens  of  thousands 
of  pages  of  official  documents  and  public  records  of  an  Indochina  war  already 
more  than  two  decades  long.  They  had  learned  in  intimate  detail  how  no  Amer- 
ican administration  had  ever  shown  the  slightest  willingness  to  allow  the  Indo- 
Chinese  to  settle  their  own  affairs,  that  even  Roosevelt,  opposing  French  colonial- 
ism at  a  time  when  the  Viet-Minh  was  aiding  the  United  States,  had  never  done 
more  than  propose  the  vague  idea  of  a  trusteeship.  The  writers  had  before  them 
official  documentation — top-secret  to  boot — that  not  once  for  twenty  years  had 
American  leaders  ever  even  considered  the  idea  of  withdrawal;  that  all  of  those 
memos,  cables,  reports,  papers,  notes,  dealt  solely  with  the  means  of  keeping 
the  United  States  in  Indochina. 

There  was  that  final  State  Department  cable,  which  the  New  York  Times  later 
entitled,  "Cable  to  Envoys  in  Asia  on  Day  of  Johnson's  De-Escalation  Speech." 
It  made  it  as  explicit  as  necessary  that  March  1968  marked  no  change  in  U.S. 
goals  in  Indochina:  ".  .  .  air  power  now  used  north  of  20th  can  probably  be 
used  in  Laos  (where  no  policy  change  planned)  and  in  SVN." 

Surely  they  must  have  realized  that  the  bombing  halts  of  March  and  November 
1968  had  nothing  to  do  with  turning  toward  "peaceful  settlement."  That,  in  fact, 
by  continuing  secret  bombing  in  Laos  while  decreasing  the  highly  publicized  air 
war  in  North  Vietnam,  American  policymakers  would  find  themselves  free  to 
wage  more  war  than  ever.  That  far  from  bringing  "limited  strikes,"  March  31 
was  to  mark  the  beginning  of  the  most  indiscriminate  bombing  in  the  history  of 
warfare. 

The  passage  quoted  above  was  written  March  31,  1968.  By  March  31,  1972, 
U.S.  bombers  had  dropped  over  4,450,000  tons  of  bombs  on  Indochina,  twice 
as  much  U.S.  bombing  as  was  absorbed  by  Europe  and  the  entire  Pacific  theater 
during  World  War  II  (2,044,000  tons — source:  Pentagon). 

During  these  four  years,  official  Pentagon  figures  say  that  over  600,000  com- 
batants have  been  killed  (31,205  Americans,  86,101  ARVN,  and  475,609 
"enemy,"  as  of  February  26,  1972);  nearly  twice  that  number  has  been  wounded. 

During  these  four  years,  well  over  3  million  civilians  have  been  killed,  wounded 
or  made  homeless,  according  to  estimates  of  the  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  on 
Refugees. 

During  these  four  years,  American  leaders  have:  tripled  the  bombing  of  Laos, 
going  from  50  to  100  sorties  per  day  to  200  to  300;  invaded  Laos  in  the  south 
with  20,000  U.S.-supported  ARVN  and  the  north  with  10,000  CIA-funded 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  297 

Thais;  resumed  the  bombing  of  North  Vietnam  after  the  November  1968  bomb- 
ing halt — hitting  it  on  328  separate  occasions  under  Nixon;  initiated  a  fullscale, 

!  no-holds-barred  war  in  once-peaceful  Cambodia;  and  spent  billions  on  expanding 
the  political  control  of  the  Thieu  regime  through  such  steps  as  building  new 
Tiger  cages,  increasing  the  secret  police,  and  mushrooming  the  Phoenix  program 
of  CIA  assassination  and  abduction. 

What  prevented  the  authors  of  the  Papers  from  realizing  that  March  1968 

'  represented  just  one  more  change  of  tactics?  That  in  the  perspective  of  twenty 
years,  Johnson's  commitment  of  U.S.  ground  troops  was  a  mere  aberration? 
That  whoever  followed  him  would  simply  correct  this  error  by  reverting  to  a 

i  pattern  of  relying  upon  massive  doses  of  U.S.  materiel,  advisers  and  technology 
supplied  to  Asians  who  would  do  the  dying?  That  far  from  leading  to  a  "peace- 

,    ful  setdement,"  the  March  31  speech  would  be  followed  by  far  more  wholesale 

I  slaughter  in  Laos  and  Cambodia  than  had  ever  occurred  in  North  Vietnam?  That 
in  April  1972,  the  American  Executive  Branch  would  remain  as  institutionally 
committed  to  interfering  in  Indochina  as  it  was  in  1950  when  its  present  leader 
was  warming  up  on  homegrown  Red-baiting?  Was  it  naivete?  Unquenchable 
optimism?  A  desire  to  please  McNamara  and  Clifford,  who  both  pushed  for  the 
bombing  halt?  An  attempt  to  share  credit  for  a  policy  which  presumably  many  of 
the  authors  of  the  Papers  themselves  had  argued  for? 

I       I  don't  know.  I  suppose  it  is  all  of  these  things.  I  think,  though,  that  it  was 

j    also  something  more,  something  which  is  itself  the  genesis  of  the  mechanized 

\    devastation  that  was  to  follow  March  1968. 

j       The  authors  of  these  papers  are,  above  all,  technicians.  Critics  who  claim 

(  they  lack  perspective  may  be  quite  right.  But  not  because  they  lacked  more 
pieces  of  paper  from  the  White  House,  CIA  or  wherever. 

They  lack  perspective  because  they  have  come  no  closer  to  hearing  the  screams 
of  the  Indochinese  than  the  men  they  served;  because  though  they  may  finally 
have  believed  the  RAND  studies  which  showed  high  morale  and  spirit  among  the 

;    "enemy,"  they  have  no  more  feeling  for  what  that  spirit  is  than  do  their  leaders 

„    who  failed  to  kill  it. 

f  These  men  are,  in  a  word,  still  inside  the  machine.  Like  gauges,  they  can 
measure,  quantify,  identify  breakdowns  and  trouble-spots;  but  they  cannot  step 
outside  and  set  their  own  direction;  like  Ellsberg  and  Russo  they  can  describe 
the  mistakes  in  U.S.  policy  toward  Vietnam;  but  unlike  these  two  men,  they  are 

I    unwilling  to  do  all  that  really  matters  anymore:  act  to  stop  it. 

I  If  there  is  a  pathology  of  power  expressed  in  American  intervention  in  Viet- 
nam, then,  it  extends  far  beyond  the  top  policymakers;  and,  indeed,  the  par- 
ticular fascination  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  for  my  generation  is  the  realization 
that  a  whole  new  generation  of  technocrats  is  waiting  in  the  wings  to  replace 
the  Rostows,  Bundys,  Kissingers  and  McNamaras;  that  these  men,  the  authors 
of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  are  even  now  helping  to  execute  new  Vietnams  at  home 

,   and  abroad  despite  all  that  they  know  and  all  they  have  seen. 

j      The  time  has  long  passed  for  all  of  us  to  realize  that  an  editorial  on  Speer 

i  which  appeared  in  the  London  Observer  twenty-eight  years  ago  showed  remark- 
able prescience;  that  this  country  has  produced  its  own  class  of  "pure  technicians, 

V  classless,  bright  young  men  without  background,  with  no  other  original  aim 

i  than  to  make  their  way  in  the  world,  and  no  other  means  than  their  technical  and 
managerial  ability";  and  that  the  Johnsons  and  Nixons  we  may  get  rid  of,  but 
that  the  authors  of  the  Pentagon  Papers — whatever  happens  to  these  particular 

L  special  men — will  long  be  with  us.  That  this  is,  indeed,  their  age. 


298      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

It  is  no  quirk  of  fate  that  though  March  1968  may  mark  the  end  for  the  j 
Pentagon  Papers,  it  was  a  mere  punctuation  point  in  a  new  and  even  bloodier 
chapter  in  the  sorry  history  of  American  intervention  in  Indochina. 

II.    TRANSITION:  MARCH  1968  THROUGH  JANUARY  1969 

I 

In  the  region  of  the  Plain  of  Jars  there  came  to  be  a  lake  of  blood  and 
destruction,  most  pitiful  for  children,  friends  and  old  people.  For  there  were 
airplanes  and  the  sound  of  bombs  throughout  the  sky  and  hills.  .  .  .  Every 
day  and  every  night  the  planes  came  to  drop  bombs  on  us.  We  lived  in  j 
holes  to  protect  our  lives.  There  were  bombs  of  many  kinds  [and]  shooting  | 
and  death  from  the  planes.  ...  I  saw  my  cousin  die  in  the  field  of  death. 
My  heart  was  most  disturbed  and  my  voice  called  out  loudly  as  I  ran  to  the 
houses.  Thusly  I  saw  the  life  and  death  for  the  people  on  account  of  the  \ 
war  of  many  airplanes.  .  .  .  Until  there  were  no  houses  at  all.  And  the  |j 
cows  and  buffalo  were  dead.  Until  everything  was  leveled  and  you  could  see 
only  the  red,  red  ground.  I  think  of  this  time  and  still  I  am  afraid. 

— from  essays  by  Laotian  peasants  from  the  Plain  of  j 
Jars  (from  Voices  from  the  Plain  of  Jars, 
Branfman,  ed.,  Harper  and  Row) 

The  aftermath  of  the  February  1968  Tet  Offensive  faced  American  planners 
with  a  tactical  dilemma.  j 

Both  the  first  (1946-1954)  and  second  (1961-1968)  Indochina  wars  had  j 
been  built  around  large  Western  expeditionary  ground  forces,  supported  by  even  j 
greater  numbers  of  local  conscripts  and  mercenaries. 

Airpower  had  of  course  been  used  lavishly — particularly  from  1965  through 
1968.  But  its  essential  function,  even  at  its  peak,  when  120,000  tons  fell  every  j 
month  in  1968,  was  to  support  the  half  million-man  U.S.  ground  army  deployed  j 
in  Vietnam.  Most  of  the  American  funds,  personnel,  and  blood  went  into  the  j 
ground  effort.  | 

Tet  proved,  however,  that  this  could  not  continue.  This  most  highly  publicized  ] 
of  ground  wars  had  already  excited  vocal  and  increasingly  powerful  domestic 
opposition  on  moral  grounds;  antiwar  activities  were,  moreover,  winning  in- 
creasing support  from  the  public  at  large  due  to  the  high  cost  of  the  war  ($33  j 
billion  in  the  peak  year  of  1968)  and  high  American  deaths  (thirty-men-a-day  j 
average  through  1967);  many  factions  within  the  Pentagon  itself  were  not  happy  | 
with  the  high  cost  of  supporting  the  ground  army,  diverting  funds  from  more  ' 
expensive  and  highly  technological  weapons  systems;  and,  in  many  ways  most 
importantly,  the  army  itself  had  begun  to  fall  apart  from  within — lack  of  leader- 
ship in  the  field  and  public  disaffection  with  the  war  at  home  had  already  begun 
to  lead  to  refusals  to  fight,  fraggings  of  officers,  heightened  black-white  tensions, 
and  a  skyrocketing  use  of  drugs. 

Tet  proved  the  coup  de  grace  to  any  hopes  of  holding  on  through  ground 
intervention.  It  was  bad  enough  that  the  war  was  immoral,  costly,  killing  Amer- 
ican boys,  and  supporting  a  bunch  of  corrupt  Asian  generals  who  showed  their 
gratitude  by  selling  heroin  to  our  soldiers.  But  that  the  war  was  also  unwinnable,  ' 
that  all  this  pain  had  been  endured  in  a  war  that  could  never  be  won,  finally  * 
proved  too  much.  The  guerrillas  might  never  defeat  the  United  States  decisively  ' 
on  the  battlefield.  But  they  could  exhaust  domestic  opinion  back  at  home  simply 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  299 

by  holding  on  through  shows  of  strength.  As  Henry  Kissinger  later  put  it  in 
an  article  in  Foreign  Affairs,  "the  guerrilla  wins  as  long  as  he  does  not  lose." 

The  U.S.  ground  army  would  be  withdrawn.  It  would  be  a  long,  slow,  painful 
process.  Over  30,000  more  Americans  would  die  after  Tet;  tens  of  thousands  of 
new  men  would  become  addicted  to  heroin;  internal  problems  would  grow  to 
such  proportions  that  by  June  1971  a  Colonel  Robert  Heinl  would  write  an 
article  entitled  "The  Collapse  of  the  Armed  Forces,"  in  the  Armed  Forces 
Journal,  stating  that  "by  every  conceivable  indicator,  our  army  that  now  remains 
in  Vietnam  is  in  a  state  approaching  collapse,  with  individual  units  avoiding  or 
having  refused  combat,  murdering  their  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers, 
drug-ridden,  and  dispirited  where  not  near-mutinous."  But  the  American  ground 
troops  would  come  out  until,  at  this  writing,  there  were  but  a  few  thousand  still 
left  in  combat.  But  while  withdrawing  U.S.  combat  troops,  American  planners 
could  no  more  rely  on  their  Asian  armies  in  1969  than  the  French  could  in  1945. 
Poorly  led,  composed  largely  of  mercenaries  and  unwilling  conscripts,  graft- 
ridden  and  dispirited,  U.S. -supported  Asians  were  simply  no  match  for  their 
highly  motivated  guerrilla  adversaries. 

Much  of  this  remained  hidden  from  the  American  public.  The  NLF  was  to 
greatly  decrease  its  fighting  in  South  Vietnam  following  1968 — presumably  to 
allow  U.S.  troop  withdrawals  to  be  completed — and  this  allowed  pro-administra- 
tion observers  to  ballyhoo  the  success  of  "Vietnamization";  the  press  on  its  side 
did  not  report  military  operations  by  Asian  troops  in  anything  like  the  detail  with 
which  it  had  reported  American  fighting. 

On  one  occasion  in  September  1970,  for  example,  I  was  visited  by  a  former 
U.S.  Special  Forces  operative  named  Ed  Rasen.  Rasen  had  just  spent  two  weeks 
with  a  massive  ARVN  operation  up  near  the  Laotian  border  as  a  freelance 
photographer.  He  had  been  the  only  American  actually  out  in  the  field  with 
the  Asian  troops.  For  several  evenings  he  regaled  me  with  stories  of  the  failures 
of  the  operation:  ARVN  troops  deserting,  ARVN  troops  running  away  at  the 
sight  of  a  possible  enemy  soldier,  ARVN  commanders  calling  in  airstrikes  on 
their  own  positions.  The  most  bizarre  tale  was  that  of  one  platoon  which  found 
a  large  enemy  cache  of  weapons,  was  told  to  carry  them  to  the  top  of  a  hill 
where  they  could  be  brought  back  to  Saigon  for  a  display  of  captured  enemy 
weapons,  refused,  and  finally  left  the  weapons  where  they  had  found  them. 

Rasen  spoke  with  some  contempt  of  American  journalists  who  never  actually 
went  out  in  the  field  with  the  troops  to  observe  them,  but  wrote  their  stories  based 
on  visits  to  the  forward  base  of  operations  where  they  received  rosy  briefings 
by  Vietnamese  officers  and  U.S.  advisers. 

Sure  enough,  several  days  later  I  opened  up  a  New  York  Times  "News  of  the 
Week  in  Review"  to  read  an  article  by  James  Sterba  describing  that  very  ARVN 
operation  as  one  of  the  great  successes  of  Vietnamization  until  that  point. 

Despite  such  public-relations  successes,  however,  it  was  as  clear  to  U.S.  mili- 
tary planners  in  1969  as  it  is  today  that  neither  the  ARVN,  RLA  (Royal  Lao 
Army)  nor  FANK  (Armed  Forces  of  the  Khmer  Nation)  could  do  a  job  that 
half  a  million  U.S.  foot  soldiers  could  not  do.  Casual  readers  of  the  newspapers 
may  have  been  surprised  when  "Vietnamization"  proved  so  conspicuous  a  failure 
during  the  ARVN  invasion  of  southern  Laos  in  February  1971,  the  Thai/Lao 
attempt  to  hold  the  Plain  of  Jars  in  December  1971,  the  operations  in  Cambodia 
1970-72,  the  collapse  at  Quang  Tri  in  April  1972.  To  anyone  living  in  Indochina, 
not  to  mention  U.S.  tacticians,  such  debacles  were  to  be  expected. 

The  Nixon  administration's  accession  to  power  in  January  1969  thus  set  into 


300      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

motion  a  changed  tactical  situation.  Forced  to  withdraw  U.S.  ground  troops  and  ; 
unable  to  rely  on  Asian  allies,  hut  fully  committed  to  remaining  on  in  Indochina,  ; 
the  administration  had  but  one  alternative:  to  place  a  new  priority  on  the  use  t 
of  airpower.  January  1969  saw  the  focus  of  U.S.  military  involvement  gradually  j 
begin  to  shift  from  the  ground  to  the  air.  !! 

There  was  ample  precedent  for  this  change.  The  Johnson  administration  had  j 
earlier  initiated  a  fullscale  mechanized  war  in  Laos,  one  which  involved  but  i 
several  hundred  U.S.  foot  soldiers.  Beginning  in  May  1964,  the  air  war  had  by  | 
January  1969  already  seen  tens  of  thousands  of  American  airmen  involved  in  j 
delivering  410,000  tons  of  bombs  into  Laos  (see  The  Air  War  in  Indochina  j 
[Beacon  Press,  1972],  p.  281,  the  revised  edition  of  the  Cornell  Air  War  study);  j 
thousands  of  villages  had  been  destroyed;  tens  of  thousands  of  civilians  had 
been  killed  or  wounded;  and  hundreds  of  thousands  had  been  driven  under- 
ground or  into  refugee  camps  (see  "Presidential  War  in  Laos:  1964-1970,"  ; 
by  F.  Branfman  in  Laos:  War  and  Revolution,  Adams  and  McCoy,  eds..  Harper 
and  Row) .  \ 

This  war  had  already  proved  eminently  successful  from  the  point  of  view  of 
our  Executive  branch.  It  was  relatively  cheap  in  dollars  and  American  lives,  and 
— most  importantly — free  from  domestic  criticism  due  to  a  highly  successful  policy 
of  news  management.  As  Undersecretary  of  State  U.  Alexis  Johnson  was  later  to  j 
testify  to  Congress,  "The  only  U.S.  forces  involved  in  Laos  are  the  air.  We  have 
no  combat  forces  stationed  there.  And  I  personally  feel  that  although  the  way  , 
that  the  operation  has  been  run  is  unorthodox,  unprecedented,  as  I  said,  in  | 
many  ways  I  think  it  is  something  of  which  we  can  be  proud  of  as  Americans. 
It  has  involved  virtually  no  American  casualties.  What  we  are  getting  for  our  j 
money  there  ...  is,  I  think,  to  use  the  old  phrase,  very  cost  effective"  (Hear-  ] 
ings  of  the  Senate  Armed  Forces  Committee,  July  22,  1971,  p.  4289). 

And  this  shift  to  the  air  in  no  way  implied  any  change  in  the  real  focal  point  of 
American  involvement:  control  of  the  cities  and  towns  of  South  Vietnam.  By 
1969,  as  today,  the  only  tangible  goal  of  American  leaders  was  to  keep  a  pro-U.S. 
regime  in  power  in  South  Vietnam  at  least  until  the  next  American  election. 
Doing  this  meant  ever-increasing  repression  in  the  urban  centers.  During  Nixon's 
first  two  and  one  half  years  in  office,  for  example,  the  State  Department  officially 
admits  that  the  CIA-run  Phoenix  program  murdered  or  abducted  35,708  Viet- 
namese civilians,  4,836  more  than  the  Pentagon  claimed  the  NLF  had  assassinated 
or  kidnapped  during  the  same  period,  and  a  monthly  increase  in  murder  of  250 
percent  over  the  200  killed  by  the  CIA  every  month  under  Johnson;  and  the 
greatly  increased  arrests  of  political  prisoners  by  the  Thieu  regime  reached  a 
crescendo  after  the  one-man  October  1971  election.  As  the  New  York  Times 
reported  on  April  2,  1972  "University  and  high  school  students  .  .  .  charge 
that  their  leaders  have  been  disappearing  from  the  streets  and  ending  up  in 
prison.  ...  'I  cannot  remember  a  period  since  Thieu  came  to  power  when 
so  many  student  arrests  have  been  made,'  a  university  student  said.  .  .  .  Tales 
of  torture  and  beating  proliferate.  Articles  in  student  publications  report  violent 
treatment  during  captivity." 

But  despite  this  continued  focus  on  political  control  in  Vietnam,  the  sum 
total  of  the  Nixon  administration's  military  tactics  is  a  new  form  of  warfare. 

By  continuing  the  bombing  while  withdrawing  American  ground  troops,  the 
administration  has  come  to  wage  the  most  fully  automated  war  in  military  history; 
in  waging  such  war,  it  has  inevitably  been  led  into  total  war,  one  which  cannot 
distinguish  between  military  and  civilian  targets  and  winds  up  destroying  every- 
thing in  its  path. 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  301 

And,  most  importantly,  the  administration  has  come  to  wage  the  most  hidden 
war  in  history.  If  domestic  opinion  was  the  main  obstacle  to  continuing  the  war, 
then,  clearly,  hiding  the  war  from  the  American  people  would  become  a  major 
goal;  and  troop  withdrawals,  diminishing  dollar  cost,  lower  U.S.  casualties  and 
an  unseen  use  of  airpower  afforded  the  means.  In  a  sense,  the  Nixon  administra- 
tion has  launched  the  most  ambitious  attempt  in  history  to  reverse  Kissinger's 
doctrine:  through  secrecy,  it  is  today  the  administration  which  wins  if  it  does  not 
lose." 

This  automated,  total,  secret  war  is  not  merely  more  of  the  same.  For  until 
Nixon,  foreign  interveners  in  Indochina  had  always  depended  on  ground  armies. 
We  prefer  to  think  of  this  new  war  under  Nixon  as  a  third  Indochina  war. 

III.    FROM  THE  NIXON  INAUGURAL  TO  THE 
1972  SPRING  OFFENSIVE 

In  the  defense  report  which  I  made  to  Congress  this  year,  I  tried  to  point 
out  that  we  would  be  continuing  air  and  sea  power  and  the  presence  of  air 
and  sea  power  in  Asia  for  a  good  time.  .  .  .  This  idea  that  somehow  or 
other  the  Nixon  Doctrine  means  that  we  will  not  have  air  or  sea  power  in 
Asia  is  a  great  mistake.  .  .  . 

— Secretary  of  Defense  Melvin  Laird  on  NBC's 
"Meet  the  Press,"  November  14,  1971 

Do  I  think  that  a  war  that  has  gone  on  for  30  years  is  going  to  end?  The 
answer  is  no  .  .  .  our  policy  is  to  get  U.S.  troops  out  of  the  war. 

— Secretary  Laird,  Washington  Post,  April  11,  1972 

The  secrecy  of  Mr.  Nixon's  war-making  in  Indochina  is  most  dramatically 
illustrated  by  the  fact  that  the  three  events  which  sparked  the  greatest  domestic 
debate  during  his  first  three  years  in  office  were  relatively  unimportant  to  the 
Indochinese.  The  U.S.  invasion  of  Cambodia  in  May  1970,  the  Son  Tay  prison 
raid  in  November  1970,  and  the  invasion  of  southern  Laos  in  February  1971  were 
all  most  significant,  to  be  sure.  But  they  were  all  relatively  short-term,  conspicuous 
in  their  failure,  and  did  little  to  affect  the  overall  course  of  events.  And,  most 
importantly,  all  were  of  relatively  little  consequence  compared  to  Mr.  Nixon's 
most  serious  escalations:  his  expansion  and  increasingly  sophisticated  use  of  the 
United  States'  highly  technological  air  power:  his  permanent  use  of  the  ARVN 
for  fullscale  fighting  in  Cambodia  and  Thais  for  the  war  in  Laos;  and  his  increas- 
ingly flagrant  disregard  for  the  rights  of  civilian  populations  in  times  of  war. 

The  full  extent  of  the  Nixon  administration's  war-making  in  Indochina  can 
only  be  appreciated  by  recalling  the  situation  when  Mr.  Nixon  first  took  office. 

The  war  was  primarily  a  contracting  ground  war  within  South  Vietnam  on 
January  20,  1969.  The  bombing  of  North  Vietnam  had  ceased  three  months 
earlier;  Cambodia  was  still  at  peace  under  Prince  Sihanouk;  and  though  the 
bombing  of  Laos  had  tripled  with  the  bombing  halt  over  North  Vietnam,  such 
heavy  bombing  had  only  been  going  on  for  three  months  at  that  point. 

Within  South  Vietnam,  the  situation  was  more  susceptible  to  a  negotiated 
settlement  than  at  any  time  since  the  buildup  of  American  ground  troops  began 
in  1965.  It  was  clearly  in  the  NLF's  interest  to  permit  Mr.  Nixon  to  withdraw 
gracefully,  but  completely,  and  it  is  an  open  secret  that  they  offered  such  a 
solution.  As  a  high-ranking  official  in  Undersecretary  of  State  John  Irwin's  office 


302      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers /Vol.  V 

was  later  to  tell  me  in  March  1971,  "the  NLF  offered  the  President  a  face- 
saving  formula  for  withdrawal  when  he  first  took  office.  They  told  him  they 
would  not  embarrass  him,  that  they  would  allow  him  to  play  any  charades  he 
wished  with  Vietnamization,  as  long  as  he  set  a  fixed  date  for  total  withdrawal 
within  a  reasonable  amount  of  time.  But  the  President  said  no." 

Instead,  the  focus  of  the  fighting  was  gradually  shifted  from  South  Vietnam 
into  Laos  and  Cambodia.  In  this  way  the  war  became  less  visible  and — coupled 
with  U.S.  ground  troop  withdrawals — served  to  give  the  illusion  that  things  were 
"'winding  down." 

The  heavy  bombing  of  Laos  continued  at  a  rate  double  that  of  1968.  Between 
January  1969  and  December  1971,  according  to  the  Cornell  Air  War  study,  over 
L3  million  tons  of  bombs  were  dropped  on  that  tiny  land.  This  was  four  times  as 
much  bombing  as  had  occurred  between  1948  and  1968,  eight  times  more  bomb- 
ing than  that  absorbed  by  Japan  during  World  War  II. 

This  bombing  is  particularly  characterized  by  the  heavy  civilian  toll  it  has 
taken.  As  a  September  1970  staff  report  of  the  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  on 
Refugees  has  reported,  'The  United  States  has  undertaken  ...  a  large-scale  air 
war  over  Laos  to  destroy  the  physical  and  social  infrastructure  in  Pathet  Lao 
areas.  .  .  .  The  bombing  has  taken  and  is  taking  a  heavy  toll  among  civilians" 
(p.  19). 

Between  1969  and  March  1972  the  bombing  is  estimated  to  have  created 
some  3,500,000  refugees  (including  those  who  were  brought  into  the  U.S.-con- 
trolled  areas,  and  those  who  remained  in  Pathet  Lao  zones  but  were  forced  to 
retreat  underground);  I  interviewed  several  thousand  of  these  people  during  my 
years  in  Laos,  and  each  one  said  that  his  or  her  village  had  been  partially  or 
totally  destroyed  by  American  bombing,  and  that  he'd  been  forced  to  live  under- 
ground for  weeks  and  months  on  end. 

Civilian  killed  and  wounded  were  also  high.  In  the  summer  of  1970  the  U.S. 
Information  Service  conducted  a  survey  among  30,000  refugees  from  the  Plain 
of  Jars  in  Northeastern  Laos.  The  Plain  of  Jars,  formerly  inhabited  by  50,000 
people,  was  totally  bombed  out  between  January  and  September  1969.  The 
USIS  survey  took  a  wide  opinion  sample  among  more  than  200  refugees  from 
96  separate  villages  spread  throughout  the  Plain.  The  report  found  that  95  per- 
cent of  the  people  had  had  their  villages  bombed,  68  percent  had  seen  someone 
wounded,  and  61  percent  had  seen  a  person  killed  (reprinted  on  p.  15,  U.S. 
Senate  Subcommittee  hearings  on  Laos,  April  1971;  see  also  a  survey  of  civilian 
casualties  from  the  Plain  of  Jars,  prepared  by  Walter  Haney,  and  reprinted  in  the 
July  1971  hearings  of  the  same  subcommittee). 

Equally  striking,  civilian  casualties  have  vastly  outnumbered  military  killed 
and  wounded  in  Laos.  The  same  USIS  survey,  for  example,  found  that  80  percent 
of  the  casualties  were  civilian  and  20  percent  Pathet  Lao. 

The  heavy  bombing  of  the  civilian  population  in  Laos  was  in  part  due  to  the 
fact  there  are  no  "strategic"  targets — such  as  factories,  large  bridges,  petroleum 
refineries;  and  those  "military"  targets  that  do  exist — soldiers,  trucks,  truck  parks, 
or  whatever,  are  rarely  locatable  from  the  air.  The  guerrillas  sleep  by  day,  move 
by  night,  through  the  forest,  in  small  groups;  trucks  also  move  at  night,  are 
camouflaged  during  the  day;  and  the  mobile,  small  units  of  the  guerrilla  forces 
simply  do  not  depend  on  large  fixed  storage  areas  or  base  camps.  When  American 
pilots  did  go  up  over  Laos  in  the  hundreds,  they  were  simply  not  prepared  to 
dump  their  bombs  at  random  out  in  the  forest;  they  inevitably  wound  up  striking 
at  such  signs  of  human  life  which  could  be  found:  footprints,  cut  grass,  smoke 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  303 

i  from  fires,  plowed  or  cultivated  fields.  Invariably,  such  signs  of  life  were  in  and 
;     around  villages;  invariably  they  were  provided  by  civilians. 

There  are  also  many  indications  that  the  CIA  continually  pushed  for  bombing 
of  villages  in  Laos  as  a  matter  of  deliberate  policy.  Former  targeting  officers  I 
have  interviewed  have  stated  time  and  again  that  the  CIA  exerted  constant  pres- 
I     sure  beginning  in  1967  to  have  villages  removed  from  the  restricted  target  listing. 
This  appears  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  the  CIA  had  created  its  own  Secret 
Army  in  Laos,  based  originally  on  Meo  tribesmen  in  northern  Laos.  As  the  tides 
I    of  war  began  to  turn  against  the  Meo  in  1966  and  1967,  the  CIA  apparently 
I   decided  that  bombing  the  Pathet  Lao  "economic  and  social  infrastructure"  was 
1    necessary  to  save  its  position.  Although  these  pressures  from  the  CIA  were  re- 
:    sisted  in  the  beginning,  the  Nixon  administration  eventually  acceded  entirely  to 
j    CIA  demands. 

I  A  third  reason  for  the  heavy  civilian  casualties  under  Nixon  is  the  vastly  in- 
!  creased  use  of  antipersonnel  weaponry.  Such  weapons,  which  cannot  destroy  a 
I    truck,  bridge  or  factory,  are  only  meant  for  human  beings. 

j  Although  the  figures  are  classified,  all  of  the  airmen  we  interviewed  have  noted 
j  a  heavy  increase  in  the  use  of  antipersonnel  bombs  and  antipersonnel  mines  in 
I   the  late  1960s. 

^  The  antipersonnel  bombs  include  the  pineapple,  which  has  250  steel  ball-bearing 
pellets  in  it  which  shoot  out  horizontally.  One  planeload  carries  1,000  such 
bombs,  which  means  that  one  sortie  sends  250,000  steel  pellets  shooting  out 

i  horizontally  over  an  area  the  size  of  four  football  fields;  the  guava  is  an  im- 
provement over  the  pineapple  in  that  it  is  smaller  and  its  pellets  shoot  out  di- 
agonally; one  planeload  of  guava  bombs  shoots  out  300,000  to  400,000  pellets 
diagonally  so  that  they  will  go  into  holes  where  the  peasants  are  hiding;  the 
plastic  bomb,  which  breaks  into  thousands  of  slivers  one-eighth  of  an  inch  by 

jj   one-sixteenth  of  an  inch,  will  not  show  up  on  an  X  ray;  the  fragmentation  anti- 

'  personnel  bombs,  like  the  BLU/63,  which  breaks  into  dozens  of  jagged  fragments, 
are  larger  and  calculated  to  do  far  more  damage  than  the  steel  ball-bearing 
pellets.  Similarly,  flechettes  are  tiny  steel  arrows  with  larger  fins  on  one  end  which 
peel  off  the  outer  flesh  as  they  enter  the  body,  enlarge  the  wound,  and  shred  the 

I    internal  organs.  They  are  fired  from  rockets  and  M79  grenade  launchers. 

j!  Antipersonnel  mines  differ  from  the  bombs  in  that  they  are  not  dropped  with 
a  specific  target  in  mind.  Rather,  they  are  part  of  an  officially  designated  "area 
denial"  program.  Under  the  Nixon  administration,  hundreds  of  square  miles  have 
been  flooded  with  hundreds  of  thousands  of  such  tiny  mines  as  the  Gravel, 
Dragontooth  and  button  bomblets,  in  an  attempt  to  make  areas  under  attack 
uninhabitable  for  human  life.  In  the  November  1970  Electronic  Battlefield 
Hearings  before  the  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee,  for  example.  Air  Force 
representatives  testified  that  the  area  denial  program  had  been  instituted  in  half  of 
southern  Laos.  This  is  an  area  of  some  20,000  square  miles  inhabited  by — 
according  to  the  American  embassy  in  Vientiane — over  200,000  people.  These 
mines  are  camouflaged  to  look  like  leaves  and  animal  droppings,  and  include  such 

I    items  as  the  WAAPM  (wide-area  antipersonnel  mine),  which  emits  eight  strings 

j   each  eight  yards  in  length.  The  individual  tripping  on  the  WAAPM  cords  will 

*  blow  himself  up. 

It  is  common  knowledge  in  Indochina  that  the  percentage  of  U.S.  ordnance  de- 
i  livered  which  is  explicitly  antipersonnel  in  nature  has  greatly  increased  in  recent 
!'  years.  During  a  visit  to  Udorn  Air  Force  Base  in  the  fall  of  1969,  for  example, 
the  man  in  charge  of  stockpiling  munitions  at  Udorn  told  me  that  about  80  per- 


304      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

cent  of  the  ordnance  stocked  on  base  for  use  in  Laos  was  antipersonnel  in  nature; 
he  said  that  this  was  considerably  higher  than  it  had  been  even  at  the  height  of 
the  war  under  Johnson  in  1968. 

It  is  clear  that  the  use  of  such  weapons  has  considerably  increased  the  num- 
bers of  civihans  killed  and  wounded  by  the  bombings. 

But  although  the  administration's  bombing  has  reduced  most  of  the  U.S.-  i 
embassy  estimated  3,500  villages  in  Pathet  Lao  zones  to  rubble,  erased  whole  j 
societies  like  the  Plain  of  Jars  off  the  face  of  the  earth,  and  driven  most  of  the  \ 
800,000  people  still  living  in  Pathet  Lao  zones  (by  estimate  of  U.S.  Ambassador  ] 
Godley)  underground,*  the  bombing  has  been  as  spectacular  in  its  military  in-  ] 
effectiveness  as  in  its  depredations.  , 

Although  the  Nixon  administration  spent  over  $4  billion  bombing  Laos  be-  [ 
tween  January  1969  and  April  1972,  flew  over  400,000  sorties  against  it,  and  ^ 
devoted  from  30,000  to  50,000  American  airmen  to  the  effort  at  any  given  time,  j 
the  astonishing  fact  is  that  the  Pathet  Lao  now  control  far  more  territory  than  | 
when  the  bombing  began.  j 

Given  the  inability  of  the  air  force  to  locate  Pathet  Lao  guerrillas,  the  bombing  ] 
may  even  have  been  counterproductive.  My  interviews  with  hundreds  of  former  !] 
Pathet  Lao  soldiers  indicate  that — as  in  North  Vietnam — the  bombing  strength-  j 
ened  military  morale  rather  than  crushing  it.  This  was  not  an  unimportant  fact  ! 
in  an  arena  where  American  planners  had  to  rely  on  the  ground  on  unmotivated  j 
Asian  conscripts  and  mercenaries  and  their  corrupt  officers.  j 

Since  January  1969,  the  Pathet  Lao  have  solidified  their  control  throughout  \ 
north  and  northeastern  Laos,  moving  to  the  outskirts  of  Luang  Prabang  in  the  : 
north  and  forcing  the  evacuation  of  Long  Cheng  in  the  northeast;  in  central  Laos  j 
they  have  moved  as  far  west  as  Dong  Hene,  and  in  southern  Laos  they  have  taken  i 
control  of  the  Bolovens  Plateau.  At  this  writing,  administration  control  in  Laos 
does  not  extend  much  farther  than  Luang  Prabang  itself,  plus  half  a  dozen  major 
towns  in  the  Mekong  Valley. 

The  Nixon  years  have  been  characterized  by  mushrooming  escalation  on  the 
ground  in  Laos,  as  well  as  in  the  air.  \ 

While  the  administration  was  talking  withdrawal  to  the  American  public  at  j 
home,  it  was  actually  transforming  what  had  been  regarded  as  a  temporary  U.S.  1 
infrastructure  in  Laos  into  a  permanent  one.  The  Quonset  huts  in  the  U.S.  AID 
compound  and  the  unprepossessing  U.S.  embassy  building  in  Laos,  once  seen  as 
a  symbol  of  American  ability  to  pack  up  and  leave  in  twenty-four  hours  if  neces-  . 
sary,  were  replaced  by  giant  cement  structures.  Between  1969  and  1971  over  $2  j 
million  was  put  into  new  American  buildings  for  an  expanding  U.S.  presence:  a  j 
giant  windowless  building  for  USAID  with  a  helicopter  pad  on  the  roof,  a  large  ( 
American  embassy,  new  apartments  for  American  officials  in  the  American  com- 
munity known  as  "Kilometer  Six,"  and  new  U.S.  AID  compounds  at  Houei  Sai, 
Luang  Prabang,  Long  Cheng,  Savannakhet  and  Pakse. 

This  U.S.  entrenchment  in  Laos,  and  the  increased  numbers  of  Americans  con- 
tracted to  the  CIA  after  1969,  have  been  occasioned  by  the  Nixon  administra- 
tion's most  far-reaching  escalation  in  Laos:  its  transformation  of  the  Secret  Army 
from  one  based  on  Meo  tribesmen  into  one  based  on  Thais. 

Due  to  endemic  corruption  within  the  regular  Lao  armed  forces,  the  CIA  be-  | 
gan  setting  up  its  own  army  in  the  late  1950s,  known  as  the  Armee  Clandestine, 
or  Secret  Army.  Recruitment  was  begun  among  the  Meos  in  northern  Laos,  and 

*  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  hearings,  July  22,  1971,  p.  4287. 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  305 

by  July  1961  CIA  Colonel  Edward  Lansdale  reported  in  a  memo  to  Ambassador 
Maxwell  Taylor  that  "About  9,000  Meo  tribesmen  have  been  equipped  for  guer- 
rilla operations.  .  .  .  Command  control  of  Meo  operations  is  exercised  by  the 
chief  CIA  Vientiane  with  the  advice  of  Chief  M.A.A.G.  Laos."  Although  later 
supplemented  by  Burmese,  lowland  and  highland  Thais,  Nationalist  Chinese, 
black  Thais  and  Vietnamese,  the  Meo  people  remained  the  core  of  the  army  until 
1968.  Trained,  directed,  and  paid  by  Americans  under  contract  to  the  CIA,  this 
secret  army  did  the  bulk  of  the  fighting  during  the  periodic  rainy  season  offensives 
carried  out  by  the  CIA,  and  did  the  bulk  of  the  defending  during  the  Pathet  Lao 
dry  season  offensives. 

As  a  result,  they  had  already  suffered  devastating  losses  by  1968,  and  a  decision 
was  made  to  step  up  the  import  of  Thais  to  make  up  these  losses.  Recruiting  at 
Udorn  in  northeast  Thailand  under  the  aegis  of  the  4802nd  Joint  Liaison  Detach- 
ment, CIA  station  chief  Pat  Landry  began  systematically  sending  in  regular  Thai 
army  units.  Thai  special  forces,  and  Thai  youths  recruited  on  an  individual  basis 
into  Laos.  During  the  Nixon  administration's  first  three  years  in  office,  the  number 
of  Thais  fighting  in  Laos  grew  from  a  few  thousand  to  nearly  20,000. 

But  if  Laos  has  represented  the  most  prolonged  and  widespread  of  the  Nixon 
administration's  escalations,  Cambodia  has  proved  the  most  sudden  and  dramatic. 
As  suggested  above,  the  American  invasion  of  Cambodia  which  began  April  30, 
1970,  and  lasted  two  months,  was  a  relatively  minor  incident.  Far  more  important 
was  the  fullscale  air  war  initiated  by  the  United  States  one  month  before  the 
invasion  began,  and  which  has  continued  until  this  very  day. 

It  took  five  and  one  half  years  in  Laos  before  outsiders  were  able  to  begin 
documenting  the  effects  of  the  air  war  on  the  civilian  population,  due  to  highly 
successful  news  management  by  the  American  government.  The  situation  is  even 
more  diflficult  in  Cambodia,  where  few  outsiders  speak  Cambodian  due  to  a  de- 
cision by  the  Nixon  administration  not  to  send  in  volunteers  and  AID  officials 
trained  in  the  language. 

Nonetheless,  as  the  earlier  edition  of  The  Air  War  in  Indochina  noted  in  Octo- 
ber 1971,  "The  relationship  between  air  power  and  civilian  casualties  and  refu- 
gees in  Cambodia  is  not  as  clearly  defined  as  it  is  in  Laos  or  South  Vietnam,  but 
the  evidence  available  suggests  a  similar  pattern.  The  use  of  air  power  in  close 
air  support  of  South  Vietnamese  and  Cambodian  ground  operations,  is,  according 
to  the  Refugee  Subcommittee,  'contributing  much  to  the  rising  toll  being  paid  by 
civilians.'  Many  towns  and  villages  were  totally  destroyed  or  severely  damaged 
by  American  air  power  during  the  first  weeks  of  the  invasion  in  May  1970,  in- 
cluding Snoul,  Mimot,  Sre  Khtum,  and  Kompong  Cham.  The  list  grows  longer 
as  the  air  war  drags  on:  Skoun  in  July  and  August  1970,  and  Prey  Totung  in 
December." 

On  December  5,  1971,  the  New  York  Times  reported  that,  according  to  an 
official  study  of  the  U.S.  Government  Accounting  Office,  "more  than  two  million 
Cambodians  have  been  driven  from  their  homes  .  .  .  since  .  .  .  the  spring  of 
1970.  .  .  .  Bombing  is  a  very  significant  cause  of  refugee  and  civilian  casualties." 
The  same  report  revealed  that  26  percent  of  Cambodian  territory  had  come  under 
saturation  bombing.  Numerous  interviews  with  Cambodian  refugees,  including 
stories  in  the  New  York  Times  on  December  4  and  5,  1971,  have  made  it  clear 
that  American  bombing  was  the  major  reason  for  the  generation  of  Cambodian 
refugees. 

A  striking  aspect  of  the  Nixon  administration's  policies  in  Cambodia  has  been 
its  total  disregard  of  refugee  needs.  Unlike  Laos  and  South  Vietnam,  where  at 


306      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

least  some  minimal  attention  was  given  to  providing  enough  food  to  keep  refugees 
alive,  the  administration  has  made  no  funds  available  for  the  relief  of  Cambodian 
refugees. 

And,  as  in  Laos,*  the  Nixon  administration  has  carried  out  parallel  escallations 
on  the  ground.  The  Lon  Nol  army  has  been  enlarged  from  some  40,000  at  the 
time  of  the  coup  to  well  over  150,000  today;  a  polyglot  Secret  Army,  part  of  the 
CIA's  100,000-man  force  stretching  throughout  Thailand,  Laos,  Cambodia  and 
South  Vietnam,  has  been  pressed  into  action  in  Cambodia,  with  the  brunt  of  the 
heaviest  fighting  born  by  Cambodian  mercenaries  who  had  been  living  in  South  ; 
Vietnam  and  fighting  under  the  name  of  the  Komphong  Khrom;  and  ARVN  ' 
forces  have  made  continuous  sweeps  through  Cambodia,  carrying  out  widespread 
looting  and  raping,  and  giving  every  sign  of  planning  to  occupy  portions  of  ' 
southeastern  Cambodia  permanently,  to  the  consternation  of  Lon  Nol  officials.** 

And  in  addition  to  taking  the  war  into  Laos  and  Cambodia,  the  Nixon  adminis-  j 
tration  also  resumed  the  bombing  of  North  Vietnam.  Between  January  1969  and  \ 
March  30,  1972,  North  Vietnam  was  struck  on  more  than  325  admitted  occa-  | 
sions.  These  occasions  included  at  least  nine  "limited  duration  protective  reaction  j 
strikes."  Though  sold  to  the  public  as  defensive  in  nature,  these  "limited  reaction"  | 
strikes  in  reality  involved  hundreds  of  aircraft  striking  throughout  the  southern  \ 
portion  of  North  Vietnam  for  periods  ranging  from  several  days  to  one  week,  i 
As  visitors  to  North  Vietnam  subsequently  discovered,  these  raids  were  as  de-  \ 
structive  to  the  civilian  population  as  had  been  those  carried  out  between  1965  f 
and  1968.  \ 

To  sum  it  all  up,  then,  the  Nixon  administration  had  dropped  over  3.3  million  i 
tons  of  bombs  on  Indochina,  more  bombs  than  had  been  dropped  by  any  govern-  ! 
ment  in  history,  before  their  adversaries  began  their  offensive  on  March  30,  1972.  ! 
Its  term  in  office  had  already  seen  over  3  million  civilians  killed,  wounded  or 
refugeed,  according  to  the  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  on  Refugees;  and,  while 
most  of  this  carnage  had  occurred  in  Laos,  Cambodia  and  North  Vietnam,  even 
civilian  and  military  casualties  within  South  Vietnam  were  running  at  roughly 
the  same  levels  as  1967,  a  year  in  which  there  were  450,000  American  ground 
troops  in  that  country. 

Much  of  this  information  had  been  hidden  from  the  American  public;  reporters  j 
had  not  been  allowed  out  on  bombing  raids  or  flown  to  the  front  lines  outside  of 
South  Vietnam  during  the  Nixon  years,  and  so  the  war  had  slowly  been  disappear- 
ing from  the  TV  screens  and  newspaper  front  pages;  all  information  which  might  j 
cause  domestic  repercussions,  such  as  the  incidence  of  use  of  antipersonnel  I 
weapons  and  their  effects  on  the  human  body,  had  been  "classified"  out  of  public 
reach;  and  the  administration  had  successfully  created  its  own  Orwellian  image 
of  a  sterile,  antiseptic  air  war,  one  in  which  only  military  targets  are  bombed, 

*  As  Senator  Edward  Kennedy,  chairman  of  the  U.S.  Senate  Subcommittee  on  Refugees, 
noted  on  May  3,  1972:  .  .  there  are  approximately  2  million  people  who  are  refu- 
gees in  Cambodia  today,  and  yet  the  United  States  fails  to  provide  even  one  dollar  of 
help  and  assistance  for  the  refugees  in  Cambodia.  .  .  .  Today,  after  two  years  of  heavy 
batde — which  began  with  an  American-sponsored  invasion  from  South  Vietnam — a 
[Government  Accounting  Office]  report  on  Cambodia  documents:  'That  it  is  the  policy 
of  the  U.S.  "to  not  become  involved  with  the  problems  of  civilian  war  victims  in  Cam- 
bodia.'" "  (See  Congressional  Record,  May  3,  1972,  S  7183-7184). 
**  These  ground  and  aerial  escalations  have  been  no  more  successful  in  Cambodia 
than  they  were  in  Laos.  At  this  writing  the  Lon  Nol  regime  controls  little  more  than 
Phnom  Penh  and  a  few  other  provincial  capitals.  Guerrillas  officially  control  about 
two-thirds  of  Cambodia,  and  move  at  ease  through  most  of  the  rest  of  the  land. 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  307 

villages  are  rarely  if  ever  hit,  and  only  defensive  "protective  reaction"  strikes  are 
carried  out  against  North  Vietnam. 

But  their  import  was  not  lost  on  the  guerrillas  of  Indochina.  They  knew  all  too 
well  that  the  war  was  not  "winding  down,"  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  ground  war 
had  merely  been  transformed  into  an  even  more  vicious  and  indiscriminate  air 
war;  that  the  Nixon  administration  had  no  more  intention  of  withdrawing  than 
had  the  Truman  administration  when  it  first  massively  intervened  twenty-two 
years  earlier.  Unless  they  wished  to  submit  to  a  permanent  American  occupation 
of  the  southern  half  of  Vietnam  and  the  populated  areas  of  Laos  and  Cambodia, 
they  had  no  choice  but  to  launch  an  offensive. 

Events  had  exploded  one  by  one  the  rationales  used  by  American  leaders  to 
justify  their  intervention  in  Indochina:  the  Pentagon  Papers,  following  hundreds 
of  newspaper  and  TV  reports  over  the  years,  followed  by  Thieu's  one-man  elec- 
tion in  October  1971,  had  successfully  exposed  the  myth  that  American  involve- 
ment was  designed  to  bring  about  a  democratic  and  fuller  life  for  the  Vietnamese; 
Nixon's  trip  to  China  in  February  1972  had  weakened  the  argument  that  the 
United  States  had  to  remain  in  Indochina  for  fear  of  China;  and  there  was  growing 
awareness  that  not  only  would  continued  fighting  indefinitely  prolong  the  intern- 
ment of  American  pilots  who  had  already  been  captured  and  create  new  prisoners 
daily,  but  that  there  was  a  good  chance  that  captured  pilots  could  return  home 
if  the  United  States  would  commit  itself  to  total  withdrawal. 

There  was  but  one  last  substantive  rationale  that  had  to  be  destroyed,  from  the 
guerrillas'  point  of  view:  the  rationale  that  "Vietnamization"  was  working,  that 
somehow  the  loss  of  50,000  American  lives,  300,000  American  wounded,  and 
200  billion  American  dollars,  could  be  redeemed  by  a  pro-American  regime  that 
could  remain  in  power,  that  not  only  would  the  people  of  the  United  States  have 
to  decide  if  their  leaders  were  war  criminals,  but  whether  it  was  these  leaders — 
or  domestic  antiwar  forces — who  had  betrayed  their  country  by  causing  it  to  lose 
in  Vietnam. 

I  And  so,  on  March  30,  1972,  guerrilla  forces  began  their  most  ambitious 
I  offensive  since  Tet  1968,  an  offensive  which  would  force  the  American  people  to 
;  choose  between  a  President  committed  to  indefinite  warfare  in  Indochina  or  an 
opponent  who  would  at  least  give  greater  hope  of  finally  withdrawing — not  be- 
I  cause  he  necessarily  wanted  to,  but  because  he  had  to. 

t 

i  IV.  THE  BOMBING  OF  HAIPHONG  AND  BEYOND 

USAF  personnel  in  Southeast  Asia  may  now  outnumber  Army  troops  for 
the  first  time  in  the  11 -year  war  in  Vietnam.  Under  administration  with- 
drawal plans,  total  U.S.  strength  "in  country"  in  South  Vietnam  was  to  drop 
to  69,000  by  May  1  .  .  .  most  of  the  withdrawals  were  expected  to  be 
Army.  .  .  .  The  Air  Force  had  only  20,300  members  in  Vietnam  on  April 
6.  .  .  .  AF  has  moved  additional  units  into  South  Vietnam  to  counter  the 
new  enemy  offensive,  so  the  total  personnel  strength  in-country  is  higher 
than  on  April  6.  .  .  . 

The  Pentagon's  "in-country"  strength  figures — the  ones  the  President  cites  in 
his  withdrawal  announcements — do  not  count  the  AF  forces  in  Thailand  or 
Guam  or  Navy  men  off  shore  aboard  ships.  Thus,  the  additional  B-52s  AF 
has  sent  to  Guam  and  the  Navy  carriers  and  other  vessels  added  to  the  off- 
shore fleet  technically  do  not  count  in  the  withdrawal  arithmetic. 

— Air  Force  Times,  April  26,  1972,  p.  2 


308      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Tapers/ Vol.  V 

When  John  Kennedy  or  Lyndon  Johnson  chose  to  escalate  in  Vietnam,  they  | 
sent  in  more  ground  troops;  nothing  revealed  the  Nixon  administration's  commit-  | 
ment  to  automated  war  more  than  the  fact  that  its  escalations  have  been  carried  ! 
out  by  the  dispatch  of  more  machines. 

Between  1969  and  1971  the  administration's  main  innovation  in  the  air  war — 
besides  the  "area  denial"  program — had  been  the  increased  use  of  electronic  gun-  | 
ships.  These  gunships,  including  the  A-119  "Shadow"  and  A-130  "Spectre,"  are  ^ 
characterized  by  highly  sophisticated  electronic  devices.  Oscilloscopes  on  board, 
picking  up  signals  from  acoustic  and  seismic  sensors  down  below,  infra-red  scopes 
designed  to  pick  up  heat  emissions,  and  radar  to  track  moving  objects,  provided 
the  intelligence  for  immediate  strikes.  On  reception  of  such  intelligence,  the  gun- 
ships — which  only  go  out  at  night  and  fly  at  a  level  of  about  5,000  feet — would 
spew  out  a  withering  rain  of  fire  from  six  guns,  each  shooting  at  a  rate  of  6,000 
rounds  per  minute.  Bullets  would  put  a  hole  every  square  foot  in  an  area  the  size 
of  a  football  field  down  below.  | 

Although  exact  figures  are  not  available,  the  Nixon  administration  is  known  to  ' 
have  dispatched  dozens  of  new  gunships  to  the  Indochina  theater  between  1969 
and  1971. 

Nixon's  major  escalations  in  the  air  war,  however,  began  in  February  1972 — 
two  months  before  the  guerrilla  offensive  began.  In  that  month  the  administration 
doubled  the  number  of  B-52s  operating  in  Indochina  from  forty  to  eighty,  doubled 
aircraft  carriers  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  from  two  to  four,  and  dispatched  several 
new  squadrons  of  F-4  Phantoms  and  gunships. 

But  February  1972  is  also  noteworthy  for  another  reason:  this  is  the  month  in  i 
which  the  Nixon  administration  resumed  heavy  bombing  of  South  Vietnam.  While 
the  administration  had  steadily  escalated  the  bombing  in  Laos,  Cambodia  and 
North  Vietnam  between  1969  and  1971,  it  had  decreased  the  bombing  within 
South  Vietnam.  By  resuming  heavy  B-52  and  jet  bombing  within  the  South  in 
February  1972,  the  model  of  Laos  was  finally  applied  in  a  massive  and  relentless 
manner  throughout  the  Indochinese  peninsula.  , 

The  March  30  offensive  soon  saw  a  flagrant  commitment  to  automated  war  so  j 
obvious  that  none  could  miss  it.  The  number  of  B-52s  was  raised  again,  up  to 
130;  a  flood  of  new  jets  and  gunships  was  unleashed,  until  by  May  6  the  number  i 
had  nearly  tripled  to  900-1,000;  aircraft  carriers  were  once  more  increased,  from 
four  to  six;  and  the  administration  even  chose  to  re-activate  Takhli  Air  Base  in  i 
Thailand.  i 

The  ultimate  outcome  of  this  escalated  air  war  is  not  yet  clear  at  this  writing. 
The  guerrilla  victory  at  Quang  Tris  made  it  clear  that  they  will  make  much  prog- 
ress on  the  ground  against  a  demoralized  ARVN.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  guerrillas  can  hold  large  swatches  of  politically  significant  territory  in  the  face  \ 
of  saturation  B-52  bombings  designed  to  destroy  towns  and  villages  in  order  to  * 
save  them. 

It  seems  safe  to  predict,  though,  that  this  offensive  will  have  serious  political  ' 
effects.  Nixon  will  no  longer  be  able  to  claim  that  he  seriously  intends  to  with-  I 
draw,  or  that  "Vietnamization"  can  work.  I 

Like  Tet  1968,  whatever  happens  on  the  battlefield  the  1972  spring  offensive  [ 
may  launch  political  ripples  back  here  in  the  United  States  which  will  eventually  |' 
lead  to  withdrawal.  Once  more,  it  may  well  be  the  guerrillas  who  win  if  they  do  | 
not  lose.  [ 

Whatever  happens  in  the  long  run,  however,  one  thing  is  assured  for  the  fore- 
seeable future:  continued  American  devastation  of  Indochina,  perhaps  going  be- 
yond anything  seen  to  date.  ' 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  309 

At  this  writing,  in  early  May  1972,  the  Nixon  administration's  giant  armada  of 
900  strike  aircraft,  150  B-52s,  four  to  six  carriers,  and  several  dozen  destroyers 
are — after  a  decade  of  practice  in  Vietnam — unmatched  in  technological  sophisti- 
cation in  the  history  of  warfare. 

More  importantly,  all  indications  are  that  this  force  is  poised  on  the  brink  of 
unprecedented  devastation  in  Indochina. 

In  this  respect,  the  B-52  saturation  bombing  of  the  city  of  Haiphong  on  the 
night  of  April  14,  1972,  marks  a  watershed  in  the  war.  By  taking  this  action,  the 
Nixon  administration  clearly  threw  down  the  gauntlet — to  its  foes  at  home  as  well 
as  in  Indochina.  To  understand  why,  it  is  important  to  put  the  strikes  against 
Haiphong  into  the  perspective  of  the  last  eight  years. 

The  significance  of  the  bombing  of  Haiphong  was  not  only  that  the  sudden, 
high-level,  nighttime,  carpet  bombing  of  an  area  inhabited  by  300,000  people  was 
an  act  of  uncommon  savagery.  It  was  that  until  then  Haiphong  has  stood  as  a 
symbol  of  ultimate  American  restraint  in  the  face  of  intense  domestic  and  world- 
wide criticism  of  the  U.S.  air  war  against  Vietnam.  By  bombing  Haiphong,  the 
Nixon  administration  served  clear  notice  that  it  would  stop  at  nothing  in  its 
attempt  to  maintain  its  position  in  Indochina. 

Conventional  wisdom  had  held  that  the  administration  would  keep  to  a  low 
profile  in  Vietnam  in  this  crucial  Presidential  election  year.  The  bombing  of 
Haiphong,  however,  made  it  clear  that  Nixon  places  a  far  greater  priority  on 
victory  in  Vietnam.  It  was  no  longer  unrealistic  to  suggest  that  only  massive 
domestic  and  international  protest  and  resistance  may  halt  the  total  destruction 
of  Hanoi  and  Haiphong,  the  mining  of  Haiphong  harbor,  devastation  of  the 
North's  dike  system,  or  even  more  blatant  acts  of  mass  murder. 

The  following  facts  have  been  widely  noted: 

!    1.    THE  B-52  BOMBING  OF  HAIPHONG  WAS  MASSIVE, 
!   INDISCRIMINATE  AND  UNPRECEDENTED 

1      The  Johnson  Administration  bombed  Haiphong  regularly  from  1966  through 
I    1968.  But  these  strikes  were  limited  in  the  "Prohibited  Areas"  of  four  nautical 
miles  around  Haiphong  center.  As  a  March  1968  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  memo 
noted,  "The  prohibited  areas  were  created  in  December  1966.  Numerous  strikes, 
however,  have  been  permitted  in  these  areas  over  the  past  two  and  one-half  years, 
e.g.,  dispersed  POL,  SAM  and  AAA  sites  .  .  ."  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 255). 
i      These  past  raids,  however,  were  carried  out  by  jet  bombers  with  a  relatively 
I   limited  radius  of  bombing  destruction.  April  15,  1972,  was  not  only  the  first  time 
that  B-52s  were  sent  over  Haiphong:  the  use  of  dozens  of  these  giant  bombers 
ensured  that  saturation  bombing  occurred  for  the  first  tmie  in  the  Haiphong  area. 

B-52s  are  huge  eight-engined  aircraft  with  a  crew  of  six  and  two  2,500  gallon 
wing  tanks.  Each  sortie  carries  twenty-five  to  thirty  tons  of  bombs,  either  as  108 
500-pound  bombs  or  sixty-six  750-pound  bombs  or  some  combination  thereof, 
j  Bombing  from  30,000  to  35,000  feet,  B-52s  leave  craters  thirty-five  feet  deep  by 
jii  forty-five  feet  in  diameter  with  their  500  pounders.  A  typical  B-52  strike  involves 
}■  six  B-52s  saturating  a  selected  grid  square,  leaving  a  swath  of  destruction  half  a 
1  mile  wide  by  three  miles  long.  (See  The  Air  War  in  Indochina,  p.  25.) 

The  fact  that  dozens  of  these  giant  bombers  were  sent  out  at  night  ensured 
il  that  saturation  and  indiscriminate  bombing  of  this  heavily  populated  area  was 
carried  out.  For  at  night,  even  the  light  spotter  planes  which  sometimes  guide 
B-52  raids  in  the  daytime  for  greater  precision  were  unavailable.  Neither,  of 


310      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon,  Papers/ Vol.  V 

course,  were  the  ground  spotters  who  made  more  precise  B-52  bombing  possible 
during  the  siege  of  Khe  Sanh. 

2.    THE  USE  OF  B-52S  OVER  HAIPHONG  NECESSARILY  LED  TO 
HEAVY  CIVILIAN  CASUALTIES 

Even  when  the  air  war  against  North  Vietnam  was  carried  out  only  by  jets,  the 
bombing  caused  heavy  civihan  casualties.  As  the  Cornell  Air  War  study  notes,  j 
"targets  ...  in  a  strategic  bombing  campaign  are  situated  near  predominately  j 
civilian  areas.  .  .  .  The  bombing  inflicted  severe  civilian  damage  on  the  civilian  , 
society  as  a  whole.  ...  In  1967  the  noncombatant  casualty  rate  was  quoted  at 
1,000  per  week  (Robert  McNamara).  .  .  .  And  the  equivalent  casualty  rate  in  i 
the  U.S.  would  be  more  than  600,000  per  year"  {The  Air  War  in  Indochina,  p.  \ 
48).  I 

The  official  population  of  Haiphong  and  its  suburbs  in  1960  was  369,248.  j 
Although  many  children  and  others  were  removed  from  the  city  during  the  mid-  I 
sixties,  many  returned  after  the  November  1968  bombing  halt.  Given  the  popula-  j 
tion  growth  and  surprise  of  the  April  14  bombing  attack,  there  may  have  been  j 
well  over  300,000  people  in  the  area  hit  by  the  B-52s.  j 

The  Pentagon  Papers  make  clear,  moreover,  that  the  heavy  civilian  casualties  [ 
expected  to  occur  from  bombing  Haiphong — and  the  worldwide  protest  they  j 
would  entail — were  the  main  reasons  that  Johnson  did  not  agree  to  level  it.  As  a  f 
memo  of  the  ISA,  prepared  in  Undersecretary  of  Defense  Warnke's  office,  re-  | 
ported:  "Experience  has  indicated  that  systematic  operations  particularly  against  j 
repair  burdens,  while  at  the  same  time  involving  substantial  civilian  casualties  in  ) 
road  and  rail  routes  [in  the  Hanoi-Haiphong  area]  adds  simply  and  slightly  to  ^ 
the  many  suburban  civilian  areas  located  along  these  routes"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  ! 
257).  j 

Civilian  casualties  from  the  bombing,  moreover,  are  by  far  the  greatest  portion. 
As  a  summary  of  the  bombing  of  North  Vietnam  noted  in  1966,  "Estimated  I 
civilian  and  military  casualties  in  NVN  also  went  up,  from  13,000  to  23-24,000 
{about  80%  civilians)''  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  136,  emphasis  added).  I 

But  although  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  did  not  dispute  the  heavy  damage  to 
civilians,  they  did  not  stop  pushing  for  bombing  Haiphong  in  any  event.  As  the 
Pentagon  Papers  reported  in  October  1967,  "in  addition  to  mining  the  harbors, 
the  chiefs  requested  that  the  comprehensive  prohibition  in  the  Hanoi/Haiphong 
areas  be  removed  with  the  expected  increase  in  civilian  casualties  to  be  accepted  ; 
as  militarily  justified  and  necessary"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 21 5). 

The  attitude  of  the  military  was  put  somewhat  more  pungently  by  Marine  \ 
Commandant  General  Wallace  Greene  in  testimony  before  the  Senate  Prepared-  ! 
ness  Investigating  Subcommittee,  October  23,  1967:  "We  are  at  war  with  North  ; 
Vietnam  right  now,  today,  and  we  shouldn't  be  so  much  interested  in  their  anger 
as  we  are  in  bringing  the  war  home  to  everyone  of  them  up  there."  Army  Chief  ! 
of  Staff  Harold  Johnson  was  even  more  explicit:  "I  put  'innocent'  civilians  in  i 
quotation  marks,"  he  stated.  ' 

The  B-52  bombing  of  Haiphong  clearly  illustrates  that  the  military  had  sue-  ; 
ceeded  beyond  its  wildest  dreams.  Even  at  the  height  of  the  air  war  in  1968, 
there  was  no  talk  of  loosing  B-52s  on  the  Hanoi/Haiphong  area. 

There  was  no  need  to  wait  several  months  for  the  inevitable  reports  by  Amer- 
ican visitors  to  Haiphong  of  heavy  civilian  casualties  from  the  April  15  raids. 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  311 

The  official  report  of  widespread  use  of  B-52s  in  the  most  heavily  populated  area 
of  Indochina  is  evidence  enough. 

3.    THE  B-52ING  OF  HAIPHONG  SERVED  NO  USEFUL  MILITARY 
END;  ITS  PRIMARY  GOAL  WAS  TO  TERRORIZE  THE 
VIETNAMESE  INTO  SUBMISSION 

The  Haiphong  bombing  was  of  limited  military  significance  and  could  have 
little  effect  on  the  fighting  in  the  South. 

An  October  1967  CIA  study  clearly  stated  that  a  bombing  campaign  against 
lines  of  communication  (LOCs) — such  as  roads  and  railroads — leading  out  of 
Haiphong  would  be  useless.  "Prospects  are  dim  that  an  air  interdiction  campaign 
against  LOCs  leading  out  of  Haiphong  alone  could  cut  off  the  flow  of  seaborne 
imports  and  isolate  Haiphong"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  215). 

The  same  report  went  on  to  conclude  that  even  mining  Haiphong  Harbor 
would  be  militarily  ineffective:       .  .  the  combined  interdiction  of  land  and 
water  routes,  including  the  mining  of  the  water  approaches  to  the  major  ports 
and  the  bombing  of  ports  and  trans  shipment  facilities  .  .  .  would  .  .  .  not 
be  able  to  cut  off  the  flow  of  essential  supplies  and,  by  itself,  would  not  be  the 
;  determining  factor  in  shaping  Hanoi's  outlook  to  the  war"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:  215). 
I     The  reason  is  simple.  Most  of  North  Vietnam's  military  supplies  do  not  come 
j'  through  Haiphong,  but  through  China.  As  a  study  carried  out  under  Defense 
•  Secretary  Clifford  noted  in  March  1968,  "the  remaining  issue  on  interdiction 
of  supplies  had  to  do  with  the  closing  of  the  port  of  Haiphong.  Although  this 
is  the  route  by  which  some  80  percent  of  NVN  imports  come  into  the  country,  it 
I  is  not  the  point  of  entry  for  most  of  the  military  supplies  and  ammunition.  These 
j  materials  predominately  enter  via  the  rail  routes  from  China.  The  closing  of 
Haiphong  port  would  not  prevent  the  continued  supply  of  sufficient  materials  to 
maintain  North  Vietnamese  military  operations  in  the  South"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 
.251). 

f    Indeed,  the  Clifford  group  concluded  that  an  attack  on  Haiphong  would 
actually  be  counterproductive:  "Apprehensions  about  bombing  attacks  that  would 
destroy  Hanoi  and  Haiphong  may  at  some  time  help  move  them  toward  produc- 
!  live  negotiations.  Actual  destruction  of  these  areas  would  eliminate  a  threat  that 
^  could  influence  them  to  seek  a  political  settlement  on  terms  acceptable  to  us" 
(Gravel  ed.,  IV:  252). 

;    Why  then  was  Haiphong  attacked  by  B-52s  on  April  15? 

j  The  answer  was  put  rather  delicately  by  a  New  York  Times  article  of  April  14, 
1972:  "In  a  comment  on  the  report  of  B-52s  going  north:  administration  officials 
disclosed  today  that  .  .  .  'the  objectives  were  diplomatic  and  political  as  well  as 
military.'  " 

Since  the  evidence  is  overwhelming  that  the  attacks  against  Hanoi  serve  little 
useful  military  purpose,  the  only  conclusion  is  that  they  are  primarily  "diplo- 
matic" and  "political." 

In  fact,  John  McNaughton  put  it  more  clearly  in  a  January  18,  1966,  memo: 
I'To  avoid  the  allegation  that  we  are  practicing  'pure  blackmail,'  the  targets 
should  be  military  targets  and  the  declaratory  policy  .  .  .  should  be  that  our 
iObjective  is  only  to  destroy  military  targets"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 45). 
I  The  B-52ing  of  Haiphong  and  the  later  attacks  against  Hanoi  were  clearly 
nettle  more  than  "pure  blackmail." 


312      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

Faced  with  a  deteriorating  military  situation  in  South  Vietnam,  the  Nixon 
administration  responded  by  launching  sneak  terror  attacks  against  Haiphong 
and  Hanoi  in  an  attempt  to  terrorize  the  Vietnamese  into  submission. 

4.    THERE  IS  NO  EVIDENCE  WHATSOEVER  THAT  THESE  ATTACKS  ; 
COULD  SUCCEED;  ON  THE  CONTRARY,  THEY  PROLONGED 
THE  WAR,  BROUGHT  MORE  POWS,  AND  OPENED  UP  ( 
THE  PROSPECT  OF  FAR  GREATER  ESCALATION  I 

The  notion  that  bombing  Hanoi  and  Haiphong  would  break  the  will  of  the 

Vietnamese  is  patently  absurd.  In  October  1967,  after  the  United  States  had  : 
already  dropped  nearly  300,000  tons  of  bombs  on  North  Vietnam,  a  top-level 

JASON  study  of  the  bombing  concluded:  'The  expectation  that  bombing  would  • 

erode  the  determination  of  Hanoi  and  its  people  clearly  overestimated  the  per-  ; 

suasive  and  disruptive  effects  of  the  bombing  and,  correspondingly,  underesti-  'I 

mated  the  tenacity  and  recuperative  capabilities  of  the  North  Vietnamese.  That  | 

the  bombing  has  not  achieved  anticipated  goals  reflects  a  general  failure  to  ap-  1 

preciate  the  fact,  well-documented  in  the  historical  and  social  scientific  literature,  \ 

that  a  direct,  frontal  attack  on  a  society  tends  to  strengthen  the  social  fabric  of  1 

the  nation,  to  increase  popular  support  of  the  existing  government,  to  improve  i 

the  determination  of  both  the  leadership  and  the  populace  to  fight  back,  to  induce  | 

a  variety  of  protective  measures  that  reduce  the  society's  vulnerability  to  future  ' 

attack  and  to  develop  an  increased  capacity  for  quick  repairs  and  restoration  of  \ 

essential  functions.  The  great  variety  of  physical  and  social  countermeasures  that  ! 

North  Vietnam  has  taken  in  response  to  the  bombing  is  now  well  documented  but  | 
the  potential  effectiveness  of  these  countermeasures  has  not  been  adequately 
considered  in  previous  planning  or  assessment  studies  (Gravel  ed.,  IV: 224). 

From  the  Vietnamese  point  of  view,  the  1972  spring  offensive  was  not  merely  \ 

a  continuation  of  a  struggle  of  a  month,  year  or  even  25  years.  It  was  seen  as  an  '[ 

integral  part  of  a  fight  of  1000  years  to  see  their  country  independent  from  ; 

foreign  aggression,  free  and  unified.  To  suggest  that  they  would — or  could —  ! 

halt  their  offensive  under  the  threat  of  saturation  bombing  was  clearly  ridiculous,  i 

The  desperate  and  reckless  quality  of  the  bombing  was,  however,  no  more 
dramatically  illustrated  than  by  its  effect  on  the  sensitive  issue  of  captured  Amer- 
ican pilots. 

To  begin  with,  such  bombing  drastically  increases  the  number  of  American  • 
pilots  who  are  shot  down  and  captured.  Over  350  men  who  were  alive  and  well 

when  Richard  Nixon  took  office  were  listed  as  captured  or  missing  in  action  be-  | 

fore  the  April  15  raids.  The  escalation  in  bombing  over  Hanoi  and  Haiphong —  ; 

a  heavily  defended  area — greatly  enlarges  their  number.  On  April  15  alone  I 

Hanoi  radio  reported  shooting  down  four  jets  and  one  B-52,  for  a  total  of  four-  ; 

teen  men.  In  the  week  ending  April  1 1  alone,  nineteen  men  were  listed  as  missing  j 

in  action,  most  of  them  airmen.  \ 

In  addition,  such  an  escalation  of  the  bombing  ensures  the  prolongation  of  \ 

internment  of  those  men  already  captured,  men  who  could  be  brought  home  j 
were  the  Nixon  administration  to  negotiate  an  end  to  American  involvement  in 

Indochina.  ' 

And,  most  seriously,  attacks  against  Hanoi/Haiphong  greatly  endanger  the  | 

lives  of  those  pilots  now  in  captivity.  As  the  study  prepared  under  Clark  Clifford  | 
reported  in  March  1968  states:  "Although  the  North  Vietnamese  do  not  mark 

the  camps  where  American  prisoners  are  kept  .  .  .  heavy  and  indiscriminate  ; 


Beyond  the  Pentagon  Papers:  Pathology  of  Power  313 

attacks  in  the  Hanoi  area  would  jeopardize  the  lives  of  these  prisoners  and  alarm 
their  wives  and  parents  into  vocal  opposition"  (Gravel  ed.,  IV:251-252). 

The  Nixon  administration's  willingness  to  even  risk  drastically  inflaming  the 
delicate  POW  issue  in  this  Presidential  election  year  ominously  suggested  that  it 
had  abandoned  reason. 

In  this  situation,  anything  was  possible. 
:     The  most  likely  possibility  in  the  wake  of  April  15  was  that  the  administration 
f  would  wipe  Hanoi  and  Haiphong  off  the  map. 

i  Another  prospect,  more  remote  but  still  possible,  was  that  it  would  go  so  far 
j  as  to  bomb  North  Vietnam's  dike  system. 

\     By  the  beginning  of  June,  the  waters  of  the  Red  River  Delta  are  swollen  by 
I  rains,  and  the  danger  of  flooding  is  at  its  greatest.  North  Vietnam's  greatest  vul- 
i  nerability  has  always  been  the  ease  with  which  the  U.S.  bombing  could  flood 
,  the  country's  rice-growing  area  and  cause  massive  famine  which  could  kill  mil- 
lions of  people.  High  Air  Force  officers  pressed  hard  for  the  bombing  of  the 
dike  systems  in  the  North  during  the  Johnson  administration,  and  although 
bombing  policy  never  went  so  far  as  an  all-out  effort  against  the  system,  the 
,  dikes  were  often  hit  as  part  of  the  effort  to  raise  the  cost  for  the  civilian  popula- 
tion. In  May  and  July  1966,  for  example,  authorities  of  Nam  Dinh  city  told 
\New  York  Times  correspondent  Harrison  Salisbury  that  U.S.  planes  had  dropped 
{ six  bombs  on  two  kilometers  of  dikes  which  protected  the  city  against  floods, 
causing  damage  to  many  sections.  Asked  to  comment  later,  the  Defense  Depart- 
ment did  not  deny  the  charge.  According  to  Christopher  Beal  of  the  moderate 
Republican  Ripon  Society,  some  "punitive  bombing"  of  Red  River  delta  dikes 
was  reported  to  him  by  ''reputable  non-Communist  sources"  in  the  summer  of 
\  1961 ,  when  the  waters  were  at  their  seasonal  high. 

I    Whether  or  not  this  happened,  however,  April  15  had  seen  a  dramatic  escala- 
ition.  Much  of  what  would  happen  thereafter  would  be  blacked  out.  On  April  12, 
■  the  Pentagon  announced  that  from  now  on  it  would  "probably  not"  give  informa- 
tion to  the  public  on  U.S.  bombing  raids  on  any  "regular"  basis. 
\    But  whatever  did  happen  it  was  clear  that  on  April  15  the  Nixon  administration 
I  had  crossed  the  Rubicon  on  Vietnam.  It  was  not  only  that  the  bombing  of  Hai- 
phong committed  the  administration  irrevocably  to  remaining  on  in  Indochina. 
It  was  that  millions  of  Americans  learned  for  the  first  time  that  their  government 
had  been  lying  to  them  for  three  years  when  it  had  implied  it  was  willing  to  with- 
draw, that  there  was  a  "secret  plan"  for  ending  the  war.  The  combination  pro- 
duced by  a  pathology  of  power  on  the  part  of  U.S.  officials — together  with  one 
of  powerlessness  on  the  part  of  millions  of  antiwar  citizens — had  almost  torn  the 
country  apart  in  1968. 

If  the  Nixon  administration  continues  to  bomb  the  North  in  1972,  the  im- 
plications seemed  even  graver. 

What  was  most  distressing  to  many  of  us  as  of  April  15  was  not  merely  that  we 
had  no  idea  how  far  the  administration  will  go;  it  was  a  growing  realization, 
buttressed  by  the  Pentagon  Papers,  that  the  administration  did  not  know  either. 
;One  thing  did  seem  clear,  however:  Despite  the  millions  who  had  already  been 
killed  and  maimed,  the  5  million  acres  of  crop  and  forest  land  destroyed,  the  10 
million  refugees,  the  100,000  political  prisoners,  the  thousands  of  villages  and 
'.owns  that  no  longer  exist,  the  400,000  prostitutes,  the  disease  and  hunger,  the  23 
inillion  bomb  craters,  the  corruption  and  degradation  of  ancient  cultures  and 
ijocial  systems,  it  was  all  far  from  over. 

V  Indeed,  at  this  writing,  the  pathological  destruction  of  Indochina  by  American 
eaders  may  have  only  begun. 


314 


A  Note  on  the  Three  Editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 


There  are  three  pubHshed  editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers.  None  is  complete. 
These  notes  are  intended  as  an  aid  to  the  reader  of  the  Gravel  edition,  in  under- 
standing how  it  differs  from  the  other  published  editions  of  the  Papers.  i 

The  Gravel  edition  contains  the  entire  manuscript  which  Senator  Mike  Gravel  " 
entered  into  the  record  of  the  Senate  Subcommittee  on  Public  Buildings  and  j 
Grounds  of  June  29,  1971.  This  material  does  not  embody  the  whole  Defense 
Department  study,  but  only  those  portions  which  had  come  into  the  Senator's  i 
possession  at  that  time.  The  full  Defense  Department  study  contained  about  i 
7,800  pages,  while  the  material  entered  into  the  Senate  record,  and  reprinted  in  | 
the  Gravel  edition,  consisted  of  about  4,100  pages  of  manuscript.  , 

The  New  York  Times  edition  of  the  Pentagon  Papers,  published  by  Bantam  \ 
Books  and  Quadrangle  Press,  is  a  summary  prepared  by  the  staff  of  that  news-  , 
paper,  along  with  a  selection  of  documents  from  the  Papers  and  elsewhere.  All  j 
documents  in  this  edition  which  were  not  in  the  Gravel  manuscript  were  reprinted  , 
in  the  Gravel  edition  and  their  source  noted.  { 

While  the  Gravel  edition  was  on  the  presses,  the  Defense  Department  released  \ 
its  declassified  version  of  the  Pentagon  Papers.  This  was  subsequently  published,  ; 
in  limited  quantity,  by  the  Government  Printing  Office.  From  this  United  States 
Government  edition  it  is  possible  to  infer  what  is  not  present  in  the  Gravel 
edition. 

No  table  of  contents  was  included  with  the  Gravel  manuscript.  (Even  the 
official  title  of  the  Defense  Department  study,  "United  States-Vietnam  Relations  : 
1945-1967,"  was  not  known  at  the  time  the  Gravel  edition  went  to  press.)  Thus, 
in  preparing  the  Gravel  edition  for  publication,  a  chapter  sequence  was  chosen  ; 
which  provided  a  convenient,  nearly  chronological  four-volume  format.  With  the 
publication  of  the  USG  edition,  an  "outline  of  studies"  as  a  table  of  contents 
became  available,  and  it  was  then  possible  to  determine  what  the  "proper"  order 
should  be.  Table  I,  the  published  "outline"  of  the  original  study,  is  a  locater  for 
both  the  Gravel  edition  and  the  USG  edition. 

As  Table  I  (pages  316-318)  shows,  several  sections  describing  the  pre- 1960 
period  are  missing  from  the  Gravel  edition.  In  addition,  only  about  one-fourth  of 
the  documents  included  with  the  original  study  were  available  with  the  Gravel  j 
material. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  version  released  by  the  Defense  Department,  and  pub- 
lished by  GPO,  had  a  number  of  pages  and  individual  sentences  deleted.  Much 
of  this  material  is  included  in  the  Gravel  edition;  it  appears  on  the  pages  shown  \ 
in  Table  II  (page  319).  ? 

The  Defense  Department  has  not  provided  any  public  rationale  for  its  dele-  | 
tions.  The  omitted  items  include  communications  from  foreign  governments,  \ 
especially  during  the  1954  Geneva  Conference;  narrative  material  and  documents 
demonstrating  American  complicity  in  the  coup  that  toppled  Diem;  narrative 
material  and  documents  describing  clandestine  naval  and  air  attacks  on  North 
Vietnam;  descriptions  of  political  weakness  and  corruption  in  South  Vietnam 


A  Note  on  the  Three  Editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  315 

and  of  American  involvement  in  South  Vietnamese  governmental  processes; 
assertions  of  American  willingness  to  use  nuclear  weapons  if  China  intervened; 
descriptions  of  the  decision,  in  1964,  to  initiate  the  bombing  of  Laos,  with  the 
knowledge  and  consent  of  the  Laotian  government;  assessments  of  Soviet  actions 
and  of  their  likely  reactions  to  American  moves;  descriptions  of  the  use  of 
Canadian  and  other  intermediaries  with  the  North  Vietnamese;  information  on 
the  presence  and  location  of  North  Vietnamese  units  in  South  Vietnam,  and 
acknowledgment  that  North  Vietnamese  and  Viet  Cong  electronic  communica- 
tions had  been  intercepted. 

The  Gravel  edition  includes  110  documents  from  the  Johnson  Administration 
which  were  not  included  with  the  original  study.  Although  the  USG  edition 
reports,  in  Book  12,  that  "a  separate  volume  covers  the  Johnson  Administration," 
this  volume  of  documents  is  not  listed  in  the  Government's  "outline"  and  prob- 
ably was  never  assembled. 

Some  of  the  manuscript  pages  in  the  Gravel  material  were  indistinct,  notably 
at  the  tops  and  bottoms  of  pages.  This  problem  was  especially  severe  in  Chapter 
IIL  2  and,  to  some  extent.  Chapter  IIL  3.  The  illegible  or  missing  material  was 
either  bridged  by  removing  the  entire  sentence  in  which  it  appeared,  when  it 
was  evident  that  no  substantive  material  would  be  lost  by  this  procedure,  or  the 
omission  was  indicated  by  a  bracketed  statement.  A  comparison  with  the  USG 
edition  shows  that  no  serious  omission  resulted.  In  addition,  the  even-numbered 
pages  were  missing  from  the  Gravel  material  dealing  with  the  Tonkin  Gulf  episode 
,  (Gravel  ed.,  IIL  182-190).  Since  this  material  is  likely  to  be  of  interest  to  many 
i  readers,  that  section  is  reprinted  here  (pages  320-341),  with  the  missing  material 
drawn  from  the  USG  edition. 


316      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

TABLE  I 


Gravel  U.S. 

Edition  Govern- 

Volume  ment 

and  The  Text  of  Edition 

Chapter  OSD  Vietnam  Task  Force  Book 
Outline  of  Studies  Number 

*  I.  Vietnam  and  the  U.S.,  1940-1950  Book  1 
1:1  A.  U.S.  Policy,  1940-50 

1  B.  The  Character  and  Power  of  the  Viet  Minh 

1  C.  Ho  Chi  Minh:  Asian  Tito? 

*  II.  U.S.  Involvement  in  the  Franco-Viet  Minh 

War,  1950-1954 

1:2  A.  U.S.,  France  and  Vietnamese  NationaHsm 

1:2  B.  Toward  a  Negotiated  Settlement 


1:3^  III.  The  Geneva  Accords 

A.  U.S.  Military  Planning  and  Diplomatic  Ma- 
neuver 

B.  Role  and  Obligations  of  State  of  Vietnam 

C.  Viet  Minh  Position  and  Sino-Soviet  Strategy 

D.  The  Intent  of  the  Geneva  Accords 

*  IV.  Evolution  of  the  War 

*  A.  U.S.   MAP  for  Diem:   The  Eisenhower 

Commitments,  1954-1960 
t  1.  NATO  and  SEATO:  A  Comparison 

1:4  2.  Aid  for  France  in  Indochina,  1950-54 

1:4  3.  U.S.  and  France's  Withdrawal  from 

Vietnam,  1954-56 
t  4.  U.S.  Training  of  Vietnamese  National      Book  2 

Army,  1954-59 
1:5^  5.  Origins  of  the  Insurgency 

*  B.  Counterinsurgency:  The  Kennedy  Commit- 

ments, 1961-1963 
11:1  1.  The  Kennedy  Commitments  and  Pro- 

grams, 1961 

11:2  2.  Strategic  Hamlet  Program,  1961-63         Book  3 

11:6  3.  The  Advisory  Build-up,  1961-67 

11:3  4.  Phased  Withdrawal  of  U.S.  Forces  in 

Vietnam,  1962-64 
11:4  5.  The  Overthrow  of  Ngo  Dinh  Diem, 

May-Nov.  1963 

*  C.  Direct  Action:  The  Johnson  Commitments, 

1964-1968 

111:1  1.  U.S.  Programs  in  South  Vietnam,  No- 

vember 1963-April  1965:  NSAM  273 
— NSAM  288— Honolulu 

NOTES  TO  TABLE  I  ARE  FOUND  ON  PAGE  318. 


A  Note  on  the  Three  Editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  317 


Gravel 
Edition 
Volume 

and 
Chapter 


The  Text  of 
OSD  Vietnam  Task  Force 
Outline  of  Studies 


U.S. 

Govern- 
ment 

Edition 
Book 

Number 


111:2 

111:3 
111:4 
111:4 
IV:2 


IV:1 

11:7 
11:5 


2.  Military  Pressures  Against  NVN 

a.  February-June  1964 

b.  July-October  1964 

c.  November-December  1964 

3.  ROLLING  THUNDER  Program  Be- 
gins: January-June  1965 

4.  Marine  Combat  Units  Go  to  DaNang, 
March  1965 

5.  Phase  I  in  the  Build-up  of  U.S.  Forces: 
March-July  1965 

6.  U.S.  Ground  Strategy  and  Force  De- 
ployments: 1965-1967 

a.  Volume  I:  Phase  II,  Program  3,  Pro- 
gram 4 

b.  Volume  II:  Program  5 

c.  Volume  III:  Program  6 

7.  Air  War  in  the  North:  1965-1968 

a.  Volume  I 

b.  Volume  II 

8.  Re-emphasis   on   Pacification:  1965- 
1967 

9.  U.S.-GVN  Relations 

a.  Volume   1:   December  1963-June 
1965 

b.  Volume   2:    July  1965-December 
1967 

10.  Statistical  Survey  of  the  War,  North  and 
South:  1965-1967 


Book  4 


Book  5 


Book  6 


Book  7 


V.  Justification  of  the  War 
A.  Public  Statements 


I  Volume    I:  A — The  Truman  Administra- 

tion 

I  B — ^The  Eisenhower  Adminis- 

tration 

II  C — The  Kennedy  Administra- 

tion 

III-IV  Volume  II:  D — The  Johnson  Administra- 

tion 

*  B.  Internal  Documents 

t  1.  The  Roosevelt  Administration 

*  2.  The  Truman  Administration  Book  8 
t                     a.  Volume  I:  1945-1949 

I  4  b.  Volume  II:  1950-1952 


318      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/VoL  V 


Gravel  U.S. 

Edition  Govern- 

Volume  ment 

and                                  The  Text  of  Edition 

Chapter                      OSD  Vietnam  Task  Force  Book 

Outline  of  Studies  Number 

*  3.  The  Eisenhower  Administration  Book  9 
I  4                   a.  Volume  I:  1953 

14  b.  Volume  II:  1954— Geneva 

t  c.  Volume  III:  Geneva  Accords — 15      Book  10 

March  1956 

t  d.  Volume  IV:    1956  French  With- 

drawal—1960 

II  4  4.  The  Kennedy  Administration  Book  1 1 

Book  I 

Book  II  Book  12 

*  VI.  Settlement  of  the  Conflict 

t  A.  Negotiations,  1965-67:  The  Public  Record 

t  B.  Negotiations,  1965-67:  Announced  Position 


Statements 

^         C.  Histories  of  Contacts  (This  material  not 
printed) 

1.  1965-1966  (This  material  not  printed) 

2.  Polish  Track  (This  material  not  printed) 

3.  Moscow  London  Track  (This  material 
not  printed) 

4.  1967-1968  (This  material  not  printed) 

*  The  entries  marked  with  an  *  are  "outline"  entries  in  the  USG  edition  and  do  not 
represent  any  text  except,  in  some  instances,  for  brief  editorial  comments  from  the 
compilers. 

t   The  entries  marked  with  a  t  are  missing  from  the  Gravel  edition. 

1.  Summaries  of  these  sections  are  included  in  the  Summary  portion  of  Gravel  1:1. 

2.  Chapter  1:3  of  the  Gravel  edition  appears  to  be  an  early  draft  of  the  study  included 
in  the  USG  edition. 

3.  This  section  of  the  Defense  Department  study  contains  four  "tabs"  or  sub-sections. 
The  Gravel  edition  includes  the  Summary  of  the  entire  section,  a  portion  of  the  first 
tab  (pp.  11-33  of  the  USG  edition  are  not  present),  and  all  of  the  second  tab.  The 
third,  entitled  "The  Role  of  Hanoi,"  and  the  fourth,  "U.S.  Perceptions  of  the  In- 
surgency, 1954-1960,"  are  not  in  Gravel. 

4.  Only  portions  of  the  documents  in  these  sections  are  present  in  the  Gravel  edition. 

5.  This  section  is  omitted  from  both  the  Gravel  and  USG  editions. 


A  Note  on  the  Three  Editions  of  the  Pentagon  Papers  319 
TABLE  11 

Deletions  from  the  United  States  Government  Edition 

GRAVEL  VOLUME  L 
Documents:  14,  pp.  390-391 

53  518-519 

66  539-540 

80  554-557 

83  560-561 

GRAVEL  VOLUME  IL 

Narrative:  pp.  38,  211-213,  216-217,  217-218,  223,  237-238,  256-258,  271, 
307-308,  318-319,  322,  333-334,  339-341 


Documents:  98, 

pp.  637-642 

144 

767-768 

145 

769 

150 

782-783 

151 

784-785 

154 

789-792 

GRAVEL  VOLUME  IIL 

I  Narrative:  pp.  32-33,  36-39,  107-108,  160,  184-185,  195-198,  251-253,  266- 
\  267,  292,  325-326,  328,  330-331,  398-399,  401-402,  426-427. 

429-430,431 
j Documents:  156-256,  pp.  486-706 

GRAVEL  VOLUME  IV: 

[Narrative:  pp.  71-73,  228,  246-247,  333,  334-335,  336,  381,  382-384,  407, 
409,  446-447,  469,  485,  492,  518,  523-524,  578-579,  581,  582 
Documents:  257-265,  pp.  605-625 


'I 


f 

320  I 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions 


I.    PROLOGUE:  ACTIONS  AND  PROGRAMS  UNDERWAY  ' 

Several  forms  of  pressure  were  already  being  applied  against  North  Vietnam 
by  July  of  1964.  Moreover,  contingency  plans  for  other  forms — should  political 
and  military  circumstances  warrant  a  decision  to  use  them — were  continually 
being  adjusted  and  modified  as  the  situation  in  Southeast  Asia  developed. 

The  best  known  of  these  pressures  was  being  applied  in  Laos.  Since  21  May, 
U.S.  aircraft  had  flown  low-level  reconnaissance  missions  over  communist-oc- 
cupied areas.  In  early  June  Premier  Souvanna  Phouma  both  gave  and  reaffirmed 
his  permission  for  armed  escort  of  these  missions,  which  included  the  right  to 
retaliate  against  hostile  fire  from  the  ground.  This  effort  was  supplemented  at 
the  end  of  the  month  when  the  United  States  decided  to  conduct  transport  and 
night  reconnaissance  operations  and  furnish  additional  T-28  aircraft  and  muni- 
tions to  support  a  Royal  Laotian  counteroffensive  near  Muong  Soui.  This  de- 
cision came  in  response  to  Souvanna's  request,  in  which  he  equated  the  protection 
of  Muong  Soui  with  the  survival  of  the  Laotian  neutralist  army.  Air  strikes  con- 
ducted by  the  Royal  Lao  Air  Force,  with  T-28s  obtained  from  the  United  States, 
were  later  credited  with  playing  a  major  role  in  the  success  of  the  RLG's  opera- 
tions. 

Other  actions  obviously  designed  to  forestall  communist  aggressive  intentions 
were  taken  in  different  parts  of  Southeast  Asia.  In  June,  following  the  Honolulu 
strategy  conference.  State  and  Defense  Department  sources  made  repeated  leaks 
to  the  press  affirming  U.S.  intentions  to  support  its  allies  and  uphold  its  treaty 
commitments  in  Southeast  Asia.  U.S.  contingency  ground-force  stockages  in 
Thailand  were  augmented  and  publicly  acknowledged.  Revelations  were  made 
that  USAF  aircraft  were  operating  out  of  a  newly  constructed  air  base  at  Da 
Nang.  Moreover,  the  base  was  characterized  as  part  of  a  network  of  new  air 
bases  and  operational  facilities  being  developed  in  South  Vietnam  and  Thailand. 
On  10  July,  the  Da  Nang  base  was  the  site  of  a  well-publicized  Air  Force  Day 
display  of  allied  airpower,  including  aircraft  from  a  B-57  wing  recently  acknowl- 
edged to  have  been  permanently  deployed  to  the  Philippines  from  Japan. 

Less  known  were  parallel  actions  taken  within  the  Government.  U.S.  resolve 
to  resist  aggression  in  Southeast  Asia  was  communicated  directly  to  North  Viet- 
nam by  the  newly  appointed  Canadian  member  of  the  International  Control 
Commission,  Blair  Seaborn.  Stressing  that  U.S.  ambitions  were  limited  and  its 
intentions  were  "essentially  peaceful,"  Seaborn  told  Pham  Van  Dong  that  the 
patience  of  the  U.S.  Government  was  not  limitless.  He  explained  that  the  United 
States  was  fully  aware  of  the  degree  to  which  Hanoi  controlled  the  Viet  Cong 
insurgency  and  the  Pathet  Lao  and  might  be  obliged  to  carry  the  war  to  the 
North  if  DRV-assisted  pressures  against  South  Vietnam  continued.  He  further 
cautioned  that  U.S.  stakes  in  resisting  a  North  Vietnamese  victory  were  high, 
since  the  United  States  saw  the  conflict  in  Southeast  Asia  as  part  of  a  general  con- 
frontation with  guerrilla  subversion  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  and  that  "in  the 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  321 

event  of  escalation  the  greatest  devastation  would  of  course  result  for  the  DRVN 
I  itself." 

I     Also  underway  were  efforts  directed  toward  educating  the  American  public 
regarding  our  national  interests  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the  extent  of  the  U.S. 
commitment  there.  In  reporting  to  the  President,  Administration  officials  who 
participated  in  the  Honolulu  Conference  stressed  the  need  for  a  domestic  in- 
formation effort  to  "get  at  the  basic  doubts"  of  the  importance  of  the  U.S.  stake 
ji  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  program  was  to  be  focused  both  on  key  members  of  the 
(  Congress  and  on  the  public.  Thereafter,  work  was  begun  under  State  Department 
guidance  to  assemble  information  in  answer  to  some  of  the  prevalent  public 
questions  on  the  U.S.  involvement.  Of  special  concern  was  a  recent  Gallup  poll 
showing  only  37  percent  of  the  public  to  have  some  interest  in  our  Southeast 
;  Asian  policies.  Administration  officials  viewed  this  group  as  consisting  primarily 
!  of  either  those  desiring  our  withdrawal  or  those  urging  our  striking  at  North 
Vietnam.  A  general  program  was  proposed  with  the  avowed  aims  of  eroding 
public  support  for  these  polar  positions  and  solidifying  a  large  "center"  behind 
the  thrust  of  current  Administration  policies.  These  aims  were  to  be  accomplished 
!  by  directing  public  comment  into  discussions  of  the  precise  alternatives  available 
I  to  the  United  States,  greater  exposure  to  which  it  was  believed  would  alienate 
both  "hawk"  and  "dove"  supporters.  Less  than  a  week  after  this  proposal  was 
submitted,  the  White  House  published  a  NSAM,  naming  its  proponent,  Robert 
Manning,  as  coordinator  of  all  public  information  activities  for  Southeast  Asia 
and  directing  all  agencies  to  cooperate  in  furthering  the  Administration's  in- 
i  formation  objectives.  One  of  the  principal  foci  of  the  subsequent  information 
program  was  the  compilation  of  a  pubhc  pamphlet  of  questions  raised  by  critics 
of  Administration  policy  together  with  answers  furnished  and  coordinated  by 
1  several  interested  Government  agencies. 

j  Unknown  to  more  than  a  limited  number  of  Government  officials  were  a 
'  variety  of  covert  military  or  quasi-military  operations  being  conducted  at  the 
expense  of  North  Vietnam.  U.S.  naval  forces  had  undertaken  intermittent  patrol 
operations  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  designed  to  acquire  visual,  electronic  and 
photographic  intelligence  on  infiltration  activities  and  coastal  navigation  from 
North  Vietnam  to  the  South.  To  carry  out  these  missions,  destroyers  were  assigned 
to  tracks  between  fixed  points  and  according  to  stipulated  schedules.  Designated 
DE  SOTO  Patrols,  the  first  such  operation  of  1964  occurred  during  the  period 
28  February-10  March.  On  this  patrol  the  U.S.S.  Craig  was  authorized  to  ap- 
proach to  within  4  n.m.  of  the  North  Vietnamese  mainland,  15  n.m.  of  the 
Chinese  mainland  and  12  n.m.  of  Chinese-held  islands.  No  incidents  were  re- 
ported as  resulting  from  this  action.  The  next  DE  SOTO  Patrol  did  not  occur 
until  31  July,  on  which  the  U.S.S.  Maddox  was  restricted  to  a  track  not  closer 
then  8  n.m.  off  the  North  Vietnamese  mainland.  Its  primary  mission,  assigned 
|on  17  July,  was  "to  determine  DRV  coastal  activity  along  the  full  extent  of 
the  patrol  track."  Other  specific  intelligence  requirements  were  assigned  as 
follows: 

(a)  location  and  identification  of  all  radar  transmitters,  and  estimate  of 
range  capabilities;  (b)  navigational  and  hydro  information  along  the  routes 
traversed  and  particular  navigational  lights  characteristics,  landmarks,  buoys, 
currents  and  tidal  information,  river  mouths  and  channel  accessibility;  (c) 
monitoring  a  junk  force  with  density  of  surface  traffic  pattern;  (d)  sampling 
electronic  environment  radars  and  navigation  aids;  (e)  photography  of  op- 
portunities in  support  of  above.  .  .  . 


322      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

Separate  coastal  patrol  operations  were  being  conducted  by  South  Vietnamese 
naval  forces.  These  were  designed  to  uncover  and  interdict  efforts  to  smuggle 
personnel  and  supplies  into  the  South  in  support  of  the  VC  insurgency.  This 
operation  had  first  been  organized  with  U.S.  assistance  in  December  1961;  to 
support  it  a  fleet  of  motorized  junks  was  built,  partially  financed  with  U.S.  mili- 
tary assistance  funds.  During  1964  these  vessels  operated  almost  continually  in 
attempts  to  intercept  communist  seaborne  logistical  operations.  As  Secretary 
McNamara  told  Senate  committees: 

In  the  first  seven  months  of  this  year  [1964],  they  have  searched  149,000 
junks,  some  570,000  people.  This  is  a  tremendous  operation  endeavoring  to 
close  the  seacoasts  of  over  900  miles.  In  the  process  of  that  action,  as  the 
junk  patrol  has  increased  in  strength  they  [sic]  have  moved  farther  and 
farther  north  endeavoring  to  find  the  source  of  the  infiltration. 

In  addition  to  these  acknowledged  activities,  the  GVN  was  also  conducting  a 
number  of  operations  against  North  Vietnam  to  which  it  did  not  publicly  admit. 
Covert  operations  were  carried  out  by  South  Vietnamese  or  hired  personnel  and 
supported  by  U.S.  training  and  logistical  efforts.  Outlined  within  OPLAN  34A, 
these  operations  had  been  underway  theoretically  since  February  but  had  experi- 
enced what  the  ICS  called  a  "slow  beginning."  Despite  an  ultimate  objective  of 
helping  "convince  the  North  Vietnamese  leadership  that  it  is  in  its  own  self- 
interest  to  desist  from  its  aggressive  policies,"  few  operations  designed  to  harass 
the  enemy  were  carried  out  successfully  during  the  February-May  period.  Never- 
theless, citing  DRV  reactions  tending  "to  substantiate  the  premise  that  Hanoi  is 
expending  substantial  resources  in  defensive  measures,"  the  ICS  concluded  that 
the  potential  of  the  OPLAN  3  4- A  program  remained  high  and  urged  its  continu- 
ation through  Phase  II  (June-September).  Operations  including  air-infiltration 
of  sabotage  teams,  underwater  demolition,  and  seizures  of  communist  junks  were 
approved  for  the  period,  and  a  few  were  carried  by  specially  trained  GVN  forces 
during  June  and  July. 

In  the  process  of  combined  GVN-U.S.  planning,  but  not  yet  approved  for 
execution,  were  cross-border  operations  against  VC-North  Vietnamese  logistical 
routes  in  Laos.  This  planning  provided  for  both  air  attacks  by  the  VNAF  and 
"ground  operations  up  to  battalion  size"  in  the  Laotian  Panhandle.  Preparations 
for  such  actions  had  been  approved  in  principle  since  March  but  since  then  little 
further  interest  had  been  shown  in  them.  Toward  the  end  of  July,  the  air  force 
portion  was  examined  seriously  by  Administration  officials  as  a  means  not  only 
to  damage  the  Communist  logistical  effort  but  also  "primarily  for  reasons  of 
morale  in  South  Vietnam  and  to  divert  GVN  attention  from  [a]  proposal  to  strike 
North  Vietnam." 

In  addition  to  both  the  open  and  covert  operations  already  underway,  a  num- 
ber of  other  actions  intended  to  bring  pressure  against  North  Vietnam  had  been 
recommended  to  the  White  House.  Receiving  considerable  attention  among  Ad- 
ministration officials  during  May  and  June  was  a  proposed  request  for  a  Con- 
gressional Resolution,  reaffirming  support  by  the  legislators  for  Presidential  action 
to  resist  Communist  advances  in  Southeast  Asia  during  an  election  year.  In  some 
respects  paralleling  this  domestic  initiative,  the  President  was  urged  to  present  to 
the  United  Nations  the  detailed  case  assembled  by  the  Government  supporting 
the  charges  of  DRV  aggression  against  South  Vietnam  and  Laos.  He  was  also 
urged  to  authorize  periodic  deployments  of  additional  forces  toward  Southeast 
Asia  as  a  means  of  demonstrating  U.S.  resolve  to  undertake  whatever  measures 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  323 

were  required  to  resist  aggression  in  that  region.  Moreover,  in  OPLAN  37-64, 
there  was  fully  developed  a  listing  of  forces  to  be  deployed  as  a  deterrent  to 
communist  escalation  in  reaction  to  U.S./GVN  actions  against  North  Vietnam. 
Finally,  it  was  recommended  that  the  President  make  the  decision  to  use  "selected 
and  carefully  graduated  military  force  against  North  Vietnam"  if  necessary  to 
improve  non-Communist  prospects  in  South  Vietnam  and  Laos. 

The  source  documents  available  to  this  writer  are  not  clear  on  the  exact  deci- 
sions made  in  response  to  each  of  these  recommendations,  or  indeed  on  the  pre- 
cise form  or  context  in  which  the  recommendations  were  presented.  It  is  evident 
that  the  proposal  to  seek  a  Congressional  Resolution  was  not  favorably  received, 
but  as  subsequent  events  indicate  neither  was  it  rejected  out-of-hand.  It  proved 
very  useful  in  largely  the  same  language  just  two  months  later.  Less  certain 
are  the  decisions  made  about  the  other  proposals.  Certainly  they  were  not  ap- 
proved for  immediate  implementation.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  they  were 
(1)  flatly  disapproved,  (2)  merely  postponed,  or  (3)  approved  in  principle,  sub- 
ject to  gradual  implementation.  At  the  Honolulu  Conference,  where  many  of  the 
proposed  actions  were  discussed  with  U.S.  officials  from  the  theatre,  many  prac- 
tical considerations  were  aired  which  showed  that  delayed  implementation  would 
be  a  reasonable  course  of  action.  But  such  factors  would  have  provided  equally 
valid  reasons  for  either  deciding  against  the  proposals  or  for  merely  deferring  a 
decision  until  a  later,  more  appropriate  time.  The  most  significant  point,  for  an 
understanding  of  the  events  and  decisions  of  the  second  half  of  1964,  is  that  these 
options  remained  "on  the  shelf"  for  possible  implementation  should  favorable 
circumstances  arise. 

11.    THE  TONKIN  GULF  CRISIS 

Several  of  the  pressuring  measures  recommended  to  the  White  House  in  May 
or  June  were  implemented  in  conjunction  with  or  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of 
naval  action  in  the  Tonkin  Gulf.  It  is  this  fact  and  the  rapidity  with  which  these 
measures  were  taken  that  has  led  critics  to  doubt  some  aspects  of  the  public 
account  of  the  Tonkin  incidents.  It  is  also  this  fact,  together  with  later  Adminis- 
tration assessments  of  the  Tonkin  Gulf  experience,  that  give  the  incidents  greater 
significance  than  the  particular  events  seemed  at  first  to  warrant. 

THE  FIRST  INCIDENT 

What  happened  in  the  Gulf?  As  noted  eariler,  U.S.S.  Maddox  commenced  the 
second  DE  SOTO  Patrol  on  31  July.  On  the  prior  night  South  Vietnamese  coastal 
patrol  forces  made  a  midnight  attack,  including  an  amphibious  "commando" 
raid,  on  Hon  Me  and  Hon  Nieu  Islands,  about  19°  N.  latitude.  At  the  time  of 
this  attack,  U.S.S.  Maddox  was  120-130  miles  away  just  heading  into  waters  off 
North  Vietnam.  On  2  August,  having  reached  the  northernmost  point  on  its 
patrol  track  and  having  headed  South,  the  destroyer  was  intercepted  by  three 
North  Vietnamese  patrol  boats.  Apparently,  these  boats  and  a  fleet  of  junks  had 
moved  into  the  area  near  the  island  to  search  for  the  attacking  force  and  had 
mistaken  Maddox  for  a  South  Vietnamese  escort  vessel.  (Approximately  eleven 
hours  earlier,  while  on  a  northerly  heading,  Maddox  had  altered  course  to  avoid 
the  junk  concentration  shown  on  her  radar;  about  six  hours  after  that — now 
headed  South — Maddox  had  altered  her  course  to  the  southeast  to  avoid  the  junks 


324      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

a  second  time.)  When  the  PT  boats  began  their  high-speed  run  at  her,  at  a  dis- 
tance of  approximately  10  miles,  the  destroyer  was  28  miles  from  the  coast  and 
heading  farther  into  international  waters.  Two  of  the  boats  closed  to  within  5,000 
yards,  launching  one  torpedo  each.  As  they  approached,  Maddox  fired  on  the 
boats  with  her  5-inch  batteries  and  altered  course  to  avoid  the  torpedoes,  which 
were  observed  passing  the  starboard  side  at  a  distance  of  100  to  200  yards.  The 
third  boat  moved  up  abeam  of  the  destroyer  and  took  a  direct  5-inch  hit;  it  man- 
aged to  launch  a  torpedo  which  failed  to  run.  All  three  PT  boats  fired  50-caliber 
machine  guns  at  Maddox  as  they  made  their  firing  runs,  and  a  bullet  fragment 
was  recovered  from  the  destroyer's  superstructure.  The  attacks  occurred  in  mid- 
afternoon,  and  photographs  were  taken  of  the  torpedo  boats  as  they  attacked. 

Upon  first  report  of  the  PT  boats'  apparently  hostile  intent,  four  F-8E  aircraft 
were  launched  from  the  aircraft  carrier  Ticonderoga,  many  miles  to  the  South, 
with  instructions  to  provide  air  cover  but  not  to  fire  unless  they  or  Maddox  were 
fired  upon.  As  Maddox  continued  in  a  southerly  direction,  Ticonderoga'^  aircraft 
attacked  the  two  boats  that  had  initiated  the  action.  Both  were  damaged  with 
Zuni  rockets  and  20mm  gunfire.  The  third  boat,  struck  by  the  destroyer's  5-inch, 
was  already  dead  in  the  water.  After  about  eight  minutes,  the  aircraft  broke  off 
their  attacks.  In  the  meantime,  Maddox  had  been  directed  by  the  7th  Fleet  Com- 
mander to  retire  from  the  area  to  avoid  hostile  fire.  Following  their  attacks  on 
the  PT's,  the  aircraft  joined  Maddox  and  escorted  her  back  toward  South  Viet- 
namese waters  where  she  joined  a  second  destroyer,  C.  Turner  Joy.  The  two  ships 
continued  to  patrol  in  international  waters.  Approximately  two  hours  after  the 
action,  in  early  evening,  reconnaissance  aircraft  from  Ticonderoga  located  the 
damaged  PT's  and  obtained  two  photographs.  The  third  boat  was  last  seen  burn- 
ing and  presumed  sunk. 

On  3  August  a  note  of  protest  was  dispatched  to  the  Hanoi  Government,  re- 
portedly through  the  International  Control  Commission  for  Indo-China.  Directed 
by  the  President,  the  note  stressed  the  unprovoked  nature  of  the  North  Viet- 
namese attack  and  closed  with  the  following  warning: 

The  U.S.  Government  expects  that  the  authorities  of  the  regime  in  North 
Vietnam  will  be  under  no  misapprehension  as  to  the  grave  consequences 
which  would  inevitably  result  from  any  further  unprovoked  offensive  military 
action  against  U.S.  forces. 

On  that  same  day,  measures  were  taken  to  increase  the  security  of  the  DE  SOTO 
Patrol,  the  approved  schedule  of  which  still  had  two  days  to  run.  At  1325  hours 
(Washington  time)  the  ICS  approved  a  CINCPAC  request  to  resume  the  patrol 
at  a  distance  of  1 1  n.m.  from  the  North  Vietnamese  coast.  Later  in  the  day, 
President  Johnson  announced  that  he  had  approved  doubling  the  patrolling  force 
and  authorized  active  defensive  measures  on  the  part  of  both  the  destroyers  and 
their  escorting  aircraft.  His  press  statement  included  the  following: 

I  have  instructed  the  Navy : 

1.  To  continue  the  patrols  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  off  the  coast  of  North 
Vietnam. 

2.  To  double  the  force  by  adding  an  additional  destroyer  to  the  one  al- 
ready on  patrol. 

3.  To  provide  a  combat  air  patrol  over  the  destroyers,  and 

4.  To  issue  orders  to  the  commanders  of  the  combat  aircraft  and  the  two 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  325 


destroyers;  (a)  to  attack  any  force  which  attacks  them  in  international 
waters,  and  (b)  to  attack  with  the  objective  not  only  of  driving  off  the  force 
but  of  destroying  it. 

THE  SECOND  INCIDENT 

Late  the  following  evening  the  destroyers,  Maddox  and  C.  Turner  Joy,  were 
involved  in  a  second  encounter  with  hostile  patrol  boats.  Like  the  first  incident, 
this  occurred  following  a  South  Vietnamese  attack  on  North  Vietnamese  coastal 
targets — this  time  the  Rhon  River  estuary  and  the  Vinh  Sonh  radar  installation, 
which  were  bombarded  on  the  night  of  3  August.  The  more  controversial  of  the 
two,  this  incident  occurred  under  cover  of  darkness  and  seems  to  have  been  both 
I    triggered  and  described  largely  by  radar  and  sonar  images.  After  the  action  had 
!    been  joined,  however,  both  visual  sightings  and  intercepted  North  Vietnamese 
communications  confirmed  that  an  attack  by  hostile  patrol  craft  was  in  progress, 
j       At  1940  hours,  4  August  1964  (Tonkin  Gulf  time),  while  "proceeding  S.E,  at 
best  speed,"  Task  Group  72.1  {Maddox  and  Turner  Joy)  radioed  "RCVD  INFO 
indicating  attack  by  PGM  P-4  iminent."  Evidently  this  was  based  on  an  inter- 
cepted communication,  later  identified  as  "an  intelligence  source,"  indicating  that 
!    "North  Vietnamese  naval  forces  had  been  ordered  to  attack  the  patrol."  At  the 
\    time,  radar  contacts  evaluated  as  "probable  torpedo  boats"  were  observed  about 
36  miles  to  the  northeast.  Accordingly,  the  Task  Group  Commander  altered 
course  and  increased  speed  to  avoid  what  he  evaluated  as  a  trap.  At  approximately 
2035  hours,  while  west  of  Hainan  Island,  the  destroyers  reported  radar  sightings 
,    of  three  unidentified  aircraft  and  two  unidentified  vessels  in  the  patrol  area.  On 
i    receiving  the  report,  Ticonderoga  immediately  launched  F-8s  and  A-4Ds  to  pro- 
I    vide  a  combat  air  patrol  over  the  destroyers.  Within  minutes,  the  unidentified 
)    aircraft  disappeared  from  the  radar  screen,  while  the  vessels  maintained  a  dis- 
\    tance  of  about  27  miles.  Actually,  surface  contacts  on  a  parallel  course  had  been 
j    shadowing  the  destroyers  with  radar  for  more  than  three  hours.  ECM  contacts 
j    maintained  by  the  C.  Turner  Joy  indicated  that  the  radar  was  that  carried  aboard 
DRV  patrol  boats. 

]       New  unidentified  surface  contacts  13  miles  distant  were  reported  at  2134  hours. 
These  vessels  were  closing  at  approximately  30  knots  on  the  beam  and  were 
evaluated  as  "hostile."  Six  minutes  later  (2140)  Maddox  opened  fire,  and  at 
i    1242,  by  which  time  two  of  the  new  contacts  had  closed  to  a  distance  of  1 1  miles, 
aircraft  from  Ticonderoga's  CAP  began  their  attacks.  Just  before  this,  one  of  the 
PT  boats  launched  a  torpedo,  which  was  later  reported  as  seen  passing  about  300 
feet  off  the  port  beam,  from  aft  to  forward,  of  the  C.  Turner  Joy.  A  searchlight 
beam  was  observed  to  swing  in  an  arc  toward  the  C.  Turner  Joy  by  all  of  the 
I    destroyer's  signal  bridge  personnel.  It  was  extinguished  before  it  illuminated  the 
1   ship,  presumably  upon  detection  of  the  approaching  aircraft.  Aboard  the  Maddox, 
I   Marine  gunners  saw  what  were  believed  to  be  cockpit  lights  of  one  or  more  small 
boats  pass  up  the  port  side  of  the  ship  and  down  the  other.  After  approximately 
an  hour's  action,  the  destroyers  reported  two  enemy  boats  sunk  and  no  damage 
or  casualties  suffered. 

In  the  meantime,  two  patrol  craft  from  the  initial  surface  contact  had  closed  to 
join  the  action,  and  the  engagement  was  described  for  higher  headquarters — 
largely  on  the  basis  of  the  destroyers'  radar  and  sonar  indications  and  on  radio 
intercept  information.  [Three  lines  illegible.]  the  count  reached  22  torpedoes,  a 


326      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

total  which  caused  the  Commanding  Officer,  once  the  engagement  had  ended,  to 
question  the  vaUdity  of  his  report  and  communicate  these  doubts  to  his  superiors: 

Review  of  action  makes  many  recorded  contacts  and  torpedoes  fired  ap- 
pear doubtful.  Freak  weather  effects  and  overeager  sonarman  may  have 
accounted  for  many  reports. 

In  addition  to  sonar  readings,  however,  the  Task  Group  had  also  reported  inter- 
cepting communications  from  North  Vietnamese  naval  craft  indicating  that  they 
were  involved  in  an  attack  on  U.S.  ("enemy")  ships  and  that  they  had  "sacrificed" 
two  vessels  in  the  engagement. 

THE  RESPONSE  IN  WASHINGTON 

Sometime  prior  to  the  reported  termination  of  the  engagement,  at  0030  hours, 
5  August  (Tonkin  Gulf  time),  "alert  orders"  to  prepare  for  possible  reprisal  raids 
were  sent  out  by  naval  authorities  to  Ticonderoga  and  to  a  second  aircraft  carrier, 
Constellation,  which  started  heading  South  from  Hong  Kong  late  on  3  August. 
Such  raids  were  actually  ordered  and  carried  out  later  in  the  day.  "Defense  offi- 
cials disclosed  [in  public  testimony,  9  January  1968]  that,  when  the  first  word 
was  received  of  the  second  attack  'immediate  consideration  was  given  to  retalia- 
tion.' "  That  apparently  began  shortly  after  0920  hours  (Washington  time),  when 
the  task  group  message  that  a  North  Vietnamese  naval  attack  was  imminent  was 
first  relayed  to  Washington.  From  this  time  on,  amid  a  sequence  of  messages 
describing  the  attack,  Secretary  McNamara  held  "a  series  of  meetings  with  [his] 
chief  civilian  and  military  advisers"  concerning  the  engagement  and  possible  U.S. 
retaliatory  actions.  As  he  testified  before  the  Fulbright  Committee: 

We  identified  and  refined  various  options  for  a  response  to  the  attack,  to 
be  presented  to  the  President.  Among  these  options  was  the  air  strike  against 
the  attacking  boats  and  their  associated  bases,  which  option  was  eventually 
selected.  As  the  options  were  identified  preliminary  messages  were  sent  to 
appropriate  operational  commanders  alerting  them  to  the  several  possibilities 
so  that  initial  planning  steps  could  be  undertaken. 

At  1230,  the  President  met  with  the  National  Security  Council.  Having  just 
come  from  a  brief  meeting  with  the  JCS,  attended  also  by  Secretary  Rusk  and 
McGeorge  Bundy,  Secretary  McNamara  briefed  the  NSC  on  the  reported  details 
of  the  attack  and  the  possibilities  for  reprisal.  Shortly  thereafter  (presumably 
during  a  working  lunch  with  the  President,  Secretary  Rusk  and  Bundy)  and  after 
receiving  by  telephone  the  advice  of  the  JCS,  McNamara  and  the  others  recom- 
mended specific  reprisal  actions.  It  was  at  this  point  that  the  President  approved 
"a  response  consisting  of  an  air  strike  on  the  PT  and  SWATOW  boat  bases  and 
their  associated  facilities." 

Returning  from  this  session  shortly  after  1500,  Secretary  McNamara,  along 
with  Deputy  Secretary  Vance,  joined  with  the  JCS  to  review  all  the  evidence  re- 
lating to  the  engagement.  Included  in  this  review  was  the  communications  intelli- 
gence information  which  the  Secretary  reported,  containing  North  Vietnamese 
reports  that  (1)  their  vessels  were  engaging  the  destroyers,  and  (2)  they  had  lost 
two  craft  in  the  fight.  In  the  meantime,  however,  messages  had  been  relayed  to 
the  Joint  Staff  indicating  considerable  confusion  over  the  details  of  the  attack. 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  321 

The  DE  SOTO  Patrol  Commander's  message,  expressing  doubts  about  earlier 
evidence  of  a  large-scale  torpedo  attack,  arrived  sometime  after  1330  hours. 
Considerably  later  (it  was  not  sent  to  CINCPACFLT  until  1447  EDT),  another 
message  arrived  to  the  effect  that  while  details  of  the  action  were  still  confusing, 
the  commander  of  Task  Group  72.1  was  certain  that  the  ambush  was  genuine. 
He  had  interviewed  the  personnel  who  sighted  the  boat's  cockpit  lights  passing 
near  the  Maddox,  and  he  had  obtained  a  report  from  the  C.  Turner  Joy  that  two 
torpedoes  were  observed  passing  nearby.  Accordingly,  these  reports  were  dis- 
cussed by  telephone  with  CINCPAC,  and  he  was  instructed  by  Secretary  Mc- 
Namara  to  make  a  careful  check  of  the  evidence  and  ascertain  whether  there  was 
I   any  doubt  concerning  the  occurrence  of  an  attack.  CINCPAC  called  the  JCS  at 
i    least  twice  more,  at  1723  and  again  at  1807  hours,  to  state  that  he  was  convinced 
I    on  the  basis  of  "additional  information"  that  the  attacks  had  taken  place.  At  the 
I    time  of  the  earlier  call  Secretary  McNamara  and  the  JCS  were  discussing  possible 
force  deployments  to  follow  any  reprisals.  On  the  occasion  of  the  first  call,  the 
Secretary  was  at  the  White  House  attending  the  day's  second  NSC  meeting.  Upon 
being  informed  of  CINCPAC's  call,  he  reports: 

I  spoke  to  the  Director  of  the  Joint  Staff  and  asked  him  to  make  certain 
that  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  was  willing  to  state  that  the  attack  had 
taken  place,  and  therefore  that  he  was  free  to  release  the  Executive  Order 
because  earlier  in  the  afternoon  I  had  told  him  that  under  no  circumstances 
would  retaliatory  action  take  place  until  we  were,  to  use  my  words,  "damned 
sure  that  the  attacks  had  taken  place." 

At  the  meeting  of  the  National  Security  Council,  proposals  to  deploy  certain 
increments  of  OPLAN  37-64  forces  to  the  Western  Pacific  were  discussed,  and 
I  the  order  to  retaliate  against  North  Vietnamese  patrol  craft  and  their  associ- 
ated  facilities  was  confirmed.  Following  this  meeting,  at  1845,  the  President  met 
I  with  16  Congressional  leaders  from  both  parties  for  a  period  of  89  minutes, 
j  Reportedly,  he  described  the  second  incident  in  the  Gulf,  explained  his  decisions 
I  to  order  reprisals,  and  informed  the  legislators  of  his  intention  to  request  a  formal 
statement  of  Congressional  support  for  these  decisions.  On  the  morning  following 
j  the  meeting,  the  Washington  Post  carried  a  report  that  none  of  the  Congressional 
J  leaders  present  at  the  meeting  had  raised  objections  to  the  course  of  action 
;  planned.  Their  only  question,  the  report  stated,  "had  to  do  with  how  Congress 
could  show  its  agreement  and  concern  in  the  crisis." 

In  many  ways  the  attacks  on  U.S.  ships  in  the  Tonkin  Gulf  provided  the  Ad- 
ministration with  an  opportunity  to  do  a  number  of  things  that  had  been  urged 
on  it.  Certainly  it  offered  a  politically  acceptable  way  of  exerting  direct  punitive 
,  pressure  on  North  Vietnam.  In  South  Vietnam,  the  U.S.  response  served  to  satisfy 
j  for  a  time  the  growing  desire  for  some  action  to  carry  the  war  to  the  North. 
Relative  to  the  election  campaign,  it  provided  a  means  of  eliminating  any  doubts 
about  President  Johnson's  decisiveness  that  may  have  been  encouraged  by  his 
I  preferred  candidate's  image  as  the  restrained  man  of  peace.  The  obvious  con- 

i'  venience  and  the  ways  in  which  it  was  exploited  have  been  at  the  root  of  much 
of  the  suspicion  with  which  critics  of  Administration  policy  have  viewed  the 
incident. 
The  documents  available  to  this  writer  are  not  conclusive  on  this  point,  but 
the  evidence  indicates  that  the  occurrence  of  a  DRV  provocation  at  this  time 
['resulted  from  events  over  which  the  U.S.  Government  exercised  little  control.  It 
has  been  suggested  that  the  incidents  were  related  in  some  way  to  pressure  coming 


328      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

from  the  GVN  for  U.S.  action  against  North  Vietnam.  However,  the  patrol  was 
authorized  on  or  prior  to  17  July,  and  General  Khanh's  oft-cited  "Go  North" 
appeal  wasn't  made  until  19  July.  The  first  attack  almost  certainly  was  a  case  of 
mistaken  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  local  Vietnamese  commander.  His  probable 
association  of  U.S.S.  Maddox  with  the  South  Vietnamese  raiding  force  is  indi- 
cated by  the  circumstances  preceding  the  event,  the  brief  duration  and  character 
of  it,  and  the  long-delayed  (not  until  5  August)  and  rather  subdued  DRV  public 
comment.  Moreover,  there  is  little  reason  to  see  anything  more  than  coincidence 
in  the  close  conjunction  between  the  GVN's  maritime  operations  against  the 
North  Vietnamese  coast  and  the  scheduling  of  the  DE  SOTO  Patrol.  The  two 
operations  were  scheduled  and  monitored  from  different  authorities  and  through 
separate  channels  of  communication  and  command.  Higher  U.S.  naval  commands 
were  informed  of  the  operations  against  the  two  islands  by  COMUSMACV,  but 
the  task  group  commander  had  no  knowledge  of  where  or  when  the  specific 
operations  had  taken  place.  As  Secretary  McNamara  told  Senator  Morse,  in  re- 
sponse to  charges  that  U.S.  naval  forces  were  supporting  the  GVN  operation, 

Our  ships  had  absolutely  no  knowledge  of  it,  were  not  connected  with  it; 
in  no  sense  of  the  word  can  be  considered  to  have  backstopped  the  effort. 

In  addition,  there  was  no  reason  on  the  basis  of  earlier  DE  SOTO  Patrol  experi- 
ence to  even  suspect  that  patrol  activity  might  precipitate  hostile  action  by  North 
Vietnam. 

Although  the  events  of  the  second  attack  were  less  clear-cut,  the  evidence  does 
not  support  beliefs  (which  have  been  expressed)  that  the  incident  was  staged. 
On  the  contrary,  the  evidence  leads  readily  to  other  explanations,  which  are  at 
least  equally  as  plausible. 

DRV  motivations  for  the  second  attack  are  unclear,  but  several  possibilities 
provide  rational  explanations  for  a  deliberate  DRV  decision.  Those  given  credence 
at  the  time — that  the  DRV  or  China  wanted  to  increase  pressures  for  an  inter- 
national conference  or  that  the  DRV  was  testing  U.S.  reactions  to  a  contemplated 
general  offensive — have  lost  some  credibility.  Subsequent  events  and  DRV  actions 
have  appeared  to  lack  any  consistent  relationship  with  such  motives.  Perhaps 
closer  to  the  mark  is  the  narrow  purpose  of  prompt  retaliation  for  an  embar- 
rassing and  well-publicized  rebuff  by  a  much-maligned  enemy.  Inexperienced  in 
modern  naval  operations,  DRV  leaders  may  have  believed  that  under  cover  of 
darkness  it  would  be  possible  to  even  the  score  or  to  provide  at  least  a  psycho- 
logical victory  by  severely  damaging  a  U.S.  ship.  Unlike  the  first  incident,  the 
DRV  was  ready  (5  August)  with  a  propaganda  blast  denying  its  own  provocation 
and  claiming  the  destruction  of  U.S.  aircraft.  Still,  regardless  of  motive,  there  is 
little  question  but  that  the  attack  on  the  destroyers  was  deliberate.  Having  fol- 
lowed the  destroyers  for  hours,  their  course  was  well  known  to  the  North  Viet- 
namese naval  force,  and  its  advance  units  were  laying  ahead  to  make  an  ambush- 
ing beam  attack  fully  60  miles  from  shore. 

The  reality  of  a  North  Vietnamese  attack  on  4  August  has  been  corroborated 
by  both  visual  and  technical  evidence.  That  it  may  have  been  deliberately  pro- 
voked by  the  United  States  is  belied  to  a  considerable  degree  by  circumstantial 
evidence.  Operating  restrictions  for  the  DE  SOTO  Patrol  were  made  more 
stringent  following  the  first  attack.  The  1 1  n.m.,  rather  than  8  n.m.,  off-shore 
patrolling  track  indicates  an  intention  to  avoid — not  provoke — further  contact. 
On  February  the  rules  of  engagement  were  modified  to  restrict  "hot  pursuit"  by 
the  U.S.  ships  to  no  closer  than  11  n.m,  from  the  North  Vietnamese  coast;  air- 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  329 

craft  were  to  pursue  no  closer  than  3  n.m.  Given  the  first  attack,  the  President's 
augmentation  of  the  patrol  force  was  a  normal  precaution,  particularly  since  both 
Ticonderoga  and  C.  Turner  Joy  were  already  deployed  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
as  supporting  elements.  Moreover,  since  the  augmentation  was  coupled  with  a 
clear  statement  of  intent  to  continue  the  patrols  and  a  firm  warning  to  the  DRV 
that  repetition  would  bring  dire  consequences,  their  addition  to  the  patrol  could 
be  expected  to  serve  more  as  a  deterrent  than  a  provocation. 

The  often  alleged  "poised"  condition  of  the  U.S.  reprisal  forces  was  anything 
but  extraordinary.  U.S.S.  Constellation  was  well  out  of  the  immediate  operating 
j    area  as  the  patrol  was  resumed  on  3  August.  In  fact,  one  reason  for  delaying  the 
j    launching  of  retaliatory  air  strikes  (nearly  1100  hours,  5  August — Tonkin  Gulf 
!    time)  was  to  permit  Constellation  to  approach  within  reasonable  range  of  the 
targets.  Target  lists  from  which  to  make  appropriate  selections  were  already  avail- 
able as  a  result  of  routine  contingency  planning  accomplished  in  June  and  July. 
In  preparation  for  the  resumed  DE  SOTO  Patrol  of  3-5  August,  the  patrol  track 
was  moved  farther  north  to  make  clearer  the  separation  between  it  and  the  34-A 
operations.  The  ways  in  which  the  events  of  the  second  Tonkin  Gulf  incident 
came  about  give  little  indication  of  a  deliberate  provocation  to  provide  opportu- 
nity for  reprisals. 

BROADENING  THE  IMPACT 

There  is  no  question,  however,  that  the  second  incident  was  promptly  exploited 
'  by  the  Administration.  The  event  was  seized  upon  as  an  opportunity  to  take 
I  several  measures  that  had  been  recommended  earlier  and  which  were  now  seen 
I  as  useful  means  of  turning  an  essentially  unique  and  localized  incident  into  an 
'  event  with  broader  strategic  impact.  The  extent  to  which  the  strategic  utility  of 
these  actions  was  perceived  during  the  two  days  between  the  incidents  is  not  clear, 
j  Certainly  the  disposition  of  U.S.S.  Constellation  does  not  suggest  a  picture  of 
intensive  preparation  for  a  planned  series  of  new  military  and  political  pressures 
i  against  North  Vietnam.  Moreover,  there  is  no  record  in  the  usual  sources  of  the 
series  of  staff  meetings,  task  assignments  and  memoranda  that  typically  accom- 
pany preparations  for  coordinated  political  and  military  initiatives.  Whatever  was 
contemplated  between  2  and  4  August,  the  deliberations  immediately  preceding 
the  reprisal  decision  seem  to  have  been  largely  ad  hoc,  both  within  DOD  and 
among  the  President's  principal  advisers, 
j      The  most  reasonable  explanation  for  the  actions  which  accompanied  the  re- 
j  prisals,  and  for  the  rapidity  of  their  implementation,  is  the  fact  that  each  of  them 
!  had  been  proposed  and  staffed  in  detail  months  before.  These  "on  the  shelf" 
:  options  had  been  recommended  unanimously  by  the  principal  officials  responsible 
I  for  security  matters  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  fact  that  they  were  implemented  in 
August  indicates  that  the  President  did  not  disapprove  of  them,  but  rather  that  the 
domestic  and  international  political  environments  had  probably  been  judged  in- 
appropriate earlier  in  the  summer.  The  measures  apparently  had  been  considered 
either  too  costly  or  too  risky  (perhaps  politically  or  perhaps  in  terms  of  commu- 
nist reactions),  given  the  President's  election  strategy  and  his  policy  theme  of 
"maximum  effect  with  minimum  escalation."  The  kind  of  circumstances  created 
by  the  Tonkin  Gulf  affair  enabled  them  to  be  carried  out  at  lower  cost  and  with 
i  less  risk.  The  promptness  with  which  these  actions  were  to  be  taken  now  is  per- 
I  haps  as  much  a  direct  result  of  the  President's  well-known  political  astuteness 
and  keen  sense  of  timing  as  any  other  single  factor. 


330      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

One  of  the  first  actions  taken  was  to  deploy  additional  U.S.  military  forces  to 
the  Western  Pacific.  This  was  done  in  part  as  a  measure  to  deter  any  hostile 
responses  by  Hanoi  or  Peking  to  the  reprisal  raids.  It  also  enabled  making  a 
stronger  signal  of  U.S.  resolve  to  defend  its  interests  throughout  Southeast  Asia, 
as  recommended  at  the  end  of  May.  Orders  directing  the  deployment  of  selected 
37-64  forces  and  the  alerting  of  others  were  dispatched  from  the  Pentagon 
shortly  after  the  President's  meeting  with  Congressional  leaders  on  the  evening  of 
4  August.  Shortly  after  midnight,  on  5  August,  and  again  later  in  the  day,  Secre- 
tary McNamara  announced  the  specific  measures  by  which  U.S.  military  capabili- 
ties around  Southeast  Asia  were  being  augmented: 

First,  an  attack  carrier  group  has  been  transferred  from  the  First  Fleet  on 
the  Pacific  coast  to  the  Western  Pacific.  Secondly,  interceptor  and  fighter 
bomber  aircraft  have  been  moved  into  South  Vietnam.  Thirdly,  fighter 
bomber  aircraft  have  been  moved  into  Thailand.  Fourthly,  interceptor  and 
fighter  bomber  squadrons  have  been  transferred  from  the  United  States  into 
advance  bases  in  the  Pacific.  Fifthly,  an  antisubmarine  task  force  group  has 
been  moved  into  the  South  China  Sea. 

It  is  significant,  relative  to  the  broader  purpose  of  the  deployments,  that  few  of 
these  additional  units  were  removed  from  the  Western  Pacific  when  the  immediate 
crisis  subsided.  In  late  September  the  fourth  attack  aircraft  carrier  was  authorized 
to  resume  its  normal  station  in  the  Eastern  Pacific  as  soon  as  the  regularly  as- 
signed carrier  completed  repairs.  The  other  forces  remained  in  the  vicinity  of 
their  August  deployment. 

Other  actions  taken  by  the  Administration  in  the  wake  of  Tonkin  Gulf  were 
intended  to  communicate  to  various  audiences  the  depth  and  sincerity  of  the  U.S. 
commitment.  On  the  evening  of  4  August,  in  conjunction  with  his  testing  of  Con- 
gressional opinion  regarding  reprisal  action,  President  Johnson  disclosed  his  in- 
tention to  request  a  resolution  in  support  of  U.S.  Southeast  Asian  policy.  This  he 
did  through  a  formal  message  to  both  houses  on  5  August.  Concurrently,  identical 
draft  resolutions,  the  language  of  which  had  been  prepared  by  executive  agencies, 
were  introduced  in  the  Senate  by  J.  William  Fulbright  (D.,  Ark.)  and  in  the 
House  by  Thomas  E.  Morgan  (D.,  Pa.)  and  co-sponsored  by  bi-partisan  leader- 
ship. Discussed  in  committee  on  6  August,  in  response  to  testimony  by  leading 
Administration  officials,  the  resolution  was  passed  the  following  day — by  votes  of 
88  to  2  in  the  Senate  and  416  to  0  in  the  House. 

Despite  the  nearly  unanimous  votes  of  support  for  the  Resolution,  Congres- 
sional opinions  varied  as  to  the  policy  implications  and  the  meaning  of  such 
support.  The  central  belief  seemed  to  be  that  the  occasion  necessitated  demon- 
strating the  nation's  unity  and  collective  will  in  support  of  the  President's  action 
and  affirming  U.S.  determination  to  oppose  further  aggression.  However,  beyond 
that  theme,  there  was  a  considerable  variety  of  opinion.  For  example,  in  the 
House,  expressions  of  support  varied  from  Congressman  Laird's  argument,  that 
while  the  retaliation  in  the  Gulf  was  appropriate  such  actions  still  left  a  policy  to 
be  developed  with  respect  to  the  land  war  in  Southeast  Asia,  to  the  more  reticent 
viewpoint  of  Congressman  Alger.  The  latter  characterized  his  support  as  being 
primarily  for  purposes  of  showing  unity  and  expressed  concern  over  the  danger 
of  being  dragged  into  war  by  "other  nations  seeking  our  help."  Several  spokesmen 
stressed  that  the  Resolution  did  not  constitute  a  declaration  of  war,  did  not  abdi- 
cate Congressional  responsibility  for  determining  national  policy  commitments, 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  331 

and  did  not  give  the  President  carte  blanche  to  involve  the  nation  in  a  major 
Asian  war. 

Similar  expressions  were  voiced  in  the  senior  chamber.  For  example,  Senator 
Nelson  sought  assurances  that  the  Resolution  would  not  be  exploited  to  commit 
the  United  States  further  in  the  direction  of  a  large  land  war  in  Asia  without  an 
expression  of  specific  Congressional  approval.  In  response,  Senator  Fulbright 
stated  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  Resolution  changed  in  any  way  the  Ad- 
ministration's concept  of  keeping  the  conflict  in  Vietnam  as  limited  as  possible. 
He  identified  the  purposes  of  the  Resolution  as  being  only  ( 1 )  "to  make  it  clear 
that  the  Congress  approves  the  action  taken  by  the  President  to  meet  the  attack 
on  U.S.  forces  .  .  ."  and  (2)  to  declare  support  for  the  resolute  policy  enunci- 
ated by  the  President  in  order  to  prevent  further  aggression,  or  to  retaliate  with 
suitable  measures  should  such  aggression  take  place."  However,  in  subsequent 
discussion  it  was  made  clear  that  preventing  or  retaliating  against  further  aggres- 
sion was  interpreted  rather  broadly  at  the  time: 

(Mr.  Cooper)  .  .  .  are  we  now  giving  the  President  advance  authority 
to  take  whatever  action  he  may  deem  necessary  respecting  South  Vietnam 
and  its  defense,  or  with  respect  to  the  defense  of  any  other  country  included 
in  the  [SEATO]  treaty? 

(Mr.  Fulbright)  I  think  that  is  correct. 

(Mr.  Cooper)  Then,  looking  ahead,  if  the  President  decided  that  it  was 
necessary  to  use  such  force  as  could  lead  into  war,  we  will  give  that  authority 
by  this  resolution? 

(Mr.  Fulbright)  That  is  the  way  I  would  interpret  it.  If  a  situation  later 
developed  in  which  we  thought  the  approval  should  be  withdrawn  it  could 
be  withdrawn  by  concurrent  resolution. 

The  Congressional  Resolution  had  several  intended  audiences.  First,  it  was 
aimed  at  the  communist  powers  who  might  not  believe  the  President  would  risk 
legislative  debate  over  strong  military  actions  in  an  election  year.  Second,  it  was 
intended  to  reassure  our  allies,  particularly  in  Asia,  who  might  doubt  the  ability 
of  the  President  to  rally  the  necessary  public  resolve  should  stronger  military 
measures  be  needed.  Finally  it  was  directed  at  the  U.S.  public,  whose  appreciation 
of  national  interests  in  Southeast  Asia  might  be  strengthened  through  observation 
of  combined  executive-legislative  and  bipartisan  political  support. 

The  United  Nations  was  the  target  of  a  separate  statement,  on  5  August,  as 
Ambassador  Stevenson  described  the  events  in  the  Gulf  for  members  of  the 
Security  Council  and  specifically  related  the  DRV  provocation  to  the  wider  cam- 
paign of  terror  and  infiltration  occurring  in  South  Vietnam  and  Laos.  This  ad- 
dress was  designed  to  establish  the  legitimacy  of  our  actions  in  the  Gulf  under 
provisions  of  the  UN  Charter  and  to  reaffirm  that  U.S.  policy  in  Southeast  Asia 
had  limited  aims  and  was  based  on  upholding  provisions  of  existing  international 
agreements. 

The  third  communication  was  directed  specifically  to  Hanoi,  on  10  August, 
through  the  Canadian  I.C.C.  representative  and  was  intended  to  strengthen  the 
warning  which  he  conveyed  on  his  initial  visit.  In  addition  to  repeating  points 
made  earlier,  Seaborn's  second  message  conveyed  the  U.S.  Government's  un- 
certainty over  DRV  intentions  in  the  4  August  attack  and  explained  that  sub- 
sequent U.S.  deployments  of  additional  airpower  to  South  Vietnam  and  Thailand 
were  "precautionary."  In  addition,  the  new  message  stressed:  (1)  that  the  Tonkin 


332      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon'  Papers/Vol.  V 

Gulf  events  demonstrated  that  "U.S.  public  and  official  patience"  was  wearing 
thin;  (2)  that  the  Congressional  Resolution  reaffirmed  U.S.  determination  "to 
continue  to  oppose  firmly,  by  all  necessary  means,  DRV  efforts  to  subvert  and 
conquer  South  Vietnam  and  Laos";  and  (3)  that  "if  the  DRV  persists  in  its 
present  course,  it  can  expect  to  suffer  the  consequences." 

Thus,  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  provocation  handed  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment in  the  Tonkin  Gulf,  the  Administration  was  able  to  carry  out  most  of  the 
actions  recommended  by  its  principal  officials  early  in  the  summer.  By  the  same 
token,  it  was  reducing  the  number  of  unused  measures  short  of  direct  military 
action  that  had  been  conceived  as  available  for  exerting  effective  pressure  on  the 
DRV.  In  effect,  as  it  made  its  commitments  in  Southeast  Asia  clearer  it  also 
deepened  them,  and  in  the  process  it  denied  itself  access  to  some  of  the  un- 
committing  options  which  it  had  perceived  earlier  as  offering  policy  flexibility. 
Meanwhile,  other  events  were  also  having  the  effect  of  denying  options  which 
had  been  considered  useful  alternatives  to  strikes  against  the  North. 

III.    POST-TONKIN  POLICY  ASSESSMENTS 

The  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents  were  important  not  only  because  of  what  they  en- 
abled the  United  States  to  do  in  response — but  also  because  of  the  way  what  was 
done  began  to  be  regarded  by  policymakers.  The  fact  that  U.S.  forces  had  re- 
sponded to  hostile  acts  by  making  direct  attacks  on  North  Vietnam,  albeit  limited 
ones  under  unique  circumstances,  had  rather  significant  impacts  on  the  Adminis- 
tration's policy  judgments.  These  impacts  appeared  as  it  became  increasingly 
evident  that  the  United  States  actually  had  fewer  options  than  it  once  believed 
available. 

DILEMMAS  IN  LAOS 

One  of  the  areas  where  the  Administration  first  saw  its  freedom  of  action  being 
impaired  was  Laos. 

Prior  to  the  events  in  Tonkin  Gulf,  the  situation  in  Laos  had  become  increas- 
ingly complex,  thus  making  U.S.  policy  choices  increasingly  delicate.  Since  the 
end  of  May,  U.S.  hopes  for  a  stabilized  Laos  had  been  based  largely  on  a  Polish 
proposal  to  convene  a  preliminary  conference  among  six  nations.  Particularly 
promising  was  the  Soviet  Union's  willingness  to  support  the  proposal.  Toward 
the  end  of  June,  as  the  Laotian  government  warned  of  the  imminent  threat  of  a 
major  communist  offensive  near  Muong  Soui,  the  Soviet  Union  asked  Great 
Britain  to  postpone  efforts  toward  such  a  conference,  and  the  Poles  seemed  to 
back  away  from  their  original  initiative.  On  25  July  the  Soviet  Union  announced 
her  return  to  the  14-Nation  formula,  and  threatened  to  resign  her  co-chairman 
role  if  a  conference  were  not  called.  The  Soviet  threat  to  withdraw  from  the 
international  machinery  that  is  basic  to  the  neutralist  Laotian  government's  claim 
to  legitimacy  was  a  matter  of  considerable  mutual  concern  in  Vientiane  and 
Washington. 

One  of  the  major  reasons  for  U.S.  support  of  the  Polish  6-Nation  preliminary 
conference  was  its  value  in  forestalling  pressure  for  a  Geneva-type  meeting.  It 
was  hoped  that  such  a  conference  could  be  prolonged  well  into  the  autumn  to 
give  the  political  and  military  situation  in  South  Vietnam  time  to  be  improved, 
and  to  build  a  more  favorable  political  climate  for  an  eventual  14-Nation  confer- 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  333 

ence  on  Laos.  The  latter  could  be  accomplished,  it  was  hoped,  by:  (1)  demon- 
strating the  extent  of  communist  responsibiHty  for  Laotian  instabiHty;  (2)  getting 
the  LC.C.  to  function  more  effectively;  (3)  strengthening  international  backing 
for  Souvanna's  position;  and  (4)  thereby  obtaining  support  for  his  insistence  on 
Pathet  Lao  withdrawal  from  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  as  a  precondition  for  a  new 
Geneva  settlement.  Insofar  as  Laos  was  concerned,  the  United  States  recognized 
that  a  new  conference  was  probably  desirable,  as  long  as  it  did  not  occur  too 
soon.  However,  it  also  recognized  the  suspicion  with  which  the  GVN  would  re- 
gard any  kind  of  negotiations  over  Southeast  Asia  and  the  likelihood  that  back- 
corridor  discussions  of  the  Vietnamese  problem  would  be  an  almost  inevitable 
by-product.  In  time  such  a  procedure  might  be  useful,  but  for  the  balance  of 
1964  it  was  to  be  avoided  in  order  to  promote  GVN  stability  and  encourage  a 
more  vigorous  GVN  war  effort. 

The  pressure  for  a  Geneva-type  conference  had  been  building  ever  since  the 
resumption  of  fighting  in  Laos  in  May.  The  chief  protagonist  in  the  quest  for 
negotiations  was  France,  who  first  proposed  reconvening  the  14-Nation  Confer- 
ence to  deal  with  the  crisis  on  20  May.  What  made  French  policy  so  dangerous 
to  U.S.  interests,  however,  was  that  its  interest  in  a  Geneva  solution  applied  to 
Vietnam  as  well.  On  12  June,  De  Gaulle  publicly  repeated  his  neutralization 
theme  for  all  Indo-China  and  called  for  an  end  to  all  foreign  intervention  there;  on 
23  July  he  proposed  reconvening  the  1954  Geneva  Conference  to  deal  with  the 
problems  of  Vietnam. 

The  Soviet  Union's  return  to  the  14-Nation  formula  in  July  (it  had  endorsed 
the  original  French  proposal  before  indicating  willingness  to  support  the  6-Nation 
approach)  indicated  solidarity  in  the  communist  camp.  The  call  was  endorsed  by 
North  Vietnam  on  the  following  day.  Communist  China  first  announced  support 
for  a  14-Nation  Conference  (on  Laos)  on  9  June,  repeating  this  through  notes 
to  the  co-chairman  calling  on  the  13th  for  an  "emergency  meeting."  On  2  August, 
the  Chinese  urged  the  USSR  not  to  carry  out  its  threat  to  abandon  its  co- 
chairman  role,  apparently  viewing  such  a  development  as  jeopardizing  the  possi- 
bilities for  a  Geneva  settlement. 

Great  Britain  also  urged  the  Russians  to  stay  on,  and  during  the  last  days  of 
July  it  attempted  to  make  arrangements  in  Moscow  to  convene  a  14-Nation  as- 
sembly on  Laos.  The  negotiations  failed  because  Britain  insisted  on  Souvanna's 
prerequisite  that  the  communists  withdraw  from  positions  taken  in  May  and  was 
unable  to  gain  Soviet  acquiescence.  However,  U.S.  leaders  were  aware  that 
Britain's  support  on  this  point  could  not  be  counted  on  indefinitely  in  the  face 
of  increasing  pressure  in  the  direction  of  Geneva. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  Laotian  military  efforts  to  counter  the  communist 
threat  to  key  routes  and  control  points  west  of  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  were  showing 
great  success.  As  a  result  of  a  counteroffensive  (Operation  Triangle),  govern- 
ment forces  gained  control  of  a  considerable  amount  of  territory  that  gave 
promise  of  assuring  access  between  the  two  capitals  (Vientiane  and  Luang  Pra- 
bang)  for  the  first  time  in  three  years. 

In  effect,  the  government's  newly  won  control  of  territory  and  communica- 
tion routes  in  Central  Laos  created  a  new  and  more  favorable  balance  of  power 
in  that  country,  which  in  the  perceptions  of  the  Administration  should  not  be 
jeopardized.  A  threat  to  this  balance  from  either  (1)  communist  reactions  to 
additional  pressure,  or  (2)  Laotian  insistence  on  extending  their  offensive  into 
the  Plaine  des  Jarres,  was  cited  to  discourage  proposals  near  the  end  of  July  to 
permit  the  VNAF  to  bomb  infiltration  routes  in  the  Laotian  Panhandle.  This 
"don't  rock  the  boat"  policy  was  given  added  encouragement  when,  on  1  August, 


334      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

Great  Britain  initiated  a  promising  effort  toward  a  new  diplomatic  solution.  Act- 
ing on  Souvanna  Phouma's  request,  the  British  government  urged  the  I.C.C. 
members  to  arrange  a  meeting  among  the  three  Laotian  political  factions. 

Concern  over  not  provoking  a  communist  military  escalation  that  would  upset 
the  relatively  stabilized  situation  in  Laos  figured  prominendy  in  a  tentative  analy- 
sis of  U.S.  strategy  for  Southeast  Asia  made  and  circulated  for  comment  by  the 
State  Department  in  mid-August.  It  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  Administra- 
tion's assessment  of  its  options  in  the  post-Tonkin  period.  Among  other  effects, 
this  concern  caused  it  to  withhold  for  several  weeks  its  approval  of  continuing 
proposals  for  air  and  ground  initiatives  in  the  Panhandle  as  means  to  improve 
the  situation  in  South  Vietnam. 

CONCERN  OVER  PRESSURES  FOR  NEGOTIATIONS 

One  of  the  Tonkin  Gulf  impacts  which  was  perceived  within  the  Administra- 
tion served  to  exacerbate  its  policy  dilemmas  regarding  Laos.  Administration 
officials  were  apprehensive  that  the  international  crisis  precipitated  by  incidents 
in  the  Gulf  might  intensify  the  kind  of  Geneva  conference  pressures  generated 
previously.  Administration  concern  was  apparently  well  founded.  On  5  August 
UN  Secretary  General  U  Thant  stated  that  the  14-Nation  assembly  should  be 
reconvened  to  deal  with  the  Tonkin  Gulf  debate  then  being  urged  on  the  UN 
Security  Council.  (He  had  earlier  urged  reconvening  the  1954  Conference  to 
negotiate  a  Vietnam  settlement.)  Two  days  later,  during  the  debate,  the  French 
delegation  urged  the  calling  of  a  conference  for  the  pacification  of  all  of  Indo- 
China.  Reports  appeared  on  10  August  that  the  Chinese  People's  Daily  published 
an  editorial  arguing  that  a  Geneva  settlement  was  the  only  effective  way  to  solve 
the  problem  of  South  Vietnam.  On  the  19th,  in  a  note  rejecting  potential  UN 
Security  Council  findings  regarding  responsibility  for  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents, 
North  Vietnam  declared  its  insistence  on  a  Geneva  conference. 

Such  was  the  Administration's  concern  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the 
crisis,  that  it  contemplated  a  diplomatic  initiative  relating  to  Laos  that  was  de- 
signed to  counteract  the  expected  pressure.  Reflecting  a  point  of  view  reportedly 
also  becoming  attractive  to  Souvanna  Phouma,  the  State  Department  sought 
reactions  to  a  policy  direction  that  would  no  longer  insist  on  Pathet  Lao  with- 
drawal from  the  Plaine  des  Jarres  as  a  precondition  to  an  international  confer- 
ence. The  gains  recently  achieved  through  "Operation  Triangle"  were  so  sig- 
nificant, it  reasoned,  that  they  more  than  offset  communist  control  of  the  Plaine. 
And  it  was  clear  that  any  negotiations  by  which  a  communist  withdrawal  might 
be  arranged  would  include  reciprocal  demands  for  the  government  to  relinquish 
its  recently  won  gains.  Moreover,  passage  of  the  Congressional  Resolution  and 
the  strong  DRV  naval  attacks  had  accomplished  the  exact  kind  of  actions  be- 
lieved to  be  necessary  earlier  to  demonstrate  U.S.  firmness  in  the  event  nego- 
tiating pressure  should  become  compelling. 

Reactions  to  this  tentative  policy  change  were  unfavorable.  It  was  seen  as 
likely  to  have  a  demoralizing  impact  on  the  GVN.  It  was  also  seen  as  possibly 
eroding  the  impression  of  strong  U.S.  resolve,  which  the  reprisal  air  strikes  were 
believed  to  have  created.  For  example,  Ambassador  Taylor  cabled: 

.  .  .  rush  to  conference  table  would  serve  to  confirm  to  CHICOMS  that 
U.S.  retaliation  for  destroyer  attacks  was  transient  phenomenon  and  that 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  335 

firm  CHICOM  response  in  form  of  commitment  to  defend  NVN  has  given 
U.S.  "Paper  tiger"  second  thoughts.  .  .  . 

In  Vietnam  sudden  backdown  from  previously  strongly  held  U.S.  position 

I  on  [Piaine  des  Jarres]  withdrawal  prior  to  conference  on  Laos  would  have 
potentially  disastrous  effect.  Morale  and  will  to  fight  and  particular  willing- 
ness to  push  ahead  with  arduous  pacification  task  .  .  .  would  be  under- 

!  mined  by  what  would  look  like  evidence  that  U.S.  seeking  to  take  advantage 
of  any  slight  improvement  in  non-Communist  position  as  excuse  for  ex- 

■         tricating  itself  from  Indo-China  via  [conference]  route.  .  .  . 

Under  circumstances,  we  see  very  little  hope  that  results  of  such  a  con- 
ference would  be  advantageous  to  us.  Moreover,  prospects  of  limiting  it  to 
consideration  of  only  Laotian  problem  appear  at  this  time  juncture  to  be 

I        dimmer  than  ever.  .  .  . 

CONCERN  OVER  TONKIN  REPRISAL  SIGNALS 

i 

f  Contained  in  Ambassador  Taylor  s  views  was  yet  another  of  the  Administra- 
tion's reflections  on  the  impact  of  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents.  Officials  developed 

I  mixed  feelings  regarding  the  effect  of  the  Tonkin  reprisals  for  signaling  firm 

f  U.S.  commitments  in  Southeast  Asia.  On  one  hand,  it  was  conceded  that  the 
reprisals  and  the  actions  which  accompanied  them  represented  the  most  forceful 
expression  of  U.S.  resolve  to  date.  Improvements  were  perceived  in  South  Viet- 
namese morale,  and  the  combination  of  force  and  restraint  demonstrated  was 

:  believed  effective  in  interrupting  communist  momentum  and  forcing  a  reassess- 
ment of  U.S.  intentions.  On  the  other  hand,  they  reflected  concern  that  these 

i  effects  might  not  last  and  that  the  larger  aspects  of  U.S.  determination  might  still 

j  be  unclear. 

I  Several  officials  and  agencies  indicated  that  our  actions  in  the  Tonkin  Gulf 
}  represented  only  one  step  along  a  continually  demanding  route  for  the  United 

States.  They  expressed  relief  that  if  a  persuasive  impression  of  firmness  were 
i  to  be  created  relative  to  the  general  security  of  Southeast  Asia,  we  could  not  rest 
j  on  our  laurels.  Ambassador  Taylor  expressed  the  limited  impact  of  the  Tonkin 

Gulf  action  as  follows: 

It  should  be  remembered  that  our  retaliatory  action  in  Gulf  of  Tonkin  is 
in  effect  an  isolated  U.S. -DRV  incident.  Although  this  has  relation  ...  to 
[thej  larger  problem  of  DRV  aggression  by  subversion  in  Viet-Nam  and 
Laos,  we  have  not  (repeat  not)  yet  come  to  grips  in  a  forceful  way  with 
DRV  over  the  issue  of  this  larger  and  much  more  complex  problem. 

Later,  he  described  a  need  for  subsequent  actions  that  would  convey  to  Hanoi 
that  "the  operational  rules  with  respect  to  the  DRV  are  changing."  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  Bundy  believed  that  Hanoi  and  Peking  had  probably  been 
[Convinced  only  "that  we  will  act  strongly  where  U.S.  force  units  are  directly  in- 
volved .  .  .  [that]  in  other  respects  the  communist  side  may  not  be  so  per- 
isuaded  that  we  are  prepared  to  take  stronger  action.  .  .  ."  He  saw  the  need 
for  a  continuous  "combination  of  military  pressure  and  some  form  of  communica- 
tion" to  cause  Hanoi  to  accept  the  idea  of  "getting  out"  of  South  Vietnam  and 
Laos.  CINCPAC  stated  that  "what  we  have  not  done  and  must  do  is  make  plain 
0  Hanoi  and  Peiping  the  cost  of  pursuing  their  current  objectives  and  impeding 


336      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

ours.  .  .  .  Our  actions  of  August  5  have  created  a  momentum  which  can  lead 
to  the  attainment  of  our  objectives  in  S.E.  Asia.  ...  It  is  most  important  that 
we  not  lose  this  momentum."  The  JCS  urged  actions  to  "sustain  the  U.S.  ad- 
vantage [recently]  gained,"  and  later  cautioned:  "Failure  to  resume  and  maintain 
a  program  of  pressure  through  military  actions  .  .  .  could  signal  a  lack  of  re- 
solve." 

What  these  advisors  had  in  mind  by  way  of  actions  varied  somewhat  but  only 
in  the  extent  to  which  they  were  willing  to  go  in  the  immediate  future.  Bundy 
stressed  that  policy  commitments  must  be  such  that  U.S.  and  GVN  hands  could 
be  kept  free  for  military  actions  against  DRV  infiltration  routes  in  Laos.  Am- 
bassador Taylor,  CINCPAC  and  the  JCS  urged  prompt  air  and  ground  operations 
across  the  Laotian  border  to  interrupt  the  current  (though  modest)  southward 
flow  of  men  and  supplies.  Both  Taylor  and  CINCPAC  indicated  the  necessity 
of  building  up  our  "readiness  posture"  to  undertake  stronger  actions — through 
additional  deployments  of  forces  and  logistical  support  elements  and  strengthening 
of  the  GVN  political  base. 

The  mood  and  attitudes  reflected  in  these  viewpoints  were  concrete  and  dra- 
matic expressions  of  the  increased  U.S.  commitment  stemming  from  the  Tonkin 
Gulf  incidents.  They  were  candidly  summed  up  by  CINCPAC  in  his  statement: 

.  .  .  pressures  against  the  other  side  once  instituted  should  not  be  relaxed 
by  any  actions  or  lack  of  them  which  would  destroy  the  benefits  of  the 
rewarding  steps  previously  taken.  .  .  . 

Increasingly  voiced  by  officials  from  many  quarters  of  the  Administration  and 
from  the  professional  agencies  were  arguments  which  said,  in  effect,  now  that  we 
have  gone  this  far  we  cannot  afford  to  stop  and  go  no  farther;  our  original 
signal  must  continually  be  reinforced.  What  was  not  stated — at  least  not  in  docu- 
mentary form — were  estimates  of  how  long  the  process  might  have  to  continue 
or  to  what  extent  the  actions  might  have  to  be  carried. 

REASSERTION  OF  THE  ROSTOW  THESIS 

Soon  after  the  Tonkin  Gulf  incidents  State  Department  Counselor  Walt  Rostow 
reformulated  and  circulated  his  earlier  thesis  that  insurgencies  supported  by 
external  powers  must  be  dealt  with  through  measures  to  neutralize  the  sources 
of  that  support.  First  presented  to  President  Johnson  in  December  1963,  varia- 
tions on  this  theme  had  been  proposed  by  Rostow  at  various  times  throughout 
1964,  the  most  recent  occasion  being  in  June,  right  after  the  Honolulu  Confer- 
ence. Now  in  mid-August,  his  newly  articulated  arguments  were  passed  to  the 
White  House,  Department  of  State,  Department  of  Defense  and  the  JCS. 

The  "Rostow  thesis"  was  generalized — not  explicitly  dealing  with  a  particular 
insurgency — but  it  was  evident  that  considerations  of  the  U.S.  dilemmas  in  South- 
east Asia  affected  its  formulation.  It  started  with  a  proposition: 

By  applying  limited,  graduated  military  actions  reinforced  by  political  and 
economic  pressures  on  a  nation  providing  external  support  for  insurgency, 
we  should  be  able  to  cause  that  nation  to  decide  to  reduce  greatly  or  elimi- 
nate altogether  support  for  the  insurgency.  The  objective  of  these  pressures 
is  not  necessarily  to  attack  his  ability  to  provide  support,  although  economic 
and  certain  military  actions  would  in  fact  do  just  that.  Rather,  the  objective 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  337 

is  to  affect  his  calculation  of  interests.  Therefore,  the  threat  that  is  implicit 
in  initial  U.S.  actions  would  be  more  important  than  the  military  effect  of 
the  actions  themselves. 

In  Rostow's  view,  the  target  government's  "calculation  of  interests"  could  be 
affected  by  a  number  of  factors,  none  of  which  would  preclude,  however,  the 
need  for  effective  counterinsurgency  programs  within  the  country  already  under 
attack.  The  factors  included:  (1)  loss,  and  fear  of  further  loss,  of  military  and 
economic  facilities;  (2)  fear  of  involvement  in  a  much  larger  conflict;  (3)  fear 
of  increased  dependence  upon,  and  loss  of  independent  action  to,  a  major  com- 
munist country;  and  (4)  fear  of  internal  political  upheaval  and  loss  of  power. 
The  coercive  impacts  of  the  pressures  were  to  be  their  principal  objectives.  Sig- 
nificant (in  view  of  currently  espoused  rationale  for  increased  pressures  on  North 
Vietnam)  was  the  explicit  caution  that  improved  morale  in  the  country  troubled 
by  insurgency  and  ''improved  U.S.  bargaining  leverage  in  any  international  con- 
ference on  the  conflict"  were  to  be  considered  merely  as  "bonus  effects." 

The  coercive  pressure  was  to  result  from  "damaging  military  actions"  coupled 
with  concurrent  political,  economic  and  psychological  pressures.  The  former 
could  include  selective  or  full  naval  blockade  and  "surgical"  destruction  of 

;  specific  targets  by  aerial  bombardment  or  naval  gunfire.  They  could  be  supported 
by  such  nondestructive  military  actions  as  aerial  reconnaissance,  harassment  of 
civil  aviation  and  maritime  commerce,  mock  air  attacks,  and  timely  concentra- 

I  tions  of  U.S.  or  allied  forces  at  sea  or  near  land  borders.  Following  a  line  of 
reasoning  prevalent  in  the  Government  during  the  early  60s,  Rostow  observed 

1  that  a  target  government  might  well  reduce  its  insurgency  supporting  role  in  the 

j  face  of  such  pressures  because  of  the  communists'  proverbial  "tactical  flexibility." 
The  thesis  was  subjected  to  a  rather  thorough  analysis  in  OSD/ISA  and  co- 
ordinated  with  the  Department  of  State.  The  nature  of  this  review  will  be  dis- 

j  cussed  on  later  pages  and  in  a  different  context. 

ACCOMPANYING  PAUSE  IN  PRESSURES 

The  foregoing  policy  assessments  were  conducted  in  an  atmosphere  relatively 
free  of  even  those  pressure  measures  that  preceded  the  Tonkin  Gulf  crisis.  Since 
the  force  deployments  of  6  August,  little  military  activity  had  been  directed  at 
the  DRV.  U-2  liights  over  North  Vietnam  and  reconnaissance  of  the  Laotian  Pan- 
handle were  continued.  Military  operations  within  Laos  were  limited  to  the  con- 
solidation of  gains  achieved  in  Operation  Triangle.  A  deliberate  stand-down  was 
adopted  for  all  other  activities — including  DE  SOTO  Patrols  and  the  GVN's 
covert  harassing  operations.  The  purpose  of  this  "holding  phase,"  as  it  was  called, 
was  to  "avoid  actions  that  would  in  any  way  take  the  onus  off  the  Communist 
side  for  [the  Tonkin]  escalation." 

However,  during  the  "holding  phase"  some  of  the  administrative  impediments 
to  wider  military  action  were  cleared  away.  One  measure  that  was  taken  was  to 
relax  the  operating  restrictions  and  the  rules  of  engagement  for  U.S.  forces  in 
Southeast  Asia.  This  was  accomplished  in  response  to  JCS  urging  that  attacking 
\  forces  not  be  permitted  sanctuaries  from  which  to  regroup  and  perhaps  repeat 
;  their  hostile  acts.  Prior  rules  had  not  permitted  pursuit  of  hostile  aircraft  outside 
j'South  Vietnam  or  authorized  intercept  of  intruders  over  Thailand.  Under  the 
revised  rules  of  15  August  1964,  U.S.  forces  were  authorized  to  attack  and 
destroy  any  vessel  or  aircraft  "which  attacks,  or  gives  positive  indication  of  in- 


338      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/Vol.  V 

tent  to  attack"  U.S.  forces  operating  in  or  over  international  waters  and  in  Laos, 
to  include  hot  pursuit  into  the  territorial  waters  or  air  space  of  North  Vietnam 
and  into  the  air  space  over  other  countries  of  Southeast  Asia.  "Hostile  aircraft 
over  South  Vietnam  and  Thailand"  could  be  engaged  as  well  and  pursued  into 
North  Vietnam,  Laos  and  Cambodia. 

Another  prerequisite  to  wider  military  action  that  was  accomplished  was  the 
combined  GVN-U.S.  planning  for  cross-border  ground  operations.  By  16  August, 
this  had  proceeded  to  such  an  extent  that  COMUSMACV  believed  it  necessary 
to  seek  approval  of  the  concept  and  appropriate  to  urge  that  Phase  I  of  the  pro- 
gram get  underway.  Significant  for  understanding  the  pressure  for  wider  actions 
increasingly  being  brought  to  bear  on  the  Administration  was  the  fact  that  MACV 
made  the  request  despite  explicit  comment  that  the  concept  was  "an  overly  am- 
bitious scheme."  Presumably,  he  considered  it  likely  to  be  ineffective  militarily, 
but  perhaps  important  in  stimulating  more  vigorous  GVN  efforts.  Whatever  his 
particular  reasons  at  the  time,  MACV  repeated  the  recommendations  later  in 
the  month  as  part  of  several  measures  to  be  taken  inside  and  outside  South 
Vietnam.  These  were  designed  "to  give  the  VC  a  bloody  nose,"  to  steady  the 
newly  reformed  South  Vietnamese  government,  and  to  raise  the  morale  of  the 
population.  However,  the  earlier  MACV  cable  had  already  acknowledged  what 
must  have  been  one  of  the  Administration's  key  inhibitions  against  undertaking 
cross-border  actions:  General  Westmoreland  stated,  "It  should  be  recognized  that 
once  this  operation  is  initiated  by  the  GVN,  U.S.  controls  may  be  marginal." 

The  period  of  the  "holding  phase"  was  also  a  period  of  significant  develop- 
ments within  South  Vietnam.  Ambassador  Taylor's  initial  report  (10  August) 
made  clear  that  the  political  situation  was  already  precarious,  giving  Khanh  only 
a  50-50  chance  of  staying  in  power  and  characterizing  the  GVN  as  ineffective 
and  fraught  with  conflicting  purposes.  In  Taylor's  view,  the  leadership  in  Saigon 
showed  symptoms  of  "defeatism"  and  a  hesitancy  to  prosecute  the  pacification 
campaign  within  South  Vietnam.  Meanwhile,  however,  its  popular  support  in 
the  countryside  seemed  to  be  directly  proportional  to  the  degree  of  protection 
which  the  government  provided.  In  view  of  this  shaky  political  base.  General 
Khanh  seized  upon  the  occasion  of  post-Tonkin  euphoria — apparently  with  Am- 
bassador Taylor's  encouragement — to  acquire  additional  executive  authority.  On 
7  August,  announcing  the  necessity  for  certain  "emergency"  powers  to  cope  with 
any  heightened  VC  activity,  he  proclaimed  himself  President  and  promulgated 
the  Vung  Tau  Charter.  This  action,  which  gave  him  virtually  dictatorial  power 
over  several  aspects  of  South  Vietnamese  life,  met  with  hostile  reactions.  In  late 
August,  Khanh's  authority  was  challenged  in  the  streets  of  Saigon,  Hue  and  Da 
Nang,  during  several  days  of  student  protest  demonstrations  and  clashes  between 
Buddhist  and  Catholic  groups.  In  response  to  student  and  Buddhist  pressures  pri- 
marily, he  resigned  his  recently  assumed  post  as  President  and  promised  that  a 
national  assemblage  would  be  called  to  form  a  more  popularly  based  government. 
On  3  September,  Khanh  returned  to  assume  the  premiership,  but  clearly  with 
weaker  and  more  conditional  authority  than  before  the  government  crisis. 

Meanwhile,  as  the  GVN's  lack  of  cohesion  and  stability  was  being  demon- 
strated, the  infiltration  of  communist  forces  into  South  Vietnam  may  have  been 
on  the  increase.  At  least,  belief  in  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  this  infiltration  ap- 
parently gained  currency  in  various  U.S.  agencies  at  this  time.  The  documents 
available  to  this  writer  from  the  period  neither  refute  nor  substantiate  the  in- 
crease, but  several  of  them  contained  references  to  this  perception.  For  example, 
a  State  Department  memorandum,  dated  24  August,  acknowledged  a  "rise  and 
change  in  the  nature  of  infiltration  in  recent  months."  Later  analyses  confirmed 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  339 

that  increases  had  taken  place,  but  the  precise  period  when  they  began  was  not 
identified.  Hence,  unless  there  were  other  intelligence  data  to  confirm  them,  any 
implications  regarding  North  Vietnamese  policy  decisions  were  largely  speculative. 

Possibly  influencing  the  judgments  of  August  was  the  fact  that  increased  com- 
munist movement  of  men  and  supplies  to  the  South  was  expected,  resulting  in 
part  from  a  DIA  assessment  (7  August)  of  the  most  likely  DRV  reactions  to  the 
Tonkin  reprisals.  Moreover,  the  State  Department's  analysis  of  next  courses  of 
action  in  Southeast  Asia  had  made  "clear  evidence  of  greatly  increased  infiltra- 
tion from  the  North"  an  explicit  condition  for  any  policy  judgment  that  "sys- 
tematic military  action  against  DRV"  was  required  during  the  balance  of  1964. 
And  leading  officials  from  several  agencies  were  beginning  to  feel  that  such  action 
might  be  inevitable. 

The  combined  effects  of  the  signs  of  increased  VC  infiltration  and  of  con- 
tinuing upheaval  in  Saigon  caused  great  concern  in  Washington.  The  central 
perception  was  one  of  impending  chaos  and  possible  failure  in  South  Vietnam. 
Among  several  agencies,  the  emerging  mood  was  that  some  kind  of  action  was 
urgently  needed — even  if  it  had  the  effect  merely  of  improving  the  U.S.  image 
prior  to  pulling  out.  It  was  this  mood  that  prevailed  as  the  period  of  "pause" 
drew  to  a  close. 


DRAFT  RESOLUTION  ON  SOUTHEAST  ASIA 
25  May  1964 

Whereas  the  signatories  of  the  Geneva  Accords  of  1954,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  Communist  regime  in  China,  and  Viet  Nam  agreed  to  respect  the 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  South  Viet  Nam,  Laos  and  Cambodia; 
and  the  United  States,  although  not  a  signatory  of  the  Accords,  declared  that 
it  would  view  any  renewal  of  aggression  in  violation  of  the  Accords  with  grave 
concern  and  as  seriously  threatening  international  peace  and  security; 

Whereas  the  Communist  regime  in  North  Viet  Nam,  with  the  aid  and  support 
of  the  Communist  regime  in  China,  has  systematically  flouted  its  obligations 
under  these  Accords  and  has  engaged  in  aggression  against  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  South  Viet  Nam  by  carrying  out  a  systematic  plan  for 
the  subversion  of  the  Government  of  South  Viet  Nam,  by  furnishing  direction, 
training,  personnel  and  arms  for  the  conduct  of  guerrilla  warfare  within  South 
Viet  Nam,  and  by  the  ruthless  use  of  terror  against  the  peaceful  population  of 
that  country; 

Whereas  in  the  face  of  this  Communist  aggression  and  subversion  the  Gov- 
ernment and  people  of  South  Viet  Nam  have  bravely  undertaken  the  defense  of 
their  independence  and  territorial  integrity,  and  at  the  request  of  that  Government 
the  United  States  has,  in  accordance  with  its  Declaration  of  1954,  provided  mili- 
tary advice,  economic  aid  and  military  equipment; 

Whereas  in  the  Geneva  Agreements  of  1962  the  United  States,  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  Communist  regime  in  China,  North  Viet  Nam  and  others  solemnly 
undertook  to  respect  the  sovereignty,  independence,  neutrality,  unity  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Kingdom  of  Laos; 

Whereas  in  violation  of  these  undertakings  the  Communist  regime  in  North 
Viet  Nam,  with  the  aid  and  support  of  the  Communist  regime  in  China,  has 
engaged  in  aggression  against  the  independence,  unity  and  territorial  integrity 
of  Laos  by  maintaining  forces  on  Laotian  territory,  by  the  use  of  that  territory 
for  the  infiltration  of  arms  and  equipment  into  South  Viet  Nam,  and  by  providing 


340      Gravel  Edition/The  Pentagon  Papers/ Vol.  V 

direction,  men  and  equipment  for  persistent  armed  attacks  against  the  Govern- 
ment of  National  Unification  of  the  Kingdom  of  Laos; 

Whereas  in  the  face  of  this  Communist  aggression  the  Government  of  National 
Unification  and  the  non-Communist  elements  in  Laos  have  striven  to  maintain 
the  conditions  of  unity,  independence  and  neutrality  envisioned  for  their  country 
in  the  Geneva  Agreements  of  1962; 

Whereas  the  United  States  has  no  territorial,  military  or  political  ambitions  in 
Southeast  Asia,  but  desires  only  that  the  peoples  of  South  Viet  Nam,  Laos  and 
Cambodia  should  be  left  in  peace  by  their  neighbors  to  work  out  their  own  des- 
tinies in  their  own  way,  and,  therefore,  its  objective  is  that  the  status  established 
for  these  countries  in  the  Geneva  Accords  of  1954  and  the  Geneva  Agreements 
of  1962  should  be  restored  with  effective  means  of  enforcement; 

Whereas  it  is  essential  that  the  world  fully  understand  that  the  American 
people  are  united  in  their  determination  to  take  all  steps  that  may  be  necessary 
to  assist  the  peoples  of  South  Viet  Nam  and  Laos  to  maintain  their  independence 
and  political  integrity. 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled: 

That  the  United  States  regards  the  preservation  of  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  the  nations  of  South  Viet  Nam  and  Laos  as  vital  to  its  national  interest 
and  to  world  peace; 

Sec.  2.  To  this  end,  if  the  President  determines  the  necessity  thereof,  the 
United  States  is  prepared,  upon  the  request  of  the  Government  of  South  Viet 
Nam  or  the  Government  of  Laos,  to  use  all  measures,  including  the  commitment 
of  armed  forces  to  assist  that  government  in  the  defense  of  its  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  against  aggression  or  subversion  supported,  controlled  or 
directed  from  any  Communist  country. 

Sec.  3.  (a)  The  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  use  for  assistance  under  this 

joint  resolution  not  to  exceed  $  during  the  fiscal  year  1964,  and  not  to 

exceed  $   during  the  fiscal  year  1965,  from  any  appropriations  made 

available  for  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961, 
as  amended,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  Act,  except  as  otherwise 
provided  in  this  joint  resolution.  This  authorization  is  in  addition  to  other  existing 
authorizations  with  respect  to  the  use  of  such  appropriations. 

(b)  Obligations  incurred  in  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  this  joint  resolution 
may  be  paid  either  out  of  appropriations  for  military  assistance  or  appropriations 
for  other  than  military  assistance,  except  that  appropriations  made  available  for 
Titles  I,  III,  and  VI  of  Chapter  2,  Part  I,  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961, 
as  amended,  shall  not  be  available  for  payment  of  such  obligations. 

(c)  Notwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of 
1961,  as  amended,  when  the  President  determines  it  to  be  important  to  the  secu- 
rity of  the  United  States  and  in  furtherance  of  the  purposes  of  this  joint  resolu- 
tion, he  may  authorize  the  use  of  up  to  $  of  funds  available  under  sub- 
section (a)  in  each  of  the  fiscal  years  1964  and  1965  under  the  authority  of 
section  614(a)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as  amended,  and  is  author- 
ized to  use  up  to  $               of  such  funds  in  each  such  year  pursuant  to  his 

certification  that  it  is  inadvisable  to  specify  the  nature  of  the  use  of  such  funds, 
which  certification  shall  be  deemed  to  be  a  sufficient  voucher  for  such  amounts. 

(d)  Upon  determination  by  the  head  of  any  agency  making  personnel  available 
under  authority  of  section  627  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as 
amended,  or  otherwise  under  that  Act,  for  purposes  of  assistance  under  this  joint 
resolution,  any  officer  or  employee  so  made  available  may  be  provided  compensa- 


The  Tonkin  Gulf  Narrative  and  Resolutions  341 

tion  and  allowances  at  rates  other  than  those  provided  by  the  Foreign  Service  Act 
of  1946,  as  amended,  the  Career  Compensation  Act  of  1949,  as  amended,  and 
the  Overseas  Differentials  and  Allowances  Act  to  the  extent  necessary  to  carry 
out  the  purposes  of  this  joint  resolution.  The  President  shall  prescribe  regulations 
under  which  such  rates  of  compensation  and  allowances  may  be  provided.  In  addi- 
tion, the  President  may  utilize  such  provisions  of  the  Foreign  Service  Act  of  1946, 
as  amended,  as  he  deems  appropriate  to  apply  to  personnel  of  any  agency  carry- 
ing out  functions  under  this  joint  resolution. 


SOUTHEAST  ASIA  RESOLUTION 

Text  of  Public  Law  88-408  [H.J.  Res.  1145],  78  Stat.  384,  approved  Aug.  10,  1964. 

Whereas  naval  units  of  the  Communist  regime  in  Vietnam,  in  violation  of  the 
principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  of  international  law,  have 
deliberately  and  repeatedly  attacked  United  States  naval  vessels  lawfully  pres- 
ent in  international  waters,  and  have  thereby  created  a  serious  threat  to  inter- 
national peace;  and 

Whereas  these  attacks  are  part  of  a  deliberate  and  systematic  campaign  of  aggres- 
sion that  the  Communist  regime  in  North  Vietnam  has  been  waging  against  its 
neighbors  and  the  nations  joined  with  them  in  the  collective  defense  of  their 
freedom;  and 

Whereas  the  United  States  is  assisting  the  peoples  of  southeast  Asia  to  protect 
their  freedom  and  has  no  territorial,  military  or  political  ambitions  in  that  area, 
but  desires  only  that  these  peoples  should  be  left  in  peace  to  work  out  their 
own  destinies  in  their  own  way:  Now,  therefore,  be  it 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States  of 
America  in  Congress  assembled.  That  the  Congress  approve  and  support  the  de- 
termination of  the  President,  as  Commander  in  Chief,  to  take  all  necessary  meas- 
ures to  repel  any  armed  attack  against  the  forces  of  the  United  States  and  to 
prevent  further  aggression. 

Sec.  2.  The  United  States  regards  as  vital  to  its  national  interest  and  to  world 
peace  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security  in  southeast  Asia. 
Consonant  with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  and  in  accordance  with  its  obligations  under  the  Southeast  Asia 
Collective  Defense  Treaty,  the  United  States  is,  therefore,  prepared,  as  the  Presi- 
dent determines,  to  take  all  necessary  steps,  including  the  use  of  armed  force,  to 
assist  any  member  or  protocol  state  of  the  Southeast  Asia  Collective  Defense 
Treaty  requesting  assistance  in  defense  of  its  freedom. 

Sec.  3.  This  resolution  shall  expire  when  the  President  shall  determine  that  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  area  is  reasonably  assured  by  international  conditions 
created  by  action  of  the  United  Nations  or  otherwise,  except  that  it  may  be 
terminated  earlier  by  concurrent  resolution  of  the  Congress. 


Appendix 


Indices  and  Glossary  for 

The  Senator  Gravel  Edition,  Volumes  I-IV 

Name  Index  3 
Subject  Index  21 
Glossary  67 


Name  Index 


The  Index  has  two  parts:  names  which  appear  in  volumes 
I-IV  are  indexed  on  pp.  3-20,  and  subjects  discussed  in  the 
four  volumes  are  indexed  on  pp.  21-66.  Cross  references  are 
made  between  the  two  parts  as  well  as  within  each  part.  The 
volume  numbers  are  indicated  by  arabic  numerals  1,  2,  3,  and 
4  followed  by  a  period;  page  references  follow  the  period: 
e.g.,  1.88-90. 


Abrams,  Gen.  Creighton  W. :  4.269, 
4.456;  as  Deputy  COMUSMACV, 
2.509;  and  LBJ,  4.593;  and  reorgani- 
zation of  Saigon  Mission,  2.619 

Acheson,  Dean  (Sec.  of  State):  1.30, 
2.124,  4.267;  advice  to  LBJ,  4.591;  on 
aid  to  Indochina,  1.6-7,  1.41-42;  and 
Griffin  mission,  1.372;  on  Ho  Chi 
Minh,  1.51;  and  Indochina  policy, 
1.370,  1.371,  1.381,  1.383;  letter  to 
R.  A.  Griffin,  1.372;  memo  on  Viet 
Minh  War,  1.29-30;  public  statements 
of,  1.6,  1.382-383;  talks  with  Eden, 
1.390-391;  on  Vietnamese  independ- 
ence, 1.41 

Adams,  Sherman:  1.101 

Aldrich,  Winthrop  (Amb.):  and  Dulles 
cables,  1.477,  1.547 

Allen,  Maj.  Fred:  1.577 

Allen,  George:  2.504 

Alsop,  Joseph:  1.579,  2.559,  2.76 

Anderson,  Adm.  Robert:  1.89 

Anderson,  Robert  (Sec.  of  Treasury): 
2.635 

Appel,  R.  W.:  4.455 

Apple,  Johnny:  4.527 

Arellano,  Oscar:  1.575,  1.576,  2.648 

Auriol,  Vincent  (French  Pres.):  1.58, 
1.96 

Ayub  Khan:  2.56 

|Bain,  Lt.  Edward:  1.577 
'Baldwin,  Hanson  W.:  4.324 
Ball,  George  W.  (Under  Sec.  of  State): 

Copyright  ©  1972  by  Beacon  Press 


2.2,  2.4,  2.9,  2.46,  2.149,  4.22;  advice 
to  LBJ,  4.591;  bombing  and,  4.52;  on 
Buddhist  crisis,  2.234;  cable  to  Lodge, 
2.749;  Chinese  intervention  and,  4.51; 
and  Diem  coup,  2.238;  June  1965 
memo,  4.609-610;  on  limited  war  with 
USSR,  4.51;  memo  to  Bundy,  4.609- 
610;  memo  for  the  President,  4.615- 
619;  on  military  defeat,  4.22;  oppo- 
sition to  troop  build-up,  3.472;  pac- 
ification and,  2.590;  position  on  Thai- 
land, 4.614;  public  statements  of, 
3.737;  and  reeducation  task,  4.609- 
610;  Vietnam  policy  of,  2.43,  2.727, 
3.238,  4.82,  4.84 

Bao  Dai  (Emperor):  1.11,'  1.25,  1.58, 
1.59,  1.395,  1.497;  abdication  of,  1.16; 
as  alternative  to  Diem,  1.233;  and 
Geneva  Conference,  1.561,  1.570;  on 
Ho  Chi  Minh,  1.50;  on  partition,  1.135; 
support  for,  1.40,  1.367;  U.S.  recog- 
nition for,  1.6,  1.41;  on  VNA,  1.71. 
See  also  Bao  Dai  solution 

Barnett:  4.682 

Bay  Vien.  See  Vien,  Le  Van  (Bay) 

Beach,  Gen.:  4.406-407 

Bell,  David:  2.235,  2.275,  2.543;  at  Ho- 
nolulu Conference,  2.550;  and  Warren- 
ton  Conference,  2.539 

Berry,  Lt.  Col.  Sidney  B.:  3.70 

Bidault,  Georges:  1.15,  1.56,  1.64,  1.80, 
1.104,  1.116;  at  Geneva  Conference, 
1.133,  1.479;  on  U.S.  intervention  in 
Indochina,  1.129-130,  1.462 


Name  Index/A 

Bien,  Gen.  Cao  Van:  4.527 
Bigart,  Homer:  1.581,  2.457 
Big  Minh.  Sec  Minh,  Gen.  Duong  Van 
Bissell,  Richard:  2.38 
Black,  Col.  E.  F.:  2.8,  2.40 
Black,  Eugene:  3.273,  3.355 
Blum,  Leon:  1.22,  1.23 
Blum,  Robert:  1.73-74,  1.78,  1.371 
Bohanan,   Maj.  Charles  T.   R.:  1.576, 
2.528 

Bonestee,  Gen.  C.  H.,  Ill:  1.446,  1.506 

Bonnet,  Henri:  1.15,  1.98,  1.539 

Bonsai,  Philip:  1.160 

Bougenot,  Andre:  1.104 

Boun  Oum:  3.197 

Bowles,  Chester:  2.31 

Bradley,  Gen.  Omar  N.:  advice  to  LBJ, 
4.591;  strategic  assessment  of  SE  Asia, 
1.363-366 

Brebisson,  Col.:  1.549 

Brent:  2.246,  2.250,  2.317 

Brink,  Brig.  Gen.  Francis  G.:  1.197 

Brinkley,  David:  2.828 

Brooke,  Sen.  Edward:  4.498 

Brown,  Dr.  Harold:  4.314,  4.447 

Brown,  Gen.  Harold  (Sec.  of  Air  Force)  : 
4.187,  4.193-195,  4.260-262 

Bruce,  David  (Amb.):  1.370 

Bullitt,  William  C:  1.62 

Bundy,  McGeorge:  4.159,  4.267;  advice 
to  LBJ,  4.591;  assessment  of  situation 
in  SVN,  2.727,  3.294,  3.309-311, 
3.346,  3.347;  August  Plot  and,  2.741; 
on  bombing,  3.35,  3.93,  3.271,  4.157- 
158,  4.278;  cables  to  Lodge,  2.782- 
783,  2.788;  on  Diem  coup,  2.259;  on 
intervention  in  NVN,  2.319,  2.339;  on 
leverage,  2.287;  memos  for  President, 
2.41,  2.353,  3.431-432;  memo  to  Man- 
ning, 3.559-560;  NODIS  message  to 
Taylor,  2.275;  NSAM  of,  2.49,  2.642, 
2.673,  2.681,  2.770-771,  3.565-566;  on 
nuclear  weapons;  3.238;  pacification 
program  and,  3.310-311,  4.312;  sus- 
tained reprisal  policy  of,  3.308,  3.687- 
691;  recommendations  of,  2.689,  3.361; 
talks  with  GVN,  3.361;  on  troop  de- 
ployment, 4.158-159;  Vietnam  trip  of, 
2.562,  3.294;  and  Warrenton  Confer- 
ence, 2.539 

Bundy,  William  P.  (Asst.  Sec.  of  State): 
2.37,  2.74,  4.19,  4.242,  4.267,  4.269; 
advice  to  LBJ,  4.592;  assessment  of 
situation  in  SVN,  3.293,  3.725;  on 
bombing,  2.339,  4.33,  4.38,  4.67,  4.97- 
98,  4.144,  4.155-156,  4.165-168; 
Bundy    Working    Group,  3.598-601; 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

{see  also  Bundy  Working  Group) 
China  policy  of,  4.245-246;  "Courses 
of  Action  for  SVN,"  3.621,  3.656-666; 
on  GVN  stability,  4.504-505;  "Hold- 
ing on  in  SVN,"  4.610-615;  at  Hono- 
lulu Conference,  3.358;  on  McNaugh- 
ton  DPM,  4.502-505;  memo  to  Lodge, 
2.792;  memos  to  McNamara,  2.13, 
2.79,  2.126;  memo  to  Rusk,  4.97-98; 
messages  to  Manila  Pact  nations, 
4.523-524;  "A  Middle  Way  Course  of 
Action  in  South  Vietnam,"  3.480;  on 
mining  NVN  waters,  4.147-148;  and 
national  security  action  paper,  3.245; 
on  negotiated  settlement,  4.253;  on 
options  in  SVN,  3.604,  3.610,  4.553, 
4.259-260;  on  political  factors  in  Viet- 
nam, 4.445-446;  position  papers  of, 
3.593,  3.606,  3.648,  3.676,  3.678-685; 
public  statements  of,  3.723,  4.663-664, 
4.668-669,  4.671-678;  recommenda- 
tions of,  3.691,  4.23;  strategy  analysis 
by,  3.197,  3.296-297,  3.727,  4.444- 
447;  support  for  stronger  military  ac- 
tions, 3.265-266;  SVN  political  crisis 
and,  4.82,  4.87-89;  on  Tet  truce,  4.141- 
142;  on  Tonkin  Gulf  Crisis,  3.190;  on 
troop  deployment,  3.427,  3.473;  and 
UK/USSR  talks  (Feb  '65),  3.327-330; 
and  US  involvement  in  SE  Asia, 
3.738-741;  on  U.S.  objectives  in  Viet- 
nam, 4.181;  Vietnam  visit  of,  4.149; 
"Where  Are  We  Heading?"  draft 
memo,  3.326-328,  3.692 

Bunker,  Amb.  Ellsworth:  2.400,  2.615, 
2.616,  4.243-244;  assessment  of  situa- 
tion in  Vietnam,  4.515-516;  on  bomb- 
ing, 4.192;  at  Guam  Conference,  4.424; 
and  "other  war,"  2.575;  public  state- 
ment of,  4.217;  on  RVNAF,  2.509 

Burchette,  Wilfred:  4.207 

Burns,  Gen.  James  H.:  1.363 

Buu,  Ta  Quang:  1.146 

Buu,  Tran  Quoc:  2.723,  2.781 

Byrd,  Sen.  Harry  F.,  Sr.:  4.197 

Calhoun,  Archibald:  2.520,  2.619 
Califano,  Joseph:  2.567 
Can,   Ngo  Dinh:    1.253,   2.226,  2.256, 

2.686,  2.733,  2.767 
Gang,  Adm.:  2.346,  2.347 
Cannon,  Sen.  Howard  W.:  4.30,  4.197 
Cao,  Gen.  Huynh  Van:   2.232,  2.237 

2.265,  2.266,  2.267,  2.268 
Cao,  Brig.  Gen.  Van  Thanh:  2.674 
Carbonel,  Col.  Jean:  1.575 
Carpentier,  Gen.  Marcel:  1.67,  1.369 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

Carter,  Gen.  Marshall  S.:  2.684-689, 
2.741 

Carver,  George:  2.598,  4.86,  4.130, 
4.268,  4.592,  4.593;  on  bombing, 
4.129;  on  NLF,  1.341;  "perseverance" 
policy  of,  4.82-83;  and  U.S.  commit- 
ment in  Vietnam,  4.89-90;  on  Viet 
Cong  terrorism,  1.334-335 

Castro,  Fidel:  2.174 

Chan,  Le  Ngoc  (Sec.  of  State  for  De- 
fense): 1.575 

Chang,  Amb.  Wen-t'ien:  1.149,  1.549 

Chau,  Nguyen  Huu:  1.560 

Chauvel,  Jean:  1.17,  1.112,  1.521,  1.542; 
at  1954  Geneva  Conference,  1.532- 
533,  1.649 

Chiang  Kai-shek:   1.1,  1.10,  1.16,  2.13, 

2.56,  2.322.  See  also  Formosa 
Chiang  Kai-shek,  Madame:  2.70 
Childs,  Marquis:  2.556 
Chinh,  Gen.:  2.394 

Chou  En-lai:  1.620;  on  cease-fire  in 
SVN,  1.147;  at  Geneva  Conference, 
1.133,  1.137,  1.156-157,  1.522,  1.535, 
1.545,  1.562;  and  Ho  Chi  Minh, 
1.148-149;  on  Laos  and  Cambodia, 
1.137-138;  and  Mendes-France,  1.537- 
538;  Vietnam  settlement  and,  1.537, 
1.538 

Choung,  Tran  Van:  1.566 
Church,  Sen.  Frank  S.:   2.204,  2.242, 
2.245 

Churchill,  Winston:  1.1,  1.10-11,  1.98 

Clark,  Col.  Carter:  2.504 

Clark,  Gen.  Mark:  1.369 

Clark,  Robert  E.:  1.606 

Clifford,  Clark:  4.233-234,  4.267,  4.268, 
4.546;  advice  to  LBJ,  4.592;  and  allied 
troop  commitments,  4.527;  and  JCS, 
4.258;  memo  to  President,  2.635;  mili- 
tary policy  of,  4.603 

Co,  Col.:  2.265,  2.266,  2.267,  2.384 

Co,  Gen.:  2.365,  2.480,  2.532 

Cohelan,  Rep.  Jeffery:  3.36 

Colby,  William:  2.539,  2.741 

Collins,  Gen.  J.  Lawton:  1.182,  1.224, 
1.580,  2.408,  2.431;  and  Diem  Gov- 
ernment, 1.226,  1.232;  on  VNA,  1.218, 
1.219;  at  Warrenton  Conference, 
2.539.  See  also  Collins  Mission 

Conein,  Maj.  Lucien:  1.575;  and  Diem 
coup,  2.237,  2.239,  2.256,  2.261,  2.267, 
2.782,  2.788;  para-military  organiza- 
tion of,  1.577 

Cooper,  Charles:  2.520,  2.619 

y,Cooper,  Chester:    2.541,   3.255,  3.681; 

.    report  on  infiltration,   3.244,  3.255- 


Name  Index/5 

256;  at  Warrenton  Conference,  2.539 
Cooper,  Sen.  John  Sherman:  3.263 
Corcoran:  2.375 
Coste-Floret,  Paul:   1.57,  1.64 
Cottrell,  Sterling:  2.15,  2.49,  2.126;  and 

Task  Force  on  Vietnam,  2.643;  on 

Taylor  Mission,  2.80,  2.96 
Craig,  May:  1.605 
Critchfield,  Richard:  2.557 
Cronkite,  Walter:  2.799,  2.827 
Cung,  Kieu  Cong:  1.307 
Cut,  Ba:  1.220 

Cutler,  Robert:  1.502,  1.515-516 


Dan,  Phan  Quang:  1.60,  1.72,  1.315- 
316 

Dao,  Maj.:  3.28 

d'Argenlieu,  Adm.:  1.21,  1.22,  1.23-25 

da  Silva,  Peer:  2.539,  3.41 

Davis,  Adm.  A.  C:  1.89,  1.212,  1.446 

De,  Tran  Dinh:  2.106 

Dean,  Arthur:  4.267,  4.591 

Dear,  Joseph:  1.598 

de  Gaulle,  Charles:  1.1,  2.162,  3.354, 
4.23,  4.619;  Geneva  Conference  and, 
3.308;  Indochina  policy  of,  1.17,  2.193; 
Vietnam  negotiations  and,  4.94 

Dejean,  Maurice:  1.135 

de  Lattre  de  Tassigny,  Gen.  Jean:  1.67 

DePuy,  Gen.  William  E.:  2.339,  4.267, 
4.331-332,  4.592,  4.593 

De  Segonzac:  4.683 

Devillers,  Philippe:  1.136,  1.251,  1.254 

Diem,  Bai:  2.387 

Diem,  Ngo  Dinh:  1.43,  1.58,  1.296,  2.1, 
2.9,  2.94,  2.117;  achievements  of, 
1.252,  1.298,  2.79;  administration  of, 
2.4,  2.94,  2.135,  2.137,  2.138,  2.679; 
aftermath  of,  3.17;  aid  request  of, 
2.3,  2.4,  2.51;  alternatives  to,  2.23, 
2.203,  2.204,  2.229,  2.231,  2.235, 
2.239,  2.241-246,  2.249,  2.251,  2.261; 
anticommunist  campaign  of,  1.255, 
1.324-325,  1.326-327;  anti-French 
position  of,  1.210-211;  armed  oppo- 
sition to,  1.183,  1.258,  1.303-305; 
army  and,  1.257;  assassination  of, 
2.189,  2.207,  2.270,  2.752,  3.17;  on 
Bao  Dai  solution,  1.59,  1.234;  and 
bilateral  defense  treaty,  2.55,  2.69, 
2.71,  2.81-82,  2.84,  2.96,  2.447;  and 
Binh  Xuyen,  1.230-231,  1.233-234, 
1.235;  Buddhist  crisis  and,  2.202, 
2.226,  2.227,  2.228;  Buddhist  leaders 
and,  2.727-728,  2.729-730,  3.20;  cabi- 
net  reorganization   of,   2,705;  Cara- 


Name  Index/6 

Diem,  Ngo  Dinh:  {cont'd) 

velle  Manifesto  against,  1.316-321; 
character  of,  2.665,  2.724,  2.759;  as 
"Churchill  of  Asia,"  2.54;  Gen.  Col- 
lins' objections  to,  1.226;  Communist 
attempts  to  discredit,  2.53;  controversy 
surrounding,  1.182;  and  counterinsur- 
gency  effort,  2.691;  coups  against, 
1.219-220,  2.266,  2.268,  2.269  {see 
also  Diem  coup);  criticism  of,  2.704, 
2.709;  deposition  of,  2.158,  2.201- 
276,  2.716,  4.675;  Amb.  Durbrow 
and,  2.27,  2.28-29;  elections  and, 
1.245,  1.246,  1.287,  1.542;  family  of, 
1.200,  1.299,  1.321-322,  2.706-707, 
2.731-732;  and  France,  1.183,  1.225, 
1.232,  1.236-237,  1.575;  Franco- 
American  differences  on,  1.236-238, 
1.304;  and  generals,  2.703;  and  Geneva 
Accords,  1.245;  and  Geneva  Confer- 
ence, 1.570,  1.576;  guard  battalion  of, 
1.582;  and  Gen.  Harkins,  2.785;  on 
ICC  support,  1.241;  interview  with 
Marguerite  Higgins,  2.230;  Joint  Com- 
munique with  Vice  Pres.  Johnson, 
2.803;  letter  to  Pres.  Kennedy,  2.62, 
2.447;  lack  of  confidence  in,  1.297, 
2.15,  2.88,  2.100,  2.105,  2.122,  2.123, 
2.125,  2.134,  2.250,  2.315;  LBJ  and, 
2.3,  2.9;  martial  law  of,  2.184;  Mc- 
Namara's  views  on,  3.22;  military 
strategy  of,  2.4;  military  opposition  to, 
1.322-324;  and  Gen.  Minh,  1.580;  Na- 
tional Emergency  Proclamation  of, 
2.84,  2.99;  nationalist  opposition  to, 
1.314-322;  and  Ngo  Dinh  Nhu,  2.739- 
740;  November  1960  coup  against, 
2.18,  2.20-21,  2.26,  2.134;  oppressions 
of,  2.766;  optimism  of,  1.611;  palace 
bombing  and,  2.705;  "personalist" 
philosophy  of,  1.300-301,  2.145,  2.152; 
popular  support  of,  2.642,  3.23;  press 
relations  of,  2.724;  prestige  of,  2.759; 
reelection  of,  2.32;  reforms  of,  2.1,  2.3, 
2.5,  2.6,  2.11,  2.54,  2.137;  on  refugees, 
2.133;  Saigon  units  loyal  to,  2.788; 
and  "single  province  plan,"  2.144;  state 
of  union  message  of,  2.252;  Strategic 
Hamlet  Program  and,  2.129,  2.130, 
2.131,  2.146,  2.152,  2.153,  2.701, 
2.702;  and  students,  3.20;  tax  reform 
of,  2.62;  and  Taylor  Mission,  2.15, 
2.86,  2.93,  2.95,  2.98;  Thompson  pro- 
posal and,  2.139;  troop  deployment 
of,  2.449;  U.S.  commitment  to,  2.52, 
2.671;  U.S.  confidence  in,  2.53,  2.55, 
2.715;  U.S.  demands  on,  2.21,  2.27, 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

2.104;  U.S.  support  of,  1.183,  1.226, 
1.227,  1.234,  1.580,  1.588,  2.7,  2.22, 
2.23,  2.123,  2.225,  2.456,  2.665,  2.705, 
2.785;  U.S.  troops  and,  2.66,  2.67, 
2.81,  2.82,  2.84,  2.85,  2.87,  2.101, 
2.102,  2.119,  2.447;  on  VC  rural  op- 
erations, 1.327.  See  also  Diem  family. 
Diem  government 

Dillon,  C.  Douglas:  4.267;  advice  to  LBJ, 
4.591;  cables  from  Paris  to  Sec.  of 
State,  1.476,  1.540,  1.541-542,  1.543- 
544,  1.545-546,  1.552-553,  1.553-554; 
on  the  French-Associated  States,  1.125 

Dinh,  Nguyen  Quoc:  1.134 

Dinh,  Maj.  Gen.  Ton  That:  2.232,  2.233, 
2.234,  2.374,  2.704,  2.736,  3.37;  dur- 
ing Diem  coup,  2.237,  2.240,  2.256, 

2.260,  2.264-268 
Dinh,  Trieu:  1.582 
Do:  2.550 

Do,  Tran  Dinh  (Sec.  of  State) :  2.707 

Do,  Tran  Van:  1.564,  1.566 

Dobrynin,  Amb.  Anatoly  F.:  4.447;  on 

bombing,  4.35;  Laos  cease-fire  and, 

2.810 

Dommen,  Arthur:  3.264 

Don,  Maj.  Gen.  Tran  Van:  2.106,  2.232, 
2.233,  2.234,  2.237,  2.387,  3.37;  coup 
plotting  of,  2.256,  2.258,  2.259,  2.260, 

2.261,  2.262,  2.264,  2.265,  2.266,  2.267, 
2.269;  during  Diem  coup,  2.206,  2.207, 
2.253,  2.269,  2.767,  2.782,  2.784,  2.788; 
as  Minister  of  Defense,  2.271,  2.275; 
post-coup  role  of,  2.271 

Dong,  Premier  Pham  Van:  3.292,  3.380; 
American  public  opinion  and,  4.389; 
"Four  Points"  of,  3.274,  3.356,  4.94, 
4.636;  at  Geneva  Conference,  1.119; 
on  partitioning  of  Indochina,  1.134 

Dooley,  Lt.  Tom:  1.613 

D'Orlandi,  Amb.:  3.37 

Downs,  Hugh:  4.662 

Drummond,  Roscoe:  2.558 

Drumright,  Everett:  1.127 

Due,  Thich  Quang:  2.227 

Dulles,  Allan:  1.444,  1.447,  2.31 

Dulles,  John  Foster  (Sec.  of  State): 
1.104,  1.105,  4.644;  Address  to  the 
Nation,  1.600-601;  on  aid  to  French 
Union  forces,  1.124,  1.131;  anticom- 
munism  of,  1.54,  1.85;  cable  to  Dil- 
lon, 1.547;  cables  from  Geneva,  1.477- 
478,  1.478-479,  1.480-481,  1.481- 
482;  cables  to  Geneva,  1.500-501, 
1.507-508,  1.518-519,  1.523-524, 
1.531,  1.532,  1.538-539,  1.563,  1.568; 
cables  to  London,  1.460,  1.461,  1.546; 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

cables  from  Paris,  1.461-462,  1.476, 
1.516-518,  1.522-523,  1.537,  1.554- 
557;  cables  to  Paris,  1.460,  1.461, 
1.524,  1.539-540,  1.541,  1.542-543, 
1.546-547,  1.547-548,  1.550-551;  and 
cease-fire,  1.480;  on  Chinese  inter- 
vention in  Indochina,  1.85-86;  on  Dien 
Bien  Phu,  1.100;  domino  theory  of, 
1.56,  1.106;  on  Franco-Viet  Minh  ne- 
gotiations, 1.96,  1.116;  on  French- 
Associated  States  relationship,  1.125; 
and  Geneva  Conference,  1.80,  1.113- 
114,  1.117,  1.150,  1.176,  1.499-500, 
1.546,  1.556;  and  Mendes-France, 
1.550-551,  1.557;  public  statements  of, 
1.593-596,  1.599,  1.603-604;  on  re- 
gional defense  for  SE  Asia,  1.98-99; 
report  on  Paris  trip,  1.558-559;  on 
supporting  Diem  Government,  1.227- 
228,  1.236-237;  on  training  the  VNA, 
1.216-217;  on  "united  action"  in  In- 
dochina, 1.93-94,  1.476,  1.482;  Viet- 
namese elections  and,  1.145-146,  1.245; 
on  U.S.  involvement  in  Indochina, 
1.481-482,  2.408 

Dung,  Tran  Trung:  2.260 

Dupont,  Frederic:  1.64 

Durbow,  Amb.  Elbridge:  1.269,  2.1,  2.2, 
2.5,  2.10,  2.20,  2.25;  cable  to  Sec.  Her- 
ter,  2.633;  CIP  and,  2.138;  departure 
of,  2.7,  2.26,  2.29,  2.30;  Diem  and, 
2.7,  2.27,  2.28-29,  2.31;  diplomacy  of, 
2.27,  2.29-30,  2.32,  2.228;  Thuan  and, 
2.60 

Durdin,  Peg:  1.581 
Durdin,  Till:  1.581 

Eden,  Anthony:  1.14,  1.116;  cable  from 
Dulles,  1.546;  on  cease-fire,  1.479;  on 
collective  defense  of  SE  Asia,  1.142; 
on  Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.478;  and  Geneva 
Conference,  1.112,  1.137-138,  1.480, 
1.519-520,  1.544,  1.546;  and  Mendes- 
France,  1.557;  SE  Asia  policy  of,  1.99, 
1.101-103,  1.477 

Eisenhower,  Pres.  Dwight  David:  4.679; 
and  Diem,  1.628-629,  2.635,  4.641; 
on  Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.101;  on  domino 
theory,  2.636;  and  Dulles,  1.502;  on 
Franco-Viet  Minh  negotiations,  1.116; 
and  Geneva  Conference,  1.118,  1.176, 
1.507;  on  Indochina,  1.85,  1.98-99, 
1.129,  1.503;  and  JFK,  2.635-637; 
news  conferences  of,  1.593,  1.602, 
1.603,  1.604-606,  1.621-622;  public 
statements  of,  1.591-592,  1.609-610, 
1.616-621,    1.624-627;    special  mes- 


Name  Index/1 

sages  to  Congress  of,  1.613-614,  1.622- 
624,  1.627-628;  on  U.S.  intervention 
in  Indochina,  1.77,  1.94;  Vietnam 
policy  of,  1.593,  4.643,  4.672 
Ely,  Gen.  Paul:  1.97,  1.104,  1.443,  1.541; 
on  Chinese  intervention,  1.458-459; 
Diem  and,  1.232,  1.545;  and  French 
Union  Forces,  1.517-518;  at  Geneva 
Conference,  1.516-518;  and  Indo- 
china situation,  1.122,  1.457,  1.459; 
Memoires:  Vlndochine  dans  la  Tour- 
mente,  1.136;  U.S.  aid  and,  1.455- 
456 

Enthoven,  Alain  (Asst.  Sec.  of  Defense) : 
2.510,  4.309,  4.310,  4.313,  4.314,  4.318, 
4.322,  4.512,  4.513;  advisory  effort  and, 
2.514;  analysis  of  MACV  troop  re- 
quirements, 4.456;  on  bombing,  4.225; 
memos  to  McNamara,  4.225,  4.363- 
364,  4.461-462,  4.463-466;  on  piaster 
budget,  4.345;  policy  review  of,  4.550; 
on  Program  4,  4.363-364;  and  Pro- 
gram 5,  4.523;  on  SEA  forces,  4.463- 
466;  on  troop  increase,  4.461-462, 
4.513-514 

Erhard,  Chancellor  Ludwig:  4.619 

Erskine,  Gen.  Graves  B.:  1.197,  1.446, 
1.451,  1.90 

Evans,  Roland:  2.610 

Fall,  Bernard:  1.1,  4.673;  on  DRV-VC 
links,  1.337;  on  VC  assassinations, 
1.336;  on  Viet  Minh  terrorism,  1.334 

Fanfani,  Amintore:  4.237 

Faure,  Edgar  (Prime  Minister):  1.237 

Felt,  Adm.  Harry:  2.13;  on  Buddhist 
crisis,  2.234;  Diem  and,  2.55,  2.664; 
during  Diem  coup,  2.260,  2.267;  meet- 
ing with  Khanh,  2.310;  on  troop  com- 
mitment and,  2.83-84.  See  also  CINC- 
PAC 

Firyubin:  3.372 

Fisher,  Roger:  barrier  concept  of,  4.112; 
notes  to  McNaughton  on  strategy, 
4.113-115,  4.148;  proposal  to  Pres. 
Johnson,  4.160 

Fitzgerald,  Desmond:  2.539 

Ford,  Rep.  Gerald:  4.389 

Forrestal,  Michael  V.:  2.317,  2.318;  on 
Buddhist  crisis,  2.233,  2.234;  memo 
to  Bundy,  3.592;  report  to  JFK,  2.151, 
2.717-725;  SVN  evaluation  of,  2.727; 
view  on  end  of  war,  2.719 

Franks,  Sir  Oliver:  1.381 

Freeman,  Orville  (Sec.  of  Agriculture): 
2.543,2.551 

Friedman,  Alvin:  2.539 


Name  Index/S 

Fulbright,  Sen.  J.  W.:  2.2,  3.187,  3.287, 
4.159,  4.262,  4.588;  on  Laos  interven- 
tion, 2.42;  "Old  Myths  and  New  Reali- 
ties" speech,  3.287;  on  Tonkin  Gulf 
Resolution,  4.98;  Vietnam  hearings  of, 
2.543.  See  also  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee 


Galbraith,  John  Kenneth:  2.117,  2.121, 
2.122,  2.123,  2.124,  2.125,  2.4,  2.37, 
2.410;  on  Diem,  2.5,  2.30,  2.147; 
memo  for  JFK,  2.670;  Vietnam 
policy  of,  2.670 

Gambiez,  Gen.  Jean:  1.231 

Gardner,  John  W.  (Sec.  of  HEW):  2.543 

Gates,  Thomas  (Sec.  of  Defense):  2.635 

Gaud,  William:  2.590 

Gavin,  Lt.  Gen.  James  M.:  military 
policy  of,  4.587;  before  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee,  4.98,  4.454 

Gelb,  Leslie:  4.550 

Geyelin,  Philip:  3.307,  4.106 

Giap,  Gen.  Vo  Nguyen:  1.246,  4.634- 
635,  4.643;  in  Cambodia,  1.120;  in 
Laos,  1.120;  "strategic  mobility"  of, 
4.305 

Gilpatric,  Roswell  (Deputy  Sec.  of  De- 
fense): 2.7,  2.8,  2.9,  2.16,  2.235;  and 
August  Plot,  2.741;  on  involvement  in 
GVN,  2.442;  memo  to  JCS,  2.48;  NSC 
memo  of,  2.79-80;  recommendations 
of,  4.1;  task  force  of,  2.2,  2.3,  2.4, 
2.37,  2.391,  2.443 

Giraud,  Gen.  Henri:  1.9 

Goldberg,  Amb.  Arthur  J.:  public  ad- 
dresses of,  4.645-646,  4.650-651;  state- 
ment before  U.  N.,  4.659-660 

Goldwater,  Sen.  Barry  S.:  2.328,  3.292 

Goodpaster,  Gen.  Nathaniel:  4.291 

Goulding,  Phil:  4.417,  4.559 

Goure,  Leon:  2.539 

Grant,  Lindsay:  3.301 

Greene,  Graham:  1.321-322,  2.535 

Griffin,  Robert  Allen:  1.66;  memo  to 
Sec.  of  State,  1.367-369;  survey  mis- 
sion of,  1.370 

Gromyko,  Andrei  (Soviet  Foreign  min.): 
2.810,  3.266 

Gruenther,  Gen.  Alfred:  1.369 

Gullion,  Edmund:  1.68,  1.74,  1.78 

Habib,  Philip  C:  2.520,  4.267,  4.592, 
4.593;  appointment  of,  2.563;  at  War- 
renton  Conference,  2.539 

Hai,  Vo  Van:  2.234 

Halberstam,  David:  2.613,  3.23-24,  3.426 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Halifax,  Lord  (British  Amb.  to  Wash- 
ington): 1.9,  1.10 

Halperin,  Morton  H.:  policy  review  of, 
4.550 

Hamilton,  Fowler:  2.666 

Hammer,  Ellen:  1.80-81 

Hanh,  Gov.:  2.370,  2.389;  as  economic 
minister,  2.400,  economic  policy  of, 
2.289;  Washington  trip  of,  2.396 

Harkins,  Gen.  Paul  D.:  2.163,  2.187, 
2.205,  2.206,  2.456;  and  advisory  ef- 
fort, 2.465;  cables  to  Gen.  Taylor, 
2.740,  2.784-785;  and  CAS  group, 
3.34;  and  Diem,  2.303,  2.752;  during 
Diem  coup,  2.237,  2.240,  2.246,  2.248, 
2.250,  2.251,  2.253,  2.255,  2.257, 
2.258,  2.260,  2.261,  2.262,  2.263, 
2.737,  2.792,  2.793;  evaluation  of  mili- 
tary situation  (1964),  3.69;  Distin- 
guished Service  Medal,  2.468;  Amb. 
Lodge  and,  2.786;  meeting  with  Khanh, 
2.310;  optimism  of,  2.275;  state  de- 
partment cables,  2.736.  See  also  COM- 
USMACV 

Harlech,  Lord  (William  David  Ormsby 
Gore):  3.325,  3.326 

Harriman,  Amb.  Averell  (Under  Sec.  of 
State):  2.29,  2.76,  2.149,  4.257,  4.267; 
advice  to  LBJ,  4.592;  on  Buddhist 
crisis,  2.233,  2.234;  on  communism, 
2.817;  during  Diem  coup,  2.238;  and 
peace  negotiations,  4.272,  4.598; 
SVN  evaluation  of  (1963),  2.727;  and 
USSR,  2.670 

Harsch,  Joseph  C:  4.662 

Heath,  Amb.  Donald  R.:  1.78,  1.104, 
1.226-227 

Heavner,  Theodore  J.  C:  2.825-827 

Hellyer,  George  (USIS  Chief):  1.575 

Helms,  Richard:  as  acting  director  of 
CIA,  2.590,  4.64,  4.267;  advice  to 
LBJ,  4.592;  August  Plot  and,  2.741; 
on  bombing,  4.184 

Herfurt,  Jack:  2.538 

Herman,  George:  1.602 

Herter,  Christian  A.  (Sec.  of  State): 
2.635,  2.636 

Heyman,  Victor  K.:  4.471 

Heymann,  Hans:  2.404,  2.503 

Heymann,  Vince:  2.520,  2.613 

Hilsman,  Roger  (Asst.  Sec.  of  State): 
2.25,  2.37,  2.117,  2.142,  2.146,  2.148, 
2.152,  3.43;  August  Plot  and,  2.741; 
on  Buddhist  crisis,  2.234;  on  coup 
possibilities,  2.231;  on  Diem  coup, 
2.235,  2.236,  2.238,  2.240,  2.241, 
2.242,  2.245;  and  Amb.  Lodge,  2.254; 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

on  McNamara-Taylor  Mission,  2.248; 
"pressure  and  persuasion"  proposal  of, 
2.246;  public  statements  of,  2.821- 
824;  resignation  of,  3.43;  State  Dept. 
memo  of,  2.690;  SVN  evaluation  of 
(1963),  2.727,  3.43 

Hinh,  Gen.  Nguyen  Van:  1.163;  anti- 
Diem  activity  of,  1.219,  1.322,  1.577; 
on  Vietnamese  partition,  1.163 

Hitch,  Charles  J.:  3.549-550 

Hoan,  Nguyen  Ton:  exile  to  Japan,  3.87; 
as  Vice  Premier,  2.327 

Ho  Chi  Minh:  1.1,  1.3,  1.6,  1.63,  1.600, 
2.99,  2.708;  allies  of,  4.110;  anti- 
colonialism  of,  2.818;  on  China,  1.49- 
.50,  1.362;  and  coalition  govt.,  1.442; 
as  communist  agent,  1.361;  and  de 
Gaulle,  4.94;  elections  and,  1.546; 
France  and,  1.24,  1.46,  1.49,  1.54; 
letter  to  LB  J,  4.144,  4.455;  negotia- 
tion offer  of,  1.95;  on  partition,  1.289; 
political  philosophy  of,  1.48-51,  1.52, 
4.57,  4.94;  supplies  of,  1.594;  and 
Tonkin  Delta  region,  1.519;  and  U.S. 
aid,  1.17,  1.50-51;  U.S.  State  Dept. 
appraisal  of,  1.4,  1.5,  1.6-7,  1.40,  on 
unification  of  Vietnam,  1.172 

Hoi,  Prince  Buu:  1.221 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell:  2.810 

Honey,  P.  J.:  1.255,  1.325 

Hua,  Huang:  as  member  of  CPR  delega- 
tion, 1.155,  1.566 

Hughes,  Thomas  L.:  2.770,  4.66 

Hull,  Cordell:  1.8,  1.9,  1.14 

Humphrey,  Hubert  H.:  3.250;  on  com- 
munism, 4.647-648;  and  pacification 
program,  4.312;  public  addresses  of, 
4.655-656;  support  for  Diem,  1.297; 
Vietnam  visit  of,  2.556,  2.558,  2.560, 
4.312,  4.646-647 

Humphries,  Maj.  Gen.  James:  2.551 

Hunnicutt,  Col.:  2.394 

Huntley,  Chet:  2.827,  2.828 

Huong,  Tran  Van:  2.277,  2.281,  2.340, 
2.353,  2.354;  and  Gen.  Khanh,  2.348, 
3.261;  overthrow  of,  3.293;  U.S.  sup- 
port for,  2.342,  3.259 

Hutchins,  Maj.  Gen.:  2.539 

Huu,  Tran  Van:  1.61,  1.225 

Iron  Mike.  See  O'Daniel,  Gen.  John 

Jackson,  Sen.  Henry:  4.197 

Jacobson,   Col.   George:    2.385,  2.583, 

2.584 
Jacquet,  Marc:  1.104 
Jenkins,  Alfred  le  Sesne:  1.596-1.597 


Name  Index/9 

Johnson,  Gen.  Harold  K.:  2.501,  2.576; 
as  Army  Chief  of  Staff,  3.5,  3.94,  3.95, 
3.320;  on  bombing,  4.207,  4.208;  and 
enclave  strategy,  3.453;  and  Program 
#5,  4.528,  4.529;  public  statement 
by,  4.401;  and  reserve  call-up,  4.314; 
Saigon  visit  of,  4.527;  21-point  pro- 
gram of,  2.257,  3.337-338;  on  troop 
deployment,  4.472;  Vietnam  visit  of, 
2.479,  3.428 
Johnson,  Louis  (Sec.  of  Defense):  1.82 
Johnson,  Pres.  Lyndon  B.:  2.3,  2.47, 
2.369,  4.644;  advisors  of,  4.592;  an- 
nouncement on  ROLLING  THUN- 
DER, 3.322;  anti-infiltration  barrier 
and,  4.124;  on  appropriations,  3.475; 
on  ARVN,  4.443;  assessment  of  situa- 
tion in  SVN,  3.72-73;  "A  to  Z"  policy 
review  of,  4.239;  attack  on  U.S.  Em- 
bassy, 3.348;  and  August  Plot,  2.741; 
on  bombing,  3.180-181,  3.354,  3.363, 
4.50,  4.133,  4.149,  4.151,  4.259,  4.268; 
on  budget,  4.361;  Bundy's  paean  to, 
4.159;  cables  to  Amb.  Lodge,  2.527- 
528,  2.561,  2.601-602,  3.511;  cable 
to  Gen.  Taylor,  3.321;  cable  to  Gen. 
Westmoreland,  2.561;  on  civilian  govt, 
in  SVN,  2.339-340;  Clifford  Group 
recommendations  and,  4.252;  on  Com- 
munism, 4.394;  on  Communist  China, 
3.741;  criticism  of,  4.197,  4.199,  4.263; 
and  Diem,  2.19,  2.45,  2.54,  2.65;  on 
Diem  coup,  2.231,  2.276;  effect  of 
election  of,  3.1;  and  82nd  Airborne 
Division,  4.238;  escalation  and,  2.199, 
4.145,  4.148-149;  foreign  aid  program 
of,  4.455;  Great  Society  of,  2.555;  at 
Guam  Conference,  4.424;  and  Ho  Chi 
Minh,  4.143;  at  Honolulu  Conference, 
2.549;  "I  shall  not  seek"  speech,  4.268, 
4.271-275,  4.596-602;  and  JCS  objec- 
tives, 4.536;  Johns  Hopkins  speech, 
3.355,  3.356,  3.435,  4.273;  Joint  Com- 
munique with  Diem,  2.803;  and  Khanh 
government,  2.314;  Kosygin  and, 
4.455;  and  Ky  gov't,  2.285,  2.287, 
2.543;  letter  to  Ho  Chi  Minh,  4.144, 
4.455;  leverage  policy,  3.337;  at  Ma- 
nila Conference,  4.130,  4.131;  and 
McNamara,  4.125-127,  4.205,  4.323, 
4.624-625;  middle  course  of,  4.100, 
4.136;  military  advisors  of,  4.216; 
and  Minh  gov't,  2.305;  on  mining  of 
waterways,  4.148;  news  conference  of, 
4.632;  negotiated  settlement  and,  3.273, 
4.591;  New  Year's  greeting  to  the 
GVN,   2.303-304;  and  NSAM  328, 


Name  Index /\0 

Johnson,  Pres.  Lyndon  B.:  {cont'd) 
3.454;  and  NSC  Working  Group, 
3.249;  and  objectives  in  SVN,  2.323, 
4.248;  and  pacification  program, 
2.507,  4.470;  and  peace  movement, 
4.263;  on  Pleiku  attack,  3.286,  3.307; 
and  POL  decision,  4.74-79;  policy 
decisions  of,  2.196,  3.248;  policy  re- 
views of,  2.191,  3.264,  4.593,  4.595; 
presidential  campaign  of,  3.111;  on 
Program  #5,  4.527,  4.529;  public  re- 
lations of,  2.321,  4.93,  4.216,  4.389; 
public  statements  of,  3.101,  3.273, 
3.292,  3.355,  4.639,  4.640,  4.644, 
4.656-657,  4.658-659,  4.667-668, 
4.678-680;  and  Prime  Min.  Quat, 
3.366;  recommendations  of,  3.170;  re- 
prisal attacks  and,  3.295;  on  reserve 
call-up,  4.93;  on  SEATO  commitment, 
3.720;  State  of  Union  Address,  4.233, 
4.639,  4.662;  and  SVN  Country  Team, 
3.80;  and  Amb.  Taylor,  2.327,  3.79, 
3.249,  3.250;  "Three  Faces  of  War" 
speech,  3.370;  "Why  Are  We  in  South 
Vietnam"  speech,  3.730;  on  troop 
deployment,  2.68,  3.102,  3.394,  3.447, 
3.451-452,  3.473-476,  4.108,  4.196, 
4.299,  4.524,  4.589;  and  U.S.  Congress, 
3.73;  on  U.S.  policy  in  SE  Asia,  3.324, 
3.718-719,  3.725;  vice-presidential 
Vietnam  visit  of,  2.7,  2.9,  2.10,  2.34, 
2.45,  2.47,  2.54,  2.93,  2.135,  2.445, 
2.446,  2.705;  Vietnam  policy  of,  2.458, 
3.2,  3.249,  3.702-703,  4.91,  4.177; 
views  on  SVN  involvement,  3.161, 
3.247,  3.251;  and  Gen.  Westmoreland, 
4.239,  4.441-443,  4.478 

Johnson,  Robert:  3.222 

Johnson,  Amb.  U.  Alexis:  1.113,  2.13, 
2.356,  2.537,  2.538,  3.4;  on  bombing, 
4.33;  cables  from  Geneva,  1.548-549; 
on  Diem,  2.126;  on  escalation,  4.26, 
4.27;  at  Geneva  Conf.,  1.566;  letter 
to  Gilpatric,  2.661;  memo  to  Mc- 
Namara,  2.662;  public  statements  of, 
2.817-818;  reaction  to  FWMAF  in 
SVN,  3.105;  and  Taylor  Report,  2.98; 
on  troop  deployment,  3.472 

Jordan,  William:  2.15,  2.80,  2.96 

Jorgenson  (CIA  station  chief):  2.539 

Judd,  Rep.  Walter:  1.85 

Just,  Ward:  2.592,  2.599,  2.613,  2.619 

Kahin,  George  M.C.:  1.260 
Kalischer,  Peter:  4.635 
Kattenburg,  Paul:  2.240,  2.241;  August 
Plot  and,  2.741;  on  Diem,  2.738 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Katzenbach,  Nicholas  deB.  (Under  Sec. 
of  State):  2.487,  4.242,  4.246,  4.267, 
4.269,  4.354;  advice  to  LBJ,  4.592;  on 
bombing  halt,  4.262;  DPM  of,  4.183, 
4.505-508;  and  JCS,  4.129;  memo  to 
President,  2.591-594;  on  pacification, 
2.599;  policy  review  of,  4.154,  4.396- 
.399;  Saigon  visit  of,  2.519,  2.591; 
Vietnam  review  of,  4.438-439 
Kaysen,  Dr.  Karl:  2.726,  4.115 
Keenan,  Amb.  George:  2.37,  4.98 
Kendrick,  Alexander:  4.635 
Kennedy,  Sen.  Edward  M.:  4.402 
Kennedy,  Pres.  John  F.:  4.679;  on  aid 
suspension,  2.235;  April  1961  de- 
cisions of,  2.38-39;  assassination  of, 
2.164,  2.190,  3.1,  3.17,  3.28;  on  Bao 
Dai  solution,  1.72;  on  Buddhist  crisis, 
2.241-242;  cable  to  Lodge,  2.746;  and 
Diem  coup,  2.31,  2.235,  2.238,  2.239, 
2.257;  on  domino  theory,  2.162;  in- 
auguration of,  2.6;  and  interdepart- 
mental task  force  report,  2.637-642; 
on  justification  of  war,  2.810;  and 
Laos  crisis,  2.799;  letter  to  Diem, 
2.185,  2.805-806;  and  McNamara- 
Taylor  mission,  2.118,  2.184,  2.247, 
2.248,  2.251;  memo  to  McNamara, 
2.748;  news  conferences  of,  2.33, 
2.805,  2.806-807,  2.810-811,  2.813, 
2.816-819,  2.824-825,  2.828;  programs 
of  (1961-63),  2.438-457;  public  state- 
ments of,  2.801-802,  2.809-810,  2.811, 
2.813,  2.828-830;  Special  Message  to 
Congress,  2.800-801,  2.804;  State  of 
the  Union  Message,  2.806,  2.815, 
2.816;  on  Strategic  Hamlet  Program, 
2.148;  SVN  evaluation  of,  2.727;  on 
troop  deployment,  2.117,  2.67;  TV 
interviews  of,  2.827-828;  United  Na- 
tions Address,  2.804-805;  as  U.S. 
Senator,  2.798-799;  Vietnam  com- 
mitment of,  2.1,  2.4,  2.50,  2.51,  2.450, 
2.808;  Vietnamese  policy  of,  2.410, 
2.726,  2.815 
Kennedy,  Sen.  Robert:  2.557,  4.589;  on 
bombing,  4.454;  on  coalition  govern- 
ment, 4.98;  as  presidential  candidate, 
4.263;  on  Vietnam  commitment,  2.243 
Khanh,  Gen.  Nguyen:  2.193,  2.196, 
2.235,  2.278,  2.279,  2.280,  2.281, 
2.317,  2.347,  2.353,  3.45,  3.292;  Bud- 
dhist alliance  of,  2.352;  and  Con- 
stituent Assembly,  3.261;  defeat  of, 
2.345;  during  Diem  coup,  2.237,  2.238, 
2.260,  2.264,  2.272;  government  of, 
2.308,  2.309,  2.319  {see  also  Khanh 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

government);  and  Hop  Tac  Program, 
2.525;  impatience  with  war  policy, 
3.64,  3.66,  3.71-72;  Laos  policy  of, 
3.173;  and  leverage,  2.498;  march  to 
the  north,  3.81-82;  and  McNamara, 
2.312,  2.315,  3.48,  3.71;  military 
policy  of,  2.321,  2.322;  National  Mo- 
bilization Plan  of,  2.197,  2.282-283, 
2.314,  2.316,  3.67,  3.165;  offensive 
tactics  of,  2.328;  overthrow  of,  3.325, 
3.433;  overthrow  of  Huong,  3.259- 
262;  pacification  program  of,  3.54, 
3.504,  3.551;  political  crisis  of,  2.334- 
338;  resignation  of,  2.334,  2.341,  3.86; 
and  Rusk,  2.320-323;  and  state  of 
emergency,  2.329;  and  Gen.  Taylor, 
2.327,  2.348,  2.350,  2.499,  3.80,  3.260; 
U.S.  support  of,  3.37,  3.78,  3.260- 
261;  during  triumvirate,  2.335,  2.339 

Khiem,  Gen.  Tran  Thien:  and  August 
plot,  2.232,  2.742;  cross  border  opera- 
tions, 3.539;  during  Diem  coup,  2.206, 
2.207,  2.237,  2.240,  2.256,  2.258,  2.260, 
2.264,  2.266,  2.767,  2.768;  exile  of, 
2.339;  during  Khanh  crisis,  2.335;  in 
triumvirate,  2.335 

Khrushchev,  Nikita  S.:  4.643;  Far  East 
policy  of,  1.618;  at  Vienna  talks,  2.57; 
wars  of  national  liberation  concept, 
1.260,  2.98 

Khuang,  Xieng:  2.79 

Khuong,  Col.:  2.258 

Killen:  2.479 

Kim,  Gen.  Le  Van:  2.234,  2.307,  2.767, 
3.37;  during  Diem  coup,  2.206-207, 
2.237,    2.238,    2.239,    2.256,  2.258, 
2.264;  post-coup  role  of,  2.271 
Kimny,  Amb.  Nong:  1.154 
King,  Adm.  Ernest  L.:  1.10 
Kirkpatrick,  Lyman  D.:  3.41,  3.42 
Kissinger,  Henry:  2.564 
Kistiakowsky,  Dr.  George:  4.115 
Knowlton,  Brig,  Gen.  William:  2.605 
Kohler,  Amb.  Foy:  3.328;  during  bomb- 
ing pause,  3.371;  Soviet  policy  and, 
3.332,  3.373 
Komer,  Amb.  Robert:  as  "blowtorch," 
2.519,  2.567-575;  as  Deputy  to  COM- 
USMACV,  2.617;  as  Deputy  for  Paci- 
fication, 4.470;  at  Guam  Conference, 
4.424;  as  head  of  CORDS,  4.155;  on 
leverage,  2.503,  2.504;  memoranda  to 
LBJ,  2.608,  4.439-441;  optimistic  Viet- 
nam prognosis  of,  2.575,  4.390-391, 
4.420;  on  pacification,  2.515,  2.565, 
^    2.570,  2.590,  4.93;  policy  reviews  of, 
2.486-487,  4.82;  rank  of,  2.536;  and 


Name  Index/ \\ 

Roles  and  Missions  Report,  2.586; 
Saigon  visit  of,  2.396,  2.400;  as  Spe- 
cial Assistant  for  "Peaceful  Recon- 
struction," 2.378,  2.387,  2.518,  2.520 

Kong  Le:  2.36,  2.637 

Koren,  Henry:  2.520,  2.613 

Kornienko:  3.373 

Kosygin,  Alexei:  4.643;  and  Geneva 
Conference,  4.94;  letters  to  LBJ, 
4.455;  and  negotiations,  4.143;  visit  to 
Hanoi,  3.270,  3.301,  3.303,  4.446 

Krag:  4.95 

Krulak,  Gen.  Victor  H.:  2.192,  2.204, 
2.534,  2.728;  on  August  Plot,  2.741, 
2.743;  briefings  for  Defense  Dept., 
3.29;  optimism  of,  2.231,  2.243-244, 
2.245;  on  pacification  program,  2.535; 
Vietnam  visit  of,  2.152,  2.158.  See  also 
Krulak-Mendenhall  mission 

Kuznetsov,  Vasily:  1.148 

Ky,  Marshal  Nguyen  Cao:  3.88;  ambi- 
tions of,  2.342,  2.347;  attempted  coup 
planned  by,  2.342;  and  Buddhist  re- 
volt, 4.101;  on  combined  command, 
2.363,  2.477;  as  Commander  of  Viet- 
namese Air  Force,  2.362,  2.365,  2.556, 
3.260;  coup  of,  2.278,  2.281,  2.361; 
coup  scare  and,  2.368;  economic 
policy  of,  2.289;  elections  and,  4.480; 
at  Guam  Conference,  4.424;  and  Hop 
Tac  Program,  2.525;  Laos  policy  of, 
2.328;  on  pacification,  4.353;  presi- 
dential candidacy  of,  2.395;  as  prime 
minister,  3.434;  on  RD,  2.594;  rela- 
tions with  Thi,  2.285,  2.370,  2.376, 
2.377;  and  Struggle  Movement,  2.285; 
and  Thieu,  4.579;  U.S.  speaking  en- 
gagement of,  2.399;  U.S.  support  of, 
4.577;  as  Young  Turk,  2.346 

Kyes,  Roger:  1.445,  1.446 

La  Chambre,  Guy:  1.214,  1.223 

Lacouture,  Jean:  1.136,  4.673 

La  Forest,  M.:  1.236-237 

Lam,  Pham  Dang:  2.272 

Laniel,  Premier  Joseph:  1.77,  1.96, 
1.104,  1.406;  requests  for  U.S.  aid 
of,  1.124-125,  1.443 

Lansdale,  Maj.  Gen.  Edward  G.:  1.447, 
2.2,  2.7,  2.8,  2.9,  2.35,  2.125,  2.440, 
2.526;  as  chief  of  SMM,  1.573,  1.574; 
counter-subversion  workers  under, 
2.530;  on  Diem's  personalism,  1.301; 
Diem's  request  for,  2.126;  on  French 
anti-Diem  activity,  1.231-232;  memo 
to  Gilpatric,  2.11;  memo  to  Gen. 
Taylor,  2.643 ;  on  pacification  program. 


Name  Index/ \2 

Lansdale,  Maj.  Gen.  Edward  G.:  {cont'd) 
2.531;  pro-Diem  policy  of,  2.26-27, 
2.30,  2.39,  2.53,  2.54;  role  of  (1961), 
2.37-38,  2.39;  "social  revolution"  and, 
2.557;  on  Taylor  Mission,  2.17,  2.80, 
2.95  (see  also  Taylor  Mission);  Viet- 
nam policy  of,  2.37,  2.43-44,  2.517. 
See  also  Lansdale  report 

Lao,  Col.  Hoang  Van:  2.674,  2.679 

Lapin:  3.328 

Lathram,  L.  Wade:  2.520,  2.612 
Lawrence,  William  H.:  4.631 
Lay,  James  S.,  Jr.:  1.385,  1.405,  1.413, 
1.434 

LBJ:  See  Johnson,  Lyndon  Baines 

Le,  Gen.  Nguyen  Ngoc:   during  Diem 

coup,  1.234,  2.237 
Leahy,  Adm.  V/illiam  D.:  1.13 
Leclerc,  Gen.  Jean:  1.23,  1.24,  1.25 
Leddy,  John:  2.639 
Le  Duan:  1.263 
Lemley,  Gen.:  4.593 

Lemnitzer,  Gen.  Lyman  L.:  2.29,  2.117, 
2.149;  memo  for  Gen.  Lansdale,  2.659 

Leonhart,  Amb.  William:  2.568,  2.615, 
4.470 

Letourneau,  Jean:  1.64,  1.69,  1.405, 
2.382 

Lewis,  John  W.:  1.260 

Lewis,  Ted:  2.556 

Lieberman,  Hank:  1.581 

Li  K'e-nung:  1.149,  1.154,  1.549 

Lilienthal,  David:  4.424 

Lin  Piao:  1.66,  4.643,  4.646 

Lippmann,  Walter:  2.117,  3.354,  4.159, 
4.389 

Lisagor,  Peter:  1.621 

Loan,  Brig.  Gen.:  2.398 

Locke,  Dep.  Amb.  Eugene:  2.400,  2.520, 
2.583;  at  Guam  Conference,  4.424;  and 
reorganization  of  Saigon  Mission,  2.619 

Lodge,  George:  at  Warrenton  Confer- 
ence, 2.539 

Lodge,  Amb.  Henry  Cabot:  2.126,  2.161, 
2.185,  2.189,  2.192,  2.196,  2.280, 
2.365,  2.519,  2.567,  2.575,  3.28,  4.379; 
appointment  of,  2.202,  2.230;  and  "big 
push"  concept,  4.328,  4.331-332;  on 
bombing,  3.173,  4.38,  4.49,  4.76;  and 
Buddhist  crisis,  2.203,  2.233,  2.234, 
2.735;  cable  to  Bundy,  2.780;  cable 
to  JFK,  2.746-748;  cables  to  LBJ, 
2.602-604,  2.605,  2.606,  4.328;  cable 
to  Rusk,  2.738;  cables  to  State  Dept., 
2.767,  2.792;  carrot  and  stick  pro- 
gram, 3.162-163;  CIA  cable  to,  2.769; 
criticism  of,  3.494;  and  Diem,  2.255, 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

2.742;  during  Diem  coup,  2.206,  2.207, 
2.235,  2.237,  2.239,  2.240,  2.242, 
2.243,  2.245,  2.246-251,  2.253,  2.254, 
2.257,  2.258-263,  2.268,  2.738,  3.18; 
endorsement  of  Abrams,  2.509;  es- 
calation and,  4.26,  4.27;  Gallop  Polls 
and,  4.99-100;  and  GVN,  2.480;  and 
Gen.  Harkins,  2.784;  at  Honolulu  Con- 
ference, 2.190,  2.323,  2.324,  2.548;  and 
Hop  Tac  Program,  2.521,  2.529;  and 
inflation  in  Vietnam,  4.338,  4.339- 
343,  4.364;  influence  with  Catholics, 
2.372;  on  international  forces  in  VN, 
4.334;  and  Minh,  2.769;  NODIS  to 
President,  2.529,  2.587;  optimism  of, 
4.389;  on  pacification  effort,  2.494, 
2.515,  2.517,  2.533,  4.328;  political 
recommendations  of,  2.188,  2.371, 
2.380-381,  2.384,  3.69;  and  Porter, 
2.605;  post-coup  role  of,  2.270,  2.271, 
2.274,  2.276,  2.303,  2.304;  post-coup 
views  of,  2.274,  2.275,  2.311;  RD  and, 
4.331;  reaction  to  Komer,  2.575;  re- 
lations with  Khanh,  2.310,  2.316-319, 
2.325,  2.326,  3.37,  3.38,  3.60,  3.63, 
3.66,  3.69;  and  reorganization  of  Sai- 
gon mission,  2.365,  2.537;  resigna- 
tion of,  2.537;  return  of,  2.482,  2.516, 
2.527,  2.793;  and  ROLLING  THUN- 
DER, 4.39,  4.40;  and  Rusk,  2.605;  on 
"social  revolution,"  2.557;  State  Dept. 
directives  to,  2.376,  2.736-737,  2.766; 
on  Struggle  Movement,  2.378;  and 
SVN  Constitution,  2.384-385;  and 
SVN  politics,  2.307,  2.370,  2.372, 
2.373,  2.374;  and  Tet  truce,  4.141; 
view  on  end  of  war,  2.532,  2.548; 
White  House  cable  to,  2.743 

Loory,  Stuart  N.:  4.592 

Lucas,  Jim:  4.51 1 

Luns:  4.95 

Luong,  Bui  Van  (Sec.  of  State):  2.674, 

2.679,  2.704 
Lyfoung,  Touby:  2.646 

MacArthur,  Douglas  II:  1.104 
MacDonald,  Malcolm:  1.304 
MacDonald:  duties  of,  2.606 
Magsaysay,  Ramon:  2.440 
Makins,  Sir  Roger:    1.98;   on  Geneva 

talks,  1.461 
Mann  (AID  Dir.):  2.539 
Mansfield,    Sen.    Mike:    1.222,  2.162, 

2.830;  on  foreign  policy,  2.813-814; 

on  troop  reduction  in  Europe,  4.402; 

Vietnam  proposals  of,  2.193,  3.263, 

4.28 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

Mao  Tse-tung:  1.620,  4.634;  on  armed 
revolution,  4.646 

Marks,  Leonard  (USIA  Director): 
2.590;  on  truce  extension,  4.142;  and 
Warrenton  Conference,  2.539 

Marlowe,  Sanford:  at  Warrenton  Con- 
ference, 2.539 

Marshall,  George  C.  (Sec.  of  State): 
on  Ho  Chi  Minh,  1.50;  on  U.S.  Indo- 
china policy,  1.31 

Marx,  Karl:  2.815 

Massigli,  Rene:  1.105 

Mau,  Do:  2.327 

Mau,  Vo  Van:  2.236,  2.759 

McCarthy,  Sen.  Eugene:  4.217,  4.263, 
4.589 

McClintock,  Robert:  1.574;  on  military 
situation  in  Indochina,  1.521 

McCone,  John  A.:  2.735,  3.32;  bomb- 
ing policy  of,  3.283,  3.352-353,  3.364; 
on  U.S.  military  strategy,  3.101 

McConnell,  Gen.  John  (Air  Force  Chief 
of  Staff):  bombing  policy  of,  3.320, 
3.342-343,  3.384-385,  4.207 

McGarr,  Gen.  Lionel  C.  (MAAG 
Chief):  2.11,  2.12,  2.14,  2.29,  2.34, 
2.65,  2.67,  2.435,  2.664;  and  Big  Minh, 
2.100;  on  clear  and  hold  strategy, 
2.143,  2.144;  and  CIP,  2.138,  2.139; 
on  combat  troops  in  SVN,  2.66-67, 
2.85;  on  military  situation,  2.70;  on 
Thompson  proposal,  2.141,  2.142;  and 
Vietnamese  command  problem,  2.659 

McGovern,  Sen.  George:  on  bombing, 
3.264 

McNamara,  Robert  S.  (Sec.  of  De- 
fense): 2.4,  2.5,  2.8,  2.150,  2.287, 
2.474,  2.504,  2.589,  3.3,  3.35,  3.156, 
3.337,  3.338,  3.475,  4.105,  4.120, 
4.123;  on  aid  to  Khanh  government, 
2.312-314,  2.315,  2.317;  on  aid  to 
SVN,  3.94;  August  Plot  and,  2.741; 
bombing  policy  of,  3.333,  3.339-340, 
3.358,  3.359,  3.385,  4.28,  4.29,  4.30- 
31,  4.32-34,  4.37,  4.49,  4.50,  4.55, 
4.68,  4.74-79,  4.112,  4.127,  4.183- 
.187,  4.191,  4.200,  4.201,  4.202- 
203,  4.204,  4.207,  4.303;  Buddhist 
crisis  and,  2.205,  2.230;  on  clear  and 
hold  strategy,  2.143,  2.144;  before 
Congressional  committee,  2.193-194, 
3.22,  4.30,  4.31,  4.112  4.633-635;  on 
Diem,  2.184,  3.20,  3.122;  during  Diem 
overthrow,  2.238,  2.239,  2.240,  2.241, 
2.243;  five-part  program  of,  4.355- 
356;  on  forward  defense  nations, 
3.717;     at     Honolulu  Conferences, 


Name  Index/ 13 

2.175-176,  2.180,  2.275,  2.323,  3.6, 
3.358-359,  3.705-706,  4.311-315;  on 
increased    military    aid,    2.436;  and 
ICS,  3.555-556,  4.70,  4.318,  4.319, 
4.326,  4.363-365;  joint  command  and, 
2.477;  justification  of  the  war,  2.193; 
on  Laos,  3.156-157;  memo  to  Gil- 
patric,  2.30-31;  memos  to  Pres.  John- 
son, 2.162,  2.191,  2.192,  2.460,  2.594, 
2.598,  3.494-496,  3.499-510,  4.77-78, 
4.297,  4.303,  4.309,  4.311,  4.348-356, 
4.365-378,     4.619-622,  4.622-623; 
memos    to    JCS,    3.555-556,  4.326, 
4.363-365;  memos  to  Pres.  Kennedy, 
2.16,  2.109,  2.662-666;  military  de- 
cision of  (April  1964),  3.70;  negotia- 
tions and,  2.597,  4.125,  4.356;  on  nu- 
clear weapons,  3.238;  pacification  and, 
2.589-590,  2.594,  2.599,  4.350;  pes- 
simism of,   2.363,  3.31,  3.32,  4.50, 
4.107;  phase-out  plan  and,  2.160-164, 
2.173,    2.179,    2.182,    2.199,  2.200, 
2.251;  on  piaster,  4.339,  4.343;  public 
statements  of,  4.236,  4.635;  queries 
CINCPAC,    3.74-75;   queries  COM- 
USMACV,   3.74-75;  report  to  LB  J 
(1964),    2.194-196;    retirement  of, 
4.216;  on  reserve  call-up,  4.93;  on 
ROLLING   THUNDER,  3.339-340; 
at  Sec.  of  Defense  Conference,  2.165; 
statement  to  Congress  (Feb.  1968), 
4.231-232;  Strategic  Hamlet  Program 
and,  2.149;  suppression  of  infiltration 
data,  3.256;  on  SVN  economy,  2.757- 
758;  on  Thai  troops,  4.524;  on  troop 
deployment,  2.470,  4.261,  4.317-318, 
4.319,  4.323,  4.530,  4.623;  on  troop 
levels,  2.181,  2.463,  3.473-476,  4.23, 
4.24-27,  4.297,  4.311,  4.318,  4.322, 
4.526;  truce  limitations  and,  4.142; 
on  VC  infrastructure,  4.513;  Vietnam 
visits    of,    2.151,    2.164,  2.311-312, 
2.318,  2.462-463,  2.504,  2.511,  2.591, 
2.600,   2.745,   2.748,    3.47,  3.67-72, 
4.195,  4.208,  4.295-296,  4.348,  4.622- 
623;  on  Vietnamese  military  support, 
3.36,  4.510-511;  view  on  end  of  war, 
2.595;    and    Warrenton  Conference, 
2.539;  on  wars  of  liberation,  3.712- 
715,  3.737;  and  Westmoreland,  4.586. 
See  also  McNamara-Taylor  Mission 
McNaughton,  John  T.  (Asst.  Sec.  for  De- 
fense):   3.199,   3.222,   3.293,  3.297, 
4.21,   4.22;   on   "Action   for  South 
Vietnam,"  3.598-601;  and  attacks  on 
NVN  POL  network,  4.103;  on  bomb- 
ing, 2.349-351,  4.32-33,  4.34,  4.38, 


I 


Name  Index/ 14 

McNaughton,  John  T.:  (cont'd) 

4.42-46,  4.68,  4.142,  4.160,  4.165, 
4.475,  4.483-484;  cable  to  Bundy, 
3.529;  and  compromise  solution, 
3.484;  DPM  of,  4.189,  4.477-489, 
4.504;  hard-line  policy  of,  4.48;  at 
Honolulu  Conference,  3.358;  and 
JCS,  4.301;  and  Johnson-Ho  letter 
exchange,  4.151;  on  Khanh  govern- 
ment, 3.686;  memo  for  Gen.  Good- 
paster,  4.291;  memos  to  McNamara, 
3.555,  3.584,  3.694-702,  4.113-114; 
military  recommendations  of,  3.448, 
4.92;  on  negotiations,  4.25;  "persever- 
ance" of,  3.267;  pessimism  of,  3.346, 
4.46-48,  4.84,  4.393;  "Plan  of  Action" 
of,  3.204,  3.348,  3.557-559,  3.695; 
SVN  political  crisis  and,  4.82,  4.85; 
position  papers  of,  3.483-484,  3.683, 
3.694-702,  4.87-89;  SVN  troop  de- 
ployments, 4.469,  4.470;  on  U.S.  ob- 
jectives in  SVN,  3.267-268;  and  West- 
moreland, 4.360 

Mecklin,  John  M.;  1.581,  2.243,  2.244, 
2.245;  during  Diem  coup,  2.237,  2.246; 
predictions  of,  2.276;  view  on  war, 
3.426 

Meeker,  Leonard:  4.644-4.645 

Mendenhall,  Joseph:  2.153,  2.158,  2.204; 
pessimism  of,  2.244,  2.246;  and  Taylor 
Mission,  2.86.  See  also  Krulak-Men- 
denhall  mission 

Mendes-France,  Pierre  (French  Pre- 
mier): 1.114,  1.544;  on  Diem  Gov- 
ernment, 1.227-228,  1.229;  and 
Dulles,  1.548,  1.556-557;  and  Geneva 
Conference  (1954),  1.552-553,  1.566, 
1.567-568;  on  Indochina  War,  1.562; 
meeting  with  Chou  En-lai,  1.537-538, 
on  partition,  1.135-136;  Vietnamese 
elections  and,  1.538;  Vietnam  policy 
of,  1.541,  1.542,  1.548-549 

Menon,  Krishna:  1.562 

Merchant,  Livingston:  on  U.S.  position 
at  Geneva  Conference,  1.117 

Metcalf,  Sen.  Lee:  2.830 

Miller,  Sen.  Jack:  member  Stennis  com- 
mittee, 4.197 

Minh,  Gen.  Duong  Van  ("Big  Minh"): 
1.257,  2.165,  2.192,  2.235,  2.272, 
2.280,  2.319,  2.341,  2.355,  2.402,  2.498, 
2.706,  2.707,  2.767,  3.35;  on  Diem 
Government,  2.747;  during  Diem  over- 
throw, 2.206-207,  2.237,  2.238,  2.239, 
2.240,  2.247,  2.256,  2.257,  2.258,  2.260, 
2.264,  2.269,  2.790;  demotion  of, 
2.334;  as  figurehead,  2.309;  govern- 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

ment   of,   3.31;   and   High  National 
Council,    2.340;   on    Khanh  govern- 
ment, 2.333;  and  Lodge,  2.768;  on 
neutralization,    3.32;    popularity  of, 
3.41;  as  President  and  Chief  of  Mili- 
tary Committee,  2.271,  2.303;  removal 
of,  3.84;  meeting  with  Taylor,  2.100, 
2.101,  U.S.  relations  with,  3.58 
Minh,  Ho  Chi.  See  Ho  Chi  Minh 
Minh,   Gen.   "Little":    and  joint  com- 
mand, 2.478 
Minh,  Gen.  Trinh:  1.578 
Mohr,  Charles:  2.554,  2.558,  2.559,  2.592 
Mollet,  Guy  (French  Premier):  1.183 
Molotov,  V.  M.:  on  Geneva  Accords, 
1.158;  at  Geneva  Conference  (1954), 
1.520-522,    1.534-537,    1.545,  1.549, 
1.559,  1.560,  1.564-565;  on  Laos  and 
Cambodia,  1.138;  Mendes-France  Gov- 
ernment and,  1.563 
Momyer,  Gen.  William  W.:  4.195 
Monroney,  Sen.  A.  S.  (Mike):  3.263 
Morgenthau,  Hans  J.:  "America's  Stake 
in  Vietnam,"  3.742;  on  Vietnam  elec- 
tions, 1.288 
Morris,  Thomas  D.:  on  manpower  re- 
quirements, 4.313,  4.317 
Morse,  Sen.  Wayne:  3.263 
Mountbatten,  Adm.  Lord  Louis:  1.11, 
1.16,  1.18 

Moutet,  Marius:  1.29,  1.30;  and 
French-DRV  negotiations,  1.23,  1.24 

Moyers,  William:  SVN  political  crisis 
and,  4.82 

Mundt,  Sen.  Karl  E.:  and  Rusk,  4.588 

Murrow,  Edward  R.:  2.741 

Mustin,  Vice  Adm.  L.  M.:  3.213,  3.632; 

on  Chinese  intervention,  3.218 
My-Diem      (American-Diem):  1.252, 

1.265.  See  also  Diem,  Ngo  Dinh 

Nassar,  Gamel  Abdel:  Vietnam  nego- 
tiations and,  4.94 

Navarre,  Gen.  Henri:  1.78,  1.104,  1.405, 
1.416,  1.445.  See  also  Navarre  Plan 

Nehru,  Jawaharlal:  1.148,  1.501 

Nelson,  Sen.  Gaylord:  3.187 

Nes,  David  (Deputy  Amb.  to  SVN): 
2.310,  2.365,  2.759 

Nhu,  Madame:  2.70,  2.224,  2.225,  2.724, 
2.737,  2.759;  Buddhist  crisis  and, 
2.227,  2.228-230;  removal  of,  2.239- 
240,  2.242,  2.247,  2.254;  rumors  about, 
2.634;  in  U.S.,  2.252 

Nhu,  Ngo  Dinh:  2.26,  2.674,  2.742;  dur- 
ing Diem  coup,  2.266,  2.268;  assas- 
sination of,  2.158,  2.189,  2.207,  2.270, 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

3.17;  Buddhist  crisis  and,  2.202,  2.227, 
2.228,  2.230;  on  Diem's  personalism, 
1.301;  McNamara-Taylor  report  on, 
2.759;  pagoda  raids  of,  2.202-203, 
2.232,  2.234,  2.236  {see  also  Pagoda 
raids);  power  of,  2.224,  2.252;  power 
bid  of,  2.733;  proposed  assassination 
of,  2.767;  relations  with  U.S.,  2.225, 
2.732,  2.734,  2.740;  removal  of,  2.239- 
240,  2.242,  2.244,  2.245,  2.247,  2.249, 
2.250,  2.253-254,  2.256;  repressive 
policies  of,  2.204;  and  Republican 
Youth,  1.311;  Strategic  Hamlet  Pro- 
gram and,  2.129-130,  2.131,  2.145, 
2.148,  2.225,  2.685,  2.700,  2.707, 
2.723;  surrender  of,  2.268-269;  totali- 
tarianism of,  2.759.  See  also  Diem 
family;  Ngo  family;  Nhu  family 

Nitze,  Paul  T.  (Deputy  Sec.  of  De- 
fense): 2.74,  4.260,  4.267,  4.313, 
4.587;  advice  to  LBJ,  4.592 

Niven,  Paul:  4.669 

Nixon,  Richard  M.:   1.104,  2.21,  4.361 

Nkrumah,  Kwame:  Vietnam  negotia- 
tions and,  4.94 

Nolting,  Frederick  E.  ("Fritz")  (Amb. 
to  SVN):  1.269,  2.2-4,  2.12,  2.32, 
2.34,  2.65,  2.86,  2.115,  2.125-126, 
2,142,  2.152,  2.165,  2.202,  2.450;  and 
Diem  coup,  2.231,  2.238,  2.241,  2.244; 
August  Plot  and,  2.741;  authority  of, 
2.444;  and  Buddhist  crisis,  2.229-230, 
2.728-729;  cables  from,  2.81-82, 
2.84,  2.99,  2.100-101,  2.102,  2.105- 
106,  2.120,  2.139;  and  Diem,  2.52, 
2.55,  2.71,  2.147,  2.228-229,  2.450, 
2.665,  2.728-729,  3.24;  early  Vietnam 
commitment  and,  2.16-17;  President 
Kennedy  and,  2.444,  2.728 

Nosavan,  Gen.  Phoumi:  2.6,  2.47,  2.55, 
3.580 

Novak,  Robert:  2.610 
Nu,  U:  1.148 


Oanh:  as  Economic  Minister,  2.310, 
2.316-318;  as  Vice  Premier,  2.327, 
2.353 

O'Daniel,  Lt.  Gen.  John  W.  (Iron  Mike): 
1.96,  1.215,  1.410,  1.434,  1.444-445, 
1.541,  1.574,  1.581;  at  Geneva  Con- 
ference, 1.516-517;  head  of  MAAG, 
1.77;  on  Navarre  Plan,  1.81;  status  of, 
1.447-448 


Parker,  Jameson:  1.599-600 
Paul  VI  (Pope):  4.228 


Name  Index/ 15 

Pearson,  Lester:  cease-fire  proposal  of, 

4.94-95 
Peers,  Maj.  Gen.:  2.539 
Persons,  Gen.  Wilton  B.:  2.635 
Phat,  Gen.  Lam  Van:  coup  attempt  of, 

2.354,  3.88 
Phillips,  Rufus:  2.243,  2.245-246,  2.539 
Phuoc,  Lt.  Col.:  3.26 
Pignon,  Leon:  1.57,  1.368 
Pike,    Douglas:    on    NLF,  1.345-346, 

2.274;  on  Tho,  1.344;  on  VC  strategy, 

1.337 

Pineau,  Christian:  1.183-184,  1.241, 
1.286 

Pleven,  Rene:  1.64 

Poats,  Rutherford:  2.539 

Porter,  William  J.  (Deputy  Amb.  to 
SVN):  2.387,  2.516,  2.520,  2.607; 
authority  of,  2.518,  2.536,  2.562- 
564,  2.593;  economic  program  of, 
2.396;  on  inflation  in  Vietnam,  4.338; 
on  Komer  proposals,  2.575;  limitations 
on,  2.565-566,  2.612;  and  OCO,  2.520, 
2.612;  on  pacification  program,  1.590; 
and  Revolutionary  Development, 
2.485-486,  2.562-564,  2.603;  and 
Rusk,  2.605;  at  Warrenton  Confer- 
ence, 2.539,  2.540 

Quang,  Gen.:  2.384,  2.391 
Quang,  Tri:  3.261 

Quang,  Trich  Tri:  2.236,  2.370-371; 
U.S.  relations  of,  2.375-376,  2.781, 
4.587 

Quat,  Phan  Huy:  1.225,  2.278,  2.354, 
2.356-357,  2.361;  on  alternative  to 
Diem,  1.233;  on  bombing  pause,  3.368; 
as  Defense  Minister,  1.163,  during 
Diem  coup,  2.260;  generals  and,  3.435, 
on  national  unity,  3.324;  overthrow  of, 
2.361,  3.434;  as  prime  minister,  3.433- 
434;  U.S.  support  of,  3.19 

Raborn,  Adm.  William:  bombing  policy 
of,  3.364-365;  at  Warrenton  Confer- 
ence, 2.539 

Radford,  Adm.  Arthur  W.  (Chairman, 
JCS):  1.97,  1.411,  1.443,  1.444,  1.446, 
1.448-451,  1.458,  1.511,  1.515;  on 
Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.100;  memo  to  Presi- 
dent, 1.459-460;  on  status  of  Gen. 
O'Daniel,  1.447-448 

Radharrishnon:  4.94 

Ramadier,  Premier  Paul:  1.4,  1.23,  1.30; 
on  French-DRV  negotiations,  1.24-25 

Raphael-Lay gues,  Jacques:  1.222 


Name  Index /Id 

Rather,    Dan:    on   Tuesday  luncheons, 

4.209-210 
Reasoner,  Harry:  4.635 
Redick:  2.38 

Reischauer,  Edmund:  before  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee,  4.454 

Resor,  Stanley  R.:  4.512 

Reston,  James:  2.73,  2.117,  4.643,  4.674; 
attacks  U.S.  policy  in  SVN,  4.98-99 

Revers,  Gen.  Georges:  on  Bao  Dai  solu- 
tion, 1.59 

Rhee,  Pres.  Syngman:  2.46 

Rice,  Edward  E.:  4.161,  4.171,  4.475 

Richards,  Robert:  1.597 

Richardson,  John:  2.206,  2.233,  2.235, 
2.784;  during  Diem  coup,  2.237,  2.238, 
2.240,  2.346,  2.735-736;  recall  of, 
2.254;  relationship  with  Diem,  3.24 

Ridgway,  Gen.  Matthew  B.:  1.92,  4.267; 
advice  to  LBJ,  4.591;  military  report 
on  Indochina,  1.127 

Rivers,  Mendel:  3.35 

Robertson,  Walter  F.:  1.215,  1.447;  ad- 
dress on  Vietnam,  1.610-613;  on  all- 
Vietnam  elections,  1.246 

Rockefeller,  Nelson:  2.21 

Roderick,  John:  1.581 

Ronning,  Chester:  4.104;  on  negotia- 
tions, 4.94-95 

Roosevelt,  Pres.  Franklin  D.:  1.10;  on 
liberation  of  Indochina,  1.11;  on 
neutralizing  Indochina,  1,8-9;  trustee- 
ship for  colonial  territories,  1.13- 
14;  trusteeship  for  Indochina,  1.1- 
2,  1.10 

Rostow,  Walt  W.:  2.4,  2.21,  2.41,  2.42, 
2.442,  4.392;  advice  to  LBJ,  4.592; 
bombing  policy  of,  4.100-101,  4.476; 
on  Diem,  2.126;  on  Green  Berets,  2.51; 
on  internal  GVN  problems,  2.310- 
311;  memos  to  JFK,  2.7,  2.34-35,  2.39; 
memos  to  McNamara,  3.632-633; 
military  recommendations  of,  3.235; 
on  NSC  Working  Group,  3.234;  San 
Antonio  formula  and,  4.262;  "Some 
Observations  As  We  Come  to  the 
Crunch  in  Southeast  Asia,"  3.645-647; 
on  Taylor  Mission,  2.80,  2.84,  2.86, 
2.102;  in  Taylor  Report,  2.98,  2.99; 
on  troop  commitments,  2.79,  4.469; 
"Victory  and  Defeat  in  Guerrilla 
Wars,"  3.381;  Vietnam  policy  of, 
2.31,  4.82,  4.162-165;  on  wars  of 
liberation  strategy,  4.666-667 

Rowen,  Henry:  memo  to  W.  Bundy, 
3.642-644;  at  Warrenton  Conference, 
2.539 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Ruge:  4.684 

Rusk,  Dean  (Sec.  of  State):  2.5,  2.279, 
2.377,  4.267,  4.455;  advice  to  LBJ, 
3.176,  4.592;  and  Diem  coup,  2.184, 
2.235,  2.739-740;  assessment  of  SVN 
(1965),  3.296;  August  Plot  and,  2.741; 
bombing  policy  of,  3.166-167,  3.727, 
4.34,  4.259;  cables,  2.105,  3.518, 
3.522,  3.524;  on  Communist  China, 
3.724;  and  Dobrynin,  3.274;  and  Gro- 
myko,  3.377;  on  Guam  Conference, 
4.424;  at  Honolulu  Conference,  2.275, 
2.323;  justification  of  war,  3.723, 
4.661;  and  Khanh  government,  2.323, 
2.335,  2.338,  3.67;  memos,  2.189, 
3.563,  3.577;  on  negotiations,  3.272, 
3.331,  4.95,  4.104,  4.206-207;  on 
neutralization  of  SVN,  3.712;  public 
statements  of,  2.819-821,  3.711,  4.236- 
237,  4.631-632,  4.635,  4.648-649, 
4.653-655,  4.660, 4.662-663, 4.664-665, 
4.665-666,  4.669-671,  4.671,  4.680- 
682,  4.682-684;  on  Ronning  mission, 
4.104;  on  San  Antonio  formula,  4.237; 
on  SEATO  obligations,  4.98;  and  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Committee, 
4.263,  4.588,  4.640-644,  4.651;  on 
Tonkin  Gulf  incident,  3.721;  on  U.S. 
aid  to  Indochina,  1.194-195;  Vietnam 
policy  of,  3.65-66,  3.163,  3.729,  3.733- 
736,  4.23;  Vietnam  visit,  3.65;  and 
Warrenton  Conference,  2.539;  on 
withdrawal,  3.717-718 

Russell,  Sen.  Richard  B.:  4.98,  4.586, 
4.588 

Sagatelyan,  Mikhail:  3:375-376 

Sainteny,  Jean:  1.222,  4.95.  See  also 
Sainteny  Mission 

Salinger,  Pierre:  3.375 

Salisbury,  Harrison:  dispatches  from 
DRV,  4.388;  on  DRV  civilian  casual- 
ties, 4.135 

Sang,  Lai  Van:  1.231 

San  Juan,  Johnny  "Frisco":  2.647 

Sarit  Thanarit,  Field  Marshal:  2.56,  2.645; 
pro-Western  policy  of,  2.59 

Sartre,  Jean-Paul:  3.354 

Sary,  Foreign  Minister  Sam:  1.154 

Scali,  John:  4.631 

Schlesinger,  Arthur  M.,  Jr.:  2.42,  2.117; 
on  Diem  coup,  2.235;  on  McNamara- 
Taylor  Mission,  2.248 

Scranton,  Governor  William:  2.537 

Schuman,  Robert  (French  Foreign  Min- 
ister): 1.371 

Seaborn,    J.    Blair:    3.163-164,  3.182. 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

3.292,  3.330,  3.380;  3.628;  and  Ton- 
kin Gulf  Crisis,  3.519-521 
Serong,  Col.:  2.528 

Shaplen,  Robert:  2.499;  and  Diem  coup, 
2.257,  2.266;  on  Viet  Minh  terrorism, 
1.334 

Sharp,  Adm.  U.S.  Grant:  3.318,  4.312; 
bombing  policy  of,  4.33,  4.38,  4.49, 
4.76,  4.103,  4.187,  4.195,  4.208,  4.229; 
on  escalation,  4.26;  at  Honolulu  Con- 
ference, 3.358;  on  mining  of  Haiphong 
harbor,  4.415;  opposes  anti-infiltration 
barrier,  4.123;  on  ROLLING  THUN- 
DER, 4.39-40 

Sheehan,  Neil:  4.512,  4.585 

Showers,  Ray:  4.614 

Sihanouk,  Prince  Norodom:  2.708;  on 
NVA/VC  sanctuaries,  4.516 

Siho,  Lt.  Col.:  2.646 

Smith,  Hedrick:  4.585 

Smith,  Sen.  Margaret  Chase:  4.197 

Smith,  Maj.  Gen.  Paul:  2.605 

Smith,  Capt.  Richard:  1.577 

Smith,  Gen.  Walter  Bedell  (Under  Sec.  of 
State):  1.90,  1.94,  1.113,  1.443,  1.447, 
1.551,  2.808;  on  Geneva  Accords, 
1.176;  cables  from  Geneva  Conference 
of,  1.519-521,  1.532-533,  1.534-537, 
1.559-560,  1.560-561,  1.566-567, 
1.567-568,  1.569-570;  at  Geneva  Con- 
ference, 1.120,  1.534-537,  1.548;  on 
ICC,  1.177;  public  statement  of,  1.598; 
on  SEATO  protection  for  Cambodia, 
1.160-161 

So,HuynhPhu:  1.294 

Soai,  Tran  Van:  1.294,  1.303 

Solbert,  Peter  (Dep.  Asst.  Sec.  of  De- 
fense):  3.87,  3.641 

Sorenson,  Theodore:  2.4,  2.62,  2.104, 
2.117,  4.674 

Souphanouvong:  3.197 

Souvanna  Phouma  (Prime  Minister  of 
Laos):  2.78-79,  2.119,  2.195,  3.182, 
3.197,  3.260,  4.444,  4.582,  4.673;  on 
bombing  supply  lines,  3.515-517;  gov- 
ernment of,  2.112;  internal  position 
of,  3.525,  3.528-529,  3.534;  negotiating 
posture  of,  3.198;  President  Kennedy's 
support  of,  2.6;  support  of  U.S.  re- 
connaissance flights,  3.253;  U.S.  posi- 
tion in  Laos  and,  3.541,  3.547;  Pathet 
Lao  and,  1.395 

Spaak,  Paul  Henri:  1.621 

Spera:  2.237 

Spivak,  Robert  G.:  1.597,  4.236 
Springstein,  George:  2.728-729 
Staley,  Eugene:  2.11,  2.63,  2.106 


Name  Index/ 11 

Stalin,  Joseph  v.:  1.1,  1.10 

Starbird,  Lt.  Gen.  Alfred:  as  barrier 
project  manager,  4.124;  Laos  corridor 
and,  4.444 

Steadman,  John  M.:  4.315;  policy  re- 
view of,  4.550 

Steadman,  Richard:  4.443-444 

Steeves,  John:  2.35 

Stennis,  Sen.  John:  4.299,  4.385;  on 
bombing  intensification,  4.527;  on  es- 
calation, 4.197-205;  support  of  West- 
moreland's troop  requests,  4.401,  4.456. 
See  also  Stennis  Hearings 

Stettinius,  E.  R.,  Jr.  (Sec.  of  State): 
1.2,  1.11,  1.15;  on  aid  to  Indochina, 
1.12;  statement  on  postwar  trustee- 
ship, 1.14-15 

Stevens,  Robert  T.  (Sec.  of  the  Army): 
on  military  aid  to  Indochina,  1.508- 
509 

Stevenson,  Adlai:  justification  of  U.S. 
policy  in  SVN,  3.715;  on  NVN  ag- 
gression, 3.727-728;  on  Southeast  Asia 
policy,  3.171 

Stilwell,  Lt.  Gen.  Richard  G.:  2.253, 
2.267,  2.783 

Stratton,  Rep.  Samuel  S.:  3.36 

Sukarno:  3.267 

Sullivan,  William  H.  (U.S.  Amb.  to 
Laos):  2.280,  2.333,  2.538,  3.77,  3.258, 
4.444;  memos  on  Vietnam,  2.319, 
2.324-325,  3.594-596;  on  mining 
DRV  harbors,  4.173 

Suu,  Phan  Khac:  2.277-278,  2.280,  2.347, 
2.353,  2.354,  2.355,  2.361,  3.89 

Symington,  Sen.  Stuart:  4.197 


Tac,  Pham  Cong  (Cao  Dai  pope) :  1.305. 
See  also  Cao  Dai 

Tam,  Nguyen  Van:  1.225;  as  Premier 
of  SVN,  1.397,  3.394 

Tanh,  Tran  Chanh  (head  of  GVN  Dept. 
of  Information  and  Youth):  1.311 

Taylor,  Gen.  Maxwell  G.  (Chairman  of 
JCS  and  Amb.  to  SVN):  2.4,  2.14, 
2.79,  2.280,  2.281,  2.320,  3.203,  3.274, 
4.267,  4.527;  advises  LBJ,  4.591; 
against  7-point  message,  2.358;  am- 
bassadorial authority  of,  3.79-80;  Au- 
gust Plot  and,  2.741;  bombing  policy 
of,  2.354,  3.6,  3.93,  3.115,  3.179, 
3.209-210,  3.241,  3.262,  3.271-272, 
3.334-335,  3.364,  4.96-97;  Buddhist 
crisis  and,  2.205,  4.86;  cables,  2.85, 
2.87,  2.88-90,  2.102,  2.103,  2.105, 
2.523,  3.445^47,   3.522-524,  3.566- 


Name  Index /IS 

Taylor,  Gen.  Maxwell  G.:  (cont'd) 
568;  cables  to  President  Kennedy, 
2.90;  cables  to  Rusk,  3.576,  3.704; 
Diem  coup  and,  2.235,  2.238,  2.241, 
2.259;  disagreement  with  JCS,  3.172; 
on  disengagement  from  Vietnam, 
3.295;  dispatch  to  Bundy,  3.103-104; 
on  enclave  strategy,  3.453;  on  escala- 
tion, 3.95,  3.110-111,  3.241,  4.26-27; 
41  points  of,  2.357;  on  "graduated  re- 
prisals," 3.315-318;  on  ground  troops, 
2.118,  3.457;  and  Hop  Tac  Program, 
2.521,  2.523-524;  at  Honolulu  Confer- 
ence, 3.358;  and  Huong,  3.258;  on 
infiltration,  3.207-208;  and  Khanh  gov- 
ernment, 2.326-329,  2.333,  2.336-338, 
2.339,  2.341,  2.348,  2.352,  2.499,  3.80, 
3.82,  3.87,  3.191,  3.240,  3.260,  3.268, 
3.295,  3.530-533,  3.675;  and  Ky,  2.363; 
on  Laos,  3.189;  letter  to  Diem,  2.185- 
186;  leverage  policy  of,  2.479;  Lodge 
replaces,  2.365;  on  logistic  deploy- 
ment, 3.449-450;  memo  to  McNamara, 
3.496-499;  on  military  situation, 
2.198-199,  3.240,  3.345,  3.471,  3.675; 
military  strategy  of,  2.135,  2.137, 
3.396;  and  NSC  Working  Group, 
3.290;  on  negotiations,  4.95-97,  4.148; 
optimism  on  military  situation  of, 
3.436-437;  on  pacification,  2.493- 
494,  2.527;  phase-out  policy  and, 
2.160;  on  Phase  Two  operations, 
3.264-265;  and  policy  changes,  3.104; 
position  papers  of,  3.363,  3.666-673, 
4.247-250;  and  Principals'  Group, 
3.239-248;  and  Quat  government, 
3.421;  relations  with  JCS,  3.590-591; 
on  search  and  destroy  strategy,  3.396; 
on  sending  U.S.  forces  to  Vietnam, 
2.90-91;  "Three  Principles"  of,  3.241; 
on  troop  buildup,  2.430,  3.455-456, 
3.472;  on  troop  deployment,  3.418, 
3.445-447,  3.451;  on  USG-GVN  co- 
operation, 3.241;  Vietnam  options  of, 
4.554-555;  Vietnam  visits  of,  2.705, 
2.745,  2.805,  2.823,  3.47;  and  Viet- 
namese command  problem,  2.659, 
See  also   McNamara-Taylor  Mission 

Thanat  Khouman:  3.257 

Thang,  Gen.  Nguyen  Due:  at  Honolulu 
Conference,  2.550;  as  Vietnamese  Min- 
ister for  RD,  2.354-355,  2.365,  2.392- 
393,  2.479,  2.486,  2.568,  2.619,  4.388 

Thang,  Ton  Due:  1.172 

Thant,  U:  2.322,  2.399;  peace  proposals 
of,  3.331,  3.347,  4.94-95,  4.388 

Thao,  Col.  Phamh  Ngoc:  2.240,  2.354; 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

and  Diem  coup,  2.264,  2.266,  2.269; 
and  Khanh  coup,  3.325 

Thi,  Gen.  Nguyen  Chanh:  2.287,  2.364, 
2.369,  3.88,  4.93;  Buddhist  uprisings 
against  Ky  and,  4.101;  dismissal  of, 
2.369-370,  4.78;  DMZ  operations  of, 
2.290;  as  Ky's  rival,  2.369;  as  Young 
Turk,  2.346 

Thieu,  Lt.  Gen.  Nguyen  Van  (President 
of  SVN):  2.392,  4.579,  4.598;  and 
Diem  coup,  2.237;  as  Chief  of  State, 
3.434;  at  Guam  Conference,  4.424; 
on  joint  command,  2.477,  2.478;  paci- 
fication and,  4.353;  and  Struggle  Move- 
ment, 2.285;  U.S.  support  of,  4.577; 
Vietnamese  elections  and,  4.480;  as 
Young  Turk,  2.346 

Tho,  Nguyen  Ngoc  (Vice  Pres.  and 
Premier  of  SVN):  2.28,  2.29,  2.94, 
2.207,  2.227,  2.235,  2.249,  2.303,  2.634, 
2.704,  2.706,  2.707,  2.716,  2.733, 
2.787;  and  Buddhists,  2.229,  2.306;  ne- 
gotiations with  Gen.  Minh,  2.270; 
post-Diem  role  of,  2.260,  2.270,  2.272; 
as  Premier,  2.271 

Tho,  Nguyen  Nuu  (First  Chairman  of 
the  NLF):  1.339;  political  background 
of,  1.344 

Thompson,  Amb.  Llewellyn:  3.691,  4.167, 
4.257;  on  mining  of  Haiphong  harbor, 
4.147;  and  negotiations,  4.272,  4.598; 
on  Soviet  reaction  to  escalation.  4.246- 
247 

Thompson,  Sir  Robert  G.  K.:  2.129, 
2.153,  2.225,  2.528,  2.674,  2.688,  2.700, 
4.161,  4.171,  4.332;  proposal  of, 
2.139-140,  2.142,  2.144 

Throckmorton,  Gen.  John  L.  (Deputy 
COMUCMACV):  2.475,  3.417 

Thuan,  Nguyen  Dinh:  2.28-29,  2.34, 
2.60,  2.66,  2.67,  2.240,  2.247,  2.253, 
2.254,  2.255,  2.674,  2.679,  2.707;  and 
Buddhist  crisis,  2.229,  2.234;  requests 
U.S.  troops,  2.81-82;  and  Taylor  Mis- 
sion, 2.86,  2.102 

Thuc,  Ngo  Dinh:  1.253,  2.226,  2.240, 
2.242.  See  also  Diem  family;  Ngo 
family 

Thue,  Dean  Vu  Quoc:  2.106 
Thurmond,  Sen.   Strom:   4.197,  4.233- 
234 

Tieu,  Lt.  Col.  Ho:  3.539 
Tillson,  Maj.  Gen.:  on  pacification,  2,587, 
2.608 

Tito,  Josip  Broz:  3.347 
Ton,  (Minister):   at  Honolulu  Confer- 
ence, 2.550 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol  5 

Topping,  Seymour:  1.155,  1.157,  1.561, 
1.566 

Trapnell,  Gen.  J.  H.:  1.122,  1.234,  1.445; 
at  Geneva  Conference,  1.516-518;  on 
Indochina,  1.487-499 

Trevelyn,  (UK  Amb.  to  Moscow):  3.326 

Tri,  Gen.  Do  Cao:  2.260,  2.264 

Tri,  Nguyen  Huu:  1.394 

Trinh,  Nguyen  Duy  (DRV  Foreign  Min- 
ister): 3.380,  4.233 

Truehart,  William  C:  2.152,  2.202, 
2.224,  2.230,  2.263;  and  Diem  coup, 
2.237,  2.246,  2.256,  2.793 

Truman,  Pres.  Harry  S:  1.2,  1.6,  1.18, 
1.64;  on  aid  to  Indochina,  1.373,  1.590; 
on  military  aid  to  Asian  countries, 
1.590;  public  statements  of,  1.588- 
589;  special  message  to  Congress, 
1.589-591 

Tu,  Lai:  2.106 

Tung,  Col.  Le  Van:  2.233,  2.736,  2.753, 
3.821;  role  in  Diem  overthrow,  2.238, 
2.253,  2.267;  Special  Forces  of,  2.232, 
2.234,  2.250,  2.251,  2.253,  2.254,  2.265, 
2.266,  2.734,  2.762;  surrender  of, 
2.268-269 

Tuyen,  Tran  Kim:  2.237,  2.634,  2.759 

Ung,  Nguyen  Tat  (SVN  Minister  of 
RD):  2.365 

Unger,  Gen.  F.  T.:  3.510 

Unger,  Leonard  (Dep.  Asst.  Sec.  of 
State  for  Far  Eastern  Affairs):  at 
Honolulu  Conference,  2.533;  negotia- 
tion policy  of,  4.83-84;  position  pa- 
pers of,  3.731,  4.649-650;  on  U.S. 
commitment  to  SVN,  4.91;  at  Warren- 
ton  Conference,  2.539 

U  Nu.  See  Nu,  U 

U  Thant.  See  Thant,  U 

Valenti,  Jack:  2.54,  2.549 
Valeriano,  Col.  Napoleon:  1.582 
Valluy,  Gen.:  1.443;  on  military  situa- 
tion in  Indochina,  1.122;  on  military 
situation  in  Tonkin  Delta,  1.518-519; 
public  statement  of,  1.521 
Vance,  Cyrus  R.:    (Dep.  Sec.  of  De- 
fense): 4.267,  4.313,  4.497;  on  air  war, 
4.191;  advice  to  LBJ,  4.591;  Buddhist 
crisis  and,  4.82;  on  B-52  strikes,  3.333- 
334;  and  ICS,  4.405;  memo  on  mari- 
time operations,  3.571 
Van  Fleet,  Gen.  James  A.:  1.155 
Vann,  John  Paul:  2.520,  2.613,  2.620 
Vien,  Le  Van  (Bay):  1.220,  1.293.  See 
also  Binh  Xuyen 


Name  Index/ 19 

Vien,  Gen.  Cao  Van  (SVN  Minister  of 
Interior):  2.340,  2.395;  and  pacifica- 
tion, 2.493 

Vincent,  John  Carter:  1.29 

Vy,  Maj.  Gen.  Nguyen  Van:  1.235,  1.575, 
2.393 


Walt,  Gen.  Lewis  W.:  2.374,  2.375, 
2.534;  pacification  and,  2.515,  2.536 

Warner,  LTC  Volney:  2.404,  2.503 

Warnke,  Paul  (Asst.  Sec.  of  Defense): 
4.568;  on  bombing,  4.225;  and  JCS, 
4.216,  4.235-236;  on  negotiations  with 
Hanoi,  4.264;  policy  review  of,  4.550; 
on  target  list  revision,  4.204-205 

Webb,  James  (Acting  Sec):  1.370 

Welles,  Sumner:  1.8-9 

Westmoreland,  Gen.  William  C:  2.280, 
2.395,  2.468,  3.4,  4.379;  on  anti-infil- 
tration measures,  4.334,  4.412-413; 
bombing  policy  of,  3.383,  4.31,  4.33, 
4.39,  4.49,  4.101,  4.130-131,  4.207; 
cable  to  CINCPAC,  3.470,  4.606-609; 
Combined  Command  Plan  of,  4.554; 
Commander's  Estimate  of  the  Situation 
in  South  Vietnam,  3.345;  and  CORDS, 
2.516;  deployment  of  Mr.rines  and, 
3.430;  on  destruction  of  enemy  bases, 
4.402;  on  enemy  sanctuaries,  4.336- 
338;  on  enemy  strategy,  4.403-406;  es- 
calation and,  4.26;  "Force  Require- 
ments and  Deployments,"  4.606-609; 
on  forcing  negotiations,  4.296;  "44- 
Battalion"  request  of,  2.474,  2.547, 
3.467;  ground  troop  recommenda- 
tions, 3.389,  3.417,  3.462-468;  at 
Guam  Conference,  4.424;  on  holiday 
truce,  4.141;  at  Honolulu  Conference, 
2.323,  2.324,  3.173,  3.358,  4.312;  and 
Hop  Tac  Program,  2.516,  2.521, 
2.526;  on  joint  US-ARVN  command, 
2.357,  2.476-477;  and  Khanh  gov't, 
2.317,  2.319,  2.326,  2.335;  on  Komer 
proposals,  2.575;  Laos  policy  of,  2.327; 
and  LBJ,  2.561,  4.588;  at  Manila 
Conference,  4.130-131;  message 
#19118  of,  3.462,  3.467;  military  ob- 
jectives of,  4.530,  4.569;  on  military 
situation,  2.337-338,  2.474,  3.89-90, 
3.337,  3.345-346,  3.438-439,  3.675, 
4.336-338,  4.426,  4.434;  mobility  de- 
fense strategy  of,  4.386;  on  objectives 
of  U.S.  forces  in  Vietnam,  4.301;  on 
OCO,  2.614;  on  173rd  for  Security, 
3.450-452;  on  pacification,  2.519, 
2.574,  2.597,  2.605;  on  Phase  II  re- 


Name  Index/20 

Westmoreland,  Gen.  William  C:  (cont'd) 
quirements,  4.305-308;  on  piaster 
limits,  4.344;  and  Program  5,  4.531; 
public  defense  of  war,  4.217;  on 
Quat  government,  3.424;  recall  of, 
4.269,  4.593;  on  relationship  between 
US/Allied  forces  and  RVNAF,  3.459; 
review  of  war  effort  with  LBJ,  4.441- 
443;  on  RD  requirements,  2.588, 
2.609,  4.330-331;  ROLLING  THUN- 
DER and,  4.39;  strategy  of  anticipa- 
tion, 4.516;  strong  position  of,  2.281, 
2.288;  support  of  ARVN,  2.500;  on 
troop  build-up,  2.471;  on  troop  de- 
ployments, 2.353-363,  3.470-471, 
3.440;  on  troop  level  requirements, 
2.282,  2.357,  4.108,  4.154,  4.238, 
4.326-327,  4.360,  4.427-431,  4.548- 
549,  4.560,  4.575,  4.580,  4.584,  4.586. 
Sec  also  COMUS;  COMUSMACV 

Westy:  see  Westmoreland,  Gen.  Wil- 
liam C. 

Weyand,  Gen.  Frederick:  2.603 
Wheeler,  Gen.  Earle  G.  (Chairman, 
JCS):  3.64,  3.320,  3.630,  3.640,  4.129, 
4.211,  4.254,  4.267,  4.363,  4.497,  4.498; 
advice  to  LBJ,  4.592;  bombing  policy 
of,  3.193,  4.49,  4.66,  4.75,  4.151, 
4.152-153,  4.159-160,  4.215;  on  es- 
calation, 4.26;  at  Honolulu  Confer- 
ence, 3.358;  on  JCSM  97-67,  4.414; 
memo  to  McNamara,  3.639;  optimism 
of  4.290;  on  strategic  reserves,  4.487; 
support  of  JCS  policies,  3.238,  4.177- 
178;  Vietnam  visit  of,  3.64,  4.546;  on 
Westmoreland's    troop  requirements, 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

4.238;  on  worldwide  military  situa- 
tion, 4.442 

White,  Theodore:  2.12,  2.70 

Wicker,  Tom:  2.558 

Wiesner,  Dr.  Jerome:  4.115 

Williams,  Lt.  Edward:  1.577 

Williams,  Lt.  Gen.  Samuel  T.:  1.577 

Wilson,  Charles  E.  (Sec.  of  Defense): 
1.89,  1.215,  1.454 

Wilson,  Harold  (British  Prime  Minis- 
ter): on  negotiations,  4.143;  and  POL 
strikes,  4.102-103;  on  reconvening  Ge- 
neva Conference,  4.94 

Wilson,  Col.  Jasper  J.:  2.481,  2.522, 
3.37 

Wilson,  Col.  Sam:  2.399;  appointment 
of,  2.563;  on  VC  in  the  Deha,  4.444 

Wittmayer,   Lt.   Col.   Raymond:  1.577 

Wood,  Chalmers  B.:  on  Buddhist  crisis, 
2.728-729;  and  Task  Force  on  Viet- 
nam, 2.643 

Wright,  Col.  Amos:  1.508-509 

Y,  Col.  Nguyen  Van.  See  Yankee,  Col. 

Nguyen  Van 
Yankee,  Col.  Nguyen  Van:  2.28,  2.679, 

2.707 

Yarmolinsky,  Adam:  4.115 

Young,  Kenneth:  1.215,  2.20,  2.125,  3.28 

Zacharias,  Jerrold:  4.225 

Zorthian,  Barry:  2.324,  2.327,  2.328, 
2.520,  2.528,  2.555;  at  Warrenton  Con- 
ference, 2.539;  duties  of,  2.606 

Zwick,  Charles  J.:  3.87;  at  Warrenton 
Conference,  2.539 


Subject  Index 


The  Index  has  two  parts:  names  which  appear  in  volumes 
I-IV  are  indexed  on  pp.  3-20,  and  subjects  discussed  in  the 
four  volumes  are  indexed  on  pp.  21-66.  Cross  references  are 
made  between  the  two  parts  as  well  as  within  each  part.  The 
volume  numbers  are  indicated  by  arable  numerals  1,  2,  3,  and 
4  followed  by  a  period;  page  references  follow  the  period: 
e.g.,  1.88-90. 


"Able  Mable":  2.178 
Accelerated  Plan:  2.190-191 
Accord  of  March  6,  1946:  1.3,  1.26 
Advisors,  U.S.:  2.317;  Air  Force,  2.513; 
battalion,  2.454;  bilingual,  2.467;  from 
CAS,  2.484,  2.614;  differences  among, 
3.24;  dispersement  of,  2.412;  district, 
2.472,  2.479;  expansion  of,  2.309, 
2.319-320;  2.325-326,  2.454,  2.467, 
2.471,  2.510-514;  extra-bureaucratic, 
2.440-441;  field,  2.454,  2.499;  frustra- 
tions of,  2.367;  increase  in,  3.81,  3.90; 
Lansdale  on,  2.441;  Marine,  2.476; 
naval,  2.513;  preparation  of,  2.512; 
Public  Safety,  2.614;  RF/PF,  2.414; 
role  of  (1964),  2.307-308;  scientific, 
4.111,  4.114,  4.115;  sector,  2.479; 
senior,  2.477-478;  Senior  Provincial, 
2.490;  tour  of  duty,  2.452;  types  of, 
2.454,  2.471;  from  USIS,  2.484;  from 
USOM,  2.484 
Advisory  effort,  U.S.:  assessment  of, 
2.466,  2.715;  chronology  of,  2.415- 
430;  concept  of,  2.464-465,  2.664; 
evaluation  of,  2.499;  expectations  of, 
2.452-453,  2.456;  increase  in,  2.464, 
2.469-479,  2.512;  LBJ  announces, 
2.475;  leverage  and,  2.499;  Sec.  Mc- 
Namara  on,  2.756;  organization  for, 
2.465;  and  pacification,  2.483;  pur- 
poses of,  2.475;  team  concept  of,  2.468, 
2.490;  transition  from,  2.461.  See  also 
Advisory  teams,  U.S. 


Advisory  teams,  U.S.:  2.490,  2.513, 
2.547,  2.573;  battalion  level  military, 
2.451 

Advisory  warfare:  2.474 

Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID):  2.7,  2.152,  2.190,  2.198,  2.279, 
3.27;  advisors,  2.724;  commodities  as 
leverage,  2.374,  2.379,  2.383;  and 
counterinsurgency,  2.668,  2.682-683; 
Country  Assistance  Program  (CAP) 
of,  2.566;  direct  support  commodities 
of,  2.286;  funding  of,  2.275,  2.326, 
2.397;  funds  from,  2.363,  2.364,  2.367; 
inflation  and,  4.341-342;  Komer's  in- 
fluence on,  2.568;  loans  to  Diem  re- 
gime, 2.250;  misuse  of  funds,  2.366, 
2.391;  and  mobilization,  3.59;  OCO 
and,  2.612;  and  pacification  program, 
2.528,  2.590;  in  Panama,  2.669;  Police 
Field  Force  of,  2.586;  Amb.  Porter 
and,  2.564,  2.565;  Public  Health  Chief 
in  Saigon  in,  2.551;  Public  Safety  Di- 
vision of,  2.720;  reorganization  of 
(1966),  2.606;  and  roles  and  missions 
study,  2.585;  and  U.S.  control  of  com- 
modities, 2.306.  See  also  International 
Cooperation  Administration  (ICA) 

"Aggression  from  the  North"  (State 
White  Paper):  2.311 

Agrarian  reform.  See  Land  reform 

"Agreement  on  the  Cessation  of  Hos- 
tilities in  Vietnam":  1.289.  See  also 
Geneva  Accords 


Subject  Index/22 

Agricultural  Credit:  2.676 

Agriculture:     2.554;    pilot-projects  in, 

2.640.  See  also  Countryside 
Agro-hamlet:  2.134 

Agrovilles:  2.24,  2.133;  failure  of,  1.256, 
2.133-134;  peasant  resistance  to, 
1.313;  VC  disruption  of,  1.338 

AID.  See  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment 

Aid,  economic:  to  Associated  States, 
1.370,  1.378;  increase  in,  2.318;  as 
leverage,  2.285-287,  2.304,  2.316; 
2.742,  2.747;  for  provinces,  2.325;  re- 
sumption of,  2.271,  2.273,  2.275;  sus- 
pension of,  2.205-206,  2.236,  2.238, 
2.242,  2.244,  2.253 

Aid,  medical:  2.551 

Aid,  military:  2.717;  as  leverage,  2.54, 
2.742.  See  also  Advisory  effort;  War 
effort 

"Aims  and  Options  in  Southeast  Asia": 
3.580-583 

Airborne  Division,  82nd:  4.540-544, 
4.584 

Airborne  Division,  101st:  4.435,  4.528; 
deployment  of,  4.529,  4.531-532;  trans- 
fer of,  4.569 

Airborne  operations:  3.607 

Aircraft:  2.179,  2.195;  artillery-spotter, 
2.181;  French,  1.403;  jet,  2.546;  MIG, 
3.335,  3.536,  3.547;  in  SVN  (1962), 
2.657;  transport,  2.114;  T-28s,  2.195 

Aircraft  losses:  credibility  gap  and, 
4.455;  under  Program  4,  4.383 

Aircraft  mechanics:  lack  of,  1.444 

Air  Force,  French:  1.402-403;  cost  of, 
1.408;  in  Indochina,  1.494;  organiza- 
tion of,  1.494;  in  Tonkin,  1.399 

Air  Force,  Royal  Laotian:  3.253 

Air  Force,  U.S.:  3.638;  and  bombing 
plan,  4.186  (see  also  Air  operations; 
Air  strikes;  Air  war;  Bombing);  and 
reserve  call-up,  4.545;  study  on  role  of 
air  and  ground  forces,  3.549-550;  in 
support  of  French  Union  Forces,  1.514 

Air  Force,  Vietnamese  (VNAF):  air- 
craft, exchange  of,  3,  4;  evolution  of, 
2.180;  pilot  training  program  in,  3.69- 
70;  politics  and,  2.688;  reorganiza- 
tion of,  2.176;  Saigon  bombing  threat 
of,  2.338;  size  of,  2.656;  threatened 
attack  on  ARVN,  2.375;  training  of, 
2.333;  U.S.  aid  to,  3.54 

Air  Force  Advisory  Group:  2.513 

Air  France:  1.444 

Airlift:  Soviet,  2.77-78;  U.S.,  2.107, 
2.114,  2.179,  2.289,  2.656 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Air  National  Guard:  4.545;  reserve  units 
of,  4.544 

Air  operations:  clandestine,  2.648.  See 
also  Air  strikes;  Air  war 

Air  strikes:  2.328,  3.167,  3.179,  3.208, 
3.245,  3.288,  3.299-300,  3.342,  3.706; 
McG.  Bundy  on,  3.351;  direct  support 
of,  2.722;  estimated  Communist  reac- 
tion to,  3.206;  expansion  of  targets, 
2.285;  graduated,  3.265;  and  Hanoi's 
will,  3.269,  4.56,  4.475;  increase  in 
3.338;  initiation  of,  3.5;  interagency 
study  on,  3.154-155;  JCS  on,  4.357; 
justification  of,  3.272,  4.51;  and  Laotian 
crisis,  3.165;  on  Laotian  infiltration 
routes,  3.297,  3.558;  McCone  on, 
3.364;  objectives  of,  3.269,  3.349, 
3.697;  probable  Communist  response 
to,  3.215,  3.692-693;  probable  effec- 
tiveness of,  2.722,  3.295,  4.133-136; 
Raborn  on,  3.365;  risks  of,  3.350, 
3.698;  Amb.  Taylor  on,  3.335-336, 
3.364;  12-week  program,  3.343-344. 
See  also  Air  operations;  Air  war; 
Bombing 

Air  war:  alternative  programs  for,  4.189- 
190;  chronology  of,  4.1-16;  escala- 
tion of,  4.21-32;  JCS  strategy  for, 
4.179;  losses  in,  4.475;  midsummer 
1965,  4.18-21;  predicted  international 
response  to,  4.500;  strategic  weakness 
of,  4.119-120.  See  also  Air  opera- 
tions; Air  strikes;  Bombing;  ROLLING 
THUNDER 
Alliance  for  Progress:  2.815,  2.830 
Allies,  U.S.:  1.424,  3.174,  3.249,  3.290, 
3.478,  3.485,  3.658,  3.681;  anti-Soviet, 
1.419-420,  1.424-425;  consultations 
with,  3.257-258;  ground  combat 
forces  of,  3.257-258,  3.459,  3.460, 
4.470;  and  JCS,  3.258;  need  for,  3.249- 
250;  notification  of  air  strikes,  3.116- 
117;  operational  performance  of, 
4.376;  support  of,  3.182 
All-Union  Communist  Party:  1.428 
All-Vietnam    elections.    See  Elections, 

all-Vietnam;  Unification 
"Alternative  to  Air  Attacks  on  North 
Vietnam  for  the  Use  of  U.S.  Ground 
Forces  in  Support  of  Diplomacy  in 
Vietnam":  3.427 
"Alternative  Courses  of  Action  in  South- 
east Asia":  4.494-497 
"Amalgamation":  concept  of,  1.594 
Ambassadorship:    PROVN    views  on, 
2.577 

Americanization:  of  war,  2.478,  4.564 


Gravel  Edition /Vol.  5 


Subject  Index /lit 


Amnesty  program:  2.721.  See  also  Chieu 

Hoi  Program 
"Anh  Dung"  operation:  3.539-540 
An  Hoa  Army  post:  Viet  Cong  attack  on, 

2.679 
Annam:  1.18,  1.291 

Anti-Americanism:  in  South  Vietnam, 
2.282,  2.289,  2.312,  2.360,  2.372, 
2.377-378 

Anti-Communist     Denunciation  Cam- 
paign:   1.311,    1.324-325.    See  also 
Diem    government;  anti-Communist 
campaign  of 
Anti-corruption    campaign:     in  SVN, 
4.578;    PRACTICE   NINE  Require- 
ments Plan  for,  4.412 
Anti-infiltration:  JCS  on,  4.413-414 
Anti-infiltration  barrier.  See  Barrier,  anti- 
infiltration 
Anti-vehicle  system:  4.121-122 
Anti-vi'ar  demonstration,  Oct.  27,  1967; 
4.217 

Anti-war  pressures:  4.98 

An  Xuyen  Province:  3.26-27 

ANZUS:  1.106;  and  intervention,  1.522; 

Treaty,  4.683.  See  also  Allies,  U.S. 
Ap  Bac,  battle  of:  2.456,  2.718 
Ap  Chien  Luoc.  See  Strategic  Hamlet 

Program 

Ap  Dot  Moi  (Real  New  Life  Hamlets): 
2.621-622 

Arab-Israeli  War  of  1967:  4.187 

Arc  Light:  3.383-385 

Armed  Forces  Council:  2.346,  2.349, 
2.353,  3.92.  See  also  Young  Turks 

Armed  reconnaissance  operations:  3.199, 
3.251;  extension  of,  4.79;  in  Laos, 
3.254,  3.682;  scope  of,  4.29;  "strangu- 
lation program"  of,  4.109.  See  also 
Reconnaissance  flights 

Armored  cavalry:  numbers  of,  2.513 

Armored  cavalry  regiment:  4.570 

Arms  factories:  2.698 

Army  Immediate  Ready  Reserve:  4.545. 
See  also  Reserves;  Reserve  call-up 

Army  of  the  Republic  of  (South)  Viet- 
nam (ARVN):  2.3,  2.224,  2.475,  3.1, 
3.28,  3.30,  4.547;  casualties  of,  2.774- 
777;  and  counterinsurgency,  2.9,  2.46, 
4.396;  creation  of,  2.433;  defeats  of, 
2.412,  2.472-473,  3.6,  3.438;  desertion 
rates  of,  2.311,  3.52,  3.501;  and  Diem 
gov't,  1.257;  dissident  units  in,  2.375; 
effectiveness  of,  3.434,  4.376-377, 
4.399,  4.516,  4.553;  expansion  of, 
2.474-475;  family  allowance  rates  for, 
2.679;  51st  regiment  of,  2.473,  2.523; 


funds  for,  2.310;  guerrilla  training  of, 
1.269;  inadequacy  of,  2.473,  2.688, 
3.60,  4.298,  4.398-399,  4.562,  4.578; 
increase  in,  2.6-8,  2.10-11,  2.64,  2.313, 
2.325,  2.642,  3.505,  3.509;  leadership 
of,  2.475;  Amb.  Lodge  and,  2.605; 
Sec.  McNamara  on,  2.313;  mobility 
of,  2.86,  2.89,  2.146;  morale  of,  4.552; 
and  pacification,  2.140,  2.487,  2.587, 
2.597,  3.55,  4.329,  4.351,  4.369,  4.397- 
398,  4.459;  peasants  and,  1.306,  2.662; 
performance  of,  2.85,  2.406,  2.500, 
3.391-393;  political  power  of,  2.205; 
problems  in,  2.186,  2.301-302,  3.439; 
and  RD,  2.495-498,  2.614,  4.409;  re- 
education of,  2.394;  reform  in,  2.596; 
regular  forces  of,  2.495;  Senior  Ad- 
visor to,  2.478;  and  Strategic  hamlet 
program,  2.150,  2.455,  4.376;  strength 
of,  2.182,  2.656,  3.97;  training  program 
for,  2.38;  UH-1  support  of,  4.467; 
U.S.  expectations  of,  2.456;  U.S.  forces 
and,  2.354-360,  2.604 
The  Arrogance  of  Power:  4.402 
ARVN.  See  Army  of  the  Republic  of 

(South)  Vietnam  (ARVN) 
ASA.  See  U.S.,  Army  Security  Agency 
of 

ASD/ISA.  See  Department  of  Defense; 
ISA 

Assassination:  VC  use  of,  2.697,  2.820. 
See  also  Terrorism 

Associated  States  of  Indochina:  1.179, 
1.553-554;  Communist  threat  to, 
1.587;  Franco-American  aid  to,  1.608- 
609;  French  policy  toward,  1.558;  in- 
dependence of,  1.437;  National  Armies 
in,  1.397;  National  Guard  of,  1.400; 
political  stability  in,  1.398;  recognition 
of,  1.377;  strength  of  armies  in,  1.400; 
U.S.  economic  mission  to,  1.370-372; 
U.S.  support  of,  1.382-383,  1.387-388; 
U.S.  training  of  forces,  1.513-515. 
See  also  Cambodia,  Indochina,  Laos, 
Vietnam 

Astrology:  as  psywar  technique,  1.582 

Asylum:  during  Diem  coup,  2.793 

The  Atlantic  Charter:  1.1,  1.14 

"The  Atlantic  Charter  and  National  In- 
dependence": 1.14 

Atomic  weapons.  See  Nuclear  weapons 

"A  to  Z  Policy  Review":  for  LBJ,  4.238- 
258,  4.583,  4.604;  military  options  in, 
4.550.  See  also  Clifford  Group 

Attrition:  war  of,  2.725.  See  also  War  of 
attrition 

August  Plot:  2.740 


Subject  Index/24 

Austerity  program:  4.579 

Australia:   3.257;  and  bombing  policy, 

4.251;  troops  in  SVN,  4.309,  4.470, 

4.524 

Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States. 

See  ANZUS 
Australian  Task  Force:  4.325 
Auto-Defense  Choc  units:  of  FAL,  2.646 

B-26:  in  Franco-Viet  Minh  War,  1.443- 
445 

B-52:  4.213,  4.535;  strikes,  2.493,  4.421 
Ba  Gia:  battle  of,  2.361,  2.438 
Balance  of  payments:  2.390,  2.512 
Balance  of  power:  3.741 
Baltimore  Sun:  2.557 

Bao  Dai  government:  key  persons  in, 
1.209;  position  at  Geneva  Conf.,  1.134; 
public  respect  for,  1.368-369;  U.S. 
policy  and,  1.53,  1.230.  See  also  Bao 
Dai;  Bao  Dai  solution 

Bao  Dai  solution:  1.3,  1.25,  1.53;  State 
Dept.  on,  1.62-63;  U.S.  policy  and, 
1.33.  See  also  Bao  Dai;  Bao  Dai  gov- 
ernment 

BARREL  ROLL:  2.349,  3.92,  3.116, 
3.254-255,  3.291,  3.297,  3.316,  3.319, 
3.338,  3.697;  justification  for,  3.95.  See 
also  Bombing;  STEEL  TIGER 

Barrier,  anti-infiltration:  4.120-121, 
4.139,  4.335,  4.356;  CINCPAC  on, 
4.336;  concept  of,  4.112-113,  4.114; 
estimated  cost  of,  4.122;  JCS  on, 
4.133;  McNamara  on,  4.126,  4.349; 
NVN  countermeasures  to,  4.122-123. 
See  also  Infiltration 

Bases,  U.S.:  in  SVN,  3.211;  in  Thailand, 
3.575 

Bassac  River:  controls  on,  3.551-552 
Battalion  Landing  Team  (BLT):  3.390- 
391 

Battalions:  construction,  4.473;  maneu- 
ver, 4.382,  4.521 

Ba  Xuyen  Province:  3.26 

Bay  of  Pigs:  2.2,  2.7,  2.33 

Ben  Cat  District:  2.149 

Ben  Cat  Project.  See  Sunrise,  Opera- 
tion 

Ben  Thuy  Port:  3.298 

Ben  Tuong  Hamlet:  2.149 

Berlin:  Soviet  threats  against,  2.2;  and 

Vietnam  policy,   2.78,   2.108,  2.112, 

2.119,  2.161,  2.174 
Berlin  Agreement,  1954:  1.507 
Berlin  Conference,   1954:    1.95,  1.111; 

and  Indochina  question,  1.96-97 
Bien  Hoa  Airbase:  2.658;  U.S.  retalia- 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

tion,  3.209,  3.291,  3.593,  3.599;  VC 

attack  on,  2.341,  3.587 
Bien  Hoa  Province:  2.406-407 
Binh  Dinh  Province:  2.355,  2.685-686, 

3.501;  and  Operation  Let's  Go,  2.702; 

success  in,  4.435 
Binh  Duong  Province:  2.143-144,  2.148- 

150,  2.701,  3.501 
Binh  paramilitary  team:  1.582-583 
Binh  Xuyen,  the:  1.183,  1.220;  alliance 

with  Viet  Minh,  1.293;  attacks  on  Diem 

gov't,  1.230-231,  1.233-234;  defeat  of, 

1.303;   gangster  activities  of,  1.293; 

guerrilla  activity  of,   1.305;  territory 

controlled  by,  1.294.  See  also  Vien, 

Le  Van  (Bay) 
Birth  rate,  Vietnamese,  4.587 
Black  Market:  2.369 

Bloc  for  Liberty  and  Progress.  See  Cara- 

velle  Group 
"Blueprint  for  National  Action":  2.578 
"Blueprint  for  Vietnam":   2.287,  2.403 
Board  of  National  Estimates,  CIA:  3.178, 

3.364;  on  VC,  4.75-76 
Body  count:  2.755.  See  also  Casualties 
Bombing:  and  allies,  4.251;  alternative 
strategies,  4.163-165;  and  British, 
4.257;  Chinese  reaction  to,  3.175, 
4.163;  and  Clifford  Group,  4.250-252; 
criticism  of,  4.30,  4.134-135,  4.217; 
debate  over,  3.108,  3.109-110,  3.237, 
3.270,  4.68-71;  and  DRV  morale, 
4.117-118,  4.140,  4.147,  4.168,  4.180, 
4.201-202,  4.224,  4.232,  4.348;  and 
DRV  ability  to  fight,  4.125,  4.169, 
4.201;  and  DRV  willingness  to  negoti- 
ate, 4.58,  4.260;  economic  effects  of, 
4.225-232;  effect  on  DRV  manpower 
of,  4.227-228;  equation  with  VC  ac- 
tivities, 3.375;  evaluation  of,  4.592; 
expansion  of,  4.43;  and  ground  war, 
4.474-477;  and  GVN  reform,  2.479; 
and  Harris  poll,  4.39;  ineffectiveness 
of,  4.68-70,  4.138,  4.223,  4.235,  4.265; 
infiltration-related  targets,  3.199;  of 
infiltration  routes,  3.386,  4.68;  in- 
tensification of,  3.383,  4.49-50,  4.60; 
and  JCS,  3.172-173,  4.254,  4.255- 
256;  of  Laos,  2.344,  3.514-515,  4.595; 
LBJ's  reservations  on,  3.113;  as  low 
risk  policy,  4.29;  military  relevance 
of,  3.386;  as  morale  booster,  4.161; 
of  NVN,  2.278-279,  2.285,  2.325, 
2.329,  2.331,  2.339,  2.353,  3.5-6,  3.45, 
3.93,  3.286,  3.324,  3.336,  3.498,  3.503, 
3.546,  3.547,  3.551-552,  4.623;  oppo- 
sition to,   3.193-194;  in  Panhandle, 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

3.523,  3.524,  3.527,  3.539,  3.577, 
4.258;  partial  suspension  of,  4.597; 
physical  consequences  of,  4.113;  pilot 
cost  of,  4.172;  as  policy  tool,  4.222; 
and  POL  supplies,  4.58-106  {see  also 
POL  supplies);  projected,  2.92,  2.96- 
97,  2.104,  2.106-109,  2.324;  projected 
Sino-Soviet  response  to,  4.184-185; 
proposals  for  suspension,  3.357;  psy- 
chological impact  of,  3.241;  psycho- 
logical objective  of,  4.119;  public  re- 
action to,  4.559;  purposes  of,  3.234- 
235,  3.385,  4.57,  4.140,  4.171,  4.194, 
4.230,  4.260;  rationale  for,  3.385;  re- 
strictions on,  4.255-256,  4.270;  re- 
sumption of,  3.275,  3.378,  4.35,  4.36- 
53,  4.68,  4.143,  4.220-221;  Soviet 
Union  and,  4.163;  Stennis  subcommit- 
tee and,  4.198-199;  suspension  of, 
2.368,  3.357,  4.241,  4.583;  SVN  reac- 
tion to,  3'.83,  4.134,  4.167,  4.224, 
4.353;  target  study  for,  3.555,  4.135, 
4.150;  tonnage,  4.216;  U.S.  policy  po- 
sition on,  3.115-116,  3.177-178;  vul- 
nerability of  DRV  and,  2.14,  4.350; 
weather,  4.257.  See  also  Air  opera- 
tions; Air  strikes;  Air  war;  Reprisal 
actions;  ROLLING  THUNDER,  Op- 
eration; Targets 

Bombing  halt:  4.221-222;  DRV  response 
to,  4.266;  Goldberg  reply,  4.389;  ISA 
and,  4.265-266;  north  of  20°  parallel, 
4.269;  risk  of,  4.219-220;  SEACABIN 
and,  4.222;  terms  for,  3.247,  3.673; 
U.S.  position  on,  4.234;  value  of,  4.221 

Bombing  pause,  3.269,  4.67;  aftermath 
of,  3.379-381;  announcement  of, 
3.367-368,  3.369,  3.374;  arguments 
about,  4.32-34,  4.35-36;  attempts  at, 
3.363;  and  Buddha's  birthday,  3.367; 
first,  3.274,  3.362,  3.366;  Hanoi  re- 
sponse to,  3.371,  3.372,  3.379,  4.39; 
"hard-line,"  4.37;  and  Harris  poll,  4.39; 
and  Kohler's  diplomatic  efforts,  3.371; 
LBJ  and,  3.363;  objectives  of,  4.37;  and 
POL  supplies,  4.66-68;  pressures  for, 
3.362-366,  4.303;  secrecy  about,  3.368; 
"soft-line,"  4.37;  termination  of,  3.375, 
3.378,  4.58 

Bombing  program:  Bundy's  recommen- 
dations for,  3.351;  Chinese  reaction  to, 
4.80;  criticisms  of,  4.44-46,  4.203;  de- 
bate over,  3.271,  3.381;  de-escalation 
of,  4.174;  effects  of,  3.387;  failure  of, 
4.111,  4.112;  ineffectiveness  of,  4.261; 
ICS  review  of,  4.254;  McNamara  re- 
view of,  3.385,  4.200-201;  McNaugh- 


Subject  Index/25 

ton  review  of,  3.349-351,  4.42-46, 
4.487;  negotiations  and,  4.352;  options, 
3.393;  political  penalities  of,  4.80;  pre- 
dictions for,  3.388,  4.113;  purposes  of, 
4.42,  4.342;  success  of,  4.229-230.  See 
also  Targets 
Bonze:  death  of,  2.727.  See  also  Buddhist 
crisis 

Border  control:  improvement  of,  3.45. 
See  also  Barrier;  Infiltration 

Border  Control  actions:  2.459;  Cambo- 
dia, 2.195,  2.459;  Laos,  2.195,  2.409 

Border  incidents:  2.368 

Border  Patrol:  concept  of,  3.508-509; 
U.S.  assistance  and,  2.50 

Border  Ranger  Force:  2.89 

Borders:  defense  of,  4.538,  4.563;  of 
SVN,  2.76 

Brain  trust.  See  Advisors,  U.S. 

Brink  Officers  Quarters:  bombing  of, 
2.350,  3.262-263 

Britain.  See  Great  Britain 

British  Advisory  Mission:  2.129,  2.676- 
700;  plan  of,  2.139,  2.141,  2.702.  See 
also  Thompson  proposal 

Broadcasts:  gray,  2.641 

Brussels  Pact:  1.35 

Bucklew  Report:  2.198 

Buddhist  crisis:  2.183-184,  2.200,  2.202, 
2.225-232,  2.237,  2.246,  2.252,  2.729- 
730,  3.20;  Diem  response  to,  2.201, 
2.158;  effects  of,  3.23;  Amb.  Lodge 
and,  2.735;  in  1963,  2.18,  2.457;  in 
1964,  2.278;  NLF  position  during, 
2.201,  2.274;  State  Dept.  handling  of, 
2.734;  VC  reaction  to,  2.183;  World 
Federation  Inquiry  Mission  and,  2.745. 
See  also  Pagoda  raids 

Buddhists:  Anti-Americanism  of,  2.289; 
anti-Ky  demonstrations  of,  4.78,  4.82; 
arrests  of,  2.203,  2.184,  2.734;  at- 
tacks on  GVN  of,  2.279;  attempted 
settlement  with,  2.229,  2.230;  and 
Catholic  church,  2.730;  civil  disorders 
of,  3.60;  demands  of,  2.334,  2.337, 
2.727;  demonstrations  of,  2.334-335, 
2.352,  3.261-262;  Diem  policy  toward, 

2.201,  2.744;  dissent  among,  2.371, 
embassy  asylum  for,  2.791;  hunger 
strike  of,  2.345;  and  Huong  Govern- 
ment, 3.261;  and  Khanh  government, 
3.85-87;  oppression  of,  2.186,  2.201, 
2.252,  2.253,  2.255;  political  power 
of,   2.204,   2.285,  4.86;  protests  of, 

2.202,  2.225,  2.370,  2.731;  reactions 
to  Thi's  dismissal,  2.370;  reprisals 
against,  2.734;  rioting  of,  2.546;  sui- 


Subject  Index/ 26 

Buddhists:  {cont'd) 

cides  of,  2.227,  2.228,  2.229,  2.252, 
2.376.  See  also  Buddhist  crisis 

Buddhist  Struggle  Movement:  2.555. 
See  also  Struggle  Movement 

Buddy  system:  2.604 

Budget.  See  Piaster;  War  effort,  financ- 
ing of 

Bui  Chu,  town  of:  1.136 

Bundy  Working  Group:   3.110,  3.112, 

3.113,   3.598-601;  NSC  and,  3.115; 

proposals    of,    3.114-115.    See  also 

Bundy,  William  P. 
Bureaucracy:     Diem    and,  2.707-708; 

problems  of,  2.618 
Burma:  and  domino  theory,  1.361,  1.373; 

military  aid  to,  1.365;  rice  exports  of, 

1.385;  U.S.  economic  aid  to,  1.440. 

See  also  Southeast  Asia 
Burmese  Army:  2.646 

C-2A  observation  aircraft:  4.539 

C-47  transports:  2.13 

C-119  aircraft:  1.446 

C- 140  jet  aircraft:  4.530 

Cach  Mang  Quoc  Gia:  1.337 

Caltrop  (anti-infiltration  device):  4.336 

Ca  Mao:  ARVN  success  in,  2.150 

Ca  Mau  peninsula,  1.306,  2.607 

Cambodia:  3.296;  Communist  threat  to, 
4.582;  and  Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.485; 
Geneva  Conference  (1954)  and, 
1.535;  independence  of,  1.593;  mili- 
tary operations  in,  4.535;  mountain 
trail  system  of,  2.78;  neutralism  of, 
2.225;  as  NVA  supply  base,  4.443, 
4.479;  relations  with  GVN,  2.305;  as 
sanctuary,  2.142,  2.195,  2.345,  2.368, 
3.503,  4.412,  4.492,  4.519,  4.527;  U.S. 
operations  in,  4.214 

Camp  Chinen:  2.649 

Cam  Pha,  port  of:  4.205 

Camp  Holloway:  VC  attack  on,  3.302 

Cam  Ranh  Bay:  3.65,  3.164,  4.131 

Canada:  3.257;  peace  proposal  of,  4.195 

Can  Lao  Vi  Cach  Mang  Dang  (or  Can 
Lao)  (Personalist  Labor  Revolution- 
ary Party):  1.253,  1.302,  2.705,  2.745; 
disbandment  of,  2.634 

Can  Tho:  as  site  of  Viet  Minh-Hoa  Hao 
clashes,  1.294-295 

Cao  Dai:  1.45,  1.220,  1.293-294,  1.578, 
2.275,  2.699,  2.709;  influence  of, 
3.495;  South  Vietnamese  nationalism 
and,  1.43;  training  of,  2.307,  2.308 

CAP,  See  Combined  Action  Platoon 

CAP  63516:  2.743 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

CAP  63560:  2.769  ' 
CAP  63590:  2.261  i 
CAP  74338:  2.258  ! 
Cape  Palaise:  bombardment  of,  3.554 
Cape  Mui  Ron:  bombardment  of,  3.554  j 
Capital  Military  District  Divisions:  2.513  1 
Capital  Military  Region:  2.482  j 
Caravelle  Group:  1.257,  1.316.  See  also  f 

Caravelle  Manifesto  j 
Caravelle  Manifesto:    1.256-257;  signa-  I 

tories  to,  1.320-321;  text,  1.316-321  \ 
"Carrot    and    stick"    approach,    3.163,  I 

3.274 

CAS:   2.100,   2.574,   3.34,   3.37;  Diem 
coup   and,   2.239,   2.738;  report  of,  j 
2.256;   station  chief,   3.33.  See  also 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  i 

CAS  74228:  2.261 

Case  1  decision:  4.312 

Casualties:     ARVN,    2.11 4-111  \  CO, 
2.114-111;  enemy,  4.408;  SDC,  2.774-  \\ 
111;  statistics  on,  2.773;  U.S.,  2.810, 
2.827,  4.623.  See  also  Killed  in  action 

CAT.  See  Civil  Air  Transport  (CAT) 

Catholic  Church:  2.226 

Catholicism:  2.658 

Catholics:    in   GVN,   2.729,   2.730;  as 

refugees,  2.226 
Catholic  Youth:  2.721 
CDIG.  See  Civilian  Irregular  Defense 

Groups 

Cease-fire:  U.S.  acceptance  of,  1.448; 
U.S.  opposition  to,  1.442,  1.453,  1.475, 
1.500.  See  also  Bombing  pause;  Neu- 
tral Nations  Supervisory  Commission 

Central  Highlands:  2.138 

Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA),  U.S.: 
2.31,  2.282;  on  aid  suspension,  2.253; 
and  bombing,  4.77,  4.139,  4.155, 
4.184-185,  4.354;  and  Buddhist  crisis, 
2.228;  cables  to  Lodge,  2.769;  on 
Cambodia,  4.414;  and  Clifford  Group, 
4.240,  4.242;  "Communist  Alternatives 
in  Vietnam,"  4.551;  and  counterinsur- 
gency,  2.682  (see  also  Counterinsur- 
gency);  on  Diem  coup,  2.237,  2.246, 
2.261,  2.735,  2.736  (see  also  Diem 
coup);  on  escalation,  4.64-66,  4.71- 
74;  evaluation  of  war  (1968),  4.550; 
failure  of  interdiction  and,  4.215; 
funding  for,  2.640;  on  Hanoi's  poli- 
cies, 4.239,  4.510;  ICS  planning  and, 
4.75;  on  MACV,  2.586;  and  OCO, 
2.612,  2.614;  Operation  Brotherhood 
and,  2.648;  pacification  and,  2.567, 
3.442-443;  pessimistic  estimates  of, 
4.111,   4.180-181;   on    POL  strikes, 


Gravel  Edition/Vol  5 

4.103-104;  and  Dep.  Amb.  Porter, 
2.565;  on  ROLLING  THUNDER, 
4.137,  4.354;  ship  of,  2.649;  situation 
analysis  by  (1962),  2.684;  "Special 
CAS  Group,"  reports  of,  2.194  {see 
also  CAS);  staff  of,  2.644;  survey  of 
(1964),  3.32-33,  3.596-597;  after 
Tonkin  crisis:  3.205-206 

Central  Intelligence  Organization 
(SVN):  2.28,  2.89,  2.114 

Central  Rural  Construction  Council 
(CRCC):  2.365 

CG.  See  Civil  Guard  (CG) 

Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (CJCS): 
on  air  strikes,  3.334;  memo  to  Mc- 
Namara,  3.44;  on  ROLLING  THUN- 
DER, 3.333.  See  also  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff;  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Memo- 
randa; Lemnitzer,  Gen.  Lyman  L.; 
Taylor,  Gen.  Maxwell;  Wheeler,  Gen. 
Earle  G. 

Chap  Le  Army  Barracks:  3.298 

Chicago  Tribune:  4.455 

Chicom.  See  People's  Republic  of  China 

Chief,  Military  Assistance  Advisory 
Group  (CHMAAG):  troop  commit- 
ment and,  2.49.  See  also  Military  As- 
sistance Advisory  Group 

Chieu  Hoi  Program:  2.388,  2.403,  2.491, 
2.569,  2.772;  improvement  of,  2.363; 
pacification  and,  2.572;  returnees  un- 
der, 2.773/z.  See  also  National  Recon- 
ciliation 

China:  Communist  takeover  of,  1.53, 
2.828 

Chinat.  See  Republic  of  China 
Chinese  Nationalists.   See  Republic  of 
China 

Chinese  People's  Republic.  See  People's 

Republic  of  China 
Chinh-Hunnicutt  affair:  2.286,  2.393 
CHMAAG:  2.49.  See  also  Chief,  Mili- 
tary Assistance  Advisory  Group 
Christian  Science  Monitor:  2.560 
Chronology:  of  advisory  build-up,  2.415- 
430;  of  air  war  in  DRV,  3.275-284, 
4.1-17;  of  Diem  overthrow,  2.207-223; 
of  France-Vietnam  relations,  1.26-28; 
of  Kennedy  commitments,  2.5-17;  of 
military  pressures  against  DRV,  3.117- 
149;  of  phased  withdrawal,  2.165-173; 
of  ROLLING  THUNDER,  3.284-286; 
of  Strategic  Hamlet  Program,  2.131- 
132;    U.S.-French    withdrawal  from 
Vietnam,    1.204-210;    U.S.  Ground 
Strategy    and    Force  Deployments, 
4.277-290;  U.S.-GVN  relations,  2.290- 


Subject  Index/21 

303;  of  U.S.  ground  troop  involvement, 

3.398-417;  U.S.  programs  in  South 

Vietnam,  3.6-17 
Chuong  Thien  Province:  3.26 
CIA.  See  Central  Intelligence  Agency, 

U.S. 

CIDG.  See  Civilian  Irregular  Defense 
Groups 

CINCPAC.  See  Commander  in  Chief, 
Pacific 

CINCPAC  04:  3.517 

CINCPAC  03710.2:  3.517 

CINCPAC  2504562:  2.238 

CINCPACFLT:  3.185 

CINCRVNAF:  2.357,  2.360 

CINCSTRIKE:  3.451;  and  troop  de- 
ployment, 4.542 

CIP.  See  Commodity  Import  Program; 
Counterinsurgency  Plan 

Cities,  Vietnamese:  fighting  in,  4.568; 
security  in,  4.557,  4.562-563 

Civic  Action  Ministry:  2.237,  2.675 

Civic  Action  Program:  2.281 

Civic  Action  teams:  1.306-308,  2.702 

Civil  Administration  Corps:  2.195, 
2.313,  3.595;  increase  of,  3.53 

Civil  Affairs  mobile  training  team:  2.644 

Civil  aid  program:  Komer  and,  4.391 

Civil  Air  Transport  (CAT):  1.576, 
2.648-649 

Civil  Defense  Corps:  2.316 

Civil  disorders:  in  U.S.,  4.541 

Civil  Guard  (CG):  1.256,  2.6,  2.175, 
2.434,  2.465,  3.30;  casualties  of, 
2.774-777;  and  counterinsurgency, 
2.651;  desertions  from,  2.779-780; 
failure  of,  1.314;  force  levels  of,  2.675, 
3.63;  funds  for,  2.136;  MAP  support 
for,  2.8,  2.39;  missions  of,  2.703;  regu- 
lar army  and,  2.678;  status  of,  2.312; 
training  of,  2.451;  U.S.  support  of,  2.8, 
2.37,  2.656.  See  also  Counterinsurgency 

Civilian  Irregular  Defense  Groups 
(CIDG):  2.178,  2.721,  3.47 

Civilianization:  4.525,  4.529-530 

Civilian  Mission:  2.562 

Civilians,  U.S.:  and  SVN  gov't,  2.398 

Civilians,  Vietnamese:  distrust  of  gov't, 
2.407.  See  also  Government  of  Viet- 
nam 

Civil  Operations  and  Revolutionary  De- 
velopment Support  (CORDS):  2.406- 
407,  2.413,  2.488;  establishment  of, 
2.487,  2.622-623;  organization  of, 
2.489,  2.491-492;  reorganization  of, 
2.520,  2.619-621.  See  also  Revolution- 
ary Development 


Subject  Index/2S 

Civil  service:  and  Diem,  2.707 
Civil  War:  in  SVN,  2.820,  4.615 
CJCS.  See  Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff 

Clandestine  Action  Service:  2.653 

Clear  and  hold:  concept  of,  2.128-129, 
2.140,  2.177,  2.186,  2.197,  2,250, 
2.723:  operations,  2.305,  2.325,  2.722; 
and  pacification,  2.572,  3.54.  See  also 
Pacification 

Clearing:  strategy  of,  2.495-497 

Clifford  Working  Group:  "A  to  Z" 
policy  review  of,  4.238-258;  on  alter- 
natives in  SVN,  4.553;  on  bombing 
policy,  2.250-252,  4.253,  4.259;  "Clif- 
ford Group  Review":  4.238-258 

Coalition  governments:  2.806-807 

Coastal  plain:  2.91 

Coastal  waters:  2.90 

Cochinchina:  1.16,  1.18,  1.291,  2.694; 
anti-French  attitudes  in,  1.292;  Dec- 
laration of  Freedom  of,  1.27;  na- 
tionalist movements  in,  1.292;  Viet 
Minh  dominated  zones  of,  1.191. 
See  also  Cambodia;  Indochina;  Laos; 
Vietnam 

Cochinchina  War.  See  Franco-Viet 
Minh  War 

Collective  security:  1.613 

Collective  self-defense:  concept  of,  4.652 

Collins-Ely  Agreements:  1.224-225 

Collins  Mission:  1.223-224.  See  also 
Collins,  Gen.  J.  Lawton 

Colombo  Conference:  1.103 

Colombo  Powers:  and  Indochina  cease- 
fire, 1.141 

Colonialism:  French,  1.380;  western, 
1.601 

Combat  Development  and  Test  Center: 
2.638 

Combat  force  ratio:  4.622 

Combat  forces,  U.S.:  2.474-483;  in- 
sufficiency of,  4.584;  introduction  into 
Vietnam,  2.65-68,  2.75.  See  also 
Ground  forces,  U.S.;  Troops,  U.S.; 
U.S.  forces 

Combat  Operations:  2.577 

Combat  Police:  2.762 

Combined  Action  Companies:  2.400 

Combined  Action  Platoon  (CAP): 
2.413,  2.476 

Combined  campaign  plan,  1967:  2.395, 
2.494-498,  4.379-381,  4.386 

Combined  command.  See  Joint  com- 
mand 

Combined  MACJ-JGS:  2.477-478 
COMIT:  2.642 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Command:  chain  of,  2.437,  2.492,  2.541, 
2.574;  civilian  lines  of,  2.593-594, 
2.601 

Command  and  General  Staff  College: 
2.510 

Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  (CINC- 
PAC):  2.162-163,  2.176-177,  2.181- 
182,  3.203,  3.252,  3.300,  4.230;  and 
advisory  effort,  2.465-466;  alert  of, 
2.41;  barrier  project  and,  4.123,  4.336; 
bombing  policies  of,  3.262,  3.271, 
3.298,  4.109,  4.124,  4.139,  4.192-193, 
4.195-196,  4.207,  4.410-411;  and  en- 
clave strategy,  3.468;  on  escalation, 
4.196;  Headquarters,  3.23;  at  Hono- 
lulu Conference,  3.358;  on  infiltra- 
tion, 4.417;  joint  command  and,  2.477; 
logistic  support  by,  1.512-513;  MAAG 
and,  2.19;  military  objectives  of, 
4.124,  4.395-396;  on  mining  NVN 
ports,  4.415;  OPLAN  32-64,  3.427; 
OPLAN  37-64,  3.287;  OPLAN  39-65, 
3.427;  Plan  32/59  PHASE  IV,  2.112; 
Planning  Conferences  of,  4.315-318, 
4.358-361;  on  POL,  4.101,  4.105;  Pro- 
gram 4  and,  4.432;  troop  commit- 
ment and,  2.13,  2.49,  2.83-84;  on 
troop  deployments,  3.419-420,  3.422, 
3.429,  4.309-310;  on  troop  levels, 
2.112,  4.319,  4.324.  See  also  Felt, 
Adm.  Harry;  Radford,  Adm.  Arthur 
W. 

Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet: 
3.185 

Commander  in  Chief,  Republic  of  Viet- 
nam Armed  Forces  (CINCRVNAF): 
2.357,  2.360 

"Commander's  Estimate  of  the  Situa- 
tion": 2.357,  3.450 

"Commander's  Personal  Military  Assess- 
ment of  the  Fourth  Quarter,  CY  63": 
3.39-40.  See  also  COMUSMACV; 
MACV 

Commander,  U.S.  Military  As^^istance 
Command,  Vietnam  (COMUSMA- 
CV): 2.164-165,  2.177,  2.181,  2.192, 
2.194,  2.355-357,  2.359,  2.362,  2.393- 
394,  3.27,  3.30,  3.252;  and  advisory 
effort,  2.198,  2.326,  2.463,  2.465-466; 
on  American  takeover,  2.380;  on  anti- 
infiltration  barrier,  4.416;  and  CPSVN, 
2.162;  Deputy,  2.585,  2.591,  2.617, 
2.619;  and  encadrement,  2.476;  force 
requirements  of,  2.468,  3.417,  4.431- 
435,  4.466-467;  at  Honolulu  Confer- 
ence, 3.358;  independence  of,  2.281; 
JCS  and,  4.571;  on  military  situation, 


Gravel  Edition /Vol.  5 

4.517-518,  4.538;  "Monthly  Evalua- 
tions for  March  and  April  1965," 
3.436;  on  NVA/VC  capabilities, 
4.403-406;  pacification  and,  2.351, 
2.574,  2.589;  and  PROVN,  2.380; 
and  RD,  2.602;  on  RVNAF  effec- 
tiveness, 4.425;  on  US-ARVN  coopera- 
tion, 2.288,  2.360.  See  also  Harkins, 
Gen.  Paul  D.;  Westmoreland,  Gen. 
Wm.  C. 

Commando-type  raids:  2.646 

Commercial  Import  Program.  See  Com- 
modity Import  Program 

Committee  of  National  Salvation:  2.347 

Committee  on  Province  Rehabilitation 
(COPROR):  2.787 

Committee  of  the  South :  1.45 

Commodities:  as  leverage,  2.374,  2.379, 
2.383.  See  also  Leverage 

Commodity  Import  Program  (CIP): 
2.316,  2.318,  2.761;  resumption  of, 
2.255,  2.383;  suspension  of,  2.253, 
2.763 

Commune  system:  2.625 
Communications  Intelligence:  2.641 
Communism:  Asian,  4.647-648,  4.682; 
"battle  against,"  2.10;  escalation  of, 
2.112;  ideology  of,  2.821;  interna- 
tional, 1.615,  1.616,  1.622;  JFK  on, 
2.809,  2.829,  2.831;  in  SE  Asia,  1.377, 
1.385,  2.108,  2.111,  2.459,  2.654, 
2.817;  in  SVN,  2.692-699;  targets  for, 
1.489;  threat  of,  1.361,  1.590,  1.628, 
2.33;  and  world  revolution,  4.634, 
4.641 

Communist  China.  See  People's  Repub- 
lic of  China 

Communist  Denunciation  Campaigns: 
1.311,  1.324-325.  See  also  Diem  gov't, 
anti-communist  laws  under 

Communist  Party:  French,  1.22,  4.163; 
North  Vietnamese,  2.35,  2.692,  2.693. 
See  also  Lao  Dong  Party 

Communists:  4.484-486;  aggression  of, 
4.660;  on  air  attacks,  4.172;  and  Bud- 
dhists, 2.731;  expansion  of,  4.646, 
4.678;  policy  of,  4.623;  possible  re- 
taliation of,  3.665;  strategy  of,  3.737; 
in  SVN,  3.658,  4.358-359;  war  policy 
of,  4.50;  weapons  of,  3.716;  world- 
wide offensive  of,  2.797.  See  also 
DRV;  Viet  Nam  Cong-San  (VC) 

Comprehensive  Plan  for  South  Vietnam 
(CPSVN):  2.162-164,  2.197;  cost 
comparison  of,  2.178;  force  level  of, 
2.180;  Model  M  Plan  of,  2.163,  2.182, 
2.185,  2.188,  2.190-191,  2.198,  2.316; 


Subject  Index/29 

objectives  of,  2.176;  review  of,  2.179; 
revision  of,  2.177,  2.181 

Compromise  solution:  4.615-619,  4.622; 
Sec.  Ball  on,  3.472-473,  4.49;  military 
program,  4.616;  political  program, 
4.616-617.  See  also  Negotiations 

"Compromise  Solution  for  South  Viet- 
nam": 3.472-473,  4.49 

COMUSMACV.  See  Commander,  U.S. 
Military  Assistance  Command,  Viet- 
nam 

CON  ARC:  4.542 

"Concept  of  Intervention  in  Vietnam": 

2.74,  2.80,  2.98 
Confederation    of   Vietnamese  Labor: 

1.310 

"Confidence  factor":  4.669 

Congress,  U.S.:  bombing  criticism  of, 
4.217;  briefing  by  Dulles,  1.500-501; 
China  Aid  Program,  1.36;  Economic 
Cooperation  Act,  1.36;  MDAP  of, 
1.36;  and  troop  deployment,  4.588. 
See  also  Senate,  U.S. 

Congressional  resolution:  on  bombing 
NVN,  3.77,  3.174,  3.180,  3.187-188, 
3.520.  See  also  Tonkin  Gulf  Resolu- 
tion 

Constitutional  Assembly:   2.377,  2.384, 

2.395;  election  of,  2.318 
Constitutional  Convention:  2.371 
Constitutional  Preparatory  Commission: 

2.372 

Constitution,  SVN:  draft,  4.150;  writing 

of,  2.370,  2.395,  2.400 
Constitution,  U.S.:  2.824 
Construction:  2.658;  highway  and  bridge, 

2.676;   hit-and-miss,  2.686 
"Containment  of  the  Sanctuaries":  4.341 
Containment  policy:  1.449 
Contingency     planning:     2.75,  2.654, 

3.420-421,  3.422 
Coolidge  Commission:  2.21 
COPROR:  2.787 
Coral  Sea:  3.302 

CORDS.  See  Civil  Operations  and  Revo- 
lutionary Development  Support 

Corps  I:  2.61,  2.186-187,  2.363,  3.20, 
4.584;  force  requirements,  4.428-429; 
force  strengths  in,  4.433;  MACV  op- 
erations in,  4.447-453;  tactical  situa- 
tion in,  4.607-609;  VC/NVA  in,  4.433 

Corps  II:  2.186,  2.187,  2.363,  3.20;  force 
requirements,  2.61,  4.429;  MACV  op- 
erations in,  4.447-453;  tactical  situa- 
tion in,  4.607-609;  VC/NVZ  in,  4.434 

Corps  III:  2.187,  2.265,  3.31;  areas, 
2.186,  3.20;  force  requirements,  4.429; 


Subject  Index/ 30 

Corps  III:  (cont'd) 

tactical  situation  in,  4.609;  tactical 
zone  of,  2.526;  VC  infrastructure  in, 
4.434-435 

Corps  IV:  2.187,  2.264;  force  require- 
ments, 4.430;  as  GVN  responsibility, 
4.444;  9th  Division  in,  4.430;  tactical 
situation  in,  4.609.  See  also  Mekong 
Delta 

Corps  Monthly  Operational  Maps: 
4.451_454 

Corps  Tactical  Zones  (CTZ):  2.177, 
2.487 

Corruption:  in  SVN,  2.366,  2.384,  2.391, 

2.502-503,  2.596,  2.705 
COSVN:  3.383 

Council  of  Notables:  abohshment  of, 
2.316;  advisory  role  of,  2.309;  Pseudo 
Parliament,  2.303 
Counter-escalation:  4.164 
Counterguerrilla  warfare:  2.703 
Counter-infiltration  operations:  3.341 
Counterinsurgency:  3.235;  and  Buddhist 
crisis,  2.731;  course  in,  2.728;  de- 
terioration of,  2.458;  doctrine  of, 
2.148,  2.689;  funding  for,  2.640;  GVN 
effort  in,  2.699-704,  2.713-714;  and 
GVN  stability,  3.2,  3.41;  instruction  in, 
2.669;  Kennedy  administration  and, 
2.32,  2.667;  Gen.  Lemnitzer  on, 
2.650-651;  McGarr's  emphasis  on, 
2.435;  personnel  for,  2.682-683;  re- 
search and  development  for,  2.684; 
schools  for,  2.668-669;  SNIE  on, 
2.729;  standards  for  success,  2.754; 
State's  assessment  of,  2.673-681; 
theory  of,  2.454;  training  objectives 
for,  2.667;  Vietnamese  politics  and, 
3.22 

Counterinsurgency  Plan  (CIP):  2.1, 
2.2,  2.23-27,  2.137-138,  2.141,  2.382, 
2.436-437,  2.669;  disagreement  about, 
1.269;  establishment  of,  2.660;  Ken- 
nedy approval  of,  2.6;  of  MAAG, 
2.138,  2.141;  negotiating  of,  2.27- 
29;  U.S.  support  and,  2.39 

Counter-subversion:  CIA  support  of, 
2.648 

Country  Internal  Defense  Plans:  2.682 
Countryside,  Vietnamese:  Communist 
position  in,  2.697-699;  control  of, 
2.507,  2.571,  2.582,  2.690,  2.787, 
4.548,  4.556,  4.558,  4.561-563,  4.566, 
4.577-578;  Diem's  position  in,  2.708- 
709.  See  also  Pacification;  Rural  De- 
velopment 

Country   Team:    2.192,    2.443,  2:537, 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

2.648,  2.682,  3.31;  weakness  of,  3.494 
Coup,  Diem.  See  Diem  coup 
Course  of  Action   in  Southeast  Asia: 

documents     on,     3.621,  3.630-632, 

3.639-640,  3.642-644,  3.648-650 
Covert  Action  Branch.  See  CAS 
Covert  Action  Program:  3.149-152 
Covert   activities:    1.387,    1.389,  1.438, 

2.653,  3.571-575 
CPR.  See  People's  Republic  of  China 
CPSVN.  See  Comprehensive  Plan  for 

South  Vietnam 
CRCC:  2.365 

Credibility  gap:  2.163,  2.610,  4.388, 
4.455 

Crop  destruction:  3.45 

Cross-border  operations:    2.459,  3.191. 

See  also  Border  control  actions 
Cross-over  point:  Bundy  and,  4.503,  J2 

and,  4.518;  Gen.  Westmoreland  and, 

4.479 
Crypto  RATT:  3.299 
CTZ:  2.177,  2.487 

Cuba:  3.201;  Vietnam  policy  and,  2.161, 
2.174 

Cuban  missile  crisis:  2.1 1,  2.174,  2.823 
CVA  air  wing:  3.298 

Dai  Viet  Qhoc  Dan  Dong  (the  Dai 
Viet):  1.44,  1.314-315,  2.709;  coup 
attempt  by,  2.335 

Dak  To:  4.567 

Dakto-Ban  Net-Attapeu  Road:  2.83 

Dalat  Conference:  1.26 

Da  Nang:  media  commentary  on,  3.426; 
site  of  Marine  landing,  2.354,  2.356, 
2.372-373,  2.477,  2.533,  2.559,  2.657, 
3.389,  3.545,  3.547.  See  also  Marine 
Corps,  U.S. 

Darlac  Province:  Montagnards  in,  2.687. 
See  also  Montagnards 

DASD:  2.383,  2.396 

Decentralization:  authority  of,  2.501 

Decentralization  of  Action:  2.305 

Decisionmaking:  process  of,  2.451, 
2.539,  2.664 

Declaration  of  the  November  1960  Con- 
ference of  Communist  and  Workers' 
Parties  of  Socialist  Countries:  1.265 

Decree  Law  10:  2.240 

De-escalation:  4.597;  and  bombing  effec- 
tiveness, 4.162;  problems  of,  4.176- 
177.  See  also  Escalation 

Defeat:  implications  of,  4.612 

Defections.  See  Desertions 

Defended  hamlet:  2.140 

Defended  village:  2.142 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

Defense  Department.  See  Department 
of  Defense,  U.S. 

Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA): 
2.77,  2.164,  2.183,  2.192,  3.333,  4.291; 
on  failure  of  POL  strikes,  4.111;  In- 
telligence Bulletin,  2.183-184;  on 
POL  system,  4.68;  on  Tonkin  repri- 
sals, 3.192 

Defoliation:  2.671,  4.335 

Delta.  See  Mekong  Delta 

Delta  Pacification  Plan.  See  Mekong 
Delta 

Demarcation  line.  See  Vietnam:  demar- 
cation line  proposals  for 

Demilitarized  Zone  (DMZ):  3.635;  de- 
foliation of,  4.335;  infiltration  through, 
4.335;  operations  in,  2.364;  U.S. 
Marines  in,  4.453 

Democracy  Building  Council:  2.368 

Democratic  Bloc:  1.315 

Democratic  People's  Republic  of  (North) 
Vietnam  (DRV):  1.6,  2.9,  3.65-66;  as 
aggressor,  3.714;  agrarian  economy  of, 
4.232;  all-out  bombing  of,  4.244-245; 
and  all-Vietnam  elections,  1.247;  arms 
levels,  1.249;  army  of,  see  North  Viet- 
namese Army  (NVA);  bombing  of, 
2.325,  2.344,  3.1,  4.18  {see  also  Bomb- 
ing: of  NVN);  and  bombing  halt, 
4.218-219;  and  bombing  pause,  3.379, 
4.33,  4.36;  British  backing  of,  4.611; 
and  China,  4.58,  4.64;  covert  action  in, 
3.500,  3.502,  3.508;  covert  actions  of, 
3.498;  destruction  of  vital  resources 
in,  4.230;  economy  of,  1.264,  2.820, 
3.215,  4.136,  4.225;  effect  of  bombing 
on,  3.215;  establishment  of,  1.16;  food 
supplies  of,  1.264;  foreign  aid  to, 
4.225-227;  and  France,  1.3,  1.182; 
Franco-American  differences  on, 
1.285-286;  GNP  of,  1.264,  4.225; 
government  of,  1.46-47;  infiltration 
into  SVN,  1.264,  2.696,  3.252,  3.681; 
internal  crises  in,  1.246,  1.262;  and 
"I  shall  not  seek"  speech,  4.275;  JFK 
on,  2.806;  and  LBJ,  4.205;  military 
pressure  on,  3.65,  3.252;  morale  of, 
3.214,  3.654,  4.192,  4.261,  4.389;  na- 
tionalism of,  1.262,  4.457,  4.463;  on 
negotiations,  4.155,  4.240-241,  4.480, 
4.602;  and  peace  initiatives,  3.356, 
4.352;  policy  of,  3.653-654;  possible 
invasion  of,  2.462,  4.244-245;  power 
plants  of,  4.201;  reactions  to  air 
strikes,  3.167,  3.169,  3.174-175,  3.193, 
3.308,  4.58;  refugees  in,  1.248;  rela- 
tions with  Soviet  Union,  1.261,  1.262- 


Subject  Index/31 

263,  4.58,  4.78;  and  Rusk,  3.725;  and 
San  Antonio  formula,  4.206,  4.237, 
4.253;  secret  contacts  with  U.S.,  4.150, 
4.237;  Sino-Soviet  aid  to,  2.60,  4.242, 
4.321;  strategy  of,  4.304,  4.576; 
strength  in  SVN,  4.622;  supplies  to 
south  of,  4.57;  support  of  insurgency 
in  SVN,  1.263,  1.265;  targets  in,  3.298, 
3.299-300,  3.305,  3.678,  4.56  (see  also 
Bombing  program;  Target  system); 
and  Tet  offensive,  4.228;  and  U.S. 
elections,  4.477-478;  U.S.  estimates 
of,  3.99,  3.153,  3.212,  3.213,  3.635, 
4.110,  4.604;  U.S.  military  opera- 
tions in,  2.315,  2.319,  2.321,  2.323, 
2.327,  2.329-331,  3.513  (see  also 
Air  strikes;  Air  war:  Bombing);  U.S. 
military  pressure  on,  2.459,  3.89- 
90,  3.106-117,  3.182,  3.194,  3.221, 
3.240,  3.245,  4.533-536,  4.611;  U.S. 
overflights  of,  2.641;  and  U.S.  policy, 
3.330;  and  VC,  2.693,  3.652-653, 
3.656,  3.668,  3.670;  and  war  of  attri- 
tion, 4.509;  war  policy  of,  4.63 

Demographic  frontier:  4.565,  4.583 

Denmark:  3.257 

Den  Muang  Airfield:  2.657 

Department  of  Defense,  U.S.  (DOD): 
cost  of  force  increases  and,  4.510; 
Diem  reforms  and,  2.21;  DOD 
152339Z,  3.436;  dollar  guidelines  of, 
2.177-179;  on  expansion  of  U.S.  com- 
bat role,  3.455-456;  Geneva  Conf. 
and,  1.448-451;  on  ground  forces  in 
Indochina,  1.93;  and  SVN  mobiliza- 
tion, 3.59;  systems  analysis  of,  4.556; 
on  troop  deployments,  4.323;  on  Viet- 
nam partition,  1.142-143 

Department  of  State,  U.S.:  on  aid  to 
Indochina,  1.7,  1.405-410;  on  all-Viet- 
nam elections,  1.287;  on  Bao  Dai, 
1.70-71;  on  bombing  pause,  4.33-34; 
cables  to  Lodge,  2.734-735,  2.737- 
738;  Clifford  Group  papers  of,  4.553 
(see  also  Clifford  Group);  on  com- 
mitment to  Indochina,  1.363;  on 
communism  in  SE  Asia,  1.5;  Country 
Internal  Defense  Plans  of,  2.682;  on 
expansion  of  U.S.  combat  role,  3.455- 
456;  on  Franco- Viet  Minh  negotia- 
tions, 1.20-21;  on  Franco-Viet  Minh 
War,  1.31-32,  1.184;  on  ground  force 
deployment,  3.420;  on  Ho  Chi  Minh, 
1.20-21;  on  Ho  Chi  Minh  Trail,  1.33- 
34;  on  inflation  in  SVN,  4.339;  on 
intervention  in  Indochina,  1.94;  and 
ISA  on  military  situation,  3.157-159; 


Subject  Index/32 

Department  of  State,  U.S.:  (cont'd) 
justification  of  war,  3.729;  meeting  of 
(Aug.  1963),  2.741-743;  memo  of 
conversation  with  president,  2.728- 
729;  Policy  Planning  Council  of, 
3.200;  policy  recommendations  of, 
3.265-266;  post-Tonkin  views  of, 
3.205;  progress  report  from,  2.673; 
recognizes  Associated  States,  1.64-65; 
support  of  "carrot  and  stick,"  3.115; 
on  Trinh  statement,  4.233;  on  Viet- 
namese Communists,  1.34 

Dependents,  U.S.:  withdrawal  of,  3.244, 
3.266,  3.297,  3.315,  3.630,  3.686 

Deployment:  inflation  and,  4.369;  JCS 
opposition  to,  4.542;  public  reaction 
to,  4.559;  strategy  of,  4.421-423;  sum- 
mary for  1967-68,  4.460.  See  also 
Troop  deployment 

DEPTEL:  534,  2.253;  576,  2.786;  619, 
2.16;  727,  3.576;  763,  3.578-579; 
4853,  1.547 

Desertions:  ARVN,  2.473,  2.508,  2.703- 
704;  CG,  2.779-780;  RVNAF,  2.508, 
2.779-780;  SDC,  2.779-780;  SVN 
military,  2.703-704,  2.772-780;  VC, 
2.772-780 

DeSoto  patrols:  2.329,  2.331,  2.333, 
3.182,  3.195,  3.203,  3.209,  3.244, 
3.291,  3.298,  3.300,  3.302,  3.641;  re- 
strictions of,  3.525-527,  3.534,  3.536; 
resumption  of,  3.194,  3.299,  3.319, 
3.543-544,  3.547-548,  3.551-552, 
3.558,  3.561-563,  3.568-569,  3.609. 
See  also  Operation  DESOTO 
De-Stalinization:  1.261 
Developing  countries:  2.685,  2.804, 
2.815;  counterinsurgency  problems  in, 
2.668-669;  U.S.  and,  2.58 
Development  Fund:  GVN,  2.397 
DIA.  See  Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
Diem  coup:  2.94,  2.158,  2.189-190,  3.2; 
abortive  attempts  at,  1.322-324,  2.236- 
240,  2.704,  2.792;  aftermath  of,  2.160- 
161,  2.163,  2.165,  2.190,  2.192,  2.200, 
2.272-273,  2.303,  3.22;  chronology  of, 
2.207-223;  contingencies  of,  2.783, 
2.789;  execution  of,  2.267-269;  fac- 
tions in,  2.262;  foreshadowings  of, 
2.183-184;  Amb.  Lodge  and,  2.782; 
situation  leading  to,  2.691,  2.741-743, 
2.763-764;  U.S.  discouragement  of, 
2.766,  2.792;  U.S.  expectations  of, 
2.457;  U.S.  involvement  in,  2.203-204, 
2.206-207,  2.231,  2.233-238,  2.246- 
247,  2.250,  2.256-262,  2.716,  2.735- 
739,  2.765,  2.781-789,  2.791 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Diem  family:  2.706-707;  Buddhist  crisis 
and,  2.731;  Catholicism  of,  1.321- 
322;  political  power  of,  1.299;  and 
U.S.  government,  2.732;  whispering 
campaign  against,  1.200.  See  also 
Diem,  Ngo  Dinh;  Ngo  family;  Nhu 
family;  Nhu,  Madame;  Nhu,  Ngo 
Dinh 

Diem  government:  1.253,  2.18;  agro- 
ville  program  under,  1.256;  alienation 
of  peasants,  1.252,  1.329,  1.338-339; 
alternatives  to,  2.733,  2.764-766;  anti- 
colonialist  feelings  toward,  1.295-296; 
anti-Communist  campaign  of,  1.257- 
258,  1.311,  1.324-325;  anti-French  po- 
sition of,  1.210-211;  and  Buddhist  cri- 
sis, 2.183  (see  also  Buddhist  crisis); 
bureaucratic  overcentralization  of, 
1.300,  2.136;  cabinet  reorganization  of, 
2.29;  Caravelle  Manifesto  against, 
1.316-321;  CJCS  criticisms  of,  3.20; 
Gen.  Collins'  objections  to,  1.226;  con- 
flict with  armed  sects,  1.303-305; 
counterinsurgency  of,  1.325  (see  also 
Counterinsurgency);  coup  attempts 
against,  1.257,  1.322-324,  2.236-240 
(see  also  Diem  coup);  credibility  of, 
2.160;  dissatisfaction  with,  2.5,  2.733, 
2.758;  domestic  problems  of,  1.298- 
299;  economic  costs  of,  2.62-63;  elite 
discontent  and,  2.759;  Farmers'  Associ- 
ations and,  1.310;  and  France,  1.225, 
1.231-232,  1.240;  Franco-American  re- 
actions to,  1.223,  1.238,  1.303-304; 
key  persons  in,  1.210;  labor  position 
on,  2.759;  land  reform  under,  1.254, 
1.309-310;  martial  law  under,  2.734; 
methods  of  control  of,  2.789-790;  mili- 
tarization of,  1.323;  military  opposition 
to,  1.322-324;  military  reforms  of,  2.24; 
Montagnard  discontent  under,  1.255; 
nationalist  opposition  to,  1.314-322; 
nepotism  in,  1.299  (see  also  Diem 
family;  Nhu  family);  as  oligarchy, 
1.253;  overthrow  of,  2.20,  2.118, 
2.189,  3.1  (see  also  Diem  coup);  paci- 
fication program  of,  1.254,  1.305-314; 
political  opposition  in,  1.256;  political 
parties  under,  1.302;  political  reedu- 
cation centers  under,  1.255;  popula- 
tion relocation  under,  1.255,  1.312- 
313;  repressions  of,  2.201,  2.705, 
2.760;  rural  security  under,  1.254- 
256,  1.314;  threats  to,  2.633-635; 
Tonkinese  refugees  and,  1.248;  United 
Front  demands  on,  1.229-230;  un- 
popularity  of,    1.251,   2.185,  2.187; 


Gravel  Edition /Vol  5 

U.S.  advisors  and,  2.450-452  {see 
also  Advisory  effort);  U.S.  aid  and, 
2.1,  2.36,  2.59,  2.90;  U.S.  commit- 
ments to,  2.96;  U.S.  confidence  in, 
2.69,  2.189,  2.202;  U.S.  estimates  of, 
1.260;  and  U.S.  government,  1.268, 
2.732,  2.765-766,  3.23;  U.S.  leverage 
and,  2.498,  2.761-763;  U.S.  pressures 
on,  2.765-766;  U.S.  support  of,  1.226- 
227,  2.29,  2.64,  2.665;  and  Viet  Cong, 
2.25,  3.729;  and  village  traditions, 
1.310;  weakness  of,  2,224 
Dien  Bien  Phu:  1.97,  1.444,  1.461,  1.476; 
chance  of  success  at,  1.456-457;  eth- 
nic composition  of  garrison,  1.68;  fall 
of,  1.56,  1.106,  1.482-487,  1.542,  1.575, 
1.603;  French  political  situation  and, 
1.480-481;  Operation  Vulture  (Vau- 
tour),  1.97;  U.S.  assistance  to,  1.455; 
U.S.  intervention  and,  1.100-101,  1.104, 
1.461 

District  advisors:  2.472,  2.479.  See  also 

Advisors,  U.S. 
Division:  1st  U.S.,  2.381 
Division:    2nd    Air,    2.178-179;  25th, 

2.381 

Divisional  Tactical  Area  (DTA):  2.487 
Division  commanders:   Diem's  reliance 

on,  2.703 
DMZ.  See  Demilitarized  Zone 
Doan  Ket.  See  National  Reconciliation 
Documents,  captured:  4.387,  4.418-420 
Documents,  list  of:  Nos.  1-95,  1.347- 

360;  Nos.   96-155,  2.624-632;  Nos. 

156-256,    3.486-493;   Nos.  257-265, 

4.605 

DOD.  See  Department  of  Defense,  U.S. 

DOD  152339Z:  3.436 

Domino  theory  (or  principle):  1.82- 
83,  1.598,  1.602-603,  2.162,  2.412, 
2.664,  2.798,  3.3,  3.153,  3.178,  3.194, 
3.265,  3.710,  3.712,  4.89,  4.389,  4.454; 
Britain  and,  1.56;  Burma  and,  1.361, 
1.373;  and  containment  of  China, 
4.650;  criticism  of,  3.220;  dismissal 
of,  3.724;  Eisenhower  on,  1.597;  JCS 
on,  2.663;  Kennedy  on,  2.817-818, 
2.828;  McNaughton  on,  4.90-91;  and 
NSAM-288,  3.51;  Rusk  on,  4.681; 
and  U  Thant,  4.662 

Dong  Hoi:  3.286,  3.298 

Dong  Minh  Hoi  (Vietnam  Revolution- 
ary League) :  1.44 

Dong  Zoai,  battle  of:  2.361,  2.473, 
3.440 

Don  Muang  Airfield.  See  Den  Muang 
Airfield 


Subject  Index/33 

Doves:  4.559-560.  See  also  War  effort: 
domestic  criticism  of 

DPM.  See  Draft  Presidential  Memo 

Draft:  Vietnamese,  2.460;  U.S.,  1.422 

"Draft  Position  Paper  on  Southeast 
Asia":  3.249 

Draft  Presidential  Memo  (DPM):  "Al- 
ternative Military  Actions  Against 
North  Vietnam,"  4.509;  of  McG. 
Bundy,  2.319-320;  of  C.  Clifford, 
4.252-258;  "Future  Actions  in  Viet- 
nam," 4.168-177,  4.501-511;  of  R.  S. 
McNamara,  4.168-177,  4.296,  4.309, 
4.365-378;  of  J.  T.  McNaughton, 
4.162,  4.474-489,  4.509 

Draper  Committee:  2.435 

DTZ:  RVNAF  in,  4.578 

Dumbarton  Oaks  Conference:  1.2,  1.14 

Eastern  Construction  Company:  2.647. 

See  also  Freedom  Company 
Eastern  Europe:  aid  to  NVN,  4.137 
Economic  policy  of  GVN:  2.389-391. 

See  also  Government  of  Vietnam 
Economist:  3.307 

EDC.  See  European  Defense  Com- 
munity 

USS  Edwards:  3.194 

18th  Fixed  Wing  Aircraft  Company: 
2.657 

Eight-week  Program:  description  of, 
3.319;  estimated  effects  of,  3.320; 
JCS  support  of,  3.318;  risks  of  es- 
calation, 3.319 

82nd  Airborne  Division:  4.540,  4.584; 
deployment  of,  4.541,  4.542,  4.544 

Eisenhower  administration:  2.19;  Indo- 
china policy  of,  2.562;  justification  of 
the  war,  1.585-587,  1.591-629;  key 
persons  in,  1.209;  Laos  and,  2.22;  na- 
tional security  structure  of,  2.32;  SE 
Asia  policy  of,  1.54;  Vietnam  commit- 
ment of,  2.20 

Elections,  all- Vietnam:  Diem  opposi- 
tion to,  1.239,  1.245-246;  DRV-GVN 
negotiations  on,  1.247,  1.288;  feasi- 
bility of,  1.453;  flaws  in  provisions 
for,  1.244-245;  Geneva  Accords  on, 
1.284,  1.559-560;  NVN  expectations 
of,  1.284;  SVN  expectations  of,  1.284- 
285;  UN  supervision  of,  1.569;  U.S. 
on,  1.239,  1.287,  1.288-289,  1.546- 
547.  See  also  Unification 

Elections,  South  Vietnamese:  2.370- 
372,  2.374,  2.781,  2.821;  Sept.  1963, 
2.750;  Sept.  1966,  2.377,  2.555;  and 
U.S.  policy,  2.376-378,  2.744 


Subject  lndex/34 

Elections,  U.S.:  2.402;  effect  on  Vietnam 
policy,  3.1,  3.77,  3.113,  3.212-213, 
3.288,  3.594;  war  issue  and,  4.363 
Electoral  Law  Commission:  2,378 
"Elements  of  a  Policy  That  Does  Not 
Include  a  Congressional  Resolution": 
3.77 

nth  Light  Infantry  Brigade:  4.528 
Elysee  Agreement:  1.27,  1.58 
Embassy,  U.S.  See  Saigon  Embassy 
EMBTEL  201:   3.512;  465,  2.336-337; 
870,  3.576;  1046,  3.583;  1068,  3.579- 
580;   1438,   3.628;   3003,  3.445-447; 
3384,  3.437 
Encadrement:   2.351-359,  2.413,  2.475, 

3.457.  See  also  Joint  command 
Enclave  strategy:  3.394,  3.448,  3.452;  de- 
velopment of,  3.453-458,  3.461;  ex- 
pectations of,  3.479;  implications  of, 
3.395 

Enemy  engagements:  types  of,  4.462. 
See  also  Military  operations 

Enemy  forces:  attrition  of,  4.370.  See 
also  War  of  attrition 

Enemy  sanctuaries:  4.337.  See  also  Cam- 
bodia 

"The  Equipment  Recovery  Mission": 
2.408,  2.433-^35 

Equivalent  punishment:  concept  of,  3.305 

Erskine  Mission:  1.197 

Erskine  Report:  1.90-91,  L496 

ERP  (European  Recovery  Program): 
1.35,  L184 

Escalation:  2.199,  2.336-337,  3.48, 
3.84-85,  3.200,  3.710;  bombing  pause 
and,  4.59;  Chinese  intervention  and, 
4.63;  control  of,  3.698;  controlled, 
3.672-673;  de-escalation,  4.597;  evalu- 
ation of,  4.592;  initiation  of,  2.306, 
3.5;  and  JFK,  2.811;  and  McNamara, 
4.107;  military  Presidential  advisors 
and,  4.160;  and  provocation  by  U.S., 
3.110;  risks  of,  3.319,  4.63 

European  Defense  Community  (EDC): 
effect  on  Geneva  Conference,  1.168; 
and  Franco-American  relations,  1.79- 
80;  French  attitude  toward,  1.558 

European  Recovery  Program  (ERP): 
1.35,  1.184 

EXDIS:  from  Sec.  Ball,  3.586-587;  from 
Amb.  Lodge,  3.61;  from  Amb.  Taylor, 
3.590-591,  3.704 

Executive  Committee  of  the  Fatherland 
Front  (Mat  tren  To  Quoc):  1.339 

Executive  Committee  of  the  Military 
Revolutionary  Council:  2.272.  See 
also  Military  Revolutionary  Council 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Expatriates:  Vietnamese,  2.704,  2.709 
Expressen:  1.95 

FAGOT/FRESCO:  3.636 
FAIRFAX:  2.483,  2.516,  4.409,  4.447 
Fallback  position:  3.112 
Far  East:   U.S.   policy  toward,  1.5-6, 

1.420;  U.S.  security  and,   1.436.  See 

also  Southeast  Asia 
Farmgate:    2.178,   2.179,   2.349,  3.162, 

3.195,  3.199,  3.208,  3.503;  concept  of, 

3.70;  cross-border  operations  of,  3.540. 

See  also  Air  strikes 
Fast/full  squeeze:  3.223 
Faure  government:  1.209 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany:  3.257 
Fertilizer:    stockpiling   of,    2.676;  U.S. 

supply  of,  3.64 
Fertilizer  Program:  2.195,  3.3,  3.509 
Feudalists:  1.314-315 
FFORCEV:  2.473 

Field  advisors:  2.454,  2.499.  See  also 
Advisors 

Fighter-bomber  squadron:  2.13.  See  also 

Air  strikes;  Air  war 
First  Indochina  War.  See  Franco-Viet 

Minh  War 

First  Logistical  Command:  Program  4 

and,  4.471 
First  Observation  Battalion:  2.641 
First  Observation  Group:  2.643-644 
Five-Power  Staff  Agency:  1.502 
Five-Year  Plans:  of  GVN,  2.710 
FLAMING  DART:  3.286,  3.300,  3.305; 
I,  3.271;  II,  3.271,  3.306;  issuance  of, 
3.270;  raids,  2.279,  3.5,  3.92.  See  also 
Reprisal  actions;  Sustained  reprisals 
FLASH  message:  to  Taylor,  3.336 
Flash  points:  3.697 

Flood  relief:  economic  aid  for,  2.114; 
U.S.  military  presence  and,  2.14,  2.85- 
87,  2.89-91,  2.103,  2.107-108,  2.110, 
2.118,  2.448;  task  force  on,  2.88,  2.91, 
2.101,  2.105,  2.106,  2.121 

Food  rations:  2.358 

Food  surplus:  in  Southeast  Asia,  2.654 
FOOTBOY:  4.214 

Force:  controlled  use  of,  3.112-113.  See 
also  Ground  forces;  Military  opera- 
tions 

Force  deployments:  projected,  4.366- 
368.  See  also  Troop  deployment 

Force  increases:  cost  of,  4.510.  See  also 
War  effort,  financing  of 

Force  levels:  McNaughton  on,  4.488- 
489;  under  Program  5,  4.526 

Force  Populaire  program:  2.686,  2.721 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol  5 

Force  ratio:  ARVN  to  VC,  4.399;  con- 
cept of,  3.440,  3.465 

Force  requirements:  4.486-487;  and 
COMUSMACV,  4.385;  FY  1968, 
4.427-431,  4.437;  MACV  and,  4.473. 
See  also  Ground  forces:  Troop  de- 
ployment 

Forces,  U.S.  See  U.S.  forces 

Foreign  Affairs:  1.325 

Foreign  exchange  negotiations:  2.396- 
397 

Foreign  Operations  Intelligence:  2.644 
Foreign  Service  Institute:  2.669 
Formosa:  strategic  importance  of,  1.418; 
U.S.  support  of,  1.590.  See  also  Re- 
public of  China 
Fort  McKinley:  STC  and,  2.648 
Fortress  America:  concept  of,  2.58 
44  battaHon  force:  2.474,  3.396,  3.462, 
3.467,  3.470,  3.471.  See  also  Phase  I 
Forty-one-point     program:  3.98-100, 
3.702 

"Forward  defense"  nations:  3.717 
Four  points:  of  Pham  Van  Dong,  3.274 
14-Nation  conference:  3.188,  3.684.  See 
also  Geneva  Accords,  1962;  Geneva 
Conference,  1962 
14-Nation  formula:  3.188 
France:  air  and  armor  superiority  of, 
1.518;  on  all- Vietnam  elections,  1.540; 
colonialism  of,  1.497;  conscripts, 
1.554;  and  Diem,  1.285-286;  and 
DRV,  1.285-286;  assessment  of  Indo- 
chinese  position,  1.396-397;  at  Geneva 
Conf.,  1.550,  1.532-533;  and  Ho  Chi 
Minh,  1.361;  in  Indochina,  2.46;  mili- 
tary situation  in  Indochina,  1.523, 
1.536;  opposes  "united  action,"  1.103; 
outdated  military  techniques  of,  1.490; 
post-Geneva  role  in  Vietnam,  1.210; 
U.S.  aid  to,  1.405-410,  1.437,  1.452; 
U.S.  cooperation  with,  1.388;  U.S. 
pressure  on,  1.474;  U.S.  support  of, 
1.387;  Viet  Minh  and,  2.820  (see  also 
Franco-Viet  Minh  War);  Vietnam 
policy  of,  1.54,  1.551;  at  Washington 
Conference,  1.220-221;  withdrawal 
from  Indochina,  1.452;  withdrawal 
from  NATO,  4.94 
Franco-Viet  Minh  armistice:  provisions 
of,  1.249 

France-Viet  Minh  War:  1.3,  1.45;  after 
Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.122,  1.146;  begin- 
ning of,  1.22;  channel  of  command, 
1.489;  and  Chinese  Communist  vic- 
tory, 1.185-187;  and  Chinese  inter- 
vention  threat,    1.170,    1.187;  com- 


Subject  Index/35 

batant  forces,   1.123;  conditions  for 
U.S.  involvement  in,  1.124-125;  cri- 
tique of  U.S.  policy  toward,  1.202- 
204;  and  domino  theory,  1.498;  Eisen- 
hower    Administration     on,  1.86; 
Franco-American     cooperation  in, 
1.201;  France-American  military  re- 
quirements,   1.467-468,    1.471;  and 
French   antiwar   sentiment,  1.95-96; 
Korean  war  and,  1.517;  military  con- 
duct  of,    1.495-497;   Navarre  Plan, 
1.77;   negotiations,    1.539;  paradoxes 
of,  1.487;  political  aspects  of,  1.497; 
psychological  aspects  of,  1.497-499; 
U.S.  aid  to,  1.179,  1.200,  1.498;  U.S. 
intervention  in,  1.4,  1.55,  1.122-132; 
U.S.  neutrality  in,   1.4,   1.184;  U.S. 
plans  for  involvement  in,  1.126-127; 
U.S.  policy  toward,  1.29;  and  U.S.  on 
negotiations,  1.96,  1.115 
Franco-Vietnamese  High  Military  Coun- 
cil: 1.396 
Free  Cambodian  Forces:  1.111 
Free  Democratic  Party:  1.315 
Freedom  Company:  1.580,  2.647 
Free  Khmer:  Geneva  Accord  on,  1.160 
"Free  Laos":  1.398 

Free  Laotian  Forces.  See  Pathet  Lao 

Free  World:  security  of,  2.800 

Free  World  battalions:  PAVN  increase 

and,  4.308 
Free  World  Forces:  2.491;  and  4:1  ad- 
vantage, 4.295 
Free  World  Military  Assistance  Forces 
(FWMAF):  2.547,  3.481;  funding  of, 
2.386;  and  RD,  2.584 
French  Air  Force.  See  Air  Force,  French 
French  Communist  Party:  4.163 
French    Expeditionary    Corps  (FEP): 
1.184,   1.541,   1.549,   1.608;  cost  of, 
1.408;  strength  of,  1.400;  withdrawal 
of,    1.612.   See   also   French  forces; 
French  naval  forces;  French  Union 
forces 

French  forces:  1.362;  in  Indochina, 
1.369;  logistics  of,  1.493;  static  de- 
fense of,  1.394.  See  also  French  Ex- 
peditionary Corps;  French  naval  forces; 
French  Union  forces 

French  Foreign  Legion:  1.445 

French  Indochina:  See  Indochina;  South- 
east Asia 

French-Indochina  War.  See  Franco- 
Viet  Minh  War 

French  naval  forces:  in  Indochina,  1.404; 
organization  of,  1.493.  See  also  French 
Expeditionary  Corps;  French  forces 


Subject  Index /36 

French  Socialist  Party:  1.22 

French  Union:  Associated  States  as  mem- 
bers of,  1.555;  collapse  of,  1.483; 
definition  of,  1.368;  Dien  Bien  Phu 
casualties,  1.484;  military  plans  of, 
1.396;  NATO  support  of,  1.591;  ob- 
jectives in  Vietnam,  1.492;  popular 
support  of,  1.392,  1.398;  U.S.  military 
aid  to,  1.394;  U.S.  support  of,  1.592- 
593;  Vietnam  within,  1.367.  See  also 
Associated  States 

French  Union  forces:  ground,  1.492;  in- 
adequate staff  of,  1.496-497;  tactics  of, 
1.496;  in  Tonkin  Delta,  1.393;  total, 
1.123;  U.S.  aid  to,  1.439.  See  also  Air 
Force,  French;  French  Expeditionary 
Corps;  French  forces;  French  naval 
forces 

Frontier  ranger  force:  2.86 

Frustration:  of  U.S.,  2.458-459.  See  also 
Optimism,  Pessimism 

Fulbright  Committee  hearings:  and 
Gavin  thesis,  4.314.  See  also  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee 

Funnel.  See  Bombing:  alternative  strat- 
egies 

FWMAF.  See  Free  World  Military  As- 
sistance Forces 


Gallop  Poll:  on  U.S.  support  of  war, 
4.99-100.  See  also  Public  opinion 

Gamble:  U.S.  in  Vietnam,  2.408-409, 
2.431-435.  See  also  U.S.  Vietnam 
commitment;  U.S.  Vietnam  policy 

Gavin  thesis:  4.314.  See  also  Gavin, 
Gen.  James 

Generals,  Council  of:  2.60-61;  and  Diem 
coup,  2.790;  pay-offs  and,  2.787;  Sai- 
gon, 2.735 

Geneva  Accords,  1954:  2.68,  2.808, 
3.723,  3.732,  4.600;  advisory  limits 
of,  2.431;  on  all-Vietnam  elections, 
1.159;  on  arms  control,  1.249;  as  basis 
for  negotiations,  4.273;  on  Cambodia, 
1.160-161,  1.270-282;  compared  to 
Seven  Points,  1.176-177;  Diem  rejec- 
tion of,  1.245,  1.285;  failure  of,  1.250; 
and  ICC  role,  1.159;  inadequacy  of, 
1.243-244,  1.250,  1.283,  2.45;  on  Laos, 
1.160-161,  1.270-282;  on  partition  of 
Vietnam,  1.158;  provisions  of,  1.176- 
177;  on  regroupment,  1.289;  SV  oppo- 
sition to,  1.163-164;  U.S.  declara- 
tion on,  1.162,  1.568-569,  1.570- 
571;  U.S.  dissatisfaction  with,  1.283; 
U.S.  evaluation  of,  1.177;  U.S.  over- 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

riding  of,  2.39,  2.40,  2.76,  2.119,  2.650, 
2.670,  4.649-650,  4.652;  U.S.  refusal 
to  sign,  1.161;  on  Vietnam,  1.270-282 

Geneva  Accords,  1962:  4.517 

Geneva  Accords,  1954-1962:  3.614, 
3.646 

Geneva  Accords,  violations  of:  DRV, 
2.80,  2.116,  2.670-672,  2.806,  4.645; 
NVN,  3.720;  SVN,  2.815;  U.S.,  2.39, 
2.76,  2.119 

Geneva  Agreements.  See  Geneva  Ac- 
cords,  1954;  Geneva  Accords,  1962 

Geneva  Conference,  1954:  1.80,  1.543, 
2.2,  2.111;  "Agreement  on  the  Cessa- 
tion of  Hostilities  in  Viet-Nam,"  1.284; 
armistice  agreements,  1.559;  British 
position  at,  1.142,  1.174-175;  cease- 
fire proposals,  1.139-141,  1.147;  on 
Cambodia,  1.136-139,  1.154-157; 
Chinese  attack  U.S.  at,  1.155-156; 
Chinese  on  Cambodia  at,  1.154;  Chi- 
nese diplomacy  at,  1.148-149;  Chi- 
nese on  Laos  at,  1.154;  Chinese  ob- 
jectives at,  1.169-172;  Communist 
proposals  at,  1.140,  1.506;  Commu- 
nist unity  at,  1.114;  CPR  at,  1.170; 
deadlock  at,  1.520;  and  Defense  De- 
partment, 1.454;  Dulles  on,  1.460, 
1.600-601;  Final  Declaration  of, 
1.177,  1.284,  1.571-573,  1.606-608; 
First  Plenary  Session,  1.504-506; 
Franco-American  disagreement  at, 
1.149-151,  1.153;  French  at,  1.117, 
1.504-505;  French  objectives  at,  1.175; 
and  French  political  situation,  1.533; 
instructions  to  U.S.  delegation,  1.507, 
1.152-153;  on  Laos,  1.135,  1.136-139, 
1.154-157;  military  vs.  political 
settlement  at,  1.133;  negotiators  at, 
1.10,  1.111;  on  partition  of  Vietnam, 
1.134,  1.142,  1.146;  political  arrange- 
ments of,  1.559;  private  negotiations 
at,  1.564;  Seven  Points,  1.144-145;  and 
Sino-Soviet  relations,  1.168-169;  So- 
viet objectives  at,  1.166-169;  Soviet 
position  at,  1.506;  U.S.  commitment 
and,  1.499;  U.S.  declaration  at,  1.568- 
569,  1.570-571;  U.S.  objectives  at, 
1.175-178;  U.S.  participation  in,  1.544, 
1.551,  1.558,  1.605;  U.S.  position  at, 
1.113,  1.114,  1.120-122,  1.451-454, 
1.536,  1.563;  U.S.  proposals  at,  1.142, 
1.505,  1.550,  1.552;  Viet  Minh  objec- 
tives at,  1.172-174;  Viet  Minh  propo- 
sals at,  1.119,  1.145,  1.505;  Vietnamese 
delegation  to,  1.569-570;  Western  dis- 
sension at,  1.114;  Western  proposals  at. 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol  5 

1.140-141.  See  also  Geneva  Accords, 
1954 

Geneva  Conference,  1962:  on  Laos, 
2.174,  2.175,  3.188,  3.197 

Geneva  Conference  on  Vietnam:  pro- 
posed reconvening  of,  3.188,  3.197, 
3.248 

Geneva  Settlement.  See  Geneva  Accords, 
1954 

"Geographically  Phased  National  Level 
Operation  Plan  for  Counterinsur- 
gency":  2.138,  2.411,  2.437 

Geography:  of  SVN,  3.452.  See  also 
Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam 

Germany:  rearmament  of,  1.420;  U.S. 
policy  toward,  1.425.  See  also  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany 

Gia  Dinh  Province:  2.150,  2.524 

Gia  Lam  Airfield:  4.215 

Giang  Province:  2.559 

Gilpatric  Task  Force:  2.2,  2.7-8,  2.33, 
2.39;  downgrading  of,  2.43;  draft  re- 
port of,  2.32,  2.35,  2.63;  final  report 
of,  2.44,  2.107,  2.110;  first  phase  of, 
2.35;  Laos  Annex  to  report,  2.8,  2.31, 
2.40-43,  2.65;  objectives  stated  in  re- 
port, 2.51;  Operations  Officer  for, 
2.38;  redrafts  of  report,  2.9,  2.43-44 

Glassboro,  N.J.:  Johnson-Kosygin  sum- 
mit meeting  at,  4.187 

"Goldberg  reply":  on  bombing  halt, 
4.389 

Government  of  (South)  Vietnam 
(GVN):  2.5,  3.1,  3.79;  and  Buddhist 
crisis,  2.732-733,  4.86  (see  also  Bud- 
dhist crisis);  budget  of,  2.279,  2.757, 
2.761;  constitution  of,  2.555;  counter- 
insurgency  effort  of,  2.692,  2.697, 
2.713;  courts,  2.398;  democracy  in, 
2.550,  2.552;  as  dictatorship,  2.723; 
economy  of,  2.710-711,  2.721-722, 
3.531,  4.377;  and  elections,  1.164, 
4.390;  guerrilla  warfare  and,  4.298; 
and  increased  pressure  on  NVN,  3.77- 
79;  inefficiency  of,  3.57,  3.60,  3.207; 
instability  of,  2.28,  2.343,  2.715,  3.21- 
22,  3.40,  3.79-83,  3.95,  4.309,  4.391, 
4.504-505;  4.609;  Komer's  re^^ommen- 
dations  for,  4.440-441;  maritime  op- 
erations of,  3.250-251,  3.252-253, 
3.288;  military  draft  of,  3.59,  4.598- 
599;  military  forces  of,  3.62,  3.249; 
military  operations  of,  2.702-704  (see 
also  Army  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
nam); morale  of,  2.503,  3.432;  and 
National  Reconciliation,  2.608;  na- 
tional unity  and,  2.344;  NSC  working 


Subject  Index/ 31 

group  on,  3.651-656;  officials  of,  4.351; 
organizational  reform  of,  2.450;  and 
pacification,  2.619,  2.622  (see  also 
Pacification);  and  partition,  1.163; 
popular  image  of,  2.679,  2.680;  popu- 
lar support  for,  2.403,  2.593,  2.681, 
3.19;  possible  collapse  of,  3.293-294, 
3.425-426,  3.652-653,  3.696;  reforms 
of,  3.90-92,  4.568,  4.584;  relations 
with  U.S.,  2.17,  2.33,  2.290-303, 
2.345,  3.99,  3.421;  request  for  U.S. 
aid,  2.652,  3.715;  reserves  of,  4.579; 
Rural  Program,  3.88  (see  also  RD); 
rural  support  of,  2.595;  secret  police 
of,  2.744;  Special  Forces  of,  2.638; 
Urban  Program,  3.88;  U.S.  advisory 
role,  3.99,  3.259  (see  also  Advisors, 
U.S.;  Advisory  effort);  U.S.  aid  to, 
2.640,  3.2,  3.4,  3.30,  3.36,  3.103  (see 
also  Aid:  economic;  Aid:  military; 
Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment); U.S.  attitudes  toward,  2.353, 
2.354,  2.357,  3.2,  3.259;  U.S.  pressure 
on,  4.575;  as  U.S.  puppet,  2.738;  U.S. 
recognition  of,  1.367;  U.S.  role  in, 
2.714-715,  2.803,  3.29,  3.107,  4.489; 
villages  controlled  by,  2.157,  4.387; 
weakness  of,  4.342.  See  also  Diem 
government;  South  Vietnam;  United 
States,  objectives  in  Vietnam 

Graduated  Overt  Military  Pressure:  con- 
cept of,  3.508,  3.510;  program  of, 
2.195,  2.459;  against  DRV,  3.246, 
3.270,  3.289;  CINCPAC  on,  3.318.  See 
also  Military  operations 

Graduated  reprisals:  3.393;  objectives  of, 
3.316;  Taylor's  concept  of,  3.315-318. 
See  also  Reprisal  actions;  Sustained 
reprisals 

Gravel  mines:  4.335 

Great  Britain:  3.257;  on  Chinese  inter- 
vention, 1.479;  on  collective  defense 
in  SE  Asia,  1.99;  on  CPR,  1.174-175; 
at  Geneva  Conf.,  1.550;  opposition  to 
military  intervention,  1.477,  1.480; 
SEATO  and,  2.78;  support  for  France 
in  Indochina,  1.11,  1.18;  terrified  by 
H-bomb,  1.501;  on  united  action  in 
Indochina,  1.101-103;  Vietnam  policy 
and,  2.116 

Great  Vietnam  Nationalist  Party  (Dai 
Viet):  1.44,  1.314-315,  2.709 

Greece:  defense  of,  1.615 

Green  Berets:  2.51.  See  also  Counter- 
insurgency;  Special  Forces 

Griffin  Mission:  1.66,  1.371,  1.372,  1.195. 
See  also  Griffin,  Robert  Allan 


Subject  Index /3S 

Ground  forces,  U.S.:  2.361,  3.6,  3.239, 
3.266,  3.421-422;  and  air  support, 
3.549;  build-up  of,  3.430-431,  3.433- 
483;  Bundy  on,  3.431;  chronology, 
4.277-290;  combat  operation  of,  3.461; 
commitment  of,  3.397-417,  3.460; 
counter-guerrilla  role,  3.419;  deploy- 
ment of,  3.226,  3.393,  3.420-421, 
3.458,  3.703;  and  enclave  strategy, 
3.394;  increase  in,  3.445-446;  intro- 
duction of,  2.358,  3.297,  3.394,  3.705; 
Kennedy  on,  2.116,  2.118-119;  maxi- 
mum estimate  of,  2.108-109,  2.112; 
objectives,  3.428-429,  3.432,  3.439; 
program  for,  3.698-699;  projected 
commitment  of,  2.97,  2.103-106;  and 
ROLLING  THUNDER,  3.397;  search 
and  destroy,  3.395,  4.369;  strategy, 
3.394,  4.478,  4.564,  4.599,  4.604; 
strength  of,  3.461;  U.S.  Army  position 
paper  on,  1.93;  U.S.  white  paper  on, 
2.354.  See  also  U.S.  Forces;  Troops, 
U.S. 

Ground  war:  entrance  into,  2.358.  See 
also  Ground  forces,  U.S. 

"Group  2"  formula:  1.143.  See  also 
Southeast  Asia:  collective  defense  of 

Guam  Conference:  2.400,  2.511,  2.516, 
4.150-154,  4.424-427 

Guantanamo  Defense  Force:  4.540 

Guerrilla  force:  Philippine,  2.647;  of 
RVNAP,  3.63,  3.70,  3.509.  See  also 
Counterinsurgency;  Guerrilla  warfare; 
Viet  Nam  Cong-San 

Guerrilla  warfare:  2.692,  2.825-826, 
3.381;  difficulties  of,  2.123;  and  food 
supply,  4.301;  Rostow  paper  on,  3.381- 
383;  success  of,  2.14;  VC,  2.20. 
See  also  Counterinsurgency;  Guer- 
rilla forces;  Viet  Nam  Cong-San 

Gulf  of  Tonkin.  See  Tonkin  Gulf 

GVN.  See  Government  of  (South)  Viet- 
nam 

Haiphong:    as   bombing   target,  3.177, 

4.533;  POL  sites,  4.108;  Viet  Minh 

take-over  of,  1.583 
Haiphong   harbor:    closure    of,  4.186; 

mining   of,   3.199,   4.66,   4.445.  See 

also  Mining 
Halberstam  article:  3.23-24 
Ha  Long  Bay  Agreement,  first:  1.27, 

1.32,  1.58 

Ha  Long  Bay  Agreement,  second:  1.27, 
1.32,  1.58 

Hamlet  Evaluation  System  (HES):  2.504, 
2.507 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Hamlets:  data  on,  2.506;  definition  of, 
2.133;  elections  councils,  2.687;  under 
GVN  control,  4.375;  militia,  3.501, 
3.506;  RD  teams  in,  2.622;  rehabilita- 
tion of,  3.505;  strategic  (see  Strategic 
Hamlet  Program).  See  also  Hop  Tac 
Program 

Hancock:  3.302 

Handicraft:  2.554 

Hanoi:  3.152,  3.665;  bombing  of  embas- 
sies in,  4.135;  as  bombing  target, 
4.533;  civilian  casualties  in,  4.153; 
POL  storage  sites,  4.108;  psywar 
strike,  1.578-579;  restricted  bombing, 
4.208,  4.233;  Viet  Minh  takeover  of, 
1.579.  See  also  Democratic  Republic  of 
Vietnam 

Hao  paramilitary  group:  1.582-583 
HARDNOSE,  Operation:  3.495 
Harriman  Committee  on  Foreign  Aid: 
1.35 

Harris  poll:  on  truce  violations,  4.388; 
on  U.S.  support  of  bombing,  4.39, 
4.144 

Hau  Nghia  Province:  2.542 

Hawks:   4.401,  4.559,  4.560.  See  also 

Public  opinion 
Hawk  Units,  U.S.:  2.331 
Headquarters    Field    Force,  Vietnam 

(FFORCEV):  2.478 
Headquarters   Support   Activity  Saigon 

(HSAS):  2.178;  phase-out  policy  of, 

2.179 

Health  Services:  2.676 
Helicopter  companies:  4.530 
Helicopter  deployments:  under  Program 
4,  4.384 

Helicopters:  2.101,  2.114;  importance  of, 
4.539;  introduction  of,  2.17,  2.126, 
2.127;  requested  by  MAAG,  2.19;  in 
SVN,  2.657;  U.S.  provision  of,  2.455 

Helicopter  sorties:  4.370 

Helicopter  support:  troop  requirements 
and,  4.316 

Helicopter  units:  2.677 

Herbicides:  use  of,  3.45 

HES:  4.556 

High  Commissioner  of  Indochina:  1.21, 
1.23,  1.25 

Highlands:   control  of,   2.13.  See  also 

Countryside;  MR5 
High  National  Council  (HNC):  2.277, 

2.339,  3.583;  appointment  of,  2.336, 

3.89;  dissolution  of,  2.277,  2.346-348, 

2.351,  3.260,  3.292 
High  Plateau:  2.86,  2.91 
HIGH  PORT:  4.443 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 
Highway  1:  3.425 

"Hit  and  withdraw"  operations:  2.721- 
723 

Hoa  Hao:  1.43,  1.45,  1.220,  1.294,  2.275, 
2.460,  2.699,  2.709;  anti-Diem  activity, 
1.305;  clashes  with  Viet  Minh,  1.294- 
295;  defeat  of,  1.303;  influence  of, 
3.495;  training  of,  2.307,  2.308 

Ho  Chi  Minh  trail:  2.718,  4.110 

Holbroke/Burnham  Study  on  Vietnam: 
4.512-513 

Holding  areas:  4.332 

Holding  phase:  3.191 

Hon  Matt  Island:  3.554 

Hon  Me  Island:  3.184,  3.519,  3.521, 
3.544 

Hon  Ngu  Island:  3.519,  3.521,  3.554 

Hon  Nieu  Island:  3.184 

Honolulu  Conferences:  Jan.  1962,  2.451; 
July  1962,  2.162,  2.164;  May  1963, 
2.180-181,  2.188,  2.190-191,  2.224; 
Nov.  1963,  2.273-276,  2.304;  May- 
June  1964,  2.278-279,  2.318,  2.323, 
2.467,  3.72,  3.76-77,  3.171,  3.177; 
Apr.  1965,  2.355,  2.357,  2.359,  2.475, 
3.1,  3.57-59,  3.274,  3.451,  3.456, 
3.458,  3.705,  4.311-315;  Feb.  1966, 
2.285,  2.289,  2.368-369,  2.485,  2.516- 
518,  2.548-554,  2.555-560,  2.561, 
4.311-312,  4.646 

Hop  Tac  Program:  2.331,  2.336,  2.343, 
2.355,  2.481-482,  2.483,  2.516,  2.521- 
527,  3.97,  3.443,  3.533,  3.546,  3.551; 
assessment  of,  2.524-526;  dissatisfac- 
tion with,  2.355;  end  of,  2.483;  during 
Khanh  crisis,  2.335;  launching  of, 
2.351;  lessons  of,  2.527;  purpose  of, 
3.532;  Ten  Point  Program,  2.530;  U.S. 
support  of,  2.529;  Vietnamese  sup- 
port of,  2.524-526;  Westmoreland  on, 
2.524.  See  also  Pacification 

Hot  pursuit:  2.195,  3.186,  3.504,  3.570; 
into  Cambodia,  3.552;  concept  of, 
3.537,  3.551;  use  of,  3.572.  See  also 
Sanctuaries 

House  Armed  Service  Committee:  reac- 
tion to  war,  3.35 

House  of  Representatives:  on  Vietnam 
policy,  4.263,  4.591 

HSAS.  See  Headquarters  Support  Ac- 
tivity Saigon 

Hue:  2.142;  burning  of  U.S.  Consulate 
in,  2.289,  2.377  {see  also  Buddhist 
crisis);  and  Tet  offensive,  4.235;  U.S. 
Consulate  in,  2.289 

Huk  rebellion:  2.440 

Humanite,  L':  1.22 


Subject  Index/39 

Hunger:  in  Southeast  Asia,  2.58 
"Hunting  licenses" :  2.445 
Huong  government:  2.347;  fall  of,  3.424; 
U.S.  support  of,  2.349 


la  Drang  River  Campaign:  4.622 
ICA.  See  International  Cooperation  Ad- 
ministration 
ICC.  See  International  Control  Com- 
mission 

Ideology   vs.   reality:    2.684.   See  also 

Optimism;  Pessimism 
IMF.  See  International  Monetary  Fund 
Immediate    Action    Program  (LAP): 

3.676-677 

India:  2.799,  3.257,  4.582;  neutrality  of, 
2.664 

Indochina:  1.463,  2.819-820;  anti-Jap- 
anese resistance  in,  1.2,  1.12-13;  bal- 
ance of  forces  in,  1.491;  cease-fire  in, 
1.141,  1.147-148;  collective  defense 
for,  1.131;  Communist  activity  in, 
1.192,  1.382,  1.433,  1.591;  and  domino 
theory  1.458,  1.179,  1.186,  1.473-476; 
and  France,  1.2,  1.439,  2.819;  Franco- 
American  aid  to,  1.190,  1.194;  Franco- 
American  position  paper  on,  1.554- 
555;  Franco-British  pact  on,  1.18; 
Franco-Chinese  agreement  on,  1.18; 
Franco- Vietnamese  negotiations  on, 
1.32-33;  French  coup  d'etat,  1.18; 
French-DRV  accord,  1.18-19;  gov- 
ernment of,  1.488-490;  High  Com- 
missioner of,  1.21,  1.23,  1.25;  Jap- 
anese occupation  of,  1.8;  justification 
of  war  in,  1.598;  logistic  situation  in, 
1.508;  ministerial  talks  on,  1.390-391; 
nationalism  of,  1.361;  naval  situation 
in,  1.494;  political  apathy  in,  1.489; 
projected  loss  of,  3.178-179;  strategic 
importance  of,  1.362,  1.378,  1.418, 
1.464,  1.475-476,  1.487-488;  threat 
of  Chinese  intervention  in,  1.84,  1.179, 
1.187,  1.379;  tripartite  discussions  on, 
1.104-106,  1.227;  U.S.  economic  aid 
to,  1.197,  1.408-410,  1.440;  U.S.  in- 
tervention in,  1.55-56,  1.511-512;  U.S. 
military  aid  for,  1.66,  1.365-366, 
1.380,  1.408-410,  1.468-471;  U.S.  mili- 
tary proposals  for,  1.506,  1.511,  1.515; 
U.S.  neutrality,  1.3;  U.S.  support  of 
France  in,  1.9,  1.15,  1.16-17;  U.S. 
World  War  II  policy  toward,  1.1,  1.9; 
Viet  Minh-dominated  zones  in,  1.189; 
Viet  Minh  resistance  in,  1.18.  See  also 
Associated  States  of  Indochina;  Cam- 


Subject  Index/ 40 

Indochina:  (cont'd) 
bodia;    Laos;    Republic    of  (South) 
Vietnam;  Vietnam 

Indochina  War  (1946-1954).  See 
Franco-Viet  Minh  War 

Indochinese  Communist  Party  (ICP): 
1.45;  and  the  Viet  Minh,  1.43-44 

Indonesia:  1.3,  1.592;  and  Peking- 
Jakarta  axis,  3.267 

Infiltration:  2.344,  2.655-656,  3.158, 
3.200,  3.244,  3.360,  3.674,  3.716, 
4.381,  4.393;  air  strikes  against,  4.133- 
134,  4.233,  4.337,  4.373-374,  4.410- 
412;  barrier  against,  4.416  (see  also 
Barrier,  anti-infiltration);  Diem  esti- 
mates of,  2.60;  increase  in,  3.192, 
3.207-208,  3.211,  4.303-308,  4.334, 
4.622;  intelligence  reports  on,  3.255; 
into  Mekong  Delta,  3.29;  and  mining 
of  ports,  4.415;  pessimism  about,  4.407; 
routes,  2.655-656,  3.251,  4.337,  4.517; 
statistics  on,  4.417;  Viet  Cong,  2.8, 
2.13,  3.31,  3.94;  White  Paper  on, 
3.330;  withholding  of  data  on,  3.256- 
257.  See  also  Anti-infiltration;  Bar- 
rier, anti-infiltration 

Inflation,  GVN:  2.389,  2.397,  2.400, 
2.710,  4.338,  4.341-342;  ARVN  de- 
sertion rate  and,  4.364,  4.377;  and 
budget,  2.761;  threat  of,  2.310,  2.318; 
and  U.S.  commitment,  4.341;  U.S. 
troop  deployments  and,  4.369.  See  also 
Piaster;  War  effort:  financing  of 

Influence.  See  Leverage 

Information  Ministry:  2.237 

Informers:  4.562 

INR:  2.189,  3.31;  on  bombing  escala- 
tion, 4.65;  on  SVN  military  situation, 
2.164,  2.189.  See  also  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency,  U.S.;  Intelligence  Sys- 
tem;  National    Intelligence  Estimate 

Inspection  team:  2.382 

Institute  for  Defense  Analyses,  JASON 
division  of:  on  failure  of  bombing, 
4M].  See  also  JASON  Summer  Study 

Insurgency,  Viet  Cong:  2.19.  See  also 
Counterinsurgency ;  Counterinsurgency 
Plan;  Viet  Nam  Cong-San 

Intelligence,  U.S.:  2.640,  3.609;  efforts 
to  improve,  3.32-35;  inadequacy  of, 
3.158;  on  infiltration,  3.255;  on  NVN 
leaders,  4.57;  on  NVN  reaction  to  air 
strikes,  3,174-175;  photographic,  2.641; 
requirements,  3.182-183;  unreliable 
sources  of,  1.266.  See  also  Central 
Intelligence  Agency,  U.S.;  INR;  In- 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

telligence  system;  National  Intelligence 
Estimates 

Intelligence  Advisory  Committee:  Indo- 
china assessment  of,  1.391-404,  1.429- 
433 

Intelligence  Coordination  and  Exploita- 
tion (ICEX):  2.585 
Intelligence  Evaluation  Center:  2.653 
Intelligence    Organizations:  indigenous, 
2.683-684 

Intelligence  system:  1.416,  2.189;  inade- 
quacy of,  2.164-165,  2.224,  2.280, 
2.287,  3.23-34;  military-political, 
2.89,  2.114,  3.2.  See  also  Central  In- 
telligence Agency,  U.S.;  INR;  Intelli- 
gence, U.S.;  National  Intelligence  Esti- 
mates 

Inter-Agency  Committee  for  Province 
Rehabilitation:  2.148 

Interdiction:  3.343,  3.359-360;  analysis 
of,  2.722,  4.42-43;  failure  of,  4.49;  in- 
filtration and,  4.200,  4.202,  4.373- 
374;  in  Laos,  4.21;  program  of,  4.43; 
strategy,  4.70-71.  See  also  Air  strikes; 
Air  war;  Bombing;  Bombing  program; 
Infiltration 

Inter-Ministerial  Committee  for  Strategic 
Hamlets  (IMCSH):  2.144-145,  2.148, 
2.674.  See  also  Strategic  Hamlet  Pro- 
gram 

International  Control  Commission  (ICC): 
1.249,  1.567,  2.17,  2.119,  2.127,  2.712, 
4.662;  Communist  infiltration  and, 
2.712;  Laos  and,  2.636;  member  states 
of,  1.159;  powers  of,  1.159;  relation- 
ship to  Joint  Commission,  1.159;  re- 
port of,  2.814-815,  2.826;  in  SVN, 
2.652 

International  Cooperation  Administra- 
tion (ICA):  2.7,  2.32,  2.34 

International  Jaycees:  and  Operation 
Brotherhood,  2.648.  See  also  Opera- 
tion Brotherhood 

International  Law:  on  collective  defense 
in  SVN,  4.645 

International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF): 
program  for  GVN,  2.382-383 

International  Supervisory  Commission: 
1.572-573,  1.607-608.  See  also  Elec- 
tions, all-Vietnam 

Intersector  V:  2.655 

Intervention,  Chinese:  1.54,  1.456,  1.462, 
1.512-513;  U.S.  reaction  to,  1.442 

Intervention,  U.S.:  1.506,  1.523;  con- 
tingencies of,  1.463;  Diem  and,  2.446; 
early  policy  on,  2.431;  and  Geneva 


I   Gravel  Edition/VoL  5 

I  Conf.,    1.524;   objectives   of,  1.465- 

[  466;     political     considerations  for, 

i  1.467;  State  Dept.  and,  2.9.  See  also 

I  U.S.  Vietnam  policy 

i  Interzone  V  Regional  Committee  (IVRC): 

i  2.694 

i  Iran:  and  Vietnam  policy,  2.78 

I  Iron  Curtain:  2.829 

1  Iron  Triangle:  4.408,4.418 

(  ISA:  2.162-163,  2.180-181,  4.221,  4.235, 

i  4.555;    on    bombing,    4.204,  4.218, 

I  4.256-257,  4.260;  on  covert  activities, 

i  3.571-575;  DPM  of,  4.561-568;  on 

j  ICS  Course  A,  4.508;  mining  Hai- 

I  phong    and,    4.257-258;  negotiations 

'  and,   4.263;   on   troop  commitment, 
2.106;  withdrawal  plan  and,  2.182 

J2:  estimate  of  NVA/VC,  4.518-520 

J3:  estimates  of  military  situation,  4.522 

Japan:  1.627;  on  bombing  of  Hanoi, 
4.614;  and  communism,  1.386,  1.436, 
1.450;  economy  of,  1.375;  rearma- 
ment of,  1.420 

JASON  study,  of  December  1967:  4.222- 
225,  4.231;  on  bombing  campaign, 
4.115,  4.224-225;  on  infiltration,  4.356 

JASON  Summer  Study:  4.116-117;  on 
barrier  concept,  4.115;  on  bomb  dam- 
age in  North,  4.354-355 
i  JCRR:  2.405 

ICS.  See  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

Jen-min  jih-pao:  1.148,  1.153.  See  also 
People's  Daily 

Johnson  administration:  2.160,  2.190, 
4.269,  4.630;  bombing  estimate,  4.231- 
232;  bombing  .policy  of,  4.203;  hawks 
vs.  doves  and,  4.138;  justification  of 
war,  3.707-3.743,  4.626-630;  and 
Khanh  Coup,  3.268;  on  role  of  ad- 
visors, 2.308;  San  Antonio  formula 
of,  4.205-210;  Southeast  Asia  com- 
mitment, 3.188;  summary  of  policy, 
3.710-713;  Tet  offensive  and,  4.232; 
on  triumvirate,  2.339-340;  troop 
question  and,  4.187;  and  U  Thant, 
4.136.  See  also  Johnson,  Lyndon  B. 

Johnson  Mission:  2.55-59.  See  also 
Johnson,  Pres.  Lyndon  B. 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  Chairman.  See 
Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (CJCS) 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (ICS):  1.90,  2.3- 
5,  2.7,  2.9;  advisory  effort  of,  1.215, 
2.408,  2.432,  2.463,  2.467,  2.470;  on 
aircraft  losses,  3.334;  on  air/naval 
war,  3.193,  4.499-501;  on  allied  de- 


Subject  Index/ A\ 

ployments,  3.258;  "Alternative  Courses 
of  Action  for  Southeast  Asia,"  4.492; 
on  anti-infiltration  barrier,  4.114, 
4.413;  bombing  policy  of,  3.35,  3.165- 
166,  3.179,  3.193,  3.209,  3.232,  3.263, 
3.271,  3.288-289,  3.297,  3.343,  3.628, 
3.629-630,  4.24,  4.33,  4.38,  4.41,  4.59- 
62,  4.67,  4.127-128,  4.132,  4.185, 
4.254-256;  on  bombing  targets,  3.273, 
4.60-61,  4.75,  4.81,  4.533;  on  Course 
A  strategy,  4.508-509;  on  covert  ac- 
tivities, 4.590;  on  domestic  reaction, 
4.495-496,  4.499-500;  on  escalation, 
4.145-146,  4.177;  eight-week  program 
of,  3.318-321,  3.427;  on  expansion, 
2.358,  4.76;  on  force  requirements, 
2.78-79,  2.181,  4.131,  4.170,  4.326-327, 
4.346,  4.431-432,  4.436-438,  4.524, 
4.536,  4.572;  on  Franco-Viet  Minh 
negotiations,  1.115-116,  1.118;  on 
Geneva  Conf.,  1.118,  1.448-451; 
against  holiday  truces,  4.141;  Indo- 
china policy  of,  1.198-200,  1.366, 
1.373-374;  on  interdiction,  4.70-71, 
4.215-216;  issue  of  authority,  1.447; 
on  Laos,  2.74,  3.159,  3.165;  on  LOG 
targets,  3.273;  on  MACV  CPSVN, 
2.179;  memo  to  Sec.  McNamara  on 
air  war,  4.210-214;  memo  of  29  March 
1954  to  Presidential  committee,  1.455- 
460;  memos  of  May  1954  for  Sec.  of 
Defense,  1.509-515;  memo  to  Pres. 
Johnson,  4.211;  on  military  aid,  1.195- 
196,  1.364;  military  assessments  of, 
2.654-659,  3.154,  4.539,  4.572-573; 
military  objectives  of,  3.172,  4.395, 
4.536,  4.598-601;  on  NLF  contacts, 
4.394;  on  NSAM-288,  3.56;  on  NSC 
Working  Group  options,  3.233; 
OPLAN  37-64,  3.157-158;  pacification 
and,  2.572,  2.599,  3.44-45;  on  POL, 
4.60-61,  4.75,  4.81;  PRACTICE  NINE 
Requirements  Plan,  4.412-413;  and 
Program  5,  4.529-530;  reaction  to 
Galbraith,  2.672;  reserve  call-up  and, 
4.124,  4.238,  4.347,  4.385,  4.544-545; 
on  ROLLING  THUNDER,  4.86-87, 
4.358;  Rostow's  proposal  and,  2.73- 
74;  on  SEACABIN,  4.222;  on  South- 
east Asia,  1.187,  1.363-366,  4.211; 
Special  Studies  Group  of,  4.291-294; 
strategy  against  NVN,  3.208,  3.213- 
214;  strategy  debate  among,  3.397; 
suppression  of  information,  4.180;  on 
Systems  Analysis  arguments,  4.132; 
requirements  of,  4.525;  Tet  offensive 


Subject  Index /A2 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS):  {cont'd) 
and,  4.235;  three-division  plan  of, 
3.468-469;  time-phasing  proposal  of, 
3.162;  and  Tonkin  crisis,  3.202-203; 
on  troop  commitment,  2.65,  3.428, 
3.469;  on  troop  deployment,  2.46, 
2.48-49,  4.318-319,  4.394;  12-week 
air  strike  program,  3.343-344;  on  U.S. 
policy,  3.550;  on  Vietnamese  capa- 
bilities, 4.302;  on  VNA  force  levels, 
1.216-218;  withdrawal  plan  of,  2.183; 
Worldwide  Posture  Paper,  4.490.  See 
also  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Cables;  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  Memoranda 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Cables:  to  CINC- 
PAC,  2.41-42;  2084/80,  3.517;  2343/ 
326-6,  3.510;  3796,  3.517;  5375, 
3.510;  7700,  3.517.  See  also  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  Memoranda 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Memoranda  (JC- 
SM):  97-67,  4.412-413;  208-67,  4.435; 
218-66,  4.319;  218-67,  4.436-438;  284- 
67,  4.489-492;  288-67,  4.501;  311-61, 
2.49;  312-67,  4.505;  321-65,  3.469-470; 
506-66,  4.325;  555-67,  4.210-214;  590- 
65,  3.477;  629-63,  2.182;  646-66,  4.347; 
652-65,  4.299-301;  702-66,  4.361-362, 
4.364;  717-61,  2.12;  729-64,  3.555;  811- 
65,  4.302;  955-64,  3.258,  3.628;  "De- 
ployment of  Forces  to  Meet  CY  Re- 
quirements," 4.361-362,  4.364;  "In- 
creased Pressures  on  North  Vietnam," 
4.210-214;  to  LBJ,  4.127-129;  to  Sec. 
McNamara,  2.663,  2.671-672,  3.563- 
564;  on  optimum  force  requirements, 
4.492;  "Operations  Against  North  Viet- 
nam," 4.489-492;  "Strategic  Assessment 
of  Southeast  Asia,"  1.363-366;  support 
for  ground  troop  involvement,  3.458; 
"U.S.  Military  Participation  in  Indo- 
china," 1.126-127 

Joint  command:  approaches  to,  2.359, 
2.478;  COMUSMACV  opposition  to, 
2.475,  2.476,  2.478;  concept  of,  2.357; 
JCS  and,  2.361;  Gen.  Minh  and,  2.360; 
Amb.  Taylor  and,  2.360;  Sec.  Mc- 
Namara's  support  of,  2.480;  opposi- 
tion to,  2.413 

Joint  Experts  Report:  2.106 

JGS.  See  Joint  General  Staff,  Vietnamese 

Joint  General  Staff,  Vietnamese  (JGS): 
2.28,  2.29,  2.162,  2.177,  2.393,  4.221; 
bombing  assessment  of,  4.218;  Direc- 
tive A-B  139  of,  2.352;  numbers  of, 
2.513;  target  evaluation  by,  4.204;  as 
U.S.  puppets,  2.736 

Joint  Operations  Center  (JOC):  2.177 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Joint  (US-GVN)  Operations  Center 
(JOC):  2.689 

Joint  United  States  Public  Affairs  Office 
(JUSPAC):  2.538;  OCO  and,  2.612, 
2.614;  reorganization  of,  2.606;  and 
roles  and  missions  report,  2.586 

Joint  War  Games  Agency:  4.291 

Jorden  report:  2.119,  3.255;  release  of, 
2.115-116 

JSOP-70:  3.428 

JUNGLE  JIM  squadron:  2.79-80,  2.653, 
2.657 

Junks:  NVN,  3.252;  and  VC  infiltra- 
tion, 2.696;  Vietnamese,  2.8,  2.39, 
2.198,  2.638 

JUSPAC.  See  Joint  United  States  Public 
Affairs  Office 


Kansas  City  Star:  3.307 

KANZUS  Force:  4.334 

Ken  Tuong  Province:  3.26 

Kennedy  administration:  chronology  of 
commitment  in  Vietnam,  2.5-17;  on 
Diem  coup,  2.261,  2.263;  foreign 
policy  of,  2.72,  2.829;  justification  of 
war,  2.794-797;  leverage  on  GVN, 
2.252;  optimism  of,  2.204;  public 
statements  of,  2.794-797;  and  Taylor 
report,  2.103-104.  See  also  Kennedy, 
Pres.  John  F. 

Khanh  coup:  2.278,  2.458,  3.35,  3.37, 
3.41,  3.81;  response  to,  3.34,  3.37- 
38,  3.41 

Khanh  government:  2.195-196,  2.472; 
and  Buddhists,  3.86-87;  charter,  3.83- 
84;  collapse  of,  2.335-336,  3.4-5; 
constitution  of,  2.279,  2.333;  Constitu- 
tional Assembly,  2.318,  2.377,  2.384, 
2.395;  demonstrations  against,  3.85- 
87;  French  plot  and,  3.38;  instability 
of,  2.309,  2.312,  2.318,  2.329-330, 
2.332,  3.57,  3.81,  3.83,  3.192,  3.499, 
3.502,  3.525,  3.546-548,  3.560-561; 
and  NSAM-288  recommendations, 
3.62-64;  and  pacification,  3.61;  Tay- 
lor report  on,  3.530-533;  U.S.  aid  to, 
2.331,  3.84-85;  U.S.  support  of,  2.313- 
315,  2.323,  2.328,  2.334,  3.4,  3.53-54, 
3.58,  3.78-79,  3.504,  3.508.  See  also 
Khanh,  Gen.  Nguyen 

Khe  Sanh:  defense  of  4.565;  VC  at, 
4.547,  4.556 

Khmer  Issarak  Forces:  1.111 

Kidnapping:  as  terrorist  tactic,  2.646, 
2.697.  See  also  Terrorism 

Killed  in  action  (KIA):  4.558;  Ameri- 


Gravel  Edition /Vol.  5 

can,  4.455;  Viet  Cong,  4.348.  See  also 

Kill  ratios:  4.370,  4.387;  ARVN,  4.425 
"Kits":  concept  of,  2.717 
"Komergrams":  2,569.  See  also  Komer, 

Amb.  Robert 
"Komer  Package":  optimism  of,  4.441. 

See  also  Komer,  Amb.  Robert 
Kong  Le-type  coup:  2.716 
Kontum  area:  2.138 
Korea:  and  U.S.  commitment  to  SVN, 

2.78.   See  also   Korean  War;  South 

Korea 

Korean  War:  1.83-84,  3.725,  3.740;  ar- 
mistice, 1.595;  and  Indochina,  1.372, 
1.374;  truce,  1.415 

Kra  Isthmus:  1.377 

Krulak-Mendenhall  mission:  2.205, 
2.243-244,  2.245 

Kuang-ming  jih-pao:  1.148 

Ky  coup:  2.362,  2.480.  See  also  Ky, 
Marshall  Nguyen  Cao 

Ky  government:  4.622;  bombing  pause 
and,  4.36;  stability  of,  4.292;  as  U.S. 
puppet,  4.170;  and  U.S.  troop  com- 
mitment, 2.362.  See  also  Ky,  Mar- 
shall Nguyen  Cao 

Labor  unions:  political  power  of,  2.204 

Lai  Khe  plantation:  2.149 

Lam  Dong  Province:   Montagnards  in, 

2.687.  See  also  Montagnards 
Land  artillery:  strategy  of,  4.421,  4.422 
Land  reform:  1.388,  2.400,  2.551,  2.554, 

2.569,  3.45;  under  Diem,  1.254-255, 

1.309-310;    and    Tarn    gov't,  1.394; 

under  Viet  Minh,  1.308 
Language  difficulties:  2.346,  2.359,  2.475 
Laniel    government:    1.407.    See  also 

Laniel,  Premier  Joseph 
Laniel-Navarre  Plan.  See  Navarre  Plan 
Lansdale  Report:   2.7,  2.442.  See  also 

Lansdale,  Maj.  Gen.  Edward  G. 
Lao  Armed  Forces  (FAL):  2.646.  See 

also  Laos 

Lao  Dong  Party:  2.820;  Resolution  of 
Fifteenth  Plenum,  1.264;  Third  Na- 
tional Congress,  1.264;  unity  of  lead- 
ership in,  1.262.  See  also  Communist 
Party,  North  Vietnamese 

Laos:  3.257,  3.296,  3.316,  3.681;  agree- 
ment with  GVN,  3.160;  air  opera- 
tions in,  2.344,  3.165-166,  3.195-197, 
3.514,  3.515-516,  3.523-524,  3.543, 
3.629,  4.535,  4.595;  air  reconnais- 
sance over,  3.181-182;  armed  recon- 
naissance in,  3.160,  3.251,  3.253-254; 


Subject  Index/43 

border  operations,  2.89,  2.142,  2.195, 
2.327;  cease-fire,  2.3,  2.6,  2.42,  2.47, 
2.810-812,  3.197;  Communist  offen- 
sive against,  2.22,  2.33,  2.42,  3.165- 
166  (see  also  Pathet  Lao;  Plaine  des 
Jarres);  Communist  threat  to,  1.537, 
4.582  (see  also  Pathet  Lao);  confer- 
ence on,  2.330,  3.171,  3.197,  3.523, 
3.684,  3.691  (see  also  14-Nation  Con- 
ference; Geneva  Conference,  1962); 
contingency  plans  for,  2.672-673;  co- 
vert activity  in,  2.276,  2.653,  3.195- 
196,  3.254,  3.508,  3.610;  cross  bor- 
der air  operations,  3.156-157;  cross 
border  ground  operations,  3.156-157, 
3.190,  3.195-197,  3.502,  3.539-540, 
3.585;  and  Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.485; 
DRV  infiltration,  3.250,  4.295,  4.517; 
Eisenhower  administration  and,  2.636; 
expansion  of  war  into,  4.491-492; 
14-nation  declaration  on,  2.162,  2.174- 
175;  French  Union  and,  1.397;  and 
Geneva  Conference,  1.136-139,  1.154- 
157,  1.535;  ground  operations  in, 
3.195-196,  3.498,  3.524,  3.535;  GVN 
troops  in,  3.585,  4.443-444;  and  Hono- 
lulu Conference,  3.174  (see  also 
Honolulu  Conference:  June  1964); 
independence  of,  1.593;  JCS  on,  2.74, 
3.158-159;  and  JCS  Program  A,  4.421; 
JCS  Rules  of  Engagement,  3.570-571; 
JFK  and,  2.806,  2.807,  2.819;  neu- 
tralist faction  in,  2.51;  neutrality  of, 
2.174,  2.819;  NSAM  249  on,  2.726; 
NVA/VC  buildup  in,  4.519;  Opera- 
tion HIGH  PORT,  4.443;  Panhandle 
operations,  3.527,  3.536,  3.547,  3.550, 
3.552,  3.563-565,  3.576;  population 
of,  2.819;  projected  targets  in,  3.566- 
568;  as  sanctuary,  4.337,  4.527;  State- 
ISA  on,  3.159;  tripartite  negotiations, 
2.75,  3.197-198,  3.525,  3.528,  3.534; 
U.S.  embarrassment  in,  2.55;  and 
U.S.  ground  forces,  2.22,  4.485-486; 
U.S.  negotiations  with,  3.159-160, 
4.444;  U.S.  objectives  in,  3.518-519; 
U.S.  policy  in,  2.31,  2.32-33,  3.526, 
3.535;  and  U.S.  Vietnam  policy,  2.1, 
2.22-23,  2.39,  2.44,  2.51,  2.56,  2.63, 
2.97,  2.109,  2.112,  2.116,  2.118-119, 
2.146,  2.161,  2.174,  2.193;  Viet  Cong 
infiltration,  2.175,  2.696;  Viet  Minh  in- 
vasion of,  1.86 

Laos  annex.  See  Gilpatric  Task  Force: 
Laos  annex  to  report 

Laotian  corridor.  See  Laos:  DRV  infil- 
tration; Laos:  Viet  Cong  infiltration 


Subject  Index /AA 

Last  Reflections  on  a  War:  1 . 1 

Latin  America:  4.636 

Leaflets:  dropping  of,  2.641.  See  also 
Propaganda 

League  for  the  Independence  of  Viet- 
nam. See  Viet  Nam  Doc  Lap  Dongh 
Minh  Hoi 

Legality:  of  Thailand  move,  2.812-813; 

of  U.S.  efi^orts  in  SV,  4.651 
LeTourneau-Allard  plan:  1.410 
"Let's  Go."  See  Operation  Dang  Tein; 

Operation  Let's  Go 
Leverage:  2.478-480,  2.498,  2.501-504, 

4.578;  French,  1.53-54;  Katzenbach  on. 

2.592;  McNamara  position  on,  2.480; 

PROVN  study  on,  2.501;  State  Dept. 

study  on,  2.404-406 
Levy  case:  4.388 

"Liberation  Army":  of  VC,  2.655 

Lien  Minh:  1.578 

Lien  Viet:  1.46 

LIMDIS  19118:  3.438-440 

"Limited  Holding  Actions  in  Southeast 
Asia":  2.75 

Limited  partnership:  2.94,  2.104,  2.128- 
129,  2.137,  2.147,  2.153,  2.409-410, 
2.449,  2.450,  2.452,  2.498,  2.652-653. 
See  also  Advisors,  U.S.;  Advisory  ef- 
fort 

Locarno:  1.142,  1.143.  See  also  South- 
east Asia:  collective  defense  of 

LOC-cut:  concept  of,  3.273.  See  also 
Targets:  LOG  as 

Long  An  Province:  2.150,  3.28,  3.30; 
counterinsurgency  in,  2.310;  USOM 
report  on,  2.481 

Long  Toan  District:  3.26 

Los  Angeles  Times:  4.266,  4.592 

Lottery  scandal:  2.706 

MAAG.  See  Military  Assistance  Ad- 
visory Group 

MACCORDS:   2.404,  2.406,  2.575 

MACV.  See  Military  Assistance  Com- 
mand, Vietnam 

Maddox,  USS:  2.329,  3.182-185,  3.519, 
3.521,  3.719.  See  also  Tonkin  Gulf 
crisis 

MAF.  See  Marine  Corps,  U.S.:  am- 
phibious force 

Malaya:  2.650;  insurgency  in,  2.164; 
U.S.  economic  aid  to,  1.441 

Malay  Federation:  2.818 

Malaysia:  3.267 

Mandate  for  Change:  1.146 

Manifesto  of  the  Eighteen.  See  Cara- 
velle  Manifesto 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Manila  Conference:  2.287,  2.387-388, 
2.516,  2.519,  2.600,  2.607,  2.609; 
Joint  Communique  of,  4.394;  Asst. 
Sec.  McNaughton  at,  4.360;  Gen. 
Westmoreland  at,  4.360 

Manila  Pact:  1.212,  2.42,  2.45,  3.719. 
See  also  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Or- 
ganization 

Manpower:  U.S.  needs  for,  \ All-All. 
See  also  Mobilization,  U.S.;  Troops, 
U.S. 

Mansfield  mission:  2.816;  report  of, 
2.225 

Mansfield  Report:  1.222-223 
Mansfield  Resolution:  4.455 
MAP.  See  Military  Assistance  Program 
"Marching  North":   concept  of,  3.512, 
3.531 

Marine  Corps,  U.S.  (USMC):  2.178; 
amphibious  force,  2.517,  2.533;  bat- 
talion landing  teams,  2.472;  casualties 
of,  3.460;  Combined  Action  Com- 
panies, 2.400;  at  Da  Nang,  2.331, 
2.356,  3.5,  3.96,  3.389-390,  3.417, 
3.418-419,  3.423,  3.431,  3.433,  3.450 
{see  also  Da  Nang);  deployment  of, 
2.355,  4.540,  4.543;  Fifth  Division, 
4.549;  helicopter  unit,  2.179;  involve- 
ment in  local  politics,  2.536;  9th  Am- 
phibious Brigade,  4.531;  and  pacifica- 
tion, 2.528;  and  reserve  call-up,  4.645; 
rifle  squads,  2.476;  seaborne,  2.783, 
2.789;  successes  of,  2.533;  TAOR  of, 
3.459;  and  Taylor,  3.455 

Marine  Expeditionary  Force  (MEF): 
III,  2.355,  4.544;  IV,  4.546.  See  also 
Marine  Corps,  U.S. 

Marines,  RVN:  2.656 

Maritime  operations  (Marops):  3.92, 
3.203,  3.606,  3.680,  3.682 

Market  Time  area:  4.538 

Marops.  See  Maritime  operations 

Marshall  Plan:  2.747 

"Masher"  movements:  2.552.  See  also 
Operation  MASHER 

MAYFLOWER:  3.274,  3.378.  See  also 
Bombing  program;  Project  Mayflower 

McNamara-Taylor  mission:  2.184-189, 
2.247-252,  2.256,  3.20,  3.27;  recom- 
mendations of,  2.205-206,  2.254-255, 
2.274;  report  of,  2.164,  2.751-766, 
3.47.  See  also  Taylor  mission 

MDAP.  See  Mutual  Defense  Assistance 
Program 

MEDCAP  program:   2.358,  3.427 
Media:  3.23;  on  Da  Nang  landing,  3.426; 
Ky's  use  of,  2.371.  See  also  Credi- 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

bility  gap;  News  media;  Propaganda; 
Public  opinion 

Medical  teams:  2.551 

MEF:  2.355,  4.544.  See  also  Marine 
Corps,  U.S. 

Mekong  Delta:  2.138,  2.141,  2.177, 
2.570;  conditions  in,  2.275;  military 
problems  in,  2.186,  2.249;  pacifica- 
tion in,  2.129,  2.140,  2.142,  2.144, 
2.146,  2.148-150,  2.674,  2.677,  2.679, 
2.681,  2.707,  2.720;  priority  of,  3.18, 
3.23,  3.25,  3.27;  RVNAF  in,  4.565; 
Viet  Cong  in,  2.254,  2.695,  3.495; 
war  in,  2.231,  2.243,  2.245,  2.248, 
2.250,  2.276,  2.303,  2.305,  3.499.  See 
also  Corps,  IV 

Mekong  River:  controls  on,  3.551-552; 
flood,  2.14,  2.123 

Mendenhall-Krulak  mission :  3.20 

Mendes-France  government:  1.209.  See 
also  Mendes-France,  Pierre 

Meo  tribes:  2.646-647 

"Metropolitan  France":  1.367 

Middle  East:  1.425 

Middle-of-the-roaders:  4.559-560.  See 
also  Public  opinion 

Mid-May  Briefing  Book:  3.61 

MIG:  3.335,  3.536,  3.547 

Military  Academy,  Vietnamese:  2.510 

Military  and  Political  Actions  Recom- 
mended for  SVN:  A.ei'i-^ilA 

Military  Assistance  Advisory  Group, 
Vietnam  (MAAG):  1.108,  1.197, 
1.523,  2.3,  2.7,  2.11,  2.438,  3.28; 
advisory  teams  of,  2.658  {see  also 
Advisors,  U.S.;  Advisory  effort);  chief 
of,  2.70;  counterinsurgency  effort  of, 
2.19,  2.436;  Diem's  requests  for, 
2.446;  early  activities  of,  2.433-2.435; 
expansion  of,  2.62,  2.176;  and  Franco- 
Viet  Minh  War,  1.78,  1.456;  French 
restrictions  on,  1.200-201;  Geneva 
limits  on,  2.433;  increase  of,  2.8,  2.27, 
2.34,  2.37-38,  2.90,  2.107,  2.453-454, 
2.638;  inspections  by,  1.497;  Johnson 
mission  and,  2.59;  and  paramilitary 
forces,  2.434-435;  phase-out  policy 
of,  2.179;  reduction  of,  2.178;  regional 
coordination  of,  1.446;  and  Sec.  of 
Defense,  2.469 

Military  Assistance  Command,  Civil  Op- 
erations and  Revolutionary  Develop- 
ment Support  (MAACORDS):  2.404, 
2.406,  2.575 

Military  Assistance  Command,  Vietnam 
(MACV):  2.177-178,  2.280,  2.335, 
2.388,  2.456,  2.486,  3.29;  on  advisory 


Subject  Index/45 

effort,  2.287-288,  2.469;  advisory  re- 
quirements of,  2.513;  airlift  of,  2.373; 
and  ARVN,  2.381,  4.466-467;  on  CIA- 
MACV  Director  of  Intelligence,  2.586; 
civilian  influence  on,  2.487;  Command 
History,  4.296,  4.304-305,  4.308, 
4.406;  and  Diem  coup,  2.783;  Direc- 
tive 525-4,  4.301;  estimate  of  enemy 
forces,  4.381;  expansion  of,  2.462- 
463;  failure  of  strategy,  4.386-387; 
force  requirements  of,  4.427,  4.514; 
GVN  relations  and,  2.364;  on  Hop 
Tac,  2.523;  and  Khanh  coup,  2.354; 
Amb.  Komer  and,  2.620;  Monthly 
Evaluation  Reports  of,  2.518,  2.545- 
548;  operations,  4.333,  4.447-454;  op- 
timism of,  3.345;  pacification  and, 
2.572-573,  2.587,  2.616,  3.442-443; 
pessimism  of,  3.2;  phase-out  policy  of, 
2.179;  PROVN  report  on,  2.578- 
579;  and  RD,  2.488-494,  2.593;  re- 
duction of,  2.176;  reorganization  of, 
2.594,  2.620;  requirements  of,  4.320, 
4.472,  4.584;  and  Sec.  of  Defense, 
2.469,  3.70;  statistics  of,  2.771-780; 
"Summary  of  Highlights,"  2.180;  on 
training  teams,  2.465-466;  troop  de- 
ployments and,  3.429;  Gen.  Wheeler 
on,  4.547 

Military  Assistance  Program  (MAP): 
1.200,  2.160,  2.162,  2.474,  3.64;  ceil- 
ings for,  2.176-177,  2.190,  2.197;  de- 
crease in,  2.164,  2.180-181;  funds  for, 
2.253,  3.466;  FY  64,  2.179,  2.190, 
2.306;  FY  65-69,  2.179,  2.191;  5-year 
projections  of,  2.194;  increase  in,  2.163, 
2.195,  2.275,  3.507;  reshaping  of,  2.801; 
SVN  force  estimate  of,  2.181-182 

Military  Defense  Assistance  Act,  1949: 
1.36 

Military  operations:  chronology  of, 
3.117-149;  increasing  effectiveness  of, 
4.625;  locations  of,  4.411;  1968  op- 
tions, 4.572;  offensive,  1.510,  4.548, 
4.563;  overt  action,  3.106,  3.161-162; 
paramilitary,  2.683;  Phase  I,  2.344, 
3.5,  4.290,  4.296,  4.303;  Phase  II, 
2.344,  2.350,  3.5,  4.296-297,  4.302, 
4.305-307,  4.318-320,  4.322;  Phase 
III,  4.296;  political  tension  and,  2.760 

Military  pressures:  covert,  3.108;  objec- 
tives of,  3.270.  See  also  Democratic 
Republic  of  (North)  Vietnam:  U.S. 
military  pressures  on 

Military  procurement  program:  4.455 

Military  Revolutionary  Committee 
(MRC):  2.347,  3.17 


Subject  Index/46 

Military  Revolutionary  Council  (MRC): 
2.207,  2.303,  2.333,  2.341,  3.32;  as 
politicians,  2.307 

Military  solution:  4.588,  4.603-604 

Military  strategy,  U.S.:  4.368-372;  for 
borders  and  sanctuaries,  4.402;  Course 
A,  4.481-486;  Course  B,  4.486-489; 
emphasis  on  pacification,  4.327;  and 
JCS,  4.300;  large  unit  operations, 
4.408-409;  McCone  on,  3.101;  mobile 
defense,  4.386  (see  also  Combined 
Campaign  Plan,  1967);  naval  surface 
operations,  4.421-423;  net  and  spear, 
2.6,  2.24;  political  costs  of,  3.201;  pos- 
sibilities of,  3.181;  pressure  against 
DRV,  3.84,  3.152-153,  3.169-170, 
3.200,  3.215-220,  3.226,  3.232,  3.670; 
Gen.  Westmoreland  and,  3.176 

Minh  coup:  2.193,  2.200,  2.309 

Minh  government:  and  Buddhists,  2.306; 
and  Catholics,  2.306;  Sec.  McNamara 
on,  3.494;  political  tension  in,  2.308; 
U.S.  recognition  of,  2.207;  U.S.  sup- 
port for,  2.275.  See  also  Minh,  Gen. 
Duong  Van 

Mining:  aerial,  4.140;  of  DRV  inland 
waterways,  4.212-213,  4.422;  of  DRV 
ports,  4.74,  4.173,  4.212,  4.243-244, 
4.245,  4.415,  4.422-423,  4.485,  4.534; 
of  Haiphong  harbor,  4.257,  4.444- 
445;  projected  Sino-Soviet  reaction  to, 
4.173,  4.485 

Ministry  of  Revolutionary  Development 
(MORD) :  2.288,  2.562.  See  also  RD 

Ministry  of  Rural  Construction  (MRC): 
2.365 

Minorities:   exploitation  of,  2.683.  See 

also  Tribes 
Minute  of  Understanding:  1.224-225 
Missiles,  SAM:   4.258,  4.535.  See  also 

Weapons 

Mission  Council:  2.515,  2.537-2.538.  See 
also  Country  Team;  Saigon  Embassy 

Mobile  Advisory  Logistics  Teams 
(MALTS):  2.513 

Mobile  Advisory  Teams  (MATS):  2.513 

Mobile  Riverine  Force  (MRF):  4.473, 
4.539 

Mobile  training  teams:  2.464-465,  2.608 

Mobilization,  GVN:  3.53;  Khanh's  ef- 
forts at,  3.49,  3.59-60 

Mobilization,  U.S.:  1.466,  4.527;  news 
media  and,  4.511;  public  reaction  to, 
4.559.  See  also  Troop  deployments 

Model  M  plan.  See  Comprehensive  Plan 
for  South  Vietnam:  Model  M  Plan  of 

Mollet  Government:  1.209 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Montagnards:  2.77,  2.687,  3.18;  casu- 
alties of,  2.772;  Commandos,  2.721; 
discontent  of,  2.339;  dissidence  among, 
2.93,  2.339;  GVN  recruitment  of, 
2.678;  resettlement  of,  1.255,  1.312, 
2.680,  2.687-688,  2.708;  in  Special 
Forces,  2.644;  training  of,  2.568, 
2.717;  Viet  Cong  and,  2.712 

Morale,  SVN:  2.705;  and  campaign 
against  DRV,  2.329,  3.78,  3.84,  3.387, 
3.546;  and  flood  relief,  2.85,  2.88; 
loss  of,  2.106,  2.111,  2.231,  2.312, 
2.339,  3.94,  3.534;  and  U.S.  military 
presence,  2.91,  2.93,  2.118.  See  also 
Democratic  Republic  of  (North) 
Vietnam:  morale  of 

Morton,  USS:  3.194 

Moscow  Declaration  of  1960:  1.265 

Movement  for  the  Defense  of  Peace 
(MDP):  1.344 

MRC.  See  Military  Revolutionary  Com- 
mittee; Military  Revolutionary  Coun- 
cil; Ministry  of  Rural  Construction 

MTT:  2.466 

"Mule  Train":  2.178 

Murday  Report:  2.350 

Mutual  Aid  Family  Group:  1.312 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Program 
(MDAP):  forces  supported  by,  1.490- 
491;  French  restrictions  of,  1.200- 
201;  and  French  Union  forces,  1.492; 
funds  from,  1.370;  Indochina  war  and, 
1.515;  1949  appropriations  under,  1.36 

Mutual  Security  Program:  1.590,  1.622- 
624,  1.627 

My  Tho:  2.718,  2.724 

Nambo  Regional  Committee  (NRC): 
2.694 

Nambo  sector:  2.655,  3.383 

Nam  Tha:  attack  on,  2.812 

Napalm:  3.334-335,  3.514;  in  Laos, 
3.254,  3.516.  See  also  Weapons 

National  Assembly,  SVN:  2.6;  disso- 
lution of,  2.271;  elections  of,  2.246- 
247,  2.252;  power  of,  2.634;  U.S. 
troops  and,  2.106 

National  Bank,  RVN:  2.389 

National  Board  of  Estimates:  on  POL 
strikes,  4.62 

National  Campaign  Plan  (NCP):  2.176- 
177,  2.224 

National  Defense  College:  2.510 

National  Directorate  of  Coordination: 
2.646-647 

National  Executive  Council:  2.101 

National     Government     of  Vietnam: 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

French  departure  and,  1.561.  See  also 
Vietnam 

National  Intelligence  Estimates  (NIE): 
on  Chinese  intervention,  1.187;  on 
consequences  of  Dien  Bien  Phu,  1.482- 
487;  on  counterinsurgency  effort, 
2.164,  2.180,  2.224,  2.275,  2.276;  on 
Diem  coup,  2.69;  on  Diem  gov't, 
1.266-267,  1.297-298,  2.18,  2.20, 
2.69-70;  on  political  situation  in  SVN, 
4.391-392;  Probable  Developments  in 
Indochina  through  mid-1954,  1.391- 
404;  Probable  Developments  in  Viet- 
nam to  July  1956,  1.297;  on  SEATO 
force  commitment,  2.77;  on  VC/ 
PAVN  strength,  2.75,  4.302,  4.325.  See 
also  SNIE 

Nationalist  China.  See  Republic  of 
China 

Nationalist  Party  of  Vietnam  (VNQDD) : 
1.292,  2.709.  See  also  Vietnamese  Na- 
tional Party 

National  Leadership  Committee:  3.434 

National  Liberation  Front  (of  South 
Vietnam)  (NLF):  2.364,  2.691, 
2.693,  2.698;  attack  on  U.S.  officers 
billet,  3.262;  Communist  role  in,  1.259, 
1.341,  1.345;  DRV  control  of,  1.265, 
1.345-346,  4.304;  DRV  support  of, 
3.64;  8-point  program  of,  1.342;  for- 
mation of,  1.258-259,  1.339-340; 
four-point  manifesto  of,  1.342-343; 
international  support  for,  2.713;  leader- 
ship of,  1.343-344;  Liberation  Army 
of,  1.259,  1.345;  membership  of,  1.259; 
military  success  of,  2.363-364;  neu- 
tralist coalition,  3.207;  organization 
of,  1.344;  post-Diem  policy  statement 
of,  2.273-274;  proposed  role  in  GVN, 
4.498;  on  reunification,  1.342-343; 
10-point  program  of,  1.340.  See  also 
People's  Revolutionary  Party;  Viet 
Nam  Cong-San 

National  Mobilization  Plan:  2.313;  ob- 
jectives of,  3.60;  revised,  3.505,  3.509 

National  Pacification  Plan.  See  Pacifi- 
cation Plan 

National  Police,  GVN:  2.585;  ARVN 
and,  2.495;  force  goals,  3.63;  increase 
of,  3.506;  and  urban  security,  4.557 

National  Press  Club:  4.217 

National  Priority  Areas:  2.483,  2.526, 
4.379,  4.381;  goals  of,  2.540;  Marines 
in,  2.535.  See  also  Pacification 

National  Psychological  Operations  Plan: 
3.45 

National  reconciliation:   2.388;  procla- 


Subject  Index/41 

mation  of,  2.400.  See  also  Chieu  Hoi 
Program 

National  Revolutionary  Civil  Servants 
League  (Lien  Doan  Cong  Chuc  Mang 
Quoc  Gia):  1.302 

National  Revolutionary  Congress  of  the 
Vietnamese  people:  1.234 

National  Security  Act:  3.49 

National  Security  Action  Memoranda 
(NSAM):  no.  52,  2.49-50,  2.445, 
2.446,  2.642-643;  no.  65,  2.11;  no. 
Ill,  2.17,  2.117,  2.174,  2.410,  2.449, 
2.454;  no.  124,  2.660;  no.  131, 
2.667-669;  no.  132,  2.666-667;  no. 
157,  2.672-673;  no.  162,  2.681-684; 
no.  182,  2.689-690;  no.  249,  2.726; 
no.  263,  2.769-770;  no.  273,  2.207, 
2.276,  2.457,  3.2,  3.17-19,  3.22,  3.28, 
3.496;  no.  288,  2.163,  2.277,  2.411- 
412,  2.459-461,  2.463,  2.577,  3.3-4, 
3.6,  3.18,  3.46,  3.50-56,  3.57,  3.61, 
3.287,  4.300,  4.500;  no.  314,  2.338, 
2.342,  3.88,  3.196,  3.236;  no.  328, 
3.6,  3.97,  3.100,  3.352,  3.447-448, 
3.454,  3.702-703;  no.  343,  2.518-519, 
2.567-568;  no.  362,  4.470;  on  air/ 
naval  war  against  DRV,  3.88,  3.245- 
246;  ground  troop  commitment,  3.447- 
448;  on  Khanh  gov't,  3.56-57;  on 
Laos,  3.88,  3.196,  3.245-246;  and 
McCone,  3.100;  on  pacification,  3.61, 
4.470-471;  strategic  guidelines  for, 
4.392;  on  troop  deployment,  3.447 

National  Security  Council,  GVN:  2.327 

National  Security  Council,  U.S.  (NSC): 
on  Chinese  intervention  in  Indochina, 
1.84,  1.88,  1.187;  on  collective  secu- 
rity in  Asia,  1.38-40;  consensus  among, 
3.236;  on  Diem  coup,  2.238;  on 
domino  theory,  1.83-84,  1.86;  on 
Franco-Viet  Minh  negotiations,  1.87; 
on  Geneva  Accords,  1.177;  on  Geneva 
Conference,  1.116-117,  1.118;  Indo- 
china report  of,  1950,  1.361-362;  on 
McNamara-Taylor  mission,  2.189;  on 
national  security  policy,  1.412-429; 
on  SE  Asia,  1.37-38,  1.375,  1.384- 
390,  1.435-443;  on  SE  Asian  com- 
munism, 1.76-77,  1.82,  1.186;  on  So- 
viet expansion,  1.185;  Task  Force 
Report,  2.49;  on  troop  commitment, 
2.47;  on  U.S.  aid  to  Indochina,  1.194, 
1.405-410;  on  U.S.  intervention  in 
Indochina,  1.91-92,  1.474;  on  U.S. 
objectives  in  Indochina,  1.198-200;  on 
U.S.  support  of  SVN,  1.267.  See  also 
National  Security  Council  meetings; 


Subject  Index /A^ 

National  Security  Council:  {cont'd) 
National    Security   Council  Working 
Group 

National  Security  Council  meetings:  May 
1954,  1.499-500;  May  1961,  2.9;  Oct. 
1961,  2.13,  2.79-80;  Nov.  1961,  2.116; 
Aug.  1963,  2.239,  2.240-241;  Sept. 
1963,  2.242-243,  2.246-247;  Oct.  1963, 
2.186,  2.187,  2.250-251,  2.257,  2.260; 
Nov.  1963,  2.191;  March  1964,  2.196, 
2.313;  July  1964,  2.199;  April  1965, 
3.445-450 

National  Security  Council  papers:  2.101, 
2.140,  2.188,  2.196;  48/1,  1.82;  48/2, 
1.82;  64,  1.83,  1.187,  1.194;  64/1, 
1.198-200;  124,  1.88;  124/2,  1.83-84, 
1.384-390;  162/2,  1.88;  177,  1.91-92; 
1074-a,  1.462-465;  5405,  1.86,  1.87, 
1.434-443,  1.452,  1.472,  1.474 

National  Security  Council  Working 
Group:  3.210,  3.288,  3.630;  "Action 
for  SVN,"  3.598-601;  on  Chinese  ex- 
pansionism, 3.218;  "Courses  of  Action 
in  SEA,"  3.588-590,  3.610-619,  3.619- 
621,  3.621-622,  3.622-628,  3.630-632; 
deviation  from  findings  of,  3.246;  di- 
vergent views  within,  3.217-220;  on 
DRV  resolve,  3.213,  3.215;  existing 
policy  objectives  for  SE  Asia,  3.216; 
fallback  policy  objectives  for  SE  Asia, 
3.216-217;  formation  of,  3.210;  on 
ground  force  commitments,  3.426-427; 
on  GVN  instability,  3.212;  intelli- 
gence estimate  of,  3.651-656;  JCS 
views,  3.231;  membership  of,  3.210; 
on  military  pressure  against  DRV, 
3.211,  3.221-225;  on  negotiations, 
3.225-228;  projected  reaction  to  pol- 
icy, 3.228-231;  Rostow  on,  3.234;  on 
strategic  importance  of  SVN,  3.219- 
220;  tasks  of,  3.211 

National  Training  Center:  2.351 

National  union:  1.57.  See  also  Unification 

National  United  Front:  1.120 

National  War  College:  2.669 

"Nation  building":  4.329 

NATO.  See  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Or- 
ganization 

Naval  surface  operations:  4.421-423 

Navarre  Plan:  1.86,  1.410-411,  1.434, 
1.437,  1.495.  See  also  Franco-Viet 
Minh  War 

Navy,  French:  1.404 

Navy,  RVN:  2.653,  2.656 

Navy,  U.S.  See  United  States  Navy 

Negotiations:  3.239,  3.247,  3.288,  3.332, 
3.351,    3.391,    3.611,    3.660,  3.664, 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Z.eil,  3.696,  3.699;  alternative  forms 
of,  3.589;  Wm.  Bundy  on,  4.446-447; 
Chinese  involvement  and,  4.59;  and 
Clifford  Group,  4.241;  danger  of  pro- 
longing, 3.248;  DRV  on,  4.169,  4.233, 
4.480;  Four-Point  Plan,  3.247;  inter- 
national diplomatic  moves,  3.346-347; 
international  support  for,  3.188-189, 
4.54;  and  ISA,  4.264;  JCS  and,  4.357; 
military  pressure  and,  3.225-228;  non- 
communist  Asians  on,  4.617-618;  pub- 
lic pressure  for,  3.354;  Rusk  and, 
3.331;  Soviet  involvement  and,  4.59; 
U.S.  bargaining  points  and,  3.225- 
226,  3.246;  U.S.  terms,  3.167-168, 
3.169-170,  3.227.  See  also  Compro- 
mise solution 

Neo-colonialism:  2.477 

"Net  and  spear"  concept:  2.6,  2.24 

Neutral  governments:  Vietnam  policy 
and,  2.113 

Neutralism:  2.343,  3.39,  3.675 

Neutralization:  3.496,  3.502-503,  3.511, 
3.712;  French  support  of,  3.188 

Neutral  Nations  Supervisory  Commis- 
sion for  Indochina:  1.140,  1.536.  See 
also  Cease-fire;  International  Control 
Commission 

New  Life  Hamlets:  2.158.  See  also  Stra- 
tegic Hamlet  Program 

News  media:  on  Buddhist  crisis,  2.227; 
Bundy's  criticism  of,  3.309;  on  Pleiku 
reprisal  actions,  3.307;  on  McNamara- 
Taylor  Mission,  2.188;  on  mobilization, 
4.511;  on  restraints,  2.306-307;  USG 
secrecy  and,  3.254,  3.256;  on  U.S. 
role  in  SVN,  3.25.  See  also  The  New 
York  Times;  Propaganda;  Public 
opinion 

New  Vietnam  Party:  1.44 

Newsweek:  3.307 

New  York  Daily  News,  The:  2.556,  4.389 
New  York  Herald  Tribune,  The:  2.555- 
556 

New  York  Post,  The:  2.557 

New  York  Times,  The:  2.554,  2.556, 
2.558-559,  3.307,  4.135,  4.262-263, 
4.455,  4.512,  4.527;  administration 
message  in,  2.103;  barred  from  Viet- 
nam, 2.306;  Diem  interview  with, 
2.102;  on  Halberstam  article  in,  2.231, 
3.23;  on  helicopter  arrival,  2.126- 
127;  Kennedy-Diem  letters  in,  2.17, 
2.115;  on  Program  5,  4.527;  ques- 
tions on  U.S.  objectives,  3.263;  Saigon 
Bureau  chief  of,  2.544;  on  Taylor 
Mission,  2.82;  on  troop  deployment. 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

4.591;  on  Westmoreland's  request, 
4.585 

New  Zealand:  3.257;  and  bombing 
policy,  4.251;  troop  contributions  of, 
4.470,  4.524.  See  also  ANZUS 

NFLSV.  See  National  Liberation  Front 
of  South  Vietnam 

Ngo  family:  2.456;  Lodge  on,  2.790; 
power  of,  2.790.  See  also  Diem  fam- 
ily; Nhu  family;  Nhu,  Madame;  Nhu, 
Ngo  Dinh 

Nguoi  Viet  Tu  Do:  1.316 

Nhan  Dan:  on  partitioning  of  Indochina, 
1.134;  on  San  Antonio  formula,  4.206, 
4.233 

Nha  Trang:  2.10 

Nhu  family:  2.716;  removal  of,  2.740; 
U.S.  attitude  toward,  2.727,  2.737, 
2.741.  See  also  Diem  family;  Ngo 
family;  Nhu,  Madame;  Nhu,  Ngo  Dinh 

NIE.  See  National  Intelligence  Estimates 

19th  parallel:  3.288,  3.300,  3.318-319, 
3.326,  3.335-336 

"94  target  list":  3.288 

Ninh  Thuan  Province:  2.687 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO):  1.36,  1.203,  1.419,  1.599; 
on  compromise  solution  in  SVN, 
4.619;  French  in,  1.454 

Northern  Dai  Viets:  1.578 

Northern  Highlands:  2.122 

North  Vietnam.  See  Democratic  Repub- 
lic of  Vietnam  (DRV) 

North  Vietnamese  Army  (NVA) :  in 
DMZ,  4.479;  in  Laos,  4.683;  in  SVN, 
4.683;  threat  of,  4.675.  See  also 
NVA/VC 

NSAM.  See  National  Security  Action 
Memoranda 

Nuclear  test  ban:  2.830 

Nuclear  testing:  2.816 

Nuclear  weapons:  Chinese  intervention 
and,  1.512;  use  of,  1.88,  1.466,  2.322, 
3.65,  3.175,  3.238.  See  also  Weapons 

NVA/VC  (also  NVA/NLF) :  final  an- 
nihilation phase  of,  4.332;  MR5  high- 
lands and,  4.305;  Main  Forces  cam- 
paign plan  of,  4.518;  strategy  of,  4.321; 
Taylor  on,  3.82.  See  also  North  Viet- 
namese Army;  PAVN/VC;  Viet  Nam 
Cong-San 

NVN.  See  Democratic  People's  Repub- 
lic of  (North)  Vietnam 


O'Daniel    Mission:     1.411.    See  also 
O'Daniel,  Gen.  John  W. 


Subject  Index/49 

Office  of  Civil  Operations  (OCO):  2.393, 
2.413,  2.486,  2.489;  accomplishments 
of,  2.614;  establishment  of,  2.487, 
2.516,  2.526,  2.564,  2.606,  2.609, 
2.612;  under  MACV,  2.610;  province 
representatives,  2.487,  2,613;  Regional 
Directors,  2.487,  2.489,  2.520,  2.612; 
relations  with  Washington,  2.615;  re- 
placement of,  2.487 
Office  of  Defense  Mobilization:  1.423 
Office  of  National  Estimates:  4.52 
Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
(OSD):  1.194,  2.470;  and  Clifford 
Group,  4.240;  post-Tonkin  crisis  views, 
3.199,  3.204-205;  Systems  Analysis: 
2.383,  2.512  (see  also  Systems  Analy- 
sis); terminates  CPSUN,  2.197-198. 
See  also  Department  of  Defense,  U.S.; 
McNamara,  Robert  S. 
Office  of  Strategic  Services  (OSS):  1.7, 
1.16 

Oil:  in  SE  Asia,  1.450 

"Oil  blot"  concept:  2.482 

"Oil  spot"  concept:  2.142,  2.313,  2.325, 

2.464,  2.481,  2.522,  3.43-44,  3.505 
Okinawa:  3.320;  1st  Special  Group  on, 

2.644,  2.646 
Okinawa  Station:  2.649 
173rd  Airborne  Brigade:  3.450,  3.457- 

458 

101st  Airborne  Division.  See  Airborne 

Division,  101st 
Open  Arms  program:   2.481.  See  also 

Chieu  Hoi  program 
Operation  ADAMS:  4.409 
Operation  ATTLEBORO:  4.381 
Operation  BARREL  ROLL.  See  BAR- 
REL ROLL 
Operation  BEAU  CHARGER:  4.453 
Operation  BIRMINGHAM:  4.322,  4.334 
Operation  Black  Virgin:  3.383 
Operation   Brotherhood    (OB):  1.575- 

576,  2.640,  2.648 
Operation  BUCKSKIN:  4.322 
Operation    CEDAR    FALLS:  2.609, 

4.387,  4.408-409,  4.418;  U.S.  deaths 

from,  4.40 
Operation  CRAZY  HORSE:  4.321 
Operation  CRIMP:  4.322 
Operation  Dang  Tein:  2.150 
Operation  DANIEL  BOONE:  4.535 
Operation  DAVEY  CROCKETT:  4.321 
Operation  DECK  HOUSE  IV:  4.333 
Operation  DESOTO:  4.409,  4.447.  See 

also  DeSoto  Patrols 
Operation  DOUBLE  EAGLE  I:  4.321 
Operation  DOUBLE  EAGLE  II:  4.321 


Subject  Index/ 50 

Operation  EL  PASO  II:  4.334,  4.381 
Operation    FAIRFAX:     2.483,  2.516, 

4.409,  4.447;  and  pacification,  4.459 
Operation  FOOTBOY:  4.536 
Operation  FRANCES  MARION:  4.452 
Operation  GADSTON:  4.447 
Operation  Giai  Phong:  1.306 
Operation  Hai  Yen  II:  2.150,  2.686 
Operation  HARDNOSE:  3.495 
Operation  HARRISON:  4.321 
Operation  HASTINGS:  2.609,  4.333 
Operation  HICKORY:  4.453 
Operation  HIGH  FORT:  4.443 
Operation  HOT  SPRINGS:  4.321 
Operation    JUNCTION    CITY:  2.609, 

4.409,  4.447 
Operation  LAM  SON:  4.453 
Operation  Let's  Go:  2.702 
Operation  MALHEUR:  4.453 
Operation  MALLET:  4.322 
Operation  MARAUDER:  4.322 
Operation  MASHER:  4.321 
Operation  MASTIFF:  4.322 
Operation  Order  FLAMING  DART.  See 

FLAMING  DART 
Operation  OREGON:  4.321 
Operation  PAUL  REVERE:  4.333 
Operation  PAUL  REVERE  II:  4.334 
Operation  PAUL  REVERE  III:  4.334 
Operation  PAUL  REVERE  IV:  4.381 
Operation  PERSHING:  4.447 
Operation  Phuong  Hoang:  2.150 
Operation  PRAIRIE:  2.609,  4.333 
Operation  PRAIRIE  IV:  4.453 
Operation  ROLLING  STONE:  4.322 
Operation  Royal  Phoenix:  2.702 
Operation  SAM  HOUSTON:  4.447 
Operation  SEA  SWALLOW:  2.674-675, 

2.678,  2.701-702,  2.720 
Operation  SEINE:  4.409 
Operation  SILVER  BAYONET:  4.304 
Operation  SILVER  CITY:  4.322 
Operation  STARLIGHT:  3.461 
Operation  STEEL  TIGER:  3.338,  3.341. 

See  also  BARREL  ROLL 
Operation  Sunrise:  2.129,  2.144,  2.148- 

150,    2.152,    2.674-685,  2.701-702, 

2.720;  criticism  of,  2.151 
Operation  Take-Off :  2.404 
Operation  TEXAS:  4.321 
Operation  THAYER  II:  4.409,  4.447 
Operation  Triangle:  3.518 
Operation  UTAH:  4.321 
Operation  VAN  BUREN:  4.321 
Operation  Vulture  (Vautour):  1.97.  See 

also  Dien  Bien  Phu 
Operation  WHITE  WING:  4.321 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Operation      YANKEE     TEAM.  See 

YANKEE  TEAM 
Operations  Control  (OPCON):  2.786 
Operations  Control  Board  (OCB):  1.177 
Operations  Coordinating  Board  (OCB): 

1.217,  1.434 
OPLAN:  32-64,  3.427;  33,  3.510;  37-64, 

3.198,  3.287-288;  39-65,  3.636,  3.427; 

99,  3.510 

OPLAN  34A:  2.327-329,  2.331,  2.333, 
3.183,  3.252,  3.316,  3.510-511,  3.525- 
526,  3.534,  3.536,  3.560,  3.562,  3.606, 
3.671;  acknowledgment  of,  3.535;  pro- 
cedures of,  3.571;  resumption  of, 
3.543-545,  3.547-548,  3.551-552, 
3.565,  3.585;  schedule  of,  3.553-554 

Optimism:  2.458-459,  3.24;  of  Sec. 
Acheson,  1.383;  of  Amb.  Bunker, 
4.516;  of  Forrestal,  2.717;  of  Gen. 
Harkins,  2.786-787;  of  Johnson  Ad- 
ministration, 2.610;  of  Amb.  Komer, 
4.390-391;  of  Gen  Krulak,  2.243;  of 
Sec.  McNamara,  2.224,  3.21;  in 
NSAM  273,  3.19-20;  about  phase- 
out  policy,  2.174-175,  2.180,  2.185, 
2.187-188,  2.190,  3.17;  of  SACSA, 
2.192;  of  Adm.  Sharp,  4.228;  of  Amb. 
Taylor,  3.434-436;  of  Sir  Robert 
Thompson,  2.225;  of  Gen.  Westmore- 
land, 4.570 

Option  A:  evaluation  of,  3.228;  pro- 
visions of,  3.223 

Option  B:  evaluation  of,  3.229;  pro- 
visions of,  3.224 

Option  C:  3.227;  evaluation  of,  3.228, 
3.230;  provisions  of,  3.224 

"Oriental"  approach:  2.503 

OSD.  See  Oflfice  of  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense 

OSD/ISA:  3.204 

OSS.  See  Office  of  Strategic  Services 
"Other  war":   2.98,   2.542,   2.556.  See 

also  Pacification 
Overflights:   of  DRV,   2.641.  See  also 

Armed  reconnaissance  flights 
Overseas  Press  Club:  4.217 

Pacific  area:  security  of,  2.57.  See  also 
Southeast  Asia 

Pacification:  2.313,  2.355,  2.362,  2.368, 
3.321;  administration  of,  3.61,  3.89;  and 
advisory  effort,  2.467,  2.472  (see  also 
Advisory  effort);  analysis  of,  2.356, 
2.366,  2.378-390,  2.507;  and  ARVN, 
2.596;  barometer  for,  2.504;  Amb. 
Bunker's  views  on,  2.616-618;  G.  Car- 
ver's   vision    of,    2.598;    chain  of 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

command,  2.620;  Civic  Action  teams 
in,  1.306-308;  civilian  approach  to, 
2.601,  3.94;  civil  service  reforms  un- 
der, 3.61;  as  COMUSMACV's  respon- 
sibility, 4.471;  decentralization  of, 
3.89;  definition  of,  2.570;  in  Delta 
{see  Mekong  Delta);  discrepancies  in, 
2.674;  economic  aspects  of,  3.55; 
effects  of  political  turmoil  on,  3.441- 
444;  effectiveness  of,  2.483,  4.348; 
emphasis  on,  2.413,  2.485,  2.545,  3.97, 
4.353;  failure  of,  2.198,  2.343,  3.667, 
4.374;  and  GVN,  2.532,  2.619,  4.351; 
Hop  Tac  Program  of,  2.521-527  {see 
also  Hop  Tac  Program);  implemen- 
tation of,  2.378,  2.468,  2.701-702;  im- 
provement of,  3.53;  intensification  of, 
3.324;  issues  of,  2.484-485;  JCS  and, 
2.599,  4.357;  Katzenbach  on,  4.506; 
Amb.  Komer  on,  2.571-574,  2.608, 
4.391;  Korean  forces  and,  4.398; 
LBJ's  emphasis  on,  2.517-518,  2.542; 
leverage  in,  2.504;  limitations  of, 
2.581,  2.674,  3.60;  MACV  and,  2.615; 
Marines  and,  2.517,  2.533,  2.559  {see 
also  Marine  Corps);  military  advisors 
involved  in,  2.484;  "military  compo- 
nent" of,  2.599;  military  support  of, 
2.548,  2.618;  new  hamlets  of,  2.550; 
nonmilitary  efforts,  2.369;  piaster 
funds  for,  2.479;  regression  of,  3.97; 
as  revolutionary  development,  2.494 
{see  also  RD);  and  ROLLING  THUN- 
DER, 3.323;  rural,  2.550  {see  also 
RD);  RVNAF  and,  2.484,  4.425;  and 
strategic  hamlets,  2.411;  Amb.  Tay- 
lor's analysis  of,  3.83  {see  also  Taylor, 
Gen.  Maxwell  G.:  on  pacification); 
U.S.  forces  and,  2.470,  2.531,  2.604, 
4.399,  4.458;  U.S.  support  for,  2.367, 
2.486,  2.515,  2.536-542,  2.622,  4.351; 
Vietnamese  concept  of,  2.550,  4.396. 
See  also  Clear  and  hold;  National 
Priorities  Areas;  RD;  Strategic  Hamlet 
Program 

Pacification  Council:  2.538 

Pacific  Command  (PACOM):  2.198, 
3.451,  3.628 

Pacific  Command  Study  Group:  3.342 

PACOM.  See  Pacific  Command 

PAD:  2.566 

Pagoda  raids:  2.202,  2.203,  2.228,  2.229, 
2.265,  2.734,  2.762;  repercussions 
from,  2.232,  2.236.  See  also  Buddhist 
crisis 

Panhandle,  Laotian:  2.673.  See  also  Laos 
Panhandle,  of  NVN:  4.165 


Subject  Index/51 

"Paper  tiger":  1.595,  3.189 
Paratroopers:  2.644 
Partition  lines:  1.540 

Pathet  Lao:  1.11,  2.12,  2.22,  2.42;  and 
DRV,  1.264;  Geneva  Accords  on, 
1.161;  Soviet  support  of,  2.636;  and 
U.S.  policy,  2.813;  withdrawal  from 
PDJ,  3.518.  See  also  Laos 

Pattle  Island:  2.402 

Pau  negotiations:  1.28,  1.60-61,  1.67 

PAVN  (People's  Army  of  [North]  Viet- 
nam): 1.204,  2.814;  troop  strength 
of,  4.303.  See  also  Democratic  Peo- 
ple's Republic  NVA/VC 

PER  (river  patrol  boats):  4.473 

PCHT  ( Packing-Crating-Handling-Trans- 
portation):  2.178 

PDJ.  See  Plaines  des  Jarres 

Peace  Bloc:  3.356,  3.357 

Peace  Corps:  2.640;  counterinsurgency 
work  and,  2.667 

Peace  demonstrations:  bombing  pause 
and,  4.36 

Peace  feelers:  4.205-206;  from  Hanoi, 
4.135 

Peace  offensive:  2.368 

Peasantry,  Vietnamese:  2.460,  2.635, 
2.662;  alienation  of,  2.153,  2.249,  3.74; 
anti- American  feelings  of,  1.252;  and 
counterinsurgency  effort,  2.312,  2.315, 
2.691;  discouragement  of,  3.501;  fi- 
nancial levies  on,  2.677;  and  GVN, 
2.576,  2.681,  2.685,  4.397;  living  stand- 
ards of,  2.556,  2.710;  political  apathy 
of,  2.151,  2.224,  2.698;  political  is- 
sues of,  1.254;  programs  for,  2.635 
{see  also  Strategic  Hamlet  Program; 
RD);  resettlement  of,  2.130,  2.131 
{see  also  Refugees);  and  security  prob- 
lem, 2.592;  unrest  among,  2.704;  and 
Viet  Cong,  2.687,  2.698 

Peking-Jakarta  axis:  3.267 

Pentalateral  Protocol  of  1950:  2.288 

People's  Army  of  (North)  Vietnam 
(PAVN).  See  PAVN 

People's  Daily:  1.155,  4.634,  4.636.  See 
also  Jen-mill  jih-pao 

People's  Republic  of  China  (CPR, 
PRP):  2.9,  3.189,  3.214,  3.644-645, 
4.665-666;  aid  to  DRV,  3.215,  4.57- 
58,  4.116,  4.137,  4.227;  on  armed 
struggle,  4.634;  on  bombing,  3.308, 
4.25,  4.41;  buffer  zone  of,  4.533;  con- 
tainment of,  3.217-218;  five  princi- 
ples of  peaceful  coexistence,  1.148; 
intervention  possibilities  of,  1.379, 
1.381-382,    1.388-390,    1.392,  1.399, 


Subject  Index/ 52 

People's  Republic  of  China:  (cont'd) 
1.432-433,  1.438,  1.442-443,  1.512- 
515,  2.78,  2.221,  3.397,  3.572-574, 
3.634,  3.636-639,  4.31,  4.50,  4.52, 
4.155,  4.164,  4.166,  4.444,  4.624;  JCS 
contingency  plans  and,  1.512-515;  LRJ 
on,  3.741;  Rusk  on,  3.724;  as  threat 
to  Southeast  Asia,  1.169,  1.436,  2.822, 
3.485,  3.592,  3.655,  4.674,  4.684;  on 
U.S.  border  violations,  1.530-531, 
4.198;  U.S.  recognition  of,  1.595;  on 
U.S.  in  Vietnam,  1.525-528 

People's  Revolutionary  Committee:  3.87 

People's  Revolutionary  Party:  1.259, 
1.345.  See  also  National  Liberation 
Front  of  South  Vietnam 

Personalism:  1.300-301 

Personalist  Labor  Revolutionary  Party. 
See  Can  Lao  Vi  Cach  Mang  Dang 

"Personalist  revolution":  concept  of, 
2.130.  See  also  Diem,  Ngo  Dinh: 
personalist  philosophy  of 

Personnel,  third  country:  2.683 

Personnel,  U.S.:  civil,  2.358;  increase  in, 
3.73;  military,  3.90;  under  Program 
4,  4.384.  See  also  Dependents,  U.S. 

Personnel  carriers:  2.195 

Pessimism:  re:  ARVN,  2.273;  Cassan- 
dras,  3.25;  Diem  gov't,  2.189;  Amb. 
Lodge's,  2.247;  about  military  situa- 
tion, 3.390;  Sec.  McNamara's,  2.192, 
2.311,  2.363,  3.21;  of  newsmen,  3.36; 
re:  rural  pacification,  3.52;  SACSA's, 
3.46;  of  SNIE,  3.42;  and  Strategic 
Hamlet  Program,  3.34,  3.35;  in  Wash- 
ington bureaucracy,  2.194,  3.23 

Pesticides:  stockpiling  of,  2.676 

Petroleum:  1.385,  1.436.  See  also  POL 

Pharmaceuticals:  2.676 

Phase-out  policy:  2.160-200;  announce- 
ment of,  2.160;  chronology  of,  2.165- 
173;  CPSVN  forecast  of,  2.179;  fu- 
ture of,  2.195-196;  after  Kennedy  as- 
sassination, 2.191;  motivation  for, 
2.173;  1000-man  withdrawal  and, 
2.188,  2.189;  rationale  behind,  2.161- 
162;  termination  of,  2.198,  2.200;  of 
U.S.  advisory  forces,  2.178.  See  also 
Withdrawal 

Phat  Diem  town:  1.136 

Phat/Duc  government:  2.338 

Philippines:  anti-Americanism  in,  2.57; 
insurgency  of,  2.164;  troop  contribu- 
tions of,  4.470,  4.524 

Photography:  2.89,  2.114.  See  also 
Reconnaissance,  flights 

Phou  Kout:  3.534,  3.543 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Phu  Bai:  2.476 

Phuc  Yen  airfield:  4.208 

Phuic  Tuy  Province:  2.144,  2.150 

Phuoc  Long  Province:  3.438 

Phuoc  Thanh:  2.70,  2.100 

Phuoc  Vinh:  VC  seizure  of,  2.12 

Phu  Yen  Province:  2.686;  Operation  Sea 
Swallow  in,  2.701 

Piaster:  devaluation  of,  2.364,  2.383, 
2.480;  distribution  of,  3.58;  evalua- 
tion of,  4.345;  limit  on,  4.343;  prob- 
lems created  by  lack  of,  3.68;  under 
Program  #4,  4.384;  rate  of  exchange 
for,  2.757;  troop  requirements  and, 
4.378,  4.430-431;  value  of,  2.758 

Piaster  ceiling:  CINCPAC  force  struc- 
tures and,  4.359;  JCS  and,  4.362;  and 
Program  #4,  4.363;  and  SVN  econ- 
omy, 4.459;  for  U.S.  elements  in  Viet- 
nam, 4.340 

Pilots  CAP:  1.445.  See  also  Air  Force 

Pilot-to-aircraft  ratio:  3.70 

PL  480:  2.252,  2.310 

Plaines  des  Jarres  (PDJ):  2.697,  3.188, 
3.196,  3.522;  reconnaissance  flights  in, 
3.253 

"Plan  of  Action  for  South  Vietnam": 
3.193,  3.199-200 

Pleiku  Airfield:  2.12,  2.658,  3.5,  3.93, 
3.270,  3.287;  VC  attacks  on,  3.271, 
3.286,  3.302,  3.303 

Pleiku  attack:  public  reaction  to,  3.307; 
and  Tonkin  Crisis,  3.304;  and  repri- 
sal operations,  3.304-306 

Pleiku-Kontum  area:  2.654 

Plei  Mrong:  VC  attack  on,  2.718 

"Plimsol  line":  4.385,  4.469 

POL  (petroleum,  oil,  lubricants)  supplies: 
4.62;  decision  to  strike,  4.102-106;  dis- 
persed storage  system  of,  4.61,  4.65, 
4.169;  vulnerability  of,  4.61 

POL  strikes:  4.79,  4.107-112;  "counter- 
infiltration"  and,  4.107;  delay  and  de- 
liberation, 4.58,  4.106;  international 
reaction  to,  4.108;  launching  of,  4.106; 
news  leak  on,  4.106;  orders  for,  4.105- 
106;  political  sensitivity  of,  4.105- 
106;  risk  of  counterescalation  and,  4.80; 
strategic  failure  of,  4.110-112 

Poland:  and  DRV  peace  feeler,  4.135 

Police,  National  (GVN):  AID  support 
of,  2.667;  in  combat,  2.232;  duties  of, 
2.497-498;  extension  of  police  system, 
2.675;  in  lieu  of  military,  2.140,  2.143, 
2.325;  pacification  and,  2.572;  repres- 
sion by,  2.289;  secret,  2.237.  See  also 
National  Police,  GVN 


Gravel  Edition/VoL  5 

Police  Aerial  Resupply  Unit  (PARU): 
2.645;  CIA  advisors  and,  2.646 

Police  Field  Force  (PFF):  2.528,  2.585, 
2.586 

Policy  Planning  Staff:  on  retargeting  of 
bombing,  4.264-265 

Political  commissars.  See  Political  Wel- 
fare Division 

Political  Settlement:  hypothetical,  4.613; 
problems  of,  3.225.  See  also  Negotia- 
tion 

Political  Welfare  Division:  2.707 
"Popular  Defense  Force":  2.313 
Popular  Forces:  2.497.  See  also  Self  De- 
fense Corps 
Popular  Force  Training  Centers:  2.513 
Population:  control  of,  2.325;  of  South- 
east Asia,   2.817;   urban,   2.224;  in 
Vietnamese  countryside,  2.505 
"Possible   Public   Reaction  to  Various 

Alternatives":  4.559 
Potsdam  Conference:  1.16 
PRACTICE  NINE  Requirement  Plan: 

4.412-413,  4.434 
PRAIRIE   FIRE:   4.214,   4.447,  4.535. 

See  also  Operation  Prairie 
Presidential  policy  review:  3.273 
"Presidential    Program    for  Vietnam": 
2.30-34 

President's  Special  Committee  on  Indo- 
china: 1.443 

Press,  U.S.:  complaints  against,  2.725; 
Diem's  image  and,  2.724,  2.744;  on 
Guam  Conference,  4.426;  on  POL 
strikes,  4.106;  speculation  on  policy, 
3.256.  See  also  News  media;  Public 
opinion 

PRIME  BEEF  unit:  4.544,  4.546 

Principals'  meeting  (Nov.  '64):  3.238, 
3.243,  3.244 

Priorities  Task  Force  in  Saigon,  Study 
of.  See  PROVN  Study 

Pri  Phap  area:  3.26 

Prisoners,  political:  2.344 

Prisoners,  of  war:  4.236;  bombing 
policy  and,  4.251;  interrogation  of, 
2.655,  2.703;  release  of  NVA,  2.368; 
Viet  Cong,  2.640 

Program  2-AR:  4.94 

Program  3:  4.320,  4.322 

Program  4:  4.527;  air  ordinance  con- 
sumption under,  4.382;  air  squad- 
rons under,  4.382,  4.383;  announce- 
ment of,  4.363-365;  as  antecedent  for 
Program  5,  4.385;  changes  in,  4.426; 
deployment  plan  summary,  4.365;  ex- 
planation of,  4.365-378;  helicopter  de- 


Subject  Index/ 53 

ployments  under,  4.384;  importance  of, 
4.385-387;  and  inflation,  4.464;  ICS 
ratification  of,  4.359;  NVA/VC  strat- 
egy and,  4.420;  sorties  under,  4.382, 
4.383;  Systems  Analysis  and,  4.459 

Program  5:  4.593,  4.602;  force  levels, 
4.515,  4.526,  4.548;  Sec.  McNamara 
and,  4.523;  opening  dialogue  on,  4.400; 
prelude  to,  4.387;  ratification  of,  4.527 

Program  for  National  Mobilization: 
2.195 

Program  6:  4.593,  4.594,  4.602 

Programs  A,  B,  and  C:  prepared  for 
LBJ,  4.420-423 

Project  Mayflower:  background  of,  3.362, 
3.368,  3.378.  See  also  MAYFLOWER 

Project  TAKEOFF:  2.502 

Propaganda,  Communist:  2.820,  4.67 

Propaganda,  French:  1.581 

Propaganda,  U.S.:  1.386,  3.554;  in  South- 
east Asia,  1.439;  USIS,  2.640,  2.763 

Propaganda,  Viet  Cong:  2.695,  2.698, 
2.771,  4.581 

Prosperity  and  density  centers  (khu  tru 
mat):  1.313;  VC  disruption  of,  1.338. 
See  also  Agrovilles 

Province  advisors:  2.326,  2.454.  See 
also  Advisors,  U.S. :  Advisory  effort 

Province  chiefs:  AID  and,  2.286,  2.724; 
cooperation  of,  2.100;  after  Diem  coup, 
2.462;  incompetence  of,  4.578;  and 
MACV,  2.607;  military  authority  of, 
2.62;  office  of,  2.24;  origins  of,  2.760; 
power  of,  2.135,  2.136,  2.140,  2.325; 
replacement  of,  2.312,  2.315,  3.501; 
role  of,  2.344,  2.554,  2.620,  2.688;  se- 
lection of,  2.551 

Province  Pacification  Committee:  2.675- 
676.  See  also  Pacification 

Provinces:  advisory  teams  in,  2.490. 
{See  also  Advisory  teams);  capitals  of, 
4.567;  critical,  2.521;  RVNAF  in, 
4.578;  survey  of,  2.89,  2.114 

Provincial  councils:  2.680 

Provincial  Forces:  purpose  of,  2.496- 
498 

Provincial  training  detachment:  2.464 

"Provisional  Constitutional  Act  No.  1": 
2.272.  See  also  Minh  government 

PROVN  study:  2.501,  2.519,  2.576, 
2.580-583;  "Program  for  the  Pacifica- 
tion and  Long  Term  Development  of 
SVN,"  2.379-380 

Psychological  operations  (Psyop).  See 
Psychological  warfare 

Psychological  warfare:  2.495,  2.582, 
2.644,  2.692,  2.762,  3.607 


Subject  Index/ 54 

Psyop.  See  Psychological  warfare 
Public  Administration  Division  (PAD): 
2.566 

Public  opinion,  French:  1.522 

Public  opinion,  U.S.:  1.381,  2.514,  3.174, 
3.236,  3.249,  4.99,  4.478,  4.561;  on 
bombing,  3.353,  3.354,  4.54;  on  bomb- 
ing pause,  4.623;  on  Diem,  2.751; 
effect  on  U.S.  policy,  2.325,  2.610; 
and  JCS  strategy,  4.495-496,  4.499- 
500;  manipulation  of,  3.304;  Mc- 
Naughton  and,  4.478-479;  of  non- 
military  activities,  2.543;  optimism  on 
Vietnam,  1.267-268;  after  Tet  offen- 
sive, 4.559 

Public  opinion,  Vietnamese:  4.570.  See 
also  Government  of  Vietnam:  popu- 
lar support  of 

Public  Safety:  2.676.  See  also  Aid,  eco- 
nomic 

Quang  Khe  Naval  Base:  3.325 

Quang  Nai  Province:  2.150,  2.686,  3.501 

Quang  Nam  Province:  3.501 

Quang  Ngai  Province:  4.433;  and  "Op- 
eration Royal  Phoenix,"  2.702 

Quang  Tri  Province:  4.569 

Quat  government:  2.472,  3.5;  coup  at- 
tempt and,  2.356 

Quebec  Conference,  Second:  1.10 

Quemoy  crisis :  1.616 

Qui  ap  settlement:  1.313 

Qw/ A'//w  settlement:  1.313 

Qui  Nhon:  helicopter  companies  at, 
2.657;  VC  attack  on,  3.271,  3.366 

"Radar  Busting  Week":  3.356 

Radar  installations:  bombing  of,  3.184 

Radar  surveillance:  installation  in  SVN 
of,  2.8,  2.39,  2.638;  during  Tonkin 
Gulf  crisis,  3.184,  3.185 

Radhakrishnan  proposal:  3.363 

Radio  Hanoi:  2.686,  2.698 

Radios:  village  program  of,  2.677 

Rail  system:  as  bombing  target,  3.341. 
See  also  Transportation 

RAND  Corporation:  4.341;  reports  of, 
4.345;  Single  Integrated  Attack  Team 
(SIAT)  proposal  of,  3.647;  VC  Moti- 
vation and  Morale  Study  of,  4.23,  4.47 

Ranger  units:  patrolling  of,  2.722;  sta- 
tistics of,  2.513 

Ranger  units.  Thai:  2.644-645 

Ranger  units,  Vietnamese:  2.678;  air- 
borne, 2.644;  disbanding  of,  2.385, 
2.584;  raids  of,  2.641.  See  also  Army 
of  the  Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Red   River  Delta:  2.818 

RD  (Revolutionary  Development  or 
Rural  Development):  2.489,  2.515, 
2.562,  4.379;  assignment  of  ARVN 
to,  4.376-377;  Cadre  program  of, 
2.568,  2.572,  2.582,  2.584,  4.388, 
4.409;  civilian  functions  of,  2.603;  and 
Combined  Command  Plan,  4.380;  crit- 
icism of,  2.393;  definition  of,  2.583; 
evaluation  of,  2.379,  2.394,  2.399;  im- 
portant areas  in,  4.434-435;  military 
support  for,  2.588;  Mobile  Training 
Teams  of,  2.395;  objectives  of,  2.622; 
OCO  assessment  of,  2.621-622;  as  pri- 
ority effort  of  ARVN,  4.330;  pur- 
pose of,  2.488;  security  weakness  of, 
4.388;  strategy  of,  2.385,  2.393;  suc- 
cess of,  4.351;  U.S.  civilian  support 
of,  2.618,  4.329;  U.S.  support  of, 
2.491,  2.492,  2.617;  U.S.  troops  and, 
2.609;  and  VC/NVA  strategy,  4.419. 
See  also  Civil  operations  and  Revo- 
lutionary Development  Support;  Pa- 
cification; Strategic  Hamlet  Program 

Real  New  Life  Hamlets  ("Ap  Doi 
Moi"):  2.621.  See  also  Strategic  Ham- 
let Program 

RECCE  STRIKE:  3.77 

Reconciliation:  national,  2.399;  policy  of, 
2.765,  4.46 

Reconnaissance  flights:  2.89,  2.114, 
3.291,  3.525,  3.607;  and  infiltration 
routes,  3.92;  over  Laos,  3.253,  3.264; 
low-level  over  DRV,  3.266,  3.296, 
3.686;  need  for,  2.381;  over  NVN, 
3.503;  in  Panhandle,  3.536;  and  SVN 
morale,  3.666.  See  also  Armed  recon- 
naissance operations 

Reforms:  civil  service,  3.61;  during 
Diem  regime,  2.25;  land,  1.254  {see 
also  Diem  government);  within  GVN 
Armed  Forces,  2.584.  See  also  Social 
reform 

Refugees:  2.648,  3.97;  camps  for,  2.551; 
in  labor  force,  2.524;  Montagnard, 
2.680  {see  also  Montagnards) ;  from 
NVN,  2.827;  problem  of,  1.576,  2.552; 
U.S.  ambivalence  toward,  2.569 

Regiments:  numbers  of,  2.513 

Regional  Forces:  numbers  of,  2.513; 
purpose  of,  2.496-497.  See  also  Civil 
Guard 

Religion:  in  Vietnam,  2.729,  3.71.  See 
also  Buddhist  crisis;  Catholic  church; 
Catholics 

Reporting  system:  Diem-Nhu,  2.201; 
falsification  in,  2.273;  inadequacy  of, 


Gravel  Edition/VoL  5 

2.164,  2.665;  Vietnamese  distortion 
of,  3.31.  See  also  Optimism 
Reprisal  actions:  2.353,  3.246,  3.250, 
3.266,  3.288,  3.296,  3.686;  conditions 
for,  3.295;  effectiveness  of,  3.294;  end 
to,  3.347;  February  1965  raids,  3.269, 
3.271;  increase  in,  3.153;  initiation  of, 
2.354,  3.270,  3.320;  intensification  of, 
3.682;  need  for,  3.190;  and  NVN 
provocations,  3.306,  3.680;  plans  for, 
3.299;  and  Pleiku,  3.303.  See  also 
Bombing;  Retaliatory  strikes;  Sustained 
reprisals 

Republican  National  Committee:  2.807 
Republican  Party  of  Vietnam:  2.709 
Republican  Youth:  1.311,  1.312,  2.721 
Republic  of  China:  2.641,  2.648-649, 
2.822;  agents  of,  2.290,  2.402;  forces 
of,  1.378,  1.443,  2.81-82,  2.652 
Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam:  anti- 
Americanism  in,  2.282,  2.289,  2.312, 
2.373,  2.377-378;  assassinations  in, 
1.336;  borders  of,  3.94;  casualties  of, 
2.772;  Catholic  refugee  population 
in,  1.291;  Communist  organizations 
in,  1.259;  communist  threat  to,  2.706; 
constitution  of,  2.369,  2.383-385; 
counterinsurgenjy  in,  1.268,  2.650, 
2.661,  2.699-704,  2.726;  defense  budget 
of,  2.352;  disruption  of  society  in, 
1.291-293;  DRV  insurgency  in,  1.260; 
economic  policy  of,  2.3;  economic  situ- 
ation in,  2.272,  2.721,  2.757-758, 
3.444,  4.459;  economic  stability  in, 
2.577,  4.400-401;  factionalism  in, 
3.88;  Franco- American  differences  on, 
1.211,  1.214,  1.221,  1.285^286; 
French  military  forces  in,  1.2;  global 
policy  and,  4.442-443;  guerrilla  op- 
erations in,  3.70;  GVN  control  over, 
4.375,  4.563;  history  of,  3.217;  iden- 
tity card  system,  2.675;  import  licens- 
ing in,  2.757-758;  independence  of, 
4.643;  kidnappings  in,  1.336;  leader- 
ship in,  3.24,  3.261;  military-civilian 
coordination  in,  2.721;  military  draft 
in,  3.261;  military  needs  of,  2.465; 
morale  in,  3.667,  3.669,  3.684,  4.502; 
nationalism  in,  4.457,  4.463;  neutral- 
ism in,  3.37-38;  pacification  program 
in,  1.254,  3.48-49,  4.313;  people  of, 
1.291,  3.42,  3.95;  political  deteriora- 
tion of,  3.228,  4.675;  politically  dis- 
tinctive regions  of,  1.291;  political 
situation  in,  3.76,  3.107-108,  3.261, 
3.345,  3.433-444;  political  tradition 
in,  2.665;  priority  zones  of,  2.522;  re- 


Subject  Index/55 

cruiting  campaign  in,  3.103;  refugees 
in,  1.248,  1.290;  rice  exports  of,  2.757; 
rural  pacification  plans  for,  1.305- 
314;  schools  in,  2.820;  security  of,  2.2, 
2.356,  2.830,  3.94;  Self  Defense  Forces 
of,  2.655  (see  also  Self  Defense 
Forces);  self-determination  of,  4.175; 
separate  armies  in,  2.720-721;  situa- 
tion analysis  of,  3.423-425;  strategic 
importance  of,  2.753,  2.821,  3.217, 
3.219,  3.220,  3.237;  terrain  of,  2.91; 
and  terrorism,  4.620;  Tripartite  talks 
on,  1.227-229,  1.235-239;  unification 
and,  3.249;  urban  situation  in,  1.256- 
257;  U.S.  aid  to,  1.268,  3.64  (see  also 
Aid,  economic;  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development);  U.S.  commit- 
ment to,  4.47-48;  U.S.  leadership  in, 
3.4;  U.S.  military  presence  in,  1954, 
1.182,  1.249-250,  2.438;  U.S.  objec- 
tives in,  1.213,  2.36,  3.497;  U.S.  pres- 
ence in,  2.472,  3.52,  4.24;  U.S.  role  in, 
2.380,  2.502,  2.826,  3.1-6,  3.18,  3.40, 
3.57,  3.74;  war  economy  of,  2.11, 
2.364,  2.366,  2.368,  2.369,  2.382-383, 
2.389;  See  also  GVN;  Vietnam 

Reserves:  mobilization  of,  4.385,  4.564; 
naval,  4.544;  need  for,  2.654 

Reserves  call-up:  3.484,  4.527,  4.591; 
Honolulu  Conference  and,  4.312, 
4.314;  JCS  on,  4.347,  4.437,  4.490, 
4.495,  4.542,  4.543,  4.545;  Under  Sec. 
Katzenbach  on,  4.506,  4.507;  LBJ  on, 
4.93-94,  4.299;  Sec.  McNamara  on, 
4.575;  McNaughton  on,  4.481;  in 
1968,  4.599;  New  York  Times  article 
on,  4.512;  Plimsoll  Line,  4.444;  politi- 
cal aspects  of,  4.314,  4.320;  and  troop 
deployments,  4.309,  4.541,  4.589, 
4.591;  and  U.S.  Army,  4.545 

Resettlement:  2.150;  in  Binh  Duong 
Province,  2.149;  losses  due  to,  2.153; 
prior  to  Strategic  Hamlet  Program, 
2.133-134;  resistance  to,  2.130,  2.131. 
See  also  Air  strikes;  Reprisal  actions 

Reuters  News  Service:  2.80 

Revolutionary  Committee:  1.234,  1.304, 
2.27 

Revolutionary  Committees:  of  VC,  4.539 
Revolutionary    Congress.    See  National 

Congress  of  the  Vietnamese  People 
Revolutionary      Development  Cadre: 

2.581.  See  also  RD 
Revolutionary  League  (Dong  Minh  Hoi) : 

1.49 

Revolutionary  Youth  League:  1.44 
"Revolving  door"  governments:  3.1 


Subject  Index/ 56 

Rhade  tribesman:  2.281,  2.338,  2.339 

Rice:  1.450,  2.112,  2.366,  2.480;  short- 
age of,  2.310;  SVN  production  of, 
2.820;  transportation  of,  3.444;  U.S. 
supply  of,  2.397 

Rice-roots  level:  4.397 

Rice  tax:  of  VC,  2.655 

Ridgway  Report:  1.55 

"Rings  of  steel":  2.522 

Riverine  Assault  forces:  4.473 

River  patrol  forces:  estimate  of,  4.473 

RLT  (Regimental  Landing  Teams): 
4.543,  4.584 

ROK.  See  South  Korea 

Roles  and  Mission  Study  Group:  4.329; 
COMUSMACV  comments  on,  2.385; 
recommendations  of,  2.385,  2.576, 
2.583,  2.620 

ROLLING  THUNDER:  2.354,  2.472, 
3.6,  3.272,  3.324,  3.338,  3.454,  4.18- 
20;  accomplishments  of,  4.53-58;  dur- 
ing bombing  pause,  4.33;  cancellation 
of,  3.325;  chronology  of,  3.284-286; 
and  CIA,  4.74;  concentration  in  "fun- 
nel," 4.474;  cost-ineffectiveness  of, 
3.332-334;  definition  of,  3.93,  3.339- 
340;  effect  on  NVN,  4.68-70,  4.73, 
4.109-110,  4.355;  expansion  of,  4.18, 
4.29,  4.196;  failure  of,  4.138;  Hanoi's 
morale  and,  4.348;  initiation  of,  3.271, 
3.321-324;  justification  for,  3.95, 
3.329,  3.330-332;  LBJ  on,  3.338, 
3.703;  magnitude  of,  4.136;  Sec.  Mc- 
Namara  on,  2.595,  3.339-340;  measur- 
able damage  from,  4.55-56;  objectives 
of,  4.40;  political  gains  of,  4.19;  psy- 
chological gains  of,  4.19;  rationale 
for,  3.309,  4.20;  restrictions  on,  4.212; 
resumption  of,  3.272,  3.378,  3.381, 
4.39,  4.43,  4.44,  4.53;  review  of,  4.229, 
4.421-422,  4.533;  Soviet  responses  to, 
3.329,  3.332;  stabilization  of,  4.125- 
126,  4.131,  4.349,  4.356;  and  targets, 
3.272,  4.19,  4.151,  4.184,  4.421-422 

Romania:  peace  negotiations  and,  4.95, 
4.228 

Rostow  Proposal:  2.12,  2.73,  2.96 
"Rostow  Thesis":    3.109,   3.200,  3.202; 

critique  of,  3.101-102,  3.110 
Royal  Laotian  Army:  defeat  of,  2.61. 

See  also  Laos 
Royal  Laotian  government  (RLG).  See 

Laos 

"Royal  Phoenix."  See  "Operation  Phuong 
Hoang" 

Rubber:  1.376,  1.436,  1.450;  as  export, 
2.757;  production  of,  2.711 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Rules  of  engagement:  3.191,  3.299.  See 
also  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

Rumor  campaigns:  and  counterinsur- 
gency,  1.575 

"Rural  Community  Development  Cen- 
ters." See  Agrovilles 

Rural  Construction:  maps  of,  2.524; 
PROVN  study  and,  2.577.  See  also 
Pacification;  RD 

"Rural  Construction  Campaign":  2.144, 
2.562 

Rural  Construction  Council:  2.538 

Rural  Construction  Plan:  GVN  support 
of,  2.367,  2.501 

Rural  Forces  (RF):  2.494.  See  also 
Pacification 

RVNAF  (Republic  of  Vietnam  Armed 
Forces):  2.3,  2.511,  2.546;  build-up 
of,  2.162,  2.163,  2.164,  2.175,  2.474, 
3.90,  3.435,  3.441,  3.507;  chain  of  com- 
mand of,  2.6;  CPSVN  estimates  of, 
2.181;  decrease  in,  3.69;  defeat  of, 
2.361;  desertion  in,  2.194,  2.779;  effec- 
tiveness of,  2.180,  2.507-510,  4.292, 
4.402-403;  evaluation  of,  2.401;  ex- 
pansion of,  2.24;  funding  of,  2.386, 
3.27,  3.60;  goals  of,  3.63;  improve- 
ment in,  2.408,  2.509;  inadequacy  of, 
3.432;  increase  in,  2.37,  2.40,  2.43, 
2.48,  2.135,  2.164,  2.177,  2.461,  2.510, 
3.4,  3.83;  Komer  on,  4.440-441; 
leadership  of,  2.510,  3.438;  limita- 
tions on,  3.432,  4.343;  mobility  of, 
2.128;  modernization  of,  4.557;  morale 
of,  2.510;  oflficer  corps  of,  1.323;  and 
pacification,  2.491-494;  performance 
of,  3.391-393;  phase  down  of,  3.27; 
problems  of,  2.337;  and  RD,  4.427; 
reorganization  of,  2.342;  review  of, 
2.510;  and  soldiers'  pay,  2.358; 
strength  of,  2.511,  3.53,  3.54,  3.72, 
3.93,  3.532,  4.439;  training  of,  2.11, 
2.176,  2.181,  2.465,  3.544;  U.S.  ad- 
visory role  to,  2.357,  2.382;  U.S. 
reinforcement  of,  3.392-393,  4.548, 
4.566;  Gen.  Wheeler's  assessment  of, 
4.347 

Sabotage:  2.712;  in  Hanoi,  1.579;  RLG 
force  for,  2.646;  Viet  Cong,  2.771. 
See  also  Counterinsurgency;  Terrorism 

SACSA  (Special  Assistant  for  Counter- 
insurgency  and  Special  Activities): 
2.164,  2.184,  3.25;  evaluation  of  Viet- 
nam situation,  2.192,  3.46-47;  and 
extension  of  advisors,  3.76;  on  GVN 
force   build-up,    3.75;   "Military  and 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 

Security  Situation,"  3.46-47;  statistics 
of,  2.771-780 
SADEYES:   4.335.  See  also  Bombing; 
Weapons 

Saigon:  as  autonomous  city,  2.526;  dur- 
ing Aug.  1963,  2.736;  flow  of  rice  into, 
4.480;  morale  in,  2.4,  3.293;  port  of, 
2.288,  2.383,  2.387,  2.389,  2.390, 
2.391,  2.398;  provinces  around,  2.138; 
riots  in,  2.334,  2.750,  2.751,  2.754; 
security  of,  2.481;  speculative  traders 
in,  2.761;  surrounding  area  of,  2.177, 
2.525,  2.532;  threat  to,  2.525;  U.S.  per- 
sonnel in,  2.761;  U.S.  troops  in,  2.461; 
VC  terrorism  in,  2.699;  Viet  Minh 
attack  on,  1.575 

Saigon-Cholon  Waterworks:  2.250,  2.251, 
2.753,  2.762 

"Saigon  commando":  2.611 

Saigon  Electric  Power  Project:  2.250, 
2.251,  2.753,  2.762 

Saigon  Embassy,  U.S.:  2.517;  divisions 
within,  2.613,  2.621;  Lansdale  Report 
on,  1.573-583;  relations  with  military, 
2.784;  relations  with  Washington, 
2.610,  2.611;  reorganization  of,  2.537, 
2.540,  2.607,  2.611,  2.613,  2.619;  and 
State  Department,  2.649;  on  Tonkin 
crisis,  3.203-204;  US/DCM,  3.37 

Saigon  Military  Mission  (SMM):  crea- 
tion of,  1.574 

Saigon  Peace  Committee:  1.344 

SAIGON  768:  of  Amb.  Lodge,  2.784, 
2.786,  2.787 

Sainteny  Mission:  1.222 

St.  Louis  Post-Dispatch:  3.263,  3.307 

Saipan  Training  Station:  2.649,  2.791 

SAM  (TALOS):  4.535.  See  also  Weap- 
ons 

SAME:  on  pacification  plans,  2.350 
San  Antonio  formula:  4.205-210,  4.237, 

4.253,  4.581;  Hanoi's  reaction,  4.264; 

Taylor  on,  4.249 
Sanctuaries:  4.337;  JCS  concern  about, 

4.410-415.  See  also  Hot  pursuit 
SAR  operations.  See  Search  and  rescue 

operations 
Sayabouri  Province:  2.672 
SEA.  See  Southeast  Asia 
SEACABIN:  4.217-222,  4.231 
SEAAPC.  See  Southeast  Asia  Aid  Pol- 
icy Committee 
SEACORD:  3.297,  3.302,  3.579 
SEA   DRAGON:    4.213,   4.216,  4.229, 

4.256,  4.534,  4.544;  expansion  of,  4.258 
Search  and  destroy  operations:  3.395, 

3.461,    3.462,    3.470,    4.402,  4.557, 


Subject  Index/51 

4.565;  expectations  of,  3.481;  force 
levels  for,  3.396;  implications  of, 
3.395-396;  sweeps,  2.140;  Amb.  Tay- 
lor's opinion  of,  3.396;  U.S.  emphasis 
on,  4.313 

Search  and  rescue  (SAR)  operations: 
3.552,  3.584-585 

Sea  Swallow.  See  Operation  Hai  Yen  II; 
Operation  SEA  SWALLOW 

Sea  Swallows:  Father  Hoa's,  2.721 

SEATO.  See  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Or- 
ganization 

Secretary  of  Defense,  Office  of.  See 
Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 

Secretary  of  Defense  conferences:  2.165, 
2.175,  2.176,  2.194.  See  also  Clifford, 
Clark;  McNamara,  Robert  S. 

Sector  Advisor  Teams:  numbers  of, 
2.513 

Securing:  concepts  of,  2.495-498 

Security,  U.S.:  1.416,  4.633;  JCS  on, 
4.346;  expenditures  for,  1.421;  Mc- 
Namara on,  4.635;  and  vital  interests 
in  Vietnam,  4.661 

Security,  Vietnamese:  in  countryside, 
2.400,  4.578  (see  also  Countryside, 
Vietnamese;  Peasantry);  internal, 
2.435,  2.682;  local  area,  2.495;  prob- 
lem of,  2.602;  RD  and,  2.581;  strategy 
of,  3.394;  in  Vietnam,  2.31 

Security  Training  Center  (STC):  pro- 
grams for,  2.648 

Self  Defense  Corps  (SDC):  1.256,  2.138, 
2.175,  2.434,  2.465,  3.30;  army  units 
and,  2.678;  casualties  of,  2.774-777; 
desertions  of,  2.779-780;  failure  of, 
1.314;  increase  in,  2.675;  independent 
missions  of,  2.703;  MAAG  support  of, 
2.8,  2.38;  morale  of,  2.311,  2.460, 
3.501;  pillaging  by,  3.495;  reorganiza- 
tion of,  3.506;  U.S.  Marines  and, 
2.476;  U.S.  support  of,  2.8,  2.37, 
2.656;  Viet  Cong  penetration  of, 
2.698.  See  also  Congress,  U.S. 

Senate,  U.S.:  on  Brussels  Pact,  1.35- 
36;  on  Vietnam  policy,  3.263 

Senate  Armed  Services  Committee:  hear- 
ings on  air  war,  4.197,  4.198,  4.199, 
4.204 

Senate  Committee  on  Appropriations: 
Sec.  McNamara  before,  4.633-635. 
See  also  Stennis  subcommittee  hear- 
ings 

Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee: 
hearings  on  Vietnam  war,  4.98,  4.262, 
4.588;  Rusk  before,  4.401.  See  also 
Fulbright  Committee  hearings 


Subject  Index/ 5^ 

"Senior     Informal    Advisory  Group": 

4.266 
Separatism:  3.87 

Seven-Nation  Conference:  2.387-407 
Seven-point  program,  U.S.:  1.144,  1.555- 
556,  2.357,  2.358;  French  reaction  to, 
1.145.  See  also  Geneva  Conference, 
1954 

17th  Parallel:  1.574 
Seventh  Fleet:  1.373,  3.286 
"Sheer  mass":  concept  of,  2.575 
SHINING  BRASS:   strategy  of,  4.421, 

4.422,  4.423 
Shipping:  1.376 

Ships,  gunfire:  4.473.  See  also  Maritime 
operations 

Short-Range  Branch:  analysis  of,  4.571 
"Short-Term     Prospects     in  Southeast 

Asia":  3.42 
"Show  the  flag"  visits:  1.378 
SIAT.  See  Rand  Corporation 
Sino-Soviet  Bloc:  2.46 
Sino-Soviet  Defense  Pact:  4.52 
Sino-Soviet  schism:  4.642 
SitReps:  3.39 

Skoda  Munition  Works:  1.594 

"Slow  squeeze":  3.112 

SNIE  (Special  National  Intelligence  Es- 
timates): 2.25,  3.2;  on  bombing  ex- 
pansion, 4.76;  on  bombing  intensity, 
4.68-70;  on  Communist  reactions, 
1.525-531,  3.480,  3.484;  on  counter- 
insurgency,  2.729-733;  on  DRV  sup- 
port of  VC,  2.15-16,  2.107,  2.109;  on 
Soviet  attitudes  and  intentions,  4.469; 
on  SEATO  force  commitment,  2.78. 
See  also  National  Intelligence  Esti- 
mates 

"Social  construction":  2.551,  2.553.  See 
also  RD 

Social  reform:  2.556;  emphasis  on,  2.558; 

need  for,  2.544.  See  also  Reforms 
Sortie  levels:  stabilization  of,  4.133 
Southeast  Asia  (SEA):  1.375,  3.37; 
American  interests  in,  4.650;  collective 
defense  of,  1.143;  Communist  domi- 
nation of,  1.453,  1.475,  2.37;  Com- 
munist threat  to,  4.679;  confidence  in 
U.S.  of,  2.57;  contradictions  of  policy 
in,  3.231;  defense  of,  1.509-511,  4.643; 
disease  in,  2.58;  facts  about,  1.473; 
ignorance  in,  2.58;  independence  of, 
4.677;  Hne  of  defense  in,  4.88-89; 
natural  resources  of,  1.376,  1.587, 
1.594,  1.623,  2.817,  4.663,  4.691; 
poverty  in,  2.58;  "static"  defense  of, 
1.510;  strategic  importance  of,  2.663- 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

666,  2.817,  3.710,  3.713,  3.715,  4.654, 

4.677;  and  Third  World  War,  4.680; 

U.S.    aid   programs   in,    1.386;  U.S. 

commitments   in,   4.665;  U.S.  policy 

in,  2.783,  3.524-529,  3.541-545 
Southeast  Asia  Aid  Committee:  1.365 
Southeast  Asia  Aid   Policy  Committee 

(SEAAPC):  1.197-198 
Southeast     Asia     Collective  Defense 

Treaty:    1.212,   4.638,    4.642,  4.654, 

4.660,  4.676.  See  also  Southeast  Asia 
Treaty  Organization  (SEATO) 

Southeast  Asia  Program  Office:  4.313 
Southeast  Asia  Security  Treaty:  4.636. 
See  also  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Or- 
ganization (SEATO) 
Southeast    Asia    Treaty  Organization 
(SEATO):  2.808,  3.710,  3.726,  4.645, 

4.661,  4.665,  4.668,  4.683;  American 
planning  for,  1.143;  British  on  forma- 
tion of,  1.174;  commitments  to,  2.8; 
contingency  plans  of,  2.91,  2.649;  con- 
tradictions of,  1.212;  future  of,  2.663; 
and  military  intervention  in  SVN, 
2.42,  2.76;  and  plan  5,  2.41,  2.92;  pro- 
posed commitment  of,  2.76-78;  pro- 
tocol of,  2.111;  Rostow  proposal  for, 
2.12;  troops  of,  2.45,  2.112,  2.113, 
3.226;  and  U.S.,  4.670,  4.684;  U.S. 
objectives  for,  1.181;  U.S.  obligation 
to,  2.49,  2.636,  2.800-813,  2.826, 
3.720,  4.641,  4.654,  4.672,  4.680;  U.S. 
organization  of,  1.562;  Vietnam  role 
of,  2.58,  2.61,  2.80 

South  Korea:  defense  capacity  of,  1.425; 

Marine    Brigade    of,    4.409,  4.325; 

troops  in  SVN,  4.292,  4.309,  4.470, 

4.524,  4.549,  4.608.  See  also  Korea; 

Korean  War 
South  Vietnam.  See  Republic  of  (South) 

Vietnam 

Soviet  Union.  See  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
cialist  Republics  (USSR) 

Special  Branch  Police:  2.585 

Special  Committee  on  the  U.S.  and  Indo- 
china: 1.94.  See  also  Smith,  Gen.  W. 
Bedell 

Special  Forces:  2.641;  advisors  of,  2.454; 
BPP  training  of,  2.645;  and  CIA, 
2.683;  introduction  into  Vietnam  of, 
2.34,  2.438,  2.445;  and  Montagnards, 
2.644,  2.717;  in  Nha  Trang,  2.50; 
Vietnamese,  2.51,  2.762;  withdrawal 
of,  4.566 

Special  Forces  Group:  2.638;  establish- 
ment of,  2.660;  functions  of,  2.661; 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

internal    defense    plans    and,  2.682; 
schools  of,  2.669 
Special    intelligence:    2.114.    See  also 
SNIE 

Special  Studies  Group:  of  JCS,  4.291- 
292.  See  also  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

Special  Troops:  of  North  Vietnam, 
2.656.  See  also  North  Vietnamese 
Army;  NVA/VC 

Spectator:  4.332 

"Spoiling"  offensive:  4.330,  4.392,  4.565 
"Squeeze-and-talk,"   concept   of:  3.602, 
3.605 

Staley  Mission:  2.3,  2.11,  2.62-65 

Star  Shell  illumination:  3.299 

State.  See  Department  of  State,  U.S. 

State  of  Vietnam:  1.181.  See  also  Re- 
public of  (South)  Vietnam 

Statistics:  as  indicators  of  war  effort, 
2.771;  for  military  situation  in  Viet- 
nam, 4.624-625;  for  1962-1963,  2.773 

Status  of  Forces  agreement:  2.361 

STEEL  TIGER:  3.338,  3.341.  See  also 
BARREL  ROLL 

Stennis  subcommittee  hearings:  4.217; 
and  alliance  with  military,  4.203-204; 
escalation  and,  4.455-456 

Strategic  Air  Command  (SAC):  3.320- 
321 

Strategic  Army  Force  (STRAP):  4.590 

"Strategic  Concept  for  South  Vietnam": 
2.142,  2.720 

"Strategic  Hamlet  Kit":  2.152 

Strategic  Hamlet  Program:  2.128-159, 
2.177,  2.186,  2.225,  2.275,  2.457,  3.24, 
3.27;  and  agroville  program,  1.313; 
appraisal  of,  2.187,  2.249,  3.30;  chron- 
ology of,  2.131-132;  collapse  of, 
2.276,  3.28-29;  completed  hamlets, 
2.154;  consolidation  of,  2.250,  2.752; 
and  counterinsurgency,  2.445;  criticism 
of,  3.394;  definition  of,  2.140;  and 
Diem  government,  3.30;  discourage- 
ment about,  2.194;  evaluation  of,  3.26; 
failures  of,  2.231,  2.245,  3.28,  3.501; 
forced  labor  in,  2.275;  GVN  report  on, 
2.151;  hamlets  in,  2.674,  2.675,  2.676, 
2.681,  2.684,  2.685,  2.686,  2.687, 
2.691,  2.697;  maturation  of,  2.755; 
Sec.  McNamara's  evaluation  of,  2.756; 
and  pacification,  2.411;  as  priority 
policy,  2.180,  2.700;  problems  of, 
2.720;  reinforcement  of,  2.723;  set- 
backs in,  3.40;  slowdown  of,  3.34; 
success  of,  2.225,  2.718;  and  VC  pa- 
trols. 2.717;  vulnerability  of,  2.152. 
See  also  Pacification;  RD;  Villages 


Subject  Index/59 

"Strategic  village":  2.142.  See  also  Stra- 
tegic Hamlet  Program 

Strategy,  U.S.:  3.453;  analysis  of,  4.420- 
423;  evolution  of,  1.496-499;  imple- 
mentation of,  2.720;  meetings  on, 
3.192-194;  against  NVN,  3.200,  4.189 
(see  also  Bombing;  Reprisal  actions; 
War  effort);  objectives  of,  2.719;  overt 
military  pressure,  3.200,  3.207;  reas- 
sessment of,  4.581;  in  Southeast  Asia, 
3.158;  of  security,  3.444-452,  3.478. 
See  also  United  States  Vietnam  policy 

Struggle  Movement:  2.286,  2.289;  in 
Da  Nang,  2.374;  and  of,  2.382;  and 
GVN,  2.288;  in  Hue,  2.374;  rise  of, 
2.369,  2.373-376;  US/SVN  relations 
during,  2.374-378;  suppression  of, 
2.372,  2.384.  See  also  Buddhist  crisis 

Students,  Vietnamese:  arrests  of,  2.242, 
2.252,  2.255;  demonstrations  of,  2.236, 
2.334,  3.85-86;  Diem  policy  toward, 
2.744;  rioting  of,  2.335,  2.546 

Study  group,  interagency:  evaluation  of 
U.S.  policy,  3.156;  on  proposed  mili- 
tary actions,  3.155;  on  war  effort, 
2.576-588 

Subsector  Advisor  Teams:  2.513 

"Subterranean  war":  2.548 

Sugar:  SVN  production  of,  2.820 

Summer  Study  Group.  See  JASON  Sum- 
mer Study 

Summit  meeting:  4.187 

Sunrise.  See  Operation  Sunrise 

Supply:  problems  in,  4.542;  routes  of, 
2.655-656.  See  also  Ho  Chi  Minh 
Trail 

SUSREPS  (senior  U.S.  representatives): 
2.579 

Sustained  reprisal,  policy  of:  3.314- 
315,  3.687-691;  McG.  Bundy  outline 
on,  3.308-315;  cost  of,  3.312;  effect  on 
Hanoi,  3.314;  effect  on  SVN,  3.314; 
estimated  effect  on  VC,  3.314;  objec- 
tive of,  3.313;  and  pacification,  3.313; 
steps  leading  to,  3.690;  vs.  graduated 
reprisals,  3.315.  See  also  Reprisal  ac- 
tions 

SVN.  See  Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam 
SWATO  craft:  GVN  capture  of,  3.252 
Systems  Analysis:  on  air  war  effective- 
ness, 4.132;  on  ARVN  forces,  4.425; 
on  deployment  capability,  4.513-514; 
on  effectiveness  of  U.S.  forces,  4.425; 
on  force  levels,  4.461-462;  force  re- 
quirements, 4.458;  on  JCS  require- 
ments, 4.525;  on  MACV  requirements, 
4.472;  on  OSD  requirements,  4.525;  on 


Subject  Index/ 60 

Systems  Analysis:  (cont'd) 

Southeast  Asia,  2.507;  on  troop  re- 
quest by  COMUSMACV,  4.456;  on 
VC/NVA  activity,  4.388 


T-28:   operations,   3.182,   3.477,  3.543, 

3.553,  3.608 
Tactical  Air  Control  System  (TAGS): 

2.657 

Tactical  Area  of  Responsibility  (TA- 
OR):  2.293,  2.356,  2.360,  2.375, 
2.376,  2.477,  2.517 

Tactical  Fighter  Squadrons:  4.576 

Taiwan:  2.822.  See  also  Republic  of 
China 

TALOS  missiles:  4.213 

Tan  Son  Nhut:  2.657,  2.658 

TAOR.  See  Tactical  Area  of  Responsi- 
bility 

Targets:  for  air  strikes,  4.57;  approval 
at  Guam  Conference,  4.150;  cate- 
gories of,  4.165-166;  exhaustion  of, 
4.170;  Hanoi  as,  4.198;  Hanoi  power 
station  as,  4.445;  LOC's  as,  3.340, 
4.73,  4.534,  4.565;  in  NVN,  3.288, 
3.298,  3.299-300,  3.382,  3.383;  and 
population,  4.621;  Presidential  authori- 
zation for,  4.135;  rail  system  as,  3.341; 
review  of,  4.204-205;  selection  of, 
4.51;  sensitive,  4.166;  "slams,"  4.337 

Target  system:  development  of,  3.340; 
and  POL,  4.66 

Task  Force:  flood,  2.88,  2.91,  2.101, 
2.105,  2.106,  2.121  (see  also  Flood 
relief);  Gilpatric  (see  Gilpatric  Task 
Force);  military,  2.90,  2.92,  2.93, 
2.104;  OREGON,  4.408,  4.435,  4.451 

TASS:  4.135 

Taxes:  to  finance  war  effort,  1.421-422, 
4.595  (see  also  War  effort:  financing 
of);  levied  by  Viet  Cong,  2.718 

Taylor  Mission:  2.1,  2.14,  2.18,  2.19, 
2.37,  2.76,  2.84-93,  2.410,  2.447-449; 
announcement  of,  2.80,  2.81,  2.82; 
"first  fruits"  of,  2.126;  recommenda- 
tions of,  2.89-92;  speculation  about, 
2.56;  U.S.  build-up  and,  2.454 

Taylor  Mission  Report:  2.5,  2.14,  2.15, 
2.92-98,  2.652;  and  American  aid, 
2.103;  contradictions  in,  2.98-99; 
"Evaluations  and  Conclusions,"  2.92, 
2.98;  on  international  communism, 
2.107;  and  JFK's  decisions,  2.104;  Sec. 
McNamara's  interpretation  of,  2.108- 
109;  and  news  stories,  2.102,  2.103, 
2.104;  optimism  of,  2.102 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Tay  Ninh  Province,  2.144 
Taylor  Report.  See  Taylor  Mission  Re- 
port 

TDY  team:  3.33,  3.34 

Technicians:  Filipino,  2.647,  2.683; 
Thai,  2.683 

Temporary  Equipment  Recovery  Mis- 
sion (TERM):  2.433 

Terrorism:  2.646,  2.692,  2.712;  Com- 
munist use  of,  2.820;  Viet  Cong,  2.697, 
2.771  (see  also  Viet  Nam  Cong-San) 

Tet  offensive:  2.414,  4.231,  4.234-235, 
4.568;  and  bombing,  4.250;  and  Clif- 
ford Group,  4.241;  and  Johnson  Ad- 
ministration, 4.232;  losses  during, 
4.570;  result  of,  4.596,  4.604;  surprise 
of,  4.539;  and  U.S.  peace  overtures, 
4.236;  U.S.  reaction  to,  2.484,  4.238; 
and  VC  infrastructure,  4.578;  and  VC 
strategy,  4.563 

Tet  pause:  4.141-144;  Pope  on,  4.143; 
U.S.  violations  of,  4.141.  See  also 
Bombing  pause 

Textiles:  SVN  production  of,  2.820 

TF  OREGON:  4.408.  See  also  Task 
force 

Thai  Armed  Forces  Security  Center: 
2.646 

Thai  Border  Patrol  (BPP) :  2.645 

Thailand:  3.182,  3.257,  3.267,  3.681, 
3.685;  and  American  influence,  4.618; 
American  military  instructors  in, 
2.637;  Communist  threat  to,  4.582; 
counterinsurgency  in,  2.661;  and  dom- 
ino theory,  1.373,  4.613;  and  Kennedy 
administration,  2.811;  military  aid 
group  in,  1.365;  neutralism  in,  2.57; 
rice  exports  of,  1.385;  security  of, 
1.377,  4.618;  troop  contributions  of, 
4.389,  4.470,  4.524;  U.S.  ambassador 
to,  2.20;  U.S.  economic  aid  to,  1.440; 
U.S.  forces  in,  2.673,  2.812;  U.S. 
policy  in,  2.67,  2.98,  3.529 

Thai  National  Police:  2.645 

Theater  CINC:  2.541 

Third  Country  forces:  2.547,  3.462;  de- 
ployment of,  3.105;  introduction  of, 
3.704;  in  SVN,  4.291 

Third  National  Congress:  of  NVN  Com- 
munist Party,  2.693 

Thoi  Luan  (Newspaper):  1.315,  1.333- 
334 

Thompson  proposal,   2.139-140,  2.144; 

Washington  reaction  to,  2.142 
"Three-division  plan":  3.469 
"Three-withs"  doctrine:  1.254 
Thua  Thien  Province:  4.569 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

Thui  Due  Reserve  Officers'  School: 
2.102,  2.704 

Ticonderoga,  USS:  3.184,  3.185.  5ee  also 
Tonkin  Gulf  crisis 

Tiger  Island:  3.252;  barracks,  3.554 

Times  of  Vietnam:  2.148,  2.253;  anti- 
American  campaign  of,  2.255;  burn- 
ing of,  2.270 

Tin:  in  SE  Asia,  1.376,  1.436,  1.450, 
1.592 

Tin  Bac:  1.316 

"Tit-for-tat"  concept:  3.287,  3.288 

Tonkin:  1.389,  1.393,  1.442,  1.449,  1.576; 
defense  of,  1.437;  military  situation 
in,  1.518-519;  Viet  Minh  dominated 
zones,  1.190 

Tonkin  Gulf  crisis:  2.163,  2.199-200, 
2.279,  3.4,  3.83,  3.183-192,  3.288, 
3.298,  3.519,  3.710;  aftermath  of,  3.59, 
3.187-188;  and  DRV  motives,  3.186; 
interagency  differences  on,  3.202;  JCS 
review  of,  3.185;  naval  patrols,  3.194; 
retaliatory  action,  3.185,  3.186,  3.189, 
3.304;  Sec.  Rusk  on,  3.721;  U.S.  policy 
on,  3.517,  3.521,  3.522.  See  also  Ton- 
kin Gulf  Resolution 

Tonkin  Gulf  Resolution:  2.277,  2.319, 
3.108-109,  3.520,  3.722;  effects  of, 
3.107,  3.109.  See  also  Tonkin  Gulf 
crisis 

Tou  Morong:  district  headquarters  at, 
2.473 

Tourane:  troop  movements  and,  2.41 

Trade  Fair  of  1962:  2.640 

Training  center  team:   2.464.  See  also 

Mobile  Training  Teams 
Training  Relations  and  Instruction  Mis- 
sion (TRIM):  1.581-582 
Transportation:   costs  of,  4.532;  NVN, 

4.57,  4.58;  in  SVN,  2.820 
Treaty:  Diem's  request  for,  2.12,  2.14, 

2.71.    See    also    Diem  government; 

SEATO,  2.4 
Tribes:  nomadic,  2.638.  See  also  Mon- 

tagnards 
"Trilemma":  3.^94,  3.696 
Triumvirate:    of    Khanh,    Minh,  and 

Khiem,  2.277,  2.335,  2.338,  3.86.  See 

also  Troika  regime 
Troika  regime:  3.88 

Troika  "Signoff":   2.286,   2.367,  2.380, 

2.479,  2.499 
TROJAN  HORSE  photography  mission: 

3.365 

Troop  Carrier  Squadron:  2.657 
Troop  deployment:  2.14,  3.342,  3.351; 
Communist  reaction  to,  1.433;  cost  of,' 


Subject  Index/ 61 

4.556;  evaluation  of,  2.16,  4.592;  ex- 
cessive, 4.326;  French,  1.545;  Gal- 
braith's  views  on,  2.671;  increase  in, 
4.594;  in  June  1965,  4.606-609;  dur- 
ing Kennedy  administration,  2.803, 
2.805;  Sec.  McNamara  projections  of, 
4.623;  under  Phase  IIA,  4.310;  and 
piaster  spending,  4.378;  and  point  of 
diminishing  returns,  4.611;  public  sup- 
port of,  4.560;  recommended  addi- 
tional, 4.619;  in  relation  to  population, 
4.470;  Rusk/McNamara  evaluation  of, 
2.16,  2.110-116,  2.117,  2.118,  2.120; 
U.S.  commitment  to,  4.564;  and 
USCONARC,  4.542.  See  also  Ground 
forces 

Troops,  Australian:  2.355 

Troops,  Korean:  2.355 

Troops,  Nationalist  Chinese:  2.365 

Troops,  U.S.:  in  April  1954,  1.486;  com- 
mitment of,  2.40,  2.43,  2.48,  4.154; 
in  Delta,  4.389;  and  ground  war, 
3.389;  increases  in,  3.31,  4.426;  intro- 
duction of,  2.665;  JCS  on,  4.359;  jus- 
tification of,  2.66;  limit  on,  4.489;  in 
1961,  2.2;  in  1966,  4.94,  4.321;  non- 
combatant  role  for,  2.66,  4.313  (see 
also  Pacification);  objective  of,  2.13; 
overextension  of,  1.425;  under  Phase 
II,  4.308;  requirement  for,  4.606;  and 
RVNAF,  2.508;  shortages  in,  4.541; 
suggested  increases  in,  3.456-457;  in 
Thailand,  2.811  (see  also  Thailand); 
and  Vietnamese  civilians,  4.510;  and 
Vietnamese  morale,  2.366;  and  Gen. 
Westmoreland,  3.389;  withdrawal  of 
(1963),  3.17,  3.18,  3.52.  See  also 
Ground  forces 

Truce:  4.139.  See  also  Bombing  pause; 
Tet  pause 

Truman  administration:  China  policy  of, 
2.30;  intervention  in  Indochina  and, 
1.55;  on  justification  of  war,  1.584, 
1.587-591 

Truman  Doctrine:  1.35,  4.248 

Tungsten:  1.592 

Turkestan  (Soviet  ship):  4.187 

Turkey:  defense  of,  1.615 

Turner  Joy,  USS:  Attack  on,  2.329, 
3.184,  3.185.  See  also  Tonkin  Gulf 
crisis 

Tuyen  Due  Province:  Montagnards  in, 

2.687.  See  also  Montagnards 
20th  parallel:  3.343 

21 -point  program:  LBJ's  approval  of, 
3.703 


Subject  Index/ 61 

U-2  flights:  3.547.  See  also  Armed  re- 
connaissance operations 
Udorn:  troops  and,  2.41 
•'Ugly  American,  The":  2.440 
Underdeveloped  countries.  See  Develop- 
ing countries 
UK/USSR    Co-chairmen    Plan:  3.325, 
3.347;  Bundy  paper  on,  3.317;  esti- 
mated effects  on  China,  3.327 
Unification,  policy  of,  2.344,  2.713 
United  Command  Plan:  1.513.  See  also 

Joint  Command 
United    Front    of    Nationalist  Forces: 
1.230,  1.303.  See  also  Vietnamese  Na- 
tionalist Party 
United  Kingdom.  See  Great  Britain 
United  Nations  (U.N.):  3.227;  and  anti- 
infiltration  role  of  KANZUS,  4.334; 
charter  of,   1.15,   1.16,   1.555,  1.565, 
2.811,  4.648,  4.663;  fact  finding  team 
of,   2.253;   and   Indochina  cease-fire, 
1.141;  JFK's  address  to,  2.804-805; 
Security  Council  involvement  in  VN, 
3.321,  3.322,  3.323,  4.94 
United  States:   aid  programs  of,  3.81; 
allies  of  (see  Allies);  atomic  capability 
of,    1.417,   2.799    (see  also  Nuclear 
weapons);    as    co-belligerent,  3.305; 
counterinsurgency  plan  for  SVN,  1.268 
(see   also   Counterinsurgency);  econ- 
omy of,  1.426;  at  Geneva  Conf.,  1.479, 
1.536,    1.538,    1.565,    1.568-569  (see 
also  Geneva  Conference,  1954);  and 
GVN,    2.354,    2.355,    2.359,  2.360, 
2.361,    2.362,    2.368,    2.381,  2.383, 
2.384;  and  Khanh  government,  2.334, 
3.85;  as  Policeman  of  Universe,  4.640, 
4.682;  prestige  of,  2.40,  2.51,  3.216, 
3.217,    3.218,    3.296,    3.376,  3.381, 
3.683,  3.700;  and  RD,  4.300  (see  also 
RD);  relations  with  Tri  Quang,  2.375- 
376;  relations  with  USSR,  4.54;  Saigon 
embassy  of,   2.280,   2.287    (see  also 
Saigon  embassy) 
United    States    Army:    Army  Security 
Agency  (ASA)  of,  2.640,  2.641,  2.642; 
Civil  Affairs  teams,  2.360,  3.103-104; 
and  NSC,  1.471-472 
United  States  Army  Support  Group  Viet- 
nam   (USASGV):    2.178;  phaseout 
policy  of,  2.179 
United  States  Congress.  See  Congress, 
U.S. 

United  States  Department  of  Defense. 
See  Department  of  Defense  (DOD), 
U.S. 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

United  States  Department  of  State.  See 

Department  of  State,  U.S. 
United  States  Fast  Carrier  Task  Force: 

1.514 

United  States  forces:  2.285,  3.390; 
buildup  of,  2.198,  3.100,  3.391,  3.498, 
4.491;  Wm.  Bundy  on,  4.503-504; 
commitment  of,  2.80;  deployment  of, 
3.418,  3.419-420,  3.426-430,  4.399 
(see  also  Troop  deployment);  effec- 
tiveness of,  4.458;  employment  of, 
4.297-299;  estimated  maximum  for, 
2.179,  2.192;  and  French,  1.467-471; 
and  FW  forces,  3.482-483,  4.468; 
graduated  use  of,  3.170;  increases  in, 
2.279-280,  4.497,  4.503-504;  infiltra- 
tion and,  4.371;  JCS  estimate  of,  2.78- 
79;  levels,  4.348,  4.355;  limitation  of, 
3.1;  logistic,  3.449;  in  Mekong  Delta, 
4.339;  noncombat  role  of,  2.91;  op- 
erational performance,  4.376;  phased 
withdrawal  of,  2.160-200,  2.316;  pias- 
ter spending  of,  4.340;  primary  role  of, 
4.397;  projected  commitment  of,  2.1 1 1, 
2.112,  2.113,  2.114,  2.118;  projected 
deployments,  3.638;  projected  strength 
of,  2.91,  3.637;  and  RD,  4.410;  recom- 
mendations for,  2.90-92,  2.93,  2.109; 
required  for  victory,  4.291;  and 
RVNAF,  4.298  (see  also  RVNAF); 
search  and  destroy  operations  of, 
4.329;  strength  of,  4.325.  See  also 
Ground  forces;  Troops,  U.S. 

United  States  Information  Agency 
(USIA):  counterinsurgency  responsi- 
bility of,  2.668;  Deputy  Ambassador 
and,  2.565;  and  pacification  program, 
2.528,  2.590 

United  States  Information  Service 
(USIS):  2.307;  attacks  on  buildings 
of,  2.352;  extension  of,  2.326 

United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB): 
2.641 

United  States  Marines.  See  Marine  Corps 
United  States  military:  political  restraints 
on,  4.401;  self-deception  in,  3.25;  sup- 
port of  strong  campaign  against  DRV, 
3.115.  See  also  Military  operations 
United  States  Military  Agency:  2.383- 
384 

United  States  Mission:  objectives  of, 
3.198,  3.533;  pacification  and,  2.573; 
reorganization  of,  2.589.  See  also  Sai- 
gon embassy 

United  States  Mission  Liaison  Group: 
2.530,  2.531 

United  States  Navy:  2.76,  3.164,  3.639; 


Gravel  Edition /Vol.  5 

on  bombing,  4.186;  at  Cam  Ranh  Bay, 
3.164;  Mine  Division  73,  2.657;  intro- 
duction of,  3.65;  mobile  construction 
battalions,  4.543,  4.544;  and  reserve 
call-up,  4.545;  surface  operations, 
4.421-423 

United     States     Operations  Mission 
(USOM):    2.149,   2.355,   3.27,  3.29, 
3.30;  and  Combat  Police,  2.762;  ex- 
tension of,  2.326;  leverage  and,  2.479; 
and  piaster  cash  funds,  3.68-69;  and 
Strategic  Hamlet  Program,  2.687 
United   States   objectives   in  Vietnam: 
2.373,   2.377,   3.3,   3.4,   3.85,  3.219, 
3.349,  3.360,  3.499-500,  3.601,  3.622- 
628,  3.713,  4.557,  4.559,  4.567;  and 
alternatives,  3.53,  3.624;  McG.  Bundy's 
analysis  of,  3.360;  Wm.  Bundy  on, 
3.113-114,  3.245,  3.657,  3.678,  3.723, 
4.182;  Amb.  Bunker  and,  4.515;  defi- 
nition of,  3.172;  disagreement  about, 
2.577,  4.188,  4.400;  Amb.  Durbrow's 
view  of,  2.635;  "hard-line,"  4.38;  hu- 
miliation and,  4.47;  immediate,  4.562; 
and   JCS,    4.178-179,   4.395,  4.436; 
Katzenbach  on,  4.506,  LBJ  on,  4.599; 
level  of  effort  required,  3.393;  limited, 
3.3,  3.201;  long-term,  3.159-160;  Mc- 
Naughton's  views  of,  4.393;  military, 
2.188,  3.169,  4.395,  4.781;  NIE  on, 
3.169;   in    1966,   4.315;   NSAM  on, 
3.349;  political,  3.181,  4.604;  and  po- 
litical solution  in  Vietnam,  4.659;  pub- 
lic   support    for,    4.457;  short-term, 
3.159-160;    softening    of,    4.233;  in 
Southeast  Asia,  1.434-443,  3.580-583, 
3.588,  3.592,  4.533;  and  State  Depart- 
ment, 3.731;  study  of,  3.154;  Vice- 
Pres.  Humphrey's  view  of,  4.647 
United    States    Vietnam  commitment: 
2.432,    3.171,    4.632,    4.636,  4.638, 
4.671;  Wm.  Bundy's  interpretation  of, 
4.182-183;  compromise  solution  and, 
4.619;  and  Diem  government,  2.411 
(see  also  Diem  government);  intensi- 
fication of,  3.106 
United   States   Vietnam   policy:  2.673, 
3.18,  3.535,  3.743,  4.315,  4.639;  and 
allies,  4.270;  Asian  concerns  and,  1.34- 
40,  2.57,  2.825,  4.615;  George  Ball  on, 
4.615;    bipartisan,    2.808;    and  Wm. 
Bundy,  3.692;  on  China,  4.684;  clarifi- 
cation of,  2.583;  and  commitment  of 
ground  forces,  1.464  (see  also  Ground 
forces);     Communist    reactions  to, 
1.525-531;  and  compromise  program, 
4.46;  conditions  for  intervention  and. 


Subject  Index/63 

1.503;  constitutionality  of,  3.116;  co- 
vert, 2.640-642,  3.289,  3.291,  3.500 
(see  also  Covert  activities);  credibility 
and,  2.90,  2.91,  2.93,  2.97,  2.106, 
2.111,  3.212,  3.432,  4.351;  dissension 
on,  3.107,  3.164,  4.188;  and  domino 
theory,  1.186  (see  also  Domino  the- 
ory); economic  aspects  of,  2.639, 
3.269;  Eisenhower  position,  4.89;  on 
escalation,  4.154  (see  also  Escalation); 
essentials  of,  4.620;  failure  of,  4.580; 
GVN  reaction  to,  2.483,  4.181-182 
(see  also  GVN);  humiliation  of,  4.22, 
4.616;  independence  and  neutrality, 
2.193;  justification  of,  3.51  (see  also 
War  effort:  justification  of);  and  Laos, 
2.18;  of  least  commitment,  3.246;  lev- 
erage, 4.610;  limitations  on,  4.584;  and 
Line  of  Containment,  1.186;  middle 
course  of,  4.612,  4.614;  military  as- 
pects of,  2.638;  and  military  pressure, 
3,269;  toward  mihtary  regime,  3.268; 
and  mutual  defense  agreements,  1.475; 
on  negotiations,  3.247,  4.154;  in  1964, 
3.291;  in  1967,  2.493;  priorities  of, 
2.582-583;  psychological  aspects  of, 
2.639-640;  reactions  to,  4.242-243;  re- 
versal of,  2.672;  review  of,  1.472, 
3.262,  3.270,  4.81-93,  4.574;  rules  of 
engagement,  3.517,  3.529,  3.537;  shift 
by  McNamara,  4.107;  Strategic  Ham- 
let Program  and,  2.454-455.  See  also 
Intervention;  Optimism;  Strategic 
Hamlet  Program;  War  effort 

USAID.  See  Agency  for  International 
Development 

USASGV.  See  United  States  Army  Sup- 
port Group  Vietnam 

USCONARC:  4.542 

US-GVN  Treaty:  lack  of,  2.282,  2.288- 
289 

USMACV.  See  Military  Assistance  Com- 
mand, Vietnam 
U.S.  News  and  World  Report:  1.621 
USSR:  3.691;  aid  to  DRV,  4.57,  4.58, 
4.116,  4.137;  atomic  capability  of, 
1.423;  and  bombing  halt,  3.376-377; 
and  Ho  Chi  Minh,  1.33-34;  influence 
on  DRV,  2.694,  3.215;  introduction  of 
SAMs  to  NVN,  4.477;  Amb.  Kohler's 
analysis  on,  3.373;  and  mining  of 
NVN  ports,  4.147,  4.173,  4.485;  and 
negotiated  settlement,  4.475;  on  par- 
titioning, 1.134,  1.565;  and  Pleiku  re- 
prisal actions,  3.308;  possible  reactions 
to  U.S.  attack  on  China,  1.530-531; 
reactions  to  bombing  of  NVN,  3.387, 


Subject  Index/ 64 

USSR:  (cont'd) 
4.25;  role  in  SE  Asia,  2.637,  3.266, 
3.301;  support  for  DRV,  1.265,  3.266- 
267,  3.302,  3.485,  4.57,  4.58,  4.137; 
SVN  interests  of,  3.301,  3.656;  Amb. 
Thompson  and,  4.246-247;  threat  of, 
1.414,  1.415,  1.424,  1.427,  4.34;  and 
U.S.  intervention  in  Indochina,  1.527, 
1.528,  1.529,  1.536;  and  U.S.  policy, 
1.167,  1.428,  2.109;  U.S.  relations 
with,  1.427,  2.5,  2.21;  Vietnam  policy 
of,  1.610,  2.113,  2.116;  and  weapons 
for  NVN,  4.490 

Van  Dien  vehicle  depot:  4.135 

VC.  See  Viet  Nam  Cong-San 

VC/NVA  (Viet  Cong/North  Vietnam 
Army):  allied  Contacts  with,  4.373; 
and  ARVN,  4.377;  capabilities  in 
SVN,  4.377,  4.403^04;  control  of 
rural  population,  4.375;  losses  of, 
4.370,  4.456,  4.458,  4.563;  reinforce- 
ment of,  4.372,  4.404-405,  4.456; 
strategy  of,  4.405-406,  4.407,  4.418- 
420;  strength  in  SVN,  4.371,  4.405, 
4.442;  Gen.  Westmoreland's  divination 
of,  4.405-406.  See  also  North  Vietnam 
Army;  Viet  Nam  Cong-San 

Vientiane:  3.196 

Viet  Cong.  See  Viet  Nam  Cong-San 
Victory:  military,  2.580;  political,  2.544; 
psychological,  4.328.  See  also  War  ef- 
fort 

"Victory  and  Defeat  in  Guerrilla  Wars: 
The  Case  of  South  Vietnam":  3.381 

Viet  Nam  Cong-San  (VC):  1.339,  2.86, 
2.533,  3.656;  agents  of,  2.675,  2.696; 
allied  contacts  with,  4.394;  areas  con- 
trolled by,  2.460,  2.654,  3.52,  3.501; 
attack  at  Bien  Hoa,  3.208,  3.288;  at- 
tack on  U.S.  Embassy,  3.347;  attacks 
of,  2.71,  2.155,  2.190,  2.363,  2.755, 
2.773,  2.774,  3.34;  attacks  on  Pleiku, 
2.353,  3.5;  attacks  on  Quinon,  2.353; 
and  Buddhist  crisis,  2.183;  build-up  of, 
2.134,  2.330,  2.690,  3.3,  3.24,  3.502; 
Bundy  assessment  of,  3.311;  capabili- 
ties of,  3.597;  casualties  of,  2.772, 
2.774-777  (see  also  Casualties);  coun- 
terinsurgency  and,  2.200;  decreased  at- 
tacks of,  2.224;  defections  of,  2.156, 
2.680,  2.695,  2.778;  in  Delta  region, 
3.27;  DRV  support  for,  2.16,  2.63, 
3.53,  4.295;  early  guerrilla  insurgency 
of,  1.338;  effectiveness  of,  2.249,  2.437, 
2.680,  2.695,  3.29,  3.42,  3.44,  3.424- 
426,  3.439,  3.651-652,  4.571;  estimated 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

strength  of,  2.32,  2.198,  3.80,  4.325; 
gains  of,  2.194,  2.303,  3.29;  and  GVN, 
2.36,  2.532,  2.596,  2.699,  2.790;  and 
hamlet  elections,  4.453;  history  of, 
1.330-331;  increased  offensive  of, 
2.184,  2.273,  2.275,  3.18,  3.32,  3.685, 
4.300;  infiltration  of,  3.495,  3.500;  in- 
fluence   of,    3.28;    infrastructure  of, 

2.694-  699,  4.513;  international  com- 
munist support  of,  2.63;  legacy  of 
Viet  Minh,  1.333;  logistic  support  of, 

2.695-  696;  and  "lull  before  the  storm" 
concept,  3.437,  3.443,  3.456;  methods 
of  operation,  2.655,  3.441;  military  air- 
craft of,  3.634;  monsoon  offensive  of, 
2.546-547;  morale  of,  2.364,  2.714, 
3.653;  and  negotiations,  3.393;  objec- 
tives of,  1.337,  2.448,  4.547;  organiz- 
ing techniques  of,  1.332-333;  popular 
support  for,  2.696;  and  RD,  4.368,  re- 
cruiting of,  1.329,  2.602-719,  4.371; 
reinforcement  of,  2.180,  4.404-405; 
rural  support  of,  1.258,  2.204,  2.545, 
2.595,  2.750;  near  Saigon,  2.522; 
strategy  of,  3.531,  4.552;  strength  of, 
2.72,  2.134,  2.718,  3.80,  3.668;  suc- 
cesses of,  2.192,  2.195,  2.196,  3.2, 
3.287,  3.494;  summer  offensive  of, 
3.440;  supplies  for,  2.75,  2.526,  2.717, 
2.719;  taxes  of,  2.718;  terrorism  of, 
1.334-339,  2.698,  4.298;  threat  of,  2.5, 
2.20,  2.23,  2.24,  2.31,  2.826;  trans- 
port system  of,  2.711;  underestima- 
tion of,  4.586;  in  urban  areas,  2.698; 
U.S.  intelligence  estimates  of,  1.266, 
3.175,  4.551;  weapon  losses,  2.773- 
778;  weapons  of,  3.736;  Gen.  West- 
moreland's assessment  of,  3.464.  See 
also  National  Liberation  Front;  VC/ 
NVA 

Viet  Minh:  1.42,  1.54,  1.392,  2.808;  anti- 
Japanese  resistance  of,  1.45;  areas  con- 
trolled by,  1.45,  1.123,  1.395,  2.93; 
armies  of,  2.22;  Chinese  Communist 
aid  to,  1.83,  1.97,  1.187;  and  Chinese 
Communist  advisors,  1.395;  Chinese 
Communist  support  of,  1.398,  1.437; 
and  Chinese  Nationalists,  1.46;  deploy- 
ment of,  1.193;  and  Diem,  1.329;  dis- 
tinguished from  Viet  Cong,  1.328; 
DRV  and,  1.45;  and  elections,  1.328, 
1.540;  and  Geneva  Accords,  1.173; 
and  Geneva  Conference,  1.549,  1.561; 
ground  force  strengths  of,  1.193,  1.401; 
guerrilla  action  of,  1.432;  ICP  control 
of,  1.47;  land  reform  under,  1.308; 
and  Lien  Viet,   1.46;  losses  at  Dien 


Gravel  Edition/Vol.  5 


Subject  Index/ 65 


Bien  Phu,  1.484;  national  appeal  of, 
1.395;  negotiated  settlement  with, 
1.379;  negotiations  with  French,  1.539; 
objectives  of,  1.492;  organization  of, 
1.295,  1.495;  and  Pathet  Lao,  1.119- 
120;  recruiting  of,  1.329;  regrouped  to 
NVN,  1.258,  1.328;  reprisals  of,  1.542; 
strength  of,  1.123,  1.397;  in  SVN, 
1.258,  1.328;  tactics  of,  1.495;  terrorist 
activity  of,  1.334;  in  Thailand,  1.393; 
U.S.  seven-point  program  and,  1.558. 
See  also  Viet  Nam  Doc  Lap;  Dong 
Minh  Hoi 

Viet  Minh  Resistance  Committee:  1.579 

Vietnam:  and  Asian  security,  4.656,  as 
Associated  State  of  the  French  Union, 
1.58;  bilateral  security  treaty  with, 
2.19;  chronology  of  withdrawal  from, 
1.204-209;  as  cork  in  the  bottle,  4.633; 
demarcation  line  proposals  for,  1.142- 
143,  1.146,  1.560,  1.572;  effects  of 
partition  on,  1.244;  elections  (see  All- 
Vietnam  elections);  formation  of, 
1.362;  French  withdrawal  from,  1.180, 
1.181,  1.285-286;  historic  development 
of,  1.292;  independence  of,  1.6,  1.40- 
41,  1.64,  1.593;  "line  of  chalk  cliffs" 
defensible  position  of,  1.533;  partition- 
ing of,  1.288,  1.531,  1.532,  1.535, 
1.539;  reform  parties  in,  1.43;  relations 
with  France,  1.189-190;  revolutionary 
parties  of,  1.43-44;  strategic  impor- 
tance of,  2.818;  theocratic  parties  in, 
1.43;  unification  of,  1.166,  1.284-285, 
3.362;  U.S.  involvement  in,  1.188,  and 
U.S.  national  security,  4.681.  See  also 
Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam; 
Government  of  Vietnam;  Republic  of 
South  Vietnam 

Vietnam  Coordinating  Committee 
(VNCC):  2.378,  3.212 

Viet  Nam  Doc  Lap  Dong  Minh  Hoi 
(League  for  the  Independence  of  Viet- 
nam): formation  of,  1.44 

Vietnamese  Armed  Psywar  Company: 
1.575  ^  ^ 

Vietnamese  Augmentation  to  U.S.  Army 
(VATSUSA):  2.401 

Vietnamese  Civic  Action:  2.640 

Vietnamese  Internal  Security  Council: 
2.355 

Vietnamese  Joint  General  Staff.  See  Joint 

General  Staff,  Vietnamese 
Vietnamese   Junk   Force:    2.39,  2.198, 

2.638;  MAP  support  for,  2.8.  See  also 

Junks 

Vietnamese    National    Army  (VNA): 


2.432,  4.543;  and  Diem,  1.230;  draft 
and,  1.491;  ethnic  composition  of, 
1.68;  force  levels  for,  1.216-217;  lo- 
gistics of,  1.493;  U.S.  training  of,  1.215 
Vietnamese  Nationalist  regime:  U.S.  rec- 
ognition of,  1.53;  and  Bao  Dai,  1.25 
Vietnamese  National  Party  (VNQDD): 

1.44,  1.49,  1.314-315,  2.536 
Vietnamese  Ranger  Force:  2.373,  2.653 
Vietnamese  Veterans  Legion:  2.648 
Vietnam  plebiscite.  See  All- Vietnam  elec- 
tions 

Vietnam  Quoc  Dan  Dang  (VNQDD). 

See  Vietnamese  National  Party 
Vietnam  Revolutionary  League  (Dong 

Minh  Hoi):  1.44 
"Vietnam  solution":  3.685 
Vietnam's  Presidential  Guard  Battalion: 

2.648 

Vietnam  Workers  Party  (Dang  Lao 
Dong):  1.328 

Village  Radio  System:  2.675-676 

Villages:  air  strikes  and,  2.723;  attitudes 
in,  2.718-719;  Communist  operations 
in,  2.96;  control  of,  2.462,  2.583; 
RVNAF  in,  4.578;  Special  Forces  in, 
2.724;  strategic,  2.674,  2.675,  2.676, 
2.681  (see  also  Strategic  Hamlet  Pro- 
gram); Viet  Cong  and,  2.655,  2.696, 
2.717;  young  males  in,  2.536.  See  also 
Peasants;  RD 

"Village  war."  See  Pacification 

Vinh  Bien:  3.26 

Vinh  Binh  Province:  2.686 

Vinh  Linh:  3.286 

Vinh  Long  Province:  2.150,  3.26 

Vinh  Thanh:  frontier  at,  4.567 

Vit  Thu  Lu  Army  Barracks:  as  target, 
3.298 

VMP:  4.543 

VNA.  See  Vietnamese  National  Army 
VNQDD.  See  Vietnamese  National  Party 
Vo  Dat:  4.567 

Voice  of  America  (VGA):  broadcast  of, 
2.235,  2.236,  2.245,  2.734,  2.743, 
2.763;  and  Diem  coup,  2.791 

Vu  Con  barracks:  3.325 

VungTau  Charter:  3.191 

Vung  Tau  training  centers:  2.568 

Wall  Street  Journal:  4.106 

War  effort:  as  albatross,  4.88;  Ameri- 
canization of,  2.478,  4.549,  4.564;  Wm. 
Bundy's  justification  of,  4.610,  4.668- 
669;  commitment  to,  4.558;  conditions 
for  success,  3.201;  conventional  stage 
of,    4.621;    dissension    on,  4.78-79, 


Subject  Index/66 

War  effort:  (cont'd) 

4.454;  domestic  criticism  of,  3.23, 
4.454-456;  domestic  reactions  to, 
4.174,  4.495_496,  4.499-500;  Eisen- 
hower administration's  justification  of, 
1.591-629;  financing  of  (1953-1954), 
1.408,  1.421,  4.339,  4.527,  4.557;  and 
GVN  assistance,  4.558;  implications 
of,  4.179;  Johnson  administration's  jus- 
tification of,  3.707-743,  4.626-684; 
justification  of,  2.415;  Kennedy  admin- 
istration's justification  of,  2.794-797; 
liberal  reaction  to,  4.560;  military 
judgment  and,  4.356;  progress  indica- 
tors and,  2.457,  2.755-756;  public  sup- 
port for,  2.578,  4.561;  reassessment  of, 
4.238-258,  4.549,  4.583,  4.604;  risk  of 
expanding,  1.466;  satisfactory  solution 
to,  1.451;  shifting  premises  of,  4.355; 
task  force  on,  2.576  (see  also  Task 
force);  Truman  administration's  jus- 
tification of,  1.587-591;  two  parts  of, 
4.397;  uncertainty  about,  4.585-586; 
unfavorable  trends  in,  2.770-780;  U.S. 
losses,  3.333-334  (see  also  Casualties); 
U.S.  objectives  and,  4.175;  and  U.S. 
options,  3.589,  3.599-601,  3.602,  3.604, 
3.659,  4.620;  views  on  end  of,  2.532, 
2.548,  2.595,  2.719,  4.348;  waste  in, 
2.575;  world  opinion  of,  2.742,  4.81. 
See  also  War  of  attrition 

Warfare:  advisory,  2.474  (see  also  Ad- 
visory effort);  counterinsurgency,  2.32 
(see  also  Counterinsurgency);  local, 
2.801;  unconventional,  2.641,  2.643- 
649,  2.682,  2.813.  See  also  Guerrilla 
warfare 

War  of  attrition:  2.725,  4.370,  4.371, 
4.509;  Katzenbach  on,  4.507 

Warrenton  Conference:  2.359,  2.517, 
2.539,  2.541,  2.542 

Wars  of  liberation:  2.35,  2.816,  3.710, 
3.731,  3.732,  3.733,  3.740,  4.632, 
4.633,  4.641,  4.643,  4.644,  4.646, 
4.653,  4.664,  4.666,  4.668;  McNamara's 
view  of,  3.712-715;  Soviet  support  of, 
2,22;  U.S.  attitude  toward,  2.660; 
Westmoreland  on,  4.405 

Wars  of  national  liberation.  See  Wars  of 
liberation 

War  zone  C:  4.571 

War  zone  D:  2.129,  2.139,  2.141,  4.571; 

ARVN  sweep  in,  2.138 
Washington  Daily  News,  The:  4.51 1 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

Washington  Evening  Star,  The:  2.555, 
2.557 

Washington  Post,  The:  2.613 

Washington  Star,  The:  4.389 

Waterways:  control  of,  2.90.  See  also 
Riverine  Assault  Forces 

Waves  of  Love:  2.720 

Weapons:  losses  of,  2.772,  2.773,  2.778; 
nuclear,  1.88,  1.466,  1.512,  2.322, 
3.65,  3.175,  3.238;  for  PARU  teams, 
2.645;  of  Thai  border  patrol,  2.645;  of 
Viet  Cong,  2.655,  2.696 

White  House  meeting:  of  April  1965, 
3.99;  of  September  1963,  2.235 

White  House  memorandum:  1.501-503 

White  House  statements:  on  McNamara- 
Taylor  Mission  Report,  2.187-188;  of 
October  1963,  2.161,  2.191,  2.196-197 

White  Lotus  sect:  2.823 

White  Star  teams:  in  Laos,  2.463,  2.464 

Win:  McNaughton's  definition  of,  4.293; 
Phase  II  concept  of,  4.302 

Wire:  stockpiling  of,  2.676 

Withdrawal:  abandonment  of,  2.278;  as 
alternative,  3.717-718;  chronology 
of,  2.165-173;  French,  1.542;  and 
Guam  Conference,  4.426;  as  issue  at 
Manila  Conference,  2.608;  of  1000 
troops,  2.190,  2.191-192,  2.193,  2.205, 
2.250,  2.251,  2.276,  2.316;  of  1000 
U.S.  advisors,  2.303;  phased,  2.278; 
political  effects  of,  4.611;  proposed  for 
1963,  2.752,  2.756,  2.770;  proposed  for 
1967,  4.504;  of  U.S.  dependents,  3.244, 
3.266,  3.288,  3.297,  3.306,  3.315, 
3.630,  3.686.  See  also  Phase-out  policy 

World  Culture:  1.170 

World  Federation:  Buddhist  Inquiry  Mis- 
sion from,  2.745 


Xa  Loi  pagoda:  raid  on,  2.232.  See  also 

Buddhist  crisis;  Pagoda  raids 
Xenophobia,  Indochinese:  1.431 
Xom  Hue  Hamlet:  2.144 

YANKEE  TEAM:  3.196,  3.253-254, 
3.291,  3.297;  disclosure  of,  3.264;  in 
Laos,  3.566-567,  3.575,  3.577,  3.608 

Yellow  Peril:  concept  of,  4.683 

Young  Turks:  2.279-280,  2.340,  2.342, 
2.346.  See  also  Armed  Forces  Council; 
Diem  coup 

Youth  Corps:  2.152.  See  also  RT> 


Glossary 


AA    Air  America;  also  antiaircraft 
AAA    Antiaircraft  artillery 
ABM    Antiballistic  Missile 
ABN  Airborne 
ACA    Asian  Communist  affairs 
ACR    Armored  cavalry  regiment 
ADP    Automatic  data  processing 
AFB    Air  Force  Base 
AFC    Armed  Forces  Council 
AID    Agency  for  International  Devel- 
opment 
AIROPS    Air  operations 
AM  Airmobile 

AMA    American  Medical  Association 

AMB  Ambassador 

ANG    Air  National  Guard 

ANZUS    Australia,      New  Zealand, 

United  States 
APB    Self-propelled  barracks  ship 
ARC    Administrative      and  Research 

Committee  (Viet  Minh) 
ARC  LIGHT    B-52  bombing  program 
ARL    Landing  craft  repair  ship 
ARVN    Army  of  the  Republic  of  (South) 

Vietnam 

ASA    (U.S.)  Army  Security  Agency 
ASAP    As  soon  as  possible 
ASD    Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense 
ASW    Antisubmarine  warfare 

BAR    Browning  automatic  rifle 
BARREL  ROLL    Code  name  for  U.S. 
bombing   operations   against  Laotian 
infiltration  routes  and  facilities 
BDE  Brigade 

Black  radio  In  psychological  warfare, 
broadcasts  by  one  side  that  are  dis- 
guised as  broadcasts  for  the  other 

"Blowtorch"  Nickname  given  Robert 
Komer  during  summer  of  1966  for  ap- 
plying great  pressure  to  both  the  Mis- 
sion and  Washington  agencies 

BLT    Battalion  landing  team 


BN  Battalion 
BOB    Bureau  of  the  Budget 
Bonze    Buddhist  monk 
BPP    Border  Patrol  Police 
B-52    U.S.  heavy  bomber 
B-57    U.S.  medium  bomber 


CAP  Combat  air  patrol;  also  prefix 
used  to  designate  White  House  cable- 
grams sent  through  CIA  channel;  also 
Country  Assistance  Program,  of  AID 
CAPs  Combined  action  platoons 
CAS  Covert  action  branch,  Saigon  of- 
fice of  the  U.S.  Central  Intelligence 
Agency.  Term  also  applied  to  CIA  in 
Laos 

CAT    Civil  Air  Transport,  airline  based 

on  Taiwan 
CBU-24    Type  of  cluster  bomb 
CCAF    Communist  Chinese  Air  Force 
CDC    Combat  Development  Command 
CDIG    Civilian      Irregular  Defense 

Groups 

CEF    French  Expeditionary  Corps 
CFD    Conference  final  declaration  (Ge- 
neva Conference,  1954) 
CG    Civil  Guard 
CHICOM    Chinese  Communist 
CHINAT    Chinese  Nationalist 
CHMAAG    Chief,   Military  Assistance 

Advisory  Group 
CI  Counterinsurgency 
CI  Course    Counterinsurgency  course 
CIA    Central  Intelligence  Agency 
CIAP    Inter-American    Committee  for 

the  Alliance  for  Progress 
CIDG    Civilian      Irregular  Defense 
Groups 

CINCPAC    Commander  in  Chief,  Pa- 
cific 

CINCPACAF    Commander    in  Chief, 
Pacific  Air  Force 


Glossary /6S 

CINCPACFLT  Commander  in  Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet 

CINCRVNAF  Commander  in  Chief, 
RepubHc  of  Vietnam  Armed  Forces 

CINCSTRIKE  Commander  in  Chief, 
Strike  Command 

CIO  Central  Intelligence  Organization 
(South  Vietnam) 

CIP  Counterinsurgency  Plan;  also 
Commodity  Import  Program 

CJCS    Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

CMD    Capital  Military  District 

CNO  VNN  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Vietnamese  Navy 

COMUS    U.S.  Commander 

COMUSMACV  Commander,  U.S.  Mili- 
tary Assistance  Command,  Vietnam 

CONARC  Continental  Army  Com- 
mand 

CON  US    Continental  United  States 
COPROR    Committee  on  Province  Re- 
habilitation 
CORDS    Civil  Operations  and  Revolu- 
tionary Development  Support 

I  Corps  Military  region,  comprising  the 
five  northern  provinces  of  South  Viet- 
nam 

II  Corps  Military  region  in  South  Viet- 
nam, comprising  the  Central  High- 
lands and  Central  Coastal  area 

III  Corps  Military  region  in  South 
Vietnam,  comprising  the  provinces  sur- 
rounding Saigon 

IV  Corps  Military  region,  comprising 
southern  Vietnam 

COS  Chief  of  station,  CIA  country 
team 

COSVN  Council  of  senior  U.S.  officials 
in  South  Vietnam,  including  ambas- 
sador. Commander  of  American  forces, 
CIA  chief,  and  others 

Country  team  Council  of  senior  U.S. 
officials  in  South  Vietnam,  including 
ambassador,  commander  of  American 
forces,  CIA  chief,  and  others 

CPR    Chinese  People's  Republic 

CPSVN  Comprehensive  Plan  for  South 
Vietnam 

CSS    Combat  Service  Support 

CTZ    Corps  tactical  zone 

CVA    Aircraft  carrier 

CY    Calendar  Year 

C-123    U.S.  transport  aircraft 


DASD    Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

DCM    Deputy  Chief  of  Mission 
DCPG    Defense    Command  Planning 
Group 

DDR&E    Director  of  Defense  Research 

and  Engineering 
Deptel    (State)  Department  telegram 
DeSoto  patrols    U.S.  destroyer  patrols 

in  Tonkin  Gulf 
DIA    Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
DMZ    Demilitarized  Zone 
Doc  Document 
DOD    Department  of  Defense 
DPM    Draft  presidential  memo 
DRV    Democratic  Republic  of  (North) 

Vietnam 
DTA    Divisional  tactical  area 
DTZ    Misprint  for  CTZ 
DULTE    Cable  identifier,  from  Geneva 

to  State  Department 

E  and  E    Escape  and  evasion 

EA  Bureau  of  East  Asian  Affairs  in  the 
State  Department 

ECA  Economic  Cooperation  Adminis- 
tration 

ECM    Electronic  countermeasures 
EDC    European  Defense  Community 
Embtel    U.S.  embassy  telegram 
EPTEL    Apparently  a  typographical  er- 
ror for  Deptel  or  Septel 
ERP    European  Recovery  Plan 
EXDIS    Exclusive  (high  level)  distribu- 
tion 

FAF    French  Air  Force 

FAL    Forces  Armees  Laotiennes  (Lao 

Armed  Forces) 
FAR   Forces   Armees   Royales  (Royal 

Armed  Forces  of  Laos) 
FARMGATE    Clandestine     U.S.  Air 

Force  strike  unit  in  Vietnam  (1964) 
FE  and  FEA    Bureau  of  Far  Eastern 

Affairs  in  the  State  Department 
FEC    French  Expeditionary  Corps 
FFORCEV    Headquarters  Field  Force, 

Vietnam 

FLAMING  DART    Code  name  for  re- 
prisal actions  for  attacks  on  U.S.  in- 
stallations 
FLASH  message    Urgent  telegram 
FOA    Foreign    Operations  Administra- 
tion 

FW    Free  World 

FWMA    Free  World  Military  Assistance 
FWMAF    Free  World  Military  Assist- 
ance Forces 
FY    Fiscal  year 


Gravel  Edition/ Vol.  5 

FYI  For  your  information 
F-105    U.S.  fighter-bomber 

GAM    Groupes  Administratifs  Mobiles 

GNP    Gross  national  product 

GOP    U.S.  Republican  Party 

GRC    Government  of  the  Republic  of 

China  (Nationalist  China) 
GVN    Government  of  (South)  Vietnam 
G-3    U.S.  Army  General  Staff  branch 

handling  plans  and  operations 

Hardnose    Code  name  for  a  CIA  oper- 
ation in  the  Laos  corridor 
HES    Hamlet  Evaluation  System 
HNC    High  National  Council  of  SVN 
Hop  Tac  plan    operation  planned  to 
clear  and  hold  Saigon  and  its  sur- 
roundings, 1964 
HQ  Headquarters 

HSAS  Headquarters  Support  Activity 
Saigon 

lAP    Immediate  Action  Program 
IBP    International  Balance  of  Payments 
ICA    International  Cooperation  Admin- 
istration 

ICC  International  Control  Commission 
for  Vietnam,  Laos 

ICEX  InteUigence  Coordination  and 
Exploitation 

ICP    Indochinese  Communist  Party 

IDA    Institute  for  Defense  Analyses 

IG    Inspector  General 

IMCSH  Interministerial  Committee  for 
Strategic  Hamlets 

IMF    International  Monetary  Fund 

INR  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Re- 
search in  the  Department  of  State  and 
CIA 

in  ref.    in  reference  to 

ISA  International  Security  Agency;  also 
Office  of  International  Security  Affairs 
in  the  Department  of  Defense 

ISI    Initial  support  increment 

IVRC  Interzone  V  Regional  Commit- 
tee 

ICS    Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
JCSM    Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Memoran- 
dum 

JFK  John  Fitzgerald  Kennedy,  U.S. 
President 

JGS    Vietnamese  Joint  General  Staff 
JOC    Joint  US-GVN  Operations  Center 
y    Joint  Chiefs    Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 


Glossary/ 69 

Joint  Staff    Staff  organization  for  the 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
JTD    Joint  Table  of  Distribution 
Jungle  Jim     Aerial  commando  opera- 
tions 

JUSPAC    Joint  United  States  Public  Af- 
fairs Office,  Saigon 
J-2    Intelligence  Branch,  U.S.  Army 
J-3    Operations  Branch,  U.S.  Army 

KANZUS     Korean,    Australian,  New 

Zealand,  and  United  States 
KIA    Killed  in  action 
KMT  Kuomintang 

LANTFLT    Atlantic  Fleet 
Lao  Dong    Communist  party  of  North 
Vietnam 

LBJ    Lyndon  Baines  Johnson,  U.S.  Presi- 
dent 

Liberation  Front     National  Liberation 
Front 

LIMDIS    Limited  distribution 

LOC    Lines  of  communication  (roads, 

bridges,  rails) 
LST    Tank  Landing  Ship 
LTC    Lt.  Colonel 

MAAG    Military    Assistance  Advisory 
Group 

MAB    Marine  Amphibious  Brigade 
MAC    Military  Assistance  Command 
MACCORDS    Military  Assistance  Com- 
mand, Civil  Operations  and  Revolu- 
tionary Development  Support 
MACV    Military  Assistance  Command, 
Vietnam 

MAF    Marine  Amphibious  Force 
MALTS    Mobile     Advisory  Logistics 
Teams 

MAP    Military  Assistance  Program 
Marigold    Code  name  for  peace  talk 
feelers  put  out  by  North  Vietnam 
through  Poles,  November  1966 
Marops    Maritime  operations 
MATs    Mobile  Advisory  Teams 
MAYFLOWER    Code  name  for  bomb- 
ing pause 

MDAP    Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Pro- 
gram 

MDP    Movement  for  the  Defense  of 
Peace 

MEB    Marine  Expeditionary  Brigade 
MEDCAP    Medical  Civil  Action  Pro- 
gram 

MEF    Marine  Expeditionary  Force 


Glossary /1 0 

MIA    Missing  in  action 

MIG  Soviet  fighter  aircraft  (Mikoyan 
i  Gurevich) 

MOD    Minister  of  Defense 

MORD  Ministry  of  Revolutionary  De- 
velopment 

MRC  Military  Revolutionary  Commit- 
tee (or  Council);  Ministry  of  Rural 
Construction 

MRF    Mobile  Riverine  Force 

MR5    Highland  Area 

NATO  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organi- 
zation 

NCO    Noncommissioned  officer 
NFLSV    National  Front  for  the  Liber- 
ation of  South  Vietnam 
NIE    National  Intelligence  Estimates 
NLF    National    Liberation    Front  (of 

South  Vietnam) 
NMCB    Navy  mobile  construction  bat- 
talion 

NMCC  National  Military  Command 
and  Control  (System) 

NNSC  Neutral  Nations  Supervisory 
Commission 

NODIS  No  distribution  (beyond  ad- 
dressee) 

NRC    Nambo  Regional  Committee 
NRM    National    Revolutionary  Move- 
ment (Phong  Trao  Cacli  Mang  Quae 
Gia) 

NSA    National  Security  Agency 
NSAM    National  Security  Action  Mem- 
orandum 
NSC    National  Security  Council 
NVA    North  Vietnamese  Army 
NVN    Democratic  People's  Republic  of 
(North)  Vietnam 

O&M    Operations  and  Management 

OASD  Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  Defense 

OB  (Enemy)  Order  of  Battle;  also  Op- 
eration Brotherhood 

OCB  Operations  Control  Board,  Oper- 
ations Coordinating  Board 

OCO  Office  of  Civil  Operations  (pacifi- 
cation) 

OEEC    Organization  for  European  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation 
Opcon    Operations  Control 
Oplan    Operations  plan 
Ops  Operations 

OSA  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Army 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

OSD  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
OSS    Office  of  Strategic  Services 

PACFLT    Pacific  Fleet 

PACOM    Pacific  Command 

PAD    Public  Administration  Division 

Para  Paragraph 

PARU    Police  Aerial  Resupply  Unit 
PAT    Political  Action  Team 
PAVN    People's  Army  of  (North)  Viet- 
nam 

PB    Planning  Board 

PBR    River  patrol  boat 

PCF    French  Communist  Party 

PDI    Plaine  des  Jarres,  Laos 

PDM    See  DPM 

Peiping  Peking 

PEO    Program  Evaluation  Office 
PF    Popular  Forces 
PFF    Police  Field  Force 
PI    Philippine  Islands 
PL    Pathet  Lao 

PNG    Provisional  National  Government 
POC    Peace  Observation  Committee  of 
the  UN 

POL    Petroleum,  oil,  lubricants 
POLAD    Political  adviser,  usually  State 

Department  representative,  assigned  to 

a  military  commander 
PriMin  Prime  Minister 
PROVN  Study    Study  of  the  Priorities 

Task  Force  in  Saigon 
PRP    People's     Revolutionary  Party, 

Communist  element  in  the  NLF 
PRV    People's  Republic  of  Vietnam 
Psyops    Psychological  operations 
PTF    Fast  patrol  boat 
P-2V    U.S.  patrol  aircraft 

QTE  Quote 

RAND  Rand  Corporation  (research  or- 
ganization) 

RAS    River  assault  squadron 

RCT    Regimental  Combat  Team 

RD  Revolutionary  Development;  also 
Rural  Development 

R&D    Research  and  Development 

RECCE  Reconnaissance 

Reclama  Protest  against  a  cut  in  budget 
or  program 

REF  Reference,  meaning  "the  docu- 
ment referred  to" 

Reftel  In  reference  to  your  telegram,  or 
telegram  referred  to 


Gravel  Edition/Vol  5 

RF    Regional  Forces 
RFK    Robert  F.  Kennedy 
RF/PF    Regional  Forces/Popular  Forces 
RLAF    Royal  Laotian  Air  Force 
RLG    Royal  Laotian  Government 
RLT    Regimental  Landing  Team 
ROK    Republic  of  (South)  Korea 
ROLLING  THUNDER    Code  name  for 

sustained  bombing  operations  against 

North  Vietnam 
Rpt  Repeat 

RSM    Robert  S.  McNamara 

RSSZ    Rungsat  Special  Zone 

RT    ROLLING  THUNDER  Program 

RTA    Royal  Thai  Army 

RT-28    Name  of  U.S.  aircraft 

RVN    Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam 

RVNAF    Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam 

Air  or  Armed  Forces 
RVNF    Republic  of  (South)  Vietnam 

forces 

SA  Systems  Analysis  Office  in  the  De- 
partment of  Defense 

SA-2    Russian  surface-to-air  missile 

SAC    Strategic  Air  Command 

SACSA  Special  Assistant  to  the  ICS  for 
Counterinsurgency  and  Special  (cov- 
ert) Activities 

SAM    Surface-to-air  missile 

SAME    Senior  Advisors  Monthly  Report 

SAR    Search  and  rescue 

S-day    (Bombing)  strike  day 

SDC    Self  Defense  Corps 

SEA    Southeast  Asia 

SEAAPC  Southeast  Asia  Aid  Policy 
Committee 

SEACABIN  "Study  of  the  Political- 
Military  Implications  in  Southeast  Asia 
of  the  Cessation  of  Aerial  Bombard- 
ment and  the  Initiation  of  Negotia- 
tions," Joint  Staff  and  ISA  Study 

SEACOOR  Southeast  Asia  Coordinat- 
ing Committee 

SEACORD  Coordinating  mechanism  of 
U.S.  ambassadors  and  military  com- 
manders in  Southeast  Asia 

SEA  DRAGON  Naval  surface  opera- 
tions against  North  Vietnam 

SEATO  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organi- 
zation 

SecArmy    Secretary  of  the  Army 

SecDef    Secretary  of  Defense 

SECTO    Cable  identifier,  to  Secretary 

of  State  from  overseas  post 
Septel    Separate  telegram 
S-hour    (Bombing)  strike  hour 


Glossary /I  \ 

SIAT    Single  Integrated  Attack  Team 
Sitrep    Situation  Report 
SMM    Saigon  Mihtary  Mission 
SNIE    Special  National  Intelligence  Esti- 
mate 

Soldiers  of  Geneva  Untrained  members 
of  Viet  Minh  units  regrouped  to  DRV 
after  Geneva  Accords 

SpeCat  Top  Secret  Special  Category  (of 
reports,  messages,  etc.) 

SQD  Squadron 

SSI    Sustaining  support  increment 
State    U.S.  State  Department 
STC    Security  Training  Center 
STRAF    Strategic  Army  Force 
SUSREPS    Senior  U.S.  representatives 
SVN    South  Vietnam 
SVNese    South  Vietnamese 

TACS    Tactical  Air  Control  System 

TAOR    Tactical  area  of  responsibility 

TCS    Tactical  Control  System 

TDY    Temporary  duty 

TEDUL  Cable  identifier.  State  Depart- 
ment to  Geneva 

TERM  Temporary  Equipment  Recov- 
ery Mission 

Tet  Lunar  new  year;  also  1968  offen- 
sive during  Tet 

TF    Task  force 

TFS    Tactical  Fighter  Squadron 

Theater  CINC  A  resources  allocation 
committee  chaired  by  the  AID  Mission 
Director,  and  a  MACV  advisory  struc- 
ture partially  under  the  Ambassador 
and  partially  separate 

34A  1964  operations  plan  covering  cov- 
ert actions  against  North  Vietnam 

TO&E  Table  of  organization  and  equip- 
ment (for  a  military  unit) 

TOSEC  Cable  identifier,  from  State  De- 
partment to  overseas  post 

Triangle  Code  name  for  an  allied  op- 
eration not  otherwise  identified  in  the 
documents 

TRIM  Training  Relations  and  Instruc- 
tion Mission 

TRS    Tactical  Reconnaissance  Squadron 

T-28  Name  of  U.S.  fighter-bomber  (pro- 
vided for  use  of  Southeast  Asian  gov- 
ernments) 

UD    Unilateral    declaration  (Geneva 

Conference,  1954) 
UE    Unit  equipment  allowance 
UH-1    U.S.  helicopter 
UK    United  Kingdom 


Glossary /12 

UN    United  Nations 
UNO    United  Nations  Organization 
UNQTE  Unquote 
URTEL    Your  telegram 
USAF    United  States  Air  Force 
USARAL    United  States  Army,  Alaska 
USAREUR    United  States  Army,  Eu- 
rope 

USARPAC  United  States  Army,  Pacific 
USASGV    United  States  Army  Support 

Group,  Vietnam 
USCINCPAC    See  CINCPAC 
use    United  States  Government 
USIA    United       States  Information 

Agency 

USIB    United  States  Intelligence  Board 
USIS    United  States  Information  Serv- 
ice 

USOM  United  States  Operations  Mis- 
sion (U.S.  economic  aid  apparatus  in 
Saigon) 

USSR  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics 

UW    Unconventional  warfare 


VATSUA    Vietnamese  Augmentation  to 

U.S.  Army 
VC    Viet  Cong 


The  Pentagon  Papers 

VM    Viet  Minh 
VN  Vietnam 

VNA  Vietnamese  National  Army  (old 
term) 

VNAF    (South)  Vietnamese  Air  Force 

or  Armed  Forces 
VNese  Vietnamese 

VNQDD  Pre-independence,  nationalis- 
tic Vietnamese  political  party  (Viet- 
nam Quoc  Dan  Dong) 

VNSF  (South)  Vietnamese  Special 
Forces 

VOA    Voice  of  America 

WALLEYE    Guided  bomb 

WESTPAC    Western  Pacific  Command 

Westy  Nickname  for  General  William 
C.  Westmoreland 

White  radio  In  psychological  warfare, 
broadcasts  admitted  by  the  side  trans- 
mitting them 

WIA    Wounded  in  action 

W/T  Walkie-talkie 

YAK-28    Soviet  aircraft 

Yankee  Team    Phase  of  the  Indochina 

bombing  operation 
YT    See  Yankee  Team 


Beacon  Paperback  430— National  AflFairs,  Political  Science 

THE  SENATOR  GRAVEL  EDITION/tHE  PENTAGON  PAPERS 

CRITICAL  ESSAYS 

edited  by  Noam  Chomsky  and  Howard  Zinn 
and  an  Index  to  Volumes  One-Four 

VOLUME  FIVE 

T'  "  I  he  release,  the  publication,  and  the  legal 
cases  surrounding  the  Pentagon  Papers 
have  attracted  enormous  attention  and  yet 
the  war  in  Indochina  goes  on.  Today  deci- 
,  I  sions  are  made  in  Washington  by  a  new 

administration  which  mirror  almost  exactly  the  decision- 
making processes  so  vividly  displayed  in  the  Pentagon 
Papers. 

Despite  the  publicity,  the  contents  of  the  Pentagon  Papers 
have  not  yet  been  fully  appreciated.  To  help  correct  this 
situation,  Noam  Chomsky  and  Howard  Zinn  invited  a  group 
of  scholars  and  journalists  to  analyze  the  Pentagon  Papers 
and  to  define  various  aspects  of  this  extraordinary  archive. 

"The  Senator  Gravel  edition  contains  most  of  the  narrative 
from  the  original,  including  those  parts  excised  by  the 
Pentagon  censor  from  the  Government  edition.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Gravel  edition  includes  only  one-fourth  as  many 
documents  as  the  Government  edition,  but— to  complicate 
the  issue  further— many  of  the  documents  in  the  Gravel 
edition  appear  never  to  have  been  part  of  the  original  study. 

"  What  then  is  the  historian  to  do?  He  must  use  both  of  the 
large  collections,  filling  the  gaps  in  one  with  material  in 
the  other.  This  process  of  collation  will,  incidentally,  reveal 
what  the  Pentagon  most  wanted  to  conceal  before  releasing 
its  edition.  The  appearance  of  the  uncensored  Gravel  edition 
made  the  Government's  hasty  censorship  futile  and, 
indeed,  quite  stupid.  No  better  way  could  be  devised  to 
advertise  exactly  what  the  Government  wanted  to  suppress." 
—Caddis  Smith  in  The  New  York  Times  Book  Review 

BEACON  PRESS  BOSTON 


BP  430  $5.00 

Cover  designed  by  Richard  C.  Bartlett 
^  ISBN  0-8070-0523-1